- TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org

TF-A Tech Forum Agenda @ Thr 8th October 2020 16:00-1700 BST

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 8th October 2020 16:00 – 17:00 (BST). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. Agenda: * Measured Boot Support in TF-A * Presented by Alexei Fedorov and Javier Almansa Sobrino * Update on the support for Measured Boot in TF-A along with an overview of test cases for integration with a TPM service * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions If TF-A contributors have anything they wish to present at any future TF-A tech forum please contact me to have that scheduled. Previous sessions, both recording and presentation material can be found on the trustedfirmware.org TF-A Technical meeting webpage: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ A scheduling tracking page is also available to help track sessions suggested and being prepared: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a-tech-forum-scheduling/ Final decisions on what will be presented will be shared a few days before the next meeting and shared on the TF-A mailing list. Thanks Joanna

5 years, 2 months

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TF-A image construction

by rkohli2000 gmail

Hi, Sorry for the wide distribution and if this isn't the appropriate board. I'm interested in TF-A image construction for the i.MX8QM SoC platform and basic image construction instructions. I'd like to understand how to deploy a user application for the Cortex-A53 core and flash image construction. For example, how to deploy BL31.bin and launch a user app for the platform and what does the following TF-A console log imply for user apps: INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 Any intro info is appreciated. Thanks again. Regards Ravi

5 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF

by Olivier Deprez

Hi Sandeep, Here are a few more details. The reasoning differs when considering pre-Armv8.4 platforms (1) vs Armv8.4 platforms onwards with secure virtualization enabled (2). Case (1): EHF framework unifies EL3 exceptions delivered via different vectors and allows them to be handled in a common way. It is also allowing exception delegation handling to lower secure ELs. This framework although primarily used for RAS, is also used for SDEI and platform EL3 interrupts. EL3's role in this case is about trapping and routing the event to appropriate the component (when the interrupt/exception is not handled solely at EL3). The interoperability between EHF and a Trusted OS is not accurately defined apart from this guidance in EHF documentation: "In order for S-EL1 software to handle Non-secure interrupts while having EHF enabled, the dispatcher must adopt a model where Non-secure interrupts are received at EL3, but are then synchronously handled over to S-EL1." Until then for the specific RAS handling scenario, this was delegated to a StandaloneMM partition running at S-EL0 (through the SPM-MM implementation) and not necessarily delegated to a TOS. In order to better help you, we would need more information on the scenario you intend to achieve, and the environment (Arm architecture version and extensions, GIC version). Or maybe your question was out of curiosity for the longer term approach (2) as described below? Case (2): As a general rule, it is preferred that EL3 reduces its footprint and minimises platform specific handling code. EHF framework would most probably not be enabled at all. The priority logic provided by the GIC PMR register to mask NS interrupts cannot really work as before because all of trusted EL3/S-EL2 and untrusted S-EL1 SPs can manipulate this register. Any secure/non-secure interrupt triggered while running SEL1/SEL0 is trapped first by the S-EL2 firmware (or the so-called SPMC). This translates into SCR_EL3.FIQ/IRQ=0 in the secure world. Group1NS interrupts are redirected to SPMD for routing to NWd. A Group0 interrupt is possibly redirected to a platform driver into an S-EL1 secure partition (e.g. a RAS handling service). Hence it does no longer hold true that Group0 interrupts are necessarily qualified as "EL3 interrupts". It is still possible to redirect Group0 interrupts from S-EL2 to EL3 and be handled there, but as said, this is a less preferred approach. Either way when NWd runs (with SCR_EL3.FIQ=1/IRQ=0), a Group1S/Group0 secure interrupt is trapped at EL3 and routed to SPMD then SPMC. The SPMC can take the decision to resume the secure partition which registered the corresponding secure INTID. This design does mean that SDEI interrupt handling would need SPMC and BL31 collaboration and this is something we are working on. Hope this helps. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Olivier Deprez via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 28 September 2020 14:01 To: Sandeep Tripathy; Soby Mathew Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF Hi Sandeep, Your question is very valid and we're discussing options internally. We will come back to you with a consolidated answer shortly. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: Sandeep Tripathy Sent: Monday, September 28, 2020 05:28 To: Soby Mathew Cc: Dan Handley; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd; Olivier Deprez Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF Thanks Soby and Dan for confirmation on TSPD. I can see a few more gaps in the related area. "The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC i.e. any execution context for that matter ". This should apply to all SPDs including SPMD. However I learned from @Oliver that SPMD/SPMC design traps FIQs to S_EL2. In that case a RAS interrupt can be masked by S_EL2 software (eg: Hafnium). Probably by design it will be ensured that S_EL2 will never mask the physical FIQ ? S_EL2 FIQ handler will exit to EL3/SPMD by SMC call. And depending on the pending interrupt type either it can exit to NWd OR invoke el3 fiq vector handler synchronously ? Are there limitations if we trap fiq to EL3 instead ? Thanks Sandeep On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:26 PM Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> wrote: > > Hi Sandeep > > > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECUE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). > > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC. Hence the usage of GIC PMR to mask the NS interrupts. As Dan says, the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT predates the EHF design and it seems there is a problem as you describe. > > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > You are right. Routing model manipulation is not required when EL3 interrupts are present as GIC PMR manipulation should take care of the required behaviour for yielding vs atomic SMC. You also need to ensure it works as expected when EL3 interrupts are not enabled and when EHF is disabled. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > > Tripathy via TF-A > > Sent: 17 September 2020 16:53 > > To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF > > > > Hi Dan, > > I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think > > EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs > > and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. > > If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf- > > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > > A correction... > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan > > > > Handley via TF-A > > > > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > > > > depending on > > > > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > > > > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the > > TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 > > > > case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a > > > > yielding SMC in S- EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to > > follow? > > > > > > > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are > > routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing > > over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to > > ehf_allow_ns_preemption. > > > > > > > Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts > > and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. > > But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is > > happening in TSPD. > > > > > Dan. > > > > > > -- > > > TF-A mailing list > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 2 months

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 3 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 defect(s), reported by Coverity Scan earlier, were marked fixed in the recent build analyzed by Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 3 of 3 defect(s) ** CID 362943: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 362943: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) /common/fdt_fixup.c: 437 in fdt_adjust_gic_redist() 431 432 /* 433 * The redistributor is described in the second "reg" entry. 434 * So we have to skip one address and one size cell, then another 435 * address cell to get to the second size cell. 436 */ >>> CID 362943: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted variable "sc * 4" to a tainted sink. 437 return fdt_setprop_inplace_namelen_partial(dtb, offset, "reg", 3, 438 (ac + sc + ac) * 4, 439 val, sc * 4); ** CID 362942: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /common/fdt_fixup.c: 428 in fdt_adjust_gic_redist() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 362942: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /common/fdt_fixup.c: 428 in fdt_adjust_gic_redist() 422 } 423 424 if (sc == 1) { 425 redist_size_32 = cpu_to_fdt32(nr_cores * gicr_frame_size); 426 val = &redist_size_32; 427 } else { >>> CID 362942: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) >>> Potentially overflowing expression "nr_cores * gicr_frame_size" with type "unsigned int" (32 bits, unsigned) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "uint64_t" (64 bits, unsigned). 428 redist_size_64 = cpu_to_fdt64(nr_cores * gicr_frame_size); 429 val = &redist_size_64; 430 } 431 432 /* 433 * The redistributor is described in the second "reg" entry. ** CID 362941: Integer handling issues (BAD_SHIFT) /mbedtls/library/bignum.c: 1713 in mbedtls_int_div_int() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 362941: Integer handling issues (BAD_SHIFT) /mbedtls/library/bignum.c: 1713 in mbedtls_int_div_int() 1707 * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 1708 */ 1709 s = mbedtls_clz( d ); 1710 d = d << s; 1711 1712 u1 = u1 << s; >>> CID 362941: Integer handling issues (BAD_SHIFT) >>> In expression "u0 >> 64UL - s", right shifting by more than 63 bits has undefined behavior. The shift amount, "64UL - s", is 64. 1713 u1 |= ( u0 >> ( biL - s ) ) & ( -(mbedtls_mpi_sint)s >> ( biL - 1 ) ); 1714 u0 = u0 << s; 1715 1716 d1 = d >> biH; 1717 d0 = d & uint_halfword_mask; 1718 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

5 years, 2 months

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STM32MP1: Adding TF-A causes kernel errors

by Jan Kiszka

Hi Yann, not sure if TF-A is the one to blame, but it's the variable that triggers the following on the STM32MP15x eval board for me. I think I'm following tfa/docs/plat/stm32mp1.rst and u-boot/doc/board/st/stm32mp1.rst correctly. Working: - U-Boot 2020.07, stm32mp15_basic_defconfig - Linux 5.9-rc7 (or 5.4.x), defconfig [ 0.000000] Memory: 815540K/917500K available (13312K kernel code, 1800K rwdata, 5452K rodata, 2048K init, 407K bss, 36424K reserved, 65536K cma-reserved, 196604K highmem) Failing: - TF-A 2.3, PLAT=stm32mp1 ARCH=aarch32 ARM_ARCH_MAJOR=7 \ AARCH32_SP=sp_min STM32MP_SDMMC=1 STM32MP_EMMC=1 STM32MP_RAW_NAND=1 \ STM32MP_SPI_NAND=1 STM32MP_SPI_NOR=1 DTB_FILE_NAME=stm32mp157c-ev1.dtb - U-Boot 2020.07, stm32mp15_trusted_defconfig - Linux as above [ 0.000000] Memory: 881076K/917500K available (13312K kernel code, 1800K rwdata, 5452K rodata, 2048K init, 407K bss, 4294938184K reserved, 65536K cma-reserved, 262140K highmem) which causes issues like [ 0.047215] BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/0 pfn:fa000 [ 0.047236] page:(ptrval) refcount:0 mapcount:-128 mapping:00000000 index:0x1 pfn:0xfa000 [ 0.047249] flags: 0x80000000() CMA [ 0.047273] raw: 80000000 e7f29004 e7f49004 00000000 00000001 0000000b ffffff7f 00000000 [ 0.047281] page dumped because: nonzero mapcount [ 0.047287] Modules linked in: [ 0.047305] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc7 #1 [ 0.047314] Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) [ 0.047358] [<c0311708>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030b88c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 0.047384] [<c030b88c>] (show_stack) from [<c0718a40>] (dump_stack+0xc8/0xdc) [ 0.047408] [<c0718a40>] (dump_stack) from [<c047b3c8>] (bad_page+0xdc/0x10c) [ 0.047426] [<c047b3c8>] (bad_page) from [<c047c060>] (__free_pages_ok+0x2e8/0x36c) [ 0.047447] [<c047c060>] (__free_pages_ok) from [<c1623a80>] (init_cma_reserved_pageblock+0x58/0x68) [ 0.047469] [<c1623a80>] (init_cma_reserved_pageblock) from [<c16266c8>] (cma_init_reserved_areas+0x170/0x1c8) [ 0.047491] [<c16266c8>] (cma_init_reserved_areas) from [<c0301ef8>] (do_one_initcall+0x54/0x22c) [ 0.047513] [<c0301ef8>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c160102c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x188/0x1ec) [ 0.047537] [<c160102c>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c0f4a340>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x118) [ 0.047559] [<c0f4a340>] (kernel_init) from [<c03001a8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) [ 0.047570] Exception stack(0xe68b7fb0 to 0xe68b7ff8) [ 0.047584] 7fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.047600] 7fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.047614] 7fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 [ 0.047624] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Still, the system boots, and I can login. That reserved value the kernel finds is obviously off. Does it come from TF-A, is U-Boot causing this in the presence of TF-A, or is the kernel itself getting it wrong? Or am I missing some switch that is not in the kernel defconfig? Thanks, Jan

5 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Tests to verify BP_OPTION

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi, tf-a-tests\tftf\tests\extensions\pauth\test_pauth.c will test fvp-pauth-pac-ret-leaf-sdei,fvp-pauth-standard:fvp-tftf-fip.tftf-aemv8a.8_5-debug fvp-pauth-pac-ret-leaf-tsp-sdei,fvp-pauth-standard:fvp-tftf-fip.tftf-aemv8a.8_5-debug CI configurations. Alexei Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 23 September 2020 18:25 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Tests to verify BP_OPTION Hi, Is there any test to verify the BP_OPTION feature set to “pac-ret+leaf” ? When BRANCH_PROTECTION is set to “3”, BP_OPTION is set to “pac-ret+leaf”. Reference code - https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/Makefile Thanks, Kalyani

5 years, 2 months

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a80x0_mcbin doesn't build with recommended mv-ddr-marvell

by Jan Kiszka

Hi all, docs/plat/marvell/armada/build.rst says that you should use branch mv_ddr-armada-atf-mainline from [1]. But that no longer works with tf-a master. The mv-ddr-devel branch builds fine (didn't run the result, though). make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- PLAT=a80x0_mcbin \ USE_COHERENT_MEM=0 MV_DDR_PATH=.../mv-ddr-marvell/ \ SCP_BL2=.../mrvl_scp_bl2.img Are there plans to update the tf-a doc or rather refresh that branch? Jan [1] https://github.com/MarvellEmbeddedProcessors/mv-ddr-marvell.git

5 years, 2 months

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Nailgun

by Varun Wadekar

Hi, Recently, I learned about Nailgun [1] - leak information by snooping across privilege boundaries with the help of CoreSight. The proof of concept uses Raspberry Pi3 (uses Cortex A-53 CPUs) platform to demonstrate the exploit. Has anyone reviewed this attack and does it affect other Arm v8 CPUs too? Do we have support in TF-A to disable CoreSight to mitigate against such attacks? Are there any other mitigations against this attack? -Varun [1] https://github.com/ningzhenyu/nailgun

5 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF

by Olivier Deprez

Hi Sandeep, Your question is very valid and we're discussing options internally. We will come back to you with a consolidated answer shortly. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: Sandeep Tripathy Sent: Monday, September 28, 2020 05:28 To: Soby Mathew Cc: Dan Handley; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd; Olivier Deprez Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF Thanks Soby and Dan for confirmation on TSPD. I can see a few more gaps in the related area. "The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC i.e. any execution context for that matter ". This should apply to all SPDs including SPMD. However I learned from @Oliver that SPMD/SPMC design traps FIQs to S_EL2. In that case a RAS interrupt can be masked by S_EL2 software (eg: Hafnium). Probably by design it will be ensured that S_EL2 will never mask the physical FIQ ? S_EL2 FIQ handler will exit to EL3/SPMD by SMC call. And depending on the pending interrupt type either it can exit to NWd OR invoke el3 fiq vector handler synchronously ? Are there limitations if we trap fiq to EL3 instead ? Thanks Sandeep On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:26 PM Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> wrote: > > Hi Sandeep > > > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECUE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). > > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC. Hence the usage of GIC PMR to mask the NS interrupts. As Dan says, the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT predates the EHF design and it seems there is a problem as you describe. > > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > You are right. Routing model manipulation is not required when EL3 interrupts are present as GIC PMR manipulation should take care of the required behaviour for yielding vs atomic SMC. You also need to ensure it works as expected when EL3 interrupts are not enabled and when EHF is disabled. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > > Tripathy via TF-A > > Sent: 17 September 2020 16:53 > > To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF > > > > Hi Dan, > > I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think > > EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs > > and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. > > If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf- > > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > > A correction... > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan > > > > Handley via TF-A > > > > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > > > > depending on > > > > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > > > > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the > > TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 > > > > case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a > > > > yielding SMC in S- EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to > > follow? > > > > > > > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are > > routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing > > over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to > > ehf_allow_ns_preemption. > > > > > > > Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts > > and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. > > But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is > > happening in TSPD. > > > > > Dan. > > > > > > -- > > > TF-A mailing list > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF

by Sandeep Tripathy

Thanks Soby and Dan for confirmation on TSPD. I can see a few more gaps in the related area. "The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC i.e. any execution context for that matter ". This should apply to all SPDs including SPMD. However I learned from @Oliver that SPMD/SPMC design traps FIQs to S_EL2. In that case a RAS interrupt can be masked by S_EL2 software (eg: Hafnium). Probably by design it will be ensured that S_EL2 will never mask the physical FIQ ? S_EL2 FIQ handler will exit to EL3/SPMD by SMC call. And depending on the pending interrupt type either it can exit to NWd OR invoke el3 fiq vector handler synchronously ? Are there limitations if we trap fiq to EL3 instead ? Thanks Sandeep On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:26 PM Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> wrote: > > Hi Sandeep > > > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECUE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). > > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC. Hence the usage of GIC PMR to mask the NS interrupts. As Dan says, the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT predates the EHF design and it seems there is a problem as you describe. > > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > You are right. Routing model manipulation is not required when EL3 interrupts are present as GIC PMR manipulation should take care of the required behaviour for yielding vs atomic SMC. You also need to ensure it works as expected when EL3 interrupts are not enabled and when EHF is disabled. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > > Tripathy via TF-A > > Sent: 17 September 2020 16:53 > > To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF > > > > Hi Dan, > > I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think > > EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs > > and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. > > If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf- > > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > > A correction... > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan > > > > Handley via TF-A > > > > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > > > > depending on > > > > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > > > > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the > > TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 > > > > case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a > > > > yielding SMC in S- EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to > > follow? > > > > > > > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are > > routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing > > over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to > > ehf_allow_ns_preemption. > > > > > > > Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts > > and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. > > But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is > > happening in TSPD. > > > > > Dan. > > > > > > -- > > > TF-A mailing list > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

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