August 2022 - TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org

[RFC] Proposed location to host the firmware handoff specification.

by Jose Marinho

Hi, Arm worked to draft a firmware handoff [1] specification, evolving it based on community feedback. This activity followed the request of some members of the Arm ecosystem [2]. The spec (still at ALP – feedback/comments welcome!) standardizes how information is propagated between different firmware components during boot. The spec hopes to remove the reliance on bespoke/platform-specific information handoff mechanisms, thus reducing the code maintenance burden. The concept of entry types is present in the spec – these are data structure layouts that carry a specific type of data. New types are meant to be added, following the needs and use-cases of the different communities. Thus, these communities should be empowered to request new types! To enable community contributions, the specification must be hosted in a location that is friendly to change requests. We propose to host the spec in trustedfirmware.org (tf.org). Tf.org hosts several open-source projects and already has an open governance model. TF-A, and the associated community, rely on tf.org, and thus are already well equipped to maintain this specification and keep it up to date. Tf.org is agnostic of any downstream projects that would adopt this specification (e.g. U-boot, EDK2, etc.). We welcome the views of the communities and want to understand if there are any strong objections to what’s being proposed! If anyone has objections, we are happy to consider alternatives and associated trade-offs. Regards [1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0135/latest [2] Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for information passing between boot stages - TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org<https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.…>

11 months, 3 weeks

10
32
1 0

About kdump hang issue in SDEI dispatch

by Ming Huang

Hi James & TF-A guys, When hest acpi table configure Hardware Error Notification type as Software Delegated Exception(0x0B) for RAS event, kernel RAS interacts with TF-A by SDEI mechanism. On the firmware first system, kernel was notified by TF-A sdei call. The calling flow like as below when fatal RAS error happens: TF-A notify kernel flow: sdei_dispatch_event() ehf_activate_priority() call sdei callback // callback registered by kerenl ehf_deactivate_priority() Kernel sdei callback: sdei_asm_handler() __sdei_handler() _sdei_handler() sdei_event_handler() ghes_sdei_critical_callback() ghes_in_nmi_queue_one_entry() /* if RAS error is fatal */ __ghes_panic() panic() If fatal RAS error occured, panic was called in sdei_asm_handle() without ehf_deactivate_priority executed, which lead interrupt masked. If interrupt masked, system would be halted in kdump flow like this: arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 65536 entries for cmdq arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 32768 entries for evtq arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 65536 entries for priq arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: SMMU currently enabled! Resetting... So interrupt should be restored before panic otherwise kdump will hang. In the process of sdei, a SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE(or SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE_AND_RESUME) call should be called before panic for a completed run of ehf_deactivate_priority(). The ehf_deactivate_priority() function restore pmr_el1 to original value(>0x80). The SDEI dispatch flow was broken if SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE was not be called. This will bring about two issue: 1 Kdump will hang for firmware reporting fatal RAS event by SDEI; (as explain above) 2 For NMI scene，TF-A enable a secure timer, the PPI 29 will trigger periodically. Kernel register a callback for hard lockup. The below code will not be called when panic in kernel callback: TF-A, services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c sdei_intr_handler(): /* * We reach here when client completes the event. * * If the cause of dispatch originally interrupted the Secure world, * resume Secure. * * No need to save the Non-secure context ahead of a world switch: the * Non-secure context was fully saved before dispatch, and has been * returned to its pre-dispatch state. */ if (sec_state == SECURE) restore_and_resume_secure_context(); /* * The event was dispatched after receiving SDEI interrupt. With * the event handling completed, EOI the corresponding * interrupt. */ if ((map->ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) && !is_map_bound(map)) { ERROR("Invalid SDEI mapping: ev=%u\n", map->ev_num); panic(); } plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); How to fix above issues? I think the root cause is that kernel broken the SDEI dispatch flow, so kernel should modify to fix these issues. Thanks, Ming

1 year, 1 month

4
10
0 0

Runtime loading of SEL-1

by Jeffrey Kardatzke

Hello, I'm working on a project for ChromeOS where we would like to be able to load the BL32 payload (OpTee) for SEL-1 after the linux kernel has booted rather than during the usual BL32 stage. We would do this via an SMC we would add which would take the OpTee image from linux and then have EL3 load it and perform the init for SEL-1 at that time. The reasoning behind this is that it's much easier to update the rootfs than the FW on our devices, and we can still ensure the integrity of the OpTee image if we load it early enough after the kernel boots. The main questions I have are if there are any issues people would be aware of by loading it after linux boots rather than during the usual BL32 stage? And I would definitely want to upstream this work if it's something we can do. Thanks, Jeffrey Kardatzke Google, Inc.

1 year, 3 months

7
14
1 0

[PATCH TF-A] fix(plat/rcar3): Fix RPC-IF device node name

by Geert Uytterhoeven

According to the Generic Names Recommendation in the Devicetree Specification Release v0.3, and the DT Bindings for the Renesas Reduced Pin Count Interface, the node name for a Renesas RPC-IF device should be "spi". The node name matters, as the node is enabled by passing a DT fragment from TF-A to subsequent software. Fix this by renaming the device nodes from "rpc" to "spi". Fixes: 12c75c8886a0ee69 ("feat(plat/rcar3): emit RPC status to DT fragment if RPC unlocked") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas(a)glider.be> --- Background: On Renesas R-Car Gen3 platforms, the SPI Multi I/O Bus Controllers (RPC-IF) provide access to HyperFlash or QSPI storage. On production systems, they are typically locked by the TF-A firmware, unless TF-A is built with RCAR_RPC_HYPERFLASH_LOCKED=0. When unlocked, TF-A communicates this to subsequent software by passing a DT fragment that sets the "status" property of the RPC-IF device node to "okay". Unfortunately there are several issues preventing this from working all the way to Linux: 1. TF-A (and U-Boot on the receiving side) uses a device node name that does not conform to the DT specification nor the DT bindings for RPC-IF, 2. While U-Boot receives the RPC-IF enablement from TF-A, it does not propagate it to Linux yet, 3. The DTS files that are part of Linux do not have RPC HyperFlash support yet. This patch takes care of the first issue in TF-A. The related patches for U-Boot are [1]. Patches to enable RPC-IF support in Linux are available at [2]. Thanks for your comments! [1] "[PATCH u-boot 0/3] renesas: Fix RPC-IF enablement" https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1648544792.git.geert+renesas@glider.be [2] "[PATCH 0/5] arm64: dts: renesas: rcar-gen3: Enable HyperFlash support" https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1648548339.git.geert+renesas@glider.be --- plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c b/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c index bbfa16927d6c2384..f85db8d650c6b1a5 100644 --- a/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c +++ b/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static void bl2_add_rpc_node(void) goto err; } - node = ret = fdt_add_subnode(fdt, node, "rpc@ee200000"); + node = ret = fdt_add_subnode(fdt, node, "spi@ee200000"); if (ret < 0) { goto err; } -- 2.25.1

1 year, 6 months

3
7
1 0

Finally, a TF-A LTS Proposal!

by Okash Khawaja

TL;DR: Attached is the TF-A LTS proposal doc. Please review and share your thoughts. Hello everyone, Long term support for TF-A has a long history. As a community we have flirted with it for a while, and like any flirtation, it started with gossip -- in our case, over mailing list [1] -- more than two years ago. Then Varun Wadekar did a wonderful tech forum presentation [2] which demonstrated interest in the topic and raised interesting questions about LTS. After some time, the affair lost headline status, only to be revived again [3], earlier this year. This time however, there is a formal proposal (no pun intended). After the mailing list discussion and feedback from TF-A tech forum [4], we have put together a draft which attempts to give a concrete idea about what the TF-A LTS will look like. Please spare some time to read through it and share your feedback. The plan is to put LTS into action this November. Cheers! Okash [1] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/search?mlist=tf-a%40lists.truste… [2] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/TF-A-LTS.pdf [3] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… [4] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/TForg_LTS_proposal.pdf

1 year, 7 months

5
7
0 0

How to trap aborts caused by TZASC?

by Chenxu Wang

Hi all, I want to test how to trap the aborts caused by TZASC. For example, when I use NS-EL1 (e.g., OS) to access a Secure region (configured in TZASC), it will generate an abort. But I am not sure how to trap it. I think it is an external abort, so I enable the SCR_EL3.EA=1 and write a handler. However I cannot trap it. Also, my other handlers in EL3 still do not report the abort. Thus, how can I trap a TZASC abort? If I want to route it into EL3 to handle, how can I do it? Sincerely, WANG Chenxu

1 year, 8 months

3
7
0 0

New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 3 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 defect(s), reported by Coverity Scan earlier, were marked fixed in the recent build analyzed by Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 3 of 3 defect(s) ** CID 380536: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT) /bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c: 220 in test_memory_send() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 380536: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT) /bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c: 220 in test_memory_send() 214 ERROR("Failed [%u] mmap_add_dynamic_region %u (%lx) (%lx) (%x)!\n", 215 i, ret, 216 (uint64_t)composite->address_range_array[i].address, 217 size, mem_attrs); 218 219 /* Remove mappings created in this transaction. */ >>> CID 380536: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT) >>> This greater-than-or-equal-to-zero comparison of an unsigned value is always true. "i >= 0U". 220 for (i--; i >= 0U; i--) { 221 ret = mmap_remove_dynamic_region( 222 (uint64_t)ptr, 223 composite->address_range_array[i].page_count * PAGE_SIZE); 224 225 if (ret != 0) { ** CID 380535: Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL) /bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c: 154 in memory_retrieve() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 380535: Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL) /bl32/tsp/ffa_helpers.c: 154 in memory_retrieve() 148 uint32_t *total_length) 149 { 150 smc_args_t ret; 151 uint32_t descriptor_size; 152 struct ffa_mtd *memory_region = (struct ffa_mtd *)mb->tx_buffer; 153 >>> CID 380535: Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL) >>> Null-checking "mb" suggests that it may be null, but it has already been dereferenced on all paths leading to the check. 154 if (retrieved == NULL || mb == NULL) { 155 ERROR("Invalid parameters!\n"); 156 return false; 157 } 158 159 /* Clear TX buffer. */ ** CID 380534: API usage errors (SWAPPED_ARGUMENTS) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 380534: API usage errors (SWAPPED_ARGUMENTS) /bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c: 476 in handle_partition_message() 470 471 default: 472 INFO("TSP Tests: Unknown request ID %d--\n", (int) arg3); 473 } 474 475 /* Swap the sender and receiver in the response. */ >>> CID 380534: API usage errors (SWAPPED_ARGUMENTS) >>> The positions of arguments in the call to "ffa_msg_send_direct_resp" do not match the ordering of the parameters: * "receiver" is passed to "sender". * "sender" is passed to "receiver". 476 return ffa_msg_send_direct_resp(receiver, sender, status, 0, 0, 0, 0); 477 } 478 479 /******************************************************************************* 480 * This function implements the event loop for handling FF-A ABI invocations. 481 ******************************************************************************/ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

1 year, 8 months

1
0
0 0

Canceled event with note: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu Aug 25, 2022 4pm - 5pm (BST) (tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by joanna.farley＠arm.com

This event has been canceled with a note: "Apologies for the short notice. We have no topic this week and some key folks are out on vacations. I'm hoping the Techforum on the 8th September can be a followup LTS discussion on the proposal submitted to the Mailing list. I'll formally organise that for the 8th next week." TF-A Tech Forum Thursday Aug 25, 2022 ⋅ 4pm – 5pm United Kingdom Time We run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Invites are via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h   Guests marek.bykowski(a)gmail.com okash.khawaja(a)gmail.com tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org ~~//~~ Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

1 year, 8 months

1
0
0 0

Does FVP and current TF-A support the SVE/SVE2 programming?

by Chenxu Wang

Hi all, I want to perform some encryption/decryption in TF-A. I find that Arm provides some hardware-assisted instructions for encryption and integrity verification (e.g., AESE, SHA1...). But it seems that FVP does not support them. I recently read Armv9 and know that Arm purposes SVE/SVE2 to accelerate the matrix computation. It seems that it can be another approach to accelerate the encryption. Since I am a novice in Armv9 (and in FVP), thus, I want to ask: (1) Do FVP and TF-A support the SVE? If yes, how to configure it? (2) Do FVP and TF-A support the SVE2? If yes, how to configure it? Looking forward to your reply! Sincerely, WANG Chenxu

1 year, 8 months

2
2
0 0

New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 3 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 defect(s), reported by Coverity Scan earlier, were marked fixed in the recent build analyzed by Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 3 of 3 defect(s) ** CID 380533: Null pointer dereferences (NULL_RETURNS) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 283 in spmc_shmem_obj_validate_id() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 380533: Null pointer dereferences (NULL_RETURNS) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 283 in spmc_shmem_obj_validate_id() 277 size_t emad_size; 278 struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad; 279 280 emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(desc, i, 281 MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1), 282 &emad_size); >>> CID 380533: Null pointer dereferences (NULL_RETURNS) >>> Dereferencing "emad", which is known to be "NULL". 283 if (sp_id == emad->mapd.endpoint_id) { 284 found = true; 285 break; 286 } 287 } 288 return found; ** CID 380532: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 380532: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1754 in spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish() 1748 req->endpoint_array[0], sp_ctx->sp_id); 1749 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1750 goto err_unlock_all; 1751 } 1752 1753 /* Validate the caller is a valid participant. */ >>> CID 380532: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->desc.emad_count" to "spmc_shmem_obj_validate_id", which uses it as a loop boundary. 1754 if (!spmc_shmem_obj_validate_id(&obj->desc, sp_ctx->sp_id)) { 1755 WARN("%s: Invalid endpoint ID (0x%x).\n", 1756 __func__, req->endpoint_array[0]); 1757 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1758 goto err_unlock_all; 1759 } ** CID 380531: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) /bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c: 34 in send_ffa_pm_success() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 380531: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) /bl32/tsp/tsp_ffa_main.c: 34 in send_ffa_pm_success() 28 29 static ffa_endpoint_id16_t tsp_id, spmc_id; 30 31 static smc_args_t *send_ffa_pm_success(void) 32 { 33 return set_smc_args(FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP_SMC32, >>> CID 380531: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) >>> Suspicious implicit sign extension: "tsp_id" with type "ffa_endpoint_id16_t" (16 bits, unsigned) is promoted in "(tsp_id << 16U) | spmc_id" to type "int" (32 bits, signed), then sign-extended to type "unsigned long" (64 bits, unsigned). If "(tsp_id << 16U) | spmc_id" is greater than 0x7FFFFFFF, the upper bits of the result will all be 1. 34 tsp_id << FFA_DIRECT_MSG_SOURCE_SHIFT | 35 spmc_id, 36 FFA_FWK_MSG_BIT | 37 (FFA_PM_MSG_PM_RESP & FFA_FWK_MSG_MASK), 38 0, 0, 0, 0, 0); 39 } ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

1 year, 8 months

1
0
0 0

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TF-A August 2022