July 2022 - TF-M - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Anton Komlev

Hi, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, July 21, 7:00-8:00 UTC (East time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Link to the forum: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/92535794925?pwd=TTl0cmo4R2hTNm8wcHo1M3ZKdjlnUT… Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

2 days, 15 hours

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Technical Forum call - July 7

by Anton Komlev

Hi, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, July 7, 15:00-16:00 UTC (West time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Link to the forum: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95570795742?pwd=N21YWHJpUjZyS3Fzd0tkOG9hanpidz… Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

3 weeks, 4 days

10
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Re: Attestation token new spec

by Tamas Ban

Hi, Sorry 2nd link was broken. Here is the working version: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab… Tamas Ban From: Andersson, Joakim <Joakim.Andersson(a)nordicsemi.no> Sent: 2022. május 9., hétfő 12:14 To: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: Attestation token new spec Is te second link broken? I get a 404 error code. -Joakim From: Tamas Ban via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: mandag 9. mai 2022 11:31 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Attestation token new spec Hi, the initial attestation token implementation is aligned with this specification: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-05<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatrack…> This spec is still evolving and there is a newer version which changes the key values of the claims in the token: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab…<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.…> This can cause combability issues between token issuer (device) and token verifier (some remote verification service). This is an ABI change between token issuer and consumer. The breaking effect would be manifest in unaccepted IAT tokens by the verifier. On-device side I see these options to make the transition: - A build-time option could be introduced which determines which range of key numbers to use. The default value would be the new range. To not let new users pick up the old values accidentally. Existing users can notice the incompatibility issue during the integration test and adjust their build command accordingly. However, the old range would be announced as deprecated in the next TF-M release, then will be removed in the next release after. - Immediate switch over to the new range, without supporting the old range anymore. On the verification service side, an SW update can handle the transition and might be accepting both ranges for a while. I assume the verification service can be updated more easily than remote devices therefore better to handle the compatibility issue there. - Keeping the support for both ranges for the long term and letting users choose by build time. Please share your thoughts on: - Are you aware that the attestation service is used in deployed devices where this transition can cause incompatibility? - From the above list which option would you vote to support the transition? Best regards, Tamas Ban

7 months, 2 weeks

3
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Split build

by Bohdan.Hunko＠infineon.com

Hi everyone, Some time ago patch for split build<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%2522split-build%2522> of SPE, NSPE, BL2 was announced. I am interested on when this patch is planned to be merged? Regards, Bohdan Hunko Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine Engineer CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW Mobile: +38099 50 19 714 Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>

1 year, 2 months

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Re: [TF-M] Supporting encryption with ITS

by Sherry Zhang

Hi George, The ITS without encryption is not a compromised RoT. In the PSA Secure Storage API spec, the PSA Internal Trust Storage aims at providing a place for devices to store their most intimate secrets. Also “””””””””””””””””””” 1. The storage underlying the PSA Internal Trusted Storage Service MUST be protected from read and modification by attackers with physical access to the device. 2. The storage underlying the PSA Internal Trusted Storage Service MUST be protected from direct read or write access from software partitions outside of the PSA Root of Trust (PRoT). “””””””””””””””””””” So, for internal trusted storage service, it requires the underlying storage itself should provide being read or write protection. The storage area should be a “trusted” area. Does the storage area on your device meet this requirement? Is the memory physically isolated? If not, I wonder why not uses the Protected Storage service instead? For the design of adding encryption in ITS, in the PS partition, the `iv` and the encrypted object data are stored with the object file while the tag of each object is stored with the object table file. So, if encrypt the PS object in the ITS file system, how the PS partition get the `tag` of each object? After a rough thought, I think probably a standalone encryption for ITS is more reasonable. As this is a relatively “big topic”, would you like to hold a discussion on the TF-M Tech forum if it is not limited by confidential information? The next Tech forum will be hold on this Thursday 3:00 PM UTC time. Regards, Sherry Zhang From: Vasilakis, Georgios <georgios.vasilakis(a)nordicsemi.no<mailto:georgios.vasilakis@nordicsemi.no>> Sent: Friday, September 24, 2021 8:52 PM To: Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com<mailto:Sherry.Zhang2@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Supporting encryption with ITS Hello Sherry, Thank you for your input! 1. Our threat model is more concerned about attacks which can happen very early in the boot process, I think. A completely compromised RoT is not in our threat model. 2. I see that, ITS is supposed to store small objects. The storage overhead of adding encryption will be probably bigger than 20 bytes I think but the intention is to have this only as a configuration, not as the default option. 3. Agreed, a HAL API should be used for this. Do you have any opinion on the design of it? Do you think that it adds value to do try to use a common design for the object handling of both PS and ITS or is it better to have it as a standalone thing for the ITS. Regards, George ________________________________ From: Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com<mailto:Sherry.Zhang2@arm.com>> Sent: Friday, September 24, 2021 11:58 AM To: Vasilakis, Georgios <georgios.vasilakis(a)nordicsemi.no<mailto:georgios.vasilakis@nordicsemi.no>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: [TF-M] Supporting encryption with ITS Hi George, Some comments from my side: 1. Internal trusted storage is part of the Root of Trust domain. If ITS storage device is attacked, then the code flash where the PSA Rot SP locates may also be attacked. Does the thread model of your system require the encryption in ITS? 2. The ITS service is intended to be used to interface to a small piece of storage. Encryption would increase the context for each ITS file. For example, similarly to PS object context, the `IV` which is used in encryption as well as the generated `tag` should be added into each file context. They total together can be about more than 20 bytes. 3. If the encryption is mandatory/ necessary required by the thread model of your system, as discussed, the PSA crypto service should not be called to avoid the circular. I think a HAL API for encryption may be created in ITS for platform implementation defined encryption/decryption. Regards, Sherry Zhang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Vasilakis, Georgios via TF-M Sent: Thursday, September 23, 2021 10:47 PM To: Gyorgy Szing <Gyorgy.Szing(a)arm.com<mailto:Gyorgy.Szing@arm.com>>; Fabian Schmidt <fabian.schmidt(a)nxp.com<mailto:fabian.schmidt@nxp.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Supporting encryption with ITS Hey Gyorgy, These are very valuable comments! I am aware of the circular dependency issue because the PSA apis are using the ITS as a storage backend. This, as you said, can be circumvented by using a software crypto library or an implementation specific API. So, for the encryption a flexible API can be used which can allow externals to use their own function calls. Regarding the key storage, this is what I had in mind as well, using derived keys from the HUK. So that we don't need to store anything but the crypto metadata. Adding another layer of storage will raise more issues, I think. ________________________________ From: Gyorgy Szing <Gyorgy.Szing(a)arm.com<mailto:Gyorgy.Szing@arm.com>> Sent: Thursday, September 23, 2021 4:30 PM To: Fabian Schmidt <fabian.schmidt(a)nxp.com<mailto:fabian.schmidt@nxp.com>>; Vasilakis, Georgios <georgios.vasilakis(a)nordicsemi.no<mailto:georgios.vasilakis@nordicsemi.no>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: [TF-M] Supporting encryption with ITS Hi, AFAIK the main reason for ITS not using encryption is the problem of circular dependency. ITS is used by crypto SP for key storage, so how will crypto fetch the key from ITS to decrypt ITS? You could use a software crypto implementation (another mbed-tls instance) in ITS, but where would you safely store the keys? If you have a two layer ITS, one for only storing the keys for the second instance, and a second, encrypted one, then you end up with something like ITS and PS. You may not need a full blown on-chip FLASH device for ITS. If you have a HUK available, you can derive the same SP specific keys from that at each boot, and store these in RAM backed ITS. You won’t be able to store other keys in ITS in a persistent way of course, but for that you can use PS. Well, something along these lines. Perhaps the TF-M team could help better if you could share some details on why your customer would need encrypted ITS. (A PSA for Cortex-A (TS) maintainer chiming in to a “not his business” discussion here 😉 ) /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Fabian Schmidt via TF-M Sent: September 23, 2021 15:51 To: Vasilakis, Georgios <georgios.vasilakis(a)nordicsemi.no<mailto:georgios.vasilakis@nordicsemi.no>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Supporting encryption with ITS Hi George, I’m wondering if that would add value. To my understanding, ITS was never designed to be encrypted because of the way it’s supposed to be set up. (It’s Internal Trusted Storage.) I believe best practice is to place it in a “trusted” location, one that is ideally only accessible from Secure world, and also ideally on-die. If you then restrict outside access to the internal flash (JTAG, flash programmer ports,…), you’re pretty golden, in that no unauthorized party should be able to read from or write to the ITS.* Let me know if I misunderstand anything about ITS or TrustZone, but that’s my view. Maybe I’m painting an idealized picture. Greetings, Fabian Schmidt * at least short of a sophisticated physical attack or finding some loophole in TrustZone… From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Vasilakis, Georgios via TF-M Sent: Donnerstag, 23. September 2021 15:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [EXT] [TF-M] Supporting encryption with ITS Caution: EXT Email Hey all, Lately the requirement for an encrypted ITS solution is being asked from our customers and I would like to have a discussion here on how we can design this in a reasonable way. The first thought that came to my mind was to add the functionality to the ITS flash-fs layer. This layer contains file metadata in the its_file_meta_t structure and it should be possible to expand this to include additional crypto metadata (conditionally). This seems to be the less invasive change to me, even though it will introduce some increased memory usage since supporting encryption will mean that we cannot read the data in chunks anymore, we will have to use static buffers. At the same time, I looked at the PS partition since I knew that it has support for encryption. I believe that some core concepts of both solutions have similarities even though the code is quite different. For example, a file in ITS is similar to an object in PS and the (linear) list of file metadata in ITS is similar to the concept of the object table in PS. So, I think that it should be possible to design some generic-enough APIs that we can use for both the ITS and PS. Even though this will require some major refactoring in both partitions, it will decrease the code of these services which will probably decrease maintenance later. What are your thoughts on this? Regards, George

1 year, 10 months

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Documentation improvements

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The project documentation will never be ideal and we are continuing improving it. Let me ask you for reply to this email with the pain points you have experienced or suggestions for improvements to be considered in this phase. Your direct contribution with docs articles will be much appreciated too. For example: TF-M debugging technics and experience would be very helpful. Thank you in advance, Anton

1 year, 11 months

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[RFC]Decoupling manifest tool with build system

by Kevin Peng

[Thread res-used, title renamed] Hi all, This is now happening - fully support non-CMake use of the manifest tool. Here is the patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/15756 With this patch, the manifest tool takes build configurations from a config header file instead of replying on the build system. Please check the details in the patch. Any comments are welcome. Best Regards, Kevin -----Original Message----- From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com> Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2022 2:49 PM To: Kevin Peng <Kevin.Peng(a)arm.com>; Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: RE: Any usage of environment variables in manifest lists > If there are strong requirements on supporting the non-cmake usecase Yes, it is 😉 -----Original Message----- From: Kevin Peng via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2022 5:46 AM To: Kevin Peng <Kevin.Peng(a)arm.com>; Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Re: Any usage of environment variables in manifest lists Well, I think I figured out a way to decouple them. If there are strong requirements on supporting the non-cmake usecase, I can try to work it out. Best Regards, Kevin -----Original Message----- From: Kevin Peng via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2022 10:09 AM To: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Re: Any usage of environment variables in manifest lists Yes. The manifest tool is now fully replying on CMake (it has been, since I introduced the conditional parsing of manifests around half a year ago). It needs to be aware of the build configurations. Best Regards, Kevin -----Original Message----- From: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com> Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2022 7:15 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Kevin Peng <Kevin.Peng(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: Any usage of environment variables in manifest lists Hey Kevin Does this mean that cmake will be required to generate the headers/etc from the manifests? I believe in the past we deliberately supported the non-cmake usecase, as some people were building TF-M in alternate ways. Raef ________________________________________ From: Kevin Peng via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 11 May 2022 09:24 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd Subject: [TF-M] Any usage of environment variables in manifest lists Hi, Is there anyone using environment variables for the "manifest" attribute in out-of-tree manifest lists? I'm asking because I'm working to support configurable stack_size for Secure Partitions<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…>. In the patch the support of environment variables in manifest lists is removed<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…>. Because I have to call the CMake command configure_file to replace the stack_size symbols (CMake variables<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…> surrounded with "@") with their values. While configure_file does not recognize environment variables. If you do have environment variables in manifest list, there is an alternative: Replace the env. variables with CMake variables surrounded with "@" and set the value of the CMake variables in either config files or command line inputs. Best Regards, Kevin -- TF-M mailing list -- tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to tf-m-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org -- TF-M mailing list -- tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to tf-m-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

1 year, 11 months

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Intended use of psa_reset_key_attributes()

by S Krishnan, Archanaa

Hi, What was the intended usage of psa_reset_key_attribute(*attributes) which requires a PSA call from non-secure side to reset the client attributes? I am curious because the attributes to be reset comes from the non-secure memory, not directly associated with ITS/PS. The current IPC setup performs a PSA call to tfm_crypto_rest_key_attributes()(https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trust… This function creates a copy of client key attribute in a secure key attribute structure. The secure key attribute is reset (set to 0) and then copied back to the client key attribute before returning to non-secure code. At first glance, this seems like a roundabout way to zeorise client side attributes. Regards, Archanaa

1 year, 11 months

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FW: [Tf-openci-triage] [Maintenance] - ci.staging.trustedfirmware.org down time 2022-07-22

by Xinyu Zhang

Hi All, FYI. Open CI will be down from 2022 07-22 18:00 UTC to 2022-07-22 22:00 UTC for Jenkins upgrade. Please let us know if there is any problem. Thanks Xinyu -----Original Message----- From: Kelley Spoon via Tf-openci-triage <tf-openci-triage(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2022 10:14 PM To: tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; tf-openci-triage(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [Tf-openci-triage] [Maintenance] - ci.staging.trustedfirmware.org down time 2022-07-22 Hello All, The server will be offline to start a maintenance window on 2022-07-22 at 20:00 UTC. Jenkins will be put into "Shutdown Mode" at 2022-07-22 18:00 UTC to stop accepting new jobs and allow executing tasks to complete. This downtime is required to add a plugin to Jenkins to support new functionality required for a service being developed. The version of Jenkins and the plugins currently being run will not be changing. Emails will be sent prior to and following the upgrade to provide status reports. Start: 2022 07-22 18:00 UTC End: 2022-07-22 22:00 UTC Regards, -- Kelley Spoon <kelley.spoon(a)linaro.org> -- Tf-openci-triage mailing list -- tf-openci-triage(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to tf-openci-triage-leave(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org

2 years

1
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ns_agent flag

by Chris.Brand＠infineon.com

In https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.… Ken mentions the need for a special flag in the manifest to indicate a non-secure agent partition. The code change is fairly easy, I think, but the manifest file format is specified by PSA, and presumably would also need to change. How do we go about doing that? Thanks, Chris Brand Cypress Semiconductor (Canada), Inc. An Infineon Technologies Company Sr Prin Software Engr CSCA CSS ICW SW PSW 1 Office: +1 778 234 0515 Chris.Brand(a)infineon.com<mailto:Chris.Brand@infineon.com> International Place 13700 V6V 2X8 Richmond Canada www.infineon.com<www.cypress.com> www.cypress.com<http://www.cypress.com> Discoveries<http://www.infineon.com/discoveries> Facebook<http://www.facebook.com/infineon> Twitter<http://www.twitter.com/Infineon> LinkedIn<http://www.linkedin.com/company/infineon-technologies> Part of your life. Part of tomorrow. NOTICE: The information transmitted is intended only for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material of Infineon Technologies AG and its affiliated entities which is for the exclusive use of the individual designated above as the recipient. Any review, retransmission, dissemination or other use of, or taking of any action in reliance upon, this information by persons or entities other than the intended recipient is prohibited. If you received this in error, please contact immediately the sender by returning e-mail and delete the material from any computer. If you are not the specified recipient, you are hereby notified that all disclosure, reproduction, distribution or action taken on the basis of this message is prohibited.

2 years

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TF-M July 2022