October 2023 - TF-M - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Anton Komlev

Hi, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, July 21, 7:00-8:00 UTC (East time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Link to the forum: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/92535794925?pwd=TTl0cmo4R2hTNm8wcHo1M3ZKdjlnUT… Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

2 days, 22 hours

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Technical Forum call - July 7

by Anton Komlev

Hi, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, July 7, 15:00-16:00 UTC (West time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Link to the forum: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95570795742?pwd=N21YWHJpUjZyS3Fzd0tkOG9hanpidz… Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

2 weeks, 2 days

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Security Vulnerability Notice - Partial tag comparison when using Chacha20-Poly1305 on the PSA driver API interface in CryptoCell enabled platforms

by Antonio De Angelis

Hi Everyone, There is a new security vulnerability discovered on the PSA Driver API for CryptoCell enabled platforms, described as "Partial tag comparison when using Chacha20-Poly1305 on the PSA driver API interface in CryptoCell enabled platforms". Please find the security advisory specific to TF-M and patches that have been developed as per the TrustedFirmware.org security process [1] below : * TF-M Security advisory: TFMV-6: Add cc3xx_partial_tag_compare_on_chacha20_poly1305 advisory (I44bc426f) · Gerrit Code Review (trustedfirmware.org)<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/22995> * Patch to fix the issue has been already merged on master branch as commit https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/commit/?id=2e82… * TF-Mv1.8.1 will be released in the next days containing the same hotfix Please let us know if you have any comments. Best regards, /Antonio [1] https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/security_center/report...<https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/security_center/repor…>

2 weeks, 2 days

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Re: Attestation token new spec

by Tamas Ban

Hi, Sorry 2nd link was broken. Here is the working version: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab… Tamas Ban From: Andersson, Joakim <Joakim.Andersson(a)nordicsemi.no> Sent: 2022. május 9., hétfő 12:14 To: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: Attestation token new spec Is te second link broken? I get a 404 error code. -Joakim From: Tamas Ban via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: mandag 9. mai 2022 11:31 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Attestation token new spec Hi, the initial attestation token implementation is aligned with this specification: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-05<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatrack…> This spec is still evolving and there is a newer version which changes the key values of the claims in the token: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab…<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.…> This can cause combability issues between token issuer (device) and token verifier (some remote verification service). This is an ABI change between token issuer and consumer. The breaking effect would be manifest in unaccepted IAT tokens by the verifier. On-device side I see these options to make the transition: - A build-time option could be introduced which determines which range of key numbers to use. The default value would be the new range. To not let new users pick up the old values accidentally. Existing users can notice the incompatibility issue during the integration test and adjust their build command accordingly. However, the old range would be announced as deprecated in the next TF-M release, then will be removed in the next release after. - Immediate switch over to the new range, without supporting the old range anymore. On the verification service side, an SW update can handle the transition and might be accepting both ranges for a while. I assume the verification service can be updated more easily than remote devices therefore better to handle the compatibility issue there. - Keeping the support for both ranges for the long term and letting users choose by build time. Please share your thoughts on: - Are you aware that the attestation service is used in deployed devices where this transition can cause incompatibility? - From the above list which option would you vote to support the transition? Best regards, Tamas Ban

4 months, 2 weeks

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Various issues in successfully using GDB to debug secure apps on Musca S1 connected over USB DAPLink to a Linux host

by Arun D

Now sure where exactly this belongs, but I already posted question abut the Musca S1 earlier, and this seems relevant. ARM support essentially seem to tell me that they cannot support GDB and they are not certain of DAPLink, and recommend ULINKPLUS debugger with ARM IDE. So wanted to get a sense from anyone who has attempted to use this. In the following I describe the steps to obtain a base line, then provide description in what way GDB / DAPLink seems to misbehave. To get a base line: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - I build 'samples/hello_world' app using Zephyr 'v3.4.0'. Copy the 'build/zephyr/zephyr.hex' file to '/media/user/MUSCA_S1' directory when the board is USB. Connect a terminal emulator to the UART exposed by USB DAPLink, e.g. 'picocom -b 115200 -y n /dev/ttyACM0'. I can see on the console the followinbg *** Booting Zephyr OS build zephyr-v3.4.0 *** Hello World! musca_s1 If I press the reset button, the app restarts as well. This is as expected. I note that this is entirely running as in secure mode, that it does not use TF-M. - Next I start 'pyocd-gdbserver'. Then start a GDB session using the 'zephyr.elf' file, 'target remote localhost:3333' to connect it to the gdbserver. It connects ok. So I put a breakpoint at "main", do a 'monitor reset halt', and then continue. The breakpoint at 'main' is hit, I can obtain the backtrace to see it is correct as expected. So my setup seems good. Next I attempt to test a non-secure app with TF-M. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - Build the app using Zephyr build env 'west build -b v2m_musca_s1_ns samples/tfm_integration/tfm_psa_test/ -DCONFIG_TFM_PSA_TEST_CRYPTO=y'. Copy 'build/zephyr/tfm_merged.hex' to '/media/user/MUSCA_S1'. Connect a terminal emulator, picocom, to the console, and hit the PBON (power on) button. I see the following output as expected on the console: Musca-S1 Dual Firmware Version 1.9 [WRN] This device was provisioned with dummy keys. This device is NOT SECURE [Sec Thread] Secure image initializing! Booting TF-M 79a6115d3 [INF][Crypto] Initialising HW accelerator... complete. *** Booting Zephyr OS build zephyr-v3.4.0 *** ***** PSA Architecture Test Suite - Version 1.4 ***** Running.. Crypto Suite ****************************************** TEST: 201 | DESCRIPTION: Testing crypto key management APIs | UT: psa_crypto_init [Info] Executing tests from non-secure This is as expected. However, if I press the reset button the board does not appear to reset - this is unexpected. Has anyone seen a different behavior? Is the specific board that I have is misbehaving? - Now I start PyOCD GDB server, start GDB and successfully connect it to the GDB server. The target is halted where it was executing, e.g. Remote debugging using localhost:3333 CC_HalWaitInterruptRND (data=data@entry=1024) at /home/zephyr/zephyrproject/modules/tee/tf-m/trusted-firmware-m/lib/ext/cryptocell-312-runtime/host/src/hal/cc3x/cc_hal.c:107 107 irr = CC_HAL_READ_REGISTER(CC_REG_OFFSET(HOST_RGF, HOST_IRR)); (gdb) This is as expected. - Next I put a breakpoint at 'sprt_main', then issue a 'monitor reset halt', then issue a 'continue', The breakpoint is is NOT hit. I see a blue LED blink at perhaps 4 times per second. This is unexpected. Has anyone seen this behave correctly? Do I have a board that is misbehaving?

5 months, 2 weeks

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Building TF-M for ARM reference SoC/boards MPS2/MPS3 and Musca S1

by capablegh＠gmail.com

Hello. The ARM MPS2/MPS3 have Cortex M33 two processor configuration. I am building TF-M under the Zephyr OS setup. From the build it appears that the secure (TF-M) and non-secure (Zephyr OS and app) are bound and executed on separate CPUs. Assuming that two CPUs are used, in the build, is there a way to force using same one CPU for TF-M and Zephyr/app, while disabling the second CPU? Thanks.

5 months, 2 weeks

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Increasing the flash partition for the Secure Firmware in TF-M for MPS2-AN521 board emulated using Qemu

by Gowri Ramshankar

Problem: ARoT app is too large, that the image build fails. Error: /home/gramshan/zephyr-sdk-0.16.1/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: bin/tfm_s.axf section `.ER_UNPRIV_CODE' will not fit in region `FLASH' /home/gramshan/zephyr-sdk-0.16.1/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: region `FLASH' overflowed by 114956 bytes Memory region Used Size Region Size %age Used FLASH: 572684 B 447 KB 125.11% RAM: 54556 B 1 MB 5.20% To overcome this issue, I changed the flash_layout header file (https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/master/platfo…) such that the secure side size is (FLASH_S_PARTITION_SIZE) 700+KB from the 512KB default for the MPS2 AN521 app, and correspondingly update the non-secure side FLASH_NS_PARTITION_SIZEto be 300KB. This builds the tfm_merged.hex file, But fails it to boot the app. So, I do not use your ARoT, but just built as non-secure app - the 'hello_world' Zephyr app that prints a one line hello_world on the console, but using the modified partition layout. This too fails to boot, in that the "hello world" is not printed. I debugged this to find that it is BL2 that is failing. I see that the Panic occurs during the image swapping operation, this is because the image to be filled in the primary slot is identified as invalid and the secure boot stops. The TF-M thinks some firmware upgrade is happening, the integrity check fails and panics, thus inducing a Fault Injection Hardening defense. Now I am stuck with this issue and I do not know how to proceed further, any help on how to change the flash partition sizes in a clean manner would be appreciated.

5 months, 2 weeks

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How is Secure Enclave configured?

by Sunguk Bin

I have a few questions regarding RSS and Secure Enclave to see what's required and considered for SoC design to leverage RSS and why we nee to use RSS & TF-M 1. What is the difference between RSS and Secure Enclave? - Is RSS the same as Secure Enclave? - Or is it referring to any subsystem providing runtime crypto service regardless of whether it's a Secure Enclave or not? Question below is assuming RSS is a Secure Enclave...... 2. What enables TF-M to operate as a Secure Enclave? - To operate as a Secure Enclave, HW support is mandatory? a) If so, we must use a Secure Enclave IP such as cryptoisland(CI-300P-C)? b) Or can we construct a Secure Enclave with some other IPs(LCM, KMU, CryptoCell) metioned RSS doc? (by using TF-M without secure enclave IP) It feels vague whether this can be called a Secure Enclave... https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/platform/arm/rss/rss_key_manage… - If HW support is not mandatory, I wonder how TF-M can operate as a Secure Enclave. - The article below seems to say that TF-M can provide Secure Enclave functionality without HW support. or I may misunderstand. https://developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK/doc/2.2.0/tfm/technical_re…

5 months, 4 weeks

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Non-secure client id management

by Chris.Brand＠infineon.com

Hi, Reading through https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/integration_guide/non-secure_cl… I'm wondering why so much of the work is done in the secure world. Ultimately, the secure world relies on the non-secure world to tell it the client_id, directly or indirectly. Is there a good reason for the NCSE part to reside in the secure world, rather than the non-secure? Particularly as the document states that the non-secure RTOS may have a built-in "Secure Context Manager", there may well be redundancy between that and NCSE that could be eliminated if the NCSE was in the NSPE. And the less code there is in the secure world, the less scope for vulnerabilities. If client_ids themselves were passed from the NS to the S world, it would probably be very easy to use that same interface on the NS core in a dual core system, too. Chris

6 months

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Bool cast is wrong in Corestone cmake file

by Bohdan.Hunko＠infineon.com

Hi, Seems like following code $<$<BOOL:TFM_PARTITION_PLATFORM>:${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/services/src/tfm_platform_system.c> In platform/ext/target/arm/corstone1000/CMakeLists.txt is wrong because it uses TFM_PARTITION_PLATFORM but should use ${ TFM_PARTITION_PLATFORM } If so then maybe platform maintainers can fix this. Regards, Bohdan Hunko Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine Engineer CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW Mobile: +38099 50 19 714 Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>

6 months, 1 week

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TF-M October 2023