Hello All,
I hope it is the correct process to inform you than I got an issue and how I solved it
I was using tools GNU Arm compiler version minimum 10.3.2021.10 as mentioned on TFM web
But with latest TFM on main branch I had a build error dur to -Warray-parameter (only with GNU it is ok with IAR and CLANG that seems normal)
I moved to GNU 14.3.1 (arm-gnu-toolchain-14.3.rel1-mingw-w64-x86_64-arm-none-eabi.exe as I’m using windows) and my problem was solved 😊
So I think the minimal version on TFM web is no more valid.
Since:
[cid:image007.png@01DC6B7E.96AB43D0]
Regards, Ronan,
[Shape, rectangle Description automatically generated]
Ronan GABOU
MDRF / Embedded Processing / General Purpose and Automotive MCU / Ecosystem / Security
STMicroelectronics
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Hello,
I'd like to check with the community about upgrading the compilation standard from C99 to C11. The initial trial looks promising, as you can see here:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/46212
Please let me know if your platform or project depends on C99 or if you would prefer to keep using it, and feel free to object to this upgrade.
With no objections by Dec 21, I will merge the patch.
Thanks,
Anton
Hi all,
I have noticed an issue with absolute paths in exported targets:
Background:
1. During Secure build some header file paths are added to include directories of tfm_config (and some other targets) – for example TARGET_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE, PROJECT_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
2. Then tfm_config is exported to install directory and is used in Non-Secure build
There are several issues here:
1. In Non-Secure build exported tfm_config uses absolute paths that ware defined during secure build. This is an issue as NS-interface (api_ns folder) may be built on another machine.
2. Also looking into api_ns folder – I don’t see those files being exported (for example TARGET_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE, PROJECT_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE are not exported to api_ns)
* Looking into a code I was able to identify at least these defines that are effected (but list may be longer):
i. TARGET_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
ii. PROJECT_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
iii. MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE
iv. MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
Is there a plan to somehow solve this issue? If so, then what is the schedule on it?
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine LLC
Senior Engineer
CSS ICW SW INT BFS SFW
Mobile: +380995019714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hello, I'm a RSE firmware developer for Arm Neoverse V3 core.
I am currently reviewing the code to upgrade the version of TF-M used in our product from 2.1.1 to 2.2.2. In this process, I have a few questions and am sending this email.
1. In the previous TF-Mv2.1.1, there were dummy files for the data structure of the bundle to be provisioned to the OTP during CM and DM state. I have discovered that the method for creating the bundle has changed significantly in the TF-Mv2.2.2, but there are still parts I cannot locate: Host RoTPKs (for secure, non-secure, and CCA). This parts were provisioned during the DM provisioning process in the TF-Mv2.1.1 with a size of each 96B. I am curious how this parts are implemented in 2.2.2.
1-1. When TF-A sends a PSA call to the RSE, it distinguishes which Host RoTPK to request from the RSE via persistent key identifiers. I am also curious about how this aspect is handled within the RSE TF-M. (Should this fall outside the scope of the TF-M project, please disregard this point.)
2. In the latest TF-Mv2.2.2, as mentioned earlier, the data structure for the Provisioning value appears to have undergone significant changes. Reviewing the code, I observed that the CM and DM Provisioning values contain multiple RoTPK areas. Some are used to verify the signatures of the BL2 and PE, but many are not. Are the unused fields simply reserved for future use, or spares? Each area can contain up to four RoTPK Hashes, and in the case of DM, there are as many as eight such areas, which appears to be a significant waste of space. I would like to understand what scenarios this design anticipates.
3. To obtain information about RSE, I have been referring to the content of the official documentation. However, when comparing it to the current latest release, the documentation appears to remain based on an previous version. For example, For example, despite the code for the GPIO signal indicating the status for RSE Provisioning having been removed in the latest version, the documentation still retains that content. I would like to know specifically whether there are plans to update this documentation.
Truthfully, I suspect all these questions could be answered by better understanding the code, which makes me hesitant to send an email. However, due to various constraints, I kindly ask for your understanding regarding my posting this query on the forum.
Thank you.Best Regard,
TH Kim
All,
We've had reports of people being unable to send messages to the TF-M list.
If you are one of the people please could you send me a rough time, source
address and subject for the failed message.
Thanks,
Shaun Longhorn
Community Manager
Hi all,
I have noticed an issue with absolute paths in exported targets:
Background:
1. During Secure build some header file paths are added to include directories of tfm_config (and some other targets) – for example TARGET_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE, PROJECT_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
2. Then tfm_config is exported to install directory and is used in Non-Secure build
There are several issues here:
1. In Non-Secure build exported tfm_config uses absolute paths that ware defined during secure build. This is an issue as NS-interface (api_ns folder) may be built on another machine.
2. Also looking into api_ns folder – I don’t see those files being exported (for example TARGET_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE, PROJECT_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE are not exported to api_ns)
* Looking into a code I was able to identify at least these defines that are effected (but list may be longer):
i. TARGET_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
ii. PROJECT_CONFIG_HEADER_FILE
iii. MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CONFIG_FILE
iv. MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE
Is there a plan to somehow solve this issue? If so, then what is the schedule on it?
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine LLC
Senior Engineer
CSS ICW SW INT BFS SFW
Mobile: +380995019714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
This event has been updated with a note:
"The TF-M Technical Forum now runs on a monthly schedule in a time slot
chosen to maximize participation based on recent attendance patterns. We
recognise that time zones can be challenging, and we continue to review
scheduling based on community needs. Everyone is welcome to join, and as
always, recordings and notes will be available for those who can’t attend
live."
Changed: time
TF-M Tech forum
Every 4 weeks from 8am to 9am on Thursday from Thursday 27 May 2021 to
Wednesday 31 Dec
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Location
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This email keeps the event up to date in your calendar.
TF-M Tech forum
Every 4 weeks from 8am to 9am on Thursday from Thursday 14 Sept 2023 to
Wednesday 31 Dec
United Kingdom Time
Location
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About TF-M Tech forum:This is an open forum for anyone to participate and
it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate
under the guidance of the TF TSC.Feel free to forward it to
colleagues.Details of previous meetings are
here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/==…Topic:
TF-M Tech forum - Asia Time Zone FriendlyTime: Nov 12, 2020 07:00 AM
Greenwich Mean Time Every 4 weeks on Thu, until
Mar 4, 2021, 5 occurrence(s) Nov 12, 2020 07:00
AM Dec 10, 2020 07:00 AM
Jan 7, 2021 07:00 AM Feb 4, 2021 07:00
AM Mar 4, 2021 07:00 AMPlease download and
import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system.Weekly:
https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJYodOyvpz8jGNEc_1ykVap8Zg6oTLqZZSeJ/ics…
Zoom
Meetinghttps://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/92535794925?pwd=TTl0cmo4R2hTNm8wcHo1M3ZKdjlnUT09Meeting
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location +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma)
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+1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 301 715
8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US
(Chicago) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)
888 788 0099 US Toll-free
877 853 5247 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 925 3579 4925Find your local number:
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Guests
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Hi All,
I wanted to inform you about a change to the TF-M Technical Forum meeting schedule.
Previously, we held sessions every two weeks, alternating between Eastern and Western-friendly time zones to accommodate our global audience. After reviewing participation patterns we've decided to simplify the schedule to a monthly cadence, with meetings held in a Western-friendly time slot. We hope this update makes participation more predictable and better aligned with current engagement.
Everyone is still very welcome to attend, and as always, recordings and notes will be available for those unable to join live.
Best regards,
Anton
Hello,
The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, Sep 12 at 7:00-8:00 UTC (East time zone).
Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics.
Recording and slides of previous meetings are here:
https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/
Best regards,
Anton
I notice that TFM_VERSION_MANUAL gets set to "2.2.1" in both release/2.2.x and in main. Granted, the hash gets appended to make TFM_VERSION, and there's some reading of git tags involved that can override TFM_VERSION_MANUAL, but it still feels odd that both identify as the "same" version.
Perhaps main should be flagged as being the "next" version as soon as the previous version branch has been created? So we would tag main as v2.3.pre or something. Either that or something that identifies as *not* being a regular release.
Chris
Hi all,
I am trying to build TFM with IAR with TFM_FIH_PROFILE=HIGH and I am facing the issue with the FIH labels.
I see following errors:
[ 98%] Linking C executable ../bin/tfm_s.axf
Error[Li006]: duplicate definitions for "FIH_LABEL_FIH_CALL_END_46_1"; in
"main.o(libtfm_spm.a)", and "tfm_hal_platform.o(libtfm_spm.a)"
Error[Li006]: duplicate definitions for "FIH_LABEL_FIH_CALL_START_46_1"; in
"main.o(libtfm_spm.a)", and "tfm_hal_platform.o(libtfm_spm.a)"
Error[Li006]: duplicate definitions for "FIH_LABEL_FIH_CALL_END_35_0"; in
"tfm_hal_platform.o(libtfm_spm.a)", and
"platform_svc_handler.o(libtfm_spm.a)"
Error[Li006]: duplicate definitions for "FIH_LABEL_FIH_CALL_START_35_0"; in
"tfm_hal_platform.o(libtfm_spm.a)", and
"platform_svc_handler.o(libtfm_spm.a)"
I did some investigations and I believe I know the root cause:
Looks like __COUNTER__ for IAR is unique only for a translation unit (.c file) - thus when 2 files have FIH call in same line with the same number of FIH calls before - it creates a label which overlaps with labels in other file.
For example tfm_hal_platform.c in our case has first FIH CALL in line 46 (which creates label FIH_LABEL_FIH_CALL_END_46_1) but main.c in our code also has first FIH CALL in line 46 which also results in FIH_LABEL_FIH_CALL_END_46_1 label.
The question is - how can we solve this issue? Any ideas I can try?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hello,
We're preparing two new minor releases: v2.1.4 and v2.2.2. Both releases update TF-M to include MbedTLS v3.6.5, which brings several vulnerability fixes and fix of the bug reported in v2.2.1.
Following a successful dry-run test we'll publish Release Candidate (RC1) followed by the final release.
As these are minor updates, we don't expect platform-specific testing, assuming the changes are platform-independent and that our CI coverage will be sufficient. However, please feel free to reach out if you have any
concerns or foresee any platform impact.
Thank you and best regards,
Anton
All,
Please be aware that today we have published our AI policy with Guidance on
AI-assisted contributions.
See the full details here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/aipolicy/
Should you have any questions feel free to raise them.
Thanks,
Shaun
Community Manager
Hi TF-M team,
In our product, we intend to use the vanilla MCUboot (specifically the Zephyr port) instead of the version bundled with Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M).
Since TF-M is optional for our use case, but MCUboot is a mandatory component, we prefer to decouple the two.
Seems there are some provisioning related items that need to be handled in vanilla MCUboot for this type of usage.
We would like to know if you foresee any security concerns or risks associated with this approach? Is this an expected of a usage?
Any feedback for this type of usage would be appreciated.
Thanks
Sadik
Hello,
The Open CI testing infrastructure is currently experiencing issues due to an FVP licensing problem.
Image builds remain operational but FVP-based tests are failing, which causes all build jobs to be marked as failed.
The Open CI team is actively working to resolve the issue.
An update will be shared once normal operation is restored.
Thanks,
Anton
Hi,
Currently TF-M and mcuboot have some "common" FIH code (see for example commit 0a74c1ea8a0c0783a2914d87cd2e88b677718a2e that copied fih.{c|h} from mcuboot. There are also multiple copies of fih.h within the TF-M repo (lib/fih/inc and bl2/ext/mcuboot/include).
Are there any plans to avoid having copies of that code? Maybe to split the FIH library into its own repo that can be used by both TF-M and mcuboot?
Thanks,
Chris
Hi TFM Developer Forum Organizer,
I'm currently integrating the CryptoCell3xx Runtime code for ECDSA hardware acceleration and have a question regarding the implementation.
I'm not entirely sure if this is the right list to post to - perhaps it belongs in mbed-tls or psa-crypto instead - so please forgive me and suggest the right list if this is not the appropriate forum.
I noticed that the repository contains two variants of pka_ec_wrst_smul: one under no_scap and another under scap, located in
/lib/ext/cryptocell-312-runtime/codesafe/src/crypto_api/pki/ec_wrst/.
From the filenames and comments, it appears that scap.c is the Side-Channel Attack (SCA)-resistant version, and would therefore be preferred for end-user products where stronger security is prioritized over performance.
However, in the current version of pka_ec_wrst_smul_scap.c from the main open-source branch, I found a couple of apparent typos/bugs that cause compilation errors:
Line 239: should probably be
PkaAddJcbJcb2Mdf(EC_SIGN_REG_XS, EC_SIGN_REG_YS, EC_SIGN_REG_ZS, EC_SIGN_REG_TS,
EC_SIGN_REG_XS, EC_SIGN_REG_YS, EC_SIGN_REG_ZS,
EC_SIGN_REG_X2, EC_SIGN_REG_T2, EC_SIGN_REG_Z2);
(currently missing the leading "P".)
Lines 389 and 391: the output parameters are declared as const, which seems incorrect. For example:
CCError_t PkaEcWrstScalarMult(const CCEcpkiDomain_t *pDomain, /*!< [in] Pointer to EC domain. */
const uint32_t *scalar, /*!< [in] Pointer to the scalar buffer. */
uint32_t scalSizeInWords, /*!< [in] Size of the scalar in 32-bit words. */
uint32_t *inPointX, /*!< [in] Pointer to input point X coordinate. */
const uint32_t *inPointY, /*!< [in] Pointer to input point Y coordinate. */
const uint32_t *outPointX, /*!< [out] Pointer to output point X coordinate. */
The const qualifier on the output parameters seems unintended and rather for inPointX.
Because of these issues, it seems this file might not have been recently reviewed or tested.
So, my questions are:
1. Is the CryptoCell312 Runtime actively maintained and tested in a specific branch where these typos/bugs are already fixed? If so, could you please share which branch that is?
2. If not, it seems that CMake currently only selects the no_scap variant. Does this mean the scap variant is not actively maintained or tested, and therefore not recommended for production use due to higher risk?
Thanks in advance for your help and clarification.
Best regards,
Masaki Sato
(P.S. I have sent this message from proofpoint TFM list by "Start a new thread" button. However, I don't see a record on the "posting activity" under my account profile nor active discussion list. Pardon me, but I'm a newbie to this forum, so please forgive me to send the same message by email.
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Hello,
I would like to inform the community that the TF-M v2.3.0 release has been postponed to April 2026 in order to incorporate the forthcoming PSA-Crypto LTS release, anticipated in Q1 2026.
This decision is intended to ensure improved long-term alignment between two projects.
I apologize for any inconvenience the delay may cause and appreciate your understanding.
Best regards,
Anton
Hello,
I have already poted this. but, i can't find my thread.
I’m trying to enable the PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_SECURE_DEBUG.
1) Platform (arm neoverse RDV3R1 (RSE))
repo init -u https://git.gitlab.arm.com/infra-solutions/reference-design/infra-refdesign… -m <manifest-file-name> -b refs/tags/<RELEASE_TAG> --depth=1
repo sync -c -j $(nproc) --fetch-submodules --force-sync --no-clone-bundle
manifest file: pinned-rdv3r1.xml
release tag: refs/tags/RD-INFRA-2025.07.03
2) Enabling the ADAC Parameter
\\wsl.localhost\Ubuntu-22.04\home\phillip\251020_ws\tf-m\config\config_base.cmake
I changed the parameter from FALSE to TRUE.
set(PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_SECURE_DEBUG TRUE CACHE BOOL "Whether to use psa-adac secure debug.")
3) Build Command
phillip@phillip3420:~/251020_ws$ ./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh -p rdv3r1 -f uefi build
4) Error Message
===============================================================================
-- Populating libpsaadac
-- Configuring done (0.0s)
-- Generating done (0.0s)
-- Build files have been written to: /home/phillip/251020_ws/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-subbuild
[1/9] Creating directories for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[1/9] Performing download step (git clone) for 'libpsaadac-populate'
Cloning into 'libpsaadac-src'...
HEAD is now at 819a254 Platform: Fix prototype for crypto_hw_apply_debug_permissions
[2/9] Performing update step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
-- Already at requested ref: 819a254af6fb5eefdcef194ec85d2c7627451351
[3/9] No patch step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[5/9] No configure step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[6/9] No build step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[7/9] No install step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[8/9] No test step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[9/9] Completed 'libpsaadac-populate'
CMake Error at cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src/target/trusted-firmware-m/config.cmake:12 (Message):
Platform arm/rse/neoverse_rd/rdv3r1 not supported.
Call Stack (most recent call first):
cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src/CMakeLists.txt:34 (include)
-- Configuring incomplete, errors occurred!
+++ handle_error
++++ caller 0
+++ local 'callinfo=93 do_build ./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh'
+++ local script=./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh
+++ local lineno=93
+++ local 'func=93 do_build'
+++ func=do_build
+++ echo
+++ echo -en '\e[1m\e[31mBuild failed: error while running do_build at line '
Build failed: error while running do_build at line +++ echo -en '93 in ./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh for rdv3r1[rdv3r1]'
93 in ./build-scripts/build-tf-m.sh for rdv3r1[rdv3r1]+++ echo -e '[uefi].\e[0m'
[uefi].
+++ echo
+++ exit 1
===============================================================================
5) My opinion
TFM_PLATFORM_PATH is "/home/phillip/251020_ws/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src/target/trusted-firmware-m/platform/arm/rse/neoverse_rd/rdv3r1" in my workpace.
But, in the "/home/phillip/251020_ws/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src/target/trusted-firmware-m/platform/arm/rse/" directory, there are only two folders, "common" and "tc".
PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_VERSION should be changed?
(The RD-INFRA-2025.07.03 source code use PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_VERSION as 819a254)
I would be grateful for any advice or pointers from anyone familiar with this.
Thanks
Best Regards
Phillip
Dear TF-M Community,
I have a question regarding rollback protection in Internal Trusted Storage.
Scenario:
Recently we are seeing an increasing number of products which will come to market without internal Flash; together with this, there is also the requirement to store permanent keys using PSA key management APIs as psa_import_key, which will then in turn use Internal Trusted Storage as place where keys will be written. Considering these requirements there is a necessity to implement the Internal Trusted Storage in external Flash, which brings with it security challenges: the keys stored in external Flash would require confidentiality but also rollback protection.
The encryption of ITS encryption was recently enabled as you can see in the following Pull request https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/15096, but rollback protection is not yet implemented.
Proposal:
Our proposal would be to:
- Add ITS rollback protection as optional feature, since it is not desired feature for product where the ITS storage is internal
- Add rollback protection mechanism to Internal Trusted Storage functions relying on the NV counters APIs called from the platform layer, similar as is already done for Protected Storage
Also, we are open to discuss any other proposal which would help us to fulfill the above requests (ITS in external Flash with still providing confidentiality and rollback protection).
Thanks in advance for the answer and further guidance on the topic.
KR,
Bojan Simoneta
Bojan Simoneta
(He / Him / His)
Principal Embedded SW Engineer
Phone: +433124 299160
Email: bojan.simoneta(a)nxp.com<mailto:bojan.simoneta@nxp.com>
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NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH & Co KG | Mikronweg 1, 8101 Gratkorn | Austria |
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Unless otherwise recorded in a signed, written agreement, all sales transactions by NXP are exclusively subject to NXP's Terms and Conditions of Commercial Sale ("NXP Terms") published at: www.nxp.com/profile/terms/index.html<http://www.nxp.com/profile/terms/index.html>. NXP explicitly rejects and disregards any terms and conditions of customer that add to, or differ from, NXP's Terms irrespective of when customer raises its terms. The information contained in this message is confidential. The message is intended solely for the addressee(s). If you are not the intended recipient, any use, dissemination, or reproduction is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful and you are asked to please contact the sender by return e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message.
Hi all,
We are considering moving the TF-M Coverity scan (the results from https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/view/TF-M/job/tf-m-coverity/) to a private instance.
I am sending this out to find out if anyone who is external to Arm uses these results, or would like to see the results in the future. If there is interest in keeping the public one working then we can have both the private and public ones running alongside each other to keep the results visible.
Please let me know if you are a user of the current Coverity system, or wish to be able to view the results in the future so the jobs can be configured accordingly. If no interest is shown then the Coverity scan will be switched over to only the private instance.
Thanks,
Matt Dalzell - Arm
Hello all,
Today we have upgraded the version of Arm GNU Toolchain on the TF-M OpenCI to version 14.3rel1. We ask that you please update your local version to match this to allow for ongoing compatibility.
If you have any questions or issues, please do not hesitate to let me know.
Thanks,
Matt Dalzell - Arm
FYI
From: Saheer Babu via Tf-openci <tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Date: Wednesday, 10 September 2025 at 15:17
To: tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-openci(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [Tf-openci] CI infrastructure scheduled maintenance: 12th Sep 2025
Hi all,
We will be performing upgrade of the clusters hosting review.trustedfirmware.org and ci.trustedfirmware.org on Friday, 12th Sep 2025 at 16:00 GMT+1.
During this maintenance window, both services will be unavailable for approximately 4 hours.
A follow-up email will be sent once the services are fully restored.
Best regards,
Saheer
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Hello,
We've identified an issue with the TF-M versioning: it reports the wrong version from Git tags (showing v2.1.3 instead of the correct v2.2.1). As a temporary workaround, please set the version manually. We're working on a fix and will share updates as soon as possible.
Best regards,
Anton Komlev
Hello,
I’m trying to enable the secure debug feature and configured TF-M as
follows:
1) Configuration
# ./config/config_base.cmake
set(PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_SECURE_DEBUG TRUE CACHE BOOL "Whether to use psa-adac
secure debug.")
set(PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_SOURCE_PATH "DOWNLOAD" CACHE PATH "Path to source dir
of psa-adac.")
set(PLATFORM_PSA_ADAC_VERSION "819a254" CACHE STRING "The version of
psa-adac to use.")
2) Build result (error)
-- Populating libpsaadac
-- Configuring done (0.0s)
-- Generating done (0.0s)
-- Build files have been written to:
/home/jkpark/ADP620/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-subbuild
[1/9] Creating directories for 'libpsaadac-populate'
[1/9] Performing download step (git clone) for 'libpsaadac-populate'
Cloning into 'libpsaadac-src'...
HEAD is now at 819a254 ADAC: Check return value of
psa_adac_generate_challenge
[2/9] Performing update step for 'libpsaadac-populate'
e*rror: pathspec '819a254;;' did not match any file(s) known to git *
*CMake Error at .../libpsaadac-populate-gitupdate.cmake:188
(execute_process): *
* execute_process failed command indexes: *
* 1: "Child return code: 1" *
3) Generated ExternalProject invocation
/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-subbuild/CMakeLists.txt
include(ExternalProject)
ExternalProject_Add(libpsaadac-populate
"UPDATE_DISCONNECTED" "False"
"GIT_REPOSITORY" "https://git.trustedfirmware.org/shared/psa-adac.git"
"EXTERNALPROJECT_INTERNAL_ARGUMENT_SEPARATOR"
"GIT_TAG" "819a254" "" ""
SOURCE_DIR
"/home/jkpark/ADP620/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-src"
BINARY_DIR
"/home/jkpark/ADP620/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/lib/ext/libpsaadac-build"
CONFIGURE_COMMAND ""
BUILD_COMMAND ""
INSTALL_COMMAND ""
TEST_COMMAND ""
USES_TERMINAL_DOWNLOAD YES
USES_TERMINAL_UPDATE YES
USES_TERMINAL_PATCH YES
)
*Questions *
*https://git.trustedfirmware.org/shared/psa-adac.git
<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/shared/psa-adac.git> *
*What is causing the tag-related error when using the repository at
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/shared/psa-adac.git
<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/shared/psa-adac.git> *
?
Environment
Path: /home/jkpark/ADP620/tf-m/cmake_build/rdv3r1/0/...
Platform: RDV3R1
I would be grateful for any advice or pointers from anyone familiar with
this.
Thank you!
Hi all,
TF-M has recently introduced Python packaging for its modules and
scripts. If you’re building the latest TF-M mainline, you’ll need to
install them by running the following command from the root of the TF-M
repository (using a virtual environment is recommended):
```
pip install .
```
or
```
# `-e` installs modules and scripts in editable/development mode i.e.
source edits are automatically reflected in your dev environment
pip install -e .
```
NOTE: You'll have to re-run the above command every time a new module is
added, module is renamed or a new dependency is added.
The documentation [1] has been updated with more details. In addition,
new guidelines are now available [2] for adding new scripts and modules.
Thank you.
Best regards,
Mudit Sharma
[1]:
https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/index.ht…
[2]:
https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/contributing/python_scri…
Hi,
TF-M's tech forum of today is cancelled due to unforeseen circumstances. Talks that were scheduled for today are postponed. Will confirm in which one of the upcoming occurrences. Apologies for the short notice.
Thanks,
Antonio
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To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; Don Harbin <don.harbin(a)linaro.org>; abdelmalek.omar1(a)gmail.com <abdelmalek.omar1(a)gmail.com>; Kevin Townsend (kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org) <kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org>; seth(a)nxmlabs.com <seth(a)nxmlabs.com>; leonardo.sandoval(a)linaro.org <leonardo.sandoval(a)linaro.org>; Joanna Farley <Joanna.Farley(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: TF-M Tech forum
When: Thursday, August 28, 2025 4:00 PM-5:00 PM.
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Dear TF-M Team,
I'm Takekazu Tabata, a director and architect from the Fujitsu processor team.
We are currently developing FUJITSU-MONAKA, which supports the CCA feature.
We have three questions regarding the TF-M documents and TF-M implementations.
We would greatly appreciate it if you could provide answers.
Question 1)
In the TF-M document “RSE provisioning”,
The CM provisioning Key is used to encrypt DM Provisioning Bundle.
https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/platform/arm/rse/rse_pro…
After the cold reset, the RSE will automatically transition to Device Manufacturer provisioning
state “DM” as the LCM hardware state-machine reads the values of the cm_config_1 and cm_config_2 fields as non-zero. This state is designed to provision the DM provisioning key, the DM code-encryption key and the DM config. The procedure follows the same steps as the CM provisioning flow, with the exception that the bundle will now be encrypted and signed using the CM provisioning key and must be placed at the base of VM1.
However, the purpose of the data provided in the DM is not described in this document. These data are not used in the source code of TF-M v2.2.0.
DM provisioning is probably assumed to be done during device manufacturing, but could you explain the purpose in more detail?
Also, What are the DM provisioning key, the DM code-encryption key and the DM config used for?
Question 2)
In the TF-M document “RSE integration guide”,
attestation key(CPAK) is derived by GUK.
https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/platform/arm/rse/rse_int…<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/platform/arm/rse/rse_int…>
The GUK is a key unique to a group of chips that have identical security properties, used to derive the attestation key.
However, CPAK is derived from HUK in the source code of TF-M. GUK in the specification is a typo.
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…>
/* This derives from HUK, there is a typo in the spec, not from GUK.
* FixMe: this should be configurable per platform
*/
return setup_key_from_derivation(KMU_HW_SLOT_HUK, NULL, iak_seed_label,
sizeof(iak_seed_label), NULL, 0,
RSE_KMU_SLOT_CPAK_SEED, /* FixMe: The slot needs rename to IAK_SEED */
&aes_key0_export_config, NULL, false,
boot_state_config);
Which is right, GUK or HUK?
If it‘s HUK (not Virtual HUK), is it no problem that multiple CPAKs are generated in Multi-socket systems?
Question 3)
In the CM/DM lifecycle state, is it no problem to create an original provisioning bundle to run chip or device verification programs in PE?
Thank you for your time and assistance.
Best regards,
TABATA
Dear TF-M Community,
I have a question regarding a specific use case involving interrupt handling
and domain preemption in a TrustZone-enabled system using TF-M.
In the scenario where the processor is executing within a Secure user
context (e.g., during Secure Partition execution), is it possible for an
interrupt assigned to the Non-Secure domain to pre-empt this Secure
execution?
* Does TF-M support such preemption by default?
* If not supported out-of-the-box, what modifications or configuration
changes would be required within TF-M to enable this behavior?
Any guidance on how TF-M manages interrupt priority and security attribution
in this context would be greatly appreciated.
Best regards,
Waqar Ali
Waqar Ali Tahir
(He / Him / His)
Embedded SW Engineer
Phone: +433124 299160
Email: <mailto:waqar.tahir@nxp.com> waqar.tahir(a)nxp.com
NXP Semiconductors Austria GmbH & Co KG | Mikronweg 1, 8101 Gratkorn |
Austria |
Sitz: Gratkorn, Österreich | Firmenbuchgericht: Landesgericht für ZRS Graz |
Firmenbuchnummer: FN 541474 k | VAT: ATU76231908
Unless otherwise recorded in a signed, written agreement, all sales
transactions by NXP are exclusively subject to NXPs Terms and Conditions of
Commercial Sale (NXP Terms) published at:
<http://www.nxp.com/profile/terms/index.html>
www.nxp.com/profile/terms/index.html. NXP explicitly rejects and disregards
any terms and conditions of customer that add to, or differ from, NXPs
Terms irrespective of when customer raises its terms. The information
contained in this message is confidential. The message is intended solely
for the addressee(s). If you are not the intended recipient, any use,
dissemination, or reproduction is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful
and you are asked to please contact the sender by return e-mail and destroy
all copies of the original message.
Hi Raef,
I share the issue while applying shared patchset.
Because a variable 'dma_channel_amount' is used after the DMA wipe DTCM,
it causes that dma_channel_amount have wrong data when waiting for DMA channel finish.
/* Configure all DMA channels to wipe the DTCM with the random value in parallel. */
for (int idx = 0; idx < dma_channel_amount; idx++) {
/* DMA channel configuration to wipe DTCM*/
}
/* Wait for all the DMA channels to finish */
for (int idx = 0; idx < dma_channel_amount; idx++) { // Error occurs at here
while ((*((volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x000)) & 0x1) != 0) {}
}
So i have chosen a way that use defined value using #define like below.
/* Enable the TRAM */
*(volatile uint32_t *)(TRAM_BASE_S + 0x004) = 0x00000001;
/* Generate the TRAM erase random value */
tram_erase_value = *((volatile uint32_t *)(CC3XX_BASE_S + 0x124));
/* Configure all DMA channels to wipe the DTCM with the random value in parallel. */
for (int idx = 0; idx < DMA350_DMA0_CHANNEL_COUNT; idx++) {
/* LINKADDR must be cleared because the command linking is used in DMA H/W boot. */
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x078) = 0x00000000;
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x038) = tram_erase_value;
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x02c) = 0x000F0044;
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x018) =
DTCM_CPU0_BASE_S + (DTCM_SIZE / DMA350_DMA0_CHANNEL_COUNT * idx);
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x030) = 0x00010000;
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x020) =
(DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint64_t) / DMA350_DMA0_CHANNEL_COUNT) << 16;
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x024) = 0x00000000;
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x00c) = 0x01200603;
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x008) = 0x00000000;
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x000) = 0x00000001;
}
/* Wait for all the DMA channels to finish */
for (int idx = 0; idx < DMA350_DMA0_CHANNEL_COUNT; idx++) {
while ((*((volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x100 * idx + 0x000)) & 0x1) != 0) {}
}
Please refer to it.
Best Regards
RH Kim
----- 원본 메시지 -----
보낸 사람: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>
받는 사람: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.xn--org>,-7104au55ev23e <winxp4333(a)adtek.co.kr>
날짜: 2025-07-28 22:06:49
제목: Re: [TF-M] Re: RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Ah thanks for the testing - I had indeed reused a variable after the TRAM init but before the zero. The following patchset should fix it, and remove the unneeded DMA ICS commands
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/41222/2https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/41224/1
Thanks,
Raef
________________________________________
From: 김륜현 via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 28 July 2025 12:57
To: Raef Coles; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Re: RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
OK, Thank you for sharing the plan.
About applying patch you gave,(https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/40838)
Using variables immediately after TRAM enable can cause bus errors due to the same reason we discussing.
/* Enable the TRAM */
*(volatile uint32_t *)(TRAM_BASE_S + 0x004) = 0x00000001;
In actual, the access to variables in DTCM occur bus error after TRAM enabled.
So i modified that it temporarily clear to 0 without using variable.
/* Enable the TRAM */
*(volatile uint32_t *)(TRAM_BASE_S + 0x004) = 0x00000001;
/* Erase the DTCM */
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x038) = 0; // FILLVAL
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x02c) = 0x000F0044; // DESTRANSCFG
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x018) = DTCM_CPU0_BASE_S; // DESADDR
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x030) = 0x00010000; // XADDRINC
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x020) = (DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint64_t)) << 16; // XSIZE
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x00c) = 0x1200603; // CONFIG
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x008) = 0x00000000; // Disable All Interrupt
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x000) = 0x00000001; // RUN_CMD
while ((*((volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x000)) & 0x1) != 0) {}
But, it needs to find a fundamental solution.
Please check it and i will share the solution if we find good idea.
Best Regards
RH Kim
----- 원본 메시지 -----
보낸 사람: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>
받는 사람: 김륜현 <winxp4333@adtek.co.kr>,tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
날짜: 2025-07-28 19:28:00
제목: Re: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Yeah you're right, the patch does add some duplication. In future we plan to remove the commands to generate the TRAM key, set the TRAM key, initialize the TRAM and erase the TRAM from the DMA ICS. This way it will always be handled in SW.
The issue we have is that the TRAM setup requires retrieving random values from the TRNG, and whether that is possible in the DMA ICS depends on which HW TRNG is being used. With a single register read interface (which is what the ICS assumes) it works okay, but with (for example) the cryptocell TRNG it's not possible to read using the ICS since it requires a poll on a status register and it's not possible to encode that into a DMA command.
To avoid having some TRNGs using the ICS and some using SW, we figured it was more sensible to perform the TRAM setup in SW in all cases.
I believe that the new SW flow _should_ work if the DMA flow has already been run, but if there are any issues (likely with the KMU keyslot) then the simplest solution is to just remove the DMA commands.
Raef
________________________________________
From: 김륜현 <winxp4333(a)adtek.co.kr>
Sent: 28 July 2025 02:00
To: Raef Coles; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Hi Raef
Thanks for your answer.
I'm trying to apply your patch our base code, but some of issue occur.
I will share the result when the patch is applied properly.
Before that, i have a question.
As i know, DMA descriptor(Program6) enables TRAM on DMA H/W boot.
(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/bl1/scripts)
I think that it seems to do duplicate operation as S/W about enabling TRAM.
Regarding this, is there still no fixed method for enabling TRAM?
Best Regards
RH Kim
----- 원본 메시지 -----
보낸 사람: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>
받는 사람: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.xn--org>,-7104au55ev23e <winxp4333(a)adtek.co.kr>
날짜: 2025-07-24 21:00:22
제목: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Hey RH
Apologies, this has been a known issue for a while (or rather, a series of known issues that we keep fixing).
We've just merged a patch upstream which:
* Replaces the function calls with fixed register writes to avoid issues with uninitialized global data
* Performs DTCM initialization in all cases, avoiding relying on the DMA ICS or having to check the SP mode
You can find it here https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/40838
Unfortunately we've only been able to test it on the FVP at the moment, which has limited ECC support. If you'd be able to test the patch and let me know if it fixes your issue, that would be appreciated.
Raef
________________________________________
From: 김륜현 via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 24 July 2025 05:38
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Dear TF-M developers
Hello, i'm developing and porting TF-M our platforms based on RDV3R1.
To enable TRAM, i modified a cmake config file like below(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/config.cmake)
- set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM OFF CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
+ set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM ON CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
First of all, RSE core boots with Virgin CM
In this mode, Secure Provisioning is not enabled so that the DTCM don't be initialized even if TRAM is enabled.
setup_tram_encryption()(a)startup_rse_bl1_1.c
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
Because DTCM doesn't be initialized, the next codes which use global variable in BL1_1 data section on DTCM cause hardfault.
So, i applied the workaround by modifying condition like below.
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
- if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
+ if ((lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
But the global variable in uninitialized DTCM are also used in bl1_trng_generate_random().
So, i tried to initialize DTCM as 0 without calling bl1_trng_generate_random().
But after that, setting SP_ENABLED for CM Provisioning causes warm reset, TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized.
It causes same problem.
I know that enabling TRAM is performed DMA descriptor without RSE_ENABLE_TRAM option, it may also cause the problem because of the phenomenon that TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized when warm reset.
Should i modify let it use local variable? or is there anything to fix this problem?
Best Regards
RH Kim
OK, Thank you for sharing the plan.
About applying patch you gave,(https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/40838)…
Using variables immediately after TRAM enable can cause bus errors due to the same reason we discussing.
/* Enable the TRAM */
*(volatile uint32_t *)(TRAM_BASE_S + 0x004) = 0x00000001;
In actual, the access to variables in DTCM occur bus error after TRAM enabled.
So i modified that it temporarily clear to 0 without using variable.
/* Enable the TRAM */
*(volatile uint32_t *)(TRAM_BASE_S + 0x004) = 0x00000001;
/* Erase the DTCM */
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x038) = 0; // FILLVAL
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x02c) = 0x000F0044; // DESTRANSCFG
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x018) = DTCM_CPU0_BASE_S; // DESADDR
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x030) = 0x00010000; // XADDRINC
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x020) = (DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint64_t)) << 16; // XSIZE
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x00c) = 0x1200603; // CONFIG
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x008) = 0x00000000; // Disable All Interrupt
*(volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x000) = 0x00000001; // RUN_CMD
while ((*((volatile uint32_t *)(DMA_350_BASE_S + 0x1000 + 0x000)) & 0x1) != 0) {}
But, it needs to find a fundamental solution.
Please check it and i will share the solution if we find good idea.
Best Regards
RH Kim
----- 원본 메시지 -----
보낸 사람: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>
받는 사람: 김륜현 <winxp4333@adtek.co.kr>,tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
날짜: 2025-07-28 19:28:00
제목: Re: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Yeah you're right, the patch does add some duplication. In future we plan to remove the commands to generate the TRAM key, set the TRAM key, initialize the TRAM and erase the TRAM from the DMA ICS. This way it will always be handled in SW.
The issue we have is that the TRAM setup requires retrieving random values from the TRNG, and whether that is possible in the DMA ICS depends on which HW TRNG is being used. With a single register read interface (which is what the ICS assumes) it works okay, but with (for example) the cryptocell TRNG it's not possible to read using the ICS since it requires a poll on a status register and it's not possible to encode that into a DMA command.
To avoid having some TRNGs using the ICS and some using SW, we figured it was more sensible to perform the TRAM setup in SW in all cases.
I believe that the new SW flow _should_ work if the DMA flow has already been run, but if there are any issues (likely with the KMU keyslot) then the simplest solution is to just remove the DMA commands.
Raef
________________________________________
From: 김륜현 <winxp4333(a)adtek.co.kr>
Sent: 28 July 2025 02:00
To: Raef Coles; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Hi Raef
Thanks for your answer.
I'm trying to apply your patch our base code, but some of issue occur.
I will share the result when the patch is applied properly.
Before that, i have a question.
As i know, DMA descriptor(Program6) enables TRAM on DMA H/W boot.
(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/bl1/scripts)
I think that it seems to do duplicate operation as S/W about enabling TRAM.
Regarding this, is there still no fixed method for enabling TRAM?
Best Regards
RH Kim
----- 원본 메시지 -----
보낸 사람: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>
받는 사람: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.xn--org>,-7104au55ev23e <winxp4333(a)adtek.co.kr>
날짜: 2025-07-24 21:00:22
제목: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Hey RH
Apologies, this has been a known issue for a while (or rather, a series of known issues that we keep fixing).
We've just merged a patch upstream which:
* Replaces the function calls with fixed register writes to avoid issues with uninitialized global data
* Performs DTCM initialization in all cases, avoiding relying on the DMA ICS or having to check the SP mode
You can find it here https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/40838
Unfortunately we've only been able to test it on the FVP at the moment, which has limited ECC support. If you'd be able to test the patch and let me know if it fixes your issue, that would be appreciated.
Raef
________________________________________
From: 김륜현 via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 24 July 2025 05:38
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Dear TF-M developers
Hello, i'm developing and porting TF-M our platforms based on RDV3R1.
To enable TRAM, i modified a cmake config file like below(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/config.cmake)
- set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM OFF CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
+ set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM ON CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
First of all, RSE core boots with Virgin CM
In this mode, Secure Provisioning is not enabled so that the DTCM don't be initialized even if TRAM is enabled.
setup_tram_encryption()(a)startup_rse_bl1_1.c
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
Because DTCM doesn't be initialized, the next codes which use global variable in BL1_1 data section on DTCM cause hardfault.
So, i applied the workaround by modifying condition like below.
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
- if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
+ if ((lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
But the global variable in uninitialized DTCM are also used in bl1_trng_generate_random().
So, i tried to initialize DTCM as 0 without calling bl1_trng_generate_random().
But after that, setting SP_ENABLED for CM Provisioning causes warm reset, TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized.
It causes same problem.
I know that enabling TRAM is performed DMA descriptor without RSE_ENABLE_TRAM option, it may also cause the problem because of the phenomenon that TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized when warm reset.
Should i modify let it use local variable? or is there anything to fix this problem?
Best Regards
RH Kim
Yeah you're right, the patch does add some duplication. In future we plan to remove the commands to generate the TRAM key, set the TRAM key, initialize the TRAM and erase the TRAM from the DMA ICS. This way it will always be handled in SW.
The issue we have is that the TRAM setup requires retrieving random values from the TRNG, and whether that is possible in the DMA ICS depends on which HW TRNG is being used. With a single register read interface (which is what the ICS assumes) it works okay, but with (for example) the cryptocell TRNG it's not possible to read using the ICS since it requires a poll on a status register and it's not possible to encode that into a DMA command.
To avoid having some TRNGs using the ICS and some using SW, we figured it was more sensible to perform the TRAM setup in SW in all cases.
I believe that the new SW flow _should_ work if the DMA flow has already been run, but if there are any issues (likely with the KMU keyslot) then the simplest solution is to just remove the DMA commands.
Raef
________________________________________
From: 김륜현 <winxp4333(a)adtek.co.kr>
Sent: 28 July 2025 02:00
To: Raef Coles; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Hi Raef
Thanks for your answer.
I'm trying to apply your patch our base code, but some of issue occur.
I will share the result when the patch is applied properly.
Before that, i have a question.
As i know, DMA descriptor(Program6) enables TRAM on DMA H/W boot.
(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/bl1/scripts)
I think that it seems to do duplicate operation as S/W about enabling TRAM.
Regarding this, is there still no fixed method for enabling TRAM?
Best Regards
RH Kim
----- 원본 메시지 -----
보낸 사람: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>
받는 사람: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>,김륜현 <winxp4333(a)adtek.co.kr>
날짜: 2025-07-24 21:00:22
제목: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Hey RH
Apologies, this has been a known issue for a while (or rather, a series of known issues that we keep fixing).
We've just merged a patch upstream which:
* Replaces the function calls with fixed register writes to avoid issues with uninitialized global data
* Performs DTCM initialization in all cases, avoiding relying on the DMA ICS or having to check the SP mode
You can find it here https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/40838
Unfortunately we've only been able to test it on the FVP at the moment, which has limited ECC support. If you'd be able to test the patch and let me know if it fixes your issue, that would be appreciated.
Raef
________________________________________
From: 김륜현 via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 24 July 2025 05:38
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Dear TF-M developers
Hello, i'm developing and porting TF-M our platforms based on RDV3R1.
To enable TRAM, i modified a cmake config file like below(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/config.cmake)
- set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM OFF CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
+ set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM ON CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
First of all, RSE core boots with Virgin CM
In this mode, Secure Provisioning is not enabled so that the DTCM don't be initialized even if TRAM is enabled.
setup_tram_encryption()(a)startup_rse_bl1_1.c
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
Because DTCM doesn't be initialized, the next codes which use global variable in BL1_1 data section on DTCM cause hardfault.
So, i applied the workaround by modifying condition like below.
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
- if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
+ if ((lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
But the global variable in uninitialized DTCM are also used in bl1_trng_generate_random().
So, i tried to initialize DTCM as 0 without calling bl1_trng_generate_random().
But after that, setting SP_ENABLED for CM Provisioning causes warm reset, TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized.
It causes same problem.
I know that enabling TRAM is performed DMA descriptor without RSE_ENABLE_TRAM option, it may also cause the problem because of the phenomenon that TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized when warm reset.
Should i modify let it use local variable? or is there anything to fix this problem?
Best Regards
RH Kim
Hi Raef
Thanks for your answer.
I'm trying to apply your patch our base code, but some of issue occur.
I will share the result when the patch is applied properly.
Before that, i have a question.
As i know, DMA descriptor(Program6) enables TRAM on DMA H/W boot.
(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/bl1/scripts)
I think that it seems to do duplicate operation as S/W about enabling TRAM.
Regarding this, is there still no fixed method for enabling TRAM?
Best Regards
RH Kim
----- 원본 메시지 -----
보낸 사람: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>
받는 사람: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.xn--org>,-7104au55ev23e <winxp4333(a)adtek.co.kr>
날짜: 2025-07-24 21:00:22
제목: Re: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Hey RH
Apologies, this has been a known issue for a while (or rather, a series of known issues that we keep fixing).
We've just merged a patch upstream which:
* Replaces the function calls with fixed register writes to avoid issues with uninitialized global data
* Performs DTCM initialization in all cases, avoiding relying on the DMA ICS or having to check the SP mode
You can find it here https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/40838
Unfortunately we've only been able to test it on the FVP at the moment, which has limited ECC support. If you'd be able to test the patch and let me know if it fixes your issue, that would be appreciated.
Raef
________________________________________
From: 김륜현 via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 24 July 2025 05:38
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] RSE booting with HardFault issue when TRAM enabled
Dear TF-M developers
Hello, i'm developing and porting TF-M our platforms based on RDV3R1.
To enable TRAM, i modified a cmake config file like below(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/config.cmake)
- set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM OFF CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
+ set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM ON CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
First of all, RSE core boots with Virgin CM
In this mode, Secure Provisioning is not enabled so that the DTCM don't be initialized even if TRAM is enabled.
setup_tram_encryption()(a)startup_rse_bl1_1.c
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
Because DTCM doesn't be initialized, the next codes which use global variable in BL1_1 data section on DTCM cause hardfault.
So, i applied the workaround by modifying condition like below.
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
- if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
+ if ((lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
But the global variable in uninitialized DTCM are also used in bl1_trng_generate_random().
So, i tried to initialize DTCM as 0 without calling bl1_trng_generate_random().
But after that, setting SP_ENABLED for CM Provisioning causes warm reset, TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized.
It causes same problem.
I know that enabling TRAM is performed DMA descriptor without RSE_ENABLE_TRAM option, it may also cause the problem because of the phenomenon that TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized when warm reset.
Should i modify let it use local variable? or is there anything to fix this problem?
Best Regards
RH Kim
Dear TF-M developers
Hello, i'm developing and porting TF-M our platforms based on RDV3R1.
To enable TRAM, i modified a cmake config file like below(platform/ext/target/arm/rse/common/config.cmake)
- set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM OFF CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
+ set(RSE_ENABLE_TRAM ON CACHE BOOL "Whether TRAM encryption is enabled")
First of all, RSE core boots with Virgin CM
In this mode, Secure Provisioning is not enabled so that the DTCM don't be initialized even if TRAM is enabled.
setup_tram_encryption()(a)startup_rse_bl1_1.c
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
Because DTCM doesn't be initialized, the next codes which use global variable in BL1_1 data section on DTCM cause hardfault.
So, i applied the workaround by modifying condition like below.
tram_enable_encryption(&tram_dev_s);
- if (sp_enabled == LCM_TRUE && (lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
+ if ((lcs == LCM_LCS_CM || lcs == LCM_LCS_DM)) {
bl1_trng_generate_random((uint8_t *)&random_word, sizeof(random_word));
for (idx = 0; idx < DTCM_SIZE / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++) {
((uint32_t *)DTCM_BASE_S)[idx] = random_word;
}
}
But the global variable in uninitialized DTCM are also used in bl1_trng_generate_random().
So, i tried to initialize DTCM as 0 without calling bl1_trng_generate_random().
But after that, setting SP_ENABLED for CM Provisioning causes warm reset, TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized.
It causes same problem.
I know that enabling TRAM is performed DMA descriptor without RSE_ENABLE_TRAM option, it may also cause the problem because of the phenomenon that TRAM is disabled but DTCM doesn't be initialized when warm reset.
Should i modify let it use local variable? or is there anything to fix this problem?
Best Regards
RH Kim
Hello,
This is a notification regarding a newly reported security vulnerability in Trusted Firmware-M (TF-M):
TFMV-9: Fix unchecked TLV payload length by Bartek Piekarski from Product Security team, Arm Ltd.
Please find the detailed security advisory attached. The fix for this issue has been merged into the latest main branch under the same identifier:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/40872
We are currently preparing hotfix releases v2.1.3 and v2.2.1, which will include this fix along with other bug fixes reported up to the release date via the TF-M issue tracker:
https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/issues?q=is%3Aissue
Thanks, and best regards
Anton Komlev
Hello,
I am currently developing TF-M on the RDV3R1 S/W platform, and I would like
to report a potential issue observed during runtime with the
integrity_checker_compute_value() function in BL2.
Problem Description:
Inside the integrity_checker_compute_value() function, the iccva register
is set to the address of either the value or temp_val variable, as shown in
the example below.
enum integrity_checker_error_t integrity_checker_compute_value(struct
integrity_checker_dev_t *dev,
enum
integrity_checker_mode_t mode,
const
uint32_t *data, size_t size,
uint32_t
*value, size_t value_size,
size_t
*value_len)
{
volatile uint32_t __ALIGNED(INTEGRITY_CHECKER_REQUIRED_ALIGNMENT)
temp_val[INTEGRITY_CHECKER_OUTPUT_SIZE_SHA256 / sizeof(uint32_t)] =
{0};
volatile uint32_t *value_ptr = value;
struct _integrity_checker_reg_map_t* p_integrity_checker =
(struct _integrity_checker_reg_map_t*)dev->cfg->base;
enum integrity_checker_error_t err;
uint32_t iccval = 0;
err = check_mode_is_supported(dev, mode, true);
if (err != INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_NONE) {
return err;
}
if (value_size < mode_sizes[mode]) {
FATAL_ERR(INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_COMPUTE_VALUE_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_COMPUTE_VALUE_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
if (((uintptr_t)data % INTEGRITY_CHECKER_REQUIRED_ALIGNMENT) != 0) {
FATAL_ERR(INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_COMPUTE_VALUE_INVALID_ALIGNMENT);
return INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_COMPUTE_VALUE_INVALID_ALIGNMENT;
}
if ((size % INTEGRITY_CHECKER_REQUIRED_ALIGNMENT) != 0) {
FATAL_ERR(INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_COMPUTE_VALUE_INVALID_LENGTH);
return INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_COMPUTE_VALUE_INVALID_LENGTH;
}
if (((uintptr_t)value % INTEGRITY_CHECKER_REQUIRED_ALIGNMENT) != 0) {
value_ptr = temp_val;
}
init_integrity_checker(dev, &iccval);
/* Set algorithm */
iccval |= (mode & 0b111) << 1;
/* Set to compute mode */
iccval |= 1 << 4;
/* Configure input data. Size is in words */
p_integrity_checker->icda = remap_addr(dev, (uintptr_t)data);
p_integrity_checker->icdl = size / INTEGRITY_CHECKER_REQUIRED_ALIGNMENT;
/* Set output address */
p_integrity_checker->iccva = remap_addr(dev, (uintptr_t)value_ptr);
/* Start integrity checker */
iccval |= 1;
p_integrity_checker->icc = iccval;
/* Poll for any interrupts */
while(!p_integrity_checker->icis) {}
/* Check for any unusual error interrupts */
if (p_integrity_checker->icis & (~0b11)) {
FATAL_ERR(INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_COMPUTE_VALUE_OPERATION_FAILED);
return INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_COMPUTE_VALUE_OPERATION_FAILED;
}
if (value_ptr != value) {
for (int idx = 0; idx < mode_sizes[mode] / sizeof(uint32_t); idx++)
{
value[idx] = value_ptr[idx];
}
}
if (value_len != NULL) {
*value_len = mode_sizes[mode];
}
return INTEGRITY_CHECKER_ERROR_NONE;
}
static void init_integrity_checker(struct integrity_checker_dev_t *dev,
uint32_t *iccval)
{
struct _integrity_checker_reg_map_t* p_integrity_checker =
(struct _integrity_checker_reg_map_t*)dev->cfg->base;
/* Set MatchTriggerDisable, as it is mandatory. */
*iccval |= 1 << 5;
/* Set EncompvalOut so the integrity checker writes the value pointer in
* compute mode.
*/
*iccval |= 1 << 6;
*iccval |= (IC_APROT_SECURE_PRIVILEGED & 0b11) << 7;
*iccval |= (IC_APROT_SECURE_PRIVILEGED & 0b11) << 9;
/* Disable all alarms */
p_integrity_checker->icae = 0;
/* Enable and clear all interrupts */
p_integrity_checker->icie = 0xFF;
p_integrity_checker->icic = 0xFF;
}
The issue arises because the memory areas pointed to by value and temp_val
are cacheable (e.g., located in the vm0 memory region, which is configured
as cacheable).
As a result, even though the integrity checker writes the output data to
the physical address of value or temp_val, the CPU cache is not updated,
and this leads to stale data being read later in software, resulting in
runtime errors.
Expected Behavior:
Ideally, the memory region used for integrity checker output should either
be:
Non-cacheable, or
Explicitly synchronized (e.g., cache invalidated or cleaned) after the
integrity checker operation.
Could you please confirm whether this is a known issue, and advise on the
recommended way to handle integrity checker outputs with respect to cache
settings?
Thank you.
JK Park
Hello, I'm a RSE firmware developer for Arm Neoverse V3 core.
I tried to build with argument MCUBOOT_ENC_IMAGES, MCUBOOT_ENCRYPT_RSA, and MCUBOOT_USE_PSA_CRYPTO for RSE PE encryption.
In this process, I encountered an error during build TF-M using the repo for tag:RD-INFRA-2025.07.03.
It seems that linking problem, and I found out that the error occurred while configuring BL2.
However, that's all. Can anyone help me?
Below log is in my terminal output.
p.s. If I reached wrong site, please forgive me and teach me a right one.
cmake --build build --target bl2
[ 0%] Built target manifest_tool
[ 0%] Built target bl2_scatter
[ 10%] Built target bl2_cc3xx_psa_driver_api
[ 31%] Built target bl2_cc3xx
[ 68%] Built target platform_bl2
[ 78%] Built target bl2_crypto
[ 94%] Built target bootutil
[ 94%] Linking C executable ../bin/bl2.axf
/home/gth1919/gcc-arm-none-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/10.3.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld: ext/mcuboot/bootutil/libbootutil.a(encrypted.o): in function `bootutil_rsa_oaep_decrypt':
/TF_M/build/lib/ext/mcuboot-src/boot/bootutil/include/bootutil/crypto/rsa.h:107: undefined reference to `psa_asymmetric_decrypt'
Memory region Used Size Region Size %age Used
FLASH: 80356 B 126 KB 62.28%
RAM: 35360 B 896 KB 3.85%
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
gmake[3]: *** [bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/build.make:222: bin/bl2.axf] Error 1
gmake[2]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:2661: bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/all] Error 2
gmake[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:2668: bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/rule] Error 2
gmake: *** [Makefile:520: bl2] Error 2
HP.
Mail.
010-6768-7791
gth1919(a)adtek.co.kr
Application Platform Group김태훈 연구원
(주)에이디테크놀로지
(16512) 경기도 수원시 영통구 광교중앙로248번길 7-8
Web. http://www.adtek.co.kr
Hi everyone,
We would like to propose the deprecation of the following two TF-M platforms:
1. Musca-S1 (Arm)
Musca-S1 was one of the earliest platforms featuring an Armv8-M silicon implementation, providing a valuable real hardware target for initial development. However, with the availability of many modern hardware platforms, Musca-S1 is no longer essential and can be deprecated.
2. BL5340_dvk_cpuapp (Laird Connectivity)
This platform was initially proposed for deprecation at the end of 2023. Support activity has been minimal, and it closely mirrors the already-supported nRF5340 platform from Nordic Semiconductor.
Please share any comments or objections regarding this proposal. If no major concerns are raised by the end of June 2025, we plan to mark these platforms as deprecated and proceed with their removal from the codebase.
Thank you,
Anton
Hi All,
We have recently undergone a migration of our Gerrit server and are seeing some issues.
One such change appears to be that https://review.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m no longer resolves to https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m. So please use the latter link if that is what you wish to access.
This is causing a large slow-down on the CI causing jobs to not be run.
These issues are being actively worked on and we hope all will be back up and running normally soon.
If you have any questions or related issues please feel free to respond to this chain.
Thank you for your patience,
Matt
Hi
When compiling with IAR bxarm 9.7.1 i get the following linker errors:
cmake -S . -B cmake_build -DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521 -DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=toolchain_IARARM.cmake
cmake --build cmake_build -- install
[25/31] Linking C executable bin/tfm_s.axf
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/ubuntu/import/source/trusted-firmware-m/
cmake_build/platform/libplatform_s.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/ubuntu/import/source/trusted-firmware-m/
cmake_build/secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/libtfm_sprt.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/ubuntu/import/source/trusted-firmware-m/
cmake_build/secure_fw/spm/libtfm_spm.a"
In the build.ninja file you can see that all those libraries are includes twice.
LINK_LIBRARIES = platform/libplatform_s.a secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/libtfm_sprt.a secure_fw/spm/libtfm_spm.a secure_fw/partitions/internal_trusted_storage/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_its.a secure_fw/partitions/platform/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_platform.a platform/libplatform_s.a secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/libtfm_sprt.a secure_fw/spm/libtfm_spm.a secure_fw/partitions/internal_trusted_storage/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_its.a secure_fw/partitions/platform/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_platform.a
Is there a reason this is not resolved or this just the way Cmake works?
Is there an easy way to resolve this on the platform level?
I used the an521 as a template to create my platform.
In my platform this list grows with every feature I activate:
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/platform/libplatform_s.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/libtfm_sprt.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/spm/libtfm_spm.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/platform/libplatform_crypto_keys.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/crypto/mbedcrypto/library/libmbedcrypto.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/crypto/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/internal_trusted_storage/libtfm_psa_rot_partit
ion_its.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/platform/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_platform.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/firmware_update/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_fwu.a
"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/libtfm_sp_log.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/platform/libplatform_s.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/libtfm_sprt.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/spm/libtfm_spm.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/platform/libplatform_crypto_keys.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/crypto/mbedcrypto/library/libmbedcrypto.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/crypto/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/internal_trusted_storage/libtfm_psa_rot_partit
ion_its.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/platform/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_platform.a"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/firmware_update/libtfm_psa_rot_partition_fwu.a
"
Warning[Li065]: duplicate file: "/home/source/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_buil
d/secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/libtfm_sp_log.a"
If possible, I want to build without warnings.
Thanks for your help
Kind regards,
Nico
Hello,
I just recently found out that there's a concept of key ownership in TF-M
(e.g., if a new secure partition creates a key and returns the key handle
to NSPE, NSPE can't export it even if the key is config-ed to be exportable
-- the key can only be used by the owner).
My question is: is this design based on PSA or specific to just TF-M
implementation?
Thank you in advance,
--
Oak Norrathep
--
ศูนย์กลางการศึกษานานาชาติ มุ่งสู่ความเป็นเลิศทางวิชาการของอาเซียน
International education hub towards ASEAN’s academic excellence
Hi TF-M community,
When I am trying to build TF-M regression test for 2.2.x release, I sets the tf-m-tests repo version to recommended TF-Mv2.1.2-RC2. The tf-m-tests tests_reg/spe/CMakeLists.txt has following line:
install(FILES ${CONFIG_TFM_SOURCE_PATH}/lib/ext/qcbor/q_useful_buf.h
DESTINATION ${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/api_ns/qcbor/inc)
However, release 2.2.x https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git… has removed q_useful_buf.h. Therefore, causing a build error.
Is there anything I am missing. Any help would be appreciated.
Best regards,
Hao
Dear whoever that may concern,
I am trying to build TF-M with release/2.1.x. The first error I see when cloning mbedcrypto is
Cloning into 'mbedcrypto-src'...
remote: Enumerating objects: 31188, done.
remote: Counting objects: 100% (31188/31188), done.
remote: Compressing objects: 100% (15898/15898), done.
remote: Total 31188 (delta 24658), reused 20224 (delta 15043), pack-reused 0 (from 0)
Receiving objects: 100% (31188/31188), 35.81 MiB | 4.89 MiB/s, done.
Resolving deltas: 100% (24658/24658), done.
fatal: invalid reference: f985bee
CMake Error at mbedcrypto-subbuild/mbedcrypto-populate-prefix/tmp/mbedcrypto-populate-gitclone.cmake:40 (message):
Failed to checkout tag: 'f985bee'
I therefore change the GIT_SHALLOW to FALSE, and it builds. However, another build error come up when applying patches for mbedcrypto.
Checking patch library/psa_crypto.c...
Checking patch library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h...
error: library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h: No such file or directory
Checking patch library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c...
error: library/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers_no_static.c: No such file or directory
I did checkout commit f985bee and find in fact there is no psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h. Is it possible that the commit hash is incorrect?
Best regards,
Hao
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Hello,
I'm trying to fit a new Secure Partition into Trusted Firmware - M environment. The current working environment consists of Zephyr RTOS 3.7 + TF-M 2.1.0 running under QEMU on MPS2 AN521 platform. General skeleton is in place - manifest with dependencies on TFM_CRYPTO, interface, IPC and handling communication.
However, I have problems with using the PSA Crypto from the aforementioned new Service. I need a hash function, so I thought I'd use PSA Crypto API. The problem is that either the hash function or the initialization function (psa_crypto_init) is returning error (PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY). I discovered that logs show PSA Crypto partition is loading after mine.
This problem occurs in the entry_point function.
Is it possible to change the order of partitions loading or is there different mechanism advised to synchronize partition loading?
Thank you in advance for your suggestions.
Best regards,
Bartlomiej
Hi all,
There are some planned outages for Friday morning (30th May UK around 10AM BST) to our CI.
This will affect the review process for a short period of time, expected to be less than one hour, but may cause some disruption over the weekend too.
I will be sure to send out another message once things have settled and should be back to normal.
Thank you for your patience and apologies in advance for any issues which may arise,
Matt
Hi all,
I am trying to build docs with following commands:
cmake -S docs -B ./build_docs
cmake --build build_docs/ -- tfm_docs_userguide_pdf
But I get following error
resolving references...
failed
Warning, treated as error:
RSVG converter command 'rsvg-convert' cannot be run. Check the rsvg_converter_bin setting
When I remove -W (warnings are errors) option from
COMMAND "${SPHINX_EXECUTABLE}" -W -b html -j 1 -c ${SPHINXCFG_CONFIG_PATH} ${SPHINXCFG_SOURCE_PATH} "${SPHINXCFG_OUTPUT_PATH}/html"
In docs/CMakeLists.txt then docs builds fine.
Is this -W option intentional? Should this issue be fixed or -W removed?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi,
Per https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-07 (which is latest spec I can find for profile 1 token):
The Certification Reference claim is used to link the class of chip and PSA RoT of the attesting device to an associated entry in the PSA Certification database. It MUST be represented as a thirteen-digit [EAN-13<https://www.gs1.org/standards/barcodes/ean-upc>].¶<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-07#se…>
Linking to the PSA Certification entry can still be achieved if this claim is not present in the token by making an association at a Verifier between the reference value and other token claim values - for example, the Implementation ID.¶<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-07#se…>
psa-certification-reference-type = text .regexp "[0-9]{13}"
psa-certification-reference = (
? psa-certification-reference-key =>
psa-certification-reference-type
)
But in the tf-m-tools repo:
iat-verifier\iatverifier\psa_iot_profile1_token_claims.py it checks for PSA 2.0 profile HW version which is EAN-13 + 5.
class HardwareVersionClaim(AttestationClaim):
"""Class representing a PSA Attestation Token Hardware version claim"""
def verify(self, token_item):
self._check_type('HARDWARE_VERSION', token_item.value, str)
value_len = len(token_item.value)
expected_len = 19 # 'EAN13-Version' 13 + 1 + 5. e.g.:0604565272829-10010
if len(token_item.value) != expected_len:
msg = 'Invalid HARDWARE_VERSION length; must be {} characters, found {} characters'
self.verifier.error(msg.format(expected_len, value_len))
for idx, character in enumerate(token_item.value):
if character not in string.digits:
if idx != 13 or character not in '-':
msg = 'Invalid character {} at position {}'
self.verifier.error(msg.format(character, idx+1))
It seems like this was changed 3yrs ago:
SHA-1: 8ac8d17d15353c7f7933ae8065646946ae47f993
* Fix HW Version claim expected length
www.psacertified.org issuing HW versions of format '[0-9]{13}-[0-9]{5}'.
It is called 'certification reference':
https://www.psacertified.org/certified-products/
Signed-off-by: Tamas Ban <tamas.ban(a)arm.com>
Change-Id: I0417e1ce76896f1128864676f29a4314b3fd1fb8
When I run "check_iat" script, I get these errors:
./scripts/check_iat -k public_key.pem -K -p -t PSA-IoT-Profile1-token cc27xx.cbor
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid HARDWARE_VERSION length; must be 19 characters, found 13 characters
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character i at position 1
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character r at position 2
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character m at position 3
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character w at position 4
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character a at position 5
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character r at position 6
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character e at position 7
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character . at position 8
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character o at position 9
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character r at position 10
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character g at position 11
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character at position 12
ERROR:iat-verifiers:Invalid character at position 13
Is the verifier tool incorrect or should I be following "EAN13-Version' 13 + 1 + 5" even for profile 1 token?
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi team,
Can you help me with this statement that "Currently, the TF-M Secure Storage service implements PSA Protected Storage version 1.0-beta2. There is not yet an implementation of PSA Internal Trusted Storage in TF-M."
Our SoC does NOT have internal flash, but we have OTP where we keep the confidential data. Can you help how to handle this ITS situation. I wonder if PSA level-2 certification requires ITS? Thanks
BR
Michael
Hi Antonio,
I figured it out. I wasn’t including secure_fw/partitions/crypto/tfm_mbedcrypto_include.h properly so attestation was linking directly to the PSA Crypto function implementation instead of the client interface. I’m surprised it did not complain about a symbol collision without having the mbedcrypto__ prefix. The PSA crypto API implementation source files were “PRIVATE” so I’m not sure how attestation was able to link to them at all.
Regards,
Brian
From: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>
Sent: Thursday, May 8, 2025 9:42 AM
To: Quach, Brian <brian(a)ti.com>; Mudit Sharma <Mudit.Sharma(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Attestation calls to PSA Crypto
Hi Brian, we can't reproduce exactly that mixture easily but I don't think that should affect how the partition code gets linked to the interface code. Regardless of the type of partition (SFN/IPC) the linking of the interfaces should remain
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Hi Brian,
we can't reproduce exactly that mixture easily but I don't think that should affect how the partition code gets linked to the interface code. Regardless of the type of partition (SFN/IPC) the linking of the interfaces should remain the same, i.e. your setup should not be able to link at all directly with the crypto library that provides the PSA Crypto APIs.
Thanks, Antonio
________________________________
From: Quach, Brian
Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2025 15:29
To: Mudit Sharma; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: Antonio De Angelis
Subject: RE: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Attestation calls to PSA Crypto
Hi Mudit,
Thanks for checking. Is the build you tested using the same mix of SFN and IPC as I was?
Regards,
Brian
From: Mudit Sharma <mudit.sharma(a)arm.com<mailto:mudit.sharma@arm.com>>
Sent: Thursday, May 8, 2025 5:21 AM
To: Quach, Brian <brian(a)ti.com<mailto:brian@ti.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com<mailto:Antonio.DeAngelis@arm.com>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Attestation calls to PSA Crypto
Hi Brian, We built secure world TF-M test for AN521 platform: ``` cmake -S spe -B build_spe -DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521 \ -DCONFIG_TFM_SOURCE_PATH="$TFM_SOURCE_DIR" \ -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug \ -DTEST_S=ON -DTEST_NS=OFF ``` We ran this test
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Hi Brian,
We built secure world TF-M test for AN521 platform:
```
cmake -S spe -B build_spe -DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521 \
-DCONFIG_TFM_SOURCE_PATH="$TFM_SOURCE_DIR" \
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug \
-DTEST_S=ON -DTEST_NS=OFF
```
We ran this test on a FVP model and stepped through
`tfm_attest_test_1001`. Please find attached a screenshot of the call stack.
Function in `attest_core` (in the Attestation partition) invokes
function in the `tfm_crypto_api`. This request is routed by the Secure
Partition Manager (SPM) into the Crypto partition via `psa_call()`.
On 5/6/25 00:33, Quach, Brian wrote:
>
> Is my configuration valid? How should it work?
>
Any time you call a function across partitions, regardless of isolation
level, the SPM forwards it to the target partition using `psa_call()`
>
Best regards,
Mudit Sharma
Hi,
Assuming Isolation Level 1 and IPC backend, I'm using Attestation partition with SFN model with stateless handle and a custom Crypto partition using IPC model with stateless handle. My custom Crypto partition includes a PSA crypto wrapper which defines all the PSA Crypto APIs to use HW crypto. We used IPC since we want to be able to support isolation level 2-3 in the future.
When the Attestation partition make calls to PSA Crypto (psa_hash_setup for example), should it use a psa_call() to the Crypto Partition? That is what I had expected since the crypto partition is IPC model but I'm seeing it call the PSA crypto code directly. Also, it appears to provide client side psa_hash_operation_t directly to the psa_hash_setup which is expecting the full operation struct.
Is my configuration valid? How should it work?
[ 52%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/partitions/_1/crypto_sp/CMakeFiles/ti_tfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.dir/home/brian/gits/secure_drivers/source/third_party/psa_crypto/psa_crypto_wrapper.o
[ 53%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/partitions/_1/crypto_sp/CMakeFiles/ti_tfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.dir/__/__/__/__/__/generated/secure_fw/partitions/ti_crypto/auto_generated/intermedia_crypto_sp.o
[ 53%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/partitions/_1/crypto_sp/CMakeFiles/ti_tfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.dir/home/brian/gits/spe/source/third_party/tfm/platform/ext/common/syscalls_stub.o
[ 54%] Linking C static library libti_tfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.a
[ 54%] Built target ti_tfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto
[ 54%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/tfm_attest.o
[ 55%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/tfm_attest_req_mngr.o
[ 55%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/attest_core.o
[ 56%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/attest_boot_data.o
[ 56%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/attest_asymmetric_key.o
[ 57%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/attest_token_encode.o
[ 57%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/__/__/__/generated/secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/auto_generated/intermedia_tfm_initial_attestation.o
[ 58%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/__/__/__/lib/ext/t_cose/src/t_cose_sign1_sign.o
[ 58%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/__/__/__/lib/ext/t_cose/src/t_cose_sign1_verify.o
[ 59%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/__/__/__/lib/ext/t_cose/src/t_cose_util.o
[ 59%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/__/__/__/lib/ext/t_cose/src/t_cose_parameters.o
[ 60%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/__/__/__/lib/ext/t_cose/crypto_adapters/t_cose_psa_crypto.o
[ 60%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/initial_attestation/CMakeFiles/tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.dir/__/__/__/platform/ext/common/syscalls_stub.o
[ 61%] Linking C static library libtfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation.a
[ 61%] Built target tfm_psa_rot_partition_attestation
[ 61%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/__/platform/ext/common/syscalls_stub.o
[ 62%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/crt_memcmp.o
[ 62%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/crt_memmove.o
[ 63%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/crt_strnlen.o
[ 63%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/service_api.o
[ 64%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/shared/crt_memcpy.o
[ 64%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/shared/crt_memset.o
[ 65%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/sprt_partition_metadata_indicator.o
[ 65%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/sfn_common_thread.o
[ 66%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/psa_api_ipc.o
[ 66%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/spm/core/psa_interface_thread_fn_call.o
[ 67%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/__/interface/src/tfm_attest_api.o
[ 67%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/__/interface/src/tfm_psa_call.o
[ 68%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/__/interface/src/tfm_crypto_api.o
[ 68%] Linking C static library libtfm_sprt.a
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi everyone,
We're excited to announce the release of TF-M v2.2.0!
Major Highlights:
*
LLVM build support for MPS2/3/4 and RSE platforms.
* Mbed TLS upgraded to version 3.6.3.
* Now compliant with PSA Architecture Compliance Kit tests v1.6.
* Initial hybrid platform support:
* Enables on-core and off-core clients (A-profile + M-profile or multiple M-profile).
* Uses HYBRID_PLAT_SCHED_TYPE=NSPE (aka Solution 2).
* Note: This feature is under active development and testing.
* New platforms support
* Initial support for building nRF54L15
* Initial support for building stm32wba65i-dk
For full details, please refer to the release notes<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/tf-mv2.2.0/releases/2.2.0.html>.
TF-M v2.1.2 (LTS) Release
We've also released TF-M v2.1.2 on the LTS branch, which includes critical bug fixes, such as:
* Fixed issue where Protected Storage content could be lost under full storage conditions followed by device resets.
* Correctly mark NSPE images in the wrapper.
* Various SPM fixes:
* Removed specific section for psa_interface_thread_fn_call.
* Added missing fih_rc return value checks in interrupts.
* Resolved issues with IOVEC unmapping.
* Proper handling of refused psa_connect calls.
* Fixed invalid connection retention after psa_close.
* Resolved issues with reverse-handle usage.
*
*
New platform support:
*
MAX32657 port now available.
A huge thank you to everyone who contributed, reviewed, and supported this release!
The v2.2.0 changes will be ported to the main branch shortly. Stay tuned!
Anton and TF-M team
Hi
Just forwarding older private discussion to mailing list to make it publicly available.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
From: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 14, 2023 15:57
To: Mazurak Roman (CSS ICW SW FW 3) <Roman.Mazurak(a)infineon.com>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; Hunko Bohdan (CSS ICW SW FW 3) <Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com>
Subject: Re: Weird behavior of Clang linker
Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>.
Hi Roman,
I tried to look in the ELF spec that I could find by googling, but what I can find online doesn't mention the topic of alignment requirements at all other than a brief mention of how the base address and align requirements must be coherent. How the requirement on alignment propagates from sections to execution regions to load regions is still something that I am trying to understand as I can't find an exhaustive description. The info I shared below stem from a personal conversation that I had with the compiler team internally here in Arm, I have now asked for a reference, will revert back to you in case I get one.
[cid:0aef50f0-9105-480f-8090-06cfaa06b8d3]
Only explicit mention of alignment that I could find is in the armlink manual in section 3.3.3.
[cid:ef5c45ef-7d67-433c-9aba-b8fd7cf0d1c0]
The suggestion from the compiler team are as I mentioned:
1. just disable the strict checks on alignment (i.e. the linker will be then allowed to add padding as required to meet the constraint imposed by the base address of the load region and the ALIGN attributes, by suppressing the diagnostic or using --legacyalign (on a side note, I believe this is the default behaviour on GCC linker for example)
2. rewrite the scatter file to have all the input sections without alignment requirements in the output section where the vector reside, and then have another output section just after the first output section (i.e. with base address +0) to put all the other input sections with increased alignment. As a side note, the suggestion is to also align base addresses of sections using AlignExpr(+0, 4096) (for example, to align to 0x1000) rather than forcing ALIGN attributes. Note that this shouldn't be too complex to attain point 2 but it is something that at the moment we can't work on, but happily merge it in if you're willing to provide a patch for it. Your suggestion of having multiple output section is as well doable, but probably enough to have two of them.
Will get back to you in case I get some more reference about how the alignment requirements in ELF propagate from input section to output sections just to confirm on the spec itself.
Hope this helps, please let me know if any questions!
Thanks, Antonio
________________________________
From: Roman.Mazurak(a)infineon.com<mailto:Roman.Mazurak@infineon.com> <Roman.Mazurak(a)infineon.com<mailto:Roman.Mazurak@infineon.com>>
Sent: Thursday, December 14, 2023 13:37
To: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com<mailto:Antonio.DeAngelis@arm.com>>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com> <Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>>
Subject: RE: Weird behavior of Clang linker
Hi Antonio,
We have a use case when output section has following list of input sections:
* Vectors with alignment by 0x400.
* Partitions sections with alignment by 0x1000.
As result output section alignment is 0x1000 and address is incorrect. So, probably it’s necessary to create a separate output section for each input section.
Can you share a link to ELF specification with requirements for output section alignment?
Best regards,
Roman.
From: Antonio De Angelis via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Wednesday, December 13, 2023 18:56
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Hunko Bohdan (CSS ICW SW FW 3) <Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Weird behavior of Clang linker
Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>.
Hi Bohdan,
For reference, this is due to armlink being strict on following the ELF specification for which the region alignment is derived as the maximum alignment of the input sections. You can relax this requirement with armlink by either using the --legacyalign option (although it's being deprecated) or suppressing the diagnostic --diag_suppress=6244. In the future, we could try to reorganize the scatter file for the armclang toolchain to avoid using directly ALIGN attributes and align the base address of the execution regions using AlignExpr() instead, but even with this strategy, any alignment requirement which stems from using .aligned directive in assembly or attribute __ ((aligned)) attributes will influence the input sections alignment, hence it will require a deeper restructuring of the scatter file, possibly moving sections with increased alignment in a separate load region just after LR_CODE which must have a base address that forces a natural alignment.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
________________________________
From: Bohdan.Hunko--- via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2023 13:39
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Weird behavior of Clang linker
Hi Anton,
Here is the version I am using:
$ armclang --version
Product: Arm Development Studio Gold Edition 2020.1
Component: Arm Compiler for Embedded 6.19
Tool: armclang [5e73cb00]
Target: unspecified-arm-none-unspecified
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
From: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2023 15:34
To: Hunko Bohdan (CSS ICW SW FW 3) <Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: RE: Weird behavior of Clang linker
Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>.
Hi Bohdan,
What is Clang version you are using?
Thanks,
Anton
From: Bohdan.Hunko--- via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Monday, December 11, 2023 12:58 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Weird behavior of Clang linker
Hi all,
Our platform uses 4KBs alignment in linker files (as this is the requirement of our protection HW).
For this reasons I have introduced tfm_s_linker_alignments.h.
Everything works fine with GCC but we have a problem with Clang. The problem is that Clang requires LR_CODE to have same alignment as other sections inside of it.
Following are the steps to reproduce the issue:
1. Set TFM_LINKER_DEFAULT_ALIGNMENT to 0x1000 in tfm_s_linker_alignments.h
2. Build AN521 with following command line
cmake -S . -B build_an521 -DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521 -DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=./toolchain_ARMCLANG.cmake
Expected result:
Everything works fine
Actual result:
Error: L6244E: Load region LR_CODE address (0x10080400) not aligned on a 4096 byte boundary.
This error is weird because there is no explicit alignment assigned to LR_CODE region.
Would appreciate a help on this as it is a blocking issue for us.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hi, does TF-M use LTO? I didn't see any flags to disable it in toolchain_GNUARM.cmake. I think for GCC, it's enabled by default if no flag is set.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hello,
We're kicking off the release process for TF-Mv2.2.0, starting with the TF-Mv2.2.0-RC1 tag.
As part of this release phase, we're also updating the previous version to TF-Mv2.1.2, which includes critical bug fixes and support for new platforms. New TF-Mv2.1.2-RC1 tag will follow shortly.
After completing initial testing on the reference platform and addressing all identified issues, we'll reach out to platform owners to verify TF-M on platforms not available in LAVA. Please note, the verification might be requested on a different tag by that time.
Let me remind that the code is not frozen, and development can be continued on the main branch as described in TF-M Release Process<https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/releases/release_process.html#r…>.
Thanks,
Anton
Hi Team,
I am setting the TFM_SPM_LOG_LEVEL to DEBUG in platform config.cmake. Yet it is getting overwritten by TFM_SPM_LOG_LEVEL_SILENCE. Is there any other place I need to look for? Thanks.
Michael KH
# LOG LEVEL
set(TFM_SPM_LOG_LEVEL TFM_SPM_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG CACHE STRING "Set default SPM log level as DEBUG level")
Hello,
TF-M release v2.2.0 is unfortunately delayed for about a month.
The new tentative start date is the end of February with a goal to complete the release at the middle of March.
The main reasons of the delay are:
* Delays in PSA certification of RPi2350 platform
* An opportunity to accommodate of Mbed TLS v3.6.3 planned on February
* Limited availability of TF-M maintainers
Thanks, and sorry for the possible inconveniences caused be this delay,
Anton
Hello,
Following the Tech Forum yesterday I am repeating the questions asked at the time.
Please share your opinions
* Do we need C++ support on S side?
* CLANG/LLVM toolchain name
* toolchain_CLANG.cmake vs toolchain_LLVM.cmake
* Can we drop the support of -march -mtune options in favor of -mcpu only?
* Can we limit supported toolchains to the earliest version with m55 support?
In other words: is there anyone who must use toolchains earlier than in the table?
Toolchain
Cortex-M55 support since
Release Date
ArmClang
V6.14
March 2020
GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain
V10.
December 2020
LLVM Embedded Toolchain for Arm
V11.0.0
September 2020
IAR Embedded Workbench
V8.50
November 2020
Thanks,
Anton
Hi Everyone,
Following today's announcement in the Tech Forum, I am pleased to share that the TF-M maintainer team is expanding.
We warmly welcome back David Hu (davidhuzj(a)gmail.com<mailto:davidhuzj@gmail.com>) to the maintainer team!
David has been a key contributor and TF-M maintainer for several years. After a brief pause, he has kindly agreed to resume his role, overseeing TF-M changes once again.
Thank you, David, for your continued commitment and contributions to the project!
All the best,
Anton
Hi,
In TF-M v2.0, Initial_attestation.h says:
* The initial attestation token is planned to be aligned with future version of
* Entity Attestation Token format:
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mandyam-eat-01
But that spec is expired and superceded with the following.
Is the implementation aligned with the following spec? If so, what version of this spec is actually supported?
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rats-eat/02/
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hello Everyone,
We are currently working on TF-M for the firmware of our Cortex-M55 based core, part of a bigger platform
including a cortex-A based application processor, a bit like the corstone1000.
We use the RAM_LOAD boot mode of TF-M/MCUBoot and we want to implement an upgrade strategy based on
2 banks, and a switch to decide which bank to boot from. I have a few questions regarding some design choices.
I hope someone can answer them. Please correct me if some of my assumptions are wrong.
*
For the generic Firmware Upgrade partition, are there plans to support the RAM_LOAD mode ? Do you have
suggestions about what is missing or how it should be done ?
*
Currently, MCUBoot in RAM_LOAD mode only supports booting the slot with the highest version.
Do you think it is realistic to try and integrate another boot mode in MCUBoot that matches our needs ?
I'm asking this because I noticed that the corstone1000 platform has been developed working around
this limitation by changing the flash_map at platform initialization in order to abstract the problem from
MCUBoot completely.
Thank you and all the best,
Julien
Hi all,
I would like to know if the PSA ITS is protected in case tearing cases (power failure) happening during write/erase in the internal flash, using `psa_its_set()` or `psa_its_remove()`, please.
Thanks a lot.
Best regards,
Abel.
Could you please help with my issue? Thank you!
From: Michael Ji
Sent: Friday, February 14, 2025 4:15 PM
To: Raef.Coles(a)arm.com; Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com
Subject: TFM build error
Hi Raef and Anton:
I am following the steps in this webpage to build tfm on my Windows laptop:
https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/index.ht…
All my steps are successful till I ran this command below and got error (FYI - I am using the platform arm/mps2/an521 and GNU ARM compiler):
[cid:image001.png@01DB7EFB.878CE310]
Could you share your insight on how to resolve this? Thank you very much!
Best,
Michael
Hi all,
We would like to remove PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22remove-psa_iot_1%22> which is an early attestation token profile (used for the original
implementation of the PSA Initial Attestation service) and has been superseded by profile PSA 2.0.0
(https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#nam…).
The above patches include:
* Change the default token profile configuration to: ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_PSA_2_0_0,
* Remove support for PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1.
Please let us know if you have any concerns, suggestions.
Best regards,
David Vincze
Hi,
I'm trying to add platform power control functions (to power off/on peripherials) to the SPM. Are there any examples of this? What is the cleanest way to implement? Can it be done via adding code to source/third_party/tfm/platform/ext/target/<vendor>/ and compiling into the platform_s target?
The diagram below says connection between SPM and PRoT partitions is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED. How does the TF-M implement PRoT partitions to call the SPM? Can it be a direct API call? I did see platform_svc_handlers() but I assume that was for use by ARoT partitions (unpriviledged).
DEN0063 PSA Firmware Framework:
Some platforms include functionality that can only be accessed by firmware at the highest privilege level. For example, platform power control or control registers that are shared by secure and non-secure firmware. These Platform services must be implemented as part of the SPM, but the mechanism by which the NSPE firmware accesses these services is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.
[cid:image001.png@01DB7E32.B6F3B0D0]
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi all,
I just wanted to bring to your attention that TF-M has switched<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22t_cose_upstream%22> to using the upstream t_cose library (which is used during creating and validating
attestation tokens). The main reason for this change is to remove the forked t_cose code from the TF-M repository, along with its maintenance needs
(similarly to the QCBOR library). Additionally, it will also allow us having consistent library code across all tf.org projects.
Under normal circumstances, this change should not have any impact on you – the library code is fetched automatically during build. It might happen
that you encounter CI failures in connection with this change, but you will only need to rebase your patches to align with the changes in the CI.
Best regards,
David Vincze
Hi All,
I have several questions. Thanks in advance for helping out.
1. I am trying to build a TF-M application for my platform with small profile with asymmetric signing module enabled. I tried using following command
cmake -S . -B build -G Ninja -DTFM_PLATFORM=MY/PLATFORM -DTFM_PROFILE="profile_small" -DCRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED=y.
However, the asymmetric signing module is not included. More specifically, in trusted-firmware-m/secure_fw/partitions/crypto/crypto_asymmetric.c, the #if CRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED is not true.
From what I understand, the -DCRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED=y only define the macro, but not set it to 1, therefore, the #if CRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED is not true. I am wondering if there is any way I can enable -DCRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED module while still staying in small profile. I am aware that the default CRYPTO_ENGINE_BUF_SIZE might not be enough and I am willing to override it with a command line flag. Preferably, I would not want to enable asymmetric module in config.cmake as I only want to enable it for one specific application.
1. If to build with Zephyr and have TF-M as a module, is there anyway to enable asymmetric signing module given a small profile (I actually care more about this question than first question)
1. Just out of curiosity, how do you use menuconfig in TF-M. I did try -DMENUCONFIG=ON, but the compiler complains
CMake Error at config/kconfig.cmake:31 (file):
file STRINGS file
"trusted-firmware-m/config/../platform/ext/target/MY/PLATFORM/preload.cmake"
cannot be read.
Call Stack (most recent call first):
config/kconfig.cmake:174 (convert_normal_cmake_config_to_kconfig)
CMakeLists.txt:26 (include)
I thought preload.cmake is no longer required.
Thank you very much!
Best regards,
Hao
Hi,
I noticed this FIXME note in platform_sp.c. Is it still valid? If so, why does it only work with Isolation level 1? I thought system reset is typically an NVIC register write and platform SP should be able to do that.
enum tfm_platform_err_t platform_sp_system_reset(void)
{
/* FIXME: The system reset functionality is only supported in isolation
* level 1.
*/
tfm_platform_hal_system_reset();
return TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SUCCESS;
}
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hi,
I'm doing a PoC on initial attestation for an university project using a
RP2350 board and I'm not really understanding why boot seed is stored in
OTP, shouldn't it be a value changing on each boot?
Pico SDK conveniently exposes one via a ROM function (rom_get_boot_random).
Another similar doubt I have is w.r.t. implementation id, couldn't it be
read from the board id (pico_get_unique_board_id)? Board id is factory
programmed in otp so it should actually be unique.
Best Regards,
Augusto Zanellato
Hi, is GCC 13.3 supported by the TFM build? Has anyone tried it? I see the documentation says v7.3.1+.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hi Anton
Thank you for your response.
Let me break it down a bit.
1. We have several subsystems running on the non-secure side that require certain sensitive metadata to be stored in ITS.
2. Default values of ITS parameters are insufficient.
3. While building the Zephyr app with TF-M, NS-side (during build) passes these overriding values to CMake, which adds the specified preprocessor definitions to the compiler flags of TF-M, ensuring they are available during compilation.
4. Zephyr already has the harness for this flow.
This entire flow currently doesn’t work if we don’t explicitly use these preprocessors in TF-M CMake files.
Using a custom profile is not feasible for us because the overriding values are provided by the NS side based on their specific needs.
Additionally, even when we attempt to provide these parameters through the command line while building only TF-M (without NS-side), we encounter the same warning: "Manually-specified variables were not used by the project."
This warning indicates that these parameters are not being utilized in the CMake scripts (which make sense).
I guess the question would be is there a way to override these parameters from command-line, while being platform agnostic? If not, is there any specific reason we chose not to, other than this approach could potentially override the platform specific configuration, like you suggested?
We would appreciate any guidance or suggestions on how to properly handle this scenario. If needed, we can discuss this further in the next TF-M Tech forum, like you suggested.
Regards
Saurabh
On 1/24/25, 12:47 PM, "Anton Komlev via TF-M" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi Saurabh,
If I understand you correctly, you're looking to modify the ITS_MAX_ASSET definition, which is a build-time option and cannot be changed post S-side build. Could you please explain your scenario for wanting to update it from the NS-side?
You're correct that a platform can redefine certain options which is intended behavior, allowing platforms to either override or verify these settings. For more details, you can refer to the TF-M configuration priorities here: https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/configuration/index.html… <https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/configuration/index.html…>.
The highest priority is the command line, which can override options even those defined in platforms. We should proceed cautiously with this approach, as there might be reasons why platforms alter the default configuration.
A recommended alternative is to create a custom profile and place all your options there, though some platforms might still overwrite them as expected.
We can discuss this further in the next TF-M Tech forum if you wish.
Hope that helps,
Anton
-----Original Message-----
From: Jain, Saurabh via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2025 7:47 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Inquiry on Overriding ITS Parameters in TF-M via Zephyr
Hi All,
We are developing a platform using TF-M with Zephyr running on the Non-Secure (NS) side. As part of our requirements, we need to override certain ITS-related parameters, such as ITS_MAX_ASSET, from the NS side.
Zephyr provides a mechanism for this through Kconfig.tfm under modules/trusted-firmware-m, which includes symbols like TFM_ITS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE_OVERRIDE. When enabled, these configurations are passed to the TF-M build system via TFM_CMAKE_ARGS through CMake under modules/trusted-firmware-m. However, we observe that TF-M does not seem to support external overrides for these parameters. This results in the CMake warning:
"Manually-specified variables were not used by the project."
As a result, the overrides are ignored.
Currently, we address this by explicitly checking for external definitions of ITS_MAX_ASSET in platform-specific TF-M CMake files. While this works, it is platform-specific.
We would like to confirm:
1. Is there an existing platform-independent method to achieve such overrides that we may have missed?
2. If not, would the community be open to adding support for this functionality so it can be upstreamed and benefit other platforms?
Looking forward to your input.
Best regards,
Saurabh
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Hi All,
We are developing a platform using TF-M with Zephyr running on the Non-Secure (NS) side. As part of our requirements, we need to override certain ITS-related parameters, such as ITS_MAX_ASSET, from the NS side.
Zephyr provides a mechanism for this through Kconfig.tfm under modules/trusted-firmware-m, which includes symbols like TFM_ITS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE_OVERRIDE. When enabled, these configurations are passed to the TF-M build system via TFM_CMAKE_ARGS through CMake under modules/trusted-firmware-m. However, we observe that TF-M does not seem to support external overrides for these parameters. This results in the CMake warning:
"Manually-specified variables were not used by the project."
As a result, the overrides are ignored.
Currently, we address this by explicitly checking for external definitions of ITS_MAX_ASSET in platform-specific TF-M CMake files. While this works, it is platform-specific.
We would like to confirm:
1. Is there an existing platform-independent method to achieve such overrides that we may have missed?
2. If not, would the community be open to adding support for this functionality so it can be upstreamed and benefit other platforms?
Looking forward to your input.
Best regards,
Saurabh
Hello,
I am thrilled to announce the support of new Clan/LLVM toolchain, freely available here: https://github.com/ARM-software/LLVM-embedded-toolchain-for-Arm. This extends a suite of powerful tools designed to enhance your development experience and boost productivity.
Key Features:
* Offers Clang frontend
* Available for Linux, Windows and macOS
* Builds TF-M binaries for all Arm targets
* Secure side built without libc and picolib libraries, while both are available to Bootloader and Non-Secure side
Important notes:
* Floating point support is not verified
* MVE is not supported yet
* This has been verified with version v18.1.3 of the toolchain.
We're excited for you to try out the new toolchain support and look forward to your feedback. The use of the toolchain_CLANG.cmake is the same as all other toolchains.
I plan to present the new toolchain and compare it with the existing tools in one of the upcoming TF-M forums. Meanwhile I encourage the platform owners to include the new toolchain support using arm platforms as a reference. The relevant changes are in this chain:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/34351
There is ongoing discussion on the best name for the toolchain to avoid possible confusion. Should it be Clang as now, LLVM, or even LLVMClang? Please share your opinion.
Thanks, and best regards,
Anton.
Hi Everyone,
During our investigation into the slow write operations of the PSA Protected Storage (PS) API, we identified that numerous (>10) flash erase calls occur when executing psa_ps_set() or psa_ps_remove(). A significant portion of these erase calls is linked to the rollback protection mechanism, specifically for updating Non-Volatile (NV) counters.
A potential improvement we are considering is to differentiate rollback protection requirements based on the type of flash memory being used.
*
For systems utilizing internal flash, we suggest possibility to disable rollback protection when encryption is enabled. This improves speed of write and remove operations and reduces the flash wear.
*
Rollback protection should be enabled when protected storage is located in external flash to ensure data integrity and security
Currently, there is a Kconfig option, CONFIG_TFM_PS_ROLLBACK_PROTECTION, to disable rollback protection. However, a build-time check requires that PS encryption is also disabled, as referenced here:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…
To better align rollback protection with the type of flash memory, there is the possibility of updating the macro rule. This could involve either removing the existing rollback protection check or adding a new rule based on the flash type, enforcing rollback protection only for external flash. While introducing a Kconfig option for the flash memory type is a potential solution, it raises concerns about reduced security in cases of misconfiguration.
Your insights on how to address this would be invaluable. Thank you in advance for your input!
Best regards,
Juha Ylinen
Hi all,
When TF-M RPC callbacks were introduced to support multi-core mailbox handling, typically only a single mailbox interrupt source was available on a multi-core system.
Therefore, in the initial design, RPC callback handle_req(void) doesn't pass any information of mailbox interrupt source to platform mailbox drivers.
Recently, some platforms, such as RSE based ones, consists of multiple mailbox interrupt sources.
I notice that those platforms fetch and parse mailbox messages in their mailbox IRQ handlers. It can take quite a long time in IRQ handlers and doesn't get full benefits from Second-Level Interrupt Handling.
Due to the limitation of RPC callback handle_req(void), those platforms are unable to move mailbox message handling to threaded NS Agent Mailbox SP context.
I'd propose to add a new RPC callback handle_req_irq_src(irq_src) to pass mailbox interrupt source information to platform drivers. With this information, platform drivers can identify the source and select the corresponding handler to fetch, parse and dispatch mailbox messages in NS Agent Mailbox SP context, instead of in IRQ handlers.
If platform owners are all satisfied with this new RPC callback, I also wonder if it can replace the existing handle_req() in future, assumed no backward compatible issues are raised.
Please can you review the patches: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/34317/1?
Any comment is welcome. Thank you.
Best regards,
David Hu
Hi All,
I pushed for initial testing and review a series of patches to support the Scheduling-NSPE Hybrid Platform Solution (aka Solution-2).
A "Hybrid Platform" is an extension of the MULTICORE case where applications also run in the NS-side of the core that hosts TF-M SPE.
Patches can be found at this gerrit topic (hybrid-plat-nspe): https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22hybrid-plat-nspe%22.
All the patches are Request-For-Comments (RFC) and the community is welcome to provide feedback on such changes/proposal.
The "Hybrid Platform" support coming to TF-M has been discussed a few times in the past and slides and recordings are available in the technical forum past events: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/.
This presented solution follows the main ideas presented in the past.
However, since the last presentations, some adjustments have been done, in particular around:
- naming: we won't use numbers for solutions, like Sol.1, 2 etc, but instead we name them: _SPE, _NSPE etc, to make immediately clear the use-case.
- "simple first" approach: we aim to provide a "simple" solution in the attempt to provide an initial reference and keep the core code readable, compact and testable. If there are significant use-cases to be included, please share your feedback and we'll find a best solution.
Kindly expect some changes on these proposed patches above while I rebase, perform some other tests and need to refactor some portions.
Expected timeline for Hybrid Platform Solution:
- SPE-support: already merged into mainline
- NSPE-support (this series above), merge within two months (end of Feb-25), provided that there will be no disruptive changes
- BALANCED-support: a new set will be available around the middle of 2025 (subject to change).
Many thanks in advance and happy New Year.
Best regards,
Nicola
Nicola Mazzucato (7):
[RFC 1/7] SPM: tfm_rpc: Add `process_new_msg handler`
[RFC 2/7] tfm_spe_mailbox: Add `mailbox_process_new_msg` handler
[RFC 3/7] ns_agent_mailbox: Add NS_AGENT_MBOX_PROCESS_NEW_MSG_SIGNAL aux service
[RFC 4/7] SPM: backend_ipc: Conditionally assert MBOX signal on SCHED_TYPE
[RFC 5/7] SPM: tfm_multi_core: Record and clear mailbox IRQ via multi_core API
[RFC 6/7] docs: hybrid_platform: Add documentation
[RFC 7/7] Config Base for Hybrid Platform
Nicola Mazzucato (he/him/his) | CE-Software Group | Arm
110 Fulbourn Rd, CB1 9NJ, Cambridge UK
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Hi all,
We found the problem with FPU S16-S31 registers if FPU is enabled and compiler uses S16-S31 FPU registers on CM33 non-secure code with TZ agent. SPM doesn't save/restore S16-S31 registers properly nor by PendSV neither by FLIH SVC handler. I created a patch for this problem:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/34202
The second problem I found is related to lazy stacking. It's possible that float point context will be stacked by MCU when FLIH is switching to/from background thread after a new boundary is applied. As result it's possible that the non-privileged code will no have access to PSP stack of suspended partition because a new MPU settings are applied. Please review a patch for this problem:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/34203
Regards,
Roman.
Hello,
We are facing the same compatibility break issues, during a TF-M 1.7.0 -> 2.1.0 migration.
- About the problem [1] (commit ffd13c3)
Is there any plan to implement a mechanism, to migrate old Protected Storage objects, to the new format?
- About the problem [2] (client id).
There is also a compatibility break, on keys stored in Internal Trusted Storage (ITS). A key generated from NS, with TF-M 1.7.0, can not be read anymore after TF-M 2.1.0 migration (psa_key_attributes returns PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE).
Changing client_id_limit from value -0x3c000000 to -1 makes old keys available.
Is there a cleaner option, to support backward compatibility with keys created with client id = -1?
Best regards,
T. FLOC'H
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Hi,
I am trying to use connection-based (instead of SFN) Crypto service with MMIOVEC, but I noticed that iovec_status is not automatically cleared so the second psa_call causes a TFM panic due to detection of a previously mapped IOVEC.
FF spec says:
[cid:image001.png@01DB3B6B.1D4E93F0]
In tfm_crypto_call_srv(), I see the output vecs are unmapped but not the input vectors. Should the inputs be unmapped here as well? (psa_attest_get_token also does not unmap input vecs)
status = tfm_crypto_init_iovecs(msg, in_vec, in_len, out_vec, out_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
}
tfm_crypto_set_caller_id(msg->client_id);
/* Call the dispatcher to the functions that implement the PSA Crypto API */
status = tfm_crypto_api_dispatcher(in_vec, in_len, out_vec, out_len);
#if PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC == 1
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
if (out_vec[i].base != NULL) {
psa_unmap_outvec(msg->handle, i, out_vec[i].len);
}
}
#else
/* Write into the IPC framework outputs from the scratch */
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
psa_write(msg->handle, i, out_vec[i].base, out_vec[i].len);
}
Currently, to clear the connection's iovec_status, I have to call psa_close() after every psa_call() and reconnect with psa_connect() before the next psa_call() which adds overhead. Is this behavior of not automatically clearing iovec_status for connection-based services by design?
As an alternative to calling psa_unmap_invecs(), I was wondering if spm_get_connection()/spm_get_idle_connection() could be modified with the following workaround to avoid needing to close/connect:
#if CONFIG_TFM_CONNECTION_BASED_SERVICE_API == 1
connection = handle_to_connection(handle);
if (!connection) {
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
if (spm_validate_connection(connection) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
/* WORKAROUND */
#if PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC
connection->iovec_status &= 0xFFFF0000; // Clear status of input vecs
#endif
/* Validate the caller id in the connection handle equals client_id. */
if (connection->msg.client_id != client_id) {
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
/*
* It is a PROGRAMMER ERROR if the connection is currently
* handling a request.
*/
if (connection->status != TFM_HANDLE_STATUS_IDLE) {
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
if (!(connection->service)) {
/* FixMe: Need to implement a mechanism to resolve this failure. */
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
#else
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi Anton and Chris,
Thank you for your replies.
I have TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID set to off. That does not prevent client_id
translation to happen. `tfm_nspm_get_current_client_id` seems to do
translation unconditionally here:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git….
But as said, setting client_id_limit in code to -1 helps. Maybe there could
be additional configuration #define whether to do translation
when TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID is off.
Transition approach to convert the old PS data format to new one on the
flash when reading data in new format fails sounds reasonable assuming
there's no security problems involved in retrying to read the objects using
the old format after a failure. Probably not. It anyways sounds better than
supporting the old one "forever". At least to me, being able to do that
transition would require a bit of learning what exactly was the old and
what is the new layout. If there's some material in addition to source
code, I'd be happy to check that.
-Miika
ke 27.11.2024 klo 23.01 Chris.Brand--- via TF-M (
tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org) kirjoitti:
> Hi Miika,
>
>
>
> Unfortunately there have been a couple of changes to the way that PS data
> is stored in flash. I hope that we are getting better at considering
> backwards compatibility. In general I think that whenever we do introduce a
> change like this, we need to ensure that data stored with the old layout
> can still be read by newer code.
>
>
>
> I believe the patch that you’ve identified was part of the work to make PS
> encryption optional. Looking at it now, I don’t see that the layout was a
> necessary part of that work. Unfortunately, we’re now in a position where
> there could be PS data stored on devices in this new format, so just
> reverting that part of that patch would cause other problems.
>
>
>
> The bad news is that there’s another stored format change post-v2.1.1. The
> good news is that we did think about existing data and introduced a build
> option to read the old format.
>
>
>
> One solution to your problem would be similar to
> https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/commit/e8d48d78c166…
> - a build option to support reading the old format, with stores then using
> the new format. Another option would be to introduce the 1.8.1 format as an
> alternative implementation i.e. a second struct inside union ps_crypto_t
> and provide the 1.8.1 code as well as the current code (this would mean
> picking a storage format at build time and using it forever).
>
>
>
> Regarding the client_id. You’re correct that the client_id is used as a
> kind of access control (the client_id and UID together identify the stored
> object). Yes, there was a major change to the way that client_ids are used,
> with the mapping being added. Do you have TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID set to ON? I
> believe that if it is set to OFF then -1 is used inside TF-M to represent
> all non-secure clients, which sounds like it may be what you need.
>
>
>
> Chris
>
Hi all,
just to point out that the coding guidelines are being updated to reflect feedback received over the years about the point of variable declaration. The majority of the code already follows this style, changing the guidelines to avoid further confusion.
…/coding_guide.rst · Gerrit Code Review<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/33807/1/docs…>
Please let us know if any feedback.
Thanks,
Antonio
Hi Team
I am investigating the move from MbedTLS 2.25 to 3.6, however, our client uses the 2.25 currently (looks like they prefer to stay with it) and I need to provide convincing proof to move to 3.6 considering the upgrade issues that might arise. Any suggestions here that is convincing proof to do the migration to 3.6? I would appreciate your comments. Thanks
Michael
Hi,
I am working on an update from TF-M 1.8.1 to TF-M 2.1.1 on a board that
uses encrypted Protected Storage. The board used is stm32 b_u585i_iot02a,
NSPE side using Zephyr OS. I want to support field updates as well for
devices already having Protected Storage objects created from NSPE. In my
case, Protected Storage is created and used by TF-M 1.8.1, and I want it to
remain functional after upgrading to TF-M 2.1.1. PS_CRYPTO_AEAD_ALG is set
to (default) PSA_ALG_GCM.
I have faced two issues with the uplift:
1. It seems commit ffd13c3 (
https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/commit/ffd13c31d5e6…)
has changed the layout how Protected Storage objects are stored into flash.
With TF-M 2.1.1 and old PS data, PS init fails (or gets recreated if
PS_CREATE_FLASH_LAYOUT, which I don't want since then all the existing
objects would get erased). If I revert the commit (and
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…
as not to have conflicts), then the PS initialization can pass and objects
are decrypted successfully.
I have not been able to understand this thoroughly, but at least change in
`union ps_crypto_t` struct member order is changing padding (sizeof 48 ->
40), and that in turn seems to shift at least additional data by 8 bytes
via `#define PS_NON_AUTH_OBJ_TABLE_SIZE sizeof(union ps_crypto_t)`. Is
this compatibility issue "a bug" in 2.1.1 or expected by design?
2. PS objects in 1.8.1 were storing client id to the object table entry to
implement access control (?). With 1.8.1, the client id that got stored was
-1. With 2.1.1, likely due to the Mailbox NS Agent Design Update (
https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/design_docs/dual-cpu/mailbox_ns…),
non-secure requests to get an object seems to pass client ID -0x3c000000 to
the Protected Storage implementation. That is, client id -1 seems to be
transformed to `client_id_limit`. Due to this, `psa_ps_get_info()` fails to
get an object that has been previously made with 1.8.1 FW.
I am able to get reading of old stored objects working by changing
`client_id_limit` from value -0x3c000000 to -1 which changes to use 1-to-1
mapping when using client_id=-1. But I am unsure if this change causes some
unwanted side effects. Is this the correct way to gain backwards
compatibility? And if it is, would it make sense to pick
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…
into 2.1.x branch and add a configuration flag for the 1-to-1 mapping
support without code change for backwards compatibility?
Thanks,
Miika
Hi TF-M Maintainers,
I am trying to build tf-m regression tests with fpu tests on for an521 and musca_s1 (I manually enable allow fpu tests for musca_s1) from Zephyr's west build. I did that by
1.
set(CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP ON) in config.cmake
2.
set(TEST_NS_FPU ON) in tfm_test_config.cmake
But both build fails with
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: secure_fw/partitions/partitions/service_5/libtfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service.a(tfm_fpu_service_test.o): in function `fpu_service_check_fp_register':
~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:48: undefined reference to `dump_fp_callee'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: ~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:39: undefined reference to `dump_fp_callee'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: ~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:42: undefined reference to `populate_callee_fp_regs'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: secure_fw/partitions/partitions/service_5/libtfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service.a(tfm_fpu_service_test.o): in function `fpu_service_check_fp_register_after_ns_inturrept':
~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:92: undefined reference to `fp_func_jump_template'.
I modified line 16-19 of https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/tf-m-tests/blob/a1a178d8c1f3c75763511… to below
target_sources(tfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service
PRIVATE
tfm_fpu_service_test.c
../fpu_tests_common.c
)
Then, it starts building successfully. Is there anything particular I am missing. Thank you!
My tf-m tests version is 502ea90105ee18f20c78f710e2ba2ded0fc0756e (Merge pull request #11 from tomi-font/update_2.1.1)for https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/tf-m-tests.
Best regards,
Hao
Hi
We’re developing a platform using TF-M and would like to get some clarity on using FPU on Secure and Non-Secure side. The idea is to let NS application decide if it wants to use FPU.
Currently, we are enabling CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP which means we’re setting CPACR.CP10, CPACR.CP11 and enabling NSACR.CP10, NSACR.CP11.
With this configuration:
1. Is it okay if SE perform some FP operation which would set CONTROL.FPCA and return to NSE (CPACR_NS.CP10 and CPACR_NS.CP11 are not set) while CONTROL.FPCA is still set?
2. With the above configuration, if NSE wants to use FPU, it simply needs to enable CPACR_NS.CP10 and CPACR_NS.CP11. Is this correct?
3. If SE doesn’t require FPU, we could simply enable CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_CP10CP11 (CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP is OFF) and NS app would still be able access FPU after enabling CPACR_NS bits?
4. There is a hard requirement for the -mfloat-abi to be consistent for S, NS and all the static libraries used?
Thank you in advance!
Best
Saurabh Jain
Hi all,
I have found this interesting repo repo https://github.com/Linaro/freertos-ota-pal-psa
I was wondering whether this is official PSA FW UPDATE API support for FreeRTOS, and is it still supported/maintained?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hello,
I have been trying to test the initial attestation feature using the regression build for a platform that we are developing. TF-M small profile has been configured, which enables symmetric key-based attestation. On running the regression tests, the TFM_NS_ATTEST_TEST_2001 testcase fails.
On further debugging, I found that the static buffer that mbedtls uses for its allocation is not sufficient (
CRYPTO_ENGINE_BUF_SIZE = 0x400 in small profile). When I increase the buffer size to 0x500, the testcase passes.
Therefore, I wanted to know if this change needs to be adopted upstream or if I might be overlooking something on my end. Any leads in this regard would be helpful.
Thanks,
Jayashree
Hi Team,
Thanks for you helps. This this time I want to know how does PPC functions will be called from application to set a possible feature? The question is how PPC functions are exposed to outside world? I know we have a common ARM API in under platform/ext/driver/Driver_PPC.h
I am mapping my PPCs to this API, however wondering how they might be called that refer to my specific PPCs ? I am not using the ARM naming for my PPCs drivers, for example not using the name Driver_AHB_PPCEXP0 (using the name Driver_APB_PPCBASE0). Thank you again.
Michael
Hi all,
I am getting to know the TF-M, yet I do not understand the following comment and code where ROM (Read Only) is mentioned and its address used to store Code Data (flash_layout.h)!! Can someone help me understand this better? Thanks
BR
Michael
/* Use flash memory to store Code data */
#define S_ROM_ALIAS_BASE (0x10000000)
#define NS_ROM_ALIAS_BASE (0x00000000)
Hello
We have some platform-specific values provisioned in OTP that we need to retrieve and store in ITS (with encryption enabled) during initialization. We could do something similar to template file crypto_nv_seed.c, where the tfm_plat_crypto_provision_entropy_seed function is invoked from tfm_crypto_engine_init within secure_fw/partitions/crypto/crypto_init.c. However, we have a few questions:
1. Adding something similar in tfm_its_init won’t work as psa_its_* would again call into ITS via SPM which could be a problem? Also there is no hook in its_init to add platform specific routines as well? Is this correct?
2. Since crypto_init.c is part of secure_fw/, we’re uncertain about adding new platform-specific routines directly in tfm_crypto_engine_init. If this is not advisable, could you suggest an ideal place for implementing this functionality?
3. Regarding the SFN model, our understanding is that SPM initializes all partitions (and their respective services) before transitioning control to the NS side. Could you confirm if this is correct? We want to make sure that the provisioned values are stored in ITS before receiving request from NS client.
Thank you for your guidance!
Saurabh
Open CI infrastructure has been down since this morning and currently still not working. Will post updates to the mailing list once they are available.
Thanks,
Antonio
Hi All
I am quite new to TF-M and would like some insight into the query below. I appreciate any help you can provide.
We're adding encryption support for ITS and for nonce requirement, we're thinking of accessing TRNG which is part of the crypto partition. Now, we're aware of the possible cyclic dependency issue with the IPC model but since we're using the SFN model, will it be okay to access crypto service(TRNG) from ITS? In other words, would cyclic dependency be a concern in SFN model provided there are no limitations on hardware?
Thanks in advance.
Saurabh
Hi all,
A heads up that the Total Compute 2022 (TC2) platform is due to be deprecated. If there is no objection, I will go ahead and remove TC2 from the TF-M codebase a month from now (25/11/24). Thank you.
Thanks,
Jackson
Hi all,
I'm currently looking into an issue reported internally where the maximum latency for a zero-latency, priority 0 interrupt dramatically increases during a call to the PSA Protected Storage (PS) API.
The maximum interrupt latency goes up ~10-fold, or even some more at times (it varies), and this is not acceptable to code running on the NS side for normal operation.
It's as simple as calling psa_ps_set(1, 4, buf, PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE) once.
During that call (which I am told was also seen to be unreasonably long: 600ms for 4 bytes, 1s for 1000 bytes), the maximum interrupt latency goes up.
It (the maximum) seems to not vary too much even if increasing the size of stored assets (tested up to 4000 bytes), though it can get up to 20 times higher than the normal interrupt latency.
Also, other functions were tested (psa_generate_random(), psa_hash_compute()).
Those don't provoke an increased interrupt latency. Maybe it's only about the PS, or maybe some other calls can provoke that as well.
Does someone have an explanation for that?
And even more importantly, can that interrupt latency be reduced, ideally down to normal levels?
Thanks in advance.
Tomi
Hi,
We are going to set the PSA_2_0_0 profile as the default for the initial attestation service. This will impact which claims are included in the token and their key values.
More details are here:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-24.html
Changes on review:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22attest_profile_update%22
As a follow-up action, the PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 is being deprecated.
We are planning to remove it from the code base as well.
To figure out the timing of this we would like to collect some data:
* If you are using the PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 please let us know what would be a feasible time for you to switch over the PSA_2_0_0 profile. Thanks!
Best regards,
Tamas Ban
Hello,
This email is a notification of a new security vulnerability reported to TF-M by Infineon Technologies AG, in collaboration with: Tobias Scharnowski, Simon Wörner and Johannes Willbold from fuzzware.io.
Unchecked user-supplied pointer via mailbox messages may cause write of arbitrary address.
Please find the security advisory attached. The fix has been merged on the latest main branch tfm_spe_mailbox: Do not write-back on input vectors checks failure<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/31512>
We're preparing a hotfix release v2.1.1 to include fixes for this vulnerability and bugs reported till that date via TF-M issue tracker: https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/issues?q=is%3Aissue
Thanks and best regards
Author
Hi everyone,
It has come to our attention that QEMU is no longer able to run the regression tests in a timely manner, and before we go ahead and outright disable them, we would like to know if anyone is using QEMU for their platform testing.
If so, please reply to this message and we can have further discussion on the point.
Thanks, Matt
+ TF-M mailing list
From: David Horstmann via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2024 5:14 PM
To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>
Subject: [mbed-tls] Re: Looking for suggestions about make Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m
Hi William,
Since Mbed TLS is a cross-platform library, we don't deal directly with TrustZone-M.
However, if I have understood correctly, I think your usecase is solved by the Trusted Firmware M (TF-M) project[1], which is an implementation of secure firmware that provides cryptography services via non-secure-callable APIs.
TF-M uses Mbed TLS internally and implements the PSA Certified Cryptography API[2]. The Crypto Service Integration Guide[3] in the documentation should be a good starting point for what you are trying to do.
I hope that helps,
David Horstmann
Mbed TLS developer
[1] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m
[2] https://www.psacertified.org/getting-certified/crypto-api-compliance/
[3] https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/integration_guide/servic…
[https://www.trustedfirmware.org/images/social-media-image.png]<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m>
TrustedFirmware-M (TF-M)<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m>
TrustedFirmware-M (TF-M) implements the Secure Processing Environment (SPE) for Armv8-M, Armv8.1-M architectures or dual-core platforms.
www.trustedfirmware.org<http://www.trustedfirmware.org>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: 24 September 2024 15:08
To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Subject: [mbed-tls] Looking for suggestions about make Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m
Hi Mbed TLS,
I am looking for some suggestions about make some (or all) Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m.
The background is that I am going to have a secure firmware that provides encryption services by building part (or whole) of Mbed TLS into that firmware and make those original mbedtls_x APIs non-secure callable, so the existing non-secure firmware could link those non-secure callable APIs and use them.
Some of my thoughts:
(1) The easiest way to do it I can think of is just add the attribute "cmse_nonsecure_call" to those APIs' declaration (or use a macro to wrap the attribute for conditional build to not impact others don't want it), but I do not think this modification could be accepted by upstream 🙂.
(2) So my another thought is duplicate all header files and put them under another folder, assuming it is my-include folder, then I can do whatever I want to my-include folder, but there is also a problem I can think of: a merge/compare burden between include and my-include folder after I have updated Mbed TLS.
I really appreciate other suggestions!
Thanks,
William
Hi all,
I am working on integrating our IP(PUFcc) into TF-Mv2.1.0, with the PUFcc located at address 0x51700000.
The PUFcc can be access on bl2 stage, however, it cannot be access on booting tf-m stage.
The exception log as below:
[cid:image002.png@01DAEFC7.96FE4EB0]FATAL ERROR: HardFault
Here is some context for the exception:
EXC_RETURN (LR): 0xFFFFFFF1
Exception came from secure FW in handler mode.
xPSR: 0x00000003
MSP: 0x31000B18
PSP: 0x31000BF8
MSP_NS: 0xFFFFFFFC
PSP_NS: 0xFFFFFFFC
Exception frame at: 0x31000B18
R0: 0x31000B60
R1: 0x00000000
R2: 0x0000001B
R3: 0x00000002
R12: 0x00000000
LR: 0x38009EF7
PC: 0x3800AB02
xPSR: 0x6100000B
Callee saved register state: R4: 0xFFFFFFF9
R5: 0x31000B60
R6: 0x00000002
R7: 0x00000002
R8: 0x38030F24
R9: 0x0000001B
R10: 0x00000011
R11: 0x38030F11
CFSR: 0x00008200
BFSR: 0x00000082
BFAR: 0x00000004
MMFSR: 0x00000000
MMFAR: Not Valid
UFSR: 0x00000000
HFSR: 0x40000000
SFSR: 0x00000000
SFAR: Not Valid
The diff patch as below:
[cid:image003.png@01DAEFC7.96FE4EB0]--- a/secure_fw/spm/core/main.c
+++ b/secure_fw/spm/core/main.c
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ static fih_int tfm_core_init(void)
*/
SPMLOG_INFMSG("\033[1;34mBooting TF-M "VERSION_FULLSTR"\033[0m\r\n");
+ uint32_t* p_s = (uint32_t *)0x51700000;
+ printf("p_s = %08x\n", (uint32_t)*p_s);
Could you provide any suggestions on this issue?
Best regards,
Mark Chen
Research & Development Division II
PUFsecurity Corporation
Tel: 886-3-5601010 ext. 3110
Fax: 886-3-5601177
Email: mark(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:mark@pufsecurity.com>
[cid:image001.png@01DAEFC5.FD4AE270]
From: Andy Chen <andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>>
Sent: Thursday, August 1, 2024 12:12 AM
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>
Cc: Randy Liu <randyliu(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:randyliu@pufsecurity.com>>; Victor Huang <victor(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:victor@pufsecurity.com>>; Neil Chen <neilchen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:neilchen@pufsecurity.com>>; Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com<mailto:Antonio.DeAngelis@arm.com>>; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose <Shebu.VargheseKuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:Shebu.VargheseKuriakose@arm.com>>
Subject: Re: [Technical Loop] PSA Crypto API with PUFcc on the TF-M platform
Hi Anton,
Thank you and enjoy your time!!!
Best,
Andy
________________________________
寄件者: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>
寄件日期: Wednesday, July 31, 2024 11:34:48 PM
收件者: Andy Chen <andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>>
副本: Randy Liu <randyliu(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:randyliu@pufsecurity.com>>; Victor Huang <victor(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:victor@pufsecurity.com>>; Neil Chen <neilchen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:neilchen@pufsecurity.com>>; Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com<mailto:Antonio.DeAngelis@arm.com>>; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose <Shebu.VargheseKuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:Shebu.VargheseKuriakose@arm.com>>
主旨: RE: [Technical Loop] PSA Crypto API with PUFcc on the TF-M platform
HI Andy,
Great to hear good news.
I will be in annual leave from tomorrow, Aug 1st, but Antonio (coped) could help you and can redirect the possible questions to appropriate team members.
With the occasion, I would appreciate if your team evaluates and follows TF-M documentation and gives us feedback on possible confusion or missing information.
Best regards,
Anton
From: Andy Chen <andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>>
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2024 3:26 PM
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>
Cc: Randy Liu <randyliu(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:randyliu@pufsecurity.com>>; Victor Huang <victor(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:victor@pufsecurity.com>>; Neil Chen <neilchen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:neilchen@pufsecurity.com>>
Subject: [Technical Loop] PSA Crypto API with PUFcc on the TF-M platform
#Set a new mail loop
Hi Anton,
We set a kick-off meeting of "PSA Crypto API with PUFcc on the TF-M platform" this week.
• TF-M v2.1.0
• PSA Crypto API - v1.2.1
• PSA Certified APIs Architecture Test Suite - v1.6
• MPS3 with AN552
Randy, Victor, and Neil are members of this project.
We would have many issues when developing that need your help to solve it.
Please feel free to add your teams. Let's make the project successful.
Thank you very much.
Have a Nice Day,
Andy
[cid:image001.png@01DAEFC5.FD4AE270]
熵碼科技股份有限公司
Tel: 886-3-5601010 #2119
Email: andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>
Website: https://www.pufsecurity.com/
-------- Disclaimer: This e-mail is from PUFsecurity Corporation. This e-mail may contain privileged and confidential information. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this e-mail by persons other than the intended recipient may violate applicable laws. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete this e-mail from your system. Our postal address is 8F-1, No. 5, Tai-Yuan 1st St., Jhubei City, Hsinchu County 302082, Taiwan.--------
-------- Disclaimer: This e-mail is from PUFsecurity Corporation. This e-mail may contain privileged and confidential information. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this e-mail by persons other than the intended recipient may violate applicable laws. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete this e-mail from your system. Our postal address is 8F-1, No. 5, Tai-Yuan 1st St., Jhubei City, Hsinchu County 302082, Taiwan.--------
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
-------- Disclaimer: This e-mail is from PUFsecurity Corporation. This e-mail may contain privileged and confidential information. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this e-mail by persons other than the intended recipient may violate applicable laws. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete this e-mail from your system. Our postal address is 8F-1, No. 5, Tai-Yuan 1st St., Jhubei City, Hsinchu County 302082, Taiwan.--------
-------- Disclaimer: This e-mail is from PUFsecurity Corporation. This e-mail may contain privileged and confidential information. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this e-mail by persons other than the intended recipient may violate applicable laws. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete this e-mail from your system. Our postal address is 8F-1, No. 5, Tai-Yuan 1st St., Jhubei City, Hsinchu County 302082, Taiwan.--------
-------- Disclaimer: This e-mail is from PUFsecurity Corporation. This e-mail may contain privileged and confidential information. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this e-mail by persons other than the intended recipient may violate applicable laws. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete this e-mail from your system. Our postal address is 8F-1, No. 5, Tai-Yuan 1st St., Jhubei City, Hsinchu County 302082, Taiwan.--------
Hello,
We noticed that build of TF-M for CM33 platform generates ELF file for which architecture is armv3m. Step to reproduce:
1. Build TF-M secure image for CM33 platform with armclang (used 6.19).
2. Use arm-none-eabi-objdump provided with arm-gnu-toolchain-11.3.rel1-mingw-w64-i686-arm-none-eabi to print headers:
* arm-none-eabi-objdump -x tfm_s.axf
You will see following output:
tfm_s.axf
architecture: armv3m, flags 0x00000012:
EXEC_P, HAS_SYMS
While fromelf (from armclang) prints following:
========================================================================
** ELF Header Information
File Name: tfm_s.axf
Machine class: ELFCLASS32 (32-bit)
Data encoding: ELFDATA2LSB (Little endian)
Header version: EV_CURRENT (Current version)
Operating System ABI: none
ABI Version: 0
File Type: ET_EXEC (Executable) (2)
Machine: EM_ARM (ARM)
Image Entry point: 0x16004319
Flags: EF_ARM_HASENTRY + EF_ARM_ABI_FLOAT_HARD (0x05000402)
ARM ELF revision: 5 (ABI version 2)
Is't expected? Because we have problems with debugging images generated by armclang in eclipse with gdb.
Regards,
Roman.
Hi all,
I have pushed for review a change to improve the TF-M linker scripts / scatter files: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/30316
There are two ideas behind the change:
* Merge the isolation level 3 features from the tfm_isolation_l3 linker files into tfm_common_s, so that one linker file can support all TF-M isolation levels.
* Group the memory by its desired memory protection attribute as far as possible, so that as much of the memory map as possible can be covered by MPU regions to restrict the attributes to no more than needed. The main advantage of this is to reduce how much of the memory is executable.
There are more details in the commit message.
Since it could be a disruptive change, the new linker files are added in addition to the existing tfm_common_s.sct/ld/icf and tfm_isolation_l3.sct/ld/icf ones and only platforms that are already using the common tfm_hal_isolation_v8m.c are switched over for now. But the idea is that platforms can gradually migrate and eventually the existing linker files can be removed.
Kind regards,
Jamie
Hi TF-M teams,
This is Andy from PUFsecurity, and we have a project with ARM.
We try to integrate the PSA Crypto API with PUFcc (Our Crypto Engine) on TF-M.
However, there are multiple versions included, and we need your assistance for specification clarification.
Please ensure the versions match your recommendations.
For TF-M, we plan to integrate with:
TF-M v2.1.0
PSA Crypto API - v1.1.0
PSA Certified APIs Architecture Test Suite - v1.6
TF-M
It would be beneficial to use the same hardware (FPGA) and tools as the ARM development team.
If we can confirm which models are used for TF-M , scripts or details with the ARM hardware That would be grateful.
PSA Crypto API -
The test bench is using the PSA Crypto API v1.1.0, and it is published in 2022.
And Now is v1.2.1 in March 2024. I not sure it is a good choose or not.
[cid:983ad4d1-6d7d-4acb-a22d-5a49b94594d4]
Test Bench -
For the "PSA Certified APIs Architecture Test Suite - v1.6," we would like to identify which test codes (test_c001 to test_c067) are relevant for TF-M.
Thank you very much!!!
Have a Nice Day,
Andy
[cid:2fcb4633-c50b-4a64-8161-c5020f3b1ad3]
熵碼科技股份有限公司
Tel: 886-3-5601010 #2119
Email: andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>
Website: https://www.pufsecurity.com/
-------- Disclaimer: This e-mail is from PUFsecurity Corporation. This e-mail may contain privileged and confidential information. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this e-mail by persons other than the intended recipient may violate applicable laws. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete this e-mail from your system. Our postal address is 8F-1, No. 5, Tai-Yuan 1st St., Jhubei City, Hsinchu County 302082, Taiwan.--------
-------- Disclaimer: This e-mail is from PUFsecurity Corporation. This e-mail may contain privileged and confidential information. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this e-mail by persons other than the intended recipient may violate applicable laws. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete this e-mail from your system. Our postal address is 8F-1, No. 5, Tai-Yuan 1st St., Jhubei City, Hsinchu County 302082, Taiwan.--------
Hi all,
I would like to propose a unified logging library in TF-M. The primary aim of this is to combine the fragmented logging we have across TF-M into a single logging library, with a single top-level API. Currently, different components (BL1, SPM, secure partition, etc.) have different logging APIs and these also have different underlying implementations. Some call directly into the UART output string function and others call printf. Sometimes using one logging API in a different component leads to build failures, or nothing ending up on the UART at all.
The primary aim here is for users to be able to use the same API throughout TF-M and for it to always work. This API will naturally be split into different logging levels, with build configuration controlled whether or not the string is actually output. Note that the underlying implementation can be different for different components - there can be hooks within the library which allow components to specify how they want to output the string. Initially, these can be used to maintain the existing underlying implementation. In the longer term, however, it would be useful to unify the underlying implementation also whether that be by using printf or with our own custom printf format parser.
Please let me know any thoughts or concerns about the above suggestion.
Thanks,
Jackson
Hello everyone,
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to understand more about you and how we can design the technical information for your needs. For those who weren’t on the technical forum call today, here’s a summary of what these interviews are about:
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Hi All,
I pushed for review a Request For Comments (RFC) patch where I remove specific attributes for sections introduced a while ago.
At that time, it was fixing an issue with Armclang builds.
However it has been noticed that with GCC, those functions are not placed within the .text section, as otherwise expected.
With the proposed RFC patch https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/29755,
I ran a few tests and builds and the "old" issue with Armclang does not appear anymore and the functions are correctly placed within the .text section.
I would like to ask the community to cherry pick the patch and build & run their tests, to further verify that we are not breaking anything else.
If no issues are reported in a week or so, I will remove the RFC and then the patch will go through the final review.
Many thanks in advance for your cooperation.
Best regards,
Nicola Mazzucato (he/him/his) | CE Software group | Arm
110 Fulbourn Rd, CB1 9NJ, Cambridge UK
At Arm we work flexibly and globally, if you receive this email outside of your usual working hours please do not feel that you have to respond immediately.
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Hi TF-M and mbedtls community,
I am new to TF-M, I have a few questions about CryptoCell and random number generation. Thank you in advance.
1.
I figure there seems to have two CryptoCell 312 implementations within TF-M. One under lib/ext/cryptocell-312-runtime and the other under platform/ext/accelerator/cc312/cc312-rom. What are the difference between these two?
2.
For lib/ext/cryptocell-312-runtime, it does not define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG whereas /ext/accelerator/cc312/cc312-rom does. Does that mean cryptocell-312-runtime is initiating RNG cryptodriver by using mbedtls_entropy_add_source whereas cc312-rom is using mbedtls_psa_external_get_random<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/8df9cc8baf462…>. If so, may I ask why these two cryptocells take two different approaches? I read from one of the documentation that mbedtls_psa_external_get_random is used when entropy is sufficient. So if entropy is sufficient, is it always preferred to have MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG defined and implements mbedtls_psa_external_get_random? What are the differences between the two approaches.
3.
I also found cryptocell-312-runtime defines the entry point function cc3xx_init_random<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/8df9cc8baf462…>. But since PSA random number entry point funciton is not complete, the cc3xx_init_random is not being called anywhere, right?
[https://opengraph.githubassets.com/17cdebc400b0ed807c620b586b21f3f77ff9c5d3…]<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/8df9cc8baf462…>
trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/accelerator/cc312/cc312-rom/psa_driver_api/src/cc3xx_psa_random.c at 8df9cc8baf46252fd188bba1d87333a8daa9a5e8 · zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/8df9cc8baf462…>
Zephyr repository tracking https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/ - zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m
github.com
4.
I know random number generation PSA entry point function is in development, may I ask when that would be expected to complete?
Thank you very much!
Best regards,
Hao
Hi all
I am porting a new SoC to TF-M platform. I know I have missed something in my platform files that I am getting following error message, can someone please guide me. Thanks
Built target manifest_tool
[ 3%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/uart_stdout.o
[ 4%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/template/nv_counters.o
[ 6%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/template/flash_otp_nv_counters_backend.o
[ 6%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/template/otp_flash.o
[ 7%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/provisioning.o
[ 8%] Linking C static library libplatform_s.a
[ 12%] Built target platform_s
[ 13%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/service_api.o
[ 13%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/spm/core/psa_interface_sfn.o
[ 13%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/__/interface/src/tfm_psa_call.o
[ 14%] Linking C static library libtfm_sprt.a
[ 17%] Built target tfm_sprt
[ 17%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/tfm_boot_data.o
[ 17%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/utilities.o
[ 18%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/arch/tfm_arch.o
[ 18%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/main.o
[ 19%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/spm_ipc.o
[ 19%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/rom_loader.o
[ 20%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/psa_api.o
[ 20%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/psa_call_api.o
[ 20%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/psa_version_api.o
[ 21%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/psa_read_write_skip_api.o
[ 21%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/backend_sfn.o
[ 23%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/tfm_svcalls.o
[ 23%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/tfm_pools.o
[ 24%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/ns_client_ext/tfm_spm_ns_ctx.o
[ 24%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/spm_local_connection.o
[ 24%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/arch/tfm_arch_v8m_main.o
[ 25%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/__/__/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.o
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c: In function 'tfm_hal_irq_enable':
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:21:5: warning: implicit declaration of function 'NVIC_EnableIRQ' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
21 | NVIC_EnableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:21:21: error: 'IRQn_Type' undeclared (first use in this function)
21 | NVIC_EnableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:21:21: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:21:31: error: expected ')' before 'irq_num'
21 | NVIC_EnableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ~ ^~~~~~~
| )
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c: In function 'tfm_hal_irq_disable':
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:28:5: warning: implicit declaration of function 'NVIC_DisableIRQ' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
28 | NVIC_DisableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:28:22: error: 'IRQn_Type' undeclared (first use in this function)
28 | NVIC_DisableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:28:32: error: expected ')' before 'irq_num'
28 | NVIC_DisableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ~ ^~~~~~~
| )
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c: In function 'tfm_hal_irq_clear_pending':
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:35:5: warning: implicit declaration of function 'NVIC_ClearPendingIRQ' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
35 | NVIC_ClearPendingIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:35:27: error: 'IRQn_Type' undeclared (first use in this function)
35 | NVIC_ClearPendingIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:35:37: error: expected ')' before 'irq_num'
35 | NVIC_ClearPendingIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
Hi Maulik,
Thanks for your support.
1. I think I understand why you don’t get the error on the Musca-B1. In fact, we are not using the same flash driver:
1.1. My build uses the `emulated_flash_dvr`, which checks that the byte is erased in flash before attempting a write (this is where I get the error).
1.2. The Musca-B1 platform uses the `qspi_ip6514e_drv`, which does not perform such a check before writing to the flash. From what I understand, the MT25QL Series Flash NOR does not return an error even if you try to write a 1 in a bit that was 0. As such, you do not encounter the error.
2. It is strange that you don’t get the warning when MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE=OFF.
Best regards,
Cédric
Hello Cedric,
I built with both MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE=OFF (default config for musca b1) and MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE=ON and in both cases, I do not get any error/warning.
Running Test Suite PSA firmware update NS interface tests (TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1xxx)...
> Executing 'TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001'
Description: 'Functionity test.'
TEST: TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001 - PASSED!
> Executing 'TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1002'
...
Best Regards,
Maulik
________________________________
From: tf-m-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
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1. Re: Firmware Update: Storage Failure While Rejecting a Staged Image
(cedric.klikpo(a)scalinx.com)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 14:06:16 -0000
From: cedric.klikpo(a)scalinx.com
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Firmware Update: Storage Failure While Rejecting a
Staged Image
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Message-ID:
<171820117605.1175.3411332003376446357(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Hi Maulik,
Sorry, I forgot to mention that I got the error when the image is built with the option "MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE" enabled.
When, when this option is not enable, I do not get the error, and the FWU test status is PASSED. However, the test is marked as passed with the following warning, which clearly states that the testcase is skipped:
```
Executing 'TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001'
Description: 'Functionality test.'
The component isn't in READY state: the device is not ready to run FWU tests, skip FWU test: 1. TEST: TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001 - PASSED!
```
So, I would like to confirm with you:
1. When you enable the option "MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE," does your TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001 testcase pass?
2. When you disable the option "MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE," do you get the same warning?
Best regards,
Cédric
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Hello Cedric
Unfortunately we only have musca b1 support for FWU at the moment. However as you mentioned, I did try TFM version 1.8.0 on commit *35ac80c85 and all tests (secure and non-secure including FWU) passes without any issues.
Best Regards,
Maulik
Hello Cedric,
I tried the FWU tests on musca b1 platform and all of them passes without any failures.
Could you please provide more context on specific version/commit or platform where you encounter PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE?
Best Regards,
Maulik
________________________________
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1. Firmware Update: Storage Failure While Rejecting a Staged Image
(cedric.klikpo(a)scalinx.com)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Thu, 06 Jun 2024 13:00:29 -0000
From: cedric.klikpo(a)scalinx.com
Subject: [TF-M] Firmware Update: Storage Failure While Rejecting a
Staged Image
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Message-ID:
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Hi,
I encounter a storage failure when trying to reject a staged image. I get this error by executing `tfm_fwu_test_common_001` in `fwu_tests_common.c`. The error occurs when the `erase_boot_magic` function attempts to erase the magic number in the image trailer by writing erase into it.
The reason I am writing this post is to ask:
1. If the `erase_boot_magic` failure is a known bug in the firmware update, is a fix planned or existing?
2. Why doesn't the `erase_boot_magic` function erase the sector where the magic number is located in the image trailer, considering we erasing in a flash?
Thanks!
Best regards,
Cedric
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Hi,
I noticed that trusted-firmware-m\interface\src\tfm_crypto_api.c defines two API_DISPATCH macros for psa_call(). It is used most of the time in the file, but I still see ~10 instances where psa_call() is used. Can it be changed to consistently use the API_DISPATCH macros.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hi TF-M community,
TF-M allows Semiconductor vendors to plug in their HW accelerator using PSA cryptoprocessor driver interface. I have a couple of questions in terms of the driver interface.
1.
To port customized HW accelerator to TF-M's Crypto service for TF-M v2.1.0 LTS using driver interface, for the multipart operation, https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls/blob/zephyr/docs/proposed/psa… states that "A driver that implements a multi-part operation must define all of the entry points in this family as well as a type that represents the operation context." Take aead encrypt as an example, if the underlying hardware does not support aead_abort, could it implements aead_abort by simply return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED?
2.
The driver interface depends heavily on psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h to dispatch operations to customized HW accelerator, where the psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h file is automatically generated by scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja. To port customized HW accelerator to TF-M's Crypto service for TF-M v2.1.0 LTS, would the approach be creating a customized psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja file, the driver description file in JSON, and entry point functions. If so and we are considering upstreaming TF-M in the future, all these files would go inside platform/ext/accelerator/<vendor name>. Efforts need to be made so files such as psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja should point to mbedtls, right? Additionally, as .jinja is retiring (mentioned in another email exchange), how would semi vendors update psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h in the future?
[https://opengraph.githubassets.com/c87e79773a7fb0841ea038f7cf3dfdf4170debb8…]<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls/blob/zephyr/docs/proposed/psa…>
mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md at zephyr · zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls/blob/zephyr/docs/proposed/psa…>
mbedtls module for Zephyr, this is not a mirror of the official mbedtls repository. - zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls
github.com
Thank you very much!
Best regards
Hi,
I encounter a storage failure when trying to reject a staged image. I get this error by executing `tfm_fwu_test_common_001` in `fwu_tests_common.c`. The error occurs when the `erase_boot_magic` function attempts to erase the magic number in the image trailer by writing erase into it.
The reason I am writing this post is to ask:
1. If the `erase_boot_magic` failure is a known bug in the firmware update, is a fix planned or existing?
2. Why doesn't the `erase_boot_magic` function erase the sector where the magic number is located in the image trailer, considering we erasing in a flash?
Thanks!
Best regards,
Cedric
Hello,
I want to bring community attention to a bug fix in build script for NS application:
In the original design we shall have a single CMake target 'tfm_api_ns' prepared and exported by SPE for building NSPE with consistent configuration. At some moment 2 extra targets 'tfm_api_ns_tz' and 'tfm_api_ns_mailbox' were introduced for different S-NS communication methods to be linked to tfm_api_ns on NS side. This created unnecessary NS dependency on SPE configuration and disallows creating NS application working with all platforms.
This patch is fixing the issue:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/29005
Ideally, we should remove these redundant targets but that will break projects already adjusted and using them. There are 2 approaches to address the issue:
1. Preferred. Remove the targets and ask dependent projects for adjustment. (effectively, is 1 line change to stop linking to them).
2. Keep those targets as empty dummies for compatibility, polluting the code.
Please comment and object the removal (approach 1) if it's critical for your project. I would appreciate your feedback within 2 weeks to make the right decision.
Thanks,
Anton
Hello,
I followed this tutorial to add an example secure partition in TF-M ( https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/integration_guide/services/tfm_… ) and then followed these instructions to flash the application to my Nucleo-L552ZE-Q board ( https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/platform/stm/common/stm32l5xx/r… ). However, the script regression.sh returned the error:
Error: Cannot connect to access port 0!
If you are trying to connect to a device with TrustZone enabled please try to connect with HotPlug mode.
If you are trying to connect to a device which supports Debug Authentication with certificate or password, please open your device using it.
After this, I am unable to connect my board STM32Cube Programmer or to flash any application using Keil MDK ARM, CubeIDE, etc. The same error is returned every time. Before I runned the regression.sh script, the board was working as expected and I was able to flash simple applications (non using TF-M) to the board. I've already tried to connect the board to the STM32Cube Programmer using the Hot Plug mode - (i) pulled BOOT0 pin to HIGH, (ii) connected the board to the PC, (iii) selected Hot Plug mode in STM32Cube Programmer and Hit Connect - but did not work. I get this log:
[cid:20937ade-7ed2-4beb-bced-d577c3e58dd3]
Hi all,
Why does TFM assigns function to psa_interface_thread_fn_call section and then never places them anywhere specific?
This way functions assigned to this section are placed outside of the code region which may result in unpredictable behavior.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Thanks Antonio! 😊
(fixed typo in subject, sorry ☹)
Thanks,
William
From: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>
Date: Wednesday, May 15, 2024 at 2:18 PM
To: "Lee, William" <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: Is crytocell-312 now maintaining by TF-M mainly?
Yes, CryptoCell code in the TF-M repo is the only maintained repository. Thanks, Antonio Sent from Outlook for Android From: Lee, William via TF-M <tf-m@ lists. trustedfirmware. org> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2024 5: 32: 59 am To: tf-m@ lists. trustedfirmware. org
Yes, CryptoCell code in the TF-M repo is the only maintained repository.
Thanks, Antonio
Sent from Outlook for Android<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/aka.ms/AAb9ysg__;!!EJc4YC3iFmQ!Q29CY2id1…>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2024 5:32:59 am
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Is crytocell-312 now maintaining by TF-M mainly?
Hello!
I saw [1] is not updating anymore, but [2] is still active, anyone knows if [2] is the main place for cryptocell-312? Thanks!
[1] https://github.com/ARM-software/cryptocell-312-runtime<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/ARM-software/cryptocell-312-r…>
[2] https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+log/refs/heads/mai…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-fir…>
Thanks,
William
Hello,
I am happy to announce the new release of TF-M v2.1.0.
New major features are:
* TF-M aligns the Crypto service to the same PSA Crypto headers used by the Mbed TLS 3.6.0 reference implementation.
* Initial support for on-core and off-core clients on Hybrid platforms (A-profile + M-profile or M-profile + M-profile) using solution 1. The functionality is still under active development.
* P256-M component is enabled on the BL2 stage for image signature verification based on ECDSA.
* MCUboot upgrade to v2.1.0.
* Mbed TLS upgrade to v3.6.0.
* BL2 now provides a thin PSA Crypto core layer when MCUBOOT_USE_PSA_CRYPTO=ON and can use builtin keys when ECDSA based signature verification is selected with MCUBOOT_SIGNATURE_TYPE="EC-P256".
This version is the first, intended for Long Term Support (LTS) after PSA certification and tagging TF-Mv2.1.0-LTS as described in the updated Release Process.
Please check the release notes for more information.
The release branch changes will be ported to the main branch shortly.
Many thanks to everyone for contributing, reviewing and supporting this milestone.
Anton and TF-M team.
Hi
I am trying to use iatverifier tool from tf-m-tools repo to verify token and it seems like the values for Security Lificycle in the tool are wrong, because:
this spec https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-21.html defines them as
psa-lifecycle-unknown-type = 0x0000..0x00ff
psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type = 0x1000..0x10ff
psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type = 0x2000..0x20ff
psa-lifecycle-secured-type = 0x3000..0x30ff
psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x4000..0x40ff
psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x5000..0x50ff
psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type = 0x6000..0x60ff
Which is consistent with values of tfm_security_lifecycle_t enum in TFM
enum tfm_security_lifecycle_t {
TFM_SLC_UNKNOWN = 0x0000u,
TFM_SLC_ASSEMBLY_AND_TEST = 0x1000u,
TFM_SLC_PSA_ROT_PROVISIONING = 0x2000u,
TFM_SLC_SECURED = 0x3000u,
TFM_SLC_NON_PSA_ROT_DEBUG = 0x4000u,
TFM_SLC_RECOVERABLE_PSA_ROT_DEBUG = 0x5000u,
TFM_SLC_DECOMMISSIONED = 0x6000u,
TFM_SLC_MAX_VALUE = UINT32_MAX,
};
But in the tf-m-tools/iat-verifier/iatverifier/psa_iot_profile1_token_claims.py these values are defined differently
# Security Lifecycle claims
SL_UNKNOWN = 0x1000
SL_PSA_ROT_PROVISIONING = 0x2000
SL_SECURED = 0x3000
SL_NON_PSA_ROT_DEBUG = 0x4000
SL_RECOVERABLE_PSA_ROT_DEBUG = 0x5000
SL_PSA_LIFECYCLE_DECOMMISSIONED = 0x6000
Thus I am getting SL_UNKNOWN instead of TFM_SLC_ASSEMBLY_AND_TEST
Is this a known issue? Can this be fixed?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi,
For Isolation Level 2, ARoT cannot access PRoT data. If PRoT partition makes a call to ARoT partition, how are the input/output buffers made accessible to the ARoT partition so a transient copy of the data can be made? I looked at the AN521 implementation of tfm_hal_activate_boundary() and it does add any MPU regions to allow unprivileged access under Isolation Level 2.
For Isolation Level 3, I assume the input/output buffers would need to added to a runtime memory asset to allow unprivileged access. Is my understanding correct?
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi,
I see that tfm_crypto_call_srv() unmaps output vectors if PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC == 1, but I never see psa_unmap_invec called. This doesn't seem to be required from a functional standpoint but I was wondering if psa_unmap_invec() was purposely skipped to save some unnecessary execution time. Is psa_unmap_invec() only implemented for testing purposes?
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi,
I noticed this build warning with PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC enabled. runtime_defs.h need to be updated to add the `const` qualifier I think.
tfm/secure_fw/spm/core/psa_interface_thread_fn_call.c:287:33: warning: initialization of 'void * (*)(psa_handle_t, uint32_t)' {aka 'void * (*)(long int, long unsigned int)'} from incompatible pointer type 'const void * (*)(psa_handle_t, uint32_t)' {aka 'const void * (*)(long int, long unsigned int)'} [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
287 | psa_map_invec_thread_fn_call,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/tfm/secure_fw/spm/core/psa_interface_thread_fn_call.c:287:33: note: (near initialization for 'psa_api_thread_fn_call.psa_map_invec')
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hello,
TF-M OpenCI fails all LAVA tests and all builds are fail consequently, probably because of a new license mechanism. An investigation and problem fixing are ongoing. I will update you when the problem will be resolved.
Best regards,
Anton
Hi Ruchika,
thanks for your email and apologies for the late reply but I did not receive this directly so I am replying only because I was pointed to this.
TF-M would really welcome a contribution to move those drivers to the autogen framework. This has not been done yet due to lack of bandwidth on TF-M side. Would like to note that the TF-M builtin key loader driver can't be (maybe, just completely) moved to the autogen framework because it patches some internals of Mbed TLS as well (i.e. you would need to patch the jinja template as well). But the CC3XX driver is absolutely something that we would like to move to the autogen framework without any issue.
Thanks,
Antonio
Hello,
We plan to initiate TF-M v2.1.0 release with a feature freeze on April 8th targeting completion before April 28th.
Please let me know if there are pending patches critical to be included in this release and shall be merged before the feature freeze.
Thanks,
Anton
Hi all,
Mbed TLS 3.6.0-LTS has been recently released and we are in the process of upgrading the supported version of TF-M as well. I have prepared three patches (for tests, extras and the main repo) available here for review that need to be merged by the time the release freeze happens (likely this week at some point).
From this patch onwards, TF-M will align completely to the PSA Crypto headers shipped by the Mbed TLS project, hopefully solving the issues we have had in the past around header mismatches when both Mbed TLS and TF-M Crypto are integrated into the same environment. For this reason the TF-M project will just hold a copy of the headers (in the interface/include/psa and interface/include/mbedtls directories) and won't accept any contribution to them.
Please find the patches available for review under the following Gerrit topic:
topic:"mbedtls_3_6_0_alignment" · Gerrit Code Review (trustedfirmware.org)<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mbedtls_3_6_0_alignment%22>
Thanks,
Antonio
+ tf-m mailing list
From: Ruchika Gupta
Sent: Friday, April 5, 2024 4:14 PM
To: tf-m <"tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m"@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; security-wg(a)lists.zephyrproject.org
Subject: Use of auto-generation approach for mbedtls/mbed-crypto driver psa_crypto_driver_wrappers..h file
Hi All,
Apologies for the long email. I am adding all the 3 projects (TF-M, mbedTLS and Zephyr) to the mail chain because the issues I discuss below are inter-connected and affect all the three projects.
From mbedtls 3.5.0 version, the mbedtls project has migrated to auto-generated psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h file.
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/psa-driver-exampl…https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/proposed/psa-driv…
On TF-M, mbed-crypto, there are 2 patches for the drivers given below which are still hardcoding their changes and not following the above approach.
1. PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TFM_BUILTIN_KEY_LOADER (0001-Add-TF-M-Builtin-Key-Loader-driver-entry-points.patch)
2. PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CC3XX (0005-Hardcode-CC3XX-entry-points.patch)
We at NXP, have migrated our psa crypto wrappers to the above approach using auto-generation. We want to maintain same code base for mbedtls for our SDK's, TFM mbed-crypto as well as align mbedTLS fork in Zephyr.
We are increasingly finding it difficult to migrate to newer versions of mbedtls because of hardcoding of above drivers. The problem is specially on the Zephyr front, where in the mbedTLS fork in zephyr these patches from tfm are applied by default.
I have queries for all the 3 projects listed below :
TF-M --> Can you please let us know what are the plans to migrate these 2 drivers in tfm to the auto-generation approach. If these patches can be migrated to make changes in jinja files rather than hardcoding in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers , things would be much easier to integrate.
Is somebody already working on it ? Are you open to accept patches for this change ?
mbedTLS --> What is the long term strategy from mbedTLS on this auto-generation ? We still have a lot of hard-coding in .jinja file rather than using drivers.json. Would mbedTLS/new PSA crypto repository start accepting patches for psa wrappers from platforms ? Can the patches which TF-M project maintains be merged in the mbedTLS ?
Zephyr --> On Zephyr front, what are the plans to align to this auto-generation approach ?
Regards,
Ruchika
Hi All,
I apologize for this probably trivial question, but I cannot find out if and
why I should use MCUBOOT_SWAP_USING_MOVE or MCUBOOT_SWAP_USING_SCRATCH.
Are there any real advantages of move with SCRATCH other than that it
requires less flash? - that is, min just one extra sector for all the images
vs min one sector per image?
Move without scratch seems to provide a better wear balance but still almost
all the examples I come across use move with scratch. What am I missing?
Kind regards,
Tomasz
Hi all
I am new to TF-M and want to know if there is a public forum to post questions or search for answers? I am getting this error under Windows 10 when making clean:
make (e=206): The filename or extension is too long
Thank you
Michael
Hi,
Following the forum session today I am sending this separate email asking for your feedback.
The recent forums on the East time zone slot are getting quite low attendance, so I am wondering if it still valuable or we want to reschedule it. The potential options I can think of:
1. Keep the current schedule and change nothing.
2. Drop the East time zone slot and leave West time zone slot only for monthly meetings.
3. Reschedule slots for bi-weekly forums on West time zone.
4. Other ideas?
Thanks, and please share your opinion in this email thread,
Anton
Hi All,
As part of the work we are doing for Hybrid Platforms we prepared a patch that makes changes how the Non-Secure Client IDs are handled.
When TF-M is run in Hybrid Platform configuration, It has multiple NS agents active the same time. Each of the NS clients (either running in the NSPE the same v8M CPU as SPM, or on the other end of a Mailbox) can have their own way to assign NS Client IDs to clients. To prevent NS clients impersonate other NS clients that are accessing secure services through a different agent, the patch introduces Client ID mapping.
For each NS agent partition a range of valid Client IDs is defined in the manifest yaml file. The SPM checks boot time that the ranges don't overlap. The NS agent partitions must make sure that they map incoming client ID's in a way that the output Client ID is always in the range of valid IDs for that NS agent.
If an NS agent has multiple mailboxes, it is possible to assign separate ranges for those mailboxes (the range is associated with the Mailbox IRQ in the manifest yaml).
Please find the patch here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/26947
Any questions or comments are welcome!
Best Regards,
Mate
Hi folks,
I tried running a minimal example on the nRF9160dk.
In `boot_hal_bl2.c` the following code is executed:
#ifdef FLASH_DEV_NAME
result = FLASH_DEV_NAME.Uninitialize();
if (result != ARM_DRIVER_OK) {
while(1) {}
}
#endif /* FLASH_DEV_NAME */
For the Nordic boards `Uninitialize` is not implemented (see
`Driver_Flash.c`):
ARM_DRIVER_FLASH Driver_FLASH0 = {
.GetVersion = NULL,
.GetCapabilities = ARM_Flash_GetCapabilities,
.Initialize = ARM_Flash_Initialize,
.Uninitialize = NULL,
.PowerControl = NULL,
.ReadData = ARM_Flash_ReadData,
.ProgramData = ARM_Flash_ProgramData,
.EraseSector = ARM_Flash_EraseSector,
.EraseChip = NULL,
.GetStatus = NULL,
.GetInfo = ARM_Flash_GetInfo
};
This leads to a non-zero value being stored in `result` and my program
ends up getting stuck in the while loop.
Is it possible to fix that?
Kind regards,
Lena
Hi Ken,
I tested with 2.0.0 release. There are my conclusions.
tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code set result (for psa_wait, ...) by using SP stored in sp member of context_ctrl_t structure. It means that before calling tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code TF-M should update SP for thread (partition).
thrd_next update result by calling tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code, if query_state_cb (pointing to query_state implemented by backend_ipc.c) returns THRD_STATE_RET_VAL_AVAIL. For all partition except active (interrupted by PendSV) context (values in context_ctrl_t) is correct. But context is invalid for active partition, because it is updated by PendSV after exit from ipc_schedule and thrd_next.
As result call for psa_wait would fail if some secure IRQ will update signals_asserted after tfm_spm_partition_psa_wait and before PendSV will call thrd_next. SLIH interrupt can assert such signal (call to backend_assert_signal) in spm_handle_interrupt.
I made a simple fix:
diff --git a/secure_fw/spm/core/backend_ipc.c b/secure_fw/spm/core/backend_ipc.c
index 3a968a3..c8b0742 100644
--- a/secure_fw/spm/core/backend_ipc.c
+++ b/secure_fw/spm/core/backend_ipc.c
@@ -454,9 +454,14 @@
/* Protect concurrent access to current thread/component and thread status */
CRITICAL_SECTION_ENTER(cs);
- pth_next = thrd_next();
p_curr_ctx = (struct context_ctrl_t *)(CURRENT_THREAD->p_context_ctrl);
+ /* Update SP for current thread, so tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code can use up to date
+ * value of stack context to return value via R0.*/
+ p_curr_ctx->sp = __get_PSP() - sizeof(struct tfm_additional_context_t);
+
+ pth_next = thrd_next();
+
AAPCS_DUAL_U32_SET(ctx_ctrls, (uint32_t)p_curr_ctx, (uint32_t)p_curr_ctx);
p_part_curr = GET_CURRENT_COMPONENT();
Regards,
Roman.
From: Bohdan.Hunko--- via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Wednesday, November 8, 2023 22:22
To: Ken.Liu(a)arm.com<mailto:Ken.Liu@arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Scheduling bug
Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>.
Hi Ken,
I was using 1.8.0 Release
Looks like this issue was fixed in new design although we would like to test it and confirm this when we migrate to newest release.
We will get back on this to you.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
From: Ken Liu via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Tuesday, November 7, 2023 03:58
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Scheduling bug
Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>.
Hi Bohdan,
Can you share us the version you are working on?
Looks like the patch is based on a previous version of TFM, and this issue is resolved in the latest code base.
The reason to do such abstraction is just because of such similar issues - the logic was coupled tightly because of synching the partition status, thread status and context update which caused maintenance confusion and effort. And we refactored this part to decouple the logic:
SPM: Add STATUS_NEED_SCHEDULE to manage scheduler (21054) * Gerrit Code Review (trustedfirmware.org)<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/21054>
Hope this helps, thanks.
/Ken
From: Bohdan.Hunko--- via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 10:01 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Scheduling bug
Hi
There seem to be scheduling bug we have found in SPM.
This bug is related to handling of interrupts that arrives during SVC call and assert signed for partition.
Steps to reproduce:
1. Call psa_wait() from partition (e.g. mailbox partition)
2. During execution of SVC handler generate Interrupt that asserts signal of that partition (e.g. mailbox partition signal ) (adding long delay in SVC handler or adding breakpoint in SVC handler helps to easier reproduce this )
3. Following sequence happens:
* Mailbox IRQ has lower priority than SVC thus SVC is not preempted.
* SVC sees that mailbox partition is blocked (as it is waiting for signal and no signals are pending)
* SVC triggers pendSV
i. Mailbox IRQ and pendSV are both pending
* Mailbox IRQ has higher priority than pendSV thus Mailbox IRQ is executed
* Mailbox IRQ calls spm_handle_interrupt
i. Signal is asserted thus spm_handle_interrupt in thrd_next calls query_state_cb which returns THRD_STATE_RET_VAL_AVAIL and thus tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code is called
ii. tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code sets return code using OLD value of partition PSP (as it was never updated, as it is updated in PendSV)
* Mailbox IRQ return, pendsv is started and it runs mailbox partition
i. Mailbox partition has 0 as signal because return value was written to wrong location is stack
Patch I have attached to the mail solves this problem for us BUT it seems more like a workaround than a proper fix(
Anyways it would be nice to have this problem review by SPM experts and have proper fix (maybe we have other places with same problem...)
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi all,
It seems that on v2.0 there is a problem with FLIH handling during execution of SPM thread.
1. A partition #1 is running with unprivileged attribute (CONTROL.nPRIV = 1).
2. It requests PSA API (for example psa_call).
3. psa_call is serviced via SVC. prepare_to_thread_mode_spm schedules handling of psa_call in SPM thread mode (by prepare_to_thread_mode_spm).
4. prepare_to_thread_mode_spm saves CONTROL to saved_control. Than set CONTROL.nPRIV = 0 (privileged for SPM thread).
5. Exit from SVC starts execution of tfm_spm_client_psa_call in SPM thread (privileged).
6. SPM thread is interrupted by FLIH IRQ.
7. FLIH IRQ handler calls spm_handle_interrupt.
8. spm_handle_interrupt switches boundary to prepare environment for FLIH handler (partition #2) and schedules execution of FLIH handler.
9. FLIH handler is executed.
10. tfm_flih_return_to_isr is called on exit from FLIH handler. It restores boundary of partition #1 and set CONTROL.nPRIV = 1. Than returns to FLIH IRQ handler.
11. FLIH IRQ handler exit to SPM thread that has been interrupted on step #6.
12. SPM thread have no enough permissions, because it's running with CONTROL.nPRIV equal to 1 (unprivileged). So, processing environment is unprivileged and tfm_spm_client_psa_call fails on accessing restricted resource.
Does my understanding correct? If yes it means that we should fix exit from FLIH to SPM thread.
Regards,
Roman.
Hi
I'm working on Adding Platform support for ArmChina Alcor AN557 MPS3 FPGA board .
The code has been passed tfm_regression_test on AN557 fpga image and now submit to TF-M git repo. See:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/27267
Could you have a code review on these code ? Any comments and suggestion are welcomed.
Thank you!
B,R
Jidong
Hi Everyone,
I am glad to announce the new maintainer of TF-M project:
* Antonio de Angelis aka adeaarm Antonio.deAngelis(a)arm.com><mailto:Antonio.deAngelis@arm.com%3e%60>
Antonio was with TF-M from the very beginning being one of the project founders.
Thank you, Antonio, for agreeing to maintain the project.
All the best,
Anton
Is TFM-M currently able to verify the signature of the image downloaded by
the 'untrusted client'?
I mean, are there needed methods exposed to 'untrusted app'? If so, what
methods need to be used?
Kind regards,
Tomasz
Hi,
It appears that ITS encryption would be required for PSA Certified Level 3. I'm seeing that this would required a platform specific HAL implementation. Is there some reason PSA Crypto APIs were not used like they were for attestation?
Encryption in ITS
=================
The ITS can optionally be configured to encrypt the internal trusted storage
data.
To support encryption in ITS the target platform must provide an
implementation of the APIs defined in ``platform/include/tfm_hal_its_encryption.h``::
enum tfm_hal_status_t tfm_hal_its_aead_generate_nonce(uint8_t *nonce,
const size_t nonce_size);
enum tfm_hal_status_t tfm_hal_its_aead_encrypt(
struct tfm_hal_its_auth_crypt_ctx *ctx,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
const size_t plaintext_size,
uint8_t *ciphertext,
const size_t ciphertext_size,
uint8_t *tag,
const size_t tag_size);
enum tfm_hal_status_t tfm_hal_its_aead_decrypt(
struct tfm_hal_its_auth_crypt_ctx *ctx,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
const size_t ciphertext_size,
uint8_t *tag,
const size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *plaintext,
const size_t plaintext_size);
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi All,
Since ST platform seems to be supported only passively, I try to adapt tf-m
for the new ST U5Axx and U5Gxx MPUs with 4MB flash on my own.
It does not come easy since some things are hardcoded and new HAL version is
required while breaking HAL changes have been introduced, but this is not
the reason why I make this post.
Is there any easy way, I mean, some cmake switch, which would allow for a
full rebuild without redownloading the required packages?
Since clean rebuild from scratch takes time and I need to do it frequently
while my Internet connection currently is not super-fast and stable such
option would be the most helpful.
Kind regards,
Tomasz
Hello Bohdan
The PSA token spec v2.0 is still in draft and hence is not yet supported by the psa-arch-tests.
I am not aware of the specific plan/timelines, but could you please contact psa-arch-tests team to know details?
Best Regards,
Maulik
________________________________
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Sent: 27 February 2024 12:00 AM
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Subject: TF-M Digest, Vol 64, Issue 12
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Attest token v2.0 in psa-arch-tests
(Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 10:50:38 +0000
From: <Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Attest token v2.0 in psa-arch-tests
To: <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: Kostiantyn.Tkachov(a)infineon.com, Roman.Mazurak(a)infineon.com,
Hennadiy.Kytsun(a)infineon.com
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Hi all,
Any updates on this?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
From: Bohdan.Hunko--- via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Monday, February 19, 2024 15:24
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: Tkachov Kostiantyn (CSS ICW SW FW) <Kostiantyn.Tkachov(a)infineon.com>; Mazurak Roman (CSS ICW SW FW 3) <Roman.Mazurak(a)infineon.com>; Kytsun Hennadiy (CSS ICW SW FW 3) <Hennadiy.Kytsun(a)infineon.com>
Subject: [TF-M] Attest token v2.0 in psa-arch-tests
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Hi all,
I was trying to run PSA arch tests for INITIAL_ATTESTATION and have some problems with them.
Our platform uses version 2.0 of PSA token spec (ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_PSA_2_0_0) - https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-20.txt but psa arch tests does not seem to support it.
Am I correct that psa-arch-tests does not support v2.0 of attest token?
If yes, then how do I select v2.0 of attest token?
If no, then is there a plan to support v2.0 of attest token in psa-arch-tests? If so then what is a release date for that?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi all,
I was trying to run PSA arch tests for INITIAL_ATTESTATION and have some problems with them.
Our platform uses version 2.0 of PSA token spec (ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_PSA_2_0_0) - https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-20.txt but psa arch tests does not seem to support it.
Am I correct that psa-arch-tests does not support v2.0 of attest token?
If yes, then how do I select v2.0 of attest token?
If no, then is there a plan to support v2.0 of attest token in psa-arch-tests? If so then what is a release date for that?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi,
I'm seeing this warning when running cmake from a conan pkg: `/home/brian/.conan/data/cmake/3.21.3-0/library-msp/ga/package/be241241e9d4718e5bab4eb33935bbb69606bb0c/bin/cmake -S . -B build -DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521`. Does anyone know how to fix it? I see the language is set by `project("Trusted Firmware M" VERSION ${TFM_VERSION} LANGUAGES C CXX ASM)`.
Per-partition files done:
CMake Warning (dev) at /home/brian/.conan/data/cmake/3.21.3-0/library-msp/ga/package/be241241e9d4718e5bab4eb33935bbb69606bb0c/share/cmake-3.21/Modules/GNUInstallDirs.cmake:236 (message):
Unable to determine default CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR directory because no
target architecture is known. Please enable at least one language before
including GNUInstallDirs.
Call Stack (most recent call first):
build/lib/ext/mbedcrypto-src/CMakeLists.txt:42 (include)
This warning is for project developers. Use -Wno-dev to suppress it.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Car Mishaps is often harrowing experiences, leaving victims addressing physical injuries, emotional trauma, and financial burdens. In this sort of demanding occasions, owning the right lawful representation might make all the primary difference. When you are in Austin, Texas, and end up wanting legal support following a car accident,
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Hello,
STM32l562e dk platform is timing out in LAVA tests which fails all TF-M builds. The platform was excluded from tests temporarily to enable normal development progress.
Best regards,
Anton
Hi Ahmad,
Thank you for the confirmation. To be honest, I did not expect good news.
Kind regards,
Tomasz
From: Ahmad EL JOUAID <ahmad.eljouaid(a)st.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 7, 2024 3:04 PM
To: Tomasz Jastrzębski <tdjastrzebski(a)wp.pl>
Cc: tf-m-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Stephane LE ROY
<stephane.leroy(a)st.com>
Subject: RE: STM target - HAL version upgrade?
Hi Tomasz,
In our objectives, we have included the update of the STM HAL version.
However, an exact date for its implementation has not been determined yet.
Nevertheless, I anticipate that the timeline for its execution will not be
significantly prolonged.
Kind regards,
Ahmad STM
ST Restricted
From: Tomasz Jastrzębski < <mailto:tdjastrzebski@wp.pl> tdjastrzebski(a)wp.pl>
Sent: Tuesday, February 6, 2024 2:49 PM
To: <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: Ahmad EL JOUAID < <mailto:ahmad.eljouaid@st.com> ahmad.eljouaid(a)st.com>;
Stephane LE ROY < <mailto:stephane.leroy@st.com> stephane.leroy(a)st.com>
Subject: STM target - HAL version upgrade?
Hi All,
Are there currently any plans to update STM HAL version? HAL is a common
component shared by all the STM boards.
The currently used, relatively old version 1.0.0 does not support ST MCUs
like STM32U5A9 and STM32U5G9 - the first one released a year ago.
I need to decide where I should go ahead and do the update myself and since
then probably maintain private TF-M version or maybe I should just wait
because update is just on the way.
Needless to say, an HAL update will probably take me way more effort than if
it were done by someone who already knows the ropes.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
Hi All,
Are there currently any plans to update STM HAL version? HAL is a common
component shared by all the STM boards.
The currently used, relatively old version 1.0.0 does not support ST MCUs
like STM32U5A9 and STM32U5G9 - the first one released a year ago.
I need to decide where I should go ahead and do the update myself and since
then probably maintain private TF-M version or maybe I should just wait
because update is just on the way.
Needless to say, an HAL update will probably take me way more effort than if
it were done by someone who already knows the ropes.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
Hi All,
I think I am ready to try TF-M on B-U585I-IOT02A board.
However, before doing so I want to make sure I know how to remove it when
tests are done.
Please advise.
Tomasz
Hi Anton,
I think now I finally understand what I what to achieve with TF-M and it may
not be achievable.
I was hoping for the TF-M to be able to be able to manage both SPE and NSPE
partition containing my LocalLoader using two slots of variable size placed
in non-continuous memory.
The PRIMARY LocalLoader slot has fixed start while the SECONDARY LocalLoader
slot has fixed end, but byte order in secondary blocks can be reversed so
bootloader always knows where to start - that is, at the end of flash memory
where the header starts going backwards.
My MainApp remains managed by LocalLoader using Secure FW services, not by
TF-M/MCUboot directly.
I am afraid that the above scenario is currently not achievable with TF-M
because:
- LocalLoader secondary slot must have a fixed start location
- The memory area that Primary/Secondary slots occupy has to be continuous
- Secondary slot reverse byte order is not supported - although probably
fairly easy to implement.
Is my understanding correct?
Kind regards,
Tomasz
From: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2024 5:32 PM
To: Tomasz Jastrzębski <tdjastrzebski(a)wp.pl>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite
directions?
Hi Tomasz,
If I understand you correctly, then your scenario is fully implemented on
NSPE side while TF-M is essentially responsible for SPE side only, allowing
any functionality of NS application as long as it stays in the memory range
allocated for NSPE. Does it help?
I cut the image from the original mail to stay within the size limit (80K).
Best regards,
Anton
From: Tomasz Jastrzębski via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2024 9:25 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite
directions?
Hi All,
I'm considering a scenario where users will be able to manually update
device firmware from USB pen drive.
For this reason, my Main App does not need a secondary copy kept in case
update failed. If update fails, user can simply make another attempt a using
different media or a different image.
However, what needs to be protected against failed update is the Local
Loader (LL) - updatable app reading files from pen drive, which updates the
Main App.
As new versions get developed and functionality is added (e.g. NTFS
support), Local Loader (LL) may grow in size.
The same time I would like to be able to use all the remaining flash space
for the Main App.
All the above dictates the flash layout depictured below. Local Loader
update may result in the Main App update, but that is OK.
Can primary and secondary LL images size change in opposite directions?
Does TF-M support the described scenario? Image size flexibility is my goal.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
Hi Anton
I think what I really was uncertain about was whether sizes and locations of
my LocalLoader "slots" have to be hardcoded somewhere so they cannot change,
but it looks like it is not the case.
As you pointed out, my LocalLoader app can just use TF-M crypto service to
decrypt MainApp firmware update and then decompress it on its own.
Ofc, out-of-the-box TF-M decryption-decompression (same time) service would
be helpful, but there are no standard ones I am aware of and by no means
lack of it is any show stopper.
Kind regards,
Tomasz
Btw, I apologize for multiple posts, I thought those exceeding 80k would be
just discarded.
From: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2024 5:23 PM
To: Tomasz Jastrzębski <tdjastrzebski(a)wp.pl>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite
directions?
Hi Tomasz,
If I understand you correctly, then your scenario is fully implemented on
NSPE side while TF-M is essentially responsible for SPE side only, allowing
any functionality of NS application as long as it stays in the memory range
allocated for NSPE.
Does it help?
Best regards,
Anton
From: Tomasz Jastrzębski via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2024 9:25 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite
directions?
Hi All,
I'm considering a scenario where users will be able to manually update
device firmware from USB pen drive.
For this reason, my Main App does not need a secondary copy kept in case
update failed. If update fails, user can simply make another attempt a using
different media or a different image.
However, what needs to be protected against failed update is the Local
Loader (LL) - updatable app reading files from pen drive, which updates the
Main App.
As new versions get developed and functionality is added (e.g. NTFS
support), Local Loader (LL) may grow in size.
The same time I would like to be able to use all the remaining flash space
for the Main App.
All the above dictates the flash layout depictured below. Local Loader
update may result in the Main App update, but that is OK.
Can primary and secondary LL images size change in opposite directions?
Does TF-M support the described scenario? Image size flexibility is my goal.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
https://drive.google.com/file/d/17jrIfz0vE6OGJDWvXRn6TqNSh3mAX7e-/view?usp=s
haring
Hi Tomasz,
If I understand you correctly, then your scenario is fully implemented on NSPE side while TF-M is essentially responsible for SPE side only, allowing any functionality of NS application as long as it stays in the memory range allocated for NSPE. Does it help?
I cut the image from the original mail to stay within the size limit (80K).
Best regards,
Anton
From: Tomasz Jastrzębski via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2024 9:25 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite directions?
Hi All,
I'm considering a scenario where users will be able to manually update device firmware from USB pen drive.
For this reason, my Main App does not need a secondary copy kept in case update failed. If update fails, user can simply make another attempt a using different media or a different image.
However, what needs to be protected against failed update is the Local Loader (LL) - updatable app reading files from pen drive, which updates the Main App.
As new versions get developed and functionality is added (e.g. NTFS support), Local Loader (LL) may grow in size.
The same time I would like to be able to use all the remaining flash space for the Main App.
All the above dictates the flash layout depictured below. Local Loader update may result in the Main App update, but that is OK.
Can primary and secondary LL images size change in opposite directions?
Does TF-M support the described scenario? Image size flexibility is my goal.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
https://drive.google.com/file/d/17jrIfz0vE6OGJDWvXRn6TqNSh3mAX7e-/view?usp=…
[cid:image002.png@01DA5399.4D502290]
Hello All,
I read the entire TF-M documentation, but I still do not quite understand
how to get started with ST B-U585I-IOT02A, although my ultimate target is
STM32U5A9/U5G9 MCU (4 MB of flash, 2.5/3.0 MB SRAM).
1. Based on Getting Started
<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/index.ht
ml> section I managed to compile TF-M solution, but I do not know how to
properly flash the board using e.g. pyOCD or OpenOCD.
How do I flash bl2.bin, tfm_(n)s.bin and tfm_(n)s_signed.bin?
The only method I found was described here
<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/index.ht
ml#run-an521-regression-sample> and it relied on Arm Development Studio, a
product which after 30-day evaluation must be purchased.
2. How do I update my NS application once the device is initially
provisioned?
I think this, although excellent TF-M documentation, is probably aimed at
those who already are familiar with TF-M and could be supplemented with some
"TF-M for dummies" section, better explaining basic concepts and the purpose
all the TF-M services.
Anyway, my goal is to implement as simple as it gets, yet secure firmware
update. Firmware has to be signed and encrypted, ideally compressed as well.
Firmware must be easily upgradable by non-technical users so USB stick with
firmware file on it is the method of choice.
What I envision is this process:
1. user inserts USB stick
2. device enters firmware update mode - probably performed by a
separate, small and updatable "USB Loader" app, optionally using basic 1bit
graphics, progress bar etc. - low flash & SRAM footprint.
3. "USB Loader" loads, verifies and decrypts new firmware using TF-M
APIs and compresses it (if it was not compressed) when storing it in the
internal SRAM. Compression may be required since internal SRAM on
STM32U5A9/U5G9 (2.3/3.0 MB) is smaller than the flash size (4 MB).
4. Once the entire new firmware is loaded into internal SRAM, "USB
Loader" decompresses it block-by-block and flashes flash, I suppose, again
using TF-M APIs.
Does the above process make sense? It is possible to implement it with TF-M?
One potential challenge I can see is that, practically speaking, my "USB
Loader" must use Microsoft FileX, USBX and, in consequence, ThreadX because
probably only this way I can get USB-C and exFAT partitions support in a
reasonable amount of time. TF-M docs do not list Microsoft ThreadX as a
supported RTOS.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
After successful compilation I tried to provision B-U585I-IOT02A board following the steps described here: STM32U5 provisioning<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/platform/stm/common/stm3…>.
Process did not succeed due to the errors described below.
What am I missing?
postbuild.sh results in:
Thomas@AMDMINIATX MINGW64 /c/Temp/tf-m/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/target/stm/common/scripts (main)
$ ./postbuild.sh
./postbuild.sh: line 22: /c/Temp/tf-m/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/target/stm/common/scripts/preprocess.sh: No such file or directory
preprocess bl2 file
./postbuild.sh: line 36: preprocess: command not found
C:\Python312\python.exe: can't open file 'C:\\Temp\\tf-m\\trusted-firmware-m\\platform\\ext\\target\\stm\\common\\scripts\\scripts\\stm_tool.py': [Errno 2] No such file or directory
postbuild.sh failed
There are 3 versions of preprocess.sh script, it is compiler specific.
TFM_UPDATE.sh has some syntax errors which reveal themselves under GitBash
Thomas@AMDMINIATX MINGW64 /c/Temp/tf-m/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/target/stm/common/scripts (main)
$ ./TFM_UPDATE.sh
TFM UPDATE started
./TFM_UPDATE.sh: line 52: [: ==: unary operator expected
./TFM_UPDATE.sh: line 56: [: ==: unary operator expected
./TFM_UPDATE.sh: line 59: [: ==: unary operator expected
These are easy to fix.
Eg. if [ $encrypted == "0x1" ]; then
-> if [ "$encrypted" == "0x1" ]; then
It looks postbuild.sh and TFM_UPDATE.sh take two additional parameters which are not documented.
regression.sh takes one undocumented parameter.
Hi All,
I'm considering a scenario where users will be able to manually update device firmware from USB pen drive.
For this reason, my Main App does not need a secondary copy kept in case update failed. If update fails, user can simply make another attempt a using different media or a different image.
However, what needs to be protected against failed update is the Local Loader (LL) - updatable app reading files from pen drive, which updates the Main App.
As new versions get developed and functionality is added (e.g. NTFS support), Local Loader (LL) may grow in size, hence the latest version may be clearly larger than the previous one.
The same time I would like to be able to use all the remaining flash space for the Main App.
All the above dictates the flash layout depictured below. LL1 size may be clearly different than LL2, Local Loader update may result in the Main App update, but that is OK.
Does TF-M support the described scenario? Flexibility is the key.
Can primary and secondary Local Loader (LL) images have clearly different sizes?
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n4Ihqk8S-04FlluvlveQflb5nYsXBluA/view?usp=…
[cid:image001.png@01DA4F08.95319C00]<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n4Ihqk8S-04FlluvlveQflb5nYsXBluA/view?usp=…>
Hello All,
Does the current TF-M version support image compression before image is
encrypted?
Needless to say, compression after the image has been encrypted would not
yield reasonable compression ratio.
I am showing that *.bin files, even built with MinSizeRel option,
zip-compress with minimum 50% compression ratio so probably this would make
sense. Tested with STM32U5 target and GCC.
"PSA Certified Firmware Update API
<https://arm-software.github.io/psa-api/fwu/1.0/overview/architecture.html#m
anifest> " document in sections 3.1 and 3.2 provides for image compression.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
If using IPC backend, how much performance and/or memory savings is there when using SFN vs IPC partition model?
I saw FF-M v1.1 recommended SFN partition model but it was not clear to me why it was preferred.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi All,
When I compile with GCC and Debug config (only Debug), process stops with
these errors:
[ 97%] Building C object
bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/__/platform/ext/target/stm/common/hal/accelerator/stm
.o
[ 98%] Linking C executable ../bin/bl2.axf
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: address 0xc030fc4 of ../bin/bl2.axf section `.text' is not within region
`FLASH'
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: ../bin/bl2.axf section `.ARM.exidx' will not fit in region `FLASH'
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: address 0xc030fc4 of ../bin/bl2.axf section `.text' is not within region
`FLASH'
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: section .BL2_NoHdp_Code LMA [0c02a000,0c02a5a7] overlaps section .text
LMA [0c014000,0c030fc3]
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: region `FLASH' overflowed by 28620 bytes
Memory region Used Size Region Size %age Used
FLASH_NVMCNT: 32 B 8 KB 0.39%
FLASH: 118732 B 88 KB 131.76%
FLASH_NOHDP: 1448 B 8 KB 17.68%
FLASH_OTP: 756 B 4 KB 18.46%
FLASH_NVM: 32 B 8 KB 0.39%
RAM: 31624 B 63 KB 49.02%
collect2.exe: error: ld returned 1 exit status
make[5]: *** [bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/build.make:490: bin/bl2.axf] Error 1
make[4]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:1982: bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/all] Error 2
make[3]: *** [Makefile:136: all] Error 2
make[2]: *** [CMakeFiles/TF-M.dir/build.make:86:
temp/src/TF-M-stamp/TF-M-build] Error 2
make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:83: CMakeFiles/TF-M.dir/all] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:124: all] Error 2
Changing config to anything than Debug solves the issue, but along the way
there are some warnings, of which these three seems to be particularly
important:
tests_reg/build_spe/build-spe/lib/ext/mbedcrypto-src/include/mbedtls/ecp.h:3
65: warning: "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES" redefined
tests_reg/build_spe/build-spe/lib/ext/mbedcrypto-src/include/mbedtls/ecp.h:3
66: warning: "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN" redefined
trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/config/mcuboot-mbedtls-cfg.h:132:2:
warning: #warning "Use legacy driver API for BL2" [-Wcpp]
132 | #warning "Use legacy driver API for BL2"
When I try to compile with Clang compiler latest version 6.21, I immediately
get this error:
C:\Temp\tf-m\tf-m-tests\tests_reg>cmake --build build_spe -- install
[ 12%] Creating directories for 'TF-M'
[ 25%] No download step for 'TF-M'
[ 37%] No update step for 'TF-M'
[ 50%] No patch step for 'TF-M'
[ 62%] Performing configure step for 'TF-M'
loading initial cache file
C:/Temp/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/build_spe/temp/tmp/TF-M-cache-Debug.cmake
-- Found Git: C:/Program Files/Git/cmd/git.exe (found version
"2.43.0.windows.1")
-- The C compiler identification is unknown
-- The CXX compiler identification is unknown
-- The ASM compiler identification is ARMClang
-- Found assembler: C:/Program
Files/ArmCompilerforEmbedded6.21/bin/armasm.exe
CMake Error at toolchain_ARMCLANG.cmake:190 (message):
Please select newer Arm compiler version starting from 6.13.
Call Stack (most recent call first):
CMakeLists.txt:50 (tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler)
-- Configuring incomplete, errors occurred!
make[2]: *** [CMakeFiles/TF-M.dir/build.make:92:
temp/src/TF-M-stamp/TF-M-configure] Error 1
make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:83: CMakeFiles/TF-M.dir/all] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:124: all] Error 2
Please advise,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
Hi Jamie,
thank you for the quick response! The culprit was indeed an MPU configuration that didn't comply with TF-M Isolation Level 2 requirements.
Regards,
Robert
Hello,
I am currently having an issue during TF-M initialization where a MemManage fault is being triggered during secure FW initialization (most likely when the SPM is initialized). It appears to be an error during unstacking/returning from an exception as the MUNSTKERR bit of the MMFSR register is set.
I receive the following exception context and exception frame when the error occurs:
__________________________________________________________
FATAL ERROR: MemManage fault
Here is some context for the exception:
EXC_RETURN (LR): 0xFFFFFFFD
Exception came from secure FW in thread mode.
xPSR: 0x20000004
MSP: 0x20000BF8
PSP: 0x20002518
MSP_NS: 0x20042DF8
PSP_NS: 0xFFFFFFFC
Exception frame at: 0x20002518
(Note that the exception frame may be corrupted for this type of error.)
R0: 0x00000000
R1: 0x00000000
R2: 0x00000000
R3: 0x00000000
R12: 0x00000000
LR: 0xFFFFFFFE
PC: 0x000358D1
xPSR: 0x01000000
CFSR: 0x00000008
BFSR: 0x00000000
BFAR: Not Valid
MMFSR: 0x00000008
MMFAR: Not Valid
UFSR: 0x00000000
HFSR: 0x00000000
SFSR: 0x00000000
SFAR: Not Valid
__________________________________________________________
Other Information:
- I am running Nordic Semiconductor's "tfm_psa_template" sample: https://developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK/doc/2.2.0/nrf/samples/tfm/…
- The Secure MPU is enabled (only the background region) before TF-M initialization begins
- Board: nRF5340dk
- TF-M Version: v1.8.0
- TF-M Isolation Level: 2
My questions are:
- What part of the TF-M FW could be the cause of this MemManage fault?
- Is there any way to solve this issue (such as a different TF-M configuration) so that TF-M will initialize properly?
Regards,
Robert Sari
Hi,
With every TFM release, I see that there is a memory footprint table<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/releases/2.0.0.html#refe…> which is made available for the AN521 platform.
Are there any scripts available to run on the map file/other binaries to generate this table ? I would like to use the same for our platform and do some analysis.
Further question-
Why is there a tie up between the large profile with TFM isolation level 3 ? Is it a certification requirement ?
Regards,
Ruchika
Hi Antonio,
Thank you for your information, it is very helpful.
Best regards
Tao Li (William Lee)
Software Engineer @ Garmin
Mobile: +8618628138760
From: Antonio De Angelis via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Reply-To: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>
Date: Monday, January 1, 2024 at 06:58
To: "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
CAUTION - EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.
Hi Torsten,
you can have a look at the design document for ITS which describes encryption in ITS for a generic introduction:
https://developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK/doc/latest/tfm/design_docs…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK…>
A platform supports ITS_ENCRYPTION=ON if it provides an implementation of the HAL functions as follows:
tfm_hal_its_aead_*
For the exact list of Nordic platforms that support this option I suggest to have a look directly in the Nordic Connect SDK. Probably any platform based on the 5340 would be able to support this option, but there might be other platforms as well which you would be able to use through the SDK itself.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
________________________________
From: Labs, Torsten via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2023 14:51
To: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>; Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hi antonio,
Thanks for those interesting news. Do you know on which Nordic platform supports encrypted ITS with TFM?
Regards
Torsten
________________________________
Von: Antonio De Angelis via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Gesendet: Saturday, December 30, 2023 9:31:10 AM
An: Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Betreff: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hi William,
The requirement on the storage is for it to be isolated, either physically or cryptographically, as you can read from the PSA security model [1].
TF-M initially supported only the isolated model in ITS (i.e. for internal flashes) but more recently it was added support for encrypted ITS, which I believe it can be used on one of the Nordic platforms already.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
[1] Platform Security Model - PSA Certified https://www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2021/12/JSADEN014_PSA_Certified_SM…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2021/12…>
Sent from Outlook for Android<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/aka.ms/AAb9ysg__;!!EJc4YC3iFmQ!X1Zeo-qnf…>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2023 5:53:50 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hello everyone,
Happy New Year!
Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
From TF-M’s documents, I saw ITS(Internal Trusted Storage) is a PSA-ROT secure service and requires store data in internal flash.
Does that mean TF-M not support hardware platforms that do not have internal flash? For example, RT500 does not have internal flash: https://www.nxp.com/products/processors-and-microcontrollers/arm-microcontr…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.nxp.com/products/processors-and-micr…>
Thank you!
Best regards
William Lee
Hi Torsten,
you can have a look at the design document for ITS which describes encryption in ITS for a generic introduction:
https://developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK/doc/latest/tfm/design_docs…
A platform supports ITS_ENCRYPTION=ON if it provides an implementation of the HAL functions as follows:
tfm_hal_its_aead_*
For the exact list of Nordic platforms that support this option I suggest to have a look directly in the Nordic Connect SDK. Probably any platform based on the 5340 would be able to support this option, but there might be other platforms as well which you would be able to use through the SDK itself.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
________________________________
From: Labs, Torsten via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2023 14:51
To: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>; Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hi antonio,
Thanks for those interesting news. Do you know on which Nordic platform supports encrypted ITS with TFM?
Regards
Torsten
________________________________
Von: Antonio De Angelis via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Gesendet: Saturday, December 30, 2023 9:31:10 AM
An: Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Betreff: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hi William,
The requirement on the storage is for it to be isolated, either physically or cryptographically, as you can read from the PSA security model [1].
TF-M initially supported only the isolated model in ITS (i.e. for internal flashes) but more recently it was added support for encrypted ITS, which I believe it can be used on one of the Nordic platforms already.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
[1] Platform Security Model - PSA Certified https://www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2021/12/JSADEN014_PSA_Certified_SM…
Sent from Outlook for Android<https://aka.ms/AAb9ysg>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2023 5:53:50 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hello everyone,
Happy New Year!
Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
From TF-M’s documents, I saw ITS(Internal Trusted Storage) is a PSA-ROT secure service and requires store data in internal flash.
Does that mean TF-M not support hardware platforms that do not have internal flash? For example, RT500 does not have internal flash: https://www.nxp.com/products/processors-and-microcontrollers/arm-microcontr…
Thank you!
Best regards
William Lee
Hello everyone,
Happy New Year!
Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
From TF-M’s documents, I saw ITS(Internal Trusted Storage) is a PSA-ROT secure service and requires store data in internal flash.
Does that mean TF-M not support hardware platforms that do not have internal flash? For example, RT500 does not have internal flash: https://www.nxp.com/products/processors-and-microcontrollers/arm-microcontr…
Thank you!
Best regards
William Lee
Hello TF-A and TF-M communities,
I've done 2 minor updates to the generic tf.org project maintenance
process, which TF-A and TF-M both use. Please see the pull request here:
https://github.com/TrustedFirmware/tf_docs/pull/1
Please provide your feedback on the pull request, if any.
Happy end-of-year celebrations to all!
Best regards,
Sandrine
Hi all,
I have been working with FPU lately and I have a few questions regarding this topic:
Looks like there are 4 use cases of FPU usage:
FPU is used in
Use case number
SPE
NSPE
1
-
-
2
-
+
3
+
-
4
+
+
From https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/integration_guide/tfm_fpu_suppo… my understanding is following:
1. If SPE and NSPE both does not use SPU (use case 1) then they both must be compiler with fp=soft?
2. consistent FP ABI types between SPE and NSPE must be used. So even if only one of SPE or NSPE (use cases 2 and 3) does not use FPU they both still must be compiler with fp=hard
Also if both SPE and NSPE use PFU then they both must be compiler with fp=hard
3. Even if FPU is not used by NSPE, NSPE still MUST enable CP10 an CP11? - Is this correct? Is it possible to enable FPU for SPE but don't enable CP10 and CP11 in NSPE?
So basically if either SPE or NSPE or both of them need to use FPU then both of them need to enable CP10 and CP11 and be compiled with fp=hard
Is my understanding correct? Inline comments are welcome.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi all,
From what I have seen, looks like __disable_irq() only disables non-secure interrupts when called from NSPE on ARM v8 arch.
Am I correct?
If so then how can I disable all interrupts (including secure interrupts) from NSPE? - We need this for critical section and other critical code.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi everyone!
I am currently integrating TF-M with an IoT OS (RIOT OS) and I have a few problems.
I managed to build and link a secure TF-M binary and a non-secure RIOT binary and I can run some application code (print "hello world", turn LEDs on and off, etc) on the nRF9160dk. I can also use the crypto API and call psa_crypto_init.
Now I have tried a few things and each of them leads to different problems, some of which I will describe in this mail hoping that someone can help me with this.
I have done some debugging and have some ideas on what could be wrong, but I don't really understand how to fix the issues and don't really know how to proceed with either of them.
Formatted Prints
Somehow formatted prints are ignored. Calls to printf without formatting default to the stdio puts implementation and are printed without issues. Calls to printf with formatting use the implementation in tfm_sp_log_raw.c and are just ignored. They crashed at first, but I could fix that (RIOT has different implementations of the SVC ISR and I used the wrong one). Now they don't crash anymore, but are also not printed (no error output, application keeps running). Since this function is part of the secure firmware, my guess is that there's a problem with it being called from the NS world. But that should result in a SecureFault, shouldn't it? Does anyone have an idea what the issue could be?
Secure memset called from NS image
When calling psa_generate_key, the first step is a struct initialization:
struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
.function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_GENERATE_KEY_SID,
};
This runs into a SecureFault. It turns out that during struct initialization, memset is called to zeroize the structure. This uses the memset implemented in secure_fw/shared/crt_memset.c and accesses secure RAM (between addresses 0x20015000 and 0x20016000). I found a workaround by moving the start address of NS RAM from 0x20016000 to 0x20020000. Memset now still accesses RAM before NS RAM, but does not run into a SecureFault anymore. This works for now, but I would like to find an actual fix for this.
This only occurs when building with RIOT. When building the TF-M NS image and running crypto tests, memset accesses NS RAM, though I don't know if the same implementation is used. Unfortunately I don't get any debug symbols there. Could it be that a different memset implementation should be linked? Can I change it somehow? Can someone tell me which one is linked in the TF-M NS image?
Crypto partition is NULL
When using the workaround described above, calling psa_generate_key runs into tfm_core_panic. The stack trace here is:
psa_call (tfm_psa_call.c)
tfm_psa_call_pack (backend_sfn.c)
tfm_spm_client_psa_call (psa_call_api.c)
tfm_spm_is_ns_caller (spm_ipc.c)
The problem is in tfm_spm_is_ns_caller, where
struct partition_t *partition = GET_CURRENT_COMPONENT();
gets a NULL pointer. So somehow there is no crypto partition available.
Of course I have enabled the crypto partition in config_base.cmake, as well as protected storage and internal trusted storage. I checked with a debugger and found out that during start up, multiple partitions are initialized and added to the global component list (stored in backend_sfn.c). Can I somehow check what types of partitions are initialized?
Did anyone have a similar issue before or has any idea why the partition could be missing? Did I miss any extra steps I need to take?
I know these are pretty much unrelated issues, but they are persistent and I am at a loss at how to fix them.
I will take any hints and ideas, including pointers to where I can find relevant information in the docs (those have not been very helpful in these cases, but maybe I've overlooked something).
Best regards,
Lena
Hi all,
Our platform uses 4KBs alignment in linker files (as this is the requirement of our protection HW).
For this reasons I have introduced tfm_s_linker_alignments.h.
Everything works fine with GCC but we have a problem with Clang. The problem is that Clang requires LR_CODE to have same alignment as other sections inside of it.
Following are the steps to reproduce the issue:
1. Set TFM_LINKER_DEFAULT_ALIGNMENT to 0x1000 in tfm_s_linker_alignments.h
2. Build AN521 with following command line
cmake -S . -B build_an521 -DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521 -DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=./toolchain_ARMCLANG.cmake
Expected result:
Everything works fine
Actual result:
Error: L6244E: Load region LR_CODE address (0x10080400) not aligned on a 4096 byte boundary.
This error is weird because there is no explicit alignment assigned to LR_CODE region.
Would appreciate a help on this as it is a blocking issue for us.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi,
Sorry 2nd link was broken. Here is the working version:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab…
Tamas Ban
From: Andersson, Joakim <Joakim.Andersson(a)nordicsemi.no>
Sent: 2022. május 9., hétfő 12:14
To: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: Attestation token new spec
Is te second link broken? I get a 404 error code.
-Joakim
From: Tamas Ban via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: mandag 9. mai 2022 11:31
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>
Subject: [TF-M] Attestation token new spec
Hi,
the initial attestation token implementation is aligned with this specification:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-05<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatrack…>
This spec is still evolving and there is a newer version which changes the key values of the claims in the token:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab…<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.…>
This can cause combability issues between token issuer (device) and token verifier (some remote verification service).
This is an ABI change between token issuer and consumer.
The breaking effect would be manifest in unaccepted IAT tokens by the verifier.
On-device side I see these options to make the transition:
- A build-time option could be introduced which determines which range of key numbers to use. The default value would be the new range. To not let new users pick up the old values accidentally. Existing users can notice the incompatibility issue during the integration test and adjust their build command accordingly. However, the old range would be announced as deprecated in the next TF-M release, then will be removed in the next release after.
- Immediate switch over to the new range, without supporting the old range anymore. On the verification service side, an SW update can handle the transition and might be accepting both ranges for a while. I assume the verification service can be updated more easily than remote devices therefore better to handle the compatibility issue there.
- Keeping the support for both ranges for the long term and letting users choose by build time.
Please share your thoughts on:
- Are you aware that the attestation service is used in deployed devices where this transition can cause incompatibility?
- From the above list which option would you vote to support the transition?
Best regards,
Tamas Ban
Hi all,
I found that using FIH medium/high profile with gcc generates code that uses stack extensively. It happens because fih_int structure is marked as volatile.
Is there any reason why structure itself is marked as volatile? Why it's not enough to make val and msk volatile members of fih_int structure?
Best regards,
Roman.
Hi all,
In config/check_config.cmake there is a following code:
tfm_invalid_config((MCUBOOT_UPGRADE_STRATEGY STREQUAL " DIRECT_XIP " OR MCUBOOT_UPGRADE_STRATEGY STREQUAL "RAM_LOAD") AND TFM_PARTITION_FIRMWARE_UPDATE)
So looks like FWU is not supported when DIRECT_XIP or RAM_LOAD upgrade strategies are used.
But then in FWU code I see a lot of checks for DIRECT_XIP or RAM_LOAD, for example in fwu_bootloader_get_image_info:
#if !defined(MCUBOOT_DIRECT_XIP) && !defined(MCUBOOT_RAM_LOAD) && \
!defined(MCUBOOT_OVERWRITE_ONLY)
What is the point of these checks if it is impossible to compile FWU code with DIRECT_XIP Because of check in config/check_config.cmake?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi all,
The current minimum CMake version specified in TF-M is 3.15. It is quite out-of-date.
I’d like to propose to increase minimum CMake version to 3.21.
CMake 3.21 can bring in some benefits, compared to CMake 3.15
* NEW behavior of several CMake policies, such as CMP0123 for Armclang.
* After build split, TF-M secure build installs several build scripts. When NS build includes those build scripts, `CMAKE_CURRENT_FUNCTION_LIST_FILE/DIR` can make it easier to handle source code paths.
CMake 3.21 was released 2 years ago. It should be stable enough now.
May I know if you have any feedback or different opinions?
Thank you.
Best regards,
Hu Ziji
Hi all,
I faced the problem that mailbox configuration of secure image differs from one provided for non-secure. It's because I'm using a split-build but a little bit different that is prepared for v2.0. I think we can minimize dependencies and unexpected impacts between different images when common data structures will have less customization.
Currently we have three options that can change mailbox structures:
1. NUM_MAILBOX_QUEUE_SLOT - number of mailbox slots
2. TFM_MULTI_CORE_NS_OS_MAILBOX_THREAD - defines which NS client implementation is selected.
3. TFM_MULTI_CORE_TEST - specify whether NS multi-core test suite is built.
There is requirement that NUM_MAILBOX_QUEUE_SLOT must be set to 1 if NS bare metal environment is used. But this limitation is excessive. Because it's important that secure side is not using slots that are not used by non-secure side. It can be possible to use NS bare metal client even if mailbox queue size is more than one, it's just the waste of resources in such case. But it can bring a benefit that it's possible to build secure image with default settings (aka 4 mailbox slots) and there is no need to rebuild it if there will be decision to switch from RTOS to bare metal environment which can be useful for some end-user use cases.
More flexible update will be to pass number of allocated slots from NS side to TF-M during initialization, it's just important to validate that number of slots doesn't not exceed maximum supported by design.
TFM_MULTI_CORE_NS_OS_MAILBOX_THREAD is another problem, because mailbox_reply_t allocates data that are not shared but used by non-secure side only. Which means that it's important to decide which NS client implementation is going to be used when TF-M is built. I see two different solutions for this problem:
1. Use union to allocate space for both of them and let decide NS client implementation which on to use. Something like this:
struct mailbox_reply_t {
union
{
//#ifdef TFM_MULTI_CORE_NS_OS_MAILBOX_THREAD
uint8_t *woken_flag; /* Indicate that owner task has been
* or should be woken up, after the
* reply is received.
*/
//#else
bool is_woken; /* Indicate that owner task has been
* or should be woken up, after the
* reply is received.
*/
//#endif
};
};
1. Redesign mailbox by separating data that are used by NS client from data that are shared between cores. So, it will be much easier to update non-secure client without touching secure image.
It looks like there is data needed for test suite only (nr_tx and nr_used_slots fields of ns_mailbox_queue_t) defined by TFM_MULTI_CORE_TEST. I think we can allocate it in test suite only, so there will be no need to allocate this data in shared structure and there will not be the case when location of is_full field of ns_mailbox_queue_t accessed by both cores have different location if TFM_MULTI_CORE_TEST configuration is not applied the same way for both secure and non-secure images.
Regards,
Roman.