- TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [TF-A] Lost gerrit email notifications

by Joanna Farley

Hi Raghu, That’s should have been corrected as there was a fault on trustedfirmware.org servers which was fixed overnight as I was also missing notifications but they have started to come through now. Joanna From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: "raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com" <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> Date: Thursday, 13 May 2021 at 15:47 To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Lost gerrit email notifications Hi All, I seem to have lost email notification of comments on gerrit reviews. I’ve checked my gerrit settings and reset the settings to enable notifications but I cant seem to get notifications from gerrit. Is this something others are seeing as well? Thanks Raghu

4 years, 1 month

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Lost gerrit email notifications

by raghu.ncstate＠icloud.com

Hi All, I seem to have lost email notification of comments on gerrit reviews. I've checked my gerrit settings and reset the settings to enable notifications but I cant seem to get notifications from gerrit. Is this something others are seeing as well? Thanks Raghu

4 years, 1 month

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Stack Protector for platforms not implementing plat_get_stack_protector_canary

by Heiko Thiery

Hi all, I recently encountered a build issue with the imx8m platform. Buildroot will set the SSP (Stack Smashing Protection) option to on by default in the next release. This option also turns on the ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR in the ATF. But since the plat_get_stack_protector_canary() function is not implemented for the imx8m for example, the build fails for this platform. My question now is: could you implement a generic function like it is implemented for some platforms that don't have a real RNG? Or is there a concern here? I must admit that I have no experience with ATF other than building and deploying it. Thanks -- Heiko

4 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for information passing between boot stages

by François Ozog

Hi here is the meeting recording: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/rec/share/zjfHeMIumkJhirLCVQYTHR6ftaqyWvF_0klgQn… Passcode: IPn+5q%z I am really sorry about the confusion related to the meeting time. I have now understood: the Collaborate portal uses a specific calendar which is tied to US/Chicago timezone while the actual Google Calendar is tied to Central Europe timezone. I am going to drop the Collaborate portal and use a shared Google calendar (it should be visible on the trusted-substrate.org page). I'll try to summarize what I learnt and highlight my view on what can be next steps in a future mail. Cheers FF On Thu, 8 Apr 2021 at 13:56, Manish Pandey2 via TF-A < tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi, > > From TF-A project point of view, we prefer to use existing mechanism to > pass parameters across boot stages using linked list of tagged elements (as > suggested by Julius). It has support for both generic and SiP-specific > tags. Having said that, it does not stop partners to introduce new > mechanisms suitable for their usecase in platform port initially and later > move to generic code if its suitable for other platforms. > > To start with, Ampere can introduce a platform specific implementation of > memory tag(speed/NUMA topology etc) which can be evaluated and discussed > for generalization in future. The tag will be populated in BL2 stage and > can be forwarded to further stages(and to BL33) by passing the head of list > pointer in one of the registers. Initially any register can be used but > going forward a standardization will be needed. > > The U-boot bloblist mentioned by Simon is conceptually similar to what > TF-A is using, if there is consensus of using bloblist/taglist then TF-A > tag list may be enhanced to take best of both the implementations. > > One of the potential problems of having structure used in different > projects is maintainability, this can be avoided by having a single copy of > these structures in TF-A (kept inside "include/export" which intended to be > used by other projects.) > > Regarding usage of either UUID or tag, I echo the sentiments of Simon and > Julius to keep it simple and use tag values. > > Looking forward to having further discussions on zoom call today. > > Thanks > Manish P > > ------------------------------ > *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Julius > Werner via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Sent:* 25 March 2021 02:43 > *To:* Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org> > *Cc:* Harb Abdulhamid OS <abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com>; Boot > Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>; > tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; U-Boot > Mailing List <u-boot(a)lists.denx.de>; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org>; > Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com> > *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for > information passing between boot stages > > Just want to point out that TF-A currently already supports a (very > simple) mechanism like this: > > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/… > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/… > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/… > > It's just a linked list of tagged elements. The tag space is split into > TF-A-wide generic tags and SiP-specific tags (with plenty of room to spare > if more areas need to be defined -- a 64-bit tag can fit a lot). This is > currently being used by some platforms that run coreboot in place of > BL1/BL2, to pass information from coreboot (BL2) to BL31. > > I would echo Simon's sentiment of keeping this as simple as possible and > avoiding complicated and bloated data structures with UUIDs. You usually > want to parse something like this as early as possible in the passed-to > firmware stage, particularly if the structure encodes information about the > debug console (like it does for the platforms I mentioned above). For > example, in BL31 this basically means doing it right after moving from > assembly to C in bl31_early_platform_setup2() to get the console up before > running anything else. At that point in the BL31 initialization, the MMU > and caches are disabled, so data accesses are pretty expensive and you > don't want to spend a lot of parsing effort or calculate complicated > checksums or the like. You just want something extremely simple where you > ideally have to touch every data word only once. > > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 5:06 PM Simon Glass via TF-A < > tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi Harb, > > On Wed, 24 Mar 2021 at 11:39, Harb Abdulhamid OS < > abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com> wrote: > > Hello Folks, > > Appreciate the feedback and replies on this. Glad to see that there is > interest in this topic. 😊 > > > > I try to address the comments/feedback from Francois and Simon below…. > > > > @François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org> – happy to discuss this on a > zoom call. I will make that time slot work, and will be available to > attend April 8, 4pm CT. > > > > Note that I’m using the term “HOB” here more generically, as there are > typically vendor specific structures beyond the resource descriptor HOB, > which provides only a small subset of the information that needs to be > passed between the boot phases. > > > > The whole point here is to provide mechanism to develop firmware that we > can build ARM Server SoC’s that support **any** BL33 payload (e.g. EDK2, > AptioV, CoreBoot, and maybe even directly boot strapping LinuxBoot at some > point). In other-words, we are trying to come up with a TF-A that would > be completely agnostic to the implementation of BL33 (i.e. BL33 is built > completely independently by a separate entity – e.g. an ODM/OEM). > > > > Keep in mind, in the server/datacenter market segment we are not building > vertically integrated systems with a single entity compiling > firmware/software stacks like most folks in TF-A have become use to. There > are two categories of higher level firmware code blobs in the > server/datacenter model: > > 1. “SoC” or “silicon” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL1, BL2, > BL31, and **possibly** one or more BL32 instances > 2. “Platform” or “board” firmware – in TF-A this may map to BL33 and * > *possibly** one or more BL32 instances. > > > > Even the platform firmware stack could be further fragmented by having > multiple entities involved in delivering the entire firmware stack: IBVs, > ODMs, OEMs, CSPs, and possibly even device vendor code. > > > > To support a broad range of platform designs with a broad range of memory > devices, we need a crisp and clear contract between the SoC firmware that > initializes memory (e.g. BL2) and how that platform boot firmware (e.g. > BL33) gathers information about what memory that was initialized, at what > speeds, NUMA topology, and many other relevant information that needs to be > known and comprehended by the platform firmware and eventually by the > platform software. > > > > I understand the versatility of DT, but I see two major problems with DT: > > - DT requires more complicated parsing to get properties, and even > more complex to dynamically set properties – this HOB structures may need > to be generated in boot phases where DDR is not available, and therefore we > will be extremely memory constrained. > - DT is probably overkill for this purpose – We really just want a > list of pointers to simple C structures that code cast (e.g. JEDEC SPD data > blob) > > > > I think that we should not mix the efforts around DT/ACPI specs with what > we are doing here, because those specs and concepts were developed for a > completely different purpose (i.e. abstractions needed for OS / RTOS > software, and not necessarily suitable for firmware-to-firmware hand-offs). > > > > Frankly, I would personally push back pretty hard on defining SMC’s for > something that should be one way information passing. Every SMC we add is > another attack vector to the secure world and an increased burden on the > folks that have to do security auditing and threat analysis. I see no > benefit in exposing these boot/HOB/BOB structures at run-time via SMC > calls. > > > > Please do let me know if you disagree and why. Look forward to discussing > on this thread or on the call. > > > > @Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org> - Thanks for the pointer to bloblist. > I briefly reviewed and it seems like a good baseline for what we may be > looking for. > > > > That being said, I would say that there is some benefit in having some > kind of unique identifiers (e.g. UUID or some unique signature) so that we > can tie standardized data structures (based on some future TBD specs) to a > particular ID. For example, if the TPM driver in BL33 is looking for the > TPM structure in the HOB/BOB list, and may not care about the other data > blobs. The driver needs a way to identify and locate the blob it cares > about. > > > The tag is intended to serve that purpose, although perhaps it should > switch from an auto-allocating enum to one with explicit values for each > entry and a range for 'local' use. > > > > I guess we can achieve this with the tag, but the problem with tag when > you have eco-system with a lot of parties doing parallel development, you > can end up with tag collisions and folks fighting about who has rights to > what tag values. We would need some official process for folks to register > tags for whatever new structures we define, or maybe some tag range for > vendor specific structures. This comes with a lot of pain and > bureaucracy. On the other hand, UUID has been a proven way to make it easy > to just define your own blobs with **either** standard or vendor specific > structures without worry of ID collisions between vendors. > > > True. I think the pain is overstated, though. In this case I think we > actually want something that can be shared between projects and orgs, so > some amount of coordination could be considered a benefit. It could just be > a github pull request. I find the UUID unfriendly and not just to code size > and eyesight! Trying to discover what GUIDs mean or are valid is quite > tricky. E.g. see this code: > > #define FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_TSEG_GUID \ > EFI_GUID(0xd038747c, 0xd00c, 0x4980, \ > 0xb3, 0x19, 0x49, 0x01, 0x99, 0xa4, 0x7d, 0x55) > (etc.) > > static struct guid_name { > efi_guid_t guid; > const char *name; > } guid_name[] = { > { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_TSEG_GUID, "TSEG" }, > { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_FSP_GUID, "FSP" }, > { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_SMM_PEI_SMRAM_GUID, "SMM PEI SMRAM" }, > { FSP_NON_VOLATILE_STORAGE_HOB_GUID, "NVS" }, > { FSP_VARIABLE_NV_DATA_HOB_GUID, "Variable NVS" }, > { FSP_GRAPHICS_INFO_HOB_GUID, "Graphics info" }, > { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PCD_DATABASE_GUID1, "PCD database ea" }, > { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PCD_DATABASE_GUID2, "PCD database 9b" }, > (never figured out what those two are) > > { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_PEIM_DXE_GUID, "PEIM Init DXE" }, > { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_ALLOC_STACK_GUID, "Alloc stack" }, > { FSP_HOB_RESOURCE_OWNER_SMBIOS_MEMORY_GUID, "SMBIOS memory" }, > { {}, "zero-guid" }, > {} > }; > > static const char *guid_to_name(const efi_guid_t *guid) > { > struct guid_name *entry; > > for (entry = guid_name; entry->name; entry++) { > if (!guidcmp(guid, &entry->guid)) > return entry->name; > } > > return NULL; > } > > Believe it or not it took a fair bit of effort to find just that small > list, with nearly every one in a separate doc, from memory. > > > > We can probably debate whether there is any value in GUID/UUID or not > during the call… but again, boblist seems like a reasonable starting point > as an alternative to HOB. > > > Indeed. There is certainly value in both approaches. > > Regards, > Simon > > > > > Thanks, > > --Harb > > > > *From:* François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org> > *Sent:* Tuesday, March 23, 2021 10:00 AM > *To:* François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org>; Ron Minnich < > rminnich(a)google.com>; Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org> > *Cc:* Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org>; Harb Abdulhamid OS < > abdulhamid(a)os.amperecomputing.com>; Boot Architecture Mailman List < > boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] Proposal: TF-A to adopt hand-off blocks (HOBs) for > information passing between boot stages > > > > +Ron Minnich <rminnich(a)google.com> +Paul Isaac's <paul.isaacs(a)linaro.org> > > > > Adding Ron and Paul because I think this interface should be also > benefiting LinuxBoot efforts. > > > > On Tue, 23 Mar 2021 at 11:17, François Ozog via TF-A < > tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi, > > > > I propose we cover the topic at the next Trusted Substrate > <https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/TS/Trusted+Substrate+Home> zoom > call <https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/94563644892> on April 8th 4pm CET. > > > > The agenda: > > ABI between non-secure firmware and the rest of firmware (EL3, S-EL1, > S-EL2, SCP) to adapt hardware description to some runtime conditions. > > runtime conditions here relates to DRAM size and topology detection, > secure DRAM memory carvings, PSCI and SCMI interface publishing. > > > > For additional background on existing metadata: UEFI Platform > Initialization Specification Version 1.7 > <https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/PI_Spec_1_7_final_Jan_2019.p…> > , 5.5 Resource Descriptor HOB > > Out of the ResourceType we care about is EFI_RESOURCE_SYSTEM_MEMORY. > > This HOB lacks memory NUMA attachment or something that could be related > to fill SRAT table for ACPI or relevant DT proximity domains. > > HOB is not consistent accros platforms: some platforms (Arm) lists memory > from the booting NUMA node, other platforms (x86) lists all memory from all > NUMA nodes. (At least this is the case on the two platforms I tested). > > > > There are two proposals to use memory structures from SPL/BLx up to the > handover function (as defined in the Device Tree technical report > <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1CLkhLRaz_zcCq44DLGmPZQFPbYHOC6nzPowaL0X…>) > which can be U-boot (BL33 or just U-Boot in case of SPL/U-Boot scheme) or > EDK2. > > I would propose we also discuss possibility of FF-A interface to actually > query information or request actions to be done (this is a model actually > used in some SoCs with proprietary SMC calls). > > > > Requirements (to be validated): > > - ACPI and DT hardware descriptions. > > - agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2) > > - agnostic to boot framework (SPL/U-Boot, TF-A/U-Boot, TF-A/EDK2, > TF-A/LinuxBoot) > > - at least allows complete DRAM description and "persistent" usage > (reserved areas for secure world or other usages) > > - support secure world device assignment > > > > Cheers > > > > FF > > > > > > On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 19:56, Simon Glass <sjg(a)chromium.org> wrote: > > Hi, > > Can I suggest using bloblist for this instead? It is lightweight, > easier to parse, doesn't have GUIDs and is already used within U-Boot > for passing info between SPL/U-Boot, etc. > > Docs here: > https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.bloblist > Header file describes the format: > https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/include/bloblist.h > > Full set of unit tests: > https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/test/bloblist.c > > Regards, > Simon > > On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 23:58, François Ozog <francois.ozog(a)linaro.org> > wrote: > > > > +Boot Architecture Mailman List <boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org> > > > > standardization is very much welcomed here and need to accommodate a very > > diverse set of situations. > > For example, TEE OS may need to pass memory reservations to BL33 or > > "capture" a device for the secure world. > > > > I have observed a number of architectures: > > 1) pass information from BLx to BLy in the form of a specific object > > 2) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to get information > > 3) BLx called by BLy by a platform specific SMC to perform Device Tree > > fixups > > > > I also imagined a standardized "broadcast" FF-A call so that any firmware > > element can either provide information or "do something". > > > > My understanding of your proposal is about standardizing on architecture > 1) > > with the HOB format. > > > > The advantage of the HOB is simplicity but it may be difficult to > implement > > schemes such as pruning a DT because device assignment in the secure > world. > > > > In any case, it looks feasible to have TF-A and OP-TEE complement the > list > > of HOBs to pass information downstream (the bootflow). > > > > It would be good to start with building the comprehensive list of > > information that need to be conveyed between firmware elements: > > > > information. | authoritative entity | reporting entity | information > > exchanged: > > dram | TFA | TFA | > > <format to be detailed, NUMA topology to build the SRAT table or DT > > equivalent?> > > PSCI | SCP | TFA? | > > SCMI | SCP or TEE-OS | TFA? TEE-OS?| > > secure SRAM | TFA. | TFA. | > > secure DRAM | TFA? TEE-OS? | TFA? TEE-OS? | > > other? | | > > | > > > > Cheers > > > > FF > > > > > > On Mon, 22 Mar 2021 at 09:34, Harb Abdulhamid OS via TF-A < > > tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > Hello Folks, > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm emailing to start an open discussion about the adoption of a > concept > > > known as "hand-off blocks" or HOB to become a part of the TF-A Firmware > > > Framework Architecture (FFA). This is something that is a pretty major > > > pain point when it comes to the adoption of TF-A in ARM Server SoC’s > > > designed to enable a broad range of highly configurable datacenter > > > platforms. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > What is a HOB (Background)? > > > > > > --------------------------- > > > > > > UEFI PI spec describes a particular definition for how HOB may be used > for > > > transitioning between the PEI and DXE boot phases, which is a good > > > reference point for this discussion, but not necessarily the exact > solution > > > appropriate for TF-A. > > > > > > > > > > > > A HOB is simply a dynamically generated data structure passed in > between > > > two boot phases. This is information that was obtained through > discovery > > > and needs to be passed forward to the next boot phase *once*, with no > API > > > needed to call back (e.g. no call back into previous firmware phase is > > > needed to fetch this information at run-time - it is simply passed one > time > > > during boot). > > > > > > > > > > > > There may be one or more HOBs passed in between boot phases. If there > are > > > more than one HOB that needs to be passed, this can be in a form of a > "HOB > > > table", which (for example) could be a UUID indexed array of pointers > to > > > HOB structures, used to locate a HOB of interest (based on UUID). In > such > > > cases, instead of passing a single HOB, the boot phases may rely on > passing > > > the pointer to the HOB table. > > > > > > > > > > > > This has been extremely useful concept to employ on highly configurable > > > systems that must rely on flexible discovery mechanisms to initialize > and > > > boot the system. This is especially helpful when you have multiple > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why do we need HOBs in TF-A?: > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > > > > > It is desirable that EL3 firmware (e.g. TF-A) built for ARM Server SoC > in > > > a way that is SoC specific *but* platform agnostic. This means that a > > > single ARM SoC that a SiP may deliver to customers may provide a single > > > TF-A binary (e.g. BL1, BL2, BL31) that could be used to support a broad > > > range of platform designs and configurations in order to boot a > platform > > > specific firmware (e.g. BL33 and possibly even BL32 code). In order to > > > achieve this, the platform configuration must be *discovered* instead > of > > > statically compiled as it is today in TF-A via device tree based > > > enumeration. The mechanisms of discovery may differ broadly depending > on > > > the relevant industry standard, or in some cases may have rely on SiP > > > specific discovery flows. > > > > > > > > > > > > For example: On server systems that support a broad range DIMM memory > > > population/topologies, all the necessary information required to boot > is > > > fully discovered via standard JEDEC Serial Presence Detect (SPD) over > an > > > I2C bus. Leveraging the SPD bus, may platform variants could be > supported > > > with a single TF-A binary. Not only is this information required to > > > initialize memory in early boot phases (e.g. BL2), the subsequent boot > > > phases will also need this SPD info to construct a system physical > address > > > map and properly initialize the MMU based on the memory present, and > where > > > the memory may be present. Subsequent boot phases (e.g. BL33 / UEFI) > may > > > need to generate standard firmware tables to the operating systems, > such as > > > SMBIOS tables describing DIMM topology and various ACPI tables (e.g. > SLIT, > > > SRAT, even NFIT if NVDIMM's are present). > > > > > > > > > > > > In short, it all starts with a standardized or vendor specific > discovery > > > flow in an early boot stage (e.g. BL1/BL2), followed by the passing of > > > information to the next boot stages (e.g. BL31/BL32/BL33). > > > > > > > > > > > > Today, every HOB may be a vendor specific structure, but in the future > > > there may be benefit of defining standard HOBs. This may be useful for > > > memory discovery, passing the system physical address map, enabling TPM > > > measured boot, and potentially many other common HOB use-cases. > > > > > > > > > > > > It would be extremely beneficial to the datacenter market segment if > the > > > TF-A community would adopt this concept of information passing between > all > > > boot phases as opposed to rely solely on device tree enumeration. > This is > > > not intended to replace device tree, rather intended as an alternative > way > > > to describe the info that must be discovered and dynamically generated. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Conclusion: > > > > > > ----------- > > > > > > We are proposing that the TF-A community begin pursuing the adoption of > > > HOBs as a mechanism used for information exchange between each boot > stage > > > (e.g. BL1->BL2, BL2->BL31, BL31->BL32, and BL31->BL33)? Longer term we > > > want to explore standardizing some HOB structures for the BL33 phase > (e.g. > > > UEFI HOB structures), but initially would like to agree on this being a > > > useful mechanism used to pass information between each boot stage. > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > > --Harb > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > TF-A mailing list > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > > > > > > > > -- > > François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* > > T: +33.67221.6485 > > francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog > > _______________________________________________ > > boot-architecture mailing list > > boot-architecture(a)lists.linaro.org > > https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/boot-architecture > > > > > -- > > *François-Frédéric Ozog* | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* > > T: +33.67221.6485 > francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog > > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > > > > -- > > *François-Frédéric Ozog* | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* > > T: +33.67221.6485 > francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog > > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > -- François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* T: +33.67221.6485 francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog

4 years, 1 month

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Rockchip rk3399 build broken with gcc11

by Olivier Deprez

Hi Rockchip platform maintainers, There's a build issue spotted with GCC11 on rk3399 platform reported here using tip of master: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T925 The issue is not breaking the build with earlier gcc versions, but we think the error is legitimate and caused by a mistake in the platform code. Details in the ticket. Any chance for you to have a look? Thanks, Olivier.

4 years, 1 month

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MEM_PROTECT for secure world?

by Okash Khawaja

Hi, As a PSCI call, MEM_PROTECT which is used to protect against cold reboot attack, can't be called from TZ-secure. In a situation where at run time, HLOS in NS-EL1 transfers some buffer that it owns, to a secure partition then secure partition can't call MEM_PROTECT because psci_smc_handler will return SMC_UNK if the caller is secure. Should MEM_PROTECT be available to TZ-secure as well? Thanks, Okash

4 years, 1 month

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TF-A Tech Forum Agenda @ Thr 6th May 2021 16:00-1700 BST

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 6th May 2021 16:00 – 17:00 (BST). Agenda: * Discussion Session: Static and Dynamic Information Handling in TF-A * Lead by Manish Pandy and Madhukar Pappireddy · There is ongoing mailing lists discussion[1] related with adopting a mechanism to pass information through boot stages. The requirement is two-fold: 1. Passing static information(config files) 2. Passing dynamic information (Hob list) In the upcoming TF-A tech forum, we can start with a discussion on dynamic information passing and if time permits, we can cover static information passing. The purpose of the call is to have an open discussion and continue the discussion from the trusted-substrate call[2] done earlier. We would like to understand the various requirements and possible ways to implement it in TF-A in a generalized way so that it can work with other Firmware projects. The two specific item which we would like to discuss are: 1. HOB format: TF-A/u-boot both has an existing bloblist implementation, which uses tag values. Question, can this be enhanced to use hybrid values(Tag and UUID) both? 2. Standardization on Physical register use to pass base of HoB data structure. References: [1] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2021-April/001069.html [2] https://linaro-org.zoom.us/rec/share/zjfHeMIumkJhirLCVQYTHR6ftaqyWvF_0klgQn… Passcode: IPn+5q% Thanks Joanna You have been invited to the following event. TF-A Tech Forum When Every 2 weeks from 16:00 to 17:00 on Thursday United Kingdom Time Calendar tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who • Bill Fletcher- creator • tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NWlub3Ewdm1tMmk1cTJrM…> We run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Invites are via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.trustedfirmware.org%2Fmeetin…> Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/9159704974<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fzoom.us%2Fj%2F9159704974&sa=D&us…> Meeting ID: 915 970 4974 One tap mobile +16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York) +16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 915 970 4974 Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fzoom.us%2Fu%2Fad27hc6t7h&sa=D&us…> Going (tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org)? All events in this series: Yes<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NWlub3Ewdm1tMmk1cT…> - Maybe<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NWlub3Ewdm1tMmk1cT…> - No<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NWlub3Ewdm1tMmk1cT…> more options »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NWlub3Ewdm1tMmk1cTJrM…> Invitation from Google Calendar<https://www.google.com/calendar/> You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more<https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>.

4 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3

by François Ozog

Le mar. 27 avr. 2021 à 11:04, Loh, Tien Hock via TF-A < tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> a écrit : > Achin, > > Yes that’s what I have suspected in the first place, but no harm asking :) > > > > Tien Fong, > > As per discussed, we could probably expose the a compile time option in > BL31 that expose a command that read/write to the secure domain. > > That case, u-boot shell will be able to access secure domain and not need > to run in EL3. > Would you allow an OS to access underlying hypervisor ? In essence this is what you are asking: there are architectural services such as kicking off a new cpu that are supposed to be routed to the right service handler (PSCI) or secure firmware updates with anti-bricking support.... Could you be more specific on what you want to do and why ? That may help us advise on achieving your goals while still being architecturally correct. > > > Thanks > > > > *From:* Chee, Tien Fong <tien.fong.chee(a)intel.com> > *Sent:* Tuesday, April 27, 2021 5:01 PM > *To:* Achin Gupta <Achin.Gupta(a)arm.com>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; > Loh, Tien Hock <tien.hock.loh(a)intel.com> > *Cc:* See, Chin Liang <chin.liang.see(a)intel.com>; Hea, Kok Kiang < > kok.kiang.hea(a)intel.com> > *Subject:* RE: Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3 > > > > Hi Achin, > > > > Thanks for the feedback. > > > > This is use case when user doing development, testing and bring up the > board, they can use this option to run their script on U-Boot shell to > access these secure region. Once they have finished the development, and > testing, then user can switch U-Boot into EL2. This flexibility would > definitely giving some degree of convenience for development and testing. > > > > Thanks. > > > > *From:* Achin Gupta <Achin.Gupta(a)arm.com> > *Sent:* Tuesday, 27 April, 2021 4:38 PM > *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Loh, Tien Hock < > tien.hock.loh(a)intel.com> > *Cc:* Chee, Tien Fong <tien.fong.chee(a)intel.com>; See, Chin Liang < > chin.liang.see(a)intel.com>; Hea, Kok Kiang <kok.kiang.hea(a)intel.com> > *Subject:* Re: Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3 > > > > Hi Tien Hock, > > > > The maintainers will have more thoughts on this but my $0.02 fwiw. > > > > I cannot see why the Trusted Firmware project should carry any option that > enables use of EL3 by users who do not care about security. EL3 is not > meant to run u-boot with a shell that can be used to fiddle with secure > memory. This flies against the basic security principles that the project > is built upon. > > > > cheers, > Achin > > > ------------------------------ > > *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Loh, > Tien Hock via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Sent:* 27 April 2021 09:02 > *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Cc:* Chee, Tien Fong <tien.fong.chee(a)intel.com>; See, Chin Liang < > chin.liang.see(a)intel.com>; Hea, Kok Kiang <kok.kiang.hea(a)intel.com> > *Subject:* [TF-A] Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3 > > > > Hi, > > > > I’m maintaining TF-A for Intel SoCFPGA platform. > > Would it be possible if we should have the option to run BL33 (u-boot in > our case) in EL3? > > > > The Intel SoCFPGA platform u-boot used to handle all SMC calls: > > SPL u-boot (EL3) -> u-boot (EL3) > > And we have since move to use TF-A’s BL31, thus boot became > SPL u-boot (EL3) -> TF-A BL31 (EL3) -> u-boot (EL2) > > > > Main reason is that some users would like to keep u-boot at EL3 as they do > not care about security, and some users wanted to run some debugging > read/write to secure region in u-boot shell. > > > > Thanks > > Tien Hock > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > -- François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* T: +33.67221.6485 francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog

4 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3

by Manish Pandey2

Hi Tien Hock, Did you explored EL3_PAYLOAD_BASE build option. This option enables booting an EL3 payload, if it suits you then u-boot as EL3 payload. thanks Manish ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 27 April 2021 20:16 To: Loh, Tien Hock <tien.hock.loh(a)intel.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; See, Chin Liang <chin.liang.see(a)intel.com>; Chee, Tien Fong <tien.fong.chee(a)intel.com>; Hea, Kok Kiang <kok.kiang.hea(a)intel.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3 Le mar. 27 avr. 2021 à 11:04, Loh, Tien Hock via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> a écrit : Achin, Yes that’s what I have suspected in the first place, but no harm asking :) Tien Fong, As per discussed, we could probably expose the a compile time option in BL31 that expose a command that read/write to the secure domain. That case, u-boot shell will be able to access secure domain and not need to run in EL3. Would you allow an OS to access underlying hypervisor ? In essence this is what you are asking: there are architectural services such as kicking off a new cpu that are supposed to be routed to the right service handler (PSCI) or secure firmware updates with anti-bricking support.... Could you be more specific on what you want to do and why ? That may help us advise on achieving your goals while still being architecturally correct. Thanks From: Chee, Tien Fong <tien.fong.chee(a)intel.com<mailto:tien.fong.chee@intel.com>> Sent: Tuesday, April 27, 2021 5:01 PM To: Achin Gupta <Achin.Gupta(a)arm.com<mailto:Achin.Gupta@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Loh, Tien Hock <tien.hock.loh(a)intel.com<mailto:tien.hock.loh@intel.com>> Cc: See, Chin Liang <chin.liang.see(a)intel.com<mailto:chin.liang.see@intel.com>>; Hea, Kok Kiang <kok.kiang.hea(a)intel.com<mailto:kok.kiang.hea@intel.com>> Subject: RE: Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3 Hi Achin, Thanks for the feedback. This is use case when user doing development, testing and bring up the board, they can use this option to run their script on U-Boot shell to access these secure region. Once they have finished the development, and testing, then user can switch U-Boot into EL2. This flexibility would definitely giving some degree of convenience for development and testing. Thanks. From: Achin Gupta <Achin.Gupta(a)arm.com<mailto:Achin.Gupta@arm.com>> Sent: Tuesday, 27 April, 2021 4:38 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Loh, Tien Hock <tien.hock.loh(a)intel.com<mailto:tien.hock.loh@intel.com>> Cc: Chee, Tien Fong <tien.fong.chee(a)intel.com<mailto:tien.fong.chee@intel.com>>; See, Chin Liang <chin.liang.see(a)intel.com<mailto:chin.liang.see@intel.com>>; Hea, Kok Kiang <kok.kiang.hea(a)intel.com<mailto:kok.kiang.hea@intel.com>> Subject: Re: Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3 Hi Tien Hock, The maintainers will have more thoughts on this but my $0.02 fwiw. I cannot see why the Trusted Firmware project should carry any option that enables use of EL3 by users who do not care about security. EL3 is not meant to run u-boot with a shell that can be used to fiddle with secure memory. This flies against the basic security principles that the project is built upon. cheers, Achin ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Loh, Tien Hock via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: 27 April 2021 09:02 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Cc: Chee, Tien Fong <tien.fong.chee(a)intel.com<mailto:tien.fong.chee@intel.com>>; See, Chin Liang <chin.liang.see(a)intel.com<mailto:chin.liang.see@intel.com>>; Hea, Kok Kiang <kok.kiang.hea(a)intel.com<mailto:kok.kiang.hea@intel.com>> Subject: [TF-A] Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3 Hi, I’m maintaining TF-A for Intel SoCFPGA platform. Would it be possible if we should have the option to run BL33 (u-boot in our case) in EL3? The Intel SoCFPGA platform u-boot used to handle all SMC calls: SPL u-boot (EL3) -> u-boot (EL3) And we have since move to use TF-A’s BL31, thus boot became SPL u-boot (EL3) -> TF-A BL31 (EL3) -> u-boot (EL2) Main reason is that some users would like to keep u-boot at EL3 as they do not care about security, and some users wanted to run some debugging read/write to secure region in u-boot shell. Thanks Tien Hock -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- [https://drive.google.com/a/linaro.org/uc?id=0BxTAygkus3RgQVhuNHMwUi1mYWc&ex…] François-Frédéric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group T: +33.67221.6485 francois.ozog(a)linaro.org<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org> | Skype: ffozog

4 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3

by Achin Gupta

Hi Tien Hock, The maintainers will have more thoughts on this but my $0.02 fwiw. I cannot see why the Trusted Firmware project should carry any option that enables use of EL3 by users who do not care about security. EL3 is not meant to run u-boot with a shell that can be used to fiddle with secure memory. This flies against the basic security principles that the project is built upon. cheers, Achin ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Loh, Tien Hock via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 27 April 2021 09:02 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: Chee, Tien Fong <tien.fong.chee(a)intel.com>; See, Chin Liang <chin.liang.see(a)intel.com>; Hea, Kok Kiang <kok.kiang.hea(a)intel.com> Subject: [TF-A] Run BL33 (u-boot) in EL3 Hi, I’m maintaining TF-A for Intel SoCFPGA platform. Would it be possible if we should have the option to run BL33 (u-boot in our case) in EL3? The Intel SoCFPGA platform u-boot used to handle all SMC calls: SPL u-boot (EL3) -> u-boot (EL3) And we have since move to use TF-A’s BL31, thus boot became SPL u-boot (EL3) -> TF-A BL31 (EL3) -> u-boot (EL2) Main reason is that some users would like to keep u-boot at EL3 as they do not care about security, and some users wanted to run some debugging read/write to secure region in u-boot shell. Thanks Tien Hock

4 years, 2 months

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