- TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Varun Wadekar

Hello Soby/Joanna, We would like to upstream support for a new Tegra platform along with some other changes. The last time I checked, there were more than 400 changes waiting to be upstreamed. Can someone help me with the best/fastest approach to start upstreaming? Previously, we would upstream changes in big chunks (as branches) but I don't know if that approach still works. Thanks. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] On supporting unmaintained platforms and downstream projects

by Julius Werner

Hi Soby, > Hmm, if we merge a non-trivial patch and ensure the build works, then we > do not know whether it runs correctly, whether there are any runtime > effects that would affect stability/robustness of the platform that even > might have security implications. Hence, in my view, it is better to > have a broken build for the platform, rather than have runtime problems. > > The project could form a policy that if a platform remains broken for > more than 2 releases (1 year by current release intervals), then it will > get removed from the tree after giving enough notifications. Thanks, yes, I think it would be good to have a clear policy on this, whatever it is. I would still like to make a case for keeping these platforms in the tree on a best-effort basis. You're right that there's a chance for untested patches to cause all sorts of runtime errors, but I think that may still be better than a platform that doesn't build at all. A platform that doesn't build doesn't benefit anyone. A platform that may have errors still has a chance of working, and even if it doesn't it gives a third-party contributor or hobby developer who wants to start using it a chance to fix it up again. This is something we occasionally see happening with some of our older, less maintained platforms in coreboot. But if it doesn't even build, the chance of someone coming along to fix it seem very slim, because then more and more build issues will keep piling up over time. (In fact, I doubt there's even any point in keeping broken stuff in the tree for another year as you proposed... likely all that would do is confuse people who are trying to refactor project-wide APIs. Code that's never build-tested just bit rots very quickly. I think at that point you might as well remove it from the repo immediately.) It's true that there may also be security issues (which is more serious), but I'm skeptical that this really makes a lot of difference. After all, this may happen even while the platform is still actively maintained. Just testing whether it boots doesn't make sure you have no security issues anyway. Maybe a way to make this more visible instead could be to introduce a new ALLOW_UNMAINTAINED_PLATFORM=1 make variable that the user has to explicitly set to build a platform without active maintainer? That could serve as a warning that the code may not be safe to use for critical applications anymore while still giving developers access to something if they're willing to deal with possible issues. Anyway, whatever the policy may be, a more defined process would help. I think the initial messaging around the console deprecation plan was fine, but it would have been good to have another explicit announcement when the CI actually gets turned off for a platform.

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] broken link in phabricator wiki

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Leif, On 9/3/19 3:16 AM, Leif Lindholm via TF-A wrote: > On page https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/gerrit-getting-started/ > the link to "new TF-A Contribution Guidelines" points at > https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/about/contribut…, > which is a dead link. > I expect it is meant to be pointing to > https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/about/docs/proc…. You're right, thanks for pointing it out. We forgot to update this page when the docs hierarchy got restructured some time ago. This is now fixed. Regards, Sandrine

5 years, 11 months

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broken link in phabricator wiki

by Leif Lindholm

Hi there, On page https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/gerrit-getting-started/ the link to "new TF-A Contribution Guidelines" points at https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/about/contribut…, which is a dead link. I expect it is meant to be pointing to https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/about/docs/proc…. Best Regards, Leif

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] On supporting unmaintained platforms and downstream projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Julius, On 8/27/19 9:55 PM, Julius Werner via TF-A wrote: > Could either of you please help get the Tegra fix in > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/1192 > landed (and subsequently CI for Tegra re-enabled)? It has been > reviewed and approved for two weeks but nobody is merging it. This is > blocking more and more work across all coreboot-based platforms so I > would appreciate if we could get it resolved quickly. Apologies for the delay. As you may have seen, the patch has now been merged, and we've also re-enabled the Tegra builds in the CI. Regards, Sandrine

5 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-A] On supporting unmaintained platforms and downstream projects

by Julius Werner

Hi Soby, Joanna, Could either of you please help get the Tegra fix in https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/1192 landed (and subsequently CI for Tegra re-enabled)? It has been reviewed and approved for two weeks but nobody is merging it. This is blocking more and more work across all coreboot-based platforms so I would appreciate if we could get it resolved quickly. Thanks, Julius

5 years, 12 months

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Ultra96-V1 stops booting since b8e39f49e634

by Jan Kiszka

Hi all, I've bisected a boot issue of my Ultra96 version 1 down to commit [1]. U-Boot plays no role, I tried current master, 2019.07 and 2019.01. What might be related: I'm using pre-built fsbl, pmu-fw and bitstream from Alex' OpenSUSE packages [2][3][4]. Build steps are as described in [5]. Meanwhile, I rebuilt at least the pmu-fw from current embeddedsw git (c12743e5d7b0), but also without any impact on the issue. Any idea what could be wrong and why specifically this commit triggers it? I'd like to lift everything to a recent ATF version because of compilation issues with currently used 1.6 and newer gcc releases. Thanks, Jan [1] https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/commit/b8e39f49e634 [2] https://download.opensuse.org/repositories/devel:/ARM:/Factory:/Contrib:/Zy… [3] https://download.opensuse.org/repositories/devel:/ARM:/Factory:/Contrib:/Zy… [4] https://download.opensuse.org/repositories/devel:/ARM:/Factory:/Contrib:/Zy… [5] https://github.com/siemens/jailhouse-images/blob/v0.11/recipes-bsp/u-boot/f…

5 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-A] SMC to intentionally trigger a panic in TF-A

by Dan Handley

Hi Julius > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Julius > Werner via TF-A > Sent: 20 August 2019 02:15 > > Hi Soby et. al., > > I'd like to implement a small new feature and ask some guidance for how to go > about it: Chrome OS has the ability to automatically collect crash reports > from runtime crashes in Trusted Firmware, and we would like to set up > automated tests to ensure this feature stays working. > In order to do this we need a way for the non-secure OS to intentionally > trigger a panic in EL3. The obvious solution would be to implement a new SMC > for that. (It's common for operating systems to have similar facilities, e.g. > Linux can force a kernel panic by writing 'c' into /proc/sysrq-trigger.) > OK I can see the use of that, although I'd be a bit concerned about such a thing being available as a general service in case it gets used as an attack vector. For example, a test program could aggressively use this service to try to get the firmware to leak secure world information or something about its behaviour. > My main question is: where should I get an SMC function ID for this? > This is not a silicon or OEM specific feature, so the SiP Service Calls and > OEM Service Calls ID ranges seem inappropriate (or do you think it would make > sense to treat Google or Chrome OS as the "OEM" > here, even though that's not quite accurate?). I guess in theory you could mandate that all Chrome OS SiPs provide a specific function ID in their own specific SiP service, but I don't think that's the right solution here... > There are ranges for Trusted > Applications and the Trusted OS but unfortunately none for the normal world > OS. I don't think the TOS range is right either. > Is this something that would make sense to allocate under Standard > Service Calls? Could you just find an ID for me to use there or does > everything in that range need a big specification document written by Arm? > For sure everything in the standard or architectural ranges require specification by Arm, although this does not necessarily need to be big. However, I think there might already be support for what you need. PSCI is part of the standard service and the function SYSTEM_RESET2 allows for both architectural and vendor-specific resets. The latter allows for vendor-specific semantics, which could include crashing the firmware as you suggest. Chrome OS could specify what such a vendor-specific reset looks like and each Chromebook's platform PSCI hooks could be implemented accordingly. Alternatively, this could potentially be defined as an additional architectural reset. This would enable a generic implementation but would require approval/definition by Arm's Architecture team. Like me they might have concerns about this being defined at a generic architectural level. Regards Dan. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years

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SMC to intentionally trigger a panic in TF-A

by Julius Werner

Hi Soby et. al., I'd like to implement a small new feature and ask some guidance for how to go about it: Chrome OS has the ability to automatically collect crash reports from runtime crashes in Trusted Firmware, and we would like to set up automated tests to ensure this feature stays working. In order to do this we need a way for the non-secure OS to intentionally trigger a panic in EL3. The obvious solution would be to implement a new SMC for that. (It's common for operating systems to have similar facilities, e.g. Linux can force a kernel panic by writing 'c' into /proc/sysrq-trigger.) My main question is: where should I get an SMC function ID for this? This is not a silicon or OEM specific feature, so the SiP Service Calls and OEM Service Calls ID ranges seem inappropriate (or do you think it would make sense to treat Google or Chrome OS as the "OEM" here, even though that's not quite accurate?). There are ranges for Trusted Applications and the Trusted OS but unfortunately none for the normal world OS. Is this something that would make sense to allocate under Standard Service Calls? Could you just find an ID for me to use there or does everything in that range need a big specification document written by Arm? Thanks, Julius

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Advisory TFV 5 to CVE-2017-15031 only saves/stores the PMCR_EL0 across world switching

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Marek The patch is available at https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/1789 Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Joanna Farley via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 19 August 2019 11:41 To: Marek <marek.bykowski(a)gmail.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Advisory TFV 5 to CVE-2017-15031 only saves/stores the PMCR_EL0 across world switching Hi Marek, Changes are in review so hopefully soon. Joanna On 19/08/2019, 10:56, "TF-A on behalf of Marek via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hi Dan, Are there any time estimates when the fix should be in? Thanks, Marek On Sat, 10 Aug 2019 at 22:46, Marek via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Thank you Dan for checking this out. Looking forward into the fix. > > Marek > > On Thu, 8 Aug 2019 at 17:52, Dan Handley via TF-A > <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > Hi Marek > > > > Thanks for pointing this out. Typically we expect any timing sensitive secure operations to be implemented at Secure-EL1 or lower, which the current code does protect. However, you are correct that all secure world code including EL3 should not expose timing information. A fix is in progress to address this. > > > > Regards > > > > Dan. > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Marek > > > Bykowski via TF-A > > > Sent: 03 August 2019 07:37 > > > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; David Cunado <David.Cunado(a)arm.com> > > > Subject: [TF-A] Advisory TFV 5 to CVE-2017-15031 only saves/stores the > > > PMCR_EL0 across world switching > > > > > > Hi David/ATF Support, > > > > > > An excerpt from the commit message to CVE-2017-15031 is "Additionally, > > > PMCR_EL0 is added to the list of registers that are saved and restored during > > > a world switch." > > > > > > My question is why it is only being saved/restored across the world switch > > > and not during a "normal" SMC call? When I do modify the > > > PMCR_EL0 in EL2 or NonSecure-EL1 and run the smc call the PMCCNTR counter > > > counts during the smc call and does expose secure world timing information to > > > NonSecure in that matter. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > Marek > > > -- > > > TF-A mailing list > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > > > -- > Slán, > Marek > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- Slán, Marek -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years

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