- TF-M - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [TF-M] TF-M is trying to migrate to mbedtls 3.0

by Chris.Brand＠infineon.com

Hi Summer. Is the plan that this is part of the 1.4 release? Thanks, Chris From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Summer Qin via TF-M Sent: Monday, July 19, 2021 3:40 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M is trying to migrate to mbedtls 3.0 Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>. Hi, TF-M is trying to migrate to mbedtls 3.0. Here<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mbedtls3.0%22+(status:open%20…> are the patches for mbedtls 3.0 upgrading. Some patches touch platforms changes, especially are the following three patches: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/10628/6 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/10685/5 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/10760/1 If these patches influence your platform's work, please feel free to let us know. Best Regards, Summer

3 years, 2 months

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TF-M is trying to migrate to mbedtls 3.0

by Summer Qin

Hi, TF-M is trying to migrate to mbedtls 3.0. Here<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mbedtls3.0%22+(status:open%20…> are the patches for mbedtls 3.0 upgrading. Some patches touch platforms changes, especially are the following three patches: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/10628/6 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/10685/5 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/10760/1 If these patches influence your platform's work, please feel free to let us know. Best Regards, Summer

3 years, 2 months

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Technical Forum call - July 22

by Anton Komlev

Hi, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, July 22 7:00-8:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

3 years, 2 months

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[CANCELLED]: Technical Forum call - July 8

by Anton Komlev

Hi, Having no topics proposed or requested and considering the release preparation busy time, let me cancel this slot. A reminder: TF-M v1.4.0 code freeze is planned on July 16 and the release is on July 30. Thanks, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, July 5, 2021 2:15 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - July 8 Hi, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, July 8 at 15:00-16:00 UTC (US time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

3 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder?

by Raef Coles

Hey Poppy Along with all the good advice from Kevin, I wanted to highlight a couple of things: * There is an example of this already being done in TF-M. The nv-seed code calls into ITS depite being in the platform layer. This code isn't widely enabled, but works fine. (see platform/ext/common/template/crypto_nv_seed.c) * One nuance is when you're calling into the SP. Under library mode, it's not possible to call into another secure partition from a secure partitions's init code. It's possible to do this under IPC mode however. This is likely to cause problems with your usecase, as it seems likely you'd want to load cryptographic keys into the crypto partition during init. On another note - we're currently looking into tidying up our OTP support and creating some sort of basic provisioning workflow (which would also replace the current CryptoCell-312 provisioning code). Our design seems to be similar to yours (Either storing the provisioned data in real OTP or internal flash depending on platform support). This is currently still in progress, but we hope to get patches on the trustedfirmware.org gerrit soon. Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Kevin Peng via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 08 July 2021 03:56 To: Edward Yang; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Poppy, As you said, how to read the provisioned information varies from platforms. So I cannot comment on how is your approach. But I can give something from the Framework’s point of view. The Client APIs mainly target two kind of consumers, one is the NSPE, the other is Secure Partitions. In your scenario B, a Partition wants to call psa_its_get(this is not the PSA Client API, but a “service API” that implemented with the Client APIs) to get something, that’s totally OK. Remember to add your Partition to the “dependencies” of the ITS Partition’s manifest, otherwise you’ll get errors for permission issues. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: Thursday, July 8, 2021 10:43 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Anton and Kevin, "call secure services directly” here means calling by PSA client API in IPC mode. Here is the scenarios, For example, a new secure partition is added ,and this partition provides some secure services. One service needs get some pre-provisioned information,such as a key. This operation(get pre-provisioned information) may vary with platforms. [cid:image001.gif@01D773E7.56814130] [cid:image002.gif@01D773E7.56814130] Scenario A:Target1(A board without MCU embedded Flash ) , the pre-provisioned information were stored in OTP during provisioning, so this target reads pre-provisioned information from OTP during deployment period. Scenario B: Target1(A board with MCU embedded Flash ) , assume the pre-provisioned information were stored in MCU embedded Flash by calling psa_its_set() service during provisioning(I am not sure whether this kind of implementation is right ), so this target needs reading pre-provisioned information by calling psa_its_get() service during deployment period. I am wondering whether this design breaks the design rules of tf-m. Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Kevin Peng via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> 2021/07/07 11:10 Please respond to Kevin Peng <Kevin.Peng(a)arm.com<mailto:Kevin.Peng@arm.com>> To "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Poppy, By “call secure services directly” I guess you mean function call? That is forbidden. Secure services can be only called by PSA Client APIs (psa_connect/psa_call/psa_close) or Partition provided APIs (for example psa_ps_set). As Anton mentioned, platform folder actually provide HW level support to Secure Partitions and Framework (SPM). Could you provide more details of you use case of calling Secure Services from platform folder? Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 8:31 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Poppy, Platform folder represents a HW integration layer. What kind of use case you have in mind to call the secure services from there? Thanks, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 9:30 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi experts, The tf-m project includes secure_fw and paltform these two folders, I want to know whether the codes in platform folder are allowed to call secure services directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

3 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder?

by Kevin Peng

Hi Poppy, As you said, how to read the provisioned information varies from platforms. So I cannot comment on how is your approach. But I can give something from the Framework's point of view. The Client APIs mainly target two kind of consumers, one is the NSPE, the other is Secure Partitions. In your scenario B, a Partition wants to call psa_its_get(this is not the PSA Client API, but a "service API" that implemented with the Client APIs) to get something, that's totally OK. Remember to add your Partition to the "dependencies" of the ITS Partition's manifest, otherwise you'll get errors for permission issues. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: Thursday, July 8, 2021 10:43 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Anton and Kevin, "call secure services directly" here means calling by PSA client API in IPC mode. Here is the scenarios, For example, a new secure partition is added ,and this partition provides some secure services. One service needs get some pre-provisioned information,such as a key. This operation(get pre-provisioned information) may vary with platforms. [cid:image001.gif@01D773E7.56814130] [cid:image002.gif@01D773E7.56814130] Scenario A:Target1(A board without MCU embedded Flash ) , the pre-provisioned information were stored in OTP during provisioning, so this target reads pre-provisioned information from OTP during deployment period. Scenario B: Target1(A board with MCU embedded Flash ) , assume the pre-provisioned information were stored in MCU embedded Flash by calling psa_its_set() service during provisioning(I am not sure whether this kind of implementation is right ), so this target needs reading pre-provisioned information by calling psa_its_get() service during deployment period. I am wondering whether this design breaks the design rules of tf-m. Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Kevin Peng via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> 2021/07/07 11:10 Please respond to Kevin Peng <Kevin.Peng(a)arm.com<mailto:Kevin.Peng@arm.com>> To "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Poppy, By "call secure services directly" I guess you mean function call? That is forbidden. Secure services can be only called by PSA Client APIs (psa_connect/psa_call/psa_close) or Partition provided APIs (for example psa_ps_set). As Anton mentioned, platform folder actually provide HW level support to Secure Partitions and Framework (SPM). Could you provide more details of you use case of calling Secure Services from platform folder? Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 8:31 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Poppy, Platform folder represents a HW integration layer. What kind of use case you have in mind to call the secure services from there? Thanks, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 9:30 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi experts, The tf-m project includes secure_fw and paltform these two folders, I want to know whether the codes in platform folder are allowed to call secure services directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

3 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder?

by Edward Yang

Hi Anton and Kevin, "call secure services directly” here means calling by PSA client API in IPC mode. Here is the scenarios, For example, a new secure partition is added ,and this partition provides some secure services. One service needs get some pre-provisioned information,such as a key. This operation(get pre-provisioned information) may vary with platforms. Scenario A:Target1(A board without MCU embedded Flash ) , the pre-provisioned information were stored in OTP during provisioning, so this target reads pre-provisioned information from OTP during deployment period. Scenario B: Target1(A board with MCU embedded Flash ) , assume the pre-provisioned information were stored in MCU embedded Flash by calling psa_its_set() service during provisioning(I am not sure whether this kind of implementation is right ), so this target needs reading pre-provisioned information by calling psa_its_get() service during deployment period. I am wondering whether this design breaks the design rules of tf-m. Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Kevin Peng via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 2021/07/07 11:10 Please respond to Kevin Peng <Kevin.Peng(a)arm.com> To "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Poppy, By “call secure services directly” I guess you mean function call? That is forbidden. Secure services can be only called by PSA Client APIs (psa_connect/psa_call/psa_close) or Partition provided APIs (for example psa_ps_set). As Anton mentioned, platform folder actually provide HW level support to Secure Partitions and Framework (SPM). Could you provide more details of you use case of calling Secure Services from platform folder? Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 8:31 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Poppy, Platform folder represents a HW integration layer. What kind of use case you have in mind to call the secure services from there? Thanks, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 9:30 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi experts, The tf-m project includes secure_fw and paltform these two folders, I want to know whether the codes in platform folder are allowed to call secure services directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

3 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder?

by Kevin Peng

Hi Poppy, By "call secure services directly" I guess you mean function call? That is forbidden. Secure services can be only called by PSA Client APIs (psa_connect/psa_call/psa_close) or Partition provided APIs (for example psa_ps_set). As Anton mentioned, platform folder actually provide HW level support to Secure Partitions and Framework (SPM). Could you provide more details of you use case of calling Secure Services from platform folder? Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 8:31 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi Poppy, Platform folder represents a HW integration layer. What kind of use case you have in mind to call the secure services from there? Thanks, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 9:30 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Whether the codes in platform folder of tf-m project can be allowed to call secure services in secure_fw folder? Hi experts, The tf-m project includes secure_fw and paltform these two folders, I want to know whether the codes in platform folder are allowed to call secure services directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

3 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis

by Antonio De Angelis

Hi Suresh/Raef, There is no problem in evaluating and reviewing fixes and optimisations to the CC runtime hosted in TF-M. I will have a look into this and sync up with @Raef Coles as well regarding the possible solution that he mentions below. Thanks, Antonio -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raef Coles via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, July 6, 2021 5:15 PM To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com>; Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com>; Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis Hey Suresh I've had a look into this, and it seems to be a limitation of the cryptocell runtime library. Profile medium enables MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, which then causes cryptocell's accelerator config to set MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT, which are both working as expected. The problem is that the runtime library doesn't use the MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED define (or any other define) to conditionally enable function pointers in the lists used for selecting ECC functions (see cc_ecpki_info.c), so the linker cant optimize those functions out of the final image. Actually fixing this issue probably isn't too much of a problem, but there is an underlying problem that currently the runtime library is effectively unmaintained, and I'm not sure that TF-M can commit to fixing all of the issues in it. Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Suresh Marisetty via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 06 July 2021 15:49 To: David Hu; Mark Horvath Cc: nd; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis Hi David, One of our observation is that for Medium profile, some ciphers are disabled in the medcrypto portion through the config file (tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h). However, the CC312 components appears to be generating libraries that are disabled in mbedcrypto. One such example is the object file: cc_ecpki_domain_secp521r1.o generated for medium profile. Wondering if this is expected or just an overlooked escape. I am assuming all ciphers not enabled in mbedcrypto portion should NOT have corresponding cc312 components, to help optimize the image sizes. thanks Suresh Marisetty Infineon Semiconductor Corporation From: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com> Sent: Sunday, July 4, 2021 11:37 PM To: Marisetty Suresh (CYSC CSS ICW SW SSE) <Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com>; Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: RE: Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://goto.infineon.com/SocialEngineering>. Hi Suresh, 1. Please check t Profile Medium and Profile Large design documents below. The ciphers supported are listed in the document. Profile Medium: https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/docs/technical_references/profi… Profile Large: https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/docs/technical_references/profi… 1. I don’t think the software countermeasures against physical attacks are enabled in Musca-B1 SE, by default. Mark, please correct me if I misunderstand it. TF-M implements a Fault Inject Hardening (FIH) library as software countermeasure to mitigate physical attacks. FIH is enabled as Medium Profile in Profile Large by default. You can set `TFM_FIH_PROFILE` as OFF to disable FIH features. FIH is not implemented by mebd TLS or CC312. It consists of protections of TF-M SPM critical routine and platform specific isolation configuration. Please check FIH design document: https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/docs/technical_references/tfm_p… Compared to Profile Medium, Profile Large enables more cryptographic algorithms support and FIH library. It may also include more configurations of higher isolation. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Suresh Marisetty via TF-M Sent: Sunday, July 4, 2021 2:26 AM To: Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis Hi Mark, Wondering if someone can provide more visibility in the following in regards to the SE build with profile medium and large: 1. What ciphers are supported in medium vs. large (I see the size of the code bloats up almost twice from 30 to 60K approx) – observation from size of libmbedcrypto and libcrypto_service_cc312 – any clear documentation on this or a link would be helpful (besides code review) 2. When the SE is built for the large profile, assume it also includes “Software countermeasures against physical attacks” since it is offloading to the CC-312 * Is there a way to build the large profile without physical attack counter-measures? * While library are these countermeasures implemented in (libmbed or lib_cc312)? 1. On our initial analysis, for a medium profile these two libraries appears to be 30K-33K in size each and is this in the right ballpark? (with minsizerel) I assume the code size increase is due to additional cipher support + physical attack countermeasures. Correct me otherwise. thanks Suresh Marisetty Infineon Semiconductor Corporation From: Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com>> Sent: Friday, May 14, 2021 5:30 AM To: Marisetty Suresh (CYSC CSS ICW SW SSE) <Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com<mailto:Suresh.Marisetty@infineon.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://goto.infineon.com/SocialEngineering>. Hi Suresh, Yes, by default the cc312 acceleration is turned on at build time for SE, and the algorithms will be handled by HW instead of the SW implementation. If you would like to use SW crypto instead you can pass the HW_ACCELERATOR="OFF" flag to cmake when building the SE TF-M instance. And here are the TF-M image sizes as of now with GCC in release mode: SE: ~185 KiB code flash and ~63 KiB RAM Host: ~22 KiB code flash and ~16 KiB RAM (a few more KiB needed for the images in flash for image header and trailer if loaded by mcuboot) Best regards, Mark ________________________________ From: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Hu@arm.com>> Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2021 5:26 AM To: Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com<mailto:Suresh.Marisetty@infineon.com> <Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com<mailto:Suresh.Marisetty@infineon.com>>; Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com<mailto:Tamas.Ban@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>; Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation Hi @Mark Horvath<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com>, Could you please help take a look at the following questions about Musca-B1 SE? Thanks 😊 Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Suresh Marisetty via TF-M Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2021 6:04 AM To: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com<mailto:Tamas.Ban@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation Hi Tamas, The following is good information. A few questions: 1. Is it correct to state that for the SE, the PSA RoT services do not have any software Crypto implementation, but leverage from CC-312? 2. What is the size of the TFM on the host (M33) with only PSA RoT service proxy with redirection to SE 3. Just trying to understand the TFM image size requirements on M33 vs. SE 4. How much of the Flash region/code Executed In Place vs. execution out of SRAM (XIP) thanks Suresh Marisetty Infineon Semiconductor Corporation From: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com<mailto:Tamas.Ban@arm.com>> Sent: Friday, April 30, 2021 12:40 AM To: Marisetty Suresh (CYSC CSS ICW SW SSE) <Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com<mailto:Suresh.Marisetty@infineon.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://goto.infineon.com/SocialEngineering>. Hi Suresh, Here is a link how to build images to Musca-B1 SE: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/platform/e… I have built with GCC and MinSizeRel build type: Profile Medium: Memory region Used Size Region Size %age Used FLASH: 101464 B 381 KB 26.01% RAM: 61304 B 64 KB 93.54% [100%] Built target tfm_s Profile Large: Memory region Used Size Region Size %age Used FLASH: 170448 B 381 KB 43.69% RAM: 62980 B 64 KB 96.10% [ 97%] Built target tfm_s The profiles means different capabilities of TF-M, they were introduced to support constrained devices as well, with limited capability. There is a detailed description about the profiles here: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/techn… BR, Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Suresh Marisetty via TF-M Sent: 2021. április 29., csütörtök 21:49 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation I am following up on a question that came up on the TFM Core and MCUBoot image sizes that is built for SE on Musca-B1. We are trying to figure out the resource requirements for SE, to be able to host the TF-M as suggested in the slides below. Wondering if anyone throw more light on the RAM/FLASH requirements for it. Also, does the TFM profile small/medium/large map to this at all or is it different from them. Also, what’s are the estimated latencies of boot on SE with all the Flash accesses, etc. https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/Musca-B1-Secure-Enclave-Solution.pdf https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/platform/e… Any info on this would be appreciated. thanks Suresh Marisetty Infineon Semiconductor Corporation -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

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Re: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis

by Raef Coles

Hey Suresh I've had a look into this, and it seems to be a limitation of the cryptocell runtime library. Profile medium enables MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C, which then causes cryptocell's accelerator config to set MBEDTLS_ECDSA_VERIFY_ALT, which are both working as expected. The problem is that the runtime library doesn't use the MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP521R1_ENABLED define (or any other define) to conditionally enable function pointers in the lists used for selecting ECC functions (see cc_ecpki_info.c), so the linker cant optimize those functions out of the final image. Actually fixing this issue probably isn't too much of a problem, but there is an underlying problem that currently the runtime library is effectively unmaintained, and I'm not sure that TF-M can commit to fixing all of the issues in it. Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Suresh Marisetty via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 06 July 2021 15:49 To: David Hu; Mark Horvath Cc: nd; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis Hi David, One of our observation is that for Medium profile, some ciphers are disabled in the medcrypto portion through the config file (tfm_mbedcrypto_config_profile_medium.h). However, the CC312 components appears to be generating libraries that are disabled in mbedcrypto. One such example is the object file: cc_ecpki_domain_secp521r1.o generated for medium profile. Wondering if this is expected or just an overlooked escape. I am assuming all ciphers not enabled in mbedcrypto portion should NOT have corresponding cc312 components, to help optimize the image sizes. thanks Suresh Marisetty Infineon Semiconductor Corporation From: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com> Sent: Sunday, July 4, 2021 11:37 PM To: Marisetty Suresh (CYSC CSS ICW SW SSE) <Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com>; Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: RE: Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://goto.infineon.com/SocialEngineering>. Hi Suresh, 1. Please check t Profile Medium and Profile Large design documents below. The ciphers supported are listed in the document. Profile Medium: https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/docs/technical_references/profi… Profile Large: https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/docs/technical_references/profi… 1. I don’t think the software countermeasures against physical attacks are enabled in Musca-B1 SE, by default. Mark, please correct me if I misunderstand it. TF-M implements a Fault Inject Hardening (FIH) library as software countermeasure to mitigate physical attacks. FIH is enabled as Medium Profile in Profile Large by default. You can set `TFM_FIH_PROFILE` as OFF to disable FIH features. FIH is not implemented by mebd TLS or CC312. It consists of protections of TF-M SPM critical routine and platform specific isolation configuration. Please check FIH design document: https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/docs/technical_references/tfm_p… Compared to Profile Medium, Profile Large enables more cryptographic algorithms support and FIH library. It may also include more configurations of higher isolation. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Suresh Marisetty via TF-M Sent: Sunday, July 4, 2021 2:26 AM To: Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation - code size analysis Hi Mark, Wondering if someone can provide more visibility in the following in regards to the SE build with profile medium and large: 1. What ciphers are supported in medium vs. large (I see the size of the code bloats up almost twice from 30 to 60K approx) – observation from size of libmbedcrypto and libcrypto_service_cc312 – any clear documentation on this or a link would be helpful (besides code review) 2. When the SE is built for the large profile, assume it also includes “Software countermeasures against physical attacks” since it is offloading to the CC-312 * Is there a way to build the large profile without physical attack counter-measures? * While library are these countermeasures implemented in (libmbed or lib_cc312)? 1. On our initial analysis, for a medium profile these two libraries appears to be 30K-33K in size each and is this in the right ballpark? (with minsizerel) I assume the code size increase is due to additional cipher support + physical attack countermeasures. Correct me otherwise. thanks Suresh Marisetty Infineon Semiconductor Corporation From: Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com>> Sent: Friday, May 14, 2021 5:30 AM To: Marisetty Suresh (CYSC CSS ICW SW SSE) <Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com<mailto:Suresh.Marisetty@infineon.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://goto.infineon.com/SocialEngineering>. Hi Suresh, Yes, by default the cc312 acceleration is turned on at build time for SE, and the algorithms will be handled by HW instead of the SW implementation. If you would like to use SW crypto instead you can pass the HW_ACCELERATOR="OFF" flag to cmake when building the SE TF-M instance. And here are the TF-M image sizes as of now with GCC in release mode: SE: ~185 KiB code flash and ~63 KiB RAM Host: ~22 KiB code flash and ~16 KiB RAM (a few more KiB needed for the images in flash for image header and trailer if loaded by mcuboot) Best regards, Mark ________________________________ From: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Hu@arm.com>> Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2021 5:26 AM To: Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com<mailto:Suresh.Marisetty@infineon.com> <Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com<mailto:Suresh.Marisetty@infineon.com>>; Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com<mailto:Tamas.Ban@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>; Mark Horvath <Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation Hi @Mark Horvath<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com>, Could you please help take a look at the following questions about Musca-B1 SE? Thanks 😊 Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Suresh Marisetty via TF-M Sent: Thursday, May 13, 2021 6:04 AM To: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com<mailto:Tamas.Ban@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation Hi Tamas, The following is good information. A few questions: 1. Is it correct to state that for the SE, the PSA RoT services do not have any software Crypto implementation, but leverage from CC-312? 2. What is the size of the TFM on the host (M33) with only PSA RoT service proxy with redirection to SE 3. Just trying to understand the TFM image size requirements on M33 vs. SE 4. How much of the Flash region/code Executed In Place vs. execution out of SRAM (XIP) thanks Suresh Marisetty Infineon Semiconductor Corporation From: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com<mailto:Tamas.Ban@arm.com>> Sent: Friday, April 30, 2021 12:40 AM To: Marisetty Suresh (CYSC CSS ICW SW SSE) <Suresh.Marisetty(a)infineon.com<mailto:Suresh.Marisetty@infineon.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://goto.infineon.com/SocialEngineering>. Hi Suresh, Here is a link how to build images to Musca-B1 SE: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/platform/e… I have built with GCC and MinSizeRel build type: Profile Medium: Memory region Used Size Region Size %age Used FLASH: 101464 B 381 KB 26.01% RAM: 61304 B 64 KB 93.54% [100%] Built target tfm_s Profile Large: Memory region Used Size Region Size %age Used FLASH: 170448 B 381 KB 43.69% RAM: 62980 B 64 KB 96.10% [ 97%] Built target tfm_s The profiles means different capabilities of TF-M, they were introduced to support constrained devices as well, with limited capability. There is a detailed description about the profiles here: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/techn… BR, Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Suresh Marisetty via TF-M Sent: 2021. április 29., csütörtök 21:49 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Questions on Musca-B1 SE implementation I am following up on a question that came up on the TFM Core and MCUBoot image sizes that is built for SE on Musca-B1. We are trying to figure out the resource requirements for SE, to be able to host the TF-M as suggested in the slides below. Wondering if anyone throw more light on the RAM/FLASH requirements for it. Also, does the TFM profile small/medium/large map to this at all or is it different from them. Also, what’s are the estimated latencies of boot on SE with all the Flash accesses, etc. https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/Musca-B1-Secure-Enclave-Solution.pdf https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/platform/e… Any info on this would be appreciated. thanks Suresh Marisetty Infineon Semiconductor Corporation

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