Hi Anton and Chris,
Thank you for your replies.
I have TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID set to off. That does not prevent client_id
translation to happen. `tfm_nspm_get_current_client_id` seems to do
translation unconditionally here:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git….
But as said, setting client_id_limit in code to -1 helps. Maybe there could
be additional configuration #define whether to do translation
when TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID is off.
Transition approach to convert the old PS data format to new one on the
flash when reading data in new format fails sounds reasonable assuming
there's no security problems involved in retrying to read the objects using
the old format after a failure. Probably not. It anyways sounds better than
supporting the old one "forever". At least to me, being able to do that
transition would require a bit of learning what exactly was the old and
what is the new layout. If there's some material in addition to source
code, I'd be happy to check that.
-Miika
ke 27.11.2024 klo 23.01 Chris.Brand--- via TF-M (
tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org) kirjoitti:
> Hi Miika,
>
>
>
> Unfortunately there have been a couple of changes to the way that PS data
> is stored in flash. I hope that we are getting better at considering
> backwards compatibility. In general I think that whenever we do introduce a
> change like this, we need to ensure that data stored with the old layout
> can still be read by newer code.
>
>
>
> I believe the patch that you’ve identified was part of the work to make PS
> encryption optional. Looking at it now, I don’t see that the layout was a
> necessary part of that work. Unfortunately, we’re now in a position where
> there could be PS data stored on devices in this new format, so just
> reverting that part of that patch would cause other problems.
>
>
>
> The bad news is that there’s another stored format change post-v2.1.1. The
> good news is that we did think about existing data and introduced a build
> option to read the old format.
>
>
>
> One solution to your problem would be similar to
> https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/commit/e8d48d78c166…
> - a build option to support reading the old format, with stores then using
> the new format. Another option would be to introduce the 1.8.1 format as an
> alternative implementation i.e. a second struct inside union ps_crypto_t
> and provide the 1.8.1 code as well as the current code (this would mean
> picking a storage format at build time and using it forever).
>
>
>
> Regarding the client_id. You’re correct that the client_id is used as a
> kind of access control (the client_id and UID together identify the stored
> object). Yes, there was a major change to the way that client_ids are used,
> with the mapping being added. Do you have TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID set to ON? I
> believe that if it is set to OFF then -1 is used inside TF-M to represent
> all non-secure clients, which sounds like it may be what you need.
>
>
>
> Chris
>
Hi all,
just to point out that the coding guidelines are being updated to reflect feedback received over the years about the point of variable declaration. The majority of the code already follows this style, changing the guidelines to avoid further confusion.
…/coding_guide.rst · Gerrit Code Review<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/33807/1/docs…>
Please let us know if any feedback.
Thanks,
Antonio
Hi Team
I am investigating the move from MbedTLS 2.25 to 3.6, however, our client uses the 2.25 currently (looks like they prefer to stay with it) and I need to provide convincing proof to move to 3.6 considering the upgrade issues that might arise. Any suggestions here that is convincing proof to do the migration to 3.6? I would appreciate your comments. Thanks
Michael
Hi,
I am working on an update from TF-M 1.8.1 to TF-M 2.1.1 on a board that
uses encrypted Protected Storage. The board used is stm32 b_u585i_iot02a,
NSPE side using Zephyr OS. I want to support field updates as well for
devices already having Protected Storage objects created from NSPE. In my
case, Protected Storage is created and used by TF-M 1.8.1, and I want it to
remain functional after upgrading to TF-M 2.1.1. PS_CRYPTO_AEAD_ALG is set
to (default) PSA_ALG_GCM.
I have faced two issues with the uplift:
1. It seems commit ffd13c3 (
https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/commit/ffd13c31d5e6…)
has changed the layout how Protected Storage objects are stored into flash.
With TF-M 2.1.1 and old PS data, PS init fails (or gets recreated if
PS_CREATE_FLASH_LAYOUT, which I don't want since then all the existing
objects would get erased). If I revert the commit (and
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…
as not to have conflicts), then the PS initialization can pass and objects
are decrypted successfully.
I have not been able to understand this thoroughly, but at least change in
`union ps_crypto_t` struct member order is changing padding (sizeof 48 ->
40), and that in turn seems to shift at least additional data by 8 bytes
via `#define PS_NON_AUTH_OBJ_TABLE_SIZE sizeof(union ps_crypto_t)`. Is
this compatibility issue "a bug" in 2.1.1 or expected by design?
2. PS objects in 1.8.1 were storing client id to the object table entry to
implement access control (?). With 1.8.1, the client id that got stored was
-1. With 2.1.1, likely due to the Mailbox NS Agent Design Update (
https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/design_docs/dual-cpu/mailbox_ns…),
non-secure requests to get an object seems to pass client ID -0x3c000000 to
the Protected Storage implementation. That is, client id -1 seems to be
transformed to `client_id_limit`. Due to this, `psa_ps_get_info()` fails to
get an object that has been previously made with 1.8.1 FW.
I am able to get reading of old stored objects working by changing
`client_id_limit` from value -0x3c000000 to -1 which changes to use 1-to-1
mapping when using client_id=-1. But I am unsure if this change causes some
unwanted side effects. Is this the correct way to gain backwards
compatibility? And if it is, would it make sense to pick
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…
into 2.1.x branch and add a configuration flag for the 1-to-1 mapping
support without code change for backwards compatibility?
Thanks,
Miika
Hi TF-M Maintainers,
I am trying to build tf-m regression tests with fpu tests on for an521 and musca_s1 (I manually enable allow fpu tests for musca_s1) from Zephyr's west build. I did that by
1.
set(CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP ON) in config.cmake
2.
set(TEST_NS_FPU ON) in tfm_test_config.cmake
But both build fails with
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: secure_fw/partitions/partitions/service_5/libtfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service.a(tfm_fpu_service_test.o): in function `fpu_service_check_fp_register':
~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:48: undefined reference to `dump_fp_callee'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: ~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:39: undefined reference to `dump_fp_callee'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: ~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:42: undefined reference to `populate_callee_fp_regs'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: secure_fw/partitions/partitions/service_5/libtfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service.a(tfm_fpu_service_test.o): in function `fpu_service_check_fp_register_after_ns_inturrept':
~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:92: undefined reference to `fp_func_jump_template'.
I modified line 16-19 of https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/tf-m-tests/blob/a1a178d8c1f3c75763511… to below
target_sources(tfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service
PRIVATE
tfm_fpu_service_test.c
../fpu_tests_common.c
)
Then, it starts building successfully. Is there anything particular I am missing. Thank you!
My tf-m tests version is 502ea90105ee18f20c78f710e2ba2ded0fc0756e (Merge pull request #11 from tomi-font/update_2.1.1)for https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/tf-m-tests.
Best regards,
Hao
Hi
We’re developing a platform using TF-M and would like to get some clarity on using FPU on Secure and Non-Secure side. The idea is to let NS application decide if it wants to use FPU.
Currently, we are enabling CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP which means we’re setting CPACR.CP10, CPACR.CP11 and enabling NSACR.CP10, NSACR.CP11.
With this configuration:
1. Is it okay if SE perform some FP operation which would set CONTROL.FPCA and return to NSE (CPACR_NS.CP10 and CPACR_NS.CP11 are not set) while CONTROL.FPCA is still set?
2. With the above configuration, if NSE wants to use FPU, it simply needs to enable CPACR_NS.CP10 and CPACR_NS.CP11. Is this correct?
3. If SE doesn’t require FPU, we could simply enable CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_CP10CP11 (CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP is OFF) and NS app would still be able access FPU after enabling CPACR_NS bits?
4. There is a hard requirement for the -mfloat-abi to be consistent for S, NS and all the static libraries used?
Thank you in advance!
Best
Saurabh Jain
Hi all,
I have found this interesting repo repo https://github.com/Linaro/freertos-ota-pal-psa
I was wondering whether this is official PSA FW UPDATE API support for FreeRTOS, and is it still supported/maintained?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hello,
I have been trying to test the initial attestation feature using the regression build for a platform that we are developing. TF-M small profile has been configured, which enables symmetric key-based attestation. On running the regression tests, the TFM_NS_ATTEST_TEST_2001 testcase fails.
On further debugging, I found that the static buffer that mbedtls uses for its allocation is not sufficient (
CRYPTO_ENGINE_BUF_SIZE = 0x400 in small profile). When I increase the buffer size to 0x500, the testcase passes.
Therefore, I wanted to know if this change needs to be adopted upstream or if I might be overlooking something on my end. Any leads in this regard would be helpful.
Thanks,
Jayashree
Hi Team,
Thanks for you helps. This this time I want to know how does PPC functions will be called from application to set a possible feature? The question is how PPC functions are exposed to outside world? I know we have a common ARM API in under platform/ext/driver/Driver_PPC.h
I am mapping my PPCs to this API, however wondering how they might be called that refer to my specific PPCs ? I am not using the ARM naming for my PPCs drivers, for example not using the name Driver_AHB_PPCEXP0 (using the name Driver_APB_PPCBASE0). Thank you again.
Michael
Hi all,
I am getting to know the TF-M, yet I do not understand the following comment and code where ROM (Read Only) is mentioned and its address used to store Code Data (flash_layout.h)!! Can someone help me understand this better? Thanks
BR
Michael
/* Use flash memory to store Code data */
#define S_ROM_ALIAS_BASE (0x10000000)
#define NS_ROM_ALIAS_BASE (0x00000000)
Hello
We have some platform-specific values provisioned in OTP that we need to retrieve and store in ITS (with encryption enabled) during initialization. We could do something similar to template file crypto_nv_seed.c, where the tfm_plat_crypto_provision_entropy_seed function is invoked from tfm_crypto_engine_init within secure_fw/partitions/crypto/crypto_init.c. However, we have a few questions:
1. Adding something similar in tfm_its_init won’t work as psa_its_* would again call into ITS via SPM which could be a problem? Also there is no hook in its_init to add platform specific routines as well? Is this correct?
2. Since crypto_init.c is part of secure_fw/, we’re uncertain about adding new platform-specific routines directly in tfm_crypto_engine_init. If this is not advisable, could you suggest an ideal place for implementing this functionality?
3. Regarding the SFN model, our understanding is that SPM initializes all partitions (and their respective services) before transitioning control to the NS side. Could you confirm if this is correct? We want to make sure that the provisioned values are stored in ITS before receiving request from NS client.
Thank you for your guidance!
Saurabh
Open CI infrastructure has been down since this morning and currently still not working. Will post updates to the mailing list once they are available.
Thanks,
Antonio
Hi All
I am quite new to TF-M and would like some insight into the query below. I appreciate any help you can provide.
We're adding encryption support for ITS and for nonce requirement, we're thinking of accessing TRNG which is part of the crypto partition. Now, we're aware of the possible cyclic dependency issue with the IPC model but since we're using the SFN model, will it be okay to access crypto service(TRNG) from ITS? In other words, would cyclic dependency be a concern in SFN model provided there are no limitations on hardware?
Thanks in advance.
Saurabh
Hi all,
A heads up that the Total Compute 2022 (TC2) platform is due to be deprecated. If there is no objection, I will go ahead and remove TC2 from the TF-M codebase a month from now (25/11/24). Thank you.
Thanks,
Jackson
Hi all,
I'm currently looking into an issue reported internally where the maximum latency for a zero-latency, priority 0 interrupt dramatically increases during a call to the PSA Protected Storage (PS) API.
The maximum interrupt latency goes up ~10-fold, or even some more at times (it varies), and this is not acceptable to code running on the NS side for normal operation.
It's as simple as calling psa_ps_set(1, 4, buf, PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE) once.
During that call (which I am told was also seen to be unreasonably long: 600ms for 4 bytes, 1s for 1000 bytes), the maximum interrupt latency goes up.
It (the maximum) seems to not vary too much even if increasing the size of stored assets (tested up to 4000 bytes), though it can get up to 20 times higher than the normal interrupt latency.
Also, other functions were tested (psa_generate_random(), psa_hash_compute()).
Those don't provoke an increased interrupt latency. Maybe it's only about the PS, or maybe some other calls can provoke that as well.
Does someone have an explanation for that?
And even more importantly, can that interrupt latency be reduced, ideally down to normal levels?
Thanks in advance.
Tomi
Hi,
We are going to set the PSA_2_0_0 profile as the default for the initial attestation service. This will impact which claims are included in the token and their key values.
More details are here:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-24.html
Changes on review:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22attest_profile_update%22
As a follow-up action, the PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 is being deprecated.
We are planning to remove it from the code base as well.
To figure out the timing of this we would like to collect some data:
* If you are using the PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 please let us know what would be a feasible time for you to switch over the PSA_2_0_0 profile. Thanks!
Best regards,
Tamas Ban
Hello,
This email is a notification of a new security vulnerability reported to TF-M by Infineon Technologies AG, in collaboration with: Tobias Scharnowski, Simon Wörner and Johannes Willbold from fuzzware.io.
Unchecked user-supplied pointer via mailbox messages may cause write of arbitrary address.
Please find the security advisory attached. The fix has been merged on the latest main branch tfm_spe_mailbox: Do not write-back on input vectors checks failure<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/31512>
We're preparing a hotfix release v2.1.1 to include fixes for this vulnerability and bugs reported till that date via TF-M issue tracker: https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/issues?q=is%3Aissue
Thanks and best regards
Author
Hi everyone,
It has come to our attention that QEMU is no longer able to run the regression tests in a timely manner, and before we go ahead and outright disable them, we would like to know if anyone is using QEMU for their platform testing.
If so, please reply to this message and we can have further discussion on the point.
Thanks, Matt
+ TF-M mailing list
From: David Horstmann via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2024 5:14 PM
To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>
Subject: [mbed-tls] Re: Looking for suggestions about make Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m
Hi William,
Since Mbed TLS is a cross-platform library, we don't deal directly with TrustZone-M.
However, if I have understood correctly, I think your usecase is solved by the Trusted Firmware M (TF-M) project[1], which is an implementation of secure firmware that provides cryptography services via non-secure-callable APIs.
TF-M uses Mbed TLS internally and implements the PSA Certified Cryptography API[2]. The Crypto Service Integration Guide[3] in the documentation should be a good starting point for what you are trying to do.
I hope that helps,
David Horstmann
Mbed TLS developer
[1] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m
[2] https://www.psacertified.org/getting-certified/crypto-api-compliance/
[3] https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/integration_guide/servic…
[https://www.trustedfirmware.org/images/social-media-image.png]<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m>
TrustedFirmware-M (TF-M)<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m>
TrustedFirmware-M (TF-M) implements the Secure Processing Environment (SPE) for Armv8-M, Armv8.1-M architectures or dual-core platforms.
www.trustedfirmware.org<http://www.trustedfirmware.org>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: 24 September 2024 15:08
To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Subject: [mbed-tls] Looking for suggestions about make Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m
Hi Mbed TLS,
I am looking for some suggestions about make some (or all) Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m.
The background is that I am going to have a secure firmware that provides encryption services by building part (or whole) of Mbed TLS into that firmware and make those original mbedtls_x APIs non-secure callable, so the existing non-secure firmware could link those non-secure callable APIs and use them.
Some of my thoughts:
(1) The easiest way to do it I can think of is just add the attribute "cmse_nonsecure_call" to those APIs' declaration (or use a macro to wrap the attribute for conditional build to not impact others don't want it), but I do not think this modification could be accepted by upstream 🙂.
(2) So my another thought is duplicate all header files and put them under another folder, assuming it is my-include folder, then I can do whatever I want to my-include folder, but there is also a problem I can think of: a merge/compare burden between include and my-include folder after I have updated Mbed TLS.
I really appreciate other suggestions!
Thanks,
William
Hi all,
I am working on integrating our IP(PUFcc) into TF-Mv2.1.0, with the PUFcc located at address 0x51700000.
The PUFcc can be access on bl2 stage, however, it cannot be access on booting tf-m stage.
The exception log as below:
[cid:image002.png@01DAEFC7.96FE4EB0]FATAL ERROR: HardFault
Here is some context for the exception:
EXC_RETURN (LR): 0xFFFFFFF1
Exception came from secure FW in handler mode.
xPSR: 0x00000003
MSP: 0x31000B18
PSP: 0x31000BF8
MSP_NS: 0xFFFFFFFC
PSP_NS: 0xFFFFFFFC
Exception frame at: 0x31000B18
R0: 0x31000B60
R1: 0x00000000
R2: 0x0000001B
R3: 0x00000002
R12: 0x00000000
LR: 0x38009EF7
PC: 0x3800AB02
xPSR: 0x6100000B
Callee saved register state: R4: 0xFFFFFFF9
R5: 0x31000B60
R6: 0x00000002
R7: 0x00000002
R8: 0x38030F24
R9: 0x0000001B
R10: 0x00000011
R11: 0x38030F11
CFSR: 0x00008200
BFSR: 0x00000082
BFAR: 0x00000004
MMFSR: 0x00000000
MMFAR: Not Valid
UFSR: 0x00000000
HFSR: 0x40000000
SFSR: 0x00000000
SFAR: Not Valid
The diff patch as below:
[cid:image003.png@01DAEFC7.96FE4EB0]--- a/secure_fw/spm/core/main.c
+++ b/secure_fw/spm/core/main.c
@@ -56,6 +56,9 @@ static fih_int tfm_core_init(void)
*/
SPMLOG_INFMSG("\033[1;34mBooting TF-M "VERSION_FULLSTR"\033[0m\r\n");
+ uint32_t* p_s = (uint32_t *)0x51700000;
+ printf("p_s = %08x\n", (uint32_t)*p_s);
Could you provide any suggestions on this issue?
Best regards,
Mark Chen
Research & Development Division II
PUFsecurity Corporation
Tel: 886-3-5601010 ext. 3110
Fax: 886-3-5601177
Email: mark(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:mark@pufsecurity.com>
[cid:image001.png@01DAEFC5.FD4AE270]
From: Andy Chen <andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>>
Sent: Thursday, August 1, 2024 12:12 AM
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>
Cc: Randy Liu <randyliu(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:randyliu@pufsecurity.com>>; Victor Huang <victor(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:victor@pufsecurity.com>>; Neil Chen <neilchen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:neilchen@pufsecurity.com>>; Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com<mailto:Antonio.DeAngelis@arm.com>>; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose <Shebu.VargheseKuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:Shebu.VargheseKuriakose@arm.com>>
Subject: Re: [Technical Loop] PSA Crypto API with PUFcc on the TF-M platform
Hi Anton,
Thank you and enjoy your time!!!
Best,
Andy
________________________________
寄件者: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>
寄件日期: Wednesday, July 31, 2024 11:34:48 PM
收件者: Andy Chen <andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>>
副本: Randy Liu <randyliu(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:randyliu@pufsecurity.com>>; Victor Huang <victor(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:victor@pufsecurity.com>>; Neil Chen <neilchen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:neilchen@pufsecurity.com>>; Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com<mailto:Antonio.DeAngelis@arm.com>>; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose <Shebu.VargheseKuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:Shebu.VargheseKuriakose@arm.com>>
主旨: RE: [Technical Loop] PSA Crypto API with PUFcc on the TF-M platform
HI Andy,
Great to hear good news.
I will be in annual leave from tomorrow, Aug 1st, but Antonio (coped) could help you and can redirect the possible questions to appropriate team members.
With the occasion, I would appreciate if your team evaluates and follows TF-M documentation and gives us feedback on possible confusion or missing information.
Best regards,
Anton
From: Andy Chen <andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>>
Sent: Wednesday, July 31, 2024 3:26 PM
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>
Cc: Randy Liu <randyliu(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:randyliu@pufsecurity.com>>; Victor Huang <victor(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:victor@pufsecurity.com>>; Neil Chen <neilchen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:neilchen@pufsecurity.com>>
Subject: [Technical Loop] PSA Crypto API with PUFcc on the TF-M platform
#Set a new mail loop
Hi Anton,
We set a kick-off meeting of "PSA Crypto API with PUFcc on the TF-M platform" this week.
• TF-M v2.1.0
• PSA Crypto API - v1.2.1
• PSA Certified APIs Architecture Test Suite - v1.6
• MPS3 with AN552
Randy, Victor, and Neil are members of this project.
We would have many issues when developing that need your help to solve it.
Please feel free to add your teams. Let's make the project successful.
Thank you very much.
Have a Nice Day,
Andy
[cid:image001.png@01DAEFC5.FD4AE270]
熵碼科技股份有限公司
Tel: 886-3-5601010 #2119
Email: andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>
Website: https://www.pufsecurity.com/
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Hello,
We noticed that build of TF-M for CM33 platform generates ELF file for which architecture is armv3m. Step to reproduce:
1. Build TF-M secure image for CM33 platform with armclang (used 6.19).
2. Use arm-none-eabi-objdump provided with arm-gnu-toolchain-11.3.rel1-mingw-w64-i686-arm-none-eabi to print headers:
* arm-none-eabi-objdump -x tfm_s.axf
You will see following output:
tfm_s.axf
architecture: armv3m, flags 0x00000012:
EXEC_P, HAS_SYMS
While fromelf (from armclang) prints following:
========================================================================
** ELF Header Information
File Name: tfm_s.axf
Machine class: ELFCLASS32 (32-bit)
Data encoding: ELFDATA2LSB (Little endian)
Header version: EV_CURRENT (Current version)
Operating System ABI: none
ABI Version: 0
File Type: ET_EXEC (Executable) (2)
Machine: EM_ARM (ARM)
Image Entry point: 0x16004319
Flags: EF_ARM_HASENTRY + EF_ARM_ABI_FLOAT_HARD (0x05000402)
ARM ELF revision: 5 (ABI version 2)
Is't expected? Because we have problems with debugging images generated by armclang in eclipse with gdb.
Regards,
Roman.
Hi all,
I have pushed for review a change to improve the TF-M linker scripts / scatter files: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/30316
There are two ideas behind the change:
* Merge the isolation level 3 features from the tfm_isolation_l3 linker files into tfm_common_s, so that one linker file can support all TF-M isolation levels.
* Group the memory by its desired memory protection attribute as far as possible, so that as much of the memory map as possible can be covered by MPU regions to restrict the attributes to no more than needed. The main advantage of this is to reduce how much of the memory is executable.
There are more details in the commit message.
Since it could be a disruptive change, the new linker files are added in addition to the existing tfm_common_s.sct/ld/icf and tfm_isolation_l3.sct/ld/icf ones and only platforms that are already using the common tfm_hal_isolation_v8m.c are switched over for now. But the idea is that platforms can gradually migrate and eventually the existing linker files can be removed.
Kind regards,
Jamie
Hi TF-M teams,
This is Andy from PUFsecurity, and we have a project with ARM.
We try to integrate the PSA Crypto API with PUFcc (Our Crypto Engine) on TF-M.
However, there are multiple versions included, and we need your assistance for specification clarification.
Please ensure the versions match your recommendations.
For TF-M, we plan to integrate with:
TF-M v2.1.0
PSA Crypto API - v1.1.0
PSA Certified APIs Architecture Test Suite - v1.6
TF-M
It would be beneficial to use the same hardware (FPGA) and tools as the ARM development team.
If we can confirm which models are used for TF-M , scripts or details with the ARM hardware That would be grateful.
PSA Crypto API -
The test bench is using the PSA Crypto API v1.1.0, and it is published in 2022.
And Now is v1.2.1 in March 2024. I not sure it is a good choose or not.
[cid:983ad4d1-6d7d-4acb-a22d-5a49b94594d4]
Test Bench -
For the "PSA Certified APIs Architecture Test Suite - v1.6," we would like to identify which test codes (test_c001 to test_c067) are relevant for TF-M.
Thank you very much!!!
Have a Nice Day,
Andy
[cid:2fcb4633-c50b-4a64-8161-c5020f3b1ad3]
熵碼科技股份有限公司
Tel: 886-3-5601010 #2119
Email: andychen(a)pufsecurity.com<mailto:andychen@pufsecurity.com>
Website: https://www.pufsecurity.com/
-------- Disclaimer: This e-mail is from PUFsecurity Corporation. This e-mail may contain privileged and confidential information. It is intended for the named recipient(s) only. Disclosure, copying, distribution, or use of the contents of this e-mail by persons other than the intended recipient may violate applicable laws. If you are not an intended recipient, please notify us immediately (by reply e-mail) and delete this e-mail from your system. Our postal address is 8F-1, No. 5, Tai-Yuan 1st St., Jhubei City, Hsinchu County 302082, Taiwan.--------
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Hi all,
I would like to propose a unified logging library in TF-M. The primary aim of this is to combine the fragmented logging we have across TF-M into a single logging library, with a single top-level API. Currently, different components (BL1, SPM, secure partition, etc.) have different logging APIs and these also have different underlying implementations. Some call directly into the UART output string function and others call printf. Sometimes using one logging API in a different component leads to build failures, or nothing ending up on the UART at all.
The primary aim here is for users to be able to use the same API throughout TF-M and for it to always work. This API will naturally be split into different logging levels, with build configuration controlled whether or not the string is actually output. Note that the underlying implementation can be different for different components - there can be hooks within the library which allow components to specify how they want to output the string. Initially, these can be used to maintain the existing underlying implementation. In the longer term, however, it would be useful to unify the underlying implementation also whether that be by using printf or with our own custom printf format parser.
Please let me know any thoughts or concerns about the above suggestion.
Thanks,
Jackson
Hello everyone,
Thank you for giving us the opportunity to understand more about you and how we can design the technical information for your needs. For those who weren’t on the technical forum call today, here’s a summary of what these interviews are about:
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Lisa Durbin | Principal Technical Content Developer
She/her
CE-SW Technology Management team
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Hi All,
I pushed for review a Request For Comments (RFC) patch where I remove specific attributes for sections introduced a while ago.
At that time, it was fixing an issue with Armclang builds.
However it has been noticed that with GCC, those functions are not placed within the .text section, as otherwise expected.
With the proposed RFC patch https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/29755,
I ran a few tests and builds and the "old" issue with Armclang does not appear anymore and the functions are correctly placed within the .text section.
I would like to ask the community to cherry pick the patch and build & run their tests, to further verify that we are not breaking anything else.
If no issues are reported in a week or so, I will remove the RFC and then the patch will go through the final review.
Many thanks in advance for your cooperation.
Best regards,
Nicola Mazzucato (he/him/his) | CE Software group | Arm
110 Fulbourn Rd, CB1 9NJ, Cambridge UK
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Hi TF-M and mbedtls community,
I am new to TF-M, I have a few questions about CryptoCell and random number generation. Thank you in advance.
1.
I figure there seems to have two CryptoCell 312 implementations within TF-M. One under lib/ext/cryptocell-312-runtime and the other under platform/ext/accelerator/cc312/cc312-rom. What are the difference between these two?
2.
For lib/ext/cryptocell-312-runtime, it does not define MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG whereas /ext/accelerator/cc312/cc312-rom does. Does that mean cryptocell-312-runtime is initiating RNG cryptodriver by using mbedtls_entropy_add_source whereas cc312-rom is using mbedtls_psa_external_get_random<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/8df9cc8baf462…>. If so, may I ask why these two cryptocells take two different approaches? I read from one of the documentation that mbedtls_psa_external_get_random is used when entropy is sufficient. So if entropy is sufficient, is it always preferred to have MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG defined and implements mbedtls_psa_external_get_random? What are the differences between the two approaches.
3.
I also found cryptocell-312-runtime defines the entry point function cc3xx_init_random<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/8df9cc8baf462…>. But since PSA random number entry point funciton is not complete, the cc3xx_init_random is not being called anywhere, right?
[https://opengraph.githubassets.com/17cdebc400b0ed807c620b586b21f3f77ff9c5d3…]<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/8df9cc8baf462…>
trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/accelerator/cc312/cc312-rom/psa_driver_api/src/cc3xx_psa_random.c at 8df9cc8baf46252fd188bba1d87333a8daa9a5e8 · zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/8df9cc8baf462…>
Zephyr repository tracking https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/ - zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m
github.com
4.
I know random number generation PSA entry point function is in development, may I ask when that would be expected to complete?
Thank you very much!
Best regards,
Hao
Hi all
I am porting a new SoC to TF-M platform. I know I have missed something in my platform files that I am getting following error message, can someone please guide me. Thanks
Built target manifest_tool
[ 3%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/uart_stdout.o
[ 4%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/template/nv_counters.o
[ 6%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/template/flash_otp_nv_counters_backend.o
[ 6%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/template/otp_flash.o
[ 7%] Building C object platform/CMakeFiles/platform_s.dir/ext/common/provisioning.o
[ 8%] Linking C static library libplatform_s.a
[ 12%] Built target platform_s
[ 13%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/service_api.o
[ 13%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/spm/core/psa_interface_sfn.o
[ 13%] Building C object secure_fw/partitions/lib/runtime/CMakeFiles/tfm_sprt.dir/__/__/__/__/interface/src/tfm_psa_call.o
[ 14%] Linking C static library libtfm_sprt.a
[ 17%] Built target tfm_sprt
[ 17%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/tfm_boot_data.o
[ 17%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/utilities.o
[ 18%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/arch/tfm_arch.o
[ 18%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/main.o
[ 19%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/spm_ipc.o
[ 19%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/rom_loader.o
[ 20%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/psa_api.o
[ 20%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/psa_call_api.o
[ 20%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/psa_version_api.o
[ 21%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/psa_read_write_skip_api.o
[ 21%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/backend_sfn.o
[ 23%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/tfm_svcalls.o
[ 23%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/tfm_pools.o
[ 24%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/ns_client_ext/tfm_spm_ns_ctx.o
[ 24%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/spm_local_connection.o
[ 24%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/core/arch/tfm_arch_v8m_main.o
[ 25%] Building C object secure_fw/spm/CMakeFiles/tfm_spm.dir/__/__/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.o
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c: In function 'tfm_hal_irq_enable':
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:21:5: warning: implicit declaration of function 'NVIC_EnableIRQ' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
21 | NVIC_EnableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:21:21: error: 'IRQn_Type' undeclared (first use in this function)
21 | NVIC_EnableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:21:21: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each function it appears in
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:21:31: error: expected ')' before 'irq_num'
21 | NVIC_EnableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ~ ^~~~~~~
| )
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c: In function 'tfm_hal_irq_disable':
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:28:5: warning: implicit declaration of function 'NVIC_DisableIRQ' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
28 | NVIC_DisableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:28:22: error: 'IRQn_Type' undeclared (first use in this function)
28 | NVIC_DisableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:28:32: error: expected ')' before 'irq_num'
28 | NVIC_DisableIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ~ ^~~~~~~
| )
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c: In function 'tfm_hal_irq_clear_pending':
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:35:5: warning: implicit declaration of function 'NVIC_ClearPendingIRQ' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
35 | NVIC_ClearPendingIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:35:27: error: 'IRQn_Type' undeclared (first use in this function)
35 | NVIC_ClearPendingIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
| ^~~~~~~~~
C:/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/common/tfm_hal_nvic.c:35:37: error: expected ')' before 'irq_num'
35 | NVIC_ClearPendingIRQ((IRQn_Type)irq_num);
Hi Maulik,
Thanks for your support.
1. I think I understand why you don’t get the error on the Musca-B1. In fact, we are not using the same flash driver:
1.1. My build uses the `emulated_flash_dvr`, which checks that the byte is erased in flash before attempting a write (this is where I get the error).
1.2. The Musca-B1 platform uses the `qspi_ip6514e_drv`, which does not perform such a check before writing to the flash. From what I understand, the MT25QL Series Flash NOR does not return an error even if you try to write a 1 in a bit that was 0. As such, you do not encounter the error.
2. It is strange that you don’t get the warning when MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE=OFF.
Best regards,
Cédric
Hello Cedric,
I built with both MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE=OFF (default config for musca b1) and MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE=ON and in both cases, I do not get any error/warning.
Running Test Suite PSA firmware update NS interface tests (TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1xxx)...
> Executing 'TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001'
Description: 'Functionity test.'
TEST: TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001 - PASSED!
> Executing 'TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1002'
...
Best Regards,
Maulik
________________________________
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1. Re: Firmware Update: Storage Failure While Rejecting a Staged Image
(cedric.klikpo(a)scalinx.com)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 14:06:16 -0000
From: cedric.klikpo(a)scalinx.com
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Firmware Update: Storage Failure While Rejecting a
Staged Image
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
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<171820117605.1175.3411332003376446357(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
Hi Maulik,
Sorry, I forgot to mention that I got the error when the image is built with the option "MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE" enabled.
When, when this option is not enable, I do not get the error, and the FWU test status is PASSED. However, the test is marked as passed with the following warning, which clearly states that the testcase is skipped:
```
Executing 'TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001'
Description: 'Functionality test.'
The component isn't in READY state: the device is not ready to run FWU tests, skip FWU test: 1. TEST: TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001 - PASSED!
```
So, I would like to confirm with you:
1. When you enable the option "MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE," does your TFM_NS_FWU_TEST_1001 testcase pass?
2. When you disable the option "MCUBOOT_CONFIRM_IMAGE," do you get the same warning?
Best regards,
Cédric
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Hello Cedric
Unfortunately we only have musca b1 support for FWU at the moment. However as you mentioned, I did try TFM version 1.8.0 on commit *35ac80c85 and all tests (secure and non-secure including FWU) passes without any issues.
Best Regards,
Maulik
Hello Cedric,
I tried the FWU tests on musca b1 platform and all of them passes without any failures.
Could you please provide more context on specific version/commit or platform where you encounter PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE?
Best Regards,
Maulik
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(cedric.klikpo(a)scalinx.com)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Thu, 06 Jun 2024 13:00:29 -0000
From: cedric.klikpo(a)scalinx.com
Subject: [TF-M] Firmware Update: Storage Failure While Rejecting a
Staged Image
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Hi,
I encounter a storage failure when trying to reject a staged image. I get this error by executing `tfm_fwu_test_common_001` in `fwu_tests_common.c`. The error occurs when the `erase_boot_magic` function attempts to erase the magic number in the image trailer by writing erase into it.
The reason I am writing this post is to ask:
1. If the `erase_boot_magic` failure is a known bug in the firmware update, is a fix planned or existing?
2. Why doesn't the `erase_boot_magic` function erase the sector where the magic number is located in the image trailer, considering we erasing in a flash?
Thanks!
Best regards,
Cedric
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Hi,
I noticed that trusted-firmware-m\interface\src\tfm_crypto_api.c defines two API_DISPATCH macros for psa_call(). It is used most of the time in the file, but I still see ~10 instances where psa_call() is used. Can it be changed to consistently use the API_DISPATCH macros.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hi TF-M community,
TF-M allows Semiconductor vendors to plug in their HW accelerator using PSA cryptoprocessor driver interface. I have a couple of questions in terms of the driver interface.
1.
To port customized HW accelerator to TF-M's Crypto service for TF-M v2.1.0 LTS using driver interface, for the multipart operation, https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls/blob/zephyr/docs/proposed/psa… states that "A driver that implements a multi-part operation must define all of the entry points in this family as well as a type that represents the operation context." Take aead encrypt as an example, if the underlying hardware does not support aead_abort, could it implements aead_abort by simply return PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED?
2.
The driver interface depends heavily on psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h to dispatch operations to customized HW accelerator, where the psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h file is automatically generated by scripts/data_files/driver_templates/psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja. To port customized HW accelerator to TF-M's Crypto service for TF-M v2.1.0 LTS, would the approach be creating a customized psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja file, the driver description file in JSON, and entry point functions. If so and we are considering upstreaming TF-M in the future, all these files would go inside platform/ext/accelerator/<vendor name>. Efforts need to be made so files such as psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h.jinja should point to mbedtls, right? Additionally, as .jinja is retiring (mentioned in another email exchange), how would semi vendors update psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h in the future?
[https://opengraph.githubassets.com/c87e79773a7fb0841ea038f7cf3dfdf4170debb8…]<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls/blob/zephyr/docs/proposed/psa…>
mbedtls/docs/proposed/psa-driver-interface.md at zephyr · zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls<https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls/blob/zephyr/docs/proposed/psa…>
mbedtls module for Zephyr, this is not a mirror of the official mbedtls repository. - zephyrproject-rtos/mbedtls
github.com
Thank you very much!
Best regards
Hi,
I encounter a storage failure when trying to reject a staged image. I get this error by executing `tfm_fwu_test_common_001` in `fwu_tests_common.c`. The error occurs when the `erase_boot_magic` function attempts to erase the magic number in the image trailer by writing erase into it.
The reason I am writing this post is to ask:
1. If the `erase_boot_magic` failure is a known bug in the firmware update, is a fix planned or existing?
2. Why doesn't the `erase_boot_magic` function erase the sector where the magic number is located in the image trailer, considering we erasing in a flash?
Thanks!
Best regards,
Cedric
Hello,
I want to bring community attention to a bug fix in build script for NS application:
In the original design we shall have a single CMake target 'tfm_api_ns' prepared and exported by SPE for building NSPE with consistent configuration. At some moment 2 extra targets 'tfm_api_ns_tz' and 'tfm_api_ns_mailbox' were introduced for different S-NS communication methods to be linked to tfm_api_ns on NS side. This created unnecessary NS dependency on SPE configuration and disallows creating NS application working with all platforms.
This patch is fixing the issue:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/29005
Ideally, we should remove these redundant targets but that will break projects already adjusted and using them. There are 2 approaches to address the issue:
1. Preferred. Remove the targets and ask dependent projects for adjustment. (effectively, is 1 line change to stop linking to them).
2. Keep those targets as empty dummies for compatibility, polluting the code.
Please comment and object the removal (approach 1) if it's critical for your project. I would appreciate your feedback within 2 weeks to make the right decision.
Thanks,
Anton
Hello,
I followed this tutorial to add an example secure partition in TF-M ( https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/integration_guide/services/tfm_… ) and then followed these instructions to flash the application to my Nucleo-L552ZE-Q board ( https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/platform/stm/common/stm32l5xx/r… ). However, the script regression.sh returned the error:
Error: Cannot connect to access port 0!
If you are trying to connect to a device with TrustZone enabled please try to connect with HotPlug mode.
If you are trying to connect to a device which supports Debug Authentication with certificate or password, please open your device using it.
After this, I am unable to connect my board STM32Cube Programmer or to flash any application using Keil MDK ARM, CubeIDE, etc. The same error is returned every time. Before I runned the regression.sh script, the board was working as expected and I was able to flash simple applications (non using TF-M) to the board. I've already tried to connect the board to the STM32Cube Programmer using the Hot Plug mode - (i) pulled BOOT0 pin to HIGH, (ii) connected the board to the PC, (iii) selected Hot Plug mode in STM32Cube Programmer and Hit Connect - but did not work. I get this log:
[cid:20937ade-7ed2-4beb-bced-d577c3e58dd3]
Hi all,
Why does TFM assigns function to psa_interface_thread_fn_call section and then never places them anywhere specific?
This way functions assigned to this section are placed outside of the code region which may result in unpredictable behavior.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Thanks Antonio! 😊
(fixed typo in subject, sorry ☹)
Thanks,
William
From: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>
Date: Wednesday, May 15, 2024 at 2:18 PM
To: "Lee, William" <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: Is crytocell-312 now maintaining by TF-M mainly?
Yes, CryptoCell code in the TF-M repo is the only maintained repository. Thanks, Antonio Sent from Outlook for Android From: Lee, William via TF-M <tf-m@ lists. trustedfirmware. org> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2024 5: 32: 59 am To: tf-m@ lists. trustedfirmware. org
Yes, CryptoCell code in the TF-M repo is the only maintained repository.
Thanks, Antonio
Sent from Outlook for Android<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/aka.ms/AAb9ysg__;!!EJc4YC3iFmQ!Q29CY2id1…>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2024 5:32:59 am
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Is crytocell-312 now maintaining by TF-M mainly?
Hello!
I saw [1] is not updating anymore, but [2] is still active, anyone knows if [2] is the main place for cryptocell-312? Thanks!
[1] https://github.com/ARM-software/cryptocell-312-runtime<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/github.com/ARM-software/cryptocell-312-r…>
[2] https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+log/refs/heads/mai…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-fir…>
Thanks,
William
Hello,
I am happy to announce the new release of TF-M v2.1.0.
New major features are:
* TF-M aligns the Crypto service to the same PSA Crypto headers used by the Mbed TLS 3.6.0 reference implementation.
* Initial support for on-core and off-core clients on Hybrid platforms (A-profile + M-profile or M-profile + M-profile) using solution 1. The functionality is still under active development.
* P256-M component is enabled on the BL2 stage for image signature verification based on ECDSA.
* MCUboot upgrade to v2.1.0.
* Mbed TLS upgrade to v3.6.0.
* BL2 now provides a thin PSA Crypto core layer when MCUBOOT_USE_PSA_CRYPTO=ON and can use builtin keys when ECDSA based signature verification is selected with MCUBOOT_SIGNATURE_TYPE="EC-P256".
This version is the first, intended for Long Term Support (LTS) after PSA certification and tagging TF-Mv2.1.0-LTS as described in the updated Release Process.
Please check the release notes for more information.
The release branch changes will be ported to the main branch shortly.
Many thanks to everyone for contributing, reviewing and supporting this milestone.
Anton and TF-M team.
Hi
I am trying to use iatverifier tool from tf-m-tools repo to verify token and it seems like the values for Security Lificycle in the tool are wrong, because:
this spec https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-21.html defines them as
psa-lifecycle-unknown-type = 0x0000..0x00ff
psa-lifecycle-assembly-and-test-type = 0x1000..0x10ff
psa-lifecycle-psa-rot-provisioning-type = 0x2000..0x20ff
psa-lifecycle-secured-type = 0x3000..0x30ff
psa-lifecycle-non-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x4000..0x40ff
psa-lifecycle-recoverable-psa-rot-debug-type = 0x5000..0x50ff
psa-lifecycle-decommissioned-type = 0x6000..0x60ff
Which is consistent with values of tfm_security_lifecycle_t enum in TFM
enum tfm_security_lifecycle_t {
TFM_SLC_UNKNOWN = 0x0000u,
TFM_SLC_ASSEMBLY_AND_TEST = 0x1000u,
TFM_SLC_PSA_ROT_PROVISIONING = 0x2000u,
TFM_SLC_SECURED = 0x3000u,
TFM_SLC_NON_PSA_ROT_DEBUG = 0x4000u,
TFM_SLC_RECOVERABLE_PSA_ROT_DEBUG = 0x5000u,
TFM_SLC_DECOMMISSIONED = 0x6000u,
TFM_SLC_MAX_VALUE = UINT32_MAX,
};
But in the tf-m-tools/iat-verifier/iatverifier/psa_iot_profile1_token_claims.py these values are defined differently
# Security Lifecycle claims
SL_UNKNOWN = 0x1000
SL_PSA_ROT_PROVISIONING = 0x2000
SL_SECURED = 0x3000
SL_NON_PSA_ROT_DEBUG = 0x4000
SL_RECOVERABLE_PSA_ROT_DEBUG = 0x5000
SL_PSA_LIFECYCLE_DECOMMISSIONED = 0x6000
Thus I am getting SL_UNKNOWN instead of TFM_SLC_ASSEMBLY_AND_TEST
Is this a known issue? Can this be fixed?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi,
For Isolation Level 2, ARoT cannot access PRoT data. If PRoT partition makes a call to ARoT partition, how are the input/output buffers made accessible to the ARoT partition so a transient copy of the data can be made? I looked at the AN521 implementation of tfm_hal_activate_boundary() and it does add any MPU regions to allow unprivileged access under Isolation Level 2.
For Isolation Level 3, I assume the input/output buffers would need to added to a runtime memory asset to allow unprivileged access. Is my understanding correct?
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi,
I see that tfm_crypto_call_srv() unmaps output vectors if PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC == 1, but I never see psa_unmap_invec called. This doesn't seem to be required from a functional standpoint but I was wondering if psa_unmap_invec() was purposely skipped to save some unnecessary execution time. Is psa_unmap_invec() only implemented for testing purposes?
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi,
I noticed this build warning with PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC enabled. runtime_defs.h need to be updated to add the `const` qualifier I think.
tfm/secure_fw/spm/core/psa_interface_thread_fn_call.c:287:33: warning: initialization of 'void * (*)(psa_handle_t, uint32_t)' {aka 'void * (*)(long int, long unsigned int)'} from incompatible pointer type 'const void * (*)(psa_handle_t, uint32_t)' {aka 'const void * (*)(long int, long unsigned int)'} [-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
287 | psa_map_invec_thread_fn_call,
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
/tfm/secure_fw/spm/core/psa_interface_thread_fn_call.c:287:33: note: (near initialization for 'psa_api_thread_fn_call.psa_map_invec')
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hello,
TF-M OpenCI fails all LAVA tests and all builds are fail consequently, probably because of a new license mechanism. An investigation and problem fixing are ongoing. I will update you when the problem will be resolved.
Best regards,
Anton
Hi Ruchika,
thanks for your email and apologies for the late reply but I did not receive this directly so I am replying only because I was pointed to this.
TF-M would really welcome a contribution to move those drivers to the autogen framework. This has not been done yet due to lack of bandwidth on TF-M side. Would like to note that the TF-M builtin key loader driver can't be (maybe, just completely) moved to the autogen framework because it patches some internals of Mbed TLS as well (i.e. you would need to patch the jinja template as well). But the CC3XX driver is absolutely something that we would like to move to the autogen framework without any issue.
Thanks,
Antonio
Hello,
We plan to initiate TF-M v2.1.0 release with a feature freeze on April 8th targeting completion before April 28th.
Please let me know if there are pending patches critical to be included in this release and shall be merged before the feature freeze.
Thanks,
Anton
Hi all,
Mbed TLS 3.6.0-LTS has been recently released and we are in the process of upgrading the supported version of TF-M as well. I have prepared three patches (for tests, extras and the main repo) available here for review that need to be merged by the time the release freeze happens (likely this week at some point).
From this patch onwards, TF-M will align completely to the PSA Crypto headers shipped by the Mbed TLS project, hopefully solving the issues we have had in the past around header mismatches when both Mbed TLS and TF-M Crypto are integrated into the same environment. For this reason the TF-M project will just hold a copy of the headers (in the interface/include/psa and interface/include/mbedtls directories) and won't accept any contribution to them.
Please find the patches available for review under the following Gerrit topic:
topic:"mbedtls_3_6_0_alignment" · Gerrit Code Review (trustedfirmware.org)<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mbedtls_3_6_0_alignment%22>
Thanks,
Antonio
+ tf-m mailing list
From: Ruchika Gupta
Sent: Friday, April 5, 2024 4:14 PM
To: tf-m <"tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m"@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; security-wg(a)lists.zephyrproject.org
Subject: Use of auto-generation approach for mbedtls/mbed-crypto driver psa_crypto_driver_wrappers..h file
Hi All,
Apologies for the long email. I am adding all the 3 projects (TF-M, mbedTLS and Zephyr) to the mail chain because the issues I discuss below are inter-connected and affect all the three projects.
From mbedtls 3.5.0 version, the mbedtls project has migrated to auto-generated psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h file.
https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/psa-driver-exampl…https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/development/docs/proposed/psa-driv…
On TF-M, mbed-crypto, there are 2 patches for the drivers given below which are still hardcoding their changes and not following the above approach.
1. PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_TFM_BUILTIN_KEY_LOADER (0001-Add-TF-M-Builtin-Key-Loader-driver-entry-points.patch)
2. PSA_CRYPTO_DRIVER_CC3XX (0005-Hardcode-CC3XX-entry-points.patch)
We at NXP, have migrated our psa crypto wrappers to the above approach using auto-generation. We want to maintain same code base for mbedtls for our SDK's, TFM mbed-crypto as well as align mbedTLS fork in Zephyr.
We are increasingly finding it difficult to migrate to newer versions of mbedtls because of hardcoding of above drivers. The problem is specially on the Zephyr front, where in the mbedTLS fork in zephyr these patches from tfm are applied by default.
I have queries for all the 3 projects listed below :
TF-M --> Can you please let us know what are the plans to migrate these 2 drivers in tfm to the auto-generation approach. If these patches can be migrated to make changes in jinja files rather than hardcoding in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers , things would be much easier to integrate.
Is somebody already working on it ? Are you open to accept patches for this change ?
mbedTLS --> What is the long term strategy from mbedTLS on this auto-generation ? We still have a lot of hard-coding in .jinja file rather than using drivers.json. Would mbedTLS/new PSA crypto repository start accepting patches for psa wrappers from platforms ? Can the patches which TF-M project maintains be merged in the mbedTLS ?
Zephyr --> On Zephyr front, what are the plans to align to this auto-generation approach ?
Regards,
Ruchika
Hi All,
I apologize for this probably trivial question, but I cannot find out if and
why I should use MCUBOOT_SWAP_USING_MOVE or MCUBOOT_SWAP_USING_SCRATCH.
Are there any real advantages of move with SCRATCH other than that it
requires less flash? - that is, min just one extra sector for all the images
vs min one sector per image?
Move without scratch seems to provide a better wear balance but still almost
all the examples I come across use move with scratch. What am I missing?
Kind regards,
Tomasz
Hi all
I am new to TF-M and want to know if there is a public forum to post questions or search for answers? I am getting this error under Windows 10 when making clean:
make (e=206): The filename or extension is too long
Thank you
Michael
Hi,
Following the forum session today I am sending this separate email asking for your feedback.
The recent forums on the East time zone slot are getting quite low attendance, so I am wondering if it still valuable or we want to reschedule it. The potential options I can think of:
1. Keep the current schedule and change nothing.
2. Drop the East time zone slot and leave West time zone slot only for monthly meetings.
3. Reschedule slots for bi-weekly forums on West time zone.
4. Other ideas?
Thanks, and please share your opinion in this email thread,
Anton
Hi All,
As part of the work we are doing for Hybrid Platforms we prepared a patch that makes changes how the Non-Secure Client IDs are handled.
When TF-M is run in Hybrid Platform configuration, It has multiple NS agents active the same time. Each of the NS clients (either running in the NSPE the same v8M CPU as SPM, or on the other end of a Mailbox) can have their own way to assign NS Client IDs to clients. To prevent NS clients impersonate other NS clients that are accessing secure services through a different agent, the patch introduces Client ID mapping.
For each NS agent partition a range of valid Client IDs is defined in the manifest yaml file. The SPM checks boot time that the ranges don't overlap. The NS agent partitions must make sure that they map incoming client ID's in a way that the output Client ID is always in the range of valid IDs for that NS agent.
If an NS agent has multiple mailboxes, it is possible to assign separate ranges for those mailboxes (the range is associated with the Mailbox IRQ in the manifest yaml).
Please find the patch here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/26947
Any questions or comments are welcome!
Best Regards,
Mate
Hi folks,
I tried running a minimal example on the nRF9160dk.
In `boot_hal_bl2.c` the following code is executed:
#ifdef FLASH_DEV_NAME
result = FLASH_DEV_NAME.Uninitialize();
if (result != ARM_DRIVER_OK) {
while(1) {}
}
#endif /* FLASH_DEV_NAME */
For the Nordic boards `Uninitialize` is not implemented (see
`Driver_Flash.c`):
ARM_DRIVER_FLASH Driver_FLASH0 = {
.GetVersion = NULL,
.GetCapabilities = ARM_Flash_GetCapabilities,
.Initialize = ARM_Flash_Initialize,
.Uninitialize = NULL,
.PowerControl = NULL,
.ReadData = ARM_Flash_ReadData,
.ProgramData = ARM_Flash_ProgramData,
.EraseSector = ARM_Flash_EraseSector,
.EraseChip = NULL,
.GetStatus = NULL,
.GetInfo = ARM_Flash_GetInfo
};
This leads to a non-zero value being stored in `result` and my program
ends up getting stuck in the while loop.
Is it possible to fix that?
Kind regards,
Lena
Hi Ken,
I tested with 2.0.0 release. There are my conclusions.
tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code set result (for psa_wait, ...) by using SP stored in sp member of context_ctrl_t structure. It means that before calling tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code TF-M should update SP for thread (partition).
thrd_next update result by calling tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code, if query_state_cb (pointing to query_state implemented by backend_ipc.c) returns THRD_STATE_RET_VAL_AVAIL. For all partition except active (interrupted by PendSV) context (values in context_ctrl_t) is correct. But context is invalid for active partition, because it is updated by PendSV after exit from ipc_schedule and thrd_next.
As result call for psa_wait would fail if some secure IRQ will update signals_asserted after tfm_spm_partition_psa_wait and before PendSV will call thrd_next. SLIH interrupt can assert such signal (call to backend_assert_signal) in spm_handle_interrupt.
I made a simple fix:
diff --git a/secure_fw/spm/core/backend_ipc.c b/secure_fw/spm/core/backend_ipc.c
index 3a968a3..c8b0742 100644
--- a/secure_fw/spm/core/backend_ipc.c
+++ b/secure_fw/spm/core/backend_ipc.c
@@ -454,9 +454,14 @@
/* Protect concurrent access to current thread/component and thread status */
CRITICAL_SECTION_ENTER(cs);
- pth_next = thrd_next();
p_curr_ctx = (struct context_ctrl_t *)(CURRENT_THREAD->p_context_ctrl);
+ /* Update SP for current thread, so tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code can use up to date
+ * value of stack context to return value via R0.*/
+ p_curr_ctx->sp = __get_PSP() - sizeof(struct tfm_additional_context_t);
+
+ pth_next = thrd_next();
+
AAPCS_DUAL_U32_SET(ctx_ctrls, (uint32_t)p_curr_ctx, (uint32_t)p_curr_ctx);
p_part_curr = GET_CURRENT_COMPONENT();
Regards,
Roman.
From: Bohdan.Hunko--- via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Wednesday, November 8, 2023 22:22
To: Ken.Liu(a)arm.com<mailto:Ken.Liu@arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Scheduling bug
Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>.
Hi Ken,
I was using 1.8.0 Release
Looks like this issue was fixed in new design although we would like to test it and confirm this when we migrate to newest release.
We will get back on this to you.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
From: Ken Liu via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Tuesday, November 7, 2023 03:58
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Scheduling bug
Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>.
Hi Bohdan,
Can you share us the version you are working on?
Looks like the patch is based on a previous version of TFM, and this issue is resolved in the latest code base.
The reason to do such abstraction is just because of such similar issues - the logic was coupled tightly because of synching the partition status, thread status and context update which caused maintenance confusion and effort. And we refactored this part to decouple the logic:
SPM: Add STATUS_NEED_SCHEDULE to manage scheduler (21054) * Gerrit Code Review (trustedfirmware.org)<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/21054>
Hope this helps, thanks.
/Ken
From: Bohdan.Hunko--- via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Monday, November 6, 2023 10:01 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Scheduling bug
Hi
There seem to be scheduling bug we have found in SPM.
This bug is related to handling of interrupts that arrives during SVC call and assert signed for partition.
Steps to reproduce:
1. Call psa_wait() from partition (e.g. mailbox partition)
2. During execution of SVC handler generate Interrupt that asserts signal of that partition (e.g. mailbox partition signal ) (adding long delay in SVC handler or adding breakpoint in SVC handler helps to easier reproduce this )
3. Following sequence happens:
* Mailbox IRQ has lower priority than SVC thus SVC is not preempted.
* SVC sees that mailbox partition is blocked (as it is waiting for signal and no signals are pending)
* SVC triggers pendSV
i. Mailbox IRQ and pendSV are both pending
* Mailbox IRQ has higher priority than pendSV thus Mailbox IRQ is executed
* Mailbox IRQ calls spm_handle_interrupt
i. Signal is asserted thus spm_handle_interrupt in thrd_next calls query_state_cb which returns THRD_STATE_RET_VAL_AVAIL and thus tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code is called
ii. tfm_arch_set_context_ret_code sets return code using OLD value of partition PSP (as it was never updated, as it is updated in PendSV)
* Mailbox IRQ return, pendsv is started and it runs mailbox partition
i. Mailbox partition has 0 as signal because return value was written to wrong location is stack
Patch I have attached to the mail solves this problem for us BUT it seems more like a workaround than a proper fix(
Anyways it would be nice to have this problem review by SPM experts and have proper fix (maybe we have other places with same problem...)
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi all,
It seems that on v2.0 there is a problem with FLIH handling during execution of SPM thread.
1. A partition #1 is running with unprivileged attribute (CONTROL.nPRIV = 1).
2. It requests PSA API (for example psa_call).
3. psa_call is serviced via SVC. prepare_to_thread_mode_spm schedules handling of psa_call in SPM thread mode (by prepare_to_thread_mode_spm).
4. prepare_to_thread_mode_spm saves CONTROL to saved_control. Than set CONTROL.nPRIV = 0 (privileged for SPM thread).
5. Exit from SVC starts execution of tfm_spm_client_psa_call in SPM thread (privileged).
6. SPM thread is interrupted by FLIH IRQ.
7. FLIH IRQ handler calls spm_handle_interrupt.
8. spm_handle_interrupt switches boundary to prepare environment for FLIH handler (partition #2) and schedules execution of FLIH handler.
9. FLIH handler is executed.
10. tfm_flih_return_to_isr is called on exit from FLIH handler. It restores boundary of partition #1 and set CONTROL.nPRIV = 1. Than returns to FLIH IRQ handler.
11. FLIH IRQ handler exit to SPM thread that has been interrupted on step #6.
12. SPM thread have no enough permissions, because it's running with CONTROL.nPRIV equal to 1 (unprivileged). So, processing environment is unprivileged and tfm_spm_client_psa_call fails on accessing restricted resource.
Does my understanding correct? If yes it means that we should fix exit from FLIH to SPM thread.
Regards,
Roman.
Hi
I'm working on Adding Platform support for ArmChina Alcor AN557 MPS3 FPGA board .
The code has been passed tfm_regression_test on AN557 fpga image and now submit to TF-M git repo. See:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/27267
Could you have a code review on these code ? Any comments and suggestion are welcomed.
Thank you!
B,R
Jidong
Hi Everyone,
I am glad to announce the new maintainer of TF-M project:
* Antonio de Angelis aka adeaarm Antonio.deAngelis(a)arm.com><mailto:Antonio.deAngelis@arm.com%3e%60>
Antonio was with TF-M from the very beginning being one of the project founders.
Thank you, Antonio, for agreeing to maintain the project.
All the best,
Anton
Is TFM-M currently able to verify the signature of the image downloaded by
the 'untrusted client'?
I mean, are there needed methods exposed to 'untrusted app'? If so, what
methods need to be used?
Kind regards,
Tomasz
Hi,
It appears that ITS encryption would be required for PSA Certified Level 3. I'm seeing that this would required a platform specific HAL implementation. Is there some reason PSA Crypto APIs were not used like they were for attestation?
Encryption in ITS
=================
The ITS can optionally be configured to encrypt the internal trusted storage
data.
To support encryption in ITS the target platform must provide an
implementation of the APIs defined in ``platform/include/tfm_hal_its_encryption.h``::
enum tfm_hal_status_t tfm_hal_its_aead_generate_nonce(uint8_t *nonce,
const size_t nonce_size);
enum tfm_hal_status_t tfm_hal_its_aead_encrypt(
struct tfm_hal_its_auth_crypt_ctx *ctx,
const uint8_t *plaintext,
const size_t plaintext_size,
uint8_t *ciphertext,
const size_t ciphertext_size,
uint8_t *tag,
const size_t tag_size);
enum tfm_hal_status_t tfm_hal_its_aead_decrypt(
struct tfm_hal_its_auth_crypt_ctx *ctx,
const uint8_t *ciphertext,
const size_t ciphertext_size,
uint8_t *tag,
const size_t tag_size,
uint8_t *plaintext,
const size_t plaintext_size);
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi All,
Since ST platform seems to be supported only passively, I try to adapt tf-m
for the new ST U5Axx and U5Gxx MPUs with 4MB flash on my own.
It does not come easy since some things are hardcoded and new HAL version is
required while breaking HAL changes have been introduced, but this is not
the reason why I make this post.
Is there any easy way, I mean, some cmake switch, which would allow for a
full rebuild without redownloading the required packages?
Since clean rebuild from scratch takes time and I need to do it frequently
while my Internet connection currently is not super-fast and stable such
option would be the most helpful.
Kind regards,
Tomasz
Hello Bohdan
The PSA token spec v2.0 is still in draft and hence is not yet supported by the psa-arch-tests.
I am not aware of the specific plan/timelines, but could you please contact psa-arch-tests team to know details?
Best Regards,
Maulik
________________________________
From: tf-m-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 27 February 2024 12:00 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: TF-M Digest, Vol 64, Issue 12
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Today's Topics:
1. Re: Attest token v2.0 in psa-arch-tests
(Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Message: 1
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 10:50:38 +0000
From: <Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Attest token v2.0 in psa-arch-tests
To: <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: Kostiantyn.Tkachov(a)infineon.com, Roman.Mazurak(a)infineon.com,
Hennadiy.Kytsun(a)infineon.com
Message-ID: <be7dcff9aa504e3f894b7f4fd263512d(a)infineon.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
boundary="_000_be7dcff9aa504e3f894b7f4fd263512dinfineoncom_"
Hi all,
Any updates on this?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
From: Bohdan.Hunko--- via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Monday, February 19, 2024 15:24
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: Tkachov Kostiantyn (CSS ICW SW FW) <Kostiantyn.Tkachov(a)infineon.com>; Mazurak Roman (CSS ICW SW FW 3) <Roman.Mazurak(a)infineon.com>; Kytsun Hennadiy (CSS ICW SW FW 3) <Hennadiy.Kytsun(a)infineon.com>
Subject: [TF-M] Attest token v2.0 in psa-arch-tests
Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe<https://intranet-content.infineon.com/explore/aboutinfineon/rules/informati…>.
Hi all,
I was trying to run PSA arch tests for INITIAL_ATTESTATION and have some problems with them.
Our platform uses version 2.0 of PSA token spec (ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_PSA_2_0_0) - https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-20.txt but psa arch tests does not seem to support it.
Am I correct that psa-arch-tests does not support v2.0 of attest token?
If yes, then how do I select v2.0 of attest token?
If no, then is there a plan to support v2.0 of attest token in psa-arch-tests? If so then what is a release date for that?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi all,
I was trying to run PSA arch tests for INITIAL_ATTESTATION and have some problems with them.
Our platform uses version 2.0 of PSA token spec (ATTEST_TOKEN_PROFILE_PSA_2_0_0) - https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-20.txt but psa arch tests does not seem to support it.
Am I correct that psa-arch-tests does not support v2.0 of attest token?
If yes, then how do I select v2.0 of attest token?
If no, then is there a plan to support v2.0 of attest token in psa-arch-tests? If so then what is a release date for that?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi,
I'm seeing this warning when running cmake from a conan pkg: `/home/brian/.conan/data/cmake/3.21.3-0/library-msp/ga/package/be241241e9d4718e5bab4eb33935bbb69606bb0c/bin/cmake -S . -B build -DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521`. Does anyone know how to fix it? I see the language is set by `project("Trusted Firmware M" VERSION ${TFM_VERSION} LANGUAGES C CXX ASM)`.
Per-partition files done:
CMake Warning (dev) at /home/brian/.conan/data/cmake/3.21.3-0/library-msp/ga/package/be241241e9d4718e5bab4eb33935bbb69606bb0c/share/cmake-3.21/Modules/GNUInstallDirs.cmake:236 (message):
Unable to determine default CMAKE_INSTALL_LIBDIR directory because no
target architecture is known. Please enable at least one language before
including GNUInstallDirs.
Call Stack (most recent call first):
build/lib/ext/mbedcrypto-src/CMakeLists.txt:42 (include)
This warning is for project developers. Use -Wno-dev to suppress it.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Car Mishaps is often harrowing experiences, leaving victims addressing physical injuries, emotional trauma, and financial burdens. In this sort of demanding occasions, owning the right lawful representation might make all the primary difference. When you are in Austin, Texas, and end up wanting legal support following a car accident,
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Hello,
STM32l562e dk platform is timing out in LAVA tests which fails all TF-M builds. The platform was excluded from tests temporarily to enable normal development progress.
Best regards,
Anton
Hi Ahmad,
Thank you for the confirmation. To be honest, I did not expect good news.
Kind regards,
Tomasz
From: Ahmad EL JOUAID <ahmad.eljouaid(a)st.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 7, 2024 3:04 PM
To: Tomasz Jastrzębski <tdjastrzebski(a)wp.pl>
Cc: tf-m-request(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Stephane LE ROY
<stephane.leroy(a)st.com>
Subject: RE: STM target - HAL version upgrade?
Hi Tomasz,
In our objectives, we have included the update of the STM HAL version.
However, an exact date for its implementation has not been determined yet.
Nevertheless, I anticipate that the timeline for its execution will not be
significantly prolonged.
Kind regards,
Ahmad STM
ST Restricted
From: Tomasz Jastrzębski < <mailto:tdjastrzebski@wp.pl> tdjastrzebski(a)wp.pl>
Sent: Tuesday, February 6, 2024 2:49 PM
To: <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: Ahmad EL JOUAID < <mailto:ahmad.eljouaid@st.com> ahmad.eljouaid(a)st.com>;
Stephane LE ROY < <mailto:stephane.leroy@st.com> stephane.leroy(a)st.com>
Subject: STM target - HAL version upgrade?
Hi All,
Are there currently any plans to update STM HAL version? HAL is a common
component shared by all the STM boards.
The currently used, relatively old version 1.0.0 does not support ST MCUs
like STM32U5A9 and STM32U5G9 - the first one released a year ago.
I need to decide where I should go ahead and do the update myself and since
then probably maintain private TF-M version or maybe I should just wait
because update is just on the way.
Needless to say, an HAL update will probably take me way more effort than if
it were done by someone who already knows the ropes.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
Hi All,
Are there currently any plans to update STM HAL version? HAL is a common
component shared by all the STM boards.
The currently used, relatively old version 1.0.0 does not support ST MCUs
like STM32U5A9 and STM32U5G9 - the first one released a year ago.
I need to decide where I should go ahead and do the update myself and since
then probably maintain private TF-M version or maybe I should just wait
because update is just on the way.
Needless to say, an HAL update will probably take me way more effort than if
it were done by someone who already knows the ropes.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
Hi All,
I think I am ready to try TF-M on B-U585I-IOT02A board.
However, before doing so I want to make sure I know how to remove it when
tests are done.
Please advise.
Tomasz
Hi Anton,
I think now I finally understand what I what to achieve with TF-M and it may
not be achievable.
I was hoping for the TF-M to be able to be able to manage both SPE and NSPE
partition containing my LocalLoader using two slots of variable size placed
in non-continuous memory.
The PRIMARY LocalLoader slot has fixed start while the SECONDARY LocalLoader
slot has fixed end, but byte order in secondary blocks can be reversed so
bootloader always knows where to start - that is, at the end of flash memory
where the header starts going backwards.
My MainApp remains managed by LocalLoader using Secure FW services, not by
TF-M/MCUboot directly.
I am afraid that the above scenario is currently not achievable with TF-M
because:
- LocalLoader secondary slot must have a fixed start location
- The memory area that Primary/Secondary slots occupy has to be continuous
- Secondary slot reverse byte order is not supported - although probably
fairly easy to implement.
Is my understanding correct?
Kind regards,
Tomasz
From: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2024 5:32 PM
To: Tomasz Jastrzębski <tdjastrzebski(a)wp.pl>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite
directions?
Hi Tomasz,
If I understand you correctly, then your scenario is fully implemented on
NSPE side while TF-M is essentially responsible for SPE side only, allowing
any functionality of NS application as long as it stays in the memory range
allocated for NSPE. Does it help?
I cut the image from the original mail to stay within the size limit (80K).
Best regards,
Anton
From: Tomasz Jastrzębski via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2024 9:25 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite
directions?
Hi All,
I'm considering a scenario where users will be able to manually update
device firmware from USB pen drive.
For this reason, my Main App does not need a secondary copy kept in case
update failed. If update fails, user can simply make another attempt a using
different media or a different image.
However, what needs to be protected against failed update is the Local
Loader (LL) - updatable app reading files from pen drive, which updates the
Main App.
As new versions get developed and functionality is added (e.g. NTFS
support), Local Loader (LL) may grow in size.
The same time I would like to be able to use all the remaining flash space
for the Main App.
All the above dictates the flash layout depictured below. Local Loader
update may result in the Main App update, but that is OK.
Can primary and secondary LL images size change in opposite directions?
Does TF-M support the described scenario? Image size flexibility is my goal.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
Hi Anton
I think what I really was uncertain about was whether sizes and locations of
my LocalLoader "slots" have to be hardcoded somewhere so they cannot change,
but it looks like it is not the case.
As you pointed out, my LocalLoader app can just use TF-M crypto service to
decrypt MainApp firmware update and then decompress it on its own.
Ofc, out-of-the-box TF-M decryption-decompression (same time) service would
be helpful, but there are no standard ones I am aware of and by no means
lack of it is any show stopper.
Kind regards,
Tomasz
Btw, I apologize for multiple posts, I thought those exceeding 80k would be
just discarded.
From: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 30, 2024 5:23 PM
To: Tomasz Jastrzębski <tdjastrzebski(a)wp.pl>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite
directions?
Hi Tomasz,
If I understand you correctly, then your scenario is fully implemented on
NSPE side while TF-M is essentially responsible for SPE side only, allowing
any functionality of NS application as long as it stays in the memory range
allocated for NSPE.
Does it help?
Best regards,
Anton
From: Tomasz Jastrzębski via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2024 9:25 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite
directions?
Hi All,
I'm considering a scenario where users will be able to manually update
device firmware from USB pen drive.
For this reason, my Main App does not need a secondary copy kept in case
update failed. If update fails, user can simply make another attempt a using
different media or a different image.
However, what needs to be protected against failed update is the Local
Loader (LL) - updatable app reading files from pen drive, which updates the
Main App.
As new versions get developed and functionality is added (e.g. NTFS
support), Local Loader (LL) may grow in size.
The same time I would like to be able to use all the remaining flash space
for the Main App.
All the above dictates the flash layout depictured below. Local Loader
update may result in the Main App update, but that is OK.
Can primary and secondary LL images size change in opposite directions?
Does TF-M support the described scenario? Image size flexibility is my goal.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
https://drive.google.com/file/d/17jrIfz0vE6OGJDWvXRn6TqNSh3mAX7e-/view?usp=s
haring
Hi Tomasz,
If I understand you correctly, then your scenario is fully implemented on NSPE side while TF-M is essentially responsible for SPE side only, allowing any functionality of NS application as long as it stays in the memory range allocated for NSPE. Does it help?
I cut the image from the original mail to stay within the size limit (80K).
Best regards,
Anton
From: Tomasz Jastrzębski via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2024 9:25 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Can primary and secondary images size change in opposite directions?
Hi All,
I'm considering a scenario where users will be able to manually update device firmware from USB pen drive.
For this reason, my Main App does not need a secondary copy kept in case update failed. If update fails, user can simply make another attempt a using different media or a different image.
However, what needs to be protected against failed update is the Local Loader (LL) - updatable app reading files from pen drive, which updates the Main App.
As new versions get developed and functionality is added (e.g. NTFS support), Local Loader (LL) may grow in size.
The same time I would like to be able to use all the remaining flash space for the Main App.
All the above dictates the flash layout depictured below. Local Loader update may result in the Main App update, but that is OK.
Can primary and secondary LL images size change in opposite directions?
Does TF-M support the described scenario? Image size flexibility is my goal.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
https://drive.google.com/file/d/17jrIfz0vE6OGJDWvXRn6TqNSh3mAX7e-/view?usp=…
[cid:image002.png@01DA5399.4D502290]
Hello All,
I read the entire TF-M documentation, but I still do not quite understand
how to get started with ST B-U585I-IOT02A, although my ultimate target is
STM32U5A9/U5G9 MCU (4 MB of flash, 2.5/3.0 MB SRAM).
1. Based on Getting Started
<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/index.ht
ml> section I managed to compile TF-M solution, but I do not know how to
properly flash the board using e.g. pyOCD or OpenOCD.
How do I flash bl2.bin, tfm_(n)s.bin and tfm_(n)s_signed.bin?
The only method I found was described here
<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/index.ht
ml#run-an521-regression-sample> and it relied on Arm Development Studio, a
product which after 30-day evaluation must be purchased.
2. How do I update my NS application once the device is initially
provisioned?
I think this, although excellent TF-M documentation, is probably aimed at
those who already are familiar with TF-M and could be supplemented with some
"TF-M for dummies" section, better explaining basic concepts and the purpose
all the TF-M services.
Anyway, my goal is to implement as simple as it gets, yet secure firmware
update. Firmware has to be signed and encrypted, ideally compressed as well.
Firmware must be easily upgradable by non-technical users so USB stick with
firmware file on it is the method of choice.
What I envision is this process:
1. user inserts USB stick
2. device enters firmware update mode - probably performed by a
separate, small and updatable "USB Loader" app, optionally using basic 1bit
graphics, progress bar etc. - low flash & SRAM footprint.
3. "USB Loader" loads, verifies and decrypts new firmware using TF-M
APIs and compresses it (if it was not compressed) when storing it in the
internal SRAM. Compression may be required since internal SRAM on
STM32U5A9/U5G9 (2.3/3.0 MB) is smaller than the flash size (4 MB).
4. Once the entire new firmware is loaded into internal SRAM, "USB
Loader" decompresses it block-by-block and flashes flash, I suppose, again
using TF-M APIs.
Does the above process make sense? It is possible to implement it with TF-M?
One potential challenge I can see is that, practically speaking, my "USB
Loader" must use Microsoft FileX, USBX and, in consequence, ThreadX because
probably only this way I can get USB-C and exFAT partitions support in a
reasonable amount of time. TF-M docs do not list Microsoft ThreadX as a
supported RTOS.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
After successful compilation I tried to provision B-U585I-IOT02A board following the steps described here: STM32U5 provisioning<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/platform/stm/common/stm3…>.
Process did not succeed due to the errors described below.
What am I missing?
postbuild.sh results in:
Thomas@AMDMINIATX MINGW64 /c/Temp/tf-m/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/target/stm/common/scripts (main)
$ ./postbuild.sh
./postbuild.sh: line 22: /c/Temp/tf-m/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/target/stm/common/scripts/preprocess.sh: No such file or directory
preprocess bl2 file
./postbuild.sh: line 36: preprocess: command not found
C:\Python312\python.exe: can't open file 'C:\\Temp\\tf-m\\trusted-firmware-m\\platform\\ext\\target\\stm\\common\\scripts\\scripts\\stm_tool.py': [Errno 2] No such file or directory
postbuild.sh failed
There are 3 versions of preprocess.sh script, it is compiler specific.
TFM_UPDATE.sh has some syntax errors which reveal themselves under GitBash
Thomas@AMDMINIATX MINGW64 /c/Temp/tf-m/trusted-firmware-m/platform/ext/target/stm/common/scripts (main)
$ ./TFM_UPDATE.sh
TFM UPDATE started
./TFM_UPDATE.sh: line 52: [: ==: unary operator expected
./TFM_UPDATE.sh: line 56: [: ==: unary operator expected
./TFM_UPDATE.sh: line 59: [: ==: unary operator expected
These are easy to fix.
Eg. if [ $encrypted == "0x1" ]; then
-> if [ "$encrypted" == "0x1" ]; then
It looks postbuild.sh and TFM_UPDATE.sh take two additional parameters which are not documented.
regression.sh takes one undocumented parameter.
Hi All,
I'm considering a scenario where users will be able to manually update device firmware from USB pen drive.
For this reason, my Main App does not need a secondary copy kept in case update failed. If update fails, user can simply make another attempt a using different media or a different image.
However, what needs to be protected against failed update is the Local Loader (LL) - updatable app reading files from pen drive, which updates the Main App.
As new versions get developed and functionality is added (e.g. NTFS support), Local Loader (LL) may grow in size, hence the latest version may be clearly larger than the previous one.
The same time I would like to be able to use all the remaining flash space for the Main App.
All the above dictates the flash layout depictured below. LL1 size may be clearly different than LL2, Local Loader update may result in the Main App update, but that is OK.
Does TF-M support the described scenario? Flexibility is the key.
Can primary and secondary Local Loader (LL) images have clearly different sizes?
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n4Ihqk8S-04FlluvlveQflb5nYsXBluA/view?usp=…
[cid:image001.png@01DA4F08.95319C00]<https://drive.google.com/file/d/1n4Ihqk8S-04FlluvlveQflb5nYsXBluA/view?usp=…>
Hello All,
Does the current TF-M version support image compression before image is
encrypted?
Needless to say, compression after the image has been encrypted would not
yield reasonable compression ratio.
I am showing that *.bin files, even built with MinSizeRel option,
zip-compress with minimum 50% compression ratio so probably this would make
sense. Tested with STM32U5 target and GCC.
"PSA Certified Firmware Update API
<https://arm-software.github.io/psa-api/fwu/1.0/overview/architecture.html#m
anifest> " document in sections 3.1 and 3.2 provides for image compression.
Kind regards,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
If using IPC backend, how much performance and/or memory savings is there when using SFN vs IPC partition model?
I saw FF-M v1.1 recommended SFN partition model but it was not clear to me why it was preferred.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi All,
When I compile with GCC and Debug config (only Debug), process stops with
these errors:
[ 97%] Building C object
bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/__/platform/ext/target/stm/common/hal/accelerator/stm
.o
[ 98%] Linking C executable ../bin/bl2.axf
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: address 0xc030fc4 of ../bin/bl2.axf section `.text' is not within region
`FLASH'
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: ../bin/bl2.axf section `.ARM.exidx' will not fit in region `FLASH'
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: address 0xc030fc4 of ../bin/bl2.axf section `.text' is not within region
`FLASH'
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: section .BL2_NoHdp_Code LMA [0c02a000,0c02a5a7] overlaps section .text
LMA [0c014000,0c030fc3]
C:/Program Files (x86)/Arm GNU Toolchain arm-none-eabi/13.2
Rel1/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-none-eabi/13.2.1/../../../../arm-none-eabi/bin/ld.ex
e: region `FLASH' overflowed by 28620 bytes
Memory region Used Size Region Size %age Used
FLASH_NVMCNT: 32 B 8 KB 0.39%
FLASH: 118732 B 88 KB 131.76%
FLASH_NOHDP: 1448 B 8 KB 17.68%
FLASH_OTP: 756 B 4 KB 18.46%
FLASH_NVM: 32 B 8 KB 0.39%
RAM: 31624 B 63 KB 49.02%
collect2.exe: error: ld returned 1 exit status
make[5]: *** [bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/build.make:490: bin/bl2.axf] Error 1
make[4]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:1982: bl2/CMakeFiles/bl2.dir/all] Error 2
make[3]: *** [Makefile:136: all] Error 2
make[2]: *** [CMakeFiles/TF-M.dir/build.make:86:
temp/src/TF-M-stamp/TF-M-build] Error 2
make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:83: CMakeFiles/TF-M.dir/all] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:124: all] Error 2
Changing config to anything than Debug solves the issue, but along the way
there are some warnings, of which these three seems to be particularly
important:
tests_reg/build_spe/build-spe/lib/ext/mbedcrypto-src/include/mbedtls/ecp.h:3
65: warning: "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES" redefined
tests_reg/build_spe/build-spe/lib/ext/mbedcrypto-src/include/mbedtls/ecp.h:3
66: warning: "MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_PT_LEN" redefined
trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/config/mcuboot-mbedtls-cfg.h:132:2:
warning: #warning "Use legacy driver API for BL2" [-Wcpp]
132 | #warning "Use legacy driver API for BL2"
When I try to compile with Clang compiler latest version 6.21, I immediately
get this error:
C:\Temp\tf-m\tf-m-tests\tests_reg>cmake --build build_spe -- install
[ 12%] Creating directories for 'TF-M'
[ 25%] No download step for 'TF-M'
[ 37%] No update step for 'TF-M'
[ 50%] No patch step for 'TF-M'
[ 62%] Performing configure step for 'TF-M'
loading initial cache file
C:/Temp/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/build_spe/temp/tmp/TF-M-cache-Debug.cmake
-- Found Git: C:/Program Files/Git/cmd/git.exe (found version
"2.43.0.windows.1")
-- The C compiler identification is unknown
-- The CXX compiler identification is unknown
-- The ASM compiler identification is ARMClang
-- Found assembler: C:/Program
Files/ArmCompilerforEmbedded6.21/bin/armasm.exe
CMake Error at toolchain_ARMCLANG.cmake:190 (message):
Please select newer Arm compiler version starting from 6.13.
Call Stack (most recent call first):
CMakeLists.txt:50 (tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler)
-- Configuring incomplete, errors occurred!
make[2]: *** [CMakeFiles/TF-M.dir/build.make:92:
temp/src/TF-M-stamp/TF-M-configure] Error 1
make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:83: CMakeFiles/TF-M.dir/all] Error 2
make: *** [Makefile:124: all] Error 2
Please advise,
Tomasz Jastrzębski
Hi Jamie,
thank you for the quick response! The culprit was indeed an MPU configuration that didn't comply with TF-M Isolation Level 2 requirements.
Regards,
Robert
Hello,
I am currently having an issue during TF-M initialization where a MemManage fault is being triggered during secure FW initialization (most likely when the SPM is initialized). It appears to be an error during unstacking/returning from an exception as the MUNSTKERR bit of the MMFSR register is set.
I receive the following exception context and exception frame when the error occurs:
__________________________________________________________
FATAL ERROR: MemManage fault
Here is some context for the exception:
EXC_RETURN (LR): 0xFFFFFFFD
Exception came from secure FW in thread mode.
xPSR: 0x20000004
MSP: 0x20000BF8
PSP: 0x20002518
MSP_NS: 0x20042DF8
PSP_NS: 0xFFFFFFFC
Exception frame at: 0x20002518
(Note that the exception frame may be corrupted for this type of error.)
R0: 0x00000000
R1: 0x00000000
R2: 0x00000000
R3: 0x00000000
R12: 0x00000000
LR: 0xFFFFFFFE
PC: 0x000358D1
xPSR: 0x01000000
CFSR: 0x00000008
BFSR: 0x00000000
BFAR: Not Valid
MMFSR: 0x00000008
MMFAR: Not Valid
UFSR: 0x00000000
HFSR: 0x00000000
SFSR: 0x00000000
SFAR: Not Valid
__________________________________________________________
Other Information:
- I am running Nordic Semiconductor's "tfm_psa_template" sample: https://developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK/doc/2.2.0/nrf/samples/tfm/…
- The Secure MPU is enabled (only the background region) before TF-M initialization begins
- Board: nRF5340dk
- TF-M Version: v1.8.0
- TF-M Isolation Level: 2
My questions are:
- What part of the TF-M FW could be the cause of this MemManage fault?
- Is there any way to solve this issue (such as a different TF-M configuration) so that TF-M will initialize properly?
Regards,
Robert Sari
Hi,
With every TFM release, I see that there is a memory footprint table<https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/releases/2.0.0.html#refe…> which is made available for the AN521 platform.
Are there any scripts available to run on the map file/other binaries to generate this table ? I would like to use the same for our platform and do some analysis.
Further question-
Why is there a tie up between the large profile with TFM isolation level 3 ? Is it a certification requirement ?
Regards,
Ruchika
Hi Antonio,
Thank you for your information, it is very helpful.
Best regards
Tao Li (William Lee)
Software Engineer @ Garmin
Mobile: +8618628138760
From: Antonio De Angelis via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Reply-To: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>
Date: Monday, January 1, 2024 at 06:58
To: "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
CAUTION - EXTERNAL EMAIL: Do not click any links or open any attachments unless you trust the sender and know the content is safe.
Hi Torsten,
you can have a look at the design document for ITS which describes encryption in ITS for a generic introduction:
https://developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK/doc/latest/tfm/design_docs…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK…>
A platform supports ITS_ENCRYPTION=ON if it provides an implementation of the HAL functions as follows:
tfm_hal_its_aead_*
For the exact list of Nordic platforms that support this option I suggest to have a look directly in the Nordic Connect SDK. Probably any platform based on the 5340 would be able to support this option, but there might be other platforms as well which you would be able to use through the SDK itself.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
________________________________
From: Labs, Torsten via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2023 14:51
To: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>; Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hi antonio,
Thanks for those interesting news. Do you know on which Nordic platform supports encrypted ITS with TFM?
Regards
Torsten
________________________________
Von: Antonio De Angelis via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Gesendet: Saturday, December 30, 2023 9:31:10 AM
An: Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Betreff: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hi William,
The requirement on the storage is for it to be isolated, either physically or cryptographically, as you can read from the PSA security model [1].
TF-M initially supported only the isolated model in ITS (i.e. for internal flashes) but more recently it was added support for encrypted ITS, which I believe it can be used on one of the Nordic platforms already.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
[1] Platform Security Model - PSA Certified https://www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2021/12/JSADEN014_PSA_Certified_SM…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2021/12…>
Sent from Outlook for Android<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/aka.ms/AAb9ysg__;!!EJc4YC3iFmQ!X1Zeo-qnf…>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2023 5:53:50 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hello everyone,
Happy New Year!
Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
From TF-M’s documents, I saw ITS(Internal Trusted Storage) is a PSA-ROT secure service and requires store data in internal flash.
Does that mean TF-M not support hardware platforms that do not have internal flash? For example, RT500 does not have internal flash: https://www.nxp.com/products/processors-and-microcontrollers/arm-microcontr…<https://urldefense.com/v3/__https:/www.nxp.com/products/processors-and-micr…>
Thank you!
Best regards
William Lee
Hi Torsten,
you can have a look at the design document for ITS which describes encryption in ITS for a generic introduction:
https://developer.nordicsemi.com/nRF_Connect_SDK/doc/latest/tfm/design_docs…
A platform supports ITS_ENCRYPTION=ON if it provides an implementation of the HAL functions as follows:
tfm_hal_its_aead_*
For the exact list of Nordic platforms that support this option I suggest to have a look directly in the Nordic Connect SDK. Probably any platform based on the 5340 would be able to support this option, but there might be other platforms as well which you would be able to use through the SDK itself.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
________________________________
From: Labs, Torsten via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Saturday, December 30, 2023 14:51
To: Antonio De Angelis <Antonio.DeAngelis(a)arm.com>; Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hi antonio,
Thanks for those interesting news. Do you know on which Nordic platform supports encrypted ITS with TFM?
Regards
Torsten
________________________________
Von: Antonio De Angelis via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Gesendet: Saturday, December 30, 2023 9:31:10 AM
An: Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Betreff: [TF-M] Re: Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hi William,
The requirement on the storage is for it to be isolated, either physically or cryptographically, as you can read from the PSA security model [1].
TF-M initially supported only the isolated model in ITS (i.e. for internal flashes) but more recently it was added support for encrypted ITS, which I believe it can be used on one of the Nordic platforms already.
Hope this helps.
Thanks, Antonio
[1] Platform Security Model - PSA Certified https://www.psacertified.org/app/uploads/2021/12/JSADEN014_PSA_Certified_SM…
Sent from Outlook for Android<https://aka.ms/AAb9ysg>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2023 5:53:50 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
Hello everyone,
Happy New Year!
Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
From TF-M’s documents, I saw ITS(Internal Trusted Storage) is a PSA-ROT secure service and requires store data in internal flash.
Does that mean TF-M not support hardware platforms that do not have internal flash? For example, RT500 does not have internal flash: https://www.nxp.com/products/processors-and-microcontrollers/arm-microcontr…
Thank you!
Best regards
William Lee
Hello everyone,
Happy New Year!
Are MCUs without internal flash not supported by TF-M?
From TF-M’s documents, I saw ITS(Internal Trusted Storage) is a PSA-ROT secure service and requires store data in internal flash.
Does that mean TF-M not support hardware platforms that do not have internal flash? For example, RT500 does not have internal flash: https://www.nxp.com/products/processors-and-microcontrollers/arm-microcontr…
Thank you!
Best regards
William Lee
Hello TF-A and TF-M communities,
I've done 2 minor updates to the generic tf.org project maintenance
process, which TF-A and TF-M both use. Please see the pull request here:
https://github.com/TrustedFirmware/tf_docs/pull/1
Please provide your feedback on the pull request, if any.
Happy end-of-year celebrations to all!
Best regards,
Sandrine
Hi all,
I have been working with FPU lately and I have a few questions regarding this topic:
Looks like there are 4 use cases of FPU usage:
FPU is used in
Use case number
SPE
NSPE
1
-
-
2
-
+
3
+
-
4
+
+
From https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/integration_guide/tfm_fpu_suppo… my understanding is following:
1. If SPE and NSPE both does not use SPU (use case 1) then they both must be compiler with fp=soft?
2. consistent FP ABI types between SPE and NSPE must be used. So even if only one of SPE or NSPE (use cases 2 and 3) does not use FPU they both still must be compiler with fp=hard
Also if both SPE and NSPE use PFU then they both must be compiler with fp=hard
3. Even if FPU is not used by NSPE, NSPE still MUST enable CP10 an CP11? - Is this correct? Is it possible to enable FPU for SPE but don't enable CP10 and CP11 in NSPE?
So basically if either SPE or NSPE or both of them need to use FPU then both of them need to enable CP10 and CP11 and be compiled with fp=hard
Is my understanding correct? Inline comments are welcome.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi all,
From what I have seen, looks like __disable_irq() only disables non-secure interrupts when called from NSPE on ARM v8 arch.
Am I correct?
If so then how can I disable all interrupts (including secure interrupts) from NSPE? - We need this for critical section and other critical code.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi everyone!
I am currently integrating TF-M with an IoT OS (RIOT OS) and I have a few problems.
I managed to build and link a secure TF-M binary and a non-secure RIOT binary and I can run some application code (print "hello world", turn LEDs on and off, etc) on the nRF9160dk. I can also use the crypto API and call psa_crypto_init.
Now I have tried a few things and each of them leads to different problems, some of which I will describe in this mail hoping that someone can help me with this.
I have done some debugging and have some ideas on what could be wrong, but I don't really understand how to fix the issues and don't really know how to proceed with either of them.
Formatted Prints
Somehow formatted prints are ignored. Calls to printf without formatting default to the stdio puts implementation and are printed without issues. Calls to printf with formatting use the implementation in tfm_sp_log_raw.c and are just ignored. They crashed at first, but I could fix that (RIOT has different implementations of the SVC ISR and I used the wrong one). Now they don't crash anymore, but are also not printed (no error output, application keeps running). Since this function is part of the secure firmware, my guess is that there's a problem with it being called from the NS world. But that should result in a SecureFault, shouldn't it? Does anyone have an idea what the issue could be?
Secure memset called from NS image
When calling psa_generate_key, the first step is a struct initialization:
struct tfm_crypto_pack_iovec iov = {
.function_id = TFM_CRYPTO_GENERATE_KEY_SID,
};
This runs into a SecureFault. It turns out that during struct initialization, memset is called to zeroize the structure. This uses the memset implemented in secure_fw/shared/crt_memset.c and accesses secure RAM (between addresses 0x20015000 and 0x20016000). I found a workaround by moving the start address of NS RAM from 0x20016000 to 0x20020000. Memset now still accesses RAM before NS RAM, but does not run into a SecureFault anymore. This works for now, but I would like to find an actual fix for this.
This only occurs when building with RIOT. When building the TF-M NS image and running crypto tests, memset accesses NS RAM, though I don't know if the same implementation is used. Unfortunately I don't get any debug symbols there. Could it be that a different memset implementation should be linked? Can I change it somehow? Can someone tell me which one is linked in the TF-M NS image?
Crypto partition is NULL
When using the workaround described above, calling psa_generate_key runs into tfm_core_panic. The stack trace here is:
psa_call (tfm_psa_call.c)
tfm_psa_call_pack (backend_sfn.c)
tfm_spm_client_psa_call (psa_call_api.c)
tfm_spm_is_ns_caller (spm_ipc.c)
The problem is in tfm_spm_is_ns_caller, where
struct partition_t *partition = GET_CURRENT_COMPONENT();
gets a NULL pointer. So somehow there is no crypto partition available.
Of course I have enabled the crypto partition in config_base.cmake, as well as protected storage and internal trusted storage. I checked with a debugger and found out that during start up, multiple partitions are initialized and added to the global component list (stored in backend_sfn.c). Can I somehow check what types of partitions are initialized?
Did anyone have a similar issue before or has any idea why the partition could be missing? Did I miss any extra steps I need to take?
I know these are pretty much unrelated issues, but they are persistent and I am at a loss at how to fix them.
I will take any hints and ideas, including pointers to where I can find relevant information in the docs (those have not been very helpful in these cases, but maybe I've overlooked something).
Best regards,
Lena
Hi all,
Our platform uses 4KBs alignment in linker files (as this is the requirement of our protection HW).
For this reasons I have introduced tfm_s_linker_alignments.h.
Everything works fine with GCC but we have a problem with Clang. The problem is that Clang requires LR_CODE to have same alignment as other sections inside of it.
Following are the steps to reproduce the issue:
1. Set TFM_LINKER_DEFAULT_ALIGNMENT to 0x1000 in tfm_s_linker_alignments.h
2. Build AN521 with following command line
cmake -S . -B build_an521 -DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521 -DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=./toolchain_ARMCLANG.cmake
Expected result:
Everything works fine
Actual result:
Error: L6244E: Load region LR_CODE address (0x10080400) not aligned on a 4096 byte boundary.
This error is weird because there is no explicit alignment assigned to LR_CODE region.
Would appreciate a help on this as it is a blocking issue for us.
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hi,
Sorry 2nd link was broken. Here is the working version:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab…
Tamas Ban
From: Andersson, Joakim <Joakim.Andersson(a)nordicsemi.no>
Sent: 2022. május 9., hétfő 12:14
To: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: Attestation token new spec
Is te second link broken? I get a 404 error code.
-Joakim
From: Tamas Ban via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: mandag 9. mai 2022 11:31
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>
Subject: [TF-M] Attestation token new spec
Hi,
the initial attestation token implementation is aligned with this specification:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-05<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatrack…>
This spec is still evolving and there is a newer version which changes the key values of the claims in the token:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab…<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.…>
This can cause combability issues between token issuer (device) and token verifier (some remote verification service).
This is an ABI change between token issuer and consumer.
The breaking effect would be manifest in unaccepted IAT tokens by the verifier.
On-device side I see these options to make the transition:
- A build-time option could be introduced which determines which range of key numbers to use. The default value would be the new range. To not let new users pick up the old values accidentally. Existing users can notice the incompatibility issue during the integration test and adjust their build command accordingly. However, the old range would be announced as deprecated in the next TF-M release, then will be removed in the next release after.
- Immediate switch over to the new range, without supporting the old range anymore. On the verification service side, an SW update can handle the transition and might be accepting both ranges for a while. I assume the verification service can be updated more easily than remote devices therefore better to handle the compatibility issue there.
- Keeping the support for both ranges for the long term and letting users choose by build time.
Please share your thoughts on:
- Are you aware that the attestation service is used in deployed devices where this transition can cause incompatibility?
- From the above list which option would you vote to support the transition?
Best regards,
Tamas Ban
Hi all,
I found that using FIH medium/high profile with gcc generates code that uses stack extensively. It happens because fih_int structure is marked as volatile.
Is there any reason why structure itself is marked as volatile? Why it's not enough to make val and msk volatile members of fih_int structure?
Best regards,
Roman.