- TF-M - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [TF-M] Build issues with MCUBoot merge

by Raef Coles

Looks that that should be an ifdef not an if, and it's always worked because the syntax error isn't noticed if the condition is false. Looks to have been 056ed0bd4 that broke it based on a quick git blame. I'll get a defect created and get a patch sorted. Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 20 April 2020 12:47 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Build issues with MCUBoot merge I just noticed that there has been an MCUBoot patch merged, which appears to cause build issues in loader.c for MUSCA_A, which seems to be the only target requiring RAM_LOADING: --- [ 98%] Building C object bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/mcuboot.dir/bootutil/src/loader.o C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m2/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/bootutil/src/loader.c:189:24: error: expected value in expression #if MCUBOOT_RAM_LOADING ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ ^ 1 error generated. make[2]: *** [bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/mcuboot.dir/build.make:341: bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/mcuboot.dir/bootutil/src/loader.o] Error 1 make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:1265: bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/mcuboot.dir/all] Error 2 make: *** [Makefile:118: all] Error 2 --- Thomas -- Thomas Tï¿½rnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

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Build issues with MCUBoot merge

by Thomas Törnblom

I just noticed that there has been an MCUBoot patch merged, which appears to cause build issues in loader.c for MUSCA_A, which seems to be the only target requiring RAM_LOADING: --- [ 98%] Building C object bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/mcuboot.dir/bootutil/src/loader.o C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m2/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/bootutil/src/loader.c:189:24: error: expected value in expression #if MCUBOOT_RAM_LOADING ^ 1 error generated. make[2]: *** [bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/mcuboot.dir/build.make:341: bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/mcuboot.dir/bootutil/src/loader.o] Error 1 make[1]: *** [CMakeFiles/Makefile2:1265: bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/mcuboot.dir/all] Error 2 make: *** [Makefile:118: all] Error 2 --- Thomas -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

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Re: [TF-M] Will TFM crypto service suppot national encryption algorithm in the future?

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi Matt, TF-M plans to continue using Mbedcrypto in the crypto service. Mbed Crypto implements the PSA Crypto APIs and is also now part of trustedfirmware.org community project alongside TF-M. However, it is possible with some effort for a platform using TF-M to use another crypto library in the TF-M crypto service. Of course the library will need to support PSA Crypto APIs to be PSA compliant. There is support for ARIA, Camellia in Mbed TLS. There has already been a PR for SM4 support sometime back - https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/1165. SM2/SM3 algorithm support can be contributed to MbedTLS project (Mbed Crypto is now merged to Mbed TLS project). The maintainers will have to review and integrate the contribution as their bandwidth permits while finding time to review several contributions that the project is receiving. I am adding psa-crypto mailing list which is used for Mbedcrypto/PSA Crypto discussions. Regards, Shebu From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Matt via TF-M Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 8:24 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Will TFM crypto service suppot national encryption algorithm in the future? Hi All TFM experts, TFM crypto service is based on mbedcrypto and there is no national encryption algorithm support in current mbedcrypto implementation. The Chinese market has a strong demand for national encryption algorithms, such as SM2/SM3/SM4, will TFM crypto service change to other crypto implementation to support the national encryption algorithm in the future? Thanks, -Matt

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Will TFM crypto service suppot national encryption algorithm in the future?

by Matt

Hi All TFM experts, TFM crypto service is based on mbedcrypto and there is no national encryption algorithm support in current mbedcrypto implementation. The Chinese market has a strong demand for national encryption algorithms, such as SM2/SM3/SM4, will TFM crypto service change to other crypto implementation to support the national encryption algorithm in the future? Thanks, -Matt

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Re: [TF-M] [TF-A] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi all, Thanks to all who have commented on this proposal so far. I've edited the original document to try and incorporate all feedback gathered so far (through the TSC meeting, this email thread and the TF-A tech call). Please have another look and flag anything I might have missed: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p… The major changes are: == Removed concept of self-review == This is proving too controversial, several people do not want to allow self-review. Roles of maintainer and code owner are still cumulative but cannot be both exercised for the same patch. The exact method of dealing with review bottleneck is still to be decided. In addition to the current proposal of increasing the maintainers pool, the most popular alternatives mentioned so far are: - Set a minimum wait time for feedback before a patch can be merged without any further delay. - Mandate distinct reviewers for a patch. == Enhanced the section "Patch contribution Guidelines" == Mentioned that patches should be small, on-topic, with comprehensive commit messages. == Added a note about how to deal with disagreement == If reviewers cannot find a common ground, the proposal is to call out a 3rd-party maintainer. == Removed "out-of-date" platform state == Squashed it into "limited support" to reduce the number of states. == Removed "orphan" state from platform support life cycle == This concept is orthogonal to the level of functionality. Added a note in the "Code Owner" section instead. == Per-project guidelines as a complementary document == Added a list of things that it would typically cover. == Added requirement on fully supported platforms to document the features they support == == Added todo mentioning that the proposal might cover branching strategies in the future == The full diff may be seen here: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/phriction/diff/73/?l=4&r=5 This proposal is still open for discussion at this stage and further feedback is most welcome! Regards, Sandrine

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Design of symmetric key algorithms based Initial Attestation in TF-M

by David Hu

Hi all, Hope you all well! Profile Small (https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3598) includes symmetric key algorithm based Initial Attestation, as its Initial Attestation feature. I propose a design of symmetric key algorithm based Initial Attestation in TF-M, to complete the Profile Small feature list. Could you please take a look the design document at https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3898/? Any feedback is welcome! I also upload a PoC of symmetric key algorithm based Initial Attestation in TF-M. Please check the patch set at https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22symmetric-attest%22+(status:o…. Best regards, Hu Ziji

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TF-M Technical Forum call - April 16

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, April 16 at 7:00-8:00 UTC. Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Best regards, Anton Komlev

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Invitation: TF-M Tech Forum @ Every 2 weeks from 07:00 to 08:00 on Thursday 2 times (BST) (tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Bill Fletcher

You have been invited to the following event. Title: TF-M Tech Forum About TF-M Tech forum:This is an open forum for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC.Feel free to forward it to colleagues.Details of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h When: Every 2 weeks from 07:00 to 08:00 on Thursday 2 times United Kingdom Time Calendar: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Bill Fletcher- creator * tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NmJrNmtzbHVyYThiczFkY… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Shreve, Erik

I see the discussion of today's tech forum agenda has begun ahead of time. :) Individual public key operations can take ms even when accelerated with HW. Further, the HW accelerators operate as math coprocessors with a series of math operations stitched together by SW. No doubt existing models in TF-M have the benefit of simplicity for the secure code analysis. However, their simplicity complicates the scheduling of the non-trusted code. The qualifier in this statement "No impact to time deterministic execution on the NS side unless two threads call secure services" is the issue. I believe we need a middle ground to drive additional adoption. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of DeMars, Alan via TF-M Sent: Thursday, April 02, 2020 9:47 AM To: Reinhard Keil; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal I used crypto accelerator as a hypothetical example. In a real world use case we are faced with, the process kicked off by the secure service may take a long time (ie several ms). It is not acceptable to be parked in wfe during that time. Alan From: Reinhard Keil [mailto:Reinhard.Keil@arm.com] Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 6:52 AM To: DeMars, Alan; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Alan, "I was afraid that this was the proposal. No lower priority NS threads can run while waiting for the secure interrupt. Only higher priority threads that are initiated by a NS interrupt can run." You are correct, scheduling of lower priority NS threads would be not possible. This is definitely a shortcoming of the solution. May I ask: how long does a hardware crypto operation take? What time could be used for low priority NS thread execution? Reinhard

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Re: [TF-M] Using tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(), TFM key-storage?

by Jamie Fox

Hi Andrej, Key derivation should be deterministic - given the same input parameters, tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key() should always derive the same key. Each platform needs to implement tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key() to use a key derivation function (KDF) to derive keys from the hardware unique key (HUK) that is kept in some one time programmable (OTP) memory on the chip. Depending on the platform, the key derivation might be done with a crypto accelerator, or it might be done with a software implementation of a KDF if no accelerator is available. You can use the Musca-B1 implementation as an example (https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/platform/ext/ta…), which uses CryptoCell-312 to derive keys from the HUK. Other Arm platforms only have dummy implementations of this function. In general, users of this API will keep their derived keys in volatile memory and redo the key derivation on each boot, as the cost of key derivation is low. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 09 April 2020 11:49 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Using tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(), TFM key-storage? Hello, Could you clarify: 1) Must the tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key() function to return the same key per each call (as it's done now), or it may return randomized key (per each call) derived from HUK? 2) If tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key() may return a different key per call, the generated key must be stored in persistent storage. Is this key persistent storage already implemented (using the default parameters) for example in ITS, or the key-storage must be implemented additionally? It looks like the current TFM key storage is placed in RAM, or I have missed something? Thank you, Andrej Butok

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Using tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(), TFM key-storage?

by Andrej Butok

Hello, Could you clarify: 1) Must the tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key() function to return the same key per each call (as it's done now), or it may return randomized key (per each call) derived from HUK? 2) If tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key() may return a different key per call, the generated key must be stored in persistent storage. Is this key persistent storage already implemented (using the default parameters) for example in ITS, or the key-storage must be implemented additionally? It looks like the current TFM key storage is placed in RAM, or I have missed something? Thank you, Andrej Butok

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Re: [TF-M] [RFC] The veneer usage under library model (Ken Liu)

by Ken Liu

Hi Reinhard, Thanks for your feedback, and let's see if others would give more comments. Will broadcast the implementation after it is created. Before that we need to know if some users (especially those developing secure partitions under library model) got comments on this. Also, I think this update could help the first point in your list. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Reinhard Keil via TF-M Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 2:57 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] [RFC] The veneer usage under library model (Ken Liu) Ken, This is the answer to "What do you think about this update?" When external TF-M APIs do not change, there should be no user impact. As the veneer is just an internal implementation of parameter passing, changing the veneer implementation would be just fine. I made some suggestions here https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-m/2020-March/000805.html I would be happy to review your implementation in case that you have doubts. Best regards Reinhard

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Ken Liu

Hi Erik, Could you share us more design details such as the slides you presented in Tech Forum, the progress and so on? We want to see more details (the more the better I think) and then we could discuss more precisely. Also, if this design has been prototyped, try to collect some data would be much helpful. Thanks. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Reinhard Keil via TF-M Sent: Thursday, April 9, 2020 2:51 PM To: Shreve, Erik <e-shreve(a)ti.com>; DeMars, Alan <ademars(a)ti.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Erik, I believe we should measure timing behaviour and document it first before come to conclusions. Personally I have not reviewed the IPC mode. I was just reviewing the SFN (aka Library mode) and measured the current implementation (actually it was a RC3+patches version). My result and assessment is here https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-m/2020-March/000805.html - it has as expected for v1 "room for improvement". Did you do similar tests with the IPC model already? Do you have timing measurements of the HW crypto accelerator operations? From the STM32L5 data sheet we are getting 410 cycles as the maximum time of an AES 256-byte key decrypt operation (most operations seems to take less than 100 cycles). The fact that crypto is time consuming is not new for system designers that use a single core processor. As said the solution in today's applications is: * Crypto is in "Normal" priority * Time critical execution is "High" priority - this threads can preempt execution of "Normal" priority threads. Have a happy Easter time and stay healty! Reinhard From: Shreve, Erik <e-shreve(a)ti.com<mailto:e-shreve@ti.com>> Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 3:24 PM To: Reinhard Keil <Reinhard.Keil(a)arm.com<mailto:Reinhard.Keil@arm.com>>; DeMars, Alan <ademars(a)ti.com<mailto:ademars@ti.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Reinhard, I'm happy to engage in discussion over email. Didn't mean to send any other impression. Also, appreciate your feedback on the proposal. Elegance is in the eye of the beholder, but that said I think that the IPC model does have an elegance to it. However, its elegance imposes limitations that complicate the entirety of _some_ systems - leading to less overall elegance in _those_ systems. The IPC model isn't bad or inappropriate, it's a great solution. It just doesn't cover everything (what could?) Further, if a middle ground is needed but there exists no 'elegant' solution then a solution a bit less than elegant may be required. Also, no debate that the IPC model is not much different from when users are running mbedTLS only in a dedicated thread, but that is not how we see crypto used in our ecosystem. There are many industrial and automotive use cases where determinism is required. Further, both of these markets are seeing an uptick in security interest and even regulation pressure. And these markets don't like change. Change implies opening products back up to costly verification and validation activities and risk. I can't share particulars on this email list, but I can say that any system supporting multiple concurrent connections wherein different connections have different priority and at least some of those have deterministic response requirements will have difficulty adopting the IPC model. (Of course there are other ways to solve this such as increased clock rate or duplicated HW accelerators, but these impact die cost and can negatively impact power performance.) Keep in mind that not all connections are TLS connections over the internet where a few milliseconds would be noise. But based on your statement "Maybe there are other solutions that extending the RTOS kernel," I'm wondering if I've not communicated the idea well enough. The RTOS kernels would only be extended by the calling of tz_context APIs during task switching. This is something that is already occurring in the IPC model. (You mention that using the tz_context APIs is "tricky," can you elaborate more on this?) There is then a TF-M _to_ RTOS layer allowing secured code to signal semaphore and mutex usage to the RTOS. The RTOS kernel itself has no changes for this layer. Thus, I see the impact to the RTOS kernels as minimal. And since the RTOS retains the same control over when tasks run, there is minimal (if any) impact to application code. I think one of your concerns is adoption of TF-M and that it may be negatively impacted if difficult integration with each RTOS is required. Yes? If so, I am sharing your concern about adoption, but I think the bigger hindrance is not the RTOS integration but application level integration. After all there are far fewer RTOSes than applications in the world. Likely our different experiences are leading us to different conclusions here despite a shared concern. But providing a few well selected options can maximize adoption for effort. At the end of the Tech Forum meeting someone suggested a model like this could replace (or upgrade) the Library model. Regarding HW run times, the specifics really are in cycle counts if we want to compare them with the cost of task switching. Many ECC (and certainly RSA/DSA/DH) math operations take much longer (millions of cycles) than the time to switch a task. Finally, regarding minimal viable product (MVP), I understand the purpose of an MVP to either be a platform to gain feedback toward a product launch or a minimum product that is useful to early adopters. Either way, it seems that with the release of TF-M 1.0 this has been achieved. So then the next steps are to incorporate feedback and grow the market of the product. Growing the market use of TF-M is what I seek to do with the proposal. Again, appreciate the discussion. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: Reinhard Keil [mailto:Reinhard.Keil@arm.com] Sent: Friday, April 03, 2020 7:26 AM To: Shreve, Erik; DeMars, Alan Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Erik, Alan, Sorry I had not enough time to participate the whole meeting yesterday and I therefore kicked-off some discussion before. It's really great to see your engagement here. Let me summarize: TF-M should work with many different RTOSes as the various CSPs currently have preferences (Azure=ThreadX, AWS=FreeRTOS, etc.). To make it easy to work with this diverse eco-system we should aim for simplicity of TF-M/RTOS interaction. Also tz_context slows down overall thread switching and is tricky to use. I agree with you that we will need a middle ground. You say: "No impact to time deterministic execution on the NS side unless two threads call secure services" is the issue. However I cannot see today an elegant solution. My question is: what use-cases do you see where two different threads need to call secure services. Is in such use-cases timing a critical factor? Alan raised "In a real world use case we are faced with, the process kicked off by the secure service may take a long time (ie several ms)". This is correct, but makes it really sense to schedule CPU execution. HW accelerator math operations take some ~1usec; thread scheduling is not economic. IMHO: It is not different from today's implementation where i.e. mbedTLS is running in a thread. For time critical applications you would solve that problem with thread priorities where: * Crypto is in "Normal" priority * Time critical execution is "High" priority I believe we should focus first on a minimum viable product and then analyze the real-world problems that come with it. Maybe there are other solutions that extending the RTOS kernel. Have a good weekend. Reinhard From: Shreve, Erik <e-shreve(a)ti.com<mailto:e-shreve@ti.com>> Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 4:55 PM To: DeMars, Alan <ademars(a)ti.com<mailto:ademars@ti.com>>; Reinhard Keil <Reinhard.Keil(a)arm.com<mailto:Reinhard.Keil@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal I see the discussion of today's tech forum agenda has begun ahead of time. :) Individual public key operations can take ms even when accelerated with HW. Further, the HW accelerators operate as math coprocessors with a series of math operations stitched together by SW. No doubt existing models in TF-M have the benefit of simplicity for the secure code analysis. However, their simplicity complicates the scheduling of the non-trusted code. The qualifier in this statement "No impact to time deterministic execution on the NS side unless two threads call secure services" is the issue. I believe we need a middle ground to drive additional adoption. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of DeMars, Alan via TF-M Sent: Thursday, April 02, 2020 9:47 AM To: Reinhard Keil; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal I used crypto accelerator as a hypothetical example. In a real world use case we are faced with, the process kicked off by the secure service may take a long time (ie several ms). It is not acceptable to be parked in wfe during that time. Alan From: Reinhard Keil [mailto:Reinhard.Keil@arm.com] Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 6:52 AM To: DeMars, Alan; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Alan, "I was afraid that this was the proposal. No lower priority NS threads can run while waiting for the secure interrupt. Only higher priority threads that are initiated by a NS interrupt can run." You are correct, scheduling of lower priority NS threads would be not possible. This is definitely a shortcoming of the solution. May I ask: how long does a hardware crypto operation take? What time could be used for low priority NS thread execution? Reinhard

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[RFC] The veneer usage under library model (Ken Liu)

by Reinhard Keil

Ken, This is the answer to "What do you think about this update?" When external TF-M APIs do not change, there should be no user impact. As the veneer is just an internal implementation of parameter passing, changing the veneer implementation would be just fine. I made some suggestions here https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-m/2020-March/000805.html I would be happy to review your implementation in case that you have doubts. Best regards Reinhard

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[RFC] The veneer usage under library model

by Ken Liu

Hi, There are veneer prototypes in 'tfm_veneers.h', with different function name but the same parameters. These veneers are for the library model. I think these veneers can be combined into one and use a parameter 'type' to dispatch to the actual functions. What do you think about this update? Would this change impact your development much? Please provide your comments. Thanks. /Ken

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Re: [TF-M] [TF-A] TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 9 Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) - Special session on Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org

by Joanna Farley

I realise non TF-A people may not have access to session conference details. These can be found here: https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-March/000330.html From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Joanna Farley via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Joanna Farley <Joanna.Farley(a)arm.com> Date: Tuesday, 7 April 2020 at 18:10 To: tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: "tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, "op-tee(a)linaro.org" <op-tee(a)linaro.org> Subject: [TF-A] TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 9 Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) - Special session on Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Hi All, The third TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 9th Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. For this special session I have also copied the TF-M, TSC and OPTEE mailing lists as the subject may interest the people subscribed to those lists as there is a cross mailing list discussion currently ongoing. Agenda: * Overview of the Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects by Sandrine Bailleux * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions Thanks Joanna IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

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TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 9 Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) - Special session on Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The third TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 9th Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. For this special session I have also copied the TF-M, TSC and OPTEE mailing lists as the subject may interest the people subscribed to those lists as there is a cross mailing list discussion currently ongoing. Agenda: * Overview of the Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects by Sandrine Bailleux * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions Thanks Joanna IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] [TF-A] [TF-TSC] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Joakim, On 4/2/20 10:18 AM, Joakim Bech via TF-A wrote: > Hi Sandrine, > > On Wed, Apr 01, 2020 at 11:46:20AM +0200, Sandrine Bailleux wrote: >> Hi Joakim, >> >> On 4/1/20 10:08 AM, Joakim Bech via TSC wrote: >>> How that works in practice is that all OP-TEE maintainers are adding >>> their "Tested-by" (see example [2]) tag for the platform they maintain >>> when we're doing a release. If there are platforms with no "Tested-by" >>> tag, then they simply end up with the "last known version". >> >> I think that's a very good idea! >> > The "Tested-by" part for OP-TEE releases has been working pretty good, > not sure how scalable it is the long run though. To give some more > info regarding the "last known version", we even at one point had some > stop-light for that. I.e. if a maintainer missed testing a release once, > then it became "orange". If missed twice, then it became "red" and we > showed last know supported version. But we dropped that idea a short > while after introducing it. May I know why you dropped the idea? Was it too much maintenance? If that's the reason I guess again this could be addressed with some automation work (generating the stop-light status from the commit message info). >>> However, to keep that up-to-date, it requires some discipline from the >>> people maintaining such a table ... something that we in the OP-TEE >>> project haven't been very good at :) >> >> Can't this be automated, such that it doesn't need to be manually kept >> up-to-date? I imagine we could have some tools generating the platform >> support table out of such a commit message. >> > Indeed it could, it's just a matter of doing some scripting if one > doesn't want to do it manually. I already have Python scripts pulling > all tags from GitHub pull requests. But there are of course several > other ways how one could pull that kind of information. Regards, Sandrine

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] [TF-A] [EXTERNAL] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Erik, On 4/1/20 9:24 PM, Shreve, Erik via TF-A wrote: > Sandrine, > > To clarify on functionality vs. support. I listed out a support life cycle consisting of the following states: > Fully Supported > Orphan > Out of Date > Deprecated > These states are intended to have nothing to do with functionality, but only the support offered for the functionality that currently exists for a platform. > > I think I may have confused things when I listed "Functional Support" as the heading to represent "Functionality." > I'm proposing that the supported "Functionality" should be documented in a standard way (within a project) for every platform. > > I do agree this could be burdensome to keep up with. But that is why I suggested that the project's feature list be versioned. The platform's supported feature list document would reference the version of the project feature list used. Platform maintainers then don' t have to continuously update the document. But it will be clear how long it has been since they did update and thus what information may be missing. Versioning the feature list document is also why I mentioned that the project version number may want to adopt a version number scheme where feature changes are represented by a certain part of the version number. For example Semantic Versioning 2.0.0: https://semver.org/. Hope that clarifies the intent? For implementation of this I'm imagining each project could create a supported_feature_list.rst file and each platform would copy that file into their platform doc folder and fill it in. I'm not saying that approach would be required at tf.org level, just sharing to further illustrate. > > That said, perhaps the implementation details for a project would not warrant such a document per platform? My primary concern around this is misuse/misconfiguration. If a platform doesn't support a feature or configuration it may not be obvious to a user unless an error is generated at build or run-time. OK, I think I get the idea now, thanks for the explanations. This looks reasonable to me. The idea of keeping a project's feature list being mirrored and filled in per platform sounds like something we would want to enforce at the tf.org level IMO. At the same time, this could also be handled at the build system level as you pointed out, or more precisely by the configuration manager. I am thinking about the Linux kernel, where support for a particular feature is handled (and documented) through the KConfig system. This might be a more scalable approach. And it doesn't prevent us from also auto-generating some feature list out of the Kconfig files for making this information more accessible to users. > My secondary concern is being able to consistently track tickets/bugs with features. Thus, I'm recommending that the features on that list be used with the ticket/issue system by feature name. This would allow users to find all bugs for Feature X on Platform Y in Project Z. > Related to that, when I mentioned "tags." I wasn't thinking of Git tags, but "labels" in the ticket/issue tracking system(s). Different systems work differently for labeling/categorizing issues, but the goal is to provide a consistent way (per project) to find issues related to a feature on a platform. > > If requiring a feature list it is too much at the tf.org level then I'll be satisfied to push for that kind of documentation in the projects or platforms I'm involved in if/as appropriate. Yes, good point, I think it would be desirable to be able to tie tickets to some specific platform/feature/version. And I think it makes sense to unify this across tf.org projects. > Regarding the other conversational tidbits: > > Thanks for pointing out that the original proposal does say "builds all configurations supported by this platform" under "Fully Supported." I can see the intention here now. Substituting "features" for "configurations" would broaden the meaning a bit. OK, I will change the wording, thanks for the suggestion. > You said: "I am starting to think that we need a list of items to be defined per project." > Yes, this sounds like a great idea. > > My original mention of wanting a "stronger standard put forth for platform documentation" was a response to seeing "Limited Support" in the original proposal allowing documentation to fall out of date. > > > Hope that clarifies some of my thoughts. If not, I'm happy to continue the discussion. Thanks again for taking feedback! > > Erik Shreve, PSEM > Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) > > -----Original Message----- > From: Sandrine Bailleux [mailto:sandrine.bailleux@arm.com] > Sent: Wednesday, April 01, 2020 4:18 AM > To: Shreve, Erik; tf-a; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; op-tee(a)linaro.org > Cc: nd(a)arm.com > Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects > > Hello Erik, > > Thanks for the feedback. > > On 3/26/20 3:37 PM, Shreve, Erik wrote: >> Sandrine, >> >> Really glad to see this being pulled together. A couple of areas of feedback around the Platform Support Life Cycle. >> >> As previously mentioned there are two orthogonal concerns captured in the current life cycle: Support and Functionality. >> I'd like to see these split out. > > Yes, you are the second person to mention that and I agree with you > both. Unless someone disagrees, I intend to update the proposal and > separate these 2 concepts in the next version of the document. > >> For functionality, chip vendors may not have a business case for supporting all features on a given platform but they may provide full support for the features they have chosen to include. >> A simple example would be supporting PSA FF Isolation Level 1 only due to lack of HW isolation support needed to achieve Isolation Level 2 or greater. > > I completely agree. It would not make sense to support all features on > all platforms just for the sake of completeness. Each platform ought to > implement what is relevant in its case. > > That's what the current proposal tried to convey: a fully supported > platform must "build all configurations *supported by this platform*" > and "All *supported* configurations are tested in the CI". The key word > here is supported and that would be defined by the platform itself. But > I can see that maybe this wasn't clear enough. Your proposal below makes > that a lot clearer. > >> Also, I'd like to see a stronger standard put forth for platform documentation. If a platform is "supported," I believe the documentation should be complete and accurate. A lack of complete and clear documentation leaves open a wide door for misuse/misconfiguration which could result in a vulnerable system. > > Fair point. > > But is it something we should include in this proposal or should we push > it to a separate document setting expectations for the project's > documentation, which the current general proposal could refer to (as in, > "the platform should provide quality documentation up to the project's > criteria defined in document XXX')? > > This is definitely an important topic but I am wary of keeping the > tf.org proposal concise and focused at this point. I am worried that if > we put too much stuff in it discussions will diverge too much and we > might never reach an agreement. > > The same applies to testing standards for example, we could detail that > in the proposal or simply leave it to projects to define it separately. > >> Here is a more concrete proposal: >> >> Functional Support: >> Each project shall provide a standard feature or functionality list. >> Each platform shall include in its documentation a copy of this list with the supported functionality marked as supported. >> The platform documentation may reference a ticket if support is planned but not yet present. >> The platform documentation shall explicitly state if a feature or function has no plans for support. > > Regarding the last item, this would require all platform maintainers to > update their documentation every time a new feature is added to the > project's global list of features. This seems too much of a constraint > and unnecessary maintenance burden to me. > > I think a better, more lightweight alternative might be to let platform > maintainers list what's supported and if some feature is not listed, it > implies that it is not supported. This does not prevent platform > maintainers from indicating their future plans of supporting a feature > if they want to. > >> The feature/functionality list shall be versioned, with the version tied to the release version(s) of the project. >> In this way, it will be clear if a platform was last officially updated for version X but the project is currently at version Y > X. > > I can see that Joakim Bech proposed something similar, with more details > about how this was implemented for OP-TEE. > >> Note: projects will need to adopt (if they have not already) a version scheme that distinguishes between feature updates and bug fixes. > > Sorry I didn't get this, could you please elaborate? > >> Each project and platform shall use tags or similar functionality on tickets to associate tickets to features/functionality and platforms. >> If the names of tags can't match the name of the feature or platform exactly then a mapping shall be provided in the appropriate document(s). > > If there's no appropriate tag in some cases, I guess we could always use > a git SHA1 of a specific commit. > >> Life Cycle State >> >> Fully Supported >> There is (at least) one active code owner for this platform. >> All supported features build and either all tests pass or failures are associated with tracked known issues. >> Other (not associated to a test) Known Issues are tracked >> Documentation is up to date >> >> Note: Projects should document standards on how "active" code ownership is measured and >> further document standards on how code owners are warned about impending life cycle state changes. > > Yes, good point, that is currently undefined in the proposal but I agree > that it needs defining per project. I will add an item in the last > section of the document. > > I am starting to think that we need a list of items to be defined per > project. This list would complement the general tf.org proposal. Things > like code owners/maintainers activity, code review timelines, and so on. > >> >> Orphan >> There is no active code owner >> All supported features build and either all tests pass or failures are associated with tracked known issues. >> Other (not associated to a test) Known Issues may not have been maintained (as there is no active code owner) >> Documentation status is unclear since there is no active code owner. >> There has been no change to the feature/functionality list in the project since the platform was last "Fully Supported" > > I am confused, you said earlier that you would like to see the concepts > of support and functionality split out, but here you're listing 'orphan' > as one of the possible states... Did I miss your point? > >> Out of date >> Same as orphan, but either: >> there have been changes to the feature/functionality list, or >> there are failing tests without tracked tickets, or >> there are known documentation issues. >> >> Deprecated >> Same as Out of Date, but the build is broken. Platform may be removed from the project codebase in the future. >> >> Erik Shreve, PSEM >> Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development)

5 years

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Patches to remove fixed NS region numbers

by Jamie Fox

Hi all, I am proposing some patches to move away from using fixed NS region numbers defined by TF-M core, to having platform-defined SAU region numbering. The motivation for the change is to give platforms more flexibility when configuring the isolation hardware, and in particular, to make it possible to use tools like CMSIS-Zone to generate the isolation hardware configuration. There are a couple of patches: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3484 -- Removes the memory permission check API from TF-M, which was the only user of the fixed region numbers. This API is no longer required because the SPM does all necessary memory permission checks before control reaches the secure partition. The patch removes uses of this API from the Attestation service, the platform service and the tests. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3485 -- Removes the fixed region numbers and refactors all platforms to no longer use them. Reviews appreciated. Kind regards, Jamie

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] Renaming SST to PS

by Andrej Butok

Finally it will be fixed. It was confusing for new people, Thank you ;) From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: Friday, April 3, 2020 8:04 AM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Renaming SST to PS Hi, Please be aware that there is a ongoing change<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…> to rename the SST (Secure STorage) service to PS (Protected Storage). This is to align with the PSA Storage API spec. The SST service is the implementation of the PSA Protected Storage service. The change renames lots of files, API names, build configurations etc... Lots of impacts are expected. Please do get prepared. Another notice after merging the change will be sent too. And, comments are always welcomed. Best Regards, Kevin

5 years

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Renaming SST to PS

by Kevin Peng

Hi, Please be aware that there is a ongoing change<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3597> to rename the SST (Secure STorage) service to PS (Protected Storage). This is to align with the PSA Storage API spec. The SST service is the implementation of the PSA Protected Storage service. The change renames lots of files, API names, build configurations etc... Lots of impacts are expected. Please do get prepared. Another notice after merging the change will be sent too. And, comments are always welcomed. Best Regards, Kevin

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] mcmse option to compile non secure image

by Tamas Ban

Hi, Perfect timing! Please check this change: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3592 There is no reason, the above change fix it. BR, Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Cindy Chaumont via TF-M Sent: 02 April 2020 20:01 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] mcmse option to compile non secure image Hello, I have been working for a few weeks with the Trusted Firmware M software and I was wondering a question to which I cannot find an answer. This concerns CMSE, I thought the -mcmse option should only be used to compile secure images (http://www.keil.com/support/man/docs/armclang_ref/armclang_ref_pge144464730…). However, it seems to me that the non secure image of TF-M is also compiled with the -mcmse option. Is there a reason for this? Thank you in advance for the answer, Best regards, Cindy Chaumont (Intern in embedded computing at Witekio)

5 years

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mcmse option to compile non secure image

by Cindy Chaumont

Hello, I have been working for a few weeks with the Trusted Firmware M software and I was wondering a question to which I cannot find an answer. This concerns CMSE, I thought the -mcmse option should only be used to compile secure images (http://www.keil.com/support/man/docs/armclang_ref/armclang_ref_pge144464730…). However, it seems to me that the non secure image of TF-M is also compiled with the -mcmse option. Is there a reason for this? Thank you in advance for the answer, Best regards, Cindy Chaumont (Intern in embedded computing at Witekio)

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by DeMars, Alan

Is pre-emption while in secure mode supported? If so, NS RTOS may have to be modified to handle switching from a thread who's PC and SP are in secure domain. How would a secure service thread block while waiting for a security-protected hardware process to finish (ie what is the secure driver model)? Alan From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Reinhard Keil via TF-M Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 5:49 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Hi Erik, Really great to see your involvement. Let me share my view on a TF-M execution model for constrained single core v8-M with TrustZone using Secure Function Call (aka library) mode: On secure side: single thread execution only. Not stack swapping. NS to S calls are blocking until secure execution completes. On non-secure side: RTOS with threaded execution. Entry to secure side protected with Mutex. This structure is explain on page 27 of https://github.com/ARM-software/CMSIS_5/blob/develop/CMSIS_Review_Meeting_2… IMHO, there are various benefits: * Overall less complexity, no need of tz_context, any RTOS would work, less memory overhead (i.e. single stack at secure side) * No impact to time deterministic execution on the NS side unless two threads call secure services * Conflict of mulitple threads calling secure services could be minimized with RTOS that offers priority inversion Are there any obvious problems with the above model? Thanks Reinhard Keil - Sr. Director Embedded Tools, Arm P.S. maybe you read also https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-m/2020-March/000805.html IMHO we need to simplify the NS to S call entry to speed-up the overall system

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Ken Liu

Hi, Looks like another non-secure thread with higher priority could not access secure service since the secure context belongs to previous ongoing non-secure thread and tz_context is not proposed? /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Reinhard Keil via TF-M Sent: Thursday, April 2, 2020 9:52 PM To: DeMars, Alan <ademars(a)ti.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Alan, "I was afraid that this was the proposal. No lower priority NS threads can run while waiting for the secure interrupt. Only higher priority threads that are initiated by a NS interrupt can run." You are correct, scheduling of lower priority NS threads would be not possible. This is definitely a shortcoming of the solution. May I ask: how long does a hardware crypto operation take? What time could be used for low priority NS thread execution? Reinhard

5 years

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Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Reinhard Keil

Hi Erik, Really great to see your involvement. Let me share my view on a TF-M execution model for constrained single core v8-M with TrustZone using Secure Function Call (aka library) mode: On secure side: single thread execution only. Not stack swapping. NS to S calls are blocking until secure execution completes. On non-secure side: RTOS with threaded execution. Entry to secure side protected with Mutex. This structure is explain on page 27 of https://github.com/ARM-software/CMSIS_5/blob/develop/CMSIS_Review_Meeting_2… IMHO, there are various benefits: * Overall less complexity, no need of tz_context, any RTOS would work, less memory overhead (i.e. single stack at secure side) * No impact to time deterministic execution on the NS side unless two threads call secure services * Conflict of mulitple threads calling secure services could be minimized with RTOS that offers priority inversion Are there any obvious problems with the above model? Thanks Reinhard Keil - Sr. Director Embedded Tools, Arm P.S. maybe you read also https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-m/2020-March/000805.html IMHO we need to simplify the NS to S call entry to speed-up the overall system

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] [TF-TSC] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Joakim, On 4/1/20 10:08 AM, Joakim Bech via TSC wrote: > Hi Christian, Sandrine, all, > > On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 10:27:14AM +0100, Sandrine Bailleux wrote: >> Hi Christian, >> >> Thanks a lot for the read and the comments! >> >> On 3/25/20 7:05 PM, Christian Daudt wrote: >>> ï¿½The maintenance proposal looks great ! I have some feedback on >>> specific portions: >>> ï¿½1. maintainer/owner/author patches. " Note that roles can be >>> cumulative, in particular the same individual can be both a code owner >>> and a maintainer. In such a scenario, the individual would be able to >>> self-merge a patch solely affecting his module, having the authority to >>> approve it from both a code owner and maintainer's point of view.": I'm >>> always leery of people self-approving their patches. At a minimum, all >>> self-patches should be published and a minimum wait time provided for >>> feedback. Or preferably that another maintainer does the merge (it does >>> not need to be mandated but should be suggested). >> >> Yes, actually this is something that generated some disagreement inside Arm >> as well and I am glad you're bringing this up here, as I'd like to hear more >> opinions on this. >> >> I too have concerns about allowing self-reviewing. I am not so much >> concerned about people potentially abusing of this situation to silently >> merge patches, as I think we should trust our maintainers. But I am worried >> that a self-review is rarely as good as a peer review, simply because it is >> so easy to miss things when it's your own work. I believe several pair of >> eyes is always better, as different people think differently, have different >> perspectives and backgrounds, and are able to catch different issues. >> >> But to pull this off, we need enough people to do all these reviews. The >> proposal currently allows self-review because some of us feared that >> mandating 2 reviewers for every patch (especially pure platform patches) >> would be impractical and too heavyweight, especially for the TF-M project in >> its current contributors organization, as I understand. It would be great to >> get more feedback from the TF-M community as to whether they think it could >> work in the end. >> >> It's a difficult balance between having the best possible code review >> practices, and realistically getting all the review work done in a timely >> manner, avoiding bottlenecks on specific people and keeping the flow of >> patches smooth. >> >> I like your idea of a minimum wait time provided for feedback. I think it >> could be a good middle ground solution. >> > +1 for that, after silence for X weeks it should be OK to merge the > patch. X would need to be number that is high enough for people to have > a chance to find it and look into it, but shouldn't be too high, since > there is a risk that it'll force the contributor to pile up things that > might be dependent on this patch. To throw something out, I'd say ~2 > weeks sounds like a good number to me. > >> Your other suggestion of having a different maintainer doing the merge would >> work as well IMO but requires more workforce. Again this comes down to >> whether this can realistically be achieved for each project. This solution >> was actually suggested within Arm as well (and even called out at the end of >> the proposal ;) ). >> >> Bottom line is, in an ideal world I would like to condemn self-review >> because I consider this as bad practice > +1 > >> , but I do not know whether this will >> be practical and will work for TF-M as well. >> >>> ï¿½2. 'timely manner': This expectation should be more explicit - when >>> the author can start requesting other maintainers to merge on assumption >>> that silence == approval (or not). Such timeliness expectations are >>> probably best set per project however. >> >> Yes, "timely manner" is definitely too vague and was actually left that way >> on purpose at this stage to avoid touching upon what I think is a sensitive >> subject! I am aware that some patches sometimes spend a long time in review, >> definitely longer than they should and it understandably generates some >> frustration. This is something we absolutely need to improve on IMO and >> hopefully a bigger pool of maintainers will help solve this issue. But I >> agree that the expected review timeline should be clearly established and it >> is probably best to let each project decides theirs. >> >>> ï¿½3. The proposal does not address branching strategies. i.e. will >>> there be separate maintainers for dev/master/stable branches? I don't >>> think it needs to address it yet - keep it simpler for a start. But a >>> todo saying something like "in the future this project maintenance >>> proposal might be expanded to address multi-branch maintainership" would >>> be good. >> >> Good point. A todo sounds good, I will add one in the last section of the >> document. >> >>> ï¿½4. The platform lifecycle state machine has too many transitions. >>> "Fully maintained" <-> "orphan" -> "out" seems sufficient to me. >> >> Hmm OK. There might be too many transitions but I feel we need something >> between fully maintained and out, i.e. the limited support one. >> >> Julius Werner also pointed out on Thursday that orphan might be misplaced, >> as all these other stages deal with some degrees of feature support (what's >> known to work), whereas orphan is an orthogonal topic that is not directly >> related to the level of supported features. For example, a platform could >> have recently become orphan but all features and tests still work for some >> time. >> > At one point in time in the OP-TEE project we tried to keep track of > maintained platforms, by simply saying maintained "Yes" if they are > maintained. However they're not maintained, we indicated that by stating > the last known version where a platform was maintained. People can still > find that information here [1] (not up-to-date). The intention was to > give future users of an old platform a chance to know if it ever has > been supported and what version that was. That could serve as a starting > point in case someone is interested in bring a device/platform back to > life. Yes, I think such information can be very useful. It saves some "git archeology" effort to try and dig this information afterwards. Also, when someone starts looking at a project, I would expect this to be one of the first thing they look up, they would want to know in which shape the project is for the particular platform they are interested in. That's almost as important in my eyes as a "getting started" guide. We could have such a high-level table that just says whether a platform is supported or not (just a yes/no) and have complementary, per-platform documentation that goes into the details of what features are supported exactly. > How that works in practice is that all OP-TEE maintainers are adding > their "Tested-by" (see example [2]) tag for the platform they maintain > when we're doing a release. If there are platforms with no "Tested-by" > tag, then they simply end up with the "last known version". I think that's a very good idea! > However, to keep that up-to-date, it requires some discipline from the > people maintaining such a table ... something that we in the OP-TEE > project haven't been very good at :) Can't this be automated, such that it doesn't need to be manually kept up-to-date? I imagine we could have some tools generating the platform support table out of such a commit message. > So, I'm not proposing something, it's just that I wanted to share what > we've tried and it "works", but not easy to maintain (a release > checklist could fix that). > > [1] https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/platforms.html > [2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3309/commits/765b92604459240bed7fcf… >

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] [EXTERNAL] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Shreve, Erik

Sandrine, Really glad to see this being pulled together. A couple of areas of feedback around the Platform Support Life Cycle. As previously mentioned there are two orthogonal concerns captured in the current life cycle: Support and Functionality. I'd like to see these split out. For functionality, chip vendors may not have a business case for supporting all features on a given platform but they may provide full support for the features they have chosen to include. A simple example would be supporting PSA FF Isolation Level 1 only due to lack of HW isolation support needed to achieve Isolation Level 2 or greater. Also, I'd like to see a stronger standard put forth for platform documentation. If a platform is "supported," I believe the documentation should be complete and accurate. A lack of complete and clear documentation leaves open a wide door for misuse/misconfiguration which could result in a vulnerable system. Here is a more concrete proposal: Functional Support: Each project shall provide a standard feature or functionality list. Each platform shall include in its documentation a copy of this list with the supported functionality marked as supported. The platform documentation may reference a ticket if support is planned but not yet present. The platform documentation shall explicitly state if a feature or function has no plans for support. The feature/functionality list shall be versioned, with the version tied to the release version(s) of the project. In this way, it will be clear if a platform was last officially updated for version X but the project is currently at version Y > X. Note: projects will need to adopt (if they have not already) a version scheme that distinguishes between feature updates and bug fixes. Each project and platform shall use tags or similar functionality on tickets to associate tickets to features/functionality and platforms. If the names of tags can't match the name of the feature or platform exactly then a mapping shall be provided in the appropriate document(s). Life Cycle State Fully Supported There is (at least) one active code owner for this platform. All supported features build and either all tests pass or failures are associated with tracked known issues. Other (not associated to a test) Known Issues are tracked Documentation is up to date Note: Projects should document standards on how "active" code ownership is measured and further document standards on how code owners are warned about impending life cycle state changes. Orphan There is no active code owner All supported features build and either all tests pass or failures are associated with tracked known issues. Other (not associated to a test) Known Issues may not have been maintained (as there is no active code owner) Documentation status is unclear since there is no active code owner. There has been no change to the feature/functionality list in the project since the platform was last "Fully Supported" Out of date Same as orphan, but either: there have been changes to the feature/functionality list, or there are failing tests without tracked tickets, or there are known documentation issues. Deprecated Same as Out of Date, but the build is broken. Platform may be removed from the project codebase in the future. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) -----Original Message----- From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Sandrine Bailleux via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 4:42 AM To: tf-a; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; op-tee(a)linaro.org Cc: nd(a)arm.com Subject: [EXTERNAL] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects Hello all, As the developers community at trustedfirmware.org is growing, there is an increasing need to have work processes that are clearly documented, feel smooth and scale well. We think that there is an opportunity to improve the way the trustedfirmware.org projects are managed today. That's why we are sharing a project maintenance proposal, focusing on the TF-A and TF-M projects initially. The aim of this document is to propose a set of rules, guidelines and processes to try and improve the way we work together as a community today. Note that this is an early draft at this stage. This is put up for further discussion within the trustedfirmware.org community. Nothing is set in stone yet and it is expected to go under change as feedback from the community is incorporated. Please find the initial proposal here: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p… Please provide any feedback you may have by replying to this email thread, keeping all 4 mailing lists in the recipients list. I will collate comments from the community and try to incorporate them in the document, keeping you updated on changes made between revisions. Regards, Sandrine -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Christian Daudt

Hi Sandrine, > Please find the initial proposal here: > > https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p… > > Please provide any feedback you may have by replying to this email > thread, keeping all 4 mailing lists in the recipients list. > > I will collate comments from the community and try to incorporate them > in the document, keeping you updated on changes made between revisions. The maintenance proposal looks great ! I have some feedback on specific portions: 1. maintainer/owner/author patches. " Note that roles can be cumulative, in particular the same individual can be both a code owner and a maintainer. In such a scenario, the individual would be able to self-merge a patch solely affecting his module, having the authority to approve it from both a code owner and maintainer's point of view.": I'm always leery of people self-approving their patches. At a minimum, all self-patches should be published and a minimum wait time provided for feedback. Or preferably that another maintainer does the merge (it does not need to be mandated but should be suggested). 2. 'timely manner': This expectation should be more explicit - when the author can start requesting other maintainers to merge on assumption that silence == approval (or not). Such timeliness expectations are probably best set per project however. 3. The proposal does not address branching strategies. i.e. will there be separate maintainers for dev/master/stable branches? I don't think it needs to address it yet - keep it simpler for a start. But a todo saying something like "in the future this project maintenance proposal might be expanded to address multi-branch maintainership" would be good. 4. The platform lifecycle state machine has too many transitions. "Fully maintained" <-> "orphan" -> "out" seems sufficient to me. Thanks, Christian. This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

5 years

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Slight update on design proposal process document

by Ken Liu

Hi, I have made a slight update on the design proposal process document, to simplify the design document drafting. The 'Author' and 'Organization' are not both mandatory, one of them can be optional depends on the contributor. And mark the 'status' optional since it can be covered by the document system. Feel free to comment on the patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3407 And I prefer to comment on the issue link since there is more better for discussion: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T673 Reply here is an option, too. BR /Ken

5 years

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TF-M v1.0 is released

by Anton Komlev

Dear All, Happy to announce that Trusted Firmware - M project has reached the important milestone of v1.0. The major features covered in this release are : * PSA Level 1 & Level 2 certification requirements as updatable RoT * Support for PSA Dev APIs (PS, ITS, Attestation) aligned to PSA 1.0 specs, and Crypto aligned to 1.0-beta-3 * Reference implementation on various platforms * Arm : Musca-A, Musca-B1, Musca-S1, FPGAs , FVPs * Cypress PSoC6 * ST's STM32L5 and NXP's LPC55S69 are coming soon All release details are in the changelog file: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/changelog.… A Rendered HTML version is here: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… This is the result of great collaboration between multiple organizations toward a single common goal - to make firmware secure and trustful. Thanks all direct and indirect contributors who devoted their time and efforts to make this happen. Anton Komlev TF-M Technical Leader Arm Ltd.

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Shreve, Erik

Ken, Thanks for the feedback! I agree that care will be needed in the design and implementation of the calls from S to NS. I hope to provide design details that minimize the risk by minimizing the RTOS specific layer. Unfortunately, I'm not clear on your feedback about the 'scheduler' and 'context-switch' terms. Let me expand on my proposal here a bit more. Perhaps this will clarify things or at least provide enough detail for you to provide more specific feedback. I'm sure you are aware that the PSA Firmware Framework provides for the scheduling of the secure partitions. I'm proposing (as an option, it is not a core feature of the proposal) that the SPM may be responsible for scheduling of Application Root of Trust services in this new model. Further, execution of PSA RoT services on behalf of Application RoT services may also fall under the SPM's scheduling. Thus, this part of the new model would fit with the PSA FF spec. This would thus mean that the NSPE RTOS is only scheduling NSPE Tasks and the associated PSA RoT service requests for those NSPE Tasks. However, supporting the "App RoT scheduling by SPM" in the model may complicate the implementation or at the very least the straightforward understanding of how the model works. The alternative, of course, is that the NSPE RTOS schedules the execution of the Application RoT services the same as it schedules the PSA RoT services. I think I prefer the latter, but I'm open to the former if the community has good reasons for it. One reason might be an expectation that PSA RoT services will be maintained by platform owners and platform owners can choose which models to support, but the community may want creators of Application RoT services to have the same experience regardless of the model implemented. Thanks! Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 9:49 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Hi Erik, This is a good proposal, thanks. And I got two comments in your listed bullets: * Resource locking APIs are provided to allow PSA RoT functions to communicate with the NSPE scheduler (i.e. mutex take/give) - Even the Trustzone-M supports S to NS call, be cation when you are designing such features because leave a waiting pattern in the secure side exposes one extra interface. * A SPE scheduler may still exist for application root of trust services, if any exist on a system. - Please use the 'scheduler' and 'context-switch' with scope. If there are 2 threads only and just switching contexts between them, the word 'scheduler' would be a bit confusing here. Hope my assumption is incorrect. Please go ahead with your preparation for the Tech Forum. Anton can give you detail descriptions about it and I think preparing a PUBLIC slide can be the first step. Thanks. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 5:26 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Anton, Yes, I can be prepared to discuss in the next forum. (I believe you are referring to the one on April 2nd). I've not participated in the forums yet, please send me some information as to the format/rules/etc. Thanks! Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 3:39 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Hi Erik, Thanks for proposing improvements to TF-M, cooperative scheduling namely. You hit the topic which was considered but postponed at some moment. Believe, it will be beneficial to all of us to discuss it online and share our views on potential improvement and possible side effects. Let me know, please, if you want to include this topic into next forum agenda? Kind regards, Anton Komlev From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: 23 March 2020 14:26 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal I'd like to propose an additional model that provides a single-scheduler _and_ multiple thread support for PSA RoT. To state a little more specifically: * The NSPE scheduler makes all scheduling decisions for execution (call) flows of the NSPE tasks - including when those flows are operating in secure side * APIs are provided to the NSPE scheduler to switch SPE task contexts (one task context associated to each NSPE task that uses PSA RoT) * Resource locking APIs are provided to allow PSA RoT functions to communicate with the NSPE scheduler (i.e. mutex take/give) * A SPE scheduler may still exist for application root of trust services, if any exist on a system. I don't see anything written up on a model like this in the design proposals or Phabricator. However, it appears to me that such a model (or something similar) must have been previously discussed. 1. There already exists a tz_context API set in CMSIS-Core for communicating task switches by the NSPE scheduler to the SPM 2. Cooperative scheduling rules design was accepted: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… 3. https://youtu.be/6wEFoq49qUw?t=1671 speaks about having a stack on the SPE per NSPE task. Also, the question from the audience at the end of the presentation relates to having a single NSPE scheduler. A brief word on the motivation for such a proposal... To ease (and thus increase) adaptation of PSA RoT, wherein those services are protected from nontrusted code, the impact to the NSPE code should be minimized. The current models (Library, IPC) do well to minimize the impact from an API standpoint. That is, the NSPE caller need not know where/how the PSA RoT operates in order to compile. However, the current models do not minimize impact to scheduling on single core systems. The library model locks behind a single mutex the operations that previously existed independent of one another. The IPC model provides more flexibility. However, it still extends lock times beyond current implementations and it introduces an additional scheduler which removes determinism and forces system designers to rethink existing code. I'd like to know if there are any recorded plans for such a model (or something more similar to it than the three items above). If not, has it been discussed and actively rejected? If so why? I can/will write up a more concrete proposal, but wanted to get some discussion around the high-level idea first. Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments Inc. 12500 TI Boulevard, MS F4000 Dallas, TX 75243

5 years, 1 month

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Invitation: TF-M Tech Forum @ Thu 2 Apr 2020 16:00 - 17:00 (BST) (tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Bill Fletcher

You have been invited to the following event. Title: TF-M Tech Forum After a discussion on the mailing list we have moved the timeslot this week to give an opportunity for US participants to join.About TF-M Tech forum:This is an open forum for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC.Feel free to forward it to colleagues.Details of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h When: Thu 2 Apr 2020 16:00 – 17:00 United Kingdom Time Calendar: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Bill Fletcher- creator * tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NmY2dWZkbzZtMjZyNHNmb… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - April 2

by David Wang

That sounds good! Thanks. Regards, David Wang Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142) From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 1:46 AM To: Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - April 2 Hi Jamie, Thanks for noticing. You are right, that time would be better so the new proposal is 15.00 UTC. I have reused the time from the last session but forgot about the time change. Here anyone can play with the time zones: https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/meetingtime.html?day=2&month=4&year=… Location Local Time Time Zone UTC Offset Vancouver<https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/canada/vancouver> (Canada - British Columbia) Thursday, 2 April 2020, 08:00:00 PDT<https://www.timeanddate.com/time/zones/pdt> UTC-7 hours Chicago<https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/usa/chicago> (USA - Illinois) Thursday, 2 April 2020, 10:00:00 CDT<https://www.timeanddate.com/time/zones/cdt> UTC-5 hours Cambridge<https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/uk/cambridge> (United Kingdom - England) Thursday, 2 April 2020, 16:00:00 BST<https://www.timeanddate.com/time/zones/bst> UTC+1 hour Shanghai<https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/china/shanghai> (China - Shanghai Municipality) Thursday, 2 April 2020, 23:00:00 CST<https://www.timeanddate.com/time/zones/cst-china> UTC+8 hours Corresponding UTC (GMT) Thursday, 2 April 2020, 15:00:00<https://www.timeanddate.com/worldclock/fixedtime.html?iso=20200402T1500> Best regards, Anton From: Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com<mailto:Jamie.Fox@arm.com>> Sent: 23 March 2020 17:29 To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: TF-M Technical Forum call - April 2 Hi Anton, As we will have moved to daylight saving time in US and Europe, it seems like 15.00 UTC could be a good compromise for this next session. Would result in 8.00 west coast/10.00 central/11.00 east/16.00 UK/17.00 Europe/23.00 China. So good times for US/Europe and still possible for China to join if anyone really wants to. What do you think? Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 23 March 2020 14:30 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - April 2 Hello, Last 3 sessions of the Tech Forum were convenient for Europe – Asia time zones, where majority of participants are. To let US members a chance to join at a reasonable time, propose to have the next session at US-friendly time (17:00 UTC) and then keep it every 4th, having 1:3 ratio. What do you think about such schema? As usual, please reply to this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Best regards, Anton Komlev

5 years, 1 month

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Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hello all, As the developers community at trustedfirmware.org is growing, there is an increasing need to have work processes that are clearly documented, feel smooth and scale well. We think that there is an opportunity to improve the way the trustedfirmware.org projects are managed today. That's why we are sharing a project maintenance proposal, focusing on the TF-A and TF-M projects initially. The aim of this document is to propose a set of rules, guidelines and processes to try and improve the way we work together as a community today. Note that this is an early draft at this stage. This is put up for further discussion within the trustedfirmware.org community. Nothing is set in stone yet and it is expected to go under change as feedback from the community is incorporated. Please find the initial proposal here: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p… Please provide any feedback you may have by replying to this email thread, keeping all 4 mailing lists in the recipients list. I will collate comments from the community and try to incorporate them in the document, keeping you updated on changes made between revisions. Regards, Sandrine

5 years, 1 month

1
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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Profile Small design document under review

by Andrej Butok

Hi David, I have attached the Mbed-Crypto configuration file, which enables only minimum set of crypto algorithms required to pass the current TFM regression tests. It saves us about 30KB of ROM if to compare to the default TFM settings. Hope, it can be useful for others. Regards, Andrej Butok From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 7:37 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Profile Small design document under review Hi all, Could you please help review the latest design document of TF-M Profile Small (previously named as Profile 1)? TF-M Profile Small provides a predefined list of features with small memory footprint, on ultra-constrained device. Major changes since last version: * Renamed as Profile Small to avoid confusing readers with other similar terms. The other profiles will be named as Profile Medium and Profile Large. * Enable symmetric key algorithms based Initial Attestation. Please help review the document on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3598<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…> for more details. The corresponding implementation patch set is also updated on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22profile-s-config%22+(status:o…<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…>. Any suggestion or comment is welcome! Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Friday, March 6, 2020 4:47 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Profile 1 design document under review Hi all, As we discussed in Tech Forum yesterday, we proposed the TF-M Profile 1 design document on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3598<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…>. Any comment, suggestion or question is welcome. We will keep updating and finalizing the document. The corresponding TF-M Profile 1 implementation patch set is also under review on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22profile-1-config%22+(status:o…<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…>. Best regards, Hu Ziji

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Anton Komlev

Hi Erik, Right, I had in mind the next forum on Apr 2, which is planned for US time zone. Invitations will be send soon having no more ideas or objection on the time slot. The forum format is open and quite unformal. You can find the recordings of all sessions here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ I would suggest to have few slides with the concept for idea introduction and references during discussion. All the best, Anton Komlev From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: 23 March 2020 21:26 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Anton, Yes, I can be prepared to discuss in the next forum. (I believe you are referring to the one on April 2nd). I've not participated in the forums yet, please send me some information as to the format/rules/etc. Thanks! Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 3:39 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Hi Erik, Thanks for proposing improvements to TF-M, cooperative scheduling namely. You hit the topic which was considered but postponed at some moment. Believe, it will be beneficial to all of us to discuss it online and share our views on potential improvement and possible side effects. Let me know, please, if you want to include this topic into next forum agenda? Kind regards, Anton Komlev From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: 23 March 2020 14:26 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal I'd like to propose an additional model that provides a single-scheduler _and_ multiple thread support for PSA RoT. To state a little more specifically: * The NSPE scheduler makes all scheduling decisions for execution (call) flows of the NSPE tasks - including when those flows are operating in secure side * APIs are provided to the NSPE scheduler to switch SPE task contexts (one task context associated to each NSPE task that uses PSA RoT) * Resource locking APIs are provided to allow PSA RoT functions to communicate with the NSPE scheduler (i.e. mutex take/give) * A SPE scheduler may still exist for application root of trust services, if any exist on a system. I don't see anything written up on a model like this in the design proposals or Phabricator. However, it appears to me that such a model (or something similar) must have been previously discussed. 1. There already exists a tz_context API set in CMSIS-Core for communicating task switches by the NSPE scheduler to the SPM 2. Cooperative scheduling rules design was accepted: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… 3. https://youtu.be/6wEFoq49qUw?t=1671 speaks about having a stack on the SPE per NSPE task. Also, the question from the audience at the end of the presentation relates to having a single NSPE scheduler. A brief word on the motivation for such a proposal... To ease (and thus increase) adaptation of PSA RoT, wherein those services are protected from nontrusted code, the impact to the NSPE code should be minimized. The current models (Library, IPC) do well to minimize the impact from an API standpoint. That is, the NSPE caller need not know where/how the PSA RoT operates in order to compile. However, the current models do not minimize impact to scheduling on single core systems. The library model locks behind a single mutex the operations that previously existed independent of one another. The IPC model provides more flexibility. However, it still extends lock times beyond current implementations and it introduces an additional scheduler which removes determinism and forces system designers to rethink existing code. I'd like to know if there are any recorded plans for such a model (or something more similar to it than the three items above). If not, has it been discussed and actively rejected? If so why? I can/will write up a more concrete proposal, but wanted to get some discussion around the high-level idea first. Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments Inc. 12500 TI Boulevard, MS F4000 Dallas, TX 75243

5 years, 1 month

1
0
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TF-M Profile Small design document under review

by David Hu

Hi all, Could you please help review the latest design document of TF-M Profile Small (previously named as Profile 1)? TF-M Profile Small provides a predefined list of features with small memory footprint, on ultra-constrained device. Major changes since last version: * Renamed as Profile Small to avoid confusing readers with other similar terms. The other profiles will be named as Profile Medium and Profile Large. * Enable symmetric key algorithms based Initial Attestation. Please help review the document on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3598 for more details. The corresponding implementation patch set is also updated on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22profile-s-config%22+(status:o…. Any suggestion or comment is welcome! Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Friday, March 6, 2020 4:47 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Profile 1 design document under review Hi all, As we discussed in Tech Forum yesterday, we proposed the TF-M Profile 1 design document on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3598. Any comment, suggestion or question is welcome. We will keep updating and finalizing the document. The corresponding TF-M Profile 1 implementation patch set is also under review on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22profile-1-config%22+(status:o…. Best regards, Hu Ziji

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Ken Liu

Hi Erik, This is a good proposal, thanks. And I got two comments in your listed bullets: * Resource locking APIs are provided to allow PSA RoT functions to communicate with the NSPE scheduler (i.e. mutex take/give) - Even the Trustzone-M supports S to NS call, be cation when you are designing such features because leave a waiting pattern in the secure side exposes one extra interface. * A SPE scheduler may still exist for application root of trust services, if any exist on a system. - Please use the 'scheduler' and 'context-switch' with scope. If there are 2 threads only and just switching contexts between them, the word 'scheduler' would be a bit confusing here. Hope my assumption is incorrect. Please go ahead with your preparation for the Tech Forum. Anton can give you detail descriptions about it and I think preparing a PUBLIC slide can be the first step. Thanks. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 5:26 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Anton, Yes, I can be prepared to discuss in the next forum. (I believe you are referring to the one on April 2nd). I've not participated in the forums yet, please send me some information as to the format/rules/etc. Thanks! Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 3:39 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Hi Erik, Thanks for proposing improvements to TF-M, cooperative scheduling namely. You hit the topic which was considered but postponed at some moment. Believe, it will be beneficial to all of us to discuss it online and share our views on potential improvement and possible side effects. Let me know, please, if you want to include this topic into next forum agenda? Kind regards, Anton Komlev From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: 23 March 2020 14:26 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal I'd like to propose an additional model that provides a single-scheduler _and_ multiple thread support for PSA RoT. To state a little more specifically: * The NSPE scheduler makes all scheduling decisions for execution (call) flows of the NSPE tasks - including when those flows are operating in secure side * APIs are provided to the NSPE scheduler to switch SPE task contexts (one task context associated to each NSPE task that uses PSA RoT) * Resource locking APIs are provided to allow PSA RoT functions to communicate with the NSPE scheduler (i.e. mutex take/give) * A SPE scheduler may still exist for application root of trust services, if any exist on a system. I don't see anything written up on a model like this in the design proposals or Phabricator. However, it appears to me that such a model (or something similar) must have been previously discussed. 1. There already exists a tz_context API set in CMSIS-Core for communicating task switches by the NSPE scheduler to the SPM 2. Cooperative scheduling rules design was accepted: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… 3. https://youtu.be/6wEFoq49qUw?t=1671 speaks about having a stack on the SPE per NSPE task. Also, the question from the audience at the end of the presentation relates to having a single NSPE scheduler. A brief word on the motivation for such a proposal... To ease (and thus increase) adaptation of PSA RoT, wherein those services are protected from nontrusted code, the impact to the NSPE code should be minimized. The current models (Library, IPC) do well to minimize the impact from an API standpoint. That is, the NSPE caller need not know where/how the PSA RoT operates in order to compile. However, the current models do not minimize impact to scheduling on single core systems. The library model locks behind a single mutex the operations that previously existed independent of one another. The IPC model provides more flexibility. However, it still extends lock times beyond current implementations and it introduces an additional scheduler which removes determinism and forces system designers to rethink existing code. I'd like to know if there are any recorded plans for such a model (or something more similar to it than the three items above). If not, has it been discussed and actively rejected? If so why? I can/will write up a more concrete proposal, but wanted to get some discussion around the high-level idea first. Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments Inc. 12500 TI Boulevard, MS F4000 Dallas, TX 75243

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Shreve, Erik

Anton, Yes, I can be prepared to discuss in the next forum. (I believe you are referring to the one on April 2nd). I've not participated in the forums yet, please send me some information as to the format/rules/etc. Thanks! Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, March 23, 2020 3:39 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal Hi Erik, Thanks for proposing improvements to TF-M, cooperative scheduling namely. You hit the topic which was considered but postponed at some moment. Believe, it will be beneficial to all of us to discuss it online and share our views on potential improvement and possible side effects. Let me know, please, if you want to include this topic into next forum agenda? Kind regards, Anton Komlev From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: 23 March 2020 14:26 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal I'd like to propose an additional model that provides a single-scheduler _and_ multiple thread support for PSA RoT. To state a little more specifically: * The NSPE scheduler makes all scheduling decisions for execution (call) flows of the NSPE tasks - including when those flows are operating in secure side * APIs are provided to the NSPE scheduler to switch SPE task contexts (one task context associated to each NSPE task that uses PSA RoT) * Resource locking APIs are provided to allow PSA RoT functions to communicate with the NSPE scheduler (i.e. mutex take/give) * A SPE scheduler may still exist for application root of trust services, if any exist on a system. I don't see anything written up on a model like this in the design proposals or Phabricator. However, it appears to me that such a model (or something similar) must have been previously discussed. 1. There already exists a tz_context API set in CMSIS-Core for communicating task switches by the NSPE scheduler to the SPM 2. Cooperative scheduling rules design was accepted: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… 3. https://youtu.be/6wEFoq49qUw?t=1671 speaks about having a stack on the SPE per NSPE task. Also, the question from the audience at the end of the presentation relates to having a single NSPE scheduler. A brief word on the motivation for such a proposal... To ease (and thus increase) adaptation of PSA RoT, wherein those services are protected from nontrusted code, the impact to the NSPE code should be minimized. The current models (Library, IPC) do well to minimize the impact from an API standpoint. That is, the NSPE caller need not know where/how the PSA RoT operates in order to compile. However, the current models do not minimize impact to scheduling on single core systems. The library model locks behind a single mutex the operations that previously existed independent of one another. The IPC model provides more flexibility. However, it still extends lock times beyond current implementations and it introduces an additional scheduler which removes determinism and forces system designers to rethink existing code. I'd like to know if there are any recorded plans for such a model (or something more similar to it than the three items above). If not, has it been discussed and actively rejected? If so why? I can/will write up a more concrete proposal, but wanted to get some discussion around the high-level idea first. Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments Inc. 12500 TI Boulevard, MS F4000 Dallas, TX 75243

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Anton Komlev

Hi Erik, Thanks for proposing improvements to TF-M, cooperative scheduling namely. You hit the topic which was considered but postponed at some moment. Believe, it will be beneficial to all of us to discuss it online and share our views on potential improvement and possible side effects. Let me know, please, if you want to include this topic into next forum agenda? Kind regards, Anton Komlev From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: 23 March 2020 14:26 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal I'd like to propose an additional model that provides a single-scheduler _and_ multiple thread support for PSA RoT. To state a little more specifically: * The NSPE scheduler makes all scheduling decisions for execution (call) flows of the NSPE tasks - including when those flows are operating in secure side * APIs are provided to the NSPE scheduler to switch SPE task contexts (one task context associated to each NSPE task that uses PSA RoT) * Resource locking APIs are provided to allow PSA RoT functions to communicate with the NSPE scheduler (i.e. mutex take/give) * A SPE scheduler may still exist for application root of trust services, if any exist on a system. I don't see anything written up on a model like this in the design proposals or Phabricator. However, it appears to me that such a model (or something similar) must have been previously discussed. 1. There already exists a tz_context API set in CMSIS-Core for communicating task switches by the NSPE scheduler to the SPM 2. Cooperative scheduling rules design was accepted: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… 3. https://youtu.be/6wEFoq49qUw?t=1671 speaks about having a stack on the SPE per NSPE task. Also, the question from the audience at the end of the presentation relates to having a single NSPE scheduler. A brief word on the motivation for such a proposal... To ease (and thus increase) adaptation of PSA RoT, wherein those services are protected from nontrusted code, the impact to the NSPE code should be minimized. The current models (Library, IPC) do well to minimize the impact from an API standpoint. That is, the NSPE caller need not know where/how the PSA RoT operates in order to compile. However, the current models do not minimize impact to scheduling on single core systems. The library model locks behind a single mutex the operations that previously existed independent of one another. The IPC model provides more flexibility. However, it still extends lock times beyond current implementations and it introduces an additional scheduler which removes determinism and forces system designers to rethink existing code. I'd like to know if there are any recorded plans for such a model (or something more similar to it than the three items above). If not, has it been discussed and actively rejected? If so why? I can/will write up a more concrete proposal, but wanted to get some discussion around the high-level idea first. Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments Inc. 12500 TI Boulevard, MS F4000 Dallas, TX 75243

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - April 2

by Jamie Fox

Hi Anton, As we will have moved to daylight saving time in US and Europe, it seems like 15.00 UTC could be a good compromise for this next session. Would result in 8.00 west coast/10.00 central/11.00 east/16.00 UK/17.00 Europe/23.00 China. So good times for US/Europe and still possible for China to join if anyone really wants to. What do you think? Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 23 March 2020 14:30 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - April 2 Hello, Last 3 sessions of the Tech Forum were convenient for Europe - Asia time zones, where majority of participants are. To let US members a chance to join at a reasonable time, propose to have the next session at US-friendly time (17:00 UTC) and then keep it every 4th, having 1:3 ratio. What do you think about such schema? As usual, please reply to this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Best regards, Anton Komlev

5 years, 1 month

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TF-M Technical Forum call - April 2

by Anton Komlev

Hello, Last 3 sessions of the Tech Forum were convenient for Europe - Asia time zones, where majority of participants are. To let US members a chance to join at a reasonable time, propose to have the next session at US-friendly time (17:00 UTC) and then keep it every 4th, having 1:3 ratio. What do you think about such schema? As usual, please reply to this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Best regards, Anton Komlev

5 years, 1 month

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Multi-threaded single-scheduler model proposal

by Shreve, Erik

I'd like to propose an additional model that provides a single-scheduler _and_ multiple thread support for PSA RoT. To state a little more specifically: * The NSPE scheduler makes all scheduling decisions for execution (call) flows of the NSPE tasks - including when those flows are operating in secure side * APIs are provided to the NSPE scheduler to switch SPE task contexts (one task context associated to each NSPE task that uses PSA RoT) * Resource locking APIs are provided to allow PSA RoT functions to communicate with the NSPE scheduler (i.e. mutex take/give) * A SPE scheduler may still exist for application root of trust services, if any exist on a system. I don't see anything written up on a model like this in the design proposals or Phabricator. However, it appears to me that such a model (or something similar) must have been previously discussed. 1. There already exists a tz_context API set in CMSIS-Core for communicating task switches by the NSPE scheduler to the SPM 2. Cooperative scheduling rules design was accepted: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… 3. https://youtu.be/6wEFoq49qUw?t=1671 speaks about having a stack on the SPE per NSPE task. Also, the question from the audience at the end of the presentation relates to having a single NSPE scheduler. A brief word on the motivation for such a proposal... To ease (and thus increase) adaptation of PSA RoT, wherein those services are protected from nontrusted code, the impact to the NSPE code should be minimized. The current models (Library, IPC) do well to minimize the impact from an API standpoint. That is, the NSPE caller need not know where/how the PSA RoT operates in order to compile. However, the current models do not minimize impact to scheduling on single core systems. The library model locks behind a single mutex the operations that previously existed independent of one another. The IPC model provides more flexibility. However, it still extends lock times beyond current implementations and it introduces an additional scheduler which removes determinism and forces system designers to rethink existing code. I'd like to know if there are any recorded plans for such a model (or something more similar to it than the three items above). If not, has it been discussed and actively rejected? If so why? I can/will write up a more concrete proposal, but wanted to get some discussion around the high-level idea first. Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments Inc. 12500 TI Boulevard, MS F4000 Dallas, TX 75243

5 years, 1 month

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Trusted Firmware Keynote @Linaro TechDays (Wed 25 Mar, 16:00-16:30 GMT)

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi All, Trusted Firmware will be opening the Linaro Tech Days event on Wed 25th March at 4pm (16:00) GMT with a keynote presenting all the latest exciting news from the project. https://connect.linaro.org/resources/ltd20/ltd20-200k/ and, once registered, on sched: https://linarotechdays.sched.com/event/ZZFK/ltd20-200k-keynote-trusted-firm… The session will be live streamed and recorded (links in the above resources) and slides will be attached there too. Don't miss it! Regards, Shebu/Matteo

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] psa-arch-tests console baud rate

by Edison Ai

Hi Thomas, For your 2nd question. I have tested it on my side and it has the same problem. The TF-M can print normal boot message, but the log becomes garbage after enter into Arch test. The PSA Arch test is another independent project, and I have arisen this issue to the PSA Arch test project: https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/164. You can watch this issue directly. Thanks, Edison From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edison Ai via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2020 9:54 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] psa-arch-tests console baud rate Hi Thomas, Thanks your mail. For your 1st question. There is indeed a problem to build the PSA arch crypto test on the Musca_a board for the RAM size is too small. I suggest you split the crypto tests into different test images on the Musca_a board. For the 2nd question, I only test that on FVP AN521 but never met this problem. We will test that on the MPS2 AN521 board soon to check if it is a real problem. If yes, we will try to fix that quickly. Thanks, Edison From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 9:38 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] psa-arch-tests console baud rate Triggered by Rays mail on slow RSA key pair generation, I built and tried to run the tests, but ran into a couple of issues: 1) I attempted to build it for the Musca A, but apparently that doesn't have enough RAM to run these tests 2) Switching to an MPS2+ with AN521 configuration I see that the baud rate on the UART appears wrong when running the tests. mcuboot produces correct messages at 115200 bps, as does the normal ConfigRegression* tests, but the ConfigPsaApiTest* appears to produce just garbage. Is there a setting I need to set to get any useful data on the terminal when running the ConfigPsaApiTests? Cheers, Thomas -- Thomas Tï¿½rnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] [EXTERNAL] Re: SPM_IDLE

by DeMars, Alan

Ken, Our secure callback solution to this issue is working. I am just following up to understand what the SPM_IDLE concept is. Alan On Mar 20, 2020, at 4:34 AM, Ken Liu via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hi Alan, Looks like this is the still classic case, but unfortunately that there is no defined design at the current stage. Heard you were working on an solution for this, and got some issues when non-secure preempts secure execution, since your scheduler works in thread mode so cannot update secure context while scheduling – please correct me if my understanding is wrong. Is this mail a follow up or another thread just focus on discussion of the cooperative scheduling document? BR /Ken From: DeMars, Alan <ademars(a)ti.com> Sent: Friday, March 20, 2020 2:27 AM To: Ken Liu <Ken.Liu(a)arm.com> Cc: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: RE: SPM_IDLE Ken, Our use case is to support a “secure driver”: 1. A peripheral can only be accessed in secure mode. 2. The peripheral is configured and a hardware process is triggered within the peripheral. 3. When the process completes, a secure interrupt is triggered. 4. The NS thread that is using this driver should block (allowing other NS threads to run) while waiting for the hardware process to complete and resume when the process is finished. Alan From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 10:28 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] SPM_IDLE Hi Alan, It (8.3.5) is one of the cases can be dealt with, and now it is not detail defined yet. Can you describe what your practical purpose for S/NS interactive is so that we could collect feedbacks to check if the rules are applicable? /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of DeMars, Alan via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 10:51 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: [TF-M] SPM_IDLE Mention is made to “SPM_IDLE” in the Cooperative Scheduling Rules document: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… I’m struggling to understand section 8.3.5 which references SPM_IDLE but doesn’t really define it. Is there more info on this topic? It appears to be a proposed solution for allowing other NS threads to be scheduled while the current NS thread is waiting for an asynchronous event in the secure service it has called. Alan -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years, 1 month

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Interface: Remove unused header include

by Devaraj Ranganna

Hi, The patchset https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3620 removes the header `tfm_veneers.h` from PSA IPC API source files. If there are no objects then can this patchset be merged? Thanks, Dev IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] SPM_IDLE

by DeMars, Alan

Ken, Our use case is to support a "secure driver": 1) A peripheral can only be accessed in secure mode. 2) The peripheral is configured and a hardware process is triggered within the peripheral. 3) When the process completes, a secure interrupt is triggered. 4) The NS thread that is using this driver should block (allowing other NS threads to run) while waiting for the hardware process to complete and resume when the process is finished. Alan From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 10:28 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] SPM_IDLE Hi Alan, It (8.3.5) is one of the cases can be dealt with, and now it is not detail defined yet. Can you describe what your practical purpose for S/NS interactive is so that we could collect feedbacks to check if the rules are applicable? /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of DeMars, Alan via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 10:51 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] SPM_IDLE Mention is made to "SPM_IDLE" in the Cooperative Scheduling Rules document: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… I'm struggling to understand section 8.3.5 which references SPM_IDLE but doesn't really define it. Is there more info on this topic? It appears to be a proposed solution for allowing other NS threads to be scheduled while the current NS thread is waiting for an asynchronous event in the secure service it has called. Alan

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow

by Raymond Ngun

Thanks Tamas, Did you try with CC312 disabled as well? I am wondering if you would be able to at least reproduce what I saw. Ray From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Tamas Ban via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2020 4:30 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] FW: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. Hi, We did measurements on Musca-B1 with enabled CC312. We did 10 run with both compiler( armclang and gnuarm). RSA2048 key generation takes 10-35 sec. In average gnuarm seems a bit slower. I suspect the reason behind that random number still need to be tested that are they fit for rsa2048 generation (might are they primes?) and the testing algorithm is might faster with armclang. But for sure we have not seen any run which could take minutes. Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Adrian Shaw via TF-M Sent: 19 March 2020 12:17 To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>>; Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com<mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow If the platform has on-chip NVM then you should consider using NV seed entropy. You still need a TRNG to get the initial entropy, but seems like it could improve average runtime performance. I believe there's a macro like MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED that you have to enable, as well as providing the hooks to read/write the flash. Adrian ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Soby Mathew via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: 18 March 2020 16:24 To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Ray, That is good information. The software RNG is not truly random and is not production quality. The predictable timing could be an indicator that the randomness is reproducible. That's all I know, but the mbed-crypto team may have more inputs and they can be queried here : https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues Best Regards Soby Mathew From: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>> Sent: 18 March 2020 15:33 To: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com<mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Soby, Musca-B1 has CC312 support which will introduce an rng for this purpose. Unfortunately, I didn't test Musca-B1 with cc312 enabled and I don't have a board now to test with. However, I did test with a h/w rng on the PSoC64 and the performance isn't always better. When using s/w, the time it takes was quite consistent at 1.5 minutes or 5.5 minutes depending on toolchain. After introducing the h/w rng, I've seen it finish quickly (less than a minute) but I've also seen it take 15 minutes. Thanks, Ray From: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com<mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com>> Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 4:44 AM To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Raymond Thanks for bring this to the forum. When I did the migration to the latest mbed-crypto tag, I faced the same issue. After couple of discussion within the team and mbedcrypto, this is the understanding I have. Currently mbedcrypto is configured to use NULL entropy. Hence this is the print message when building mbedcrypto : #warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " This means that mbedcrypto uses a software algorithm to generate randomness. It iterates this algorithm till it can generate enough randomness for the keypair generation and this is the reason for the delay. If the hardware has an entropy source which can be used for this random number generation, then I understand the performance will be much better. But this will need suitable configuration to be enabled from TF-M. I am not much familiar with hardware architecture of M-Class systems. One of the questions I have to the forum is, do we have such entropy sources on the hardware? Then it is worth scheduling some task to investigate how to abstract/use the entropy source. Best Regards Soby Mathew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Raymond Ngun via TF-M Sent: 17 March 2020 21:02 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi all, When testing the PSA API Crypto Dev API test suite, I noticed that psa_generate_key() is awfully slow when generating a 2048-bit RSA keypair and the performance is different depending on toolchain used. I've run these tests on Musca-B1 and with GCC, key generation generally completes in 25s but an armclang build requires 2.5 minutes to complete. This is more pronounced on PSoC64 where we are building for armv6m. Here, the key generation can take up to 5.5 minutes and I've seen it take even longer - I assume this is due to values returned by rng. Anybody have comments on the performance of psa_generate_key() or more specifically mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()? What can be done to help improve the performance of this software implementation? Thank you, Ray This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message. This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

5 years, 1 month

1
0
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Re: [TF-M] psa-arch-tests console baud rate

by Edison Ai

Hi Thomas, Thanks your mail. For your 1st question. There is indeed a problem to build the PSA arch crypto test on the Musca_a board for the RAM size is too small. I suggest you split the crypto tests into different test images on the Musca_a board. For the 2nd question, I only test that on FVP AN521 but never met this problem. We will test that on the MPS2 AN521 board soon to check if it is a real problem. If yes, we will try to fix that quickly. Thanks, Edison From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 9:38 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] psa-arch-tests console baud rate Triggered by Rays mail on slow RSA key pair generation, I built and tried to run the tests, but ran into a couple of issues: 1) I attempted to build it for the Musca A, but apparently that doesn't have enough RAM to run these tests 2) Switching to an MPS2+ with AN521 configuration I see that the baud rate on the UART appears wrong when running the tests. mcuboot produces correct messages at 115200 bps, as does the normal ConfigRegression* tests, but the ConfigPsaApiTest* appears to produce just garbage. Is there a setting I need to set to get any useful data on the terminal when running the ConfigPsaApiTests? Cheers, Thomas -- Thomas Tï¿½rnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

5 years, 1 month

1
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Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow

by Adrian Shaw

Note that you'll still to re-seed from the TRNG periodically, but doesn't have to be done every time the application needs a random number. Adrian ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Adrian Shaw via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 19 March 2020 11:16 To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com>; Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow If the platform has on-chip NVM then you should consider using NV seed entropy. You still need a TRNG to get the initial entropy, but seems like it could improve average runtime performance. I believe there's a macro like MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED that you have to enable, as well as providing the hooks to read/write the flash. Adrian ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Soby Mathew via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 18 March 2020 16:24 To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Ray, That is good information. The software RNG is not truly random and is not production quality. The predictable timing could be an indicator that the randomness is reproducible. That’s all I know, but the mbed-crypto team may have more inputs and they can be queried here : https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues Best Regards Soby Mathew From: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com> Sent: 18 March 2020 15:33 To: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Soby, Musca-B1 has CC312 support which will introduce an rng for this purpose. Unfortunately, I didn’t test Musca-B1 with cc312 enabled and I don’t have a board now to test with. However, I did test with a h/w rng on the PSoC64 and the performance isn’t always better. When using s/w, the time it takes was quite consistent at 1.5 minutes or 5.5 minutes depending on toolchain. After introducing the h/w rng, I’ve seen it finish quickly (less than a minute) but I’ve also seen it take 15 minutes. Thanks, Ray From: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com<mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com>> Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 4:44 AM To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Raymond Thanks for bring this to the forum. When I did the migration to the latest mbed-crypto tag, I faced the same issue. After couple of discussion within the team and mbedcrypto, this is the understanding I have. Currently mbedcrypto is configured to use NULL entropy. Hence this is the print message when building mbedcrypto : #warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " This means that mbedcrypto uses a software algorithm to generate randomness. It iterates this algorithm till it can generate enough randomness for the keypair generation and this is the reason for the delay. If the hardware has an entropy source which can be used for this random number generation, then I understand the performance will be much better. But this will need suitable configuration to be enabled from TF-M. I am not much familiar with hardware architecture of M-Class systems. One of the questions I have to the forum is, do we have such entropy sources on the hardware? Then it is worth scheduling some task to investigate how to abstract/use the entropy source. Best Regards Soby Mathew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Raymond Ngun via TF-M Sent: 17 March 2020 21:02 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi all, When testing the PSA API Crypto Dev API test suite, I noticed that psa_generate_key() is awfully slow when generating a 2048-bit RSA keypair and the performance is different depending on toolchain used. I’ve run these tests on Musca-B1 and with GCC, key generation generally completes in 25s but an armclang build requires 2.5 minutes to complete. This is more pronounced on PSoC64 where we are building for armv6m. Here, the key generation can take up to 5.5 minutes and I’ve seen it take even longer – I assume this is due to values returned by rng. Anybody have comments on the performance of psa_generate_key() or more specifically mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()? What can be done to help improve the performance of this software implementation? Thank you, Ray This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message. This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

1
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FW: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow

by Tamas Ban

Hi, We did measurements on Musca-B1 with enabled CC312. We did 10 run with both compiler( armclang and gnuarm). RSA2048 key generation takes 10-35 sec. In average gnuarm seems a bit slower. I suspect the reason behind that random number still need to be tested that are they fit for rsa2048 generation (might are they primes?) and the testing algorithm is might faster with armclang. But for sure we have not seen any run which could take minutes. Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Adrian Shaw via TF-M Sent: 19 March 2020 12:17 To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>>; Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com<mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow If the platform has on-chip NVM then you should consider using NV seed entropy. You still need a TRNG to get the initial entropy, but seems like it could improve average runtime performance. I believe there's a macro like MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED that you have to enable, as well as providing the hooks to read/write the flash. Adrian ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Soby Mathew via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: 18 March 2020 16:24 To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Ray, That is good information. The software RNG is not truly random and is not production quality. The predictable timing could be an indicator that the randomness is reproducible. That's all I know, but the mbed-crypto team may have more inputs and they can be queried here : https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues Best Regards Soby Mathew From: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>> Sent: 18 March 2020 15:33 To: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com<mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Soby, Musca-B1 has CC312 support which will introduce an rng for this purpose. Unfortunately, I didn't test Musca-B1 with cc312 enabled and I don't have a board now to test with. However, I did test with a h/w rng on the PSoC64 and the performance isn't always better. When using s/w, the time it takes was quite consistent at 1.5 minutes or 5.5 minutes depending on toolchain. After introducing the h/w rng, I've seen it finish quickly (less than a minute) but I've also seen it take 15 minutes. Thanks, Ray From: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com<mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com>> Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 4:44 AM To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Raymond Thanks for bring this to the forum. When I did the migration to the latest mbed-crypto tag, I faced the same issue. After couple of discussion within the team and mbedcrypto, this is the understanding I have. Currently mbedcrypto is configured to use NULL entropy. Hence this is the print message when building mbedcrypto : #warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " This means that mbedcrypto uses a software algorithm to generate randomness. It iterates this algorithm till it can generate enough randomness for the keypair generation and this is the reason for the delay. If the hardware has an entropy source which can be used for this random number generation, then I understand the performance will be much better. But this will need suitable configuration to be enabled from TF-M. I am not much familiar with hardware architecture of M-Class systems. One of the questions I have to the forum is, do we have such entropy sources on the hardware? Then it is worth scheduling some task to investigate how to abstract/use the entropy source. Best Regards Soby Mathew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Raymond Ngun via TF-M Sent: 17 March 2020 21:02 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi all, When testing the PSA API Crypto Dev API test suite, I noticed that psa_generate_key() is awfully slow when generating a 2048-bit RSA keypair and the performance is different depending on toolchain used. I've run these tests on Musca-B1 and with GCC, key generation generally completes in 25s but an armclang build requires 2.5 minutes to complete. This is more pronounced on PSoC64 where we are building for armv6m. Here, the key generation can take up to 5.5 minutes and I've seen it take even longer - I assume this is due to values returned by rng. Anybody have comments on the performance of psa_generate_key() or more specifically mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()? What can be done to help improve the performance of this software implementation? Thank you, Ray This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message. This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow

by Adrian Shaw

If the platform has on-chip NVM then you should consider using NV seed entropy. You still need a TRNG to get the initial entropy, but seems like it could improve average runtime performance. I believe there's a macro like MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_NV_SEED that you have to enable, as well as providing the hooks to read/write the flash. Adrian ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Soby Mathew via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 18 March 2020 16:24 To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Ray, That is good information. The software RNG is not truly random and is not production quality. The predictable timing could be an indicator that the randomness is reproducible. That’s all I know, but the mbed-crypto team may have more inputs and they can be queried here : https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues Best Regards Soby Mathew From: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com> Sent: 18 March 2020 15:33 To: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Soby, Musca-B1 has CC312 support which will introduce an rng for this purpose. Unfortunately, I didn’t test Musca-B1 with cc312 enabled and I don’t have a board now to test with. However, I did test with a h/w rng on the PSoC64 and the performance isn’t always better. When using s/w, the time it takes was quite consistent at 1.5 minutes or 5.5 minutes depending on toolchain. After introducing the h/w rng, I’ve seen it finish quickly (less than a minute) but I’ve also seen it take 15 minutes. Thanks, Ray From: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com<mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com>> Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2020 4:44 AM To: Raymond Ngun <Raymond.Ngun(a)cypress.com<mailto:Raymond.Ngun@cypress.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi Raymond Thanks for bring this to the forum. When I did the migration to the latest mbed-crypto tag, I faced the same issue. After couple of discussion within the team and mbedcrypto, this is the understanding I have. Currently mbedcrypto is configured to use NULL entropy. Hence this is the print message when building mbedcrypto : #warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " This means that mbedcrypto uses a software algorithm to generate randomness. It iterates this algorithm till it can generate enough randomness for the keypair generation and this is the reason for the delay. If the hardware has an entropy source which can be used for this random number generation, then I understand the performance will be much better. But this will need suitable configuration to be enabled from TF-M. I am not much familiar with hardware architecture of M-Class systems. One of the questions I have to the forum is, do we have such entropy sources on the hardware? Then it is worth scheduling some task to investigate how to abstract/use the entropy source. Best Regards Soby Mathew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Raymond Ngun via TF-M Sent: 17 March 2020 21:02 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi all, When testing the PSA API Crypto Dev API test suite, I noticed that psa_generate_key() is awfully slow when generating a 2048-bit RSA keypair and the performance is different depending on toolchain used. I’ve run these tests on Musca-B1 and with GCC, key generation generally completes in 25s but an armclang build requires 2.5 minutes to complete. This is more pronounced on PSoC64 where we are building for armv6m. Here, the key generation can take up to 5.5 minutes and I’ve seen it take even longer – I assume this is due to values returned by rng. Anybody have comments on the performance of psa_generate_key() or more specifically mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()? What can be done to help improve the performance of this software implementation? Thank you, Ray This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message. This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow

by Soby Mathew

Hi Raymond Thanks for bring this to the forum. When I did the migration to the latest mbed-crypto tag, I faced the same issue. After couple of discussion within the team and mbedcrypto, this is the understanding I have. Currently mbedcrypto is configured to use NULL entropy. Hence this is the print message when building mbedcrypto : #warning "**** WARNING! MBEDTLS_TEST_NULL_ENTROPY defined! " This means that mbedcrypto uses a software algorithm to generate randomness. It iterates this algorithm till it can generate enough randomness for the keypair generation and this is the reason for the delay. If the hardware has an entropy source which can be used for this random number generation, then I understand the performance will be much better. But this will need suitable configuration to be enabled from TF-M. I am not much familiar with hardware architecture of M-Class systems. One of the questions I have to the forum is, do we have such entropy sources on the hardware? Then it is worth scheduling some task to investigate how to abstract/use the entropy source. Best Regards Soby Mathew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raymond Ngun via TF-M Sent: 17 March 2020 21:02 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] 2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow Hi all, When testing the PSA API Crypto Dev API test suite, I noticed that psa_generate_key() is awfully slow when generating a 2048-bit RSA keypair and the performance is different depending on toolchain used. I've run these tests on Musca-B1 and with GCC, key generation generally completes in 25s but an armclang build requires 2.5 minutes to complete. This is more pronounced on PSoC64 where we are building for armv6m. Here, the key generation can take up to 5.5 minutes and I've seen it take even longer - I assume this is due to values returned by rng. Anybody have comments on the performance of psa_generate_key() or more specifically mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()? What can be done to help improve the performance of this software implementation? Thank you, Ray This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

5 years, 1 month

2
2
0 0

psa-arch-tests console baud rate

by Thomas Törnblom

Triggered by Rays mail on slow RSA key pair generation, I built and tried to run the tests, but ran into a couple of issues: 1) I attempted to build it for the Musca A, but apparently that doesn't have enough RAM to run these tests 2) Switching to an MPS2+ with AN521 configuration I see that the baud rate on the UART appears wrong when running the tests. mcuboot produces correct messages at 115200 bps, as does the normal ConfigRegression* tests, but the ConfigPsaApiTest* appears to produce just garbage. Is there a setting I need to set to get any useful data on the terminal when running the ConfigPsaApiTests? Cheers, Thomas -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

5 years, 1 month

1
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2048-bit RSA Keypair generation is slow

by Raymond Ngun

Hi all, When testing the PSA API Crypto Dev API test suite, I noticed that psa_generate_key() is awfully slow when generating a 2048-bit RSA keypair and the performance is different depending on toolchain used. I've run these tests on Musca-B1 and with GCC, key generation generally completes in 25s but an armclang build requires 2.5 minutes to complete. This is more pronounced on PSoC64 where we are building for armv6m. Here, the key generation can take up to 5.5 minutes and I've seen it take even longer - I assume this is due to values returned by rng. Anybody have comments on the performance of psa_generate_key() or more specifically mbedtls_rsa_gen_key()? What can be done to help improve the performance of this software implementation? Thank you, Ray This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context

by Shreve, Erik

Thanks, The library model seems to treat the entire SPE as a single resource as it appears to lock and only allow a single entry at a time: /* This is the "Big Lock" on the secure side, to guarantee single entry * to SPE */ extern int32_t tfm_secure_lock; Is this a limitation of the current implementation or is this the envisioned design for the library model? If the latter, is there a technical/security reason why only a single entry is allowed? Or is it that no use-case to allow multiple entry has been discussed. To back up a bit, we have use cases where I would like to see the NSPE RTOS make all the scheduling decisions and further have all the secure peripheral resources be managed individually with respect to blocking threads. The IPC model seems to be built around having a scheduler in the SPM and the library model seems to preclude the ability to manage secure peripherals individually. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Mate Toth-Pal via TF-M Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 7:50 AM To: Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Hi Erik, Yes, the two working models are mutually exclusive, and the model is selected compile time, by choosing a corresponding config cmake file. I'm afraid there isn't a comprehensive specification for the Library model, like for IPC model. For examples on calling services in library model, you can have a look in the Secure Service API implementations. Look in interface/src for NS, and in the directory of the services, for example services/initial_attestation/tfm_attestation_secure_api.c for secure examples. The working model specific code parts that are in common files are (across the whole TF-M codebase) guarded by the TFM_PSA_API define: #ifdef TFM_PSA_API /* IPC model implementation */ #else /* TFM_PSA_API */ /* Library model implementation */ #endif /* TFM_PSA_API */ If a source file is IPC model specific it has 'ipc' in its name, or is in a directory called 'ipc'. Library model specific files have 'func' in their name. Regards, Mate From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 1:34 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Mate, Thanks for providing your time to respond. Understanding there are two models in play helps a lot. A few follow up questions... Can you confirm that the models are mutually exclusive? This page indicates to me that they are mutually exclusive: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… Or are there provisions to allow a system to run both models on the _same_ execution node? For example running both on the same v7 or v8 with TrustZone core. If there are provisions for this, where can I go to get a better understanding of them? Also, is there any spec for the library model beyond the API descriptions in the CMSIS documentation (https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/Core/html/using_TrustZone_pg.html#RT… If not, then I'll rely on reading the existing code. Please feel free to point me more documentation if I can get answers there. (I don't mind a friendly "read the manual" or "run this example code.") Thanks again for your time. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Mate Toth-Pal via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 2:34 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Hi Erik, Your mail contains quite a few questions. I'll try to give an overview in the topic you are asking, hoping that it is going to answer most (hopefully all) questions. If there is anything left unanswered, please follow up. So currently TF-M supports two working model: IPC model, and Library model. Library model has no scheduling on the secure side, secure services are called like normal functions. The IPC model contains a simple scheduler. (IPC model is an implementation of the PSA Firmware Framework for M (PSA-FF-M): https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/pdf/PlatformSecurityArchitecture/Ar… ) In this model, all the secure partitions have a runtime context associated with them. They have a separate stack, and their runtime state is saved when they are not scheduled by the Secure scheduler. This means that the number of secure contexts is determined compile time. 'Cooperative Scheduling Rules' document is a proposal of how a Non-Secure and a Secure scheduler should work together, to efficiently handle secure and non-secure asynchronous events. Currently The Secure scheduler has no knowledge of the state of the NS scheduler, and vice-versa. There is a roadmap item 'Scheduler - Initial Support' (currently without deadline) at https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/planning/ which refers to this. The RTOS Thread Context Management API implementation had been added to TF-M, to support a feature called TF-M Non-Secure client identification. It is used by the /** * \brief Stores caller's client id in state context */ void tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler(const uint32_t svc_args[]); API that is available for the secure services. Through this API secure services can distinguish Non-Secure clients. TF-M manages a database of clients reported by the Non secure software (through the TZ_*APIs), and also tracks the ID of the currently active client. That client ID is returned by 'tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler' (in case the Secure Service was called from Non-Secure code) Please note that the 'tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler' API is only supported in Library model. The TZ_* APIs are implemented in the NSPM module: secure_fw/core/tfm_nspm_func.c. The IPC model's implementation of the NSPM module is empty: secure_fw/core/tfm_nspm_ipc.c The original idea behind the RTOS Thread Context Management API is that the Secure context creation (allocating stack, and other supporting data structures) and destruction is initiated from the Non-Secure code. The number of active secure contexts is decided by the NS code in run time (of course if there is no more resource, the context creation fails). On scheduling, the non-secure SW notifies the secure code, to activate the context for the thread to be scheduled. This results in setting the secure stack pointer to the desired context (hence the "prepare"). After the NS Scheduler returns to the thread, the Secure or the Non-Secure code continues execution, depending on whether Secure, or Non-Secure execution had been interrupted by the NS scheduling. Neither the single secure context design of the library model, and the above described design of the IPC model supports this approach, and that's why the semantics of the APIs in TF-M are different in TF-M. Regards, Mate From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 3:07 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Hello everyone, I'm new to the list. Quick introduction: I work at Texas Instruments and I'm investigating TFM for use in some of our platforms here. I'm trying to understand the scheduling and task architecture for PSA and the TFM implementation and how that intersects with NS tasks. I found the following: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/Core/html/group__context__trustzone_… The existing TFM implementation doesn't seem to do much with the tz_context interface. It looks like it tracks which NS client is active, but I don't see where it uses that information to do anything. Am I missing something? I'd like to understand more about where TFM is going with the tz_context interface. Will there be a tz_context focused scheduler? I can imagine one where the SPM associates NS clients with running Secure Partitions and resumes execution of a running a Secure Partition when the NS RTOS indicates the NS client is "active." But it isn't clear to me if this is the direction or not. I note that the text for TZ_LoadContext_S says "**Prepare** the secure context for execution so that a thread in the non-secure state can call secure library modules." Preparing sounds different than immediate execution. Are there other documents I can read or source implementations I can reference to get more of a handle on this? Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments

5 years, 1 month

2
1
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context

by Mate Toth-Pal

Hi Erik, Yes, the two working models are mutually exclusive, and the model is selected compile time, by choosing a corresponding config cmake file. I'm afraid there isn't a comprehensive specification for the Library model, like for IPC model. For examples on calling services in library model, you can have a look in the Secure Service API implementations. Look in interface/src for NS, and in the directory of the services, for example services/initial_attestation/tfm_attestation_secure_api.c for secure examples. The working model specific code parts that are in common files are (across the whole TF-M codebase) guarded by the TFM_PSA_API define: #ifdef TFM_PSA_API /* IPC model implementation */ #else /* TFM_PSA_API */ /* Library model implementation */ #endif /* TFM_PSA_API */ If a source file is IPC model specific it has 'ipc' in its name, or is in a directory called 'ipc'. Library model specific files have 'func' in their name. Regards, Mate From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: Friday, March 13, 2020 1:34 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Mate, Thanks for providing your time to respond. Understanding there are two models in play helps a lot. A few follow up questions... Can you confirm that the models are mutually exclusive? This page indicates to me that they are mutually exclusive: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… Or are there provisions to allow a system to run both models on the _same_ execution node? For example running both on the same v7 or v8 with TrustZone core. If there are provisions for this, where can I go to get a better understanding of them? Also, is there any spec for the library model beyond the API descriptions in the CMSIS documentation (https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/Core/html/using_TrustZone_pg.html#RT… If not, then I'll rely on reading the existing code. Please feel free to point me more documentation if I can get answers there. (I don't mind a friendly "read the manual" or "run this example code.") Thanks again for your time. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Mate Toth-Pal via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 2:34 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Hi Erik, Your mail contains quite a few questions. I'll try to give an overview in the topic you are asking, hoping that it is going to answer most (hopefully all) questions. If there is anything left unanswered, please follow up. So currently TF-M supports two working model: IPC model, and Library model. Library model has no scheduling on the secure side, secure services are called like normal functions. The IPC model contains a simple scheduler. (IPC model is an implementation of the PSA Firmware Framework for M (PSA-FF-M): https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/pdf/PlatformSecurityArchitecture/Ar… ) In this model, all the secure partitions have a runtime context associated with them. They have a separate stack, and their runtime state is saved when they are not scheduled by the Secure scheduler. This means that the number of secure contexts is determined compile time. 'Cooperative Scheduling Rules' document is a proposal of how a Non-Secure and a Secure scheduler should work together, to efficiently handle secure and non-secure asynchronous events. Currently The Secure scheduler has no knowledge of the state of the NS scheduler, and vice-versa. There is a roadmap item 'Scheduler - Initial Support' (currently without deadline) at https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/planning/ which refers to this. The RTOS Thread Context Management API implementation had been added to TF-M, to support a feature called TF-M Non-Secure client identification. It is used by the /** * \brief Stores caller's client id in state context */ void tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler(const uint32_t svc_args[]); API that is available for the secure services. Through this API secure services can distinguish Non-Secure clients. TF-M manages a database of clients reported by the Non secure software (through the TZ_*APIs), and also tracks the ID of the currently active client. That client ID is returned by 'tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler' (in case the Secure Service was called from Non-Secure code) Please note that the 'tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler' API is only supported in Library model. The TZ_* APIs are implemented in the NSPM module: secure_fw/core/tfm_nspm_func.c. The IPC model's implementation of the NSPM module is empty: secure_fw/core/tfm_nspm_ipc.c The original idea behind the RTOS Thread Context Management API is that the Secure context creation (allocating stack, and other supporting data structures) and destruction is initiated from the Non-Secure code. The number of active secure contexts is decided by the NS code in run time (of course if there is no more resource, the context creation fails). On scheduling, the non-secure SW notifies the secure code, to activate the context for the thread to be scheduled. This results in setting the secure stack pointer to the desired context (hence the "prepare"). After the NS Scheduler returns to the thread, the Secure or the Non-Secure code continues execution, depending on whether Secure, or Non-Secure execution had been interrupted by the NS scheduling. Neither the single secure context design of the library model, and the above described design of the IPC model supports this approach, and that's why the semantics of the APIs in TF-M are different in TF-M. Regards, Mate From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 3:07 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Hello everyone, I'm new to the list. Quick introduction: I work at Texas Instruments and I'm investigating TFM for use in some of our platforms here. I'm trying to understand the scheduling and task architecture for PSA and the TFM implementation and how that intersects with NS tasks. I found the following: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/Core/html/group__context__trustzone_… The existing TFM implementation doesn't seem to do much with the tz_context interface. It looks like it tracks which NS client is active, but I don't see where it uses that information to do anything. Am I missing something? I'd like to understand more about where TFM is going with the tz_context interface. Will there be a tz_context focused scheduler? I can imagine one where the SPM associates NS clients with running Secure Partitions and resumes execution of a running a Secure Partition when the NS RTOS indicates the NS client is "active." But it isn't clear to me if this is the direction or not. I note that the text for TZ_LoadContext_S says "**Prepare** the secure context for execution so that a thread in the non-secure state can call secure library modules." Preparing sounds different than immediate execution. Are there other documents I can read or source implementations I can reference to get more of a handle on this? Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context

by Shreve, Erik

Mate, Thanks for providing your time to respond. Understanding there are two models in play helps a lot. A few follow up questions... Can you confirm that the models are mutually exclusive? This page indicates to me that they are mutually exclusive: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… Or are there provisions to allow a system to run both models on the _same_ execution node? For example running both on the same v7 or v8 with TrustZone core. If there are provisions for this, where can I go to get a better understanding of them? Also, is there any spec for the library model beyond the API descriptions in the CMSIS documentation (https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/Core/html/using_TrustZone_pg.html#RT… If not, then I'll rely on reading the existing code. Please feel free to point me more documentation if I can get answers there. (I don't mind a friendly "read the manual" or "run this example code.") Thanks again for your time. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Mate Toth-Pal via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 2:34 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Hi Erik, Your mail contains quite a few questions. I'll try to give an overview in the topic you are asking, hoping that it is going to answer most (hopefully all) questions. If there is anything left unanswered, please follow up. So currently TF-M supports two working model: IPC model, and Library model. Library model has no scheduling on the secure side, secure services are called like normal functions. The IPC model contains a simple scheduler. (IPC model is an implementation of the PSA Firmware Framework for M (PSA-FF-M): https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/pdf/PlatformSecurityArchitecture/Ar… ) In this model, all the secure partitions have a runtime context associated with them. They have a separate stack, and their runtime state is saved when they are not scheduled by the Secure scheduler. This means that the number of secure contexts is determined compile time. 'Cooperative Scheduling Rules' document is a proposal of how a Non-Secure and a Secure scheduler should work together, to efficiently handle secure and non-secure asynchronous events. Currently The Secure scheduler has no knowledge of the state of the NS scheduler, and vice-versa. There is a roadmap item 'Scheduler - Initial Support' (currently without deadline) at https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/planning/ which refers to this. The RTOS Thread Context Management API implementation had been added to TF-M, to support a feature called TF-M Non-Secure client identification. It is used by the /** * \brief Stores caller's client id in state context */ void tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler(const uint32_t svc_args[]); API that is available for the secure services. Through this API secure services can distinguish Non-Secure clients. TF-M manages a database of clients reported by the Non secure software (through the TZ_*APIs), and also tracks the ID of the currently active client. That client ID is returned by 'tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler' (in case the Secure Service was called from Non-Secure code) Please note that the 'tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler' API is only supported in Library model. The TZ_* APIs are implemented in the NSPM module: secure_fw/core/tfm_nspm_func.c. The IPC model's implementation of the NSPM module is empty: secure_fw/core/tfm_nspm_ipc.c The original idea behind the RTOS Thread Context Management API is that the Secure context creation (allocating stack, and other supporting data structures) and destruction is initiated from the Non-Secure code. The number of active secure contexts is decided by the NS code in run time (of course if there is no more resource, the context creation fails). On scheduling, the non-secure SW notifies the secure code, to activate the context for the thread to be scheduled. This results in setting the secure stack pointer to the desired context (hence the "prepare"). After the NS Scheduler returns to the thread, the Secure or the Non-Secure code continues execution, depending on whether Secure, or Non-Secure execution had been interrupted by the NS scheduling. Neither the single secure context design of the library model, and the above described design of the IPC model supports this approach, and that's why the semantics of the APIs in TF-M are different in TF-M. Regards, Mate From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 3:07 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Hello everyone, I'm new to the list. Quick introduction: I work at Texas Instruments and I'm investigating TFM for use in some of our platforms here. I'm trying to understand the scheduling and task architecture for PSA and the TFM implementation and how that intersects with NS tasks. I found the following: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/Core/html/group__context__trustzone_… The existing TFM implementation doesn't seem to do much with the tz_context interface. It looks like it tracks which NS client is active, but I don't see where it uses that information to do anything. Am I missing something? I'd like to understand more about where TFM is going with the tz_context interface. Will there be a tz_context focused scheduler? I can imagine one where the SPM associates NS clients with running Secure Partitions and resumes execution of a running a Secure Partition when the NS RTOS indicates the NS client is "active." But it isn't clear to me if this is the direction or not. I note that the text for TZ_LoadContext_S says "**Prepare** the secure context for execution so that a thread in the non-secure state can call secure library modules." Preparing sounds different than immediate execution. Are there other documents I can read or source implementations I can reference to get more of a handle on this? Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context

by Mate Toth-Pal

Hi Erik, Your mail contains quite a few questions. I'll try to give an overview in the topic you are asking, hoping that it is going to answer most (hopefully all) questions. If there is anything left unanswered, please follow up. So currently TF-M supports two working model: IPC model, and Library model. Library model has no scheduling on the secure side, secure services are called like normal functions. The IPC model contains a simple scheduler. (IPC model is an implementation of the PSA Firmware Framework for M (PSA-FF-M): https://developer.arm.com/-/media/Files/pdf/PlatformSecurityArchitecture/Ar… ) In this model, all the secure partitions have a runtime context associated with them. They have a separate stack, and their runtime state is saved when they are not scheduled by the Secure scheduler. This means that the number of secure contexts is determined compile time. 'Cooperative Scheduling Rules' document is a proposal of how a Non-Secure and a Secure scheduler should work together, to efficiently handle secure and non-secure asynchronous events. Currently The Secure scheduler has no knowledge of the state of the NS scheduler, and vice-versa. There is a roadmap item 'Scheduler - Initial Support' (currently without deadline) at https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/planning/ which refers to this. The RTOS Thread Context Management API implementation had been added to TF-M, to support a feature called TF-M Non-Secure client identification. It is used by the /** * \brief Stores caller's client id in state context */ void tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler(const uint32_t svc_args[]); API that is available for the secure services. Through this API secure services can distinguish Non-Secure clients. TF-M manages a database of clients reported by the Non secure software (through the TZ_*APIs), and also tracks the ID of the currently active client. That client ID is returned by 'tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler' (in case the Secure Service was called from Non-Secure code) Please note that the 'tfm_core_get_caller_client_id_handler' API is only supported in Library model. The TZ_* APIs are implemented in the NSPM module: secure_fw/core/tfm_nspm_func.c. The IPC model's implementation of the NSPM module is empty: secure_fw/core/tfm_nspm_ipc.c The original idea behind the RTOS Thread Context Management API is that the Secure context creation (allocating stack, and other supporting data structures) and destruction is initiated from the Non-Secure code. The number of active secure contexts is decided by the NS code in run time (of course if there is no more resource, the context creation fails). On scheduling, the non-secure SW notifies the secure code, to activate the context for the thread to be scheduled. This results in setting the secure stack pointer to the desired context (hence the "prepare"). After the NS Scheduler returns to the thread, the Secure or the Non-Secure code continues execution, depending on whether Secure, or Non-Secure execution had been interrupted by the NS scheduling. Neither the single secure context design of the library model, and the above described design of the IPC model supports this approach, and that's why the semantics of the APIs in TF-M are different in TF-M. Regards, Mate From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shreve, Erik via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 3:07 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context Hello everyone, I'm new to the list. Quick introduction: I work at Texas Instruments and I'm investigating TFM for use in some of our platforms here. I'm trying to understand the scheduling and task architecture for PSA and the TFM implementation and how that intersects with NS tasks. I found the following: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/Core/html/group__context__trustzone_… The existing TFM implementation doesn't seem to do much with the tz_context interface. It looks like it tracks which NS client is active, but I don't see where it uses that information to do anything. Am I missing something? I'd like to understand more about where TFM is going with the tz_context interface. Will there be a tz_context focused scheduler? I can imagine one where the SPM associates NS clients with running Secure Partitions and resumes execution of a running a Secure Partition when the NS RTOS indicates the NS client is "active." But it isn't clear to me if this is the direction or not. I note that the text for TZ_LoadContext_S says "**Prepare** the secure context for execution so that a thread in the non-secure state can call secure library modules." Preparing sounds different than immediate execution. Are there other documents I can read or source implementations I can reference to get more of a handle on this? Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] NS DATA Linker file

by Mate Toth-Pal

Hi Andrej, You seem to be right. In the current platforms NS_DATA_SIZE is defined as either of the following: * #define NS_DATA_SIZE (TOTAL_RAM_SIZE - S_DATA_SIZE) * #define NS_DATA_SIZE (TOTAL_RAM_SIZE / 2) Which means NS_DATA_SIZE Is the maximum available RAM for the NS Software. So the maximum available size of the RW and ZI data is decreased by the amounts you enumerate in your mail. I created a task to fix this: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T687 Thanks, Mate From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 12, 2020 9:23 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] NS DATA Linker file Hello, It looks like there is a mistake for ER_DATA region in the NS armclang linker file. ... ER_DATA NS_DATA_START NS_DATA_SIZE { * (+ZI +RW) } /* MSP */ ARM_LIB_STACK_MSP +0 ALIGN 32 EMPTY NS_MSP_STACK_SIZE { } /* PSP */ ARM_LIB_STACK +0 ALIGN 32 EMPTY NS_PSP_STACK_SIZE { } ARM_LIB_HEAP +0 ALIGN 8 EMPTY NS_HEAP_SIZE { } ... ER_DATA does not take into account the NS_MSP_STACK_SIZE+NS_PSP_STACK_SIZE+EMPTY NS_HEAP_SIZE size: #define NS_DATA_SIZE (TOTAL_RAM_SIZE - S_DATA_SIZE) Guess, the NS linker file should be: ... ER_DATA NS_DATA_START NS_DATA_SIZE-NS_MSP_STACK_SIZE-NS_PSP_STACK_SIZE-EMPTY NS_HEAP_SIZE { * (+ZI +RW) } ... Or, did I miss something? Thank you, Andrej Butok

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] PSA Test Suite - Attestation test

by Andrej Butok

Hi Tamas, I have noticed today, that the PSA test suite has done several merges to its master branch. Based the PSA test-suit readme, it has switched to newer versions of the PSA API. Should we try to update or better to wait for a right signal from the TFM team? Thanks, Andrej From: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com<mailto:Tamas.Ban@arm.com>> Sent: Thursday, February 6, 2020 2:09 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com<mailto:andrey.butok@nxp.com>> Subject: RE: PSA Test Suite - Attestation test Hi Andrej, The v19.08_TBSA0.9 version of psa-arch test suite is aligned with current TF-M master. I have executed the test suite and found that unfortunately the attestation test suite is currently broken: * It was introduced by the QCBOR library update in https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/2679/6<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…> * Currently there is a misalignment between psa-arch and tf-m in terms of QCBOR version. psa-arch still relies on older version of QCBOR. * The version mismatch lead some parsing error in CBOR that is the reason why the test suite is failing. * Other issue is that v19.08_TBSA0.9 version of psa-arch mandates the key-id in unprotected COSE header, however that field is optional according to the standard. In TF-M the inclusion of key-id was bind to ATTEST_INCLUDE_TEST_CODE_AND_KEY_ID, which was split to two compile time switch (https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3147<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…>) ATTEST_INCLUDE_COSE_KEY_ID and ATTEST_ INCLUDE_TEST_CODE. Way forward: * I let the psa-arch test team to update QCBOR. * Fix will be put on master, but currently the tip of the psa-arch master is not aligned with TF-M master. They are supports different PSA API versions. * In TF-M there is a branch<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust…> where the PSA API update is happening. This branch is intended to be merged to master in Q1. Tamas From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com<mailto:andrey.butok@nxp.com>> Sent: 05 February 2020 14:21 To: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com<mailto:Tamas.Ban@arm.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: RE: PSA Test Suite - Attestation test Hi Tamas > Could you tell what was the values of these compile time switches in your test? For the previous TFM, we have used INCLUDE_TEST_CODE_AND_KEY_ID. For the current TFM it was renamed to INCLUDE_TEST_CODE. Other parameters are new, so I have tried different combinations of these parameters, but the PSA Test-Suite Attestation is still failed. > Further do you implemented the boot data sharing between bootloader and runtime firmware? It's used the TFM template code without change from tfm\platform\ext\common\template > Do you sign SPE and NPSE images together or they are signed separately? We do not use the secondary bootloader so far, so image is not signed. As the Attestation Regression tests are passed. It's good to know what combination of parameters have to be used to generate the same token as it was generated by the older TFM and accepted by the PSA Test Suite (last commit on master branch). Or the PSA Test Suite is obsolete. Thank you, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Tamas Ban via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 1:13 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] PSA Test Suite - Attestation test Hi Andrej, Could you tell what was the values of these compile time switches in your test? I assume you did the test on NXP board. Further do you implemented the boot data sharing between bootloader and runtime firmware? Do you sign SPE and NPSE images together or they are signed separately? Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 04 February 2020 17:33 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] PSA Test Suite - Attestation test Hello, After upgrade to the latest version of TFM, the Attestation test from the PSA Test Suite is failed (but the TFM Attestation regression tests are passed). What combination of configuration parameters must be used (INCLUDE_OPTIONAL_CLAIMS, INCLUDE_TEST_CODE, INCLUDE_COSE_KEY_ID, BOOT_DATA_AVAILABLE) to follow PSA Test Suite expectations? What commit of the PSA Test-suite must be used for the latest TFM? We are still on the 2019-07-25 (c80681ed7c7f3e2cbf02ded1ef2464ba2ca7ccd5) commit, which was OK with 2-month old TFM. Is the PSA Test Suite Attestation test valid for the latest TFM? Thank you, Andrej Butok IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - March 19

by Mate Toth-Pal

Hi All, I would like to give a short talk about a tool proposal to test IRQ handling in TF-M core. Regards, Mate From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 11, 2020 1:27 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - March 19 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, March 19 at 7:00-8:00 UTC. Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Best regards, Anton Komlev

5 years, 1 month

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NS DATA Linker file

by Andrej Butok

Hello, It looks like there is a mistake for ER_DATA region in the NS armclang linker file. ... ER_DATA NS_DATA_START NS_DATA_SIZE { * (+ZI +RW) } /* MSP */ ARM_LIB_STACK_MSP +0 ALIGN 32 EMPTY NS_MSP_STACK_SIZE { } /* PSP */ ARM_LIB_STACK +0 ALIGN 32 EMPTY NS_PSP_STACK_SIZE { } ARM_LIB_HEAP +0 ALIGN 8 EMPTY NS_HEAP_SIZE { } ... ER_DATA does not take into account the NS_MSP_STACK_SIZE+NS_PSP_STACK_SIZE+EMPTY NS_HEAP_SIZE size: #define NS_DATA_SIZE (TOTAL_RAM_SIZE - S_DATA_SIZE) Guess, the NS linker file should be: ... ER_DATA NS_DATA_START NS_DATA_SIZE-NS_MSP_STACK_SIZE-NS_PSP_STACK_SIZE-EMPTY NS_HEAP_SIZE { * (+ZI +RW) } ... Or, did I miss something? Thank you, Andrej Butok

5 years, 1 month

1
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Cooperative Scheduling Rules and CMSIS tz_context

by Shreve, Erik

Hello everyone, I'm new to the list. Quick introduction: I work at Texas Instruments and I'm investigating TFM for use in some of our platforms here. I'm trying to understand the scheduling and task architecture for PSA and the TFM implementation and how that intersects with NS tasks. I found the following: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/Core/html/group__context__trustzone_… The existing TFM implementation doesn't seem to do much with the tz_context interface. It looks like it tracks which NS client is active, but I don't see where it uses that information to do anything. Am I missing something? I'd like to understand more about where TFM is going with the tz_context interface. Will there be a tz_context focused scheduler? I can imagine one where the SPM associates NS clients with running Secure Partitions and resumes execution of a running a Secure Partition when the NS RTOS indicates the NS client is "active." But it isn't clear to me if this is the direction or not. I note that the text for TZ_LoadContext_S says "**Prepare** the secure context for execution so that a thread in the non-secure state can call secure library modules." Preparing sounds different than immediate execution. Are there other documents I can read or source implementations I can reference to get more of a handle on this? Thanks, Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) Texas Instruments

5 years, 1 month

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TF-M Technical Forum call - March 19

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, March 19 at 7:00-8:00 UTC. Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Best regards, Anton Komlev

5 years, 1 month

1
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Re: [TF-M] Product Lifecycle Management: TF-M + Non-Secure Application

by Tamas Ban

Hi, TF-M version information is carried by manifest data, which is appended to the image in a post build step (at image signing): * Image header: Contains image actual version: 1.0.0 * Image TLV (footer): Can contains a dependency TLV entry which refers to the dependent image by an ID and its minimum version. Dependency verification: * At boot time the bootloader checks whether the dependency would be satisfies after a software upgrade. If not then it deny the update. * https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/user_guide… At runtime there is no API to get the image version or its capability. Did I answer your question? Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Reinhard Keil via TF-M Sent: 09 March 2020 09:45 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Product Lifecycle Management: TF-M + Non-Secure Application Hi, How does TF-M consider Product Lifecycle Management (PLM)? Assuming the following scenario where TF-M and Non-Secure Application are independently developed/updated in a deployed system: * TF-M is delivered i.e. by a silicon vendor in a pre-configured variant and Non-Secure Application starts to use this configuration. * During PLM there is a decision to update/upgrade/downgrade TF-M. The new image is pushed to deployed devices independent of Non_Secure application. Questions that I have: * Is there a way for the Non-Secure application to identify the functionality available in TF-M? * How is it ensured that new TF-M versions are compatible with previous versions? Reinhard

5 years, 1 month

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TrustZone initialisation procedure

by Reinhard Keil

Abhishek, A few days, I posted the reasons why MPC/PPC should not be used for level 3 isolation. Did you had a chance to read that? MPC/PPC implement system wide isolation. IMHO, reprogramming it for level 3 isolation should be not considered as it creates various problems for the system designer. You did also ask, how to ensure that security is actually enabled, basically if security has been initalized. The best approach would be to check if the SAU->CTRL is correctly set; if not the system should shut down. Reinhard

5 years, 1 month

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Product Lifecycle Management: TF-M + Non-Secure Application

by Reinhard Keil

Hi, How does TF-M consider Product Lifecycle Management (PLM)? Assuming the following scenario where TF-M and Non-Secure Application are independently developed/updated in a deployed system: * TF-M is delivered i.e. by a silicon vendor in a pre-configured variant and Non-Secure Application starts to use this configuration. * During PLM there is a decision to update/upgrade/downgrade TF-M. The new image is pushed to deployed devices independent of Non_Secure application. Questions that I have: * Is there a way for the Non-Secure application to identify the functionality available in TF-M? * How is it ensured that new TF-M versions are compatible with previous versions? Reinhard

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure

by Reed Hinkel

We need to be cognizant of the target usage and user base. The vast majority of usage is v8m in which case the HAL can be simple and targeted for TrustZone. Based on what I have witnessed other than the changes required to support dual/multicore usage. Why not offer a HAL option for TrustZone and one for dual/multicore? All the best! Reed From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Abhishek Pandit via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply-To: Abhishek Pandit <Abhishek.Pandit(a)arm.com> Date: Friday, March 6, 2020 at 4:28 AM To: "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure Hi, I see this slight differently. The purpose of TF-M HAL is to abstract out specific HW dependencies from the SW framework for creating isolated secure partitions. As you can understand, various systems have differences in what components are utilized for isolation, but TF-M needs to implement a generic mechanism that works across multiple platforms. Therefore it’s important to consider what’s platform specific and what’s generic. In that sense, SAU and other system components are specific to the underlying HW hence should be part of platform implementation. Of course, it is possible to implement a unified HAL for a family of devices, however I would still expect the hardware abstraction layer in TF-M to remain agnostic of how the HW implements/facilitates isolation of secure world. I don’t disagree with the suggestion about enhancements but they seem platform specific to me so should be discussed in that context. Thanks, Abhishek From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: 04 March 2020 03:14 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure Hi Jonatan, The enhancement of this TZ_SAU_Setup() sounds reasonable, and there are more background items to be considerate: * The SPM need to re-configure the isolation hardware dynamically under isolation level 3 while SPM scheduling, and MPC/PPC is potentially included. So I am not sure what the ‘system isolation’ mean in your mail, if you want a static initialization for all isolation settings then it will not work for SPM at least for the isolation level 3 design. If it includes the minimal security (and fundamental) setting while system booting and there are other functions to update the isolation setting later, it is do-able. * How does the parameter pass into this function? Because SPM needs to know the status of the existing isolation setting for some purposes (such as security checking), so there needs to be a way to let SPM know the isolation status. So if we do the fundamental security setup in SystemInit(), the advantage is the protection is already enabled between SystemInit() exits and SPM_Init() (There are platform init process in this stage). The cons are SPM may not check the isolation status. And if we do isolation in SPM_Init(), the advantage is SPM can know the status and the cons are Platform Init is not restricted (It could access anywhere). I would suggest not to propose the calling time strictly for this new enhanced API. I know cypress uses customized protection initialization mechanism so any ideas? BR /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Jonatan Antoni via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 11:09 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure Hi all, I am trying to align TrustZone initialisation procedure between TF-M and CMSIS. In CMSIS the approach from the early v8-M days is to have a “partition.h” file providing “TZ_SAU_Setup()” function. This function is called during low level “SystemInit()” which runs as part of the pre-main (called from ResetHandler and before running C lib init). In contrast TF-M calls “tfm_spm_hal_init_isolation_hw()” (which is similar to “TZ_SAU_Setup()” plus PPC/MPC configuration) during “tfm_core_init()” (which runs in secure “main()”). The advantage of “TZ_SAU_Setup()” is that this function is available by standard for all TrustZone devices. The shortcoming is it doesn’t cover MPC/PPC configuration, yet. Ideally we can enhance CMSIS standard to offer a “TrustZone_Setup()” function (the name is still to be defined) that does all this. That would simplify the TF-M HAL to just one single function call that should be provided by each TrustZone-Device low level init code. The final question is: When does this function need to be called? Are you aware of any reason why we should not configure the “system isolation” already during low level init (pre-main)? This could simplify TF-M code even more. In TF-M we could simply rely on a properly configured TrustZone isolation before running any TF-M code. Cheers, Jonatan Antoni Senior Engineering Manager - CMSIS [Germany on Google Android 8.0] [United Kingdom on Google Android 8.0] Arm Germany GmbH Phone: +49 (0)89 262 029 618 | Fax: +49 (0)89 456 040-19 Email: jonatan.antoni(a)arm.com<mailto:jonatan.antoni@arm.com> | Visit: www.keil.com<http://www.keil.com > | Address: Bretonischer Ring 16, 85630 Grasbrunn, Germany Sitz der Gesellschaft: Grasbrunn | Handelsregister: München (HRB 175362) | USt-IdNr.: DE 187925309 Geschäftsführer: Joachim Krech, Reinhard Keil IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

1
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Re: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure

by Abhishek Pandit

Hi, I see this slight differently. The purpose of TF-M HAL is to abstract out specific HW dependencies from the SW framework for creating isolated secure partitions. As you can understand, various systems have differences in what components are utilized for isolation, but TF-M needs to implement a generic mechanism that works across multiple platforms. Therefore it's important to consider what's platform specific and what's generic. In that sense, SAU and other system components are specific to the underlying HW hence should be part of platform implementation. Of course, it is possible to implement a unified HAL for a family of devices, however I would still expect the hardware abstraction layer in TF-M to remain agnostic of how the HW implements/facilitates isolation of secure world. I don't disagree with the suggestion about enhancements but they seem platform specific to me so should be discussed in that context. Thanks, Abhishek From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: 04 March 2020 03:14 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure Hi Jonatan, The enhancement of this TZ_SAU_Setup() sounds reasonable, and there are more background items to be considerate: * The SPM need to re-configure the isolation hardware dynamically under isolation level 3 while SPM scheduling, and MPC/PPC is potentially included. So I am not sure what the 'system isolation' mean in your mail, if you want a static initialization for all isolation settings then it will not work for SPM at least for the isolation level 3 design. If it includes the minimal security (and fundamental) setting while system booting and there are other functions to update the isolation setting later, it is do-able. * How does the parameter pass into this function? Because SPM needs to know the status of the existing isolation setting for some purposes (such as security checking), so there needs to be a way to let SPM know the isolation status. So if we do the fundamental security setup in SystemInit(), the advantage is the protection is already enabled between SystemInit() exits and SPM_Init() (There are platform init process in this stage). The cons are SPM may not check the isolation status. And if we do isolation in SPM_Init(), the advantage is SPM can know the status and the cons are Platform Init is not restricted (It could access anywhere). I would suggest not to propose the calling time strictly for this new enhanced API. I know cypress uses customized protection initialization mechanism so any ideas? BR /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Jonatan Antoni via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 11:09 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure Hi all, I am trying to align TrustZone initialisation procedure between TF-M and CMSIS. In CMSIS the approach from the early v8-M days is to have a "partition.h" file providing "TZ_SAU_Setup()" function. This function is called during low level "SystemInit()" which runs as part of the pre-main (called from ResetHandler and before running C lib init). In contrast TF-M calls "tfm_spm_hal_init_isolation_hw()" (which is similar to "TZ_SAU_Setup()" plus PPC/MPC configuration) during "tfm_core_init()" (which runs in secure "main()"). The advantage of "TZ_SAU_Setup()" is that this function is available by standard for all TrustZone devices. The shortcoming is it doesn't cover MPC/PPC configuration, yet. Ideally we can enhance CMSIS standard to offer a "TrustZone_Setup()" function (the name is still to be defined) that does all this. That would simplify the TF-M HAL to just one single function call that should be provided by each TrustZone-Device low level init code. The final question is: When does this function need to be called? Are you aware of any reason why we should not configure the "system isolation" already during low level init (pre-main)? This could simplify TF-M code even more. In TF-M we could simply rely on a properly configured TrustZone isolation before running any TF-M code. Cheers, Jonatan Antoni Senior Engineering Manager - CMSIS [Germany on Google Android 8.0] [United Kingdom on Google Android 8.0] Arm Germany GmbH Phone: +49 (0)89 262 029 618 | Fax: +49 (0)89 456 040-19 Email: jonatan.antoni(a)arm.com<mailto:jonatan.antoni@arm.com> | Visit: www.keil.com<http://www.keil.com > | Address: Bretonischer Ring 16, 85630 Grasbrunn, Germany Sitz der Gesellschaft: Grasbrunn | Handelsregister: München (HRB 175362) | USt-IdNr.: DE 187925309 Geschäftsführer: Joachim Krech, Reinhard Keil IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

1
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TF-M Profile 1 design document under review

by David Hu

Hi all, As we discussed in Tech Forum yesterday, we proposed the TF-M Profile 1 design document on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3598. Any comment, suggestion or question is welcome. We will keep updating and finalizing the document. The corresponding TF-M Profile 1 implementation patch set is also under review on https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22profile-1-config%22+(status:o…. Best regards, Hu Ziji

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] SPM_IDLE

by Ken Liu

Hi Alan, It (8.3.5) is one of the cases can be dealt with, and now it is not detail defined yet. Can you describe what your practical purpose for S/NS interactive is so that we could collect feedbacks to check if the rules are applicable? /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of DeMars, Alan via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 10:51 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] SPM_IDLE Mention is made to "SPM_IDLE" in the Cooperative Scheduling Rules document: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… I'm struggling to understand section 8.3.5 which references SPM_IDLE but doesn't really define it. Is there more info on this topic? It appears to be a proposed solution for allowing other NS threads to be scheduled while the current NS thread is waiting for an asynchronous event in the secure service it has called. Alan

5 years, 1 month

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Recent patches

by Thomas Törnblom

I have just pushed a simple one liner for tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py, which keeps the generated #include file names using unix style paths, even if the files were generated on windows. In the past I have manually fixed up the paths on the generated #include lines in some of the files, but got bored and fixed the script instead. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3605 I also pushed a major (80 files) fix last night that cleans up most of the warnings when building with the IAR toolkit, which for now has more warnings enabled than ARMCLANG and GNUARM. This should make it easier to enable "pedantic" mode with GNUARM as well. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3594 Thomas -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

5 years, 1 month

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Entry to TF-M

by Reinhard Keil

Hi, Today, I measured the call overhead on the function entry to TF-M is significant and will cause side effects for time deterministic MCU applications using the MDK debugger on STM32L5. Compiler: AC6.14 -oz (optimized for image size) TFM configuration: TFM_LVL=1, library mode, TFM_NS_CLIENT_IDENTIFICATION = OFF --- Execution time measurement: Function call of NS psa_open_key to corresponding secure function: NS: dispatch -> S: tfm_crypto_open_key 2135 cycles NS: dispatch -> S: psa_open_key 2536 cycles NS: psa_open_key -> S: psa_open_key 2825 cycles (this is with RTOS mutex overhead) tfm_core_sfn_request(const struct tfm_sfn_req_s *desc_ptr) { __ASM volatile( "PUSH {r4-r12, lr} \n" "SVC %[SVC_REQ] \n" <--- effectively disables interrupts for 1970 Cycles "MOV r4, #0 \n" On Musca (~48MHz) the overhead is 45us for a TF-M call. --- Code Size overhead: Each TFM function has the following flow: tfm_ns_interface_dispatch (this is a central function) #33 result = fn(arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3); -> calls each TF-M function with individual veneer tfm_core_partition_request (which is again central function) As function inlining is used, the each veneer requires 180 bytes. In my system there are 4 ITS and 46 Crypto functions; with the net result of ~10K code for just the veneer entries. Here are some suggestions: * Using a central entry point to TF-M could save ~10KB; I suggest a table driven approach (could be generated from "manifest" information). * In LVL1 isolation, why is it required to switch from NS: thread->S: handler->S: thread mode. Is it not possible to just call NS: thread-> S: thread? * Disabling NS interrupts for 1970 cycles will be problematic for many time critical applications that are ISR driven; some is caused by parameter checking: * current sequence: first check, then copied (which requires to disable interrupts); Better: First copy, then check could avoid ISR blocking. I hope this helps to improve TFM. Reinhard

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - March 5

by Bill Fletcher

Hi Reinhard, On Wed, 4 Mar 2020 at 15:41, Reinhard Keil via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Is there a forum call tomorrow? > Yes there is. At 0700 UTC. > > > Where can I find the dail-in information? > Clicking on the Google calendar image on https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ should take you to the invite. Regards Bill > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m > -- [image: Linaro] <http://www.linaro.org/> *Bill Fletcher* | *Field Engineering* T: +44 7833 498336 <+44+7833+498336> bill.fletcher(a)linaro.org | Skype: billfletcher2020

5 years, 1 month

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TF-M Technical Forum call - March 5

by Reinhard Keil

Is there a forum call tomorrow? Where can I find the dail-in information?

5 years, 1 month

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Questions on TFM_NS_CLIENT_IDENTIFICATION

by Reinhard Keil

TFM_NS_CLIENT_IDENTIFICATION seems to be a feature of the v8M implementation only. Is this correct? Is this feature explained somewhere? As it is disabled in the implementation that I'm using, would it be possible to complete the removal of code that implements it? Thanks Reinhard ti

5 years, 1 month

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SPM_IDLE

by DeMars, Alan

Mention is made to "SPM_IDLE" in the Cooperative Scheduling Rules document: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… I'm struggling to understand section 8.3.5 which references SPM_IDLE but doesn't really define it. Is there more info on this topic? It appears to be a proposed solution for allowing other NS threads to be scheduled while the current NS thread is waiting for an asynchronous event in the secure service it has called. Alan

5 years, 1 month

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memcpy variants

by Reinhard Keil

Just some minor observation: There are various variants of memory functions in tfm core * tfm_memory_utils.h defines a set of identical functions * tfm_core_utils.c/h has another set - functional equivalent with the C run-time library Why are these functions duplicated? It would be Ok if they address some additional security concerns (that I currently don't understand). But todays implementation just add complexity. Reinhard

5 years, 1 month

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TrustZone initialisation procedure

by Reinhard Keil

Hi Ken, Hi Jonatan, Here is how I see it: * PPC, MPC control system wide the access rights; DMA and other bus masters cannot bypass * SAU controls the access rights on the Processing Element * MPU controls the access rights within a execution domain (secure, non-secure) The setup for TF-M should be: * Isolation Level 1: static SAU, PPC, MPC setup * Isolation Level 2: adds static MPU setup (for privilege, non-privilege separation - could be reflected in PPC, MPC when it is supported by the device) * Isolation Level 3: dynamic MPU setup (depending on the service executed) Changing PPC, MPC setup dynamically does not make sense, as in most devices DMA could bypass TF-M. If this schema is acceptable, TF-M could always assume correct setup of Isolation level 1. A static #define could reflect that. If you think it should be different, please explain why a different schema would add further security to the overall system. Reinhard

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure

by Ken Liu

Hi Jonatan, The enhancement of this TZ_SAU_Setup() sounds reasonable, and there are more background items to be considerate: * The SPM need to re-configure the isolation hardware dynamically under isolation level 3 while SPM scheduling, and MPC/PPC is potentially included. So I am not sure what the 'system isolation' mean in your mail, if you want a static initialization for all isolation settings then it will not work for SPM at least for the isolation level 3 design. If it includes the minimal security (and fundamental) setting while system booting and there are other functions to update the isolation setting later, it is do-able. * How does the parameter pass into this function? Because SPM needs to know the status of the existing isolation setting for some purposes (such as security checking), so there needs to be a way to let SPM know the isolation status. So if we do the fundamental security setup in SystemInit(), the advantage is the protection is already enabled between SystemInit() exits and SPM_Init() (There are platform init process in this stage). The cons are SPM may not check the isolation status. And if we do isolation in SPM_Init(), the advantage is SPM can know the status and the cons are Platform Init is not restricted (It could access anywhere). I would suggest not to propose the calling time strictly for this new enhanced API. I know cypress uses customized protection initialization mechanism so any ideas? BR /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Jonatan Antoni via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 11:09 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] TrustZone initialisation procedure Hi all, I am trying to align TrustZone initialisation procedure between TF-M and CMSIS. In CMSIS the approach from the early v8-M days is to have a "partition.h" file providing "TZ_SAU_Setup()" function. This function is called during low level "SystemInit()" which runs as part of the pre-main (called from ResetHandler and before running C lib init). In contrast TF-M calls "tfm_spm_hal_init_isolation_hw()" (which is similar to "TZ_SAU_Setup()" plus PPC/MPC configuration) during "tfm_core_init()" (which runs in secure "main()"). The advantage of "TZ_SAU_Setup()" is that this function is available by standard for all TrustZone devices. The shortcoming is it doesn't cover MPC/PPC configuration, yet. Ideally we can enhance CMSIS standard to offer a "TrustZone_Setup()" function (the name is still to be defined) that does all this. That would simplify the TF-M HAL to just one single function call that should be provided by each TrustZone-Device low level init code. The final question is: When does this function need to be called? Are you aware of any reason why we should not configure the "system isolation" already during low level init (pre-main)? This could simplify TF-M code even more. In TF-M we could simply rely on a properly configured TrustZone isolation before running any TF-M code. Cheers, Jonatan Antoni Senior Engineering Manager - CMSIS [Germany on Google Android 8.0] [United Kingdom on Google Android 8.0] Arm Germany GmbH Phone: +49 (0)89 262 029 618 | Fax: +49 (0)89 456 040-19 Email: jonatan.antoni(a)arm.com<mailto:jonatan.antoni@arm.com> | Visit: www.keil.com<http://www.keil.com > | Address: Bretonischer Ring 16, 85630 Grasbrunn, Germany Sitz der Gesellschaft: Grasbrunn | Handelsregister: München (HRB 175362) | USt-IdNr.: DE 187925309 Geschäftsführer: Joachim Krech, Reinhard Keil IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

1
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TrustZone initialisation procedure

by Jonatan Antoni

Hi all, I am trying to align TrustZone initialisation procedure between TF-M and CMSIS. In CMSIS the approach from the early v8-M days is to have a "partition.h" file providing "TZ_SAU_Setup()" function. This function is called during low level "SystemInit()" which runs as part of the pre-main (called from ResetHandler and before running C lib init). In contrast TF-M calls "tfm_spm_hal_init_isolation_hw()" (which is similar to "TZ_SAU_Setup()" plus PPC/MPC configuration) during "tfm_core_init()" (which runs in secure "main()"). The advantage of "TZ_SAU_Setup()" is that this function is available by standard for all TrustZone devices. The shortcoming is it doesn't cover MPC/PPC configuration, yet. Ideally we can enhance CMSIS standard to offer a "TrustZone_Setup()" function (the name is still to be defined) that does all this. That would simplify the TF-M HAL to just one single function call that should be provided by each TrustZone-Device low level init code. The final question is: When does this function need to be called? Are you aware of any reason why we should not configure the "system isolation" already during low level init (pre-main)? This could simplify TF-M code even more. In TF-M we could simply rely on a properly configured TrustZone isolation before running any TF-M code. Cheers, Jonatan Antoni Senior Engineering Manager - CMSIS [Germany on Google Android 8.0] [United Kingdom on Google Android 8.0] Arm Germany GmbH Phone: +49 (0)89 262 029 618 | Fax: +49 (0)89 456 040-19 Email: jonatan.antoni(a)arm.com<mailto:jonatan.antoni@arm.com> | Visit: www.keil.com<http://www.keil.com > | Address: Bretonischer Ring 16, 85630 Grasbrunn, Germany Sitz der Gesellschaft: Grasbrunn | Handelsregister: München (HRB 175362) | USt-IdNr.: DE 187925309 Geschäftsführer: Joachim Krech, Reinhard Keil IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience

by Andrej Butok

Hi Anton, > I am not sure if TF-M requires add/remove files Not physically, but in scope of a project. This is the fact from very beginning. > With this occasion let me remind that TF-M is an open source project where design proposal or code change are welcome from everyone. Yes, but it should be approved and pushed by leaders, otherwise it will not work, and the main leading force of PSA projects is ARM. After that, the approach should be followed by every committer. Thank you, Andrej From: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Sent: Tuesday, March 3, 2020 3:24 PM To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience Hi Andrej, Thank you for your feedback! I am not sure if TF-M requires add/remove files for config change but have to agree that build system requires review and refactoring to be less restrictive and easy for integration. This is a valuable input for us for improvement planning and task prioritizing. With this occasion let me remind that TF-M is an open source project where design proposal or code change are welcome from everyone. Thanks again, Anton From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com<mailto:andrey.butok@nxp.com>> Sent: 03 March 2020 13:31 To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: RE: Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience Hi Anton, The biggest inconvenience for us is the way which TFM is using CMAKE. The configuration is done on level of CMAKE - adding/deleting/renaming files based on project-level configuration. So it is difficult to use the original TFM as a component, required for SDKs and CMSIS packs. For every combination of parameters is needed to create a separate project. As it is not possible, we have to choose one typical configuration. For example, if a user need to change from Isolation2&IPC to Isolation1&Lib, it is not enough to change configuration parameters, he/she must manually to add/delete source files in the project. The improvement request: - platform-independent TFM source-code file set must be fixed for any TFM project. - optional functionality must be covered by #ifdef - NOT by adding/deleting files. - allow to change configuration parameters using a user-config file (e.g. as it's done for mbedTLS/Cypto). All these has no conflict with CMAKE and brings no limits to TFM. Please, do not ignore it. Thank you, Andrej Butok From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Friday, February 7, 2020 2:13 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience Dear All, As I mentioned on yesterday's call, there is a concern on user experience related to TF-M use. To In order to understand and potentially improve it I am looking for a voice of partners who adopted TF-M project. Please share your experience and thoughts on parts which are good or might be done better to simplify TF-M integration with your project. You feedback will be very appreciated in any form - as a response to this mail or as a direct mail to me (anton.komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:anton.komlev@arm.com>) if it's more comfortable for you. Thank you in advance, Anton

5 years, 1 month

1
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Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed

by Soby Mathew

On 02/03/2020 12:00, Andrej Butok via TF-M wrote: > Hi, > > So, I have submitted the mbedCryptoï¿½ issue > https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/380 > > Several missed functions were implemented in the latest mbedCrypto. > Please read the comment. Hi Andrej, I will try to answer some of the questions. TF-M currently uses 3.0.1 tag of mbed-crypto and it has all the functions implemented in that version. We certainly need to be able to migrate to newer versions of mbed-crypto quicker and more easily. This is one of the things I will be looking into as part of the improving the crypto service implementation in TF-M. My current thoughts are that once mbed-crypto implements more of the other PSA crypto APIs, we could sync up TF-M to expose those APIs. > > They also need clarification about the PSA failed test: > > 1)ï¿½psa_asymmetric_encrypt does not have support for ECC keysï¿½ ï¿½ that's > true, the specification currently does not define any algorithm for > psa_asymmetric_encryptï¿½that uses ECC keys. What's the problem there? The PSA-ACK test need to fix this. I will highlight this issue to them. > 2) For the incorrect key derivation error codes, what are the > problematic inputs? There is an issue raised with mbed-crypto team discussing this issue here : https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/175 As I understand, this needs to be fixed by mbed-crypto. > > 3) For ï¿½psa_generate_key generates incorrect key length for RSAï¿½, what > are the problematic inputs? > > Could you clarify or this is the PSA-Test-Suite task? The problematic input can be seen here : https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/blob/master/api-tests/dev_ap… This is a mismatch between the test and the crypto implementation. PSA ACK test project had been notified. I will be following up with them. > > BTW: > > 1) ï¿½mbedCrypto does not use the PSA test suite for testing (they have > own tests). Yes, that is true. > > 2) PSA Test Suite does not inform mbedCrypto about found PSA issues. There is some communication as seen by the issues referenced above, but can be better > > 3) TFM updates to the latest mbedCrypto have to be more often (ideally > after each mbedCrypto release). > > 4) Better synchronization between the PSA Projects is needed. > Yes, certainly. Although syncing to every mbed-crypto release is too much of an overhead for TF-M and the current plan is to sync up once mbed-crypto has resolved a sizeable amount of unimplemented APIs. We are open to contributions in this regard. Currently, all of them are moving targets, the PSA ACK tests, TF-M, mbed-crypto and the PSA specification. The mbed-crypto is moving towards PSA 1.0 whereas the PSA-ACK tests are targeting PSA 1.0 Beta3. This creates some of the mismatches. Once the APIs have stabilized, it should be a matter of picking up the latest mbed-crypto tag and everything should work as expected. Best Regards Soby Mathew > Thanks, > > Andrej Butok > > *From:* TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> *On Behalf Of > *Andrej Butok via TF-M > *Sent:* Friday, February 28, 2020 1:20 PM > *To:* Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> > *Cc:* tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > *Subject:* Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed > > Hi Anton, > > OK. So this is the known issue. Is there any plan when it should be > implemented? > > As the test-log is used for a PSA certification, may we disable the > failed tests? > > BTW: As this is known issue, I did not notice it here > https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues?page=1&q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen… > <https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co…> > > Thanks, > > Andrej > > *From:* TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > <mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> *On Behalf Of *Anton > Komlev via TF-M > *Sent:* Friday, February 28, 2020 12:14 PM > *To:* tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Cc:* nd <nd(a)arm.com <mailto:nd@arm.com>> > *Subject:* Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed > > Hello Andrej, > > As you noted, the main reason of test failures is unimplemented PSA > functions. Those functions are directly dependent on Embed-Crypto > library where they are missed or API is not adjusted. > > Recently TF-M was upgraded Embed-Crypto library from v1.0.0 to v3.0.1 > and will continue so, increasing test suite coverage. > > Best regards, > > Anton > > *From:* TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > <mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> *On Behalf Of *Andrej > Butok via TF-M > *Sent:* 28 February 2020 09:46 > *To:* tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Subject:* [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed > > Hello, > > After update to the latest TFM and to the latest PSA-Test Suite, 23 > Crypto Tests are failed: > > ************ Crypto Suite Report ********** > > TOTAL TESTSï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ : 61 > > TOTAL PASSEDï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ : 37 > > TOTAL SIM ERROR : 0 > > TOTAL FAILEDï¿½ï¿½ï¿½ : 23 > > TOTAL SKIPPEDï¿½ï¿½ : 1 > > ****************************************** > > The main reason is that many of PSA Crypto functions are not implemented > by TFM. > > Is there a plan to fix it? > > Thanks, > > Andrej >

5 years, 1 month

3
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Re: [TF-M] Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience

by David Hu

Hi Reinhard, Do you mind describing more details about separating single core v8M from dual core v7M? Do you require more documents or some improvement on code? Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Reinhard Keil via TF-M Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 6:10 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience Hi Anton, Hi Kevin, Thanks for starting this discussion. Let me give you my view on it. I think the problem can be structured in these parts: * Give documentation a better overall structure * Clearly separate single core v8M from dual core v7M * Describe the overall structure of the files and configuration options of TF-M * Describe resource requirements of TF-M core * Describe platform interfaces and provide templates * Describe how a Service is added to TF-M * Describe the tools/utilities that are used for TF-M While the debugging aspect raised by Kevin is relevant, it is a generic problem for all v8-M projects, not just for TF-M. I'm supportive to provide tools like pyOCD, but we need proper resourcing for it (maybe a separate project). It should be also noted that the industry works typically with tools like EWARM, MDK, or vendor specific tools like STCube or MCUxpresso. Hence we should not directly add too much tool-specific information to TF-M itself. Now let me give more context to each of the above topics. ---- Give documentation a better overall structure The Trusted Firmware-M documentation starts here: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… While this is already a User's Guide, it contains two more user's guides https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… For an outsider it is unclear where to start. Clearly separate single core v8M from dual core v7M This seems to be somewhat better now as it seems that below only refers to v8M single core: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… Describe the overall structure of the files and configuration options of TF-M I was looking for something like this: https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/pDirectory_Files.html https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/config_rtx5.html Describe resource requirements of TF-M core Take a look here to understand that request https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/pHardwareRequirements.html Important is also to document the interrupt behaviour (for both the secure and non-secure side). I know that this is tricky. For RTX we have this here: https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/cre_rtx_proj.html#cre_Usi… For TF-M this depends on a lot of other parameters. Describe platform interfaces and provide templates What I mean by that are the functions itself that are called by TF_M core. This is an example of the OS_Tick interface that RTX is using. TF-M core has similar interfaces to setup MPC, PPC, SAU, etc. https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/group__CMSIS__RTOS__TickA… Describe how a Service is added to TF-M Assume I have functions currently used in NS. What would be the process to move this functions into TF-M as a service. How does the API interface change, what modifications do I need (ideally I would like to have the same API interface after it). Are the any rules for the API interface itself. You could also provide an example for that, i.e. functions that read a PIN number from an secure keypad or open a DOOR depending on a verification. I know making a good product is hard and takes time. CMSIS is not perfect either. Let me know if you have any questions. Reinhard

5 years, 1 month

2
3
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Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed

by Andrej Butok

Hi, So, I have submitted the mbedCrypto issue https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues/380 Several missed functions were implemented in the latest mbedCrypto. Please read the comment. They also need clarification about the PSA failed test: 1)"psa_asymmetric_encrypt does not have support for ECC keys" - that's true, the specification currently does not define any algorithm for psa_asymmetric_encrypt that uses ECC keys. What's the problem there? 2) For the incorrect key derivation error codes, what are the problematic inputs? 3) For "psa_generate_key generates incorrect key length for RSA", what are the problematic inputs? Could you clarify or this is the PSA-Test-Suite task? BTW: 1) mbedCrypto does not use the PSA test suite for testing (they have own tests). 2) PSA Test Suite does not inform mbedCrypto about found PSA issues. 3) TFM updates to the latest mbedCrypto have to be more often (ideally after each mbedCrypto release). 4) Better synchronization between the PSA Projects is needed. Thanks, Andrej Butok From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 1:20 PM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed Hi Anton, OK. So this is the known issue. Is there any plan when it should be implemented? As the test-log is used for a PSA certification, may we disable the failed tests? BTW: As this is known issue, I did not notice it here https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues?page=1&q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen…<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co…> Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 12:14 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed Hello Andrej, As you noted, the main reason of test failures is unimplemented PSA functions. Those functions are directly dependent on Embed-Crypto library where they are missed or API is not adjusted. Recently TF-M was upgraded Embed-Crypto library from v1.0.0 to v3.0.1 and will continue so, increasing test suite coverage. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 28 February 2020 09:46 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed Hello, After update to the latest TFM and to the latest PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests are failed: ************ Crypto Suite Report ********** TOTAL TESTS : 61 TOTAL PASSED : 37 TOTAL SIM ERROR : 0 TOTAL FAILED : 23 TOTAL SKIPPED : 1 ****************************************** The main reason is that many of PSA Crypto functions are not implemented by TFM. Is there a plan to fix it? Thanks, Andrej

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience

by Reinhard Keil

Hi Anton, Hi Kevin, Thanks for starting this discussion. Let me give you my view on it. I think the problem can be structured in these parts: * Give documentation a better overall structure * Clearly separate single core v8M from dual core v7M * Describe the overall structure of the files and configuration options of TF-M * Describe resource requirements of TF-M core * Describe platform interfaces and provide templates * Describe how a Service is added to TF-M * Describe the tools/utilities that are used for TF-M While the debugging aspect raised by Kevin is relevant, it is a generic problem for all v8-M projects, not just for TF-M. I'm supportive to provide tools like pyOCD, but we need proper resourcing for it (maybe a separate project). It should be also noted that the industry works typically with tools like EWARM, MDK, or vendor specific tools like STCube or MCUxpresso. Hence we should not directly add too much tool-specific information to TF-M itself. Now let me give more context to each of the above topics. ---- Give documentation a better overall structure The Trusted Firmware-M documentation starts here: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… While this is already a User's Guide, it contains two more user's guides https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… For an outsider it is unclear where to start. Clearly separate single core v8M from dual core v7M This seems to be somewhat better now as it seems that below only refers to v8M single core: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-m-build-test-nightly/lastSuccessfulBu… Describe the overall structure of the files and configuration options of TF-M I was looking for something like this: https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/pDirectory_Files.html https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/config_rtx5.html Describe resource requirements of TF-M core Take a look here to understand that request https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/pHardwareRequirements.html Important is also to document the interrupt behaviour (for both the secure and non-secure side). I know that this is tricky. For RTX we have this here: https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/cre_rtx_proj.html#cre_Usi… For TF-M this depends on a lot of other parameters. Describe platform interfaces and provide templates What I mean by that are the functions itself that are called by TF_M core. This is an example of the OS_Tick interface that RTX is using. TF-M core has similar interfaces to setup MPC, PPC, SAU, etc. https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS_5/RTOS2/html/group__CMSIS__RTOS__TickA… Describe how a Service is added to TF-M Assume I have functions currently used in NS. What would be the process to move this functions into TF-M as a service. How does the API interface change, what modifications do I need (ideally I would like to have the same API interface after it). Are the any rules for the API interface itself. You could also provide an example for that, i.e. functions that read a PIN number from an secure keypad or open a DOOR depending on a verification. I know making a good product is hard and takes time. CMSIS is not perfect either. Let me know if you have any questions. Reinhard

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed

by Andrej Butok

Hi Anton, OK. So this is the known issue. Is there any plan when it should be implemented? As the test-log is used for a PSA certification, may we disable the failed tests? BTW: As this is known issue, I did not notice it here https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/issues?page=1&q=is%3Aissue+is%3Aopen… Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Friday, February 28, 2020 12:14 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed Hello Andrej, As you noted, the main reason of test failures is unimplemented PSA functions. Those functions are directly dependent on Embed-Crypto library where they are missed or API is not adjusted. Recently TF-M was upgraded Embed-Crypto library from v1.0.0 to v3.0.1 and will continue so, increasing test suite coverage. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 28 February 2020 09:46 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed Hello, After update to the latest TFM and to the latest PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests are failed: ************ Crypto Suite Report ********** TOTAL TESTS : 61 TOTAL PASSED : 37 TOTAL SIM ERROR : 0 TOTAL FAILED : 23 TOTAL SKIPPED : 1 ****************************************** The main reason is that many of PSA Crypto functions are not implemented by TFM. Is there a plan to fix it? Thanks, Andrej

5 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed

by Anton Komlev

Hello Andrej, As you noted, the main reason of test failures is unimplemented PSA functions. Those functions are directly dependent on Embed-Crypto library where they are missed or API is not adjusted. Recently TF-M was upgraded Embed-Crypto library from v1.0.0 to v3.0.1 and will continue so, increasing test suite coverage. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 28 February 2020 09:46 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed Hello, After update to the latest TFM and to the latest PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests are failed: ************ Crypto Suite Report ********** TOTAL TESTS : 61 TOTAL PASSED : 37 TOTAL SIM ERROR : 0 TOTAL FAILED : 23 TOTAL SKIPPED : 1 ****************************************** The main reason is that many of PSA Crypto functions are not implemented by TFM. Is there a plan to fix it? Thanks, Andrej

5 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-M] Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience

by Kevin Townsend

Hi Anton, One particular difficulty I've encountered working with TF-M for the Zephyr certification demo app, and with the LPC55S69 port to upstream TF-M is the debugging experience with GDB and the dual execution environments. GDB can be quite powerful if you are familiar with it, but there is a definite learning curve, and the S and NS separation and the dual binary images (three with BL2) adds an additional degree of complexity. I think having a dedicated debugging tutorial around GDB would be very useful to people adopting TF-M and perhaps new to GDB, just to show how some basic debugging might happen, how to debug across the NS/S boundary, etc. For example, the '--tui' option for GDB may not be very well known, and it may be useful to highlight (see screenshots at the bottom of this issue: https://github.com/microbuilder/trusted-firmware-m/issues/1) Practical, step-by-step debugging documentation just seems like a good investment to help flatten this inevitable learning curve developing real-world solutions with TF-M? Best regards, Kevin On Thu, 27 Feb 2020 at 13:13, Anton Komlev via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > A kind reminder. > Your feedback is valuable all the time with no deadline defined. > > > > *From:* TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> * On Behalf Of *Anton > Komlev via TF-M > *Sent:* 07 February 2020 13:13 > *To:* tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > *Cc:* nd <nd(a)arm.com> > *Subject:* [TF-M] Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience > > > > Dear All, > > > > As I mentioned on yesterday’s call, there is a concern on user experience > related to TF-M use. > > To In order to understand and potentially improve it I am looking for a > voice of partners who adopted TF-M project. > > Please share your experience and thoughts on parts which are good or might > be done better to simplify TF-M integration with your project. > > > > You feedback will be very appreciated in any form – as a response to this > mail or as a direct mail to me (anton.komlev(a)arm.com) if it’s more > comfortable for you. > > > > Thank you in advance, > > Anton > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

5 years, 2 months

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PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests failed

by Andrej Butok

Hello, After update to the latest TFM and to the latest PSA-Test Suite, 23 Crypto Tests are failed: ************ Crypto Suite Report ********** TOTAL TESTS : 61 TOTAL PASSED : 37 TOTAL SIM ERROR : 0 TOTAL FAILED : 23 TOTAL SKIPPED : 1 ****************************************** The main reason is that many of PSA Crypto functions are not implemented by TFM. Is there a plan to fix it? Thanks, Andrej

5 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - March 5

by David Hu

Hi Anton, I'd like to share about the current design and draft implementation of TF-M Profile 1. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, February 25, 2020 1:11 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - March 5 Dear All, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, March 5 at 7:00-8:00 UTC. Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Best regards, Anton Komlev

5 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-M] Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience

by Anton Komlev

A kind reminder. Your feedback is valuable all the time with no deadline defined. From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 07 February 2020 13:13 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Call for a feedback on TF-M adaptation experience Dear All, As I mentioned on yesterday's call, there is a concern on user experience related to TF-M use. To In order to understand and potentially improve it I am looking for a voice of partners who adopted TF-M project. Please share your experience and thoughts on parts which are good or might be done better to simplify TF-M integration with your project. You feedback will be very appreciated in any form - as a response to this mail or as a direct mail to me (anton.komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:anton.komlev@arm.com>) if it's more comfortable for you. Thank you in advance, Anton

5 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-M] Update Crypto, SST and Attestation services to the latest versions

by Soby Mathew

Hi Everyone The below mentioned patches have been merged to TF-M master. The Open CI is also updated to pull in the right version of mbed-crypto (3.0.1) and it should now show results as expected. You may to have rebase your existing patches currently in review if you need to run CI tests. Best Regards Soby Mathew > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Soby > Mathew via TF-M > Sent: 18 February 2020 11:38 > To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> > Subject: [TF-M] Update Crypto, SST and Attestation services to the latest > versions > > Hi Everyone, > This is a heads up that there are patches in review which update the Crypto, > SST and Attestation services to latest versions of their respective specifications : > > 1. Crypto-service migration to Mbed Crypto 3.0.1 > > The patches is available here : > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22crypto_update%22+(status:ope > n%20OR%20status:merged) > > This migrates the crypto service to the latest implementation of PSA > specification as implemented by mbed-crypto. > > 2. SST: Implement PSA Protected Storage 1.0 > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22sst-1.0- > update%22+(status:open%20OR%20status:merged) > > 3. Initial Attestation: Align interface to PSA API 1.0 > > https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/commit/?h=feature- > psa-dev-api-update&id=b8d88ce6fb7c8e7301f32ab7f6b36dd796692f98 > > and > > https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/commit/?h=feature- > psa-dev-api-update&id=12c02d16958c9dbd57a6bebe6f29b7a207355831 > > These patches are expected to be reviewed and merged back to the master in > the next couple of weeks. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years, 2 months

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TF-M Technical Forum call - March 5

by Anton Komlev

Dear All, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, March 5 at 7:00-8:00 UTC. Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Best regards, Anton Komlev

5 years, 2 months

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TF-M

by Konstantinos Chatzis

Hi all, As Anton already announced during last TF-M Tech Forums, we have recently started a deep review initiative for the TF-M project, with main focus to improve User Experience and reduce Onboarding Effort. The team is currently focusing on the following topics: * Repository and Housekeeping * Development Environment * Build System * Source tree structure and Abstraction Layers * Coding Rules * Documentation * Continuous Integration * Testing We are fully aware of the vast area the topics above cover but, focusing on the basic principles mentioned above, we intend to conclude to implementable solutions. It is therefore of significant importance that your individual or team's onboarding experience is shared with us and this mailing list. Please share any feedback based on your experience using and/or enhancing TF-M. Regards, Kostas IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 2 months

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TF-M (PSA-Level) Fuzzing Tool

by Gary Morrison

Hi TF-Mers! Sincere apologies for the short notice, but at the next TF-M Tech Forum (in a few hours from now!), I will do a short presentation on a TF-M Fuzzing Tool that I’ve been working on for 2-3 months. Currently, it’s just a prototype, and I’ve only tested SST functionality so far, but we’re hoping we can get it out into the open-source arena soon, and get a little more brain power into improving its capabilities. (Apologies also that it’ll be at 1AM my time, out here in Austin, so please bear with me if I sound a little groggy! 😊) Hope you can join us! -- Gary Morrison gary.morrison(a)arm.com Principal SW Engineer Arm, Inc. Austin, TX. USA

5 years, 2 months

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