Hi Kevin,
Yes, you are right. The persistent key management described in PSA Cryptograhphy version 1.0 is not supported yet. It still follows the version 1.0 beta3 “key management”. I also met the “INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY” issue when I am implementing the PSA based PKCS#11 shim layer. In my side, it is caused by multiple calling psa_open_key while the key is still open. Each persistent key is saved only once in non- volatile area. But each time you open a key with the key handle, a new volatile area is used. In your code, psa_open_key is called directly after psa_import_key. So in this case, an additional volatile area is taken. The default volatile area number is 16. I suggestion you check whether similar case happen in your code(calling psa_open_key while the key is in open).
After provisioning, call psa_close_key to close the key. Then the volatile area is freed. Then to get the key handle later, you can call the psa_open_key directly.
Hope it can help you!
Regards, Sherry Zhang
From: TF-M tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:47 PM To: Thomas Törnblom via TF-M tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Query on persistent keys Crypto API
Hi,
Support for generating and working with persistent keys was recently merged into TF-M in the following change request: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3252/8
This corresponds to section 3.2.2 (Persistent keys) of the PSA Cryptography API 1.0 (dated 19/02/2020), although there seems to be some delay in implementing the functionality described in the API document. Page 209 ("Changes between 1.0 beta 3 and 1.0.0") states: "Removed psa_open_key and psa_close_key", but these functions are both present in the repo and seem to be used in the tests here: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/test/suites/cryp...
Presumably this positions the merged change request around 1.0 beta 3, just to know where we stand with the API documentation versus implementation in TF-M?
Since this is a very useful feature in real world applications, I was working on a sample application in Zephyr demonstrating how it might be used during device provisioning, and I was hoping to better understand the differences between the implementation in TF-M today and the 1.0 API document, specifically around KEY IDs versus key handle based access?
The 1.0 API documentation, for example, describes:
psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(psa_key_id_t key, uint8_t * data, size_t data_size, size_t * data_length);
But TF-M implements this add: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/interface/includ...
psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(psa_key_handle_t handle, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length);
Presumably this migration to ID based accesses (versus handles) is still a work in progress, with a goal of perhaps being complete for 1.1?
Should I still be calling psa_open_key in the interim, for example? Some examples like the AES + PKCS#7 test case here use that: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/test/suites/cryp...
However, when I try to use psa_open_key when working with PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1, I get an INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY error, and I'm not sure how to get the psa_key_handle_t for subsequent operations like reading the key back.
I've posted the WIP code that fails trying to open the key here: https://gist.github.com/microbuilder/a326cc6b935f87f413d89e44f9d3de05#file-p...
If I comment out the psa_open_key call, I CAN access the public key in the next function, but only because I have a reference to the handle from when we first persisted the key, but I wouldn't have that handle in the real world if I was accessing a previously created key, and it seems we can't access persisted keys via ID yet, only handles, unless I'm missing something (perhaps obvious)?
Best regards, Kevin
Hi Sherry,
Thanks for the quick response. The following sequence, explicitly closing the key after creation, seems to allow me to use psa_open_key, thank you:
/* Import the private key, creating the persistent key on success */ psa_import_key(&key_attributes, key_data, key_len, &key_handle);
/* Close the key to free up a volatile slot. */ psa_close_key(key_handle);
/* Now try to re-open the persisted key based on the key ID. */ psa_open_key(key_id, &key_handle);
Best regards, Kevin
On Wed, 13 May 2020 at 12:48, Sherry Zhang Sherry.Zhang2@arm.com wrote:
Hi Kevin,
Yes, you are right. The persistent key management described in PSA Cryptograhphy version 1.0 is not supported yet. It still follows the version 1.0 beta3 “key management”. I also met the “INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY” issue when I am implementing the PSA based PKCS#11 shim layer. In my side, it is caused by multiple calling psa_open_key while the key is still open. Each persistent key is saved only once in non- volatile area. But each time you open a key with the key handle, a new volatile area is used. In your code, psa_open_key is called directly after psa_import_key. So in this case, an additional volatile area is taken. The default volatile area number is 16. I suggestion you check whether similar case happen in your code(calling psa_open_key while the key is in open).
After provisioning, call psa_close_key to close the key. Then the volatile area is freed. Then to get the key handle later, you can call the psa_open_key directly.
Hope it can help you!
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
*From:* TF-M tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org * On Behalf Of *Kevin Townsend via TF-M *Sent:* Wednesday, May 13, 2020 5:47 PM *To:* Thomas Törnblom via TF-M tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org *Subject:* [TF-M] Query on persistent keys Crypto API
Hi,
Support for generating and working with persistent keys was recently merged into TF-M in the following change request: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/3252/8
This corresponds to section 3.2.2 (Persistent keys) of the PSA Cryptography API 1.0 (dated 19/02/2020), although there seems to be some delay in implementing the functionality described in the API document. Page 209 ("Changes between 1.0 beta 3 and 1.0.0") states: "Removed psa_open_key and psa_close_key", but these functions are both present in the repo and seem to be used in the tests here: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/test/suites/cryp...
Presumably this positions the merged change request around 1.0 beta 3, just to know where we stand with the API documentation versus implementation in TF-M?
Since this is a very useful feature in real world applications, I was working on a sample application in Zephyr demonstrating how it might be used during device provisioning, and I was hoping to better understand the differences between the implementation in TF-M today and the 1.0 API document, specifically around KEY IDs versus key handle based access?
The 1.0 API documentation, for example, describes:
psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(psa_key_id_t key, uint8_t * data, size_t data_size, size_t * data_length);
But TF-M implements this add: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/interface/includ...
psa_status_t psa_export_public_key(psa_key_handle_t handle, uint8_t *data, size_t data_size, size_t *data_length);
Presumably this migration to ID based accesses (versus handles) is still a work in progress, with a goal of perhaps being complete for 1.1?
Should I still be calling psa_open_key in the interim, for example? Some examples like the AES + PKCS#7 test case here use that: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/test/suites/cryp...
However, when I try to use psa_open_key when working with PSA_ECC_CURVE_SECP256R1, I get an INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY error, and I'm not sure how to get the psa_key_handle_t for subsequent operations like reading the key back.
I've posted the WIP code that fails trying to open the key here: https://gist.github.com/microbuilder/a326cc6b935f87f413d89e44f9d3de05#file-p...
If I comment out the psa_open_key call, I CAN access the public key in the next function, but only because I have a reference to the handle from when we first persisted the key, but I wouldn't have that handle in the real world if I was accessing a previously created key, and it seems we can't access persisted keys via ID yet, only handles, unless I'm missing something (perhaps obvious)?
Best regards,
Kevin
tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org
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Kevin Townsend -
Sherry Zhang