Hi,
Sorry 2nd link was broken. Here is the working version:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab…
Tamas Ban
From: Andersson, Joakim <Joakim.Andersson(a)nordicsemi.no>
Sent: 2022. május 9., hétfő 12:14
To: Tamas Ban <Tamas.Ban(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: Attestation token new spec
Is te second link broken? I get a 404 error code.
-Joakim
From: Tamas Ban via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: mandag 9. mai 2022 11:31
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>
Subject: [TF-M] Attestation token new spec
Hi,
the initial attestation token implementation is aligned with this specification:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-05<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdatatrack…>
This spec is still evolving and there is a newer version which changes the key values of the claims in the token:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-09.html#tab…<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.…>
This can cause combability issues between token issuer (device) and token verifier (some remote verification service).
This is an ABI change between token issuer and consumer.
The breaking effect would be manifest in unaccepted IAT tokens by the verifier.
On-device side I see these options to make the transition:
- A build-time option could be introduced which determines which range of key numbers to use. The default value would be the new range. To not let new users pick up the old values accidentally. Existing users can notice the incompatibility issue during the integration test and adjust their build command accordingly. However, the old range would be announced as deprecated in the next TF-M release, then will be removed in the next release after.
- Immediate switch over to the new range, without supporting the old range anymore. On the verification service side, an SW update can handle the transition and might be accepting both ranges for a while. I assume the verification service can be updated more easily than remote devices therefore better to handle the compatibility issue there.
- Keeping the support for both ranges for the long term and letting users choose by build time.
Please share your thoughts on:
- Are you aware that the attestation service is used in deployed devices where this transition can cause incompatibility?
- From the above list which option would you vote to support the transition?
Best regards,
Tamas Ban
Is 11.2-2022.02 the recommended compiler version?
I saw TF-M v1.8 states:
" GNU Arm compiler version *10-2020-q4-major* has an issue in CMSE
support. The bug is reported in `here <https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99157>`__.
Select other GNU Arm compiler versions instead.
GNU Arm compiler version greater and equal than *11.3.Rel1* has a linker issue in syscall.
Select other GNU Arm compiler versions instead.
"
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hi all,
Seems like dependency on generated files is broken.
Steps to reproduce:
1. Build any platform at any mode
2. Change any .template file
3.
Expected result:
1. New file is generated from the updated .template file
Actual result:
1. Generated files step is skipped.
My best guess will be that 1ce59292a47b1316e5d8b4d28bcaf9d8e2bdc0a5 broke it.
Could this be fixed?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Our requirement is to send email securely from our embedded device running on STM32H7 processor. There's an SMTP client application (implemented using Mbed TLS library) running on this device, which will send emails to the recipient via custom/public email server such as smtp.gmail.com. We are planning to use S/MIME email certificate from the one of the Trusted CA, for encryption of the email message and authentication of the client/server. We learnt that each S/MIME email certificate support only one email address, but we will be having multiple devices running on the field and each device will have unique email address from which email will be sent. Getting S/MIME email certificate for device will not be feasible, is there any better way we can handle this scenario effectively. Your response to this problem is greatly appreciated.
Thank you,
Nagaraj
Hi,
On the last tech forum (June 22) we started discussion on multicore hybrid platforms.
By this mail I’d like to follow up and continue offline analyses on new use-cases and requirements for TF-M design update.
The recorded session is available here: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/rec/share/yseF-mYwUTtHHPkQJQO6IEv72xCd0Lz1pQQecc…, Passcode: 5s=Npv=w
and slides: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/tech_forum_20230622_Hybrid_platforms.p…
The current plan is to take time, think on the use-cases and map them on requirements. With more thought and materials, we will have another session about September time to define our needs in the support of new type of platform.
Please share your thoughts in reply.
Thanks,
Anton
Hi,
We are planning to update the mechanism on partition interface ABI selection in IPC model.
In current Implementation, cross call ABI is chosen in Isolation Level 1, and SVC call ABI is chosen in Isolation Level 2&3.
However, interfaces are actually the bridge between SPM and caller partitions. If one partition shares the same boundary with SPM, cross call ABI is the choice; while if one partition does not share the same boundary with SPM, a SVC ABI is the proper choice.
But, a simple comparison between two boundary values cannot be used for checking if the two boundaries are the same one - these values might be encoded with bit fields and contains more info than memory regions. Hence the comparison should be done by who generated them - the isolation HAL implementation in platform sources.
So here comes to the following design:
1. In HAL function tfm_hal_bind_boundary, encode p_ldinf into boundary value, so that there is no need to pass both p_ldinf and boundary value to switch boundary.
1. Implement a HAL function to compare boundaries and switch boundary if needed.
tfm_hal_status_t tfm_hal_switch_boundary(
uintptr_t target_boundary,
uintptr _t current_boundary,
uint32_t compare_only, /* 0: Switch boundary if they are different, 1: Only compare whether the boundaries are different and do not switch */
uint32_t* compare_result); /* Tell the caller whether the boundaries are different */
1. Select correct type of ABI when processing metadata of partition based on boundary.
void prv_process_metadata(struct partition_t *p_pt)
{
...
tfm_hal_switch_boundary(SPM_BOUNDARY, p_pt->boundary, 1, *compare_result);
if (compare_result == 1) {
p_rt_meta->psa_fns = &psa_api_svc;
} else {
p_rt_meta->psa_fns = &psa_api_cross;
}
...
}
Please let us know if you have any suggestion.
Thanks,
Xinyu
Hi All,
I wanted to let you know that next Thursday, July 27th, the TF-A Tech Forum
will be hosting a presentation on OpenCI and MISRA presented by Paul
Sokolovski of Linaro and Roberto Bagnara from Bugseng. MISRA is being
enabled on both TF-A and TF-M in OpenCI, so sending this out to both lists
since users in both domains may be interested in the session.
Meeting time and dial up info can be found in the TF community calendar
located here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/
Best Regards,
Don Harbin
TrustedFirmware Community Manager
don.harbin(a)linaro.org