- TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Don Harbin

Hi All, As TF is moving forward with a TF-A LTS per the proposals that have been presented, I've created a new mail list for this purpose. Please feel free to subscribe. https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman3/lists/tfa-lts.lists.trustedfirmw… Thanks, Don Harbin TrustedFirmware Community Manager don.harbin(a)linaro.org

3 years

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Platform issues with mitigations of powerdown errata

by Boyan Karatotev

Hello everyone, There is a type of errata on a few CPUs where if they initiate a power down request which gets denied then attempting to power down again can fail in a deadlock. In essence, after the PE's power down sequence which ends on a WFI, but before actual power down, there exists a small window where an external event can interrupt the power down and cause the PE to continue after the WFI. Attempting to power down again after that can result in a deadlock. Affected CPUs are the Neoverse N2, Makalu ELP (Cortex X3), and Cortex A710. The SDEN [1] suggests to set the chicken bit CPUACTLR2_EL1[36] before the power down sequence and to clear it after coming out of the WFI (on anything other than RESET). The mitigations [2] set the bit in the `core_pwr_dwn` of each CPU but never clear it. This is because in the generic TF-A code path the WFI ends up being called in an infinite loop with the only way to come out of it being RESET. Most platforms with custom `pwr_domain_pwr_down_wfi` end up in the same loop or unrelated hardware reset mechanisms that avoid the errata. However, a few platforms could continue running as normal without going through a hardware reset which would require special treatment. The four problematic platforms are: * amlogic gxl and g12a: they fake a reset by manually calling the reset entrypoint on their primary CPUs only. This will leave the chicken bit set after reset. * socionext uniphier: same as amlogic but on all CPUs. * nxp (common code): I hope I understand what the platform is trying to do but there are 2 paths that raise an eyebrow: `_psci_sys_pwrdn_wfi` which has a single non-looped wfi (which could return as above) and `_psci_cpu_off_wfi` which seems to accept waking up as normal behaviour. The former path is a simple fix but the latter is the same case as amlogic and socionext. Due to its complexity I have not proposed any modification on either path. Finally, nvidia tegra and renesas (common code) have acceptable behaviour as far as the errata are concerned, however, they end up in the wfi loop only after a panic sequence. Although not problematic, this stands out. For all six platforms above there are a few options on how to proceed, the preferred one being to bring them in line with what everyone else does. Alternatively, ignoring the errata would be ok if these platforms never intend to use these CPUs. It must be noted, however, that it appears to be a family of errata, and these may not be all CPUs affected. [1]: the wording is identical for all 3 cores. For Neoverse N2: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1982442/latest/ [2]: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/17157/1 Regards, Boyan

3 years, 1 month

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Canceled event with note: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu Oct 6, 2022 4pm - 5pm (BST) (tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by joanna.farley＠arm.com

This event has been canceled with a note: "No topics arranged for this week so cancelling. At this time we don't have a topic for 20th September either. Something may well appear before then from Arm however if anybody in the broader community has a topic they would like to present please reach out me (Joanna.farley(a)arm.com)." TF-A Tech Forum Thursday Oct 6, 2022 ⋅ 4pm – 5pm United Kingdom Time We run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Invites are via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h   Guests marek.bykowski(a)gmail.com okash.khawaja(a)gmail.com tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org ~~//~~ Invitation from Google Calendar: https://calendar.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this email because you are an attendee on the event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer, be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or modify your RSVP. Learn more https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

3 years, 1 month

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security: BL2 at EL3 on v8a based system

by sandeep tripathy

Hi, With the RME feature BL2 has to run at EL3 instead of EL1_S. EL3 has a separate PAS not accessible to EL1_S. Is there any harm in choosing to run BL2 at EL3 instead of BL2 at S_EL1 even for non-RME(v8a) systems? Given that EL3 and EL1_S have access to the same PAS. I am trying to revisit the motivation to run BL2 at EL1_S. I see there was an old discussion at https://github.com/ARM-software/tf-issues/issues/445 The reasoning was not pointing to any issue in specific but a generic principle of less permissiveness. Thanks Sandeep

3 years, 1 month

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Re: security: BL2 at EL3 on v8a based system

by Tripathy, Sandeep

Hi Manish, >>The existing name is more suitable for configuration where the platform has BL1 in it and BL2 can run at EL3 instead of S-EL1. Well, that is a minor thing to take care. V9 implementation does that in a way. >>This configuration is currently not available in TF-A but having this flexibility is not a bad idea and it can be platform's choice. That's my answer! And the default choice costs some memory with probably no increase in security (V8). >>BL31 can mask the secure world. Cant be done reliably on V8 (with root world V9 or EL2_S there is potential to compartmentalize the secure services as PAS isolation is feasible) Ex: EL1S can always overwrite the BL31 Xlat tables and take control of the vectors and many other ways depending on the platform. It's the same PAS! Thanks Sandeep

3 years, 1 month

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[PATCH TF-A] fix(plat/rcar3): Fix RPC-IF device node name

by Geert Uytterhoeven

According to the Generic Names Recommendation in the Devicetree Specification Release v0.3, and the DT Bindings for the Renesas Reduced Pin Count Interface, the node name for a Renesas RPC-IF device should be "spi". The node name matters, as the node is enabled by passing a DT fragment from TF-A to subsequent software. Fix this by renaming the device nodes from "rpc" to "spi". Fixes: 12c75c8886a0ee69 ("feat(plat/rcar3): emit RPC status to DT fragment if RPC unlocked") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas(a)glider.be> --- Background: On Renesas R-Car Gen3 platforms, the SPI Multi I/O Bus Controllers (RPC-IF) provide access to HyperFlash or QSPI storage. On production systems, they are typically locked by the TF-A firmware, unless TF-A is built with RCAR_RPC_HYPERFLASH_LOCKED=0. When unlocked, TF-A communicates this to subsequent software by passing a DT fragment that sets the "status" property of the RPC-IF device node to "okay". Unfortunately there are several issues preventing this from working all the way to Linux: 1. TF-A (and U-Boot on the receiving side) uses a device node name that does not conform to the DT specification nor the DT bindings for RPC-IF, 2. While U-Boot receives the RPC-IF enablement from TF-A, it does not propagate it to Linux yet, 3. The DTS files that are part of Linux do not have RPC HyperFlash support yet. This patch takes care of the first issue in TF-A. The related patches for U-Boot are [1]. Patches to enable RPC-IF support in Linux are available at [2]. Thanks for your comments! [1] "[PATCH u-boot 0/3] renesas: Fix RPC-IF enablement" https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1648544792.git.geert+renesas@glider.be [2] "[PATCH 0/5] arm64: dts: renesas: rcar-gen3: Enable HyperFlash support" https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1648548339.git.geert+renesas@glider.be --- plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c b/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c index bbfa16927d6c2384..f85db8d650c6b1a5 100644 --- a/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c +++ b/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static void bl2_add_rpc_node(void) goto err; } - node = ret = fdt_add_subnode(fdt, node, "rpc@ee200000"); + node = ret = fdt_add_subnode(fdt, node, "spi@ee200000"); if (ret < 0) { goto err; } -- 2.25.1

3 years, 1 month

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Adding Openssl3 build capability to TF-A

by Gyorgy Szing

Hi, As you may know, the build system was changed, and the tip of master depends on Openssl3. This version is quite new and is not available in many old (or not so old) but still supported operating systems. (Ubuntu 18.04 is an example.) I made a quick and dirty fix to allow building Opessl3 right from TF-A if the source is pre-fetched. You can find this change here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/16800 For our downstream project this is a perfect solution as the same component introducing the new dependency carries the solution. Thus, my build environment is not becoming TF-A version specific. From TF-A point of view the situation is not so simple. The above patch extends TF-A with "build environment provisioning" responsibility. Before this patch TF-A assumed, all "common" dependencies are available in the build environment, and this patch changes that. Yes, some strongly TF-A specific components were owned and built by TF-A, but openssl is different. Thus, my modification is a "game changer" in some ways. A few things to consider: * Openssl becomes a special kind of TPIP which the project will need to manage (e.g. look for security risks, version updates, compatibility to different OSs and OS versions, etc...). * This is a system wide component. There is a risk of breaking something the build uses. Hidden things like a python module depending on openssl and now picking up an incompatible version. * This change might be considered as layer bleeding since it "melds" responsibilities of the TF-A project and the "owner of the build environment". IMHO this might be a significant difference from supply-chain security perspectives. There are alternatives which might be considered better: * making the build system and host side tooling (e.g. cert_tool) backwards compatible with openssl2 * hosting pre-built static binaries somewhere, which would simplify build environment updates As I mentioned above, this is a "good enough" fix for my use-case, but not sure if this is the right approach from TF-A perspectives. I am happy to tidy up this patch and push it trough the review, but the efforts needed to implement "other options" are beyond my capacity. I am looking for feedback both from TF-A maintainers and from "build environment owners". Thanks! /George Ps.: Apologies for not doing "my homework". I know there is a ticket somewhere in Phabricator and I did not invest the needed time to find it.

3 years, 1 month

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Finally, a TF-A LTS Proposal!

by Okash Khawaja

TL;DR: Attached is the TF-A LTS proposal doc. Please review and share your thoughts. Hello everyone, Long term support for TF-A has a long history. As a community we have flirted with it for a while, and like any flirtation, it started with gossip -- in our case, over mailing list [1] -- more than two years ago. Then Varun Wadekar did a wonderful tech forum presentation [2] which demonstrated interest in the topic and raised interesting questions about LTS. After some time, the affair lost headline status, only to be revived again [3], earlier this year. This time however, there is a formal proposal (no pun intended). After the mailing list discussion and feedback from TF-A tech forum [4], we have put together a draft which attempts to give a concrete idea about what the TF-A LTS will look like. Please spare some time to read through it and share your feedback. The plan is to put LTS into action this November. Cheers! Okash [1] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/search?mlist=tf-a%40lists.truste… [2] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/TF-A-LTS.pdf [3] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… [4] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/TForg_LTS_proposal.pdf

3 years, 1 month

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 1 of 1 defect(s) ** CID 370380: Code maintainability issues (UNUSED_VALUE) /plat/xilinx/versal/pm_service/pm_svc_main.c: 128 in pm_setup() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 370380: Code maintainability issues (UNUSED_VALUE) /plat/xilinx/versal/pm_service/pm_svc_main.c: 128 in pm_setup() 122 int32_t status, ret = 0; 123 124 status = pm_ipi_init(primary_proc); 125 126 if (status < 0) { 127 INFO("BL31: PM Service Init Failed, Error Code %d!\n", status); >>> CID 370380: Code maintainability issues (UNUSED_VALUE) >>> Assigning value from "status" to "ret" here, but that stored value is overwritten before it can be used. 128 ret = status; 129 } else { 130 pm_up = true; 131 } 132 133 /* ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

3 years, 1 month

1
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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 defect(s), reported by Coverity Scan earlier, were marked fixed in the recent build analyzed by Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 1 of 1 defect(s) ** CID 380957: Integer handling issues (NO_EFFECT) /drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3_main.c: 1109 in gicv3_raise_sgi() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 380957: Integer handling issues (NO_EFFECT) /drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3_main.c: 1109 in gicv3_raise_sgi() 1103 u_register_t target) 1104 { 1105 unsigned int tgt, aff3, aff2, aff1, aff0; 1106 uint64_t sgi_val; 1107 1108 /* Verify interrupt number is in the SGI range */ >>> CID 380957: Integer handling issues (NO_EFFECT) >>> This greater-than-or-equal-to-zero comparison of an unsigned value is always true. "sgi_num >= 0U". 1109 assert((sgi_num >= MIN_SGI_ID) && (sgi_num < MIN_PPI_ID)); 1110 1111 /* Extract affinity fields from target */ 1112 aff0 = MPIDR_AFFLVL0_VAL(target); 1113 aff1 = MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(target); 1114 aff2 = MPIDR_AFFLVL2_VAL(target); ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

3 years, 1 month

1
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0 0

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