- TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [TF-A] Design proposal: firmware debugfs interface

by Olivier Deprez

Hi, To complement the DebugFS design proposal document, here is a corresponding TF-A patchset: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2422 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2431 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2432 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2423 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2421 An associated TFTF test case illustrates the usage: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/tf-a-tests/+/2433 Regards, Olivier. ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Olivier Deprez via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 25 October 2019 15:30 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Design proposal: firmware debugfs interface Hi All, We are proposing a new firmware debug interface in the form of a "debug filesystem". The intent is to expose live firmware data or firmware driver HAL to the upper layers, in debug builds. For people interested, please review and comment the design proposal: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2381 The design is not closed, the intent is to collect opinions, and have a discussion on options and implications. Thanks & Regards, Olivier. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Linux as BL33

by Ash Wilding

Hi @François<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org>, <quote> Now, I changed U-Boot to Image, added code to ensure arg0 is 0 (DTB) but Linux does not start (zero printk visible). I don't find kernel text base anymore, may be it disappeared: any suggestion to get the kernel start when loaded at 64KB offset? the kernel image with embedded initrd is 10MB, SRAM is at 64MB so there should be enough space to decompress initrd... </quote> I recommend reading through the arm64 Linux booting requirements if you haven’t already; you’ll need to ensure all of those conditions are met before entering the kernel [1]. For example have you correctly set text_offset in the image header? <quote> u32 code0; /* Executable code */ u32 code1; /* Executable code */ u64 text_offset; /* Image load offset, little endian */ u64 image_size; /* Effective Image size, little endian */ u64 flags; /* kernel flags, little endian */ u64 res2 = 0; /* reserved */ u64 res3 = 0; /* reserved */ u64 res4 = 0; /* reserved */ u32 magic = 0x644d5241; /* Magic number, little endian, "ARM\x64" */ u32 res5; /* reserved (used for PE COFF offset) */ </quote> <quote> The Image must be placed text_offset bytes from a 2MB aligned base address anywhere in usable system RAM and called there. </quote> Kind regards, Ash. [1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/Documentation/arm64/booting.… IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] sp select in atf

by Ash Wilding

Hi Feng, This is standard practice for operating systems, hypervisors, and firmware running on Armv8-A systems. A key distinction between SPSel,#0 and SPSel,#1 is that you can tell which stack pointer you were using when you took an exception as they correspond to different offsets in the vector table. Often times, taking an exception from the same EL when using SPSel,#0 is non-terminal whereas taking an exception from the same EL when already using SPSel,#1 is considered terminal. Take for example the scenario where your operating system, hypervisor, or firmware is running some task/thread code at EL1/EL2/EL3 and runs out of stack space, triggering a translation fault and attempting to stack some data (we’ll probably be using unmapped guard pages at the stack boundaries). The first thing the exception handler will try to do is stack the GPRs. If the reason you took the exception is because the stack pointed to by SP_EL1/2/3 has itself overflowed, this attempt to stack the GPRs will itself cause a translation fault and you’ll get stuck in a recursive exception. In contrast, if the reason you took the exception is because the stack pointed to by SP_EL0 has overflowed, the exception handler will successfully stack the GPRs to the SP_EL1/2/3 stack and be able to diagnose + log what went wrong before rebooting gracefully. Hope that helps, Ash. From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Chen Feng via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Chen Feng <puck.chen(a)hisilicon.com> Date: Friday, 17 April 2020 at 09:02 To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com>, Yatharth Kochar <Yatharth.Kochar(a)arm.com>, Sandrine Bailleux <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> Cc: "puck.chen(a)hisilicon.com" <puck.chen(a)hisilicon.com>, "lizhong11(a)hisilicon.com" <lizhong11(a)hisilicon.com> Subject: [TF-A] sp select in atf Hello all, I see the atf use different sp, and special for smc64 it use the sp_el0. So for the unhandled-exception handler, it must switch to sp_el0 to do the back-trace-dump. Since it default used sp_el3 when exception happen. My question here is why using different sp in atf code? Just use the sp_el3 for all scenes seems more simpler. Cheers, - feng -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years

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sp select in atf

by Chen Feng

Hello all, I see the atf use different sp, and special for smc64 it use the sp_el0. So for the unhandled-exception handler, it must switch to sp_el0 to do the back-trace-dump. Since it default used sp_el3 when exception happen. My question here is why using different sp in atf code? Just use the sp_el3 for all scenes seems more simpler. Cheers, - feng

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Linux as BL33

by Manish Pandey2

As of now ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33 is only supported when RESET_TO_BL31=1, along with it you need to pass PRELOADED_BL33_BASE as well as ARM_PRELOADED_DTB_BASE. AFAIK This feature is not tested for platforms which uses all the BL(1/2/31) stages from TF-A . The most likely reason for this is loading and authentication of Linux Image. BL2 which is responsible for loading of various images, does not have support to load linux image. With platforms having RESET_TO_BL31, TF-A relies on prior loader which loads kernel and device tree blobs at respective address. In short, if your platform has RESET_TO_BL31=1, it will be quite easy else you need to understand the BL2 loading mechanism and see if you can extend it for loading Linux and DTB. Kernel Output format zImage/Image should work. Hope this helps! ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 15 April 2020 13:31 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Linux as BL33 I want to use Linux as BL33 on a Marvell Macchiatobin. Currently I have the successful boot flow: TFA (mainline v2.2) -> U-Boot (Mainline 2020.04rc5) -> Kernel (5.6.3) with U-root initrd (6.0.0, https://github.com/u-root/u-root ) -> Ubuntu 19.10 The 5.6.3 "intermediary" kernel is 5.5MB uncompressed , u-root initrd is 3.5MB compressed (some form of golang based busybox). I was pointed to the ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33 option which is not supported on the Macchiatobin. It does not look too difficult to add, but I'd like to have some feedback/guidance on how to do it: - how to add the option to the TFA platform - how to generate a usable kernel (compile options? non relocatable kernel? output format, i.e. Image, zImage, uImage...) Thanks for your help -FF -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Proposal for Measured Boot Implementation

by Vivek Prasad

+Harb ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Vivek Prasad via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 10:19 AM To: Stuart Yoder <stuart.yoder(a)arm.com>; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com>; tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Raghu Krishnamurthy <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> Cc: Loc Ho <loc.ho(a)amperecomputing.com>; Vivek Kumar <vivek(a)amperecomputing.com>; Benjamin Chaffin <bchaffin(a)amperecomputing.com>; Ard Biesheuvel <Ard.Biesheuvel(a)arm.com>; Mohamad Ammar <moe(a)amperecomputing.com>; Charles Garcia-Tobin <Charles.Garcia-Tobin(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal for Measured Boot Implementation Hello Stuart, Alexei, Chiming-in here on Ampere's behalf... We analysed this proposal internally. And we see a number issues with this, some of which was already raised by Raghu in the previous threads. Here is a summary of the main issues that we see. * Only supporting mbedtls, and this is fixed config at compile time. * We propose that there should be a variable for the algorithm to be used, which can be setup at initialization time. * This solution relies on taking the hash directly from the digest as the measurement, instead of the computed hash. This is not safe, especially considering measured boot may use a different hash bank, so digest hash may not be correct/valid. * Only measuring the BL2 image, per the ARM SBSG we must be measuring and logging *all* images/boot phases * BL31 * BL32 (all secure partitions) * BL33 (UEFI or any other non-secure boot loader) * Once we ERET into BL33, the measure boot flow continues and is owned by that boot loader * Only see support for PCR0, any/all unsigned config data must be logged to PCR1. * Passing PCRs to non-secure software before logging is not compliant with TCG Static-Root-of-Trust Measurement (SRTM) requirements * It was discussed before in separate conversations… especially in systems where you are talked about two different signing domains where BL33 is a different trust/signing domain. * BL33 should only do hash-log-extend… there is no need for BL33 to be aware of the current PCR value (beyond what is provided in the boot event log). * Based on comments on the mail thread, there seem to be bad assumptions/expectations around TPM accessibility from non-secure world. * Expecting SPI/I2C TPMs to be directly accessed from non-secure world instead of abstracting hardware details via the TCG CRB interface (which has been already standardized as the defacto mechanism for ARM on past mobile, client, and server solutions). * CRB will "just work" for Aptio/EDK2/Linux/Windows/Hyper-V/VMWare * NOTE: This goes back to what is a “productizable” TPM solution. We want it to be turn-key solution for customers without having to support/develop proprietary drivers. -Vivek/Harb

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi all, Thanks to all who have commented on this proposal so far. I've edited the original document to try and incorporate all feedback gathered so far (through the TSC meeting, this email thread and the TF-A tech call). Please have another look and flag anything I might have missed: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p… The major changes are: == Removed concept of self-review == This is proving too controversial, several people do not want to allow self-review. Roles of maintainer and code owner are still cumulative but cannot be both exercised for the same patch. The exact method of dealing with review bottleneck is still to be decided. In addition to the current proposal of increasing the maintainers pool, the most popular alternatives mentioned so far are: - Set a minimum wait time for feedback before a patch can be merged without any further delay. - Mandate distinct reviewers for a patch. == Enhanced the section "Patch contribution Guidelines" == Mentioned that patches should be small, on-topic, with comprehensive commit messages. == Added a note about how to deal with disagreement == If reviewers cannot find a common ground, the proposal is to call out a 3rd-party maintainer. == Removed "out-of-date" platform state == Squashed it into "limited support" to reduce the number of states. == Removed "orphan" state from platform support life cycle == This concept is orthogonal to the level of functionality. Added a note in the "Code Owner" section instead. == Per-project guidelines as a complementary document == Added a list of things that it would typically cover. == Added requirement on fully supported platforms to document the features they support == == Added todo mentioning that the proposal might cover branching strategies in the future == The full diff may be seen here: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/phriction/diff/73/?l=4&r=5 This proposal is still open for discussion at this stage and further feedback is most welcome! Regards, Sandrine

6 years, 1 month

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Linux as BL33

by François Ozog

I want to use Linux as BL33 on a Marvell Macchiatobin. Currently I have the successful boot flow: TFA (mainline v2.2) -> U-Boot (Mainline 2020.04rc5) -> Kernel (5.6.3) with U-root initrd (6.0.0, https://github.com/u-root/u-root ) -> Ubuntu 19.10 The 5.6.3 "intermediary" kernel is 5.5MB uncompressed , u-root initrd is 3.5MB compressed (some form of golang based busybox). I was pointed to the ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33 option which is not supported on the Macchiatobin. It does not look too difficult to add, but I'd like to have some feedback/guidance on how to do it: - how to add the option to the TFA platform - how to generate a usable kernel (compile options? non relocatable kernel? output format, i.e. Image, zImage, uImage...) Thanks for your help -FF

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] 回复：Re: [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed

by Matteo Carlini

Looping-in Thomas & Deepak, responsible for the RD-N1 landing team platforms releases. They might be able to help. Thanks Matteo From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of ??(??) via TF-A Sent: 14 April 2020 06:47 To: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] 回复：Re: [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed Hi RagHu, Really appreciate your help. I was downloaded this software stack from git.linaro.org. This software stack include ATF, kernel, edk2 and so on. The user guide i used from linaro is:https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/arm-reference-platforms… 1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU? A: I am running on ARM N1-Edge FVP platform. It can reproduced on this FVP platform. 2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code. A: TF-A: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/arm-tf.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0 StandloneMM seems build from edk2 & edk2-platform. so i just put edk2 and edk2-platform version information. if anything i missed, please let me know. edk2: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2.git<https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2.git/> tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0 edk2-platform: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2-platforms.git<https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2-platforms.git/> tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0 3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used? A: kernel-release: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/kernel-release.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0 The sdei driver was included in kernel, do i need to provide sdei driver version? If need please let me know. 4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123 to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external abort through memory access ? A: Sorry, linaro only refered it will inject the DMC-620 single-bit RAS error. So I am also not sure which exception type it will trigger. BRs， Bin Wu ------------------原始邮件 ------------------ 发件人:TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> 发送时间:Tue Apr 14 01:25:47 2020 收件人:Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> 主题:Re: [TF-A] [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed Hello, >>Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again? I don't think it will. It is really odd that 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) ever reaches the BL32/MM handler. This is from looking at the upstream code quickly but it definitely depends on the platform you are running, what version of TF-A you are using, build options used. Is it possible that the unhandled exception is occurring after successful handling of the DMC620 error but there is a following issue that occurs right after, causing the crash? From the register dump it looks like there was an Instruction abort exception at address 0 while running in EL3. Something seems to have gone seriously wrong to have 0xC4000061 ever go back to BL32 and to get an instruction abort at address 0. >>Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash. See above. The answer really depends on the factors mentioned above. The following would be helpful to know: 1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU? 2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code. 3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used? 4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123 to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external abort through memory access ? Thanks Raghu On 4/13/20 12:16 AM, 吴斌(郅隆) via TF-A wrote: > Dear Friends, > > I am using TF-A to test RAS feature. > When I triggered DMC620 RAS error in Linux(echo 0x123 > > /sys/kernel/debug/sdei_ras_poison). > BL32 will recieve > UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) and finally > BL31 crashed. > > In my understanding, this 0xC4000061 should consumed by BL31, not send > it to BL32 again. > > A piece of error log as below: > > ************************************* > > CperWrite - CperAddress@0xFF610064 > CperWrite - 1 Section@FFBE91A8, Length 80, SectionType@FFBE9138 > CperWrite - Got Error Section: Platform Memory. > MmEntryPoint Done > Received delegated event > X0 : 0xC4000061 > X1 : 0x0 > X2 : 0x0 > X3 : 0x0 > Received event - 0xC4000061 on cpu 0 > UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 > Failed delegated event 0xC4000061, Status 0x2 > Unhandled Exception in EL3. > x30 = 0x0000000000000000 > x0 = 0x00000000ff007e00 > x1 = 0xfffffffffffffffe > x2 = 0x00000000600003c0 > x3 = 0x0000000000000000 > x4 = 0x0000000000000000 > x5 = 0x0000000000000000 > x6 = 0x00000000ff015080 > x7 = 0x0000000000000000 > x8 = 0x00000000c4000061 > x9 = 0x0000000000000021 > x10 = 0x0000000000000040 > x11 = 0x00000000ff00f2b0 > x12 = 0x00000000ff0118c0 > x13 = 0x0000000000000002 > x14 = 0x00000000ff016b70 > x15 = 0x00000000ff003f20 > x16 = 0x0000000000000044 > x17 = 0x00000000ff010430 > x18 = 0x0000000000000e3c > x19 = 0x0000000000000000 > More error log please refer to attachment. > > My question is, > 1. Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again? > 2. Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash. > > Appreciate your help. > > BRs， > Bin Wu > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 1 month

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回复：Re: [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed

by 吴斌(郅隆)

Hi RagHu, Really appreciate your help. I was downloaded this software stack from git.linaro.org. This software stack include ATF, kernel, edk2 and so on. The user guide i used from linaro is:https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/arm-reference-platforms… 1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU? A: I am running on ARM N1-Edge FVP platform. It can reproduced on this FVP platform. 2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code. A: TF-A: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/arm-tf.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0 StandloneMM seems build from edk2 & edk2-platform. so i just put edk2 and edk2-platform version information. if anything i missed, please let me know. edk2: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0 edk2-platform: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2-platforms.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0 3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used? A: kernel-release: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/kernel-release.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0 The sdei driver was included in kernel, do i need to provide sdei driver version? If need please let me know. 4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123 to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external abort through memory access ? A: Sorry, linaro only refered it will inject the DMC-620 single-bit RAS error. So I am also not sure which exception type it will trigger. BRs， Bin Wu ------------------原始邮件 ------------------ 发件人:TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 发送时间:Tue Apr 14 01:25:47 2020 收件人:Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 主题:Re: [TF-A] [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed Hello, >>Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again? I don't think it will. It is really odd that 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) ever reaches the BL32/MM handler. This is from looking at the upstream code quickly but it definitely depends on the platform you are running, what version of TF-A you are using, build options used. Is it possible that the unhandled exception is occurring after successful handling of the DMC620 error but there is a following issue that occurs right after, causing the crash? From the register dump it looks like there was an Instruction abort exception at address 0 while running in EL3. Something seems to have gone seriously wrong to have 0xC4000061 ever go back to BL32 and to get an instruction abort at address 0. >>Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash. See above. The answer really depends on the factors mentioned above. The following would be helpful to know: 1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU? 2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code. 3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used? 4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123 to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external abort through memory access ? Thanks Raghu On 4/13/20 12:16 AM, 吴斌(郅隆) via TF-A wrote: > Dear Friends, > > I am using TF-A to test RAS feature. > When I triggered DMC620 RAS error in Linux(echo 0x123 > > /sys/kernel/debug/sdei_ras_poison). > BL32 will recieve > UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) and finally > BL31 crashed. > > In my understanding, this 0xC4000061 should consumed by BL31, not send > it to BL32 again. > > A piece of error log as below: > > ************************************* > > CperWrite - CperAddress@0xFF610064 > CperWrite - 1 Section@FFBE91A8, Length 80, SectionType@FFBE9138 > CperWrite - Got Error Section: Platform Memory. > MmEntryPoint Done > Received delegated event > X0 : 0xC4000061 > X1 : 0x0 > X2 : 0x0 > X3 : 0x0 > Received event - 0xC4000061 on cpu 0 > UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 > Failed delegated event 0xC4000061, Status 0x2 > Unhandled Exception in EL3. > x30 = 0x0000000000000000 > x0 = 0x00000000ff007e00 > x1 = 0xfffffffffffffffe > x2 = 0x00000000600003c0 > x3 = 0x0000000000000000 > x4 = 0x0000000000000000 > x5 = 0x0000000000000000 > x6 = 0x00000000ff015080 > x7 = 0x0000000000000000 > x8 = 0x00000000c4000061 > x9 = 0x0000000000000021 > x10 = 0x0000000000000040 > x11 = 0x00000000ff00f2b0 > x12 = 0x00000000ff0118c0 > x13 = 0x0000000000000002 > x14 = 0x00000000ff016b70 > x15 = 0x00000000ff003f20 > x16 = 0x0000000000000044 > x17 = 0x00000000ff010430 > x18 = 0x0000000000000e3c > x19 = 0x0000000000000000 > More error log please refer to attachment. > > My question is, > 1. Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again? > 2. Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash. > > Appreciate your help. > > BRs， > Bin Wu > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] BRANCH_PROTECTION

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Varun, 1. The value of '1' sets ‘standard’ type of BP which according to GCC documentation: "turns on all types of branch protection features. If a feature has additional tuning options, then ‘standard’ sets it to its standard level. " It equals to "bti+pac-ret". 2. Yes. See above and use option value of '1'. Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 10 April 2020 19:28 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com>; Anthony Zhou <anzhou(a)nvidia.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BRANCH_PROTECTION Hello, Can someone please help clarify? -Varun From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Varun Wadekar via TF-A Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 9:58 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com>; Anthony Zhou <anzhou(a)nvidia.com> Subject: [TF-A] BRANCH_PROTECTION External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hello, Can someone please help me understand if 1. a ‘value’ of ‘1’ for BRANCH_PROTECTION covers the PAuth protection provided by a value of ‘2’ and/or ‘3’? 2. there is a way to enable BTI and “pac-ret” at the same time? The docs provide this information. <snip> - ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves. If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option ``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use: - 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection - 1: Enables all types of branch protection features - 2: Return address signing to its standard level - 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options and resulting PAuth/BTI<https://tegra-sw-opengrok.nvidia.com/source/s?path=PAuth/BTI&project=stage-…> features. +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI | +=======+==============+=======+=====+ | 0 | none | N | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 1 | standard | Y | Y | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 2 | pac-ret | Y | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature. Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it. <snip> Thanks, Varun ________________________________ This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. ________________________________ IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

Hello, >>Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again? I don't think it will. It is really odd that 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) ever reaches the BL32/MM handler. This is from looking at the upstream code quickly but it definitely depends on the platform you are running, what version of TF-A you are using, build options used. Is it possible that the unhandled exception is occurring after successful handling of the DMC620 error but there is a following issue that occurs right after, causing the crash? From the register dump it looks like there was an Instruction abort exception at address 0 while running in EL3. Something seems to have gone seriously wrong to have 0xC4000061 ever go back to BL32 and to get an instruction abort at address 0. >>Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash. See above. The answer really depends on the factors mentioned above. The following would be helpful to know: 1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU? 2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code. 3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used? 4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123 to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external abort through memory access ? Thanks Raghu On 4/13/20 12:16 AM, 吴斌(郅隆) via TF-A wrote: > Dear Friends, > > I am using TF-A to test RAS feature. > When I triggered DMC620 RAS error in Linux(echo 0x123 > > /sys/kernel/debug/sdei_ras_poison). > BL32 will recieve > UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) and finally > BL31 crashed. > > In my understanding, this 0xC4000061 should consumed by BL31, not send > it to BL32 again. > > A piece of error log as below: > > ************************************* > > CperWrite - CperAddress@0xFF610064 > CperWrite - 1 Section@FFBE91A8, Length 80, SectionType@FFBE9138 > CperWrite - Got Error Section: Platform Memory. > MmEntryPoint Done > Received delegated event > X0 : 0xC4000061 > X1 : 0x0 > X2 : 0x0 > X3 : 0x0 > Received event - 0xC4000061 on cpu 0 > UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 > Failed delegated event 0xC4000061, Status 0x2 > Unhandled Exception in EL3. > x30 = 0x0000000000000000 > x0 = 0x00000000ff007e00 > x1 = 0xfffffffffffffffe > x2 = 0x00000000600003c0 > x3 = 0x0000000000000000 > x4 = 0x0000000000000000 > x5 = 0x0000000000000000 > x6 = 0x00000000ff015080 > x7 = 0x0000000000000000 > x8 = 0x00000000c4000061 > x9 = 0x0000000000000021 > x10 = 0x0000000000000040 > x11 = 0x00000000ff00f2b0 > x12 = 0x00000000ff0118c0 > x13 = 0x0000000000000002 > x14 = 0x00000000ff016b70 > x15 = 0x00000000ff003f20 > x16 = 0x0000000000000044 > x17 = 0x00000000ff010430 > x18 = 0x0000000000000e3c > x19 = 0x0000000000000000 > More error log please refer to attachment. > > My question is, > 1. Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again? > 2. Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash. > > Appreciate your help. > > BRs， > Bin Wu >

6 years, 1 month

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[RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed

by 吴斌(郅隆)

Dear Friends, I am using TF-A to test RAS feature. When I triggered DMC620 RAS error in Linux(echo 0x123 > /sys/kernel/debug/sdei_ras_poison). BL32 will recieve UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) and finally BL31 crashed. In my understanding, this 0xC4000061 should consumed by BL31, not send it to BL32 again. A piece of error log as below: ************************************* CperWrite - CperAddress@0xFF610064 CperWrite - 1 Section@FFBE91A8, Length 80, SectionType@FFBE9138 CperWrite - Got Error Section: Platform Memory. MmEntryPoint Done Received delegated event X0 : 0xC4000061 X1 : 0x0 X2 : 0x0 X3 : 0x0 Received event - 0xC4000061 on cpu 0 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 Failed delegated event 0xC4000061, Status 0x2 Unhandled Exception in EL3. x30 = 0x0000000000000000 x0 = 0x00000000ff007e00 x1 = 0xfffffffffffffffe x2 = 0x00000000600003c0 x3 = 0x0000000000000000 x4 = 0x0000000000000000 x5 = 0x0000000000000000 x6 = 0x00000000ff015080 x7 = 0x0000000000000000 x8 = 0x00000000c4000061 x9 = 0x0000000000000021 x10 = 0x0000000000000040 x11 = 0x00000000ff00f2b0 x12 = 0x00000000ff0118c0 x13 = 0x0000000000000002 x14 = 0x00000000ff016b70 x15 = 0x00000000ff003f20 x16 = 0x0000000000000044 x17 = 0x00000000ff010430 x18 = 0x0000000000000e3c x19 = 0x0000000000000000 More error log please refer to attachment. My question is, 1. Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again? 2. Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash. Appreciate your help. BRs， Bin Wu

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] BRANCH_PROTECTION

by Varun Wadekar

Hello, Can someone please help clarify? -Varun From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Varun Wadekar via TF-A Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 9:58 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com>; Anthony Zhou <anzhou(a)nvidia.com> Subject: [TF-A] BRANCH_PROTECTION External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hello, Can someone please help me understand if 1. a 'value' of '1' for BRANCH_PROTECTION covers the PAuth protection provided by a value of '2' and/or '3'? 2. there is a way to enable BTI and "pac-ret" at the same time? The docs provide this information. <snip> - ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves. If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option ``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use: - 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection - 1: Enables all types of branch protection features - 2: Return address signing to its standard level - 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options and resulting PAuth/BTI<https://tegra-sw-opengrok.nvidia.com/source/s?path=PAuth/BTI&project=stage-…> features. +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI | +=======+==============+=======+=====+ | 0 | none | N | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 1 | standard | Y | Y | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 2 | pac-ret | Y | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature. Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it. <snip> Thanks, Varun ________________________________ This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. ________________________________

6 years, 1 month

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Trusted Firmware-A 2.3 release candidate tags created

by Bipin Ravi

All, We have applied the release candidate tags(v2.3-rc0<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/tag/?h=v2.3-rc0>) to the TF-A source and TF-A tests trees as part of the upcoming TF-A v2.3 release. Please use these tags to perform any platform specific tests planned. https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/ https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/ Thanks & best regards, [cid:image001.jpg@01D60DB5.48537900] Bipin Ravi | Principal Design Enginee Bipin.ravi(a)arm.com<mailto:Bipin.ravi@arm.com> | Skype: Bipin.Ravi.ARM Direct: +1-512-225 -1071 | Mobile: +1-214-212-0794 5707 Southwest Parkway, Suite 100, Austin, TX 78735

6 years, 1 month

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 3 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 3 of 3 defect(s) ** CID 355490: Uninitialized variables (UNINIT) /plat/brcm/board/stingray/src/paxb.c: 516 in pcie_cores_init() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 355490: Uninitialized variables (UNINIT) /plat/brcm/board/stingray/src/paxb.c: 516 in pcie_cores_init() 510 511 pcie_core_soft_reset(core_idx); 512 513 VERBOSE("PCIe core %u is powered up\n", core_idx); 514 } 515 >>> CID 355490: Uninitialized variables (UNINIT) >>> Using uninitialized value "ret". 516 return ret; 517 } 518 519 void paxb_rc_cfg_write(unsigned int core_idx, unsigned int where, 520 uint32_t val) 521 { ** CID 355489: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT) /plat/brcm/board/stingray/src/bl2_setup.c: 685 in plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 355489: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT) /plat/brcm/board/stingray/src/bl2_setup.c: 685 in plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup() 679 EMMC_ERASE_PARTITION); 680 #endif 681 682 bcm_board_detect(); 683 #ifdef DRIVER_EMMC_ENABLE 684 /* Initialize the card, if it is not */ >>> CID 355489: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT) >>> This less-than-zero comparison of an unsigned value is never true. "bcm_emmc_init(true) < 0U". 685 if (bcm_emmc_init(true) < 0) 686 WARN("eMMC Card Initialization Failed!!!\n"); 687 #endif 688 689 #if BL2_TEST_I2C 690 i2c_test(); ** CID 355488: (VARARGS) /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 251 in bcm_elog() /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 253 in bcm_elog() /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 241 in bcm_elog() /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 234 in bcm_elog() /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 223 in bcm_elog() /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 239 in bcm_elog() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 355488: (VARARGS) /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 251 in bcm_elog() 245 case 'l': 246 bit64 = 1; 247 fmt++; 248 goto loop; 249 case 'u': 250 if (bit64) >>> CID 355488: (VARARGS) >>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start(). 251 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t); 252 else 253 unum = va_arg(args, uint32_t); 254 255 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 10); 256 break; /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 253 in bcm_elog() 247 fmt++; 248 goto loop; 249 case 'u': 250 if (bit64) 251 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t); 252 else >>> CID 355488: (VARARGS) >>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start(). 253 unum = va_arg(args, uint32_t); 254 255 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 10); 256 break; 257 default: 258 /* Exit on any other format specifier */ /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 241 in bcm_elog() 235 elog_string(elog, str); 236 break; 237 case 'x': 238 if (bit64) 239 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t); 240 else >>> CID 355488: (VARARGS) >>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start(). 241 unum = va_arg(args, uint32_t); 242 243 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 16); 244 break; 245 case 'l': 246 bit64 = 1; /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 234 in bcm_elog() 228 } else 229 unum = (unsigned long)num; 230 231 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 10); 232 break; 233 case 's': >>> CID 355488: (VARARGS) >>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start(). 234 str = va_arg(args, char *); 235 elog_string(elog, str); 236 break; 237 case 'x': 238 if (bit64) 239 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t); /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 223 in bcm_elog() 217 switch (*fmt) { 218 case 'i': /* Fall through to next one */ 219 case 'd': 220 if (bit64) 221 num = va_arg(args, int64_t); 222 else >>> CID 355488: (VARARGS) >>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start(). 223 num = va_arg(args, int32_t); 224 225 if (num < 0) { 226 elog_putchar(elog, '-'); 227 unum = (unsigned long)-num; 228 } else /plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 239 in bcm_elog() 233 case 's': 234 str = va_arg(args, char *); 235 elog_string(elog, str); 236 break; 237 case 'x': 238 if (bit64) >>> CID 355488: (VARARGS) >>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start(). 239 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t); 240 else 241 unum = va_arg(args, uint32_t); 242 243 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 16); 244 break; ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…

6 years, 1 month

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BRANCH_PROTECTION

by Varun Wadekar

Hello, Can someone please help me understand if 1. a 'value' of '1' for BRANCH_PROTECTION covers the PAuth protection provided by a value of '2' and/or '3'? 2. there is a way to enable BTI and "pac-ret" at the same time? The docs provide this information. <snip> - ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves. If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option ``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use: - 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection - 1: Enables all types of branch protection features - 2: Return address signing to its standard level - 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options and resulting PAuth/BTI<https://tegra-sw-opengrok.nvidia.com/source/s?path=PAuth/BTI&project=stage-…> features. +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI | +=======+==============+=======+=====+ | 0 | none | N | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 1 | standard | Y | Y | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 2 | pac-ret | Y | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ | 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N | +-------+--------------+-------+-----+ This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature. Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it. <snip> Thanks, Varun ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6 years, 1 month

1
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Re: [TF-A] TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 9 Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) - Special session on Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org

by Joanna Farley

I realise non TF-A people may not have access to session conference details. These can be found here: https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-March/000330.html From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Joanna Farley via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Joanna Farley <Joanna.Farley(a)arm.com> Date: Tuesday, 7 April 2020 at 18:10 To: tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: "tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, "op-tee(a)linaro.org" <op-tee(a)linaro.org> Subject: [TF-A] TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 9 Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) - Special session on Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Hi All, The third TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 9th Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. For this special session I have also copied the TF-M, TSC and OPTEE mailing lists as the subject may interest the people subscribed to those lists as there is a cross mailing list discussion currently ongoing. Agenda: * Overview of the Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects by Sandrine Bailleux * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions Thanks Joanna IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 9 Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) - Special session on Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The third TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 9th Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. For this special session I have also copied the TF-M, TSC and OPTEE mailing lists as the subject may interest the people subscribed to those lists as there is a cross mailing list discussion currently ongoing. Agenda: * Overview of the Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects by Sandrine Bailleux * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions Thanks Joanna IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [TF-TSC] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Joakim, On 4/2/20 10:18 AM, Joakim Bech via TF-A wrote: > Hi Sandrine, > > On Wed, Apr 01, 2020 at 11:46:20AM +0200, Sandrine Bailleux wrote: >> Hi Joakim, >> >> On 4/1/20 10:08 AM, Joakim Bech via TSC wrote: >>> How that works in practice is that all OP-TEE maintainers are adding >>> their "Tested-by" (see example [2]) tag for the platform they maintain >>> when we're doing a release. If there are platforms with no "Tested-by" >>> tag, then they simply end up with the "last known version". >> >> I think that's a very good idea! >> > The "Tested-by" part for OP-TEE releases has been working pretty good, > not sure how scalable it is the long run though. To give some more > info regarding the "last known version", we even at one point had some > stop-light for that. I.e. if a maintainer missed testing a release once, > then it became "orange". If missed twice, then it became "red" and we > showed last know supported version. But we dropped that idea a short > while after introducing it. May I know why you dropped the idea? Was it too much maintenance? If that's the reason I guess again this could be addressed with some automation work (generating the stop-light status from the commit message info). >>> However, to keep that up-to-date, it requires some discipline from the >>> people maintaining such a table ... something that we in the OP-TEE >>> project haven't been very good at :) >> >> Can't this be automated, such that it doesn't need to be manually kept >> up-to-date? I imagine we could have some tools generating the platform >> support table out of such a commit message. >> > Indeed it could, it's just a matter of doing some scripting if one > doesn't want to do it manually. I already have Python scripts pulling > all tags from GitHub pull requests. But there are of course several > other ways how one could pull that kind of information. Regards, Sandrine

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [EXTERNAL] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Erik, On 4/1/20 9:24 PM, Shreve, Erik via TF-A wrote: > Sandrine, > > To clarify on functionality vs. support. I listed out a support life cycle consisting of the following states: > Fully Supported > Orphan > Out of Date > Deprecated > These states are intended to have nothing to do with functionality, but only the support offered for the functionality that currently exists for a platform. > > I think I may have confused things when I listed "Functional Support" as the heading to represent "Functionality." > I'm proposing that the supported "Functionality" should be documented in a standard way (within a project) for every platform. > > I do agree this could be burdensome to keep up with. But that is why I suggested that the project's feature list be versioned. The platform's supported feature list document would reference the version of the project feature list used. Platform maintainers then don' t have to continuously update the document. But it will be clear how long it has been since they did update and thus what information may be missing. Versioning the feature list document is also why I mentioned that the project version number may want to adopt a version number scheme where feature changes are represented by a certain part of the version number. For example Semantic Versioning 2.0.0: https://semver.org/. Hope that clarifies the intent? For implementation of this I'm imagining each project could create a supported_feature_list.rst file and each platform would copy that file into their platform doc folder and fill it in. I'm not saying that approach would be required at tf.org level, just sharing to further illustrate. > > That said, perhaps the implementation details for a project would not warrant such a document per platform? My primary concern around this is misuse/misconfiguration. If a platform doesn't support a feature or configuration it may not be obvious to a user unless an error is generated at build or run-time. OK, I think I get the idea now, thanks for the explanations. This looks reasonable to me. The idea of keeping a project's feature list being mirrored and filled in per platform sounds like something we would want to enforce at the tf.org level IMO. At the same time, this could also be handled at the build system level as you pointed out, or more precisely by the configuration manager. I am thinking about the Linux kernel, where support for a particular feature is handled (and documented) through the KConfig system. This might be a more scalable approach. And it doesn't prevent us from also auto-generating some feature list out of the Kconfig files for making this information more accessible to users. > My secondary concern is being able to consistently track tickets/bugs with features. Thus, I'm recommending that the features on that list be used with the ticket/issue system by feature name. This would allow users to find all bugs for Feature X on Platform Y in Project Z. > Related to that, when I mentioned "tags." I wasn't thinking of Git tags, but "labels" in the ticket/issue tracking system(s). Different systems work differently for labeling/categorizing issues, but the goal is to provide a consistent way (per project) to find issues related to a feature on a platform. > > If requiring a feature list it is too much at the tf.org level then I'll be satisfied to push for that kind of documentation in the projects or platforms I'm involved in if/as appropriate. Yes, good point, I think it would be desirable to be able to tie tickets to some specific platform/feature/version. And I think it makes sense to unify this across tf.org projects. > Regarding the other conversational tidbits: > > Thanks for pointing out that the original proposal does say "builds all configurations supported by this platform" under "Fully Supported." I can see the intention here now. Substituting "features" for "configurations" would broaden the meaning a bit. OK, I will change the wording, thanks for the suggestion. > You said: "I am starting to think that we need a list of items to be defined per project." > Yes, this sounds like a great idea. > > My original mention of wanting a "stronger standard put forth for platform documentation" was a response to seeing "Limited Support" in the original proposal allowing documentation to fall out of date. > > > Hope that clarifies some of my thoughts. If not, I'm happy to continue the discussion. Thanks again for taking feedback! > > Erik Shreve, PSEM > Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) > > -----Original Message----- > From: Sandrine Bailleux [mailto:sandrine.bailleux@arm.com] > Sent: Wednesday, April 01, 2020 4:18 AM > To: Shreve, Erik; tf-a; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; op-tee(a)linaro.org > Cc: nd(a)arm.com > Subject: Re: [EXTERNAL] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects > > Hello Erik, > > Thanks for the feedback. > > On 3/26/20 3:37 PM, Shreve, Erik wrote: >> Sandrine, >> >> Really glad to see this being pulled together. A couple of areas of feedback around the Platform Support Life Cycle. >> >> As previously mentioned there are two orthogonal concerns captured in the current life cycle: Support and Functionality. >> I'd like to see these split out. > > Yes, you are the second person to mention that and I agree with you > both. Unless someone disagrees, I intend to update the proposal and > separate these 2 concepts in the next version of the document. > >> For functionality, chip vendors may not have a business case for supporting all features on a given platform but they may provide full support for the features they have chosen to include. >> A simple example would be supporting PSA FF Isolation Level 1 only due to lack of HW isolation support needed to achieve Isolation Level 2 or greater. > > I completely agree. It would not make sense to support all features on > all platforms just for the sake of completeness. Each platform ought to > implement what is relevant in its case. > > That's what the current proposal tried to convey: a fully supported > platform must "build all configurations *supported by this platform*" > and "All *supported* configurations are tested in the CI". The key word > here is supported and that would be defined by the platform itself. But > I can see that maybe this wasn't clear enough. Your proposal below makes > that a lot clearer. > >> Also, I'd like to see a stronger standard put forth for platform documentation. If a platform is "supported," I believe the documentation should be complete and accurate. A lack of complete and clear documentation leaves open a wide door for misuse/misconfiguration which could result in a vulnerable system. > > Fair point. > > But is it something we should include in this proposal or should we push > it to a separate document setting expectations for the project's > documentation, which the current general proposal could refer to (as in, > "the platform should provide quality documentation up to the project's > criteria defined in document XXX')? > > This is definitely an important topic but I am wary of keeping the > tf.org proposal concise and focused at this point. I am worried that if > we put too much stuff in it discussions will diverge too much and we > might never reach an agreement. > > The same applies to testing standards for example, we could detail that > in the proposal or simply leave it to projects to define it separately. > >> Here is a more concrete proposal: >> >> Functional Support: >> Each project shall provide a standard feature or functionality list. >> Each platform shall include in its documentation a copy of this list with the supported functionality marked as supported. >> The platform documentation may reference a ticket if support is planned but not yet present. >> The platform documentation shall explicitly state if a feature or function has no plans for support. > > Regarding the last item, this would require all platform maintainers to > update their documentation every time a new feature is added to the > project's global list of features. This seems too much of a constraint > and unnecessary maintenance burden to me. > > I think a better, more lightweight alternative might be to let platform > maintainers list what's supported and if some feature is not listed, it > implies that it is not supported. This does not prevent platform > maintainers from indicating their future plans of supporting a feature > if they want to. > >> The feature/functionality list shall be versioned, with the version tied to the release version(s) of the project. >> In this way, it will be clear if a platform was last officially updated for version X but the project is currently at version Y > X. > > I can see that Joakim Bech proposed something similar, with more details > about how this was implemented for OP-TEE. > >> Note: projects will need to adopt (if they have not already) a version scheme that distinguishes between feature updates and bug fixes. > > Sorry I didn't get this, could you please elaborate? > >> Each project and platform shall use tags or similar functionality on tickets to associate tickets to features/functionality and platforms. >> If the names of tags can't match the name of the feature or platform exactly then a mapping shall be provided in the appropriate document(s). > > If there's no appropriate tag in some cases, I guess we could always use > a git SHA1 of a specific commit. > >> Life Cycle State >> >> Fully Supported >> There is (at least) one active code owner for this platform. >> All supported features build and either all tests pass or failures are associated with tracked known issues. >> Other (not associated to a test) Known Issues are tracked >> Documentation is up to date >> >> Note: Projects should document standards on how "active" code ownership is measured and >> further document standards on how code owners are warned about impending life cycle state changes. > > Yes, good point, that is currently undefined in the proposal but I agree > that it needs defining per project. I will add an item in the last > section of the document. > > I am starting to think that we need a list of items to be defined per > project. This list would complement the general tf.org proposal. Things > like code owners/maintainers activity, code review timelines, and so on. > >> >> Orphan >> There is no active code owner >> All supported features build and either all tests pass or failures are associated with tracked known issues. >> Other (not associated to a test) Known Issues may not have been maintained (as there is no active code owner) >> Documentation status is unclear since there is no active code owner. >> There has been no change to the feature/functionality list in the project since the platform was last "Fully Supported" > > I am confused, you said earlier that you would like to see the concepts > of support and functionality split out, but here you're listing 'orphan' > as one of the possible states... Did I miss your point? > >> Out of date >> Same as orphan, but either: >> there have been changes to the feature/functionality list, or >> there are failing tests without tracked tickets, or >> there are known documentation issues. >> >> Deprecated >> Same as Out of Date, but the build is broken. Platform may be removed from the project codebase in the future. >> >> Erik Shreve, PSEM >> Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development)

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data

by Louis Mayencourt

Hi Raghu, I do agree with you: case 2 and 3 are similar (wrongly formed DTB) and should lead to the same behavior. A mandatory property miss or a hit with a structurally incorrect node means that the DTB doesn't follow the provided binding document. Such a DTB shouldn't be considered as valid and should trigger a build failure and/or a code panic. With the current implementation, case 2 and 3 are similar. The property_getter() functions expect a specific format of the node. If a node is not found or structurally incorrect, the function will return an error code, which will lead to a panic(). regards, Louis ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 06 April 2020 19:51 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data Thanks Louis. This new terminology helps. Let me spell this out again just to make sure we're on the same page. The following are the cases: 1) Mandatory Property hit, nodes are structurally correct - Works normally. 2) Mandatory Property hit, nodes are structurally *incorrect* - Asserts should catch structural issues during development because system integrator expected to not make mistakes with number of nodes etc. 3) Mandatory Property miss - Panic(). Why is this case causing a panic, but not case 2? You are allowing for some one to make the mistake of not having a mandatory property, but assume that if a mandatory property is present, it is always structurally sound. This is the part i have a problem with. In my view case 2 and case 3 should panic and code should not just assert on mandatory properties and must ALWAYS check for structural soundness of an FDT property. Similarly there are 3 cases for optional properties. My question: Why does case 3 panic, but not case 2 ? It sounds like your assumption is that case 2 cannot happen. If case 2 cannot happen, i claim that case 3 cannot happen either. Let me know what you think! Thanks Raghu On 4/6/20 3:57 AM, Louis Mayencourt via TF-A wrote: > Hi Raghu, > > Let me try to clarify/reword my idea: > > We complete the fconf documentation with a binding document, which > defines the nodes that should be present in the config DTB to consider > it as valid/well-formed. The document contains two kinds of node: > > * mandatory (critical): the firmware can't proceed without this > information (example: load address, image UUID, ...). If this node > is not present in the DTS, the build fails and/or the code panic. > > * optional (no-critical): the firmware can assume or assign a default > value and proceed (example: uart config, enable authentication flag, > ...). Such a property is used to influence the default behavior of > the firmware. > > />> This is non-deterministic failure./ > The miss of a mandatory (critical) node will always lead to a build > failure / code panic. > The miss of an optional (no-critical) node should not influence the > default behavior of the firmware. > > />> Is it not confusing to make the assumption that a DTB is "well > formed",i.e expect the build process/integrator to not mess up the >>> structure or number of nodes but allow the same integrator to miss a critical property in the DTB?/ > A DTB with a missing mandatory (critical) property should not be > considered well formed. > > />> If there is a missing critical property, is that not a badly formed > DTB?/ > With the above definition, it is. > > />> And if so, why not check for badly formed DTB's uniformly in code > and why only check for missing "critical" properties?/ > With the rewording of "critical" / "no-critical" to "mandatory" / > "optional", I think the situation is clearer: A DTB with a missing > "optional" node/property is is still considered well-formed. > > I hope I answered your questions and clarify the idea behind the design. > > regards, > Louis > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Raghu Krishnamurthy <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> > *Sent:* 05 April 2020 00:06 > *To:* Louis Mayencourt <Louis.Mayencourt(a)arm.com> > *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data > Thanks Louis. > >>you can imagine a well-formed DTB which contain a > >>critical set of properties and can contain some optional properties. > > This makes things even more confusing. The assumption we are asking code > to make is that the DTB is always "well formed", ie don't check for > structural issues such as extra nodes etc, but we are still making the > distinctions between critical and non-critical properties, that may or > may not exist in the DTB, which may or may not cause a panic. This is > non-deterministic failure. > Is it not confusing to make the assumption that a DTB is "well > formed",i.e expect the build process/integrator to not mess up the > structure or number of nodes but allow the same integrator to miss a > critical property in the DTB? If there is a missing critical property, > is that not a badly formed DTB ? And if so, why not check for badly > formed DTB's uniformly in code and why only check for missing "critical" > properties? > > -Raghu > > On 4/3/20 3:16 AM, Louis Mayencourt wrote: >> Hi Raghu, >> >> I do agree that we need something similar to a binding document for >> fconf properties. (similar to >> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3694/2/docs/…). > >> At least for the common properties. >> >> The main idea behind the return code of the populator function was to >> allow the code to handle no-critical property misses or to handle >> critical failure by calling a platform hook. >> With this in mind, you can imagine a well-formed DTB which contain a >> critical set of properties and can contain some optional properties. The >> return code and the populator "name" / "config" can be used to handle >> this two cases. >> >> I tried to keep the design of fconf really simple, to leave room for >> improvement according to feedbacks. Thanks for helping improving it! >> >> Regards, >> Louis >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu >> Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> >> *Sent:* 03 April 2020 10:15 >> *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> >> *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data >> A further point is that the fconf populators return an error code and >> panics on error today. But if we are making the assumption that the >> DTB's are well formed, do we really need to fail or even return an error >> code? >> >> -Raghu >> >> On 4/3/20 1:51 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A wrote: >>> Hi All, (Sorry for the long email) >>> >>> The review >>> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3845 >>> attempts to fix bounds check in the fconf populator code for the >>> topology and SP's. During review, Sandrine thoughtfully pointed out that >>> there were discussions around bounds check along the same lines in the >>> review >>> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3492 and >>> it was deemed sufficient to have assertions in code and it was safe to >>> make the assumption that the DTB is always well formed and contains >>> valid values. I think this email mostly echoes Sandrine's concern from >>> review 3492. >>> >>> While i agree with the assumptions, I am generally of the opinion that >>> we should validate/range-check any data, even if it is signed. Being >>> signed does not necessarily mean the data is well formed/valid. If there >>> is a mistake in the build process and it is validly signed, it is >>> possible that we silently corrupt state/data that could later be used to >>> exploit firmware and/or make debugging hard. This is probably far >>> fetched, but the cost of adding the check is trivial to avoid this >>> possibility. >>> >>> I imagine the case where you have secure partitions signed by different >>> entity other than the silicon provider(dual root-of-trust). A silicon >>> provider provides a dev system for the SP provider to test and validate >>> the SP's on silicon. The silicon has production firmware(and hence no >>> assertions), but loads signed data from the SP provider which has some >>> invalid values. There could be silent corruption without any indication >>> whatsoever about what went wrong and it may be hard to debug if/when >>> there are issues. >>> Also, testing does not necessarily catch all invalid values since you >>> will likely not get 100% coverage, given the number of config options >>> available. Moreover, the code today, is not consistent in asserting on >>> every property for valid values and the failure mode is not >>> consistent/deterministic. It seems like every config option should have >>> a list of valid values or a range of acceptable values that must be at a >>> minimum asserted on. >>> I also wouldn't discount platforms such as RPI, where TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT >>> is likely to be turned off since it really does not provide any >>> security, so assuming we always have signed data might not be valid. >>> >>> Anyway, is this decision worth revisiting? Too paranoid perhaps? :P >>> >>> >>> Thanks >>> Raghu >> -- >> TF-A mailing list >> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are >> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended >> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the >> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy >> the information in any medium. Thank you. > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy > the information in any medium. Thank you. > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

Thanks Louis. This new terminology helps. Let me spell this out again just to make sure we're on the same page. The following are the cases: 1) Mandatory Property hit, nodes are structurally correct - Works normally. 2) Mandatory Property hit, nodes are structurally *incorrect* - Asserts should catch structural issues during development because system integrator expected to not make mistakes with number of nodes etc. 3) Mandatory Property miss - Panic(). Why is this case causing a panic, but not case 2? You are allowing for some one to make the mistake of not having a mandatory property, but assume that if a mandatory property is present, it is always structurally sound. This is the part i have a problem with. In my view case 2 and case 3 should panic and code should not just assert on mandatory properties and must ALWAYS check for structural soundness of an FDT property. Similarly there are 3 cases for optional properties. My question: Why does case 3 panic, but not case 2 ? It sounds like your assumption is that case 2 cannot happen. If case 2 cannot happen, i claim that case 3 cannot happen either. Let me know what you think! Thanks Raghu On 4/6/20 3:57 AM, Louis Mayencourt via TF-A wrote: > Hi Raghu, > > Let me try to clarify/reword my idea: > > We complete the fconf documentation with a binding document, which > defines the nodes that should be present in the config DTB to consider > it as valid/well-formed. The document contains two kinds of node: > > * mandatory (critical): the firmware can't proceed without this > information (example: load address, image UUID, ...). If this node > is not present in the DTS, the build fails and/or the code panic. > > * optional (no-critical): the firmware can assume or assign a default > value and proceed (example: uart config, enable authentication flag, > ...). Such a property is used to influence the default behavior of > the firmware. > > />> This is non-deterministic failure./ > The miss of a mandatory (critical) node will always lead to a build > failure / code panic. > The miss of an optional (no-critical) node should not influence the > default behavior of the firmware. > > />> Is it not confusing to make the assumption that a DTB is "well > formed",i.e expect the build process/integrator to not mess up the >>> structure or number of nodes but allow the same integrator to miss a critical property in the DTB?/ > A DTB with a missing mandatory (critical) property should not be > considered well formed. > > />> If there is a missing critical property, is that not a badly formed > DTB?/ > With the above definition, it is. > > />> And if so, why not check for badly formed DTB's uniformly in code > and why only check for missing "critical" properties?/ > With the rewording of "critical" / "no-critical" to "mandatory" / > "optional", I think the situation is clearer: A DTB with a missing > "optional" node/property is is still considered well-formed. > > I hope I answered your questions and clarify the idea behind the design. > > regards, > Louis > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Raghu Krishnamurthy <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> > *Sent:* 05 April 2020 00:06 > *To:* Louis Mayencourt <Louis.Mayencourt(a)arm.com> > *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data > Thanks Louis. > >>you can imagine a well-formed DTB which contain a > >>critical set of properties and can contain some optional properties. > > This makes things even more confusing. The assumption we are asking code > to make is that the DTB is always "well formed", ie don't check for > structural issues such as extra nodes etc, but we are still making the > distinctions between critical and non-critical properties, that may or > may not exist in the DTB, which may or may not cause a panic. This is > non-deterministic failure. > Is it not confusing to make the assumption that a DTB is "well > formed",i.e expect the build process/integrator to not mess up the > structure or number of nodes but allow the same integrator to miss a > critical property in the DTB? If there is a missing critical property, > is that not a badly formed DTB ? And if so, why not check for badly > formed DTB's uniformly in code and why only check for missing "critical" > properties? > > -Raghu > > On 4/3/20 3:16 AM, Louis Mayencourt wrote: >> Hi Raghu, >> >> I do agree that we need something similar to a binding document for >> fconf properties. (similar to >> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3694/2/docs/…). > >> At least for the common properties. >> >> The main idea behind the return code of the populator function was to >> allow the code to handle no-critical property misses or to handle >> critical failure by calling a platform hook. >> With this in mind, you can imagine a well-formed DTB which contain a >> critical set of properties and can contain some optional properties. The >> return code and the populator "name" / "config" can be used to handle >> this two cases. >> >> I tried to keep the design of fconf really simple, to leave room for >> improvement according to feedbacks. Thanks for helping improving it! >> >> Regards, >> Louis >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu >> Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> >> *Sent:* 03 April 2020 10:15 >> *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> >> *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data >> A further point is that the fconf populators return an error code and >> panics on error today. But if we are making the assumption that the >> DTB's are well formed, do we really need to fail or even return an error >> code? >> >> -Raghu >> >> On 4/3/20 1:51 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A wrote: >>> Hi All, (Sorry for the long email) >>> >>> The review >>> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3845 >>> attempts to fix bounds check in the fconf populator code for the >>> topology and SP's. During review, Sandrine thoughtfully pointed out that >>> there were discussions around bounds check along the same lines in the >>> review >>> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3492 and >>> it was deemed sufficient to have assertions in code and it was safe to >>> make the assumption that the DTB is always well formed and contains >>> valid values. I think this email mostly echoes Sandrine's concern from >>> review 3492. >>> >>> While i agree with the assumptions, I am generally of the opinion that >>> we should validate/range-check any data, even if it is signed. Being >>> signed does not necessarily mean the data is well formed/valid. If there >>> is a mistake in the build process and it is validly signed, it is >>> possible that we silently corrupt state/data that could later be used to >>> exploit firmware and/or make debugging hard. This is probably far >>> fetched, but the cost of adding the check is trivial to avoid this >>> possibility. >>> >>> I imagine the case where you have secure partitions signed by different >>> entity other than the silicon provider(dual root-of-trust). A silicon >>> provider provides a dev system for the SP provider to test and validate >>> the SP's on silicon. The silicon has production firmware(and hence no >>> assertions), but loads signed data from the SP provider which has some >>> invalid values. There could be silent corruption without any indication >>> whatsoever about what went wrong and it may be hard to debug if/when >>> there are issues. >>> Also, testing does not necessarily catch all invalid values since you >>> will likely not get 100% coverage, given the number of config options >>> available. Moreover, the code today, is not consistent in asserting on >>> every property for valid values and the failure mode is not >>> consistent/deterministic. It seems like every config option should have >>> a list of valid values or a range of acceptable values that must be at a >>> minimum asserted on. >>> I also wouldn't discount platforms such as RPI, where TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT >>> is likely to be turned off since it really does not provide any >>> security, so assuming we always have signed data might not be valid. >>> >>> Anyway, is this decision worth revisiting? Too paranoid perhaps? :P >>> >>> >>> Thanks >>> Raghu >> -- >> TF-A mailing list >> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are >> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended >> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the >> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy >> the information in any medium. Thank you. > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy > the information in any medium. Thank you. >

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data

by Louis Mayencourt

Hi Raghu, Let me try to clarify/reword my idea: We complete the fconf documentation with a binding document, which defines the nodes that should be present in the config DTB to consider it as valid/well-formed. The document contains two kinds of node: * mandatory (critical): the firmware can't proceed without this information (example: load address, image UUID, ...). If this node is not present in the DTS, the build fails and/or the code panic. * optional (no-critical): the firmware can assume or assign a default value and proceed (example: uart config, enable authentication flag, ...). Such a property is used to influence the default behavior of the firmware. >> This is non-deterministic failure. The miss of a mandatory (critical) node will always lead to a build failure / code panic. The miss of an optional (no-critical) node should not influence the default behavior of the firmware. >> Is it not confusing to make the assumption that a DTB is "well formed",i.e expect the build process/integrator to not mess up the >> structure or number of nodes but allow the same integrator to miss a critical property in the DTB? A DTB with a missing mandatory (critical) property should not be considered well formed. >> If there is a missing critical property, is that not a badly formed DTB? With the above definition, it is. >> And if so, why not check for badly formed DTB's uniformly in code and why only check for missing "critical" properties? With the rewording of "critical" / "no-critical" to "mandatory" / "optional", I think the situation is clearer: A DTB with a missing "optional" node/property is is still considered well-formed. I hope I answered your questions and clarify the idea behind the design. regards, Louis ________________________________ From: Raghu Krishnamurthy <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> Sent: 05 April 2020 00:06 To: Louis Mayencourt <Louis.Mayencourt(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data Thanks Louis. >>you can imagine a well-formed DTB which contain a >>critical set of properties and can contain some optional properties. This makes things even more confusing. The assumption we are asking code to make is that the DTB is always "well formed", ie don't check for structural issues such as extra nodes etc, but we are still making the distinctions between critical and non-critical properties, that may or may not exist in the DTB, which may or may not cause a panic. This is non-deterministic failure. Is it not confusing to make the assumption that a DTB is "well formed",i.e expect the build process/integrator to not mess up the structure or number of nodes but allow the same integrator to miss a critical property in the DTB? If there is a missing critical property, is that not a badly formed DTB ? And if so, why not check for badly formed DTB's uniformly in code and why only check for missing "critical" properties? -Raghu On 4/3/20 3:16 AM, Louis Mayencourt wrote: > Hi Raghu, > > I do agree that we need something similar to a binding document for > fconf properties. (similar to > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3694/2/docs/…). > At least for the common properties. > > The main idea behind the return code of the populator function was to > allow the code to handle no-critical property misses or to handle > critical failure by calling a platform hook. > With this in mind, you can imagine a well-formed DTB which contain a > critical set of properties and can contain some optional properties. The > return code and the populator "name" / "config" can be used to handle > this two cases. > > I tried to keep the design of fconf really simple, to leave room for > improvement according to feedbacks. Thanks for helping improving it! > > Regards, > Louis > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu > Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Sent:* 03 April 2020 10:15 > *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data > A further point is that the fconf populators return an error code and > panics on error today. But if we are making the assumption that the > DTB's are well formed, do we really need to fail or even return an error > code? > > -Raghu > > On 4/3/20 1:51 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A wrote: >> Hi All, (Sorry for the long email) >> >> The review >> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3845 >> attempts to fix bounds check in the fconf populator code for the >> topology and SP's. During review, Sandrine thoughtfully pointed out that >> there were discussions around bounds check along the same lines in the >> review >> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3492 and >> it was deemed sufficient to have assertions in code and it was safe to >> make the assumption that the DTB is always well formed and contains >> valid values. I think this email mostly echoes Sandrine's concern from >> review 3492. >> >> While i agree with the assumptions, I am generally of the opinion that >> we should validate/range-check any data, even if it is signed. Being >> signed does not necessarily mean the data is well formed/valid. If there >> is a mistake in the build process and it is validly signed, it is >> possible that we silently corrupt state/data that could later be used to >> exploit firmware and/or make debugging hard. This is probably far >> fetched, but the cost of adding the check is trivial to avoid this >> possibility. >> >> I imagine the case where you have secure partitions signed by different >> entity other than the silicon provider(dual root-of-trust). A silicon >> provider provides a dev system for the SP provider to test and validate >> the SP's on silicon. The silicon has production firmware(and hence no >> assertions), but loads signed data from the SP provider which has some >> invalid values. There could be silent corruption without any indication >> whatsoever about what went wrong and it may be hard to debug if/when >> there are issues. >> Also, testing does not necessarily catch all invalid values since you >> will likely not get 100% coverage, given the number of config options >> available. Moreover, the code today, is not consistent in asserting on >> every property for valid values and the failure mode is not >> consistent/deterministic. It seems like every config option should have >> a list of valid values or a range of acceptable values that must be at a >> minimum asserted on. >> I also wouldn't discount platforms such as RPI, where TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT >> is likely to be turned off since it really does not provide any >> security, so assuming we always have signed data might not be valid. >> >> Anyway, is this decision worth revisiting? Too paranoid perhaps? :P >> >> >> Thanks >> Raghu > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy > the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

+tf-a list On 4/4/20 4:06 PM, Raghu Krishnamurthy wrote: > Thanks Louis. > >>you can imagine a well-formed DTB which contain a > >>critical set of properties and can contain some optional properties. > > This makes things even more confusing. The assumption we are asking code > to make is that the DTB is always "well formed", ie don't check for > structural issues such as extra nodes etc, but we are still making the > distinctions between critical and non-critical properties, that may or > may not exist in the DTB, which may or may not cause a panic. This is > non-deterministic failure. > Is it not confusing to make the assumption that a DTB is "well > formed",i.e expect the build process/integrator to not mess up the > structure or number of nodes but allow the same integrator to miss a > critical property in the DTB? If there is a missing critical property, > is that not a badly formed DTB ? And if so, why not check for badly > formed DTB's uniformly in code and why only check for missing "critical" > properties? > > -Raghu > > On 4/3/20 3:16 AM, Louis Mayencourt wrote: >> Hi Raghu, >> >> I do agree that we need something similar to a binding document for >> fconf properties. (similar to >> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3694/2/docs/…). >> At least for the common properties. >> >> The main idea behind the return code of the populator function was to >> allow the code to handle no-critical property misses or to handle >> critical failure by calling a platform hook. >> With this in mind, you can imagine a well-formed DTB which contain a >> critical set of properties and can contain some optional properties. >> The return code and the populator "name" / "config" can be used to >> handle this two cases. >> >> I tried to keep the design of fconf really simple, to leave room for >> improvement according to feedbacks. Thanks for helping improving it! >> >> Regards, >> Louis >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of >> Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> >> *Sent:* 03 April 2020 10:15 >> *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> >> *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data >> A further point is that the fconf populators return an error code and >> panics on error today. But if we are making the assumption that the >> DTB's are well formed, do we really need to fail or even return an error >> code? >> >> -Raghu >> >> On 4/3/20 1:51 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A wrote: >>> Hi All, (Sorry for the long email) >>> >>> The review >>> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3845 >>> attempts to fix bounds check in the fconf populator code for the >>> topology and SP's. During review, Sandrine thoughtfully pointed out >>> that there were discussions around bounds check along the same lines >>> in the review >>> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3492 and >>> it was deemed sufficient to have assertions in code and it was safe >>> to make the assumption that the DTB is always well formed and >>> contains valid values. I think this email mostly echoes Sandrine's >>> concern from review 3492. >>> >>> While i agree with the assumptions, I am generally of the opinion >>> that we should validate/range-check any data, even if it is signed. >>> Being signed does not necessarily mean the data is well formed/valid. >>> If there is a mistake in the build process and it is validly signed, >>> it is possible that we silently corrupt state/data that could later >>> be used to exploit firmware and/or make debugging hard. This is >>> probably far fetched, but the cost of adding the check is trivial to >>> avoid this possibility. >>> >>> I imagine the case where you have secure partitions signed by >>> different entity other than the silicon provider(dual root-of-trust). >>> A silicon provider provides a dev system for the SP provider to test >>> and validate the SP's on silicon. The silicon has production >>> firmware(and hence no assertions), but loads signed data from the SP >>> provider which has some invalid values. There could be silent >>> corruption without any indication whatsoever about what went wrong >>> and it may be hard to debug if/when there are issues. >>> Also, testing does not necessarily catch all invalid values since you >>> will likely not get 100% coverage, given the number of config options >>> available. Moreover, the code today, is not consistent in asserting >>> on every property for valid values and the failure mode is not >>> consistent/deterministic. It seems like every config option should >>> have a list of valid values or a range of acceptable values that must >>> be at a minimum asserted on. >>> I also wouldn't discount platforms such as RPI, where >>> TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT is likely to be turned off since it really does >>> not provide any security, so assuming we always have signed data >>> might not be valid. >>> >>> Anyway, is this decision worth revisiting? Too paranoid perhaps? :P >>> >>> >>> Thanks >>> Raghu >> -- >> TF-A mailing list >> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are >> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended >> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose >> the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or >> copy the information in any medium. Thank you. >

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Change in ...trusted-firmware-a[integration]: Check for out-of-bound accesses in the CoT description

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Raghu, On 4/3/20 1:38 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A wrote: > Thanks Sandrine. Patches look good. Thanks for the review! > I realized after looking at things a little closer that i had > misunderstood how fconf works for io policies. I thought the image id's > themselves came from the config files and not just the UUID's, which is > why i was worried about bounds check, since the id was coming from an > external source(trusted or untrusted, depending on if it is signed data > or not). > This also made me realize that we are using another table built into > code, to convert from image id to UUID for io policies. Is there a > reason image id's also can't be discovered from the config file? I remember some internal discussions around this topic a few weeks ago. If I recall correctly, the current thinking is that down the line, we would like to move image IDs to DTBs but this looks complicated to achieve today because image IDs are used by several components in TF-A to tie things together. More work would be needed to abstract this properly everywhere. I think other folks in the team (Olivier? Manish? Louis?) might be able to comment further on this. Regards, Sandrine IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

1
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0 0

Re: [TF-A] fconf: Validating config data

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

A further point is that the fconf populators return an error code and panics on error today. But if we are making the assumption that the DTB's are well formed, do we really need to fail or even return an error code? -Raghu On 4/3/20 1:51 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A wrote: > Hi All, (Sorry for the long email) > > The review > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3845 > attempts to fix bounds check in the fconf populator code for the > topology and SP's. During review, Sandrine thoughtfully pointed out that > there were discussions around bounds check along the same lines in the > review > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3492 and > it was deemed sufficient to have assertions in code and it was safe to > make the assumption that the DTB is always well formed and contains > valid values. I think this email mostly echoes Sandrine's concern from > review 3492. > > While i agree with the assumptions, I am generally of the opinion that > we should validate/range-check any data, even if it is signed. Being > signed does not necessarily mean the data is well formed/valid. If there > is a mistake in the build process and it is validly signed, it is > possible that we silently corrupt state/data that could later be used to > exploit firmware and/or make debugging hard. This is probably far > fetched, but the cost of adding the check is trivial to avoid this > possibility. > > I imagine the case where you have secure partitions signed by different > entity other than the silicon provider(dual root-of-trust). A silicon > provider provides a dev system for the SP provider to test and validate > the SP's on silicon. The silicon has production firmware(and hence no > assertions), but loads signed data from the SP provider which has some > invalid values. There could be silent corruption without any indication > whatsoever about what went wrong and it may be hard to debug if/when > there are issues. > Also, testing does not necessarily catch all invalid values since you > will likely not get 100% coverage, given the number of config options > available. Moreover, the code today, is not consistent in asserting on > every property for valid values and the failure mode is not > consistent/deterministic. It seems like every config option should have > a list of valid values or a range of acceptable values that must be at a > minimum asserted on. > I also wouldn't discount platforms such as RPI, where TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT > is likely to be turned off since it really does not provide any > security, so assuming we always have signed data might not be valid. > > Anyway, is this decision worth revisiting? Too paranoid perhaps? :P > > > Thanks > Raghu

6 years, 1 month

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fconf: Validating config data

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

Hi All, (Sorry for the long email) The review https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3845 attempts to fix bounds check in the fconf populator code for the topology and SP's. During review, Sandrine thoughtfully pointed out that there were discussions around bounds check along the same lines in the review https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3492 and it was deemed sufficient to have assertions in code and it was safe to make the assumption that the DTB is always well formed and contains valid values. I think this email mostly echoes Sandrine's concern from review 3492. While i agree with the assumptions, I am generally of the opinion that we should validate/range-check any data, even if it is signed. Being signed does not necessarily mean the data is well formed/valid. If there is a mistake in the build process and it is validly signed, it is possible that we silently corrupt state/data that could later be used to exploit firmware and/or make debugging hard. This is probably far fetched, but the cost of adding the check is trivial to avoid this possibility. I imagine the case where you have secure partitions signed by different entity other than the silicon provider(dual root-of-trust). A silicon provider provides a dev system for the SP provider to test and validate the SP's on silicon. The silicon has production firmware(and hence no assertions), but loads signed data from the SP provider which has some invalid values. There could be silent corruption without any indication whatsoever about what went wrong and it may be hard to debug if/when there are issues. Also, testing does not necessarily catch all invalid values since you will likely not get 100% coverage, given the number of config options available. Moreover, the code today, is not consistent in asserting on every property for valid values and the failure mode is not consistent/deterministic. It seems like every config option should have a list of valid values or a range of acceptable values that must be at a minimum asserted on. I also wouldn't discount platforms such as RPI, where TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT is likely to be turned off since it really does not provide any security, so assuming we always have signed data might not be valid. Anyway, is this decision worth revisiting? Too paranoid perhaps? :P Thanks Raghu

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Change in ...trusted-firmware-a[integration]: Check for out-of-bound accesses in the CoT description

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

Thanks Sandrine. Patches look good. I realized after looking at things a little closer that i had misunderstood how fconf works for io policies. I thought the image id's themselves came from the config files and not just the UUID's, which is why i was worried about bounds check, since the id was coming from an external source(trusted or untrusted, depending on if it is signed data or not). This also made me realize that we are using another table built into code, to convert from image id to UUID for io policies. Is there a reason image id's also can't be discovered from the config file? -Raghu On 4/2/20 7:17 AM, Sandrine Bailleux (Code Review) wrote: > Hi guys, > > This is the patch I mentioned last Thursday at the TF-A tech call. Sorry > it took me so long to post it. > > View Change > <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3836> > > To view, visit change 3836 > <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3836>. > To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit settings > <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/settings>. > > Gerrit-Project: TF-A/trusted-firmware-a > Gerrit-Branch: integration > Gerrit-Change-Id: Ic5ea20e43cf8ca959bb7f9b60de7c0839b390add > Gerrit-Change-Number: 3836 > Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 > Gerrit-Owner: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux(a)arm.com> > Gerrit-Reviewer: Louis Mayencourt <louis.mayencourt(a)arm.com> > Gerrit-Reviewer: Raghu K <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> > Gerrit-Reviewer: Sandrine Bailleux <sandrine.bailleux(a)arm.com> > Gerrit-Comment-Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2020 14:17:12 +0000 > Gerrit-HasComments: No > Gerrit-Has-Labels: No > Gerrit-MessageType: comment

6 years, 1 month

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 1 of 1 defect(s) ** CID 355446: (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) /mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c: 1713 in x509_get_other_name() /mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c: 1691 in x509_get_other_name() /mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c: 1728 in x509_get_other_name() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 355446: (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) /mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c: 1713 in x509_get_other_name() 1707 other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; 1708 other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.p = p; 1709 other_name->value.hardware_module_name.oid.len = len; 1710 1711 if( p + len >= end ) 1712 { >>> CID 355446: (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) >>> Passing argument "other_name" of type "mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *" and argument "8UL /* sizeof (other_name) */" to function "mbedtls_platform_zeroize" is suspicious. 1713 mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( other_name ) ); 1714 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + 1715 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); 1716 } 1717 p += len; 1718 if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, /mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c: 1691 in x509_get_other_name() 1685 { 1686 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); 1687 } 1688 1689 if( p + len >= end ) 1690 { >>> CID 355446: (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) >>> Passing argument "other_name" of type "mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *" and argument "8UL /* sizeof (other_name) */" to function "mbedtls_platform_zeroize" is suspicious. 1691 mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, sizeof( other_name ) ); 1692 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + 1693 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); 1694 } 1695 p += len; 1696 if( ( ret = mbedtls_asn1_get_tag( &p, end, &len, /mbedtls/library/x509_crt.c: 1728 in x509_get_other_name() 1722 other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.tag = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; 1723 other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.p = p; 1724 other_name->value.hardware_module_name.val.len = len; 1725 p += len; 1726 if( p != end ) 1727 { >>> CID 355446: (SIZEOF_MISMATCH) >>> Passing argument "other_name" of type "mbedtls_x509_san_other_name *" and argument "8UL /* sizeof (other_name) */" to function "mbedtls_platform_zeroize" is suspicious. 1728 mbedtls_platform_zeroize( other_name, 1729 sizeof( other_name ) ); 1730 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_INVALID_EXTENSIONS + 1731 MBEDTLS_ERR_ASN1_LENGTH_MISMATCH ); 1732 } 1733 return( 0 ); ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…

6 years, 1 month

1
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Re: [TF-A] [TF-TSC] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Joakim, On 4/1/20 10:08 AM, Joakim Bech via TSC wrote: > Hi Christian, Sandrine, all, > > On Thu, Mar 26, 2020 at 10:27:14AM +0100, Sandrine Bailleux wrote: >> Hi Christian, >> >> Thanks a lot for the read and the comments! >> >> On 3/25/20 7:05 PM, Christian Daudt wrote: >>> ï¿½The maintenance proposal looks great ! I have some feedback on >>> specific portions: >>> ï¿½1. maintainer/owner/author patches. " Note that roles can be >>> cumulative, in particular the same individual can be both a code owner >>> and a maintainer. In such a scenario, the individual would be able to >>> self-merge a patch solely affecting his module, having the authority to >>> approve it from both a code owner and maintainer's point of view.": I'm >>> always leery of people self-approving their patches. At a minimum, all >>> self-patches should be published and a minimum wait time provided for >>> feedback. Or preferably that another maintainer does the merge (it does >>> not need to be mandated but should be suggested). >> >> Yes, actually this is something that generated some disagreement inside Arm >> as well and I am glad you're bringing this up here, as I'd like to hear more >> opinions on this. >> >> I too have concerns about allowing self-reviewing. I am not so much >> concerned about people potentially abusing of this situation to silently >> merge patches, as I think we should trust our maintainers. But I am worried >> that a self-review is rarely as good as a peer review, simply because it is >> so easy to miss things when it's your own work. I believe several pair of >> eyes is always better, as different people think differently, have different >> perspectives and backgrounds, and are able to catch different issues. >> >> But to pull this off, we need enough people to do all these reviews. The >> proposal currently allows self-review because some of us feared that >> mandating 2 reviewers for every patch (especially pure platform patches) >> would be impractical and too heavyweight, especially for the TF-M project in >> its current contributors organization, as I understand. It would be great to >> get more feedback from the TF-M community as to whether they think it could >> work in the end. >> >> It's a difficult balance between having the best possible code review >> practices, and realistically getting all the review work done in a timely >> manner, avoiding bottlenecks on specific people and keeping the flow of >> patches smooth. >> >> I like your idea of a minimum wait time provided for feedback. I think it >> could be a good middle ground solution. >> > +1 for that, after silence for X weeks it should be OK to merge the > patch. X would need to be number that is high enough for people to have > a chance to find it and look into it, but shouldn't be too high, since > there is a risk that it'll force the contributor to pile up things that > might be dependent on this patch. To throw something out, I'd say ~2 > weeks sounds like a good number to me. > >> Your other suggestion of having a different maintainer doing the merge would >> work as well IMO but requires more workforce. Again this comes down to >> whether this can realistically be achieved for each project. This solution >> was actually suggested within Arm as well (and even called out at the end of >> the proposal ;) ). >> >> Bottom line is, in an ideal world I would like to condemn self-review >> because I consider this as bad practice > +1 > >> , but I do not know whether this will >> be practical and will work for TF-M as well. >> >>> ï¿½2. 'timely manner': This expectation should be more explicit - when >>> the author can start requesting other maintainers to merge on assumption >>> that silence == approval (or not). Such timeliness expectations are >>> probably best set per project however. >> >> Yes, "timely manner" is definitely too vague and was actually left that way >> on purpose at this stage to avoid touching upon what I think is a sensitive >> subject! I am aware that some patches sometimes spend a long time in review, >> definitely longer than they should and it understandably generates some >> frustration. This is something we absolutely need to improve on IMO and >> hopefully a bigger pool of maintainers will help solve this issue. But I >> agree that the expected review timeline should be clearly established and it >> is probably best to let each project decides theirs. >> >>> ï¿½3. The proposal does not address branching strategies. i.e. will >>> there be separate maintainers for dev/master/stable branches? I don't >>> think it needs to address it yet - keep it simpler for a start. But a >>> todo saying something like "in the future this project maintenance >>> proposal might be expanded to address multi-branch maintainership" would >>> be good. >> >> Good point. A todo sounds good, I will add one in the last section of the >> document. >> >>> ï¿½4. The platform lifecycle state machine has too many transitions. >>> "Fully maintained" <-> "orphan" -> "out" seems sufficient to me. >> >> Hmm OK. There might be too many transitions but I feel we need something >> between fully maintained and out, i.e. the limited support one. >> >> Julius Werner also pointed out on Thursday that orphan might be misplaced, >> as all these other stages deal with some degrees of feature support (what's >> known to work), whereas orphan is an orthogonal topic that is not directly >> related to the level of supported features. For example, a platform could >> have recently become orphan but all features and tests still work for some >> time. >> > At one point in time in the OP-TEE project we tried to keep track of > maintained platforms, by simply saying maintained "Yes" if they are > maintained. However they're not maintained, we indicated that by stating > the last known version where a platform was maintained. People can still > find that information here [1] (not up-to-date). The intention was to > give future users of an old platform a chance to know if it ever has > been supported and what version that was. That could serve as a starting > point in case someone is interested in bring a device/platform back to > life. Yes, I think such information can be very useful. It saves some "git archeology" effort to try and dig this information afterwards. Also, when someone starts looking at a project, I would expect this to be one of the first thing they look up, they would want to know in which shape the project is for the particular platform they are interested in. That's almost as important in my eyes as a "getting started" guide. We could have such a high-level table that just says whether a platform is supported or not (just a yes/no) and have complementary, per-platform documentation that goes into the details of what features are supported exactly. > How that works in practice is that all OP-TEE maintainers are adding > their "Tested-by" (see example [2]) tag for the platform they maintain > when we're doing a release. If there are platforms with no "Tested-by" > tag, then they simply end up with the "last known version". I think that's a very good idea! > However, to keep that up-to-date, it requires some discipline from the > people maintaining such a table ... something that we in the OP-TEE > project haven't been very good at :) Can't this be automated, such that it doesn't need to be manually kept up-to-date? I imagine we could have some tools generating the platform support table out of such a commit message. > So, I'm not proposing something, it's just that I wanted to share what > we've tried and it "works", but not easy to maintain (a release > checklist could fix that). > > [1] https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/platforms.html > [2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3309/commits/765b92604459240bed7fcf… >

6 years, 1 month

2
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Re: [TF-A] Event Log for Measured Boot

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

Hi Alexei, I second Varun on this. The patch is huge. I recommend breaking it up into multiple commits. I've reviewed it but since it is a large patch, it might require a few more sittings to grasp all the changes(which also means there may be some stupid review comments :)). -Raghu On 3/31/20 10:28 AM, Varun Wadekar via TF-A wrote: > Hello Alexei, > > Just curious, the patch is huge and will take some time to review. Do > you expect this change to be merged before the v2.3 release? > > -Varun > > *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> *On Behalf Of > *Alexei Fedorov via TF-A > *Sent:* Tuesday, March 31, 2020 7:19 AM > *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > *Subject:* [TF-A] Event Log for Measured Boot > > *External email: Use caution opening links or attachments* > > Hi, > > Please review and provide your comments for the patch which adds > > Event Log generation for the Measured Boot. > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3806 > > Thanks. > > Alexei > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy > the information in any medium. Thank you. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and > may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, > disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended > recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all > copies of the original message. > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >

6 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 2 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 2 of 2 defect(s) ** CID 355291: Memory - corruptions (NEGATIVE_RETURNS) /plat/arm/board/arm_fpga/fpga_pm.c: 50 in fpga_pwr_domain_on() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 355291: Memory - corruptions (NEGATIVE_RETURNS) /plat/arm/board/arm_fpga/fpga_pm.c: 50 in fpga_pwr_domain_on() 44 unsigned int pos = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr); 45 unsigned long current_mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); 46 47 if (mpidr == current_mpidr) { 48 return PSCI_E_ALREADY_ON; 49 } >>> CID 355291: Memory - corruptions (NEGATIVE_RETURNS) >>> Using variable "pos" as an index to array "hold_base". 50 hold_base[pos] = PLAT_FPGA_HOLD_STATE_GO; 51 flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&hold_base[pos], sizeof(uint64_t)); 52 sev(); /* Wake any CPUs from wfe */ 53 54 return PSCI_E_SUCCESS; 55 } ** CID 355290: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /plat/arm/board/arm_fpga/fpga_pm.c: 50 in fpga_pwr_domain_on() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 355290: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /plat/arm/board/arm_fpga/fpga_pm.c: 50 in fpga_pwr_domain_on() 44 unsigned int pos = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr); 45 unsigned long current_mpidr = read_mpidr_el1(); 46 47 if (mpidr == current_mpidr) { 48 return PSCI_E_ALREADY_ON; 49 } >>> CID 355290: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) >>> Overrunning array "hold_base" of 64 8-byte elements at element index 4294967295 (byte offset 34359738367) using index "pos" (which evaluates to 4294967295). 50 hold_base[pos] = PLAT_FPGA_HOLD_STATE_GO; 51 flush_dcache_range((uintptr_t)&hold_base[pos], sizeof(uint64_t)); 52 sev(); /* Wake any CPUs from wfe */ 53 54 return PSCI_E_SUCCESS; 55 } ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…

6 years, 1 month

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Patch-set review request: Adding Broadcom Platform support

by Sheetal Tigadoli

Hello TF-A, I understand most devs/reviewers will be busy working towards code freeze, but if its possible can this patch-set be reviewed. The patch-set is about "Add support for Broadcom platform". Patch-set link https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%2522brcm_initial_support%2522 Thanks Sheetal

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [EXTERNAL] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Shreve, Erik

Sandrine, Really glad to see this being pulled together. A couple of areas of feedback around the Platform Support Life Cycle. As previously mentioned there are two orthogonal concerns captured in the current life cycle: Support and Functionality. I'd like to see these split out. For functionality, chip vendors may not have a business case for supporting all features on a given platform but they may provide full support for the features they have chosen to include. A simple example would be supporting PSA FF Isolation Level 1 only due to lack of HW isolation support needed to achieve Isolation Level 2 or greater. Also, I'd like to see a stronger standard put forth for platform documentation. If a platform is "supported," I believe the documentation should be complete and accurate. A lack of complete and clear documentation leaves open a wide door for misuse/misconfiguration which could result in a vulnerable system. Here is a more concrete proposal: Functional Support: Each project shall provide a standard feature or functionality list. Each platform shall include in its documentation a copy of this list with the supported functionality marked as supported. The platform documentation may reference a ticket if support is planned but not yet present. The platform documentation shall explicitly state if a feature or function has no plans for support. The feature/functionality list shall be versioned, with the version tied to the release version(s) of the project. In this way, it will be clear if a platform was last officially updated for version X but the project is currently at version Y > X. Note: projects will need to adopt (if they have not already) a version scheme that distinguishes between feature updates and bug fixes. Each project and platform shall use tags or similar functionality on tickets to associate tickets to features/functionality and platforms. If the names of tags can't match the name of the feature or platform exactly then a mapping shall be provided in the appropriate document(s). Life Cycle State Fully Supported There is (at least) one active code owner for this platform. All supported features build and either all tests pass or failures are associated with tracked known issues. Other (not associated to a test) Known Issues are tracked Documentation is up to date Note: Projects should document standards on how "active" code ownership is measured and further document standards on how code owners are warned about impending life cycle state changes. Orphan There is no active code owner All supported features build and either all tests pass or failures are associated with tracked known issues. Other (not associated to a test) Known Issues may not have been maintained (as there is no active code owner) Documentation status is unclear since there is no active code owner. There has been no change to the feature/functionality list in the project since the platform was last "Fully Supported" Out of date Same as orphan, but either: there have been changes to the feature/functionality list, or there are failing tests without tracked tickets, or there are known documentation issues. Deprecated Same as Out of Date, but the build is broken. Platform may be removed from the project codebase in the future. Erik Shreve, PSEM Software Security Engineer & Architect (CMCU Platform Development) -----Original Message----- From: TF-M [mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org] On Behalf Of Sandrine Bailleux via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, March 24, 2020 4:42 AM To: tf-a; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; op-tee(a)linaro.org Cc: nd(a)arm.com Subject: [EXTERNAL] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects Hello all, As the developers community at trustedfirmware.org is growing, there is an increasing need to have work processes that are clearly documented, feel smooth and scale well. We think that there is an opportunity to improve the way the trustedfirmware.org projects are managed today. That's why we are sharing a project maintenance proposal, focusing on the TF-A and TF-M projects initially. The aim of this document is to propose a set of rules, guidelines and processes to try and improve the way we work together as a community today. Note that this is an early draft at this stage. This is put up for further discussion within the trustedfirmware.org community. Nothing is set in stone yet and it is expected to go under change as feedback from the community is incorporated. Please find the initial proposal here: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p… Please provide any feedback you may have by replying to this email thread, keeping all 4 mailing lists in the recipients list. I will collate comments from the community and try to incorporate them in the document, keeping you updated on changes made between revisions. Regards, Sandrine -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Andrej, On 3/26/20 10:54 AM, Andrej Butok via TF-A wrote: >> But I am worried that a self-review is rarely as good as a peer review > > On practice, unfortunately, some TF-M tasks are waiting weeks and even months for review and following approvals. > If I were a maintainer & owner of my own TFM area, I do not want to wait & push & remind somebody else. > Better to have a post-merge review for these cases, which does not limit and slow down the development. Thanks for the feedback. That's not good, patches can't realistically stay in review for weeks and even months, that's just not workable. Worse, it might discourage developers to contribute to the project. I can see that cumulating maintainer & owner roles would solve the problem here but perhaps enlarging the pool of maintainers would as well? Presumably, the situation is like that today because the current maintainers of the project are overloaded and cannot get all reviews done in a timely manner? I am skeptical about a post-merge review process... Once a patch is merged there is less urge and motivation (if any) for people to take a look at it. I am worried that patches might never get reviewed that way. Regards, Sandrine

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Christian Daudt

Hi Sandrine, > Please find the initial proposal here: > > https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p… > > Please provide any feedback you may have by replying to this email > thread, keeping all 4 mailing lists in the recipients list. > > I will collate comments from the community and try to incorporate them > in the document, keeping you updated on changes made between revisions. The maintenance proposal looks great ! I have some feedback on specific portions: 1. maintainer/owner/author patches. " Note that roles can be cumulative, in particular the same individual can be both a code owner and a maintainer. In such a scenario, the individual would be able to self-merge a patch solely affecting his module, having the authority to approve it from both a code owner and maintainer's point of view.": I'm always leery of people self-approving their patches. At a minimum, all self-patches should be published and a minimum wait time provided for feedback. Or preferably that another maintainer does the merge (it does not need to be mandated but should be suggested). 2. 'timely manner': This expectation should be more explicit - when the author can start requesting other maintainers to merge on assumption that silence == approval (or not). Such timeliness expectations are probably best set per project however. 3. The proposal does not address branching strategies. i.e. will there be separate maintainers for dev/master/stable branches? I don't think it needs to address it yet - keep it simpler for a start. But a todo saying something like "in the future this project maintenance proposal might be expanded to address multi-branch maintainership" would be good. 4. The platform lifecycle state machine has too many transitions. "Fully maintained" <-> "orphan" -> "out" seems sufficient to me. Thanks, Christian. This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [EXT] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA

by Varun Wadekar

Hello Pankaj, Hope you are doing well. The initial email point to one change, but I see that as the tip of a patch series. I reviewed https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3370 and left some comments, but did not review the complete patch series. Are you requesting a review of the entire patch series? -Varun From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Joanna Farley via TF-A Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 9:37 AM To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta(a)nxp.com>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] [EXT] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hi Pankaj, We will try, one of the arm team has done some +1 reviews and I have just kicked of a CI+2 run on the top of the patch stack. As you can imagine the Arm team is pressed for time the closer to the freeze date. Other TF-A contributors you all have +1 rights so if folks have time assistance with further +1 reviews would be appreciated as that would help in accelerating confidence is getting +2 and merging. Traditionally the project has relied on Arm folks but for some time now all contributors have had +1 rights on each other patches and the new project maintenance proposal is set up to take us in the direction of enabling all contributors helping each other. Thanks Joanna From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Pankaj Gupta via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Reply to: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta(a)nxp.com<mailto:pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>> Date: Monday, 30 March 2020 at 20:48 To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] [EXT] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA Please find the link to the review request. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3370 Regards Pankaj From: Pankaj Gupta via TF-A Sent: Monday, 30 March, 22:57 Subject: [EXT] [TF-A] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Caution: EXT Email Hi All, Please pick this review request so that code changes can be merged before code freeze. Thanks. Regards Pankaj IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6 years, 1 month

2
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Re: [TF-A] RFR: Tegra fixes for v2.3

by Varun Wadekar

Hello team, Please help review and merge the following bug fixes before v2.3 is released. * https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3819: include: context_mgmt: include ep_info.h * https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3820: Tegra: enable EHF for watchdog timer interrupts * https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3818: Tegra: remove ENABLE_SVE_FOR_NS = 0 Thanks. From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Varun Wadekar via TF-A Sent: Monday, March 30, 2020 10:02 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] RFR: Tegra fixes for v2.3 External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hello team, Please help review and merge the following bug fixes before v2.3 is released. * https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3731: Tegra: fixup GIC init from the 'on_finish' handler * https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3770: Tegra186: increase memory mapped regions Thanks. ________________________________ This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. ________________________________

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Event Log for Measured Boot

by Varun Wadekar

Hello Alexei, Just curious, the patch is huge and will take some time to review. Do you expect this change to be merged before the v2.3 release? -Varun From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Alexei Fedorov via TF-A Sent: Tuesday, March 31, 2020 7:19 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Event Log for Measured Boot External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hi, Please review and provide your comments for the patch which adds Event Log generation for the Measured Boot. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3806 Thanks. Alexei IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6 years, 1 month

2
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Re: [TF-A] [EXT] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA

by Joanna Farley

Hi Pankaj, We will try, one of the arm team has done some +1 reviews and I have just kicked of a CI+2 run on the top of the patch stack. As you can imagine the Arm team is pressed for time the closer to the freeze date. Other TF-A contributors you all have +1 rights so if folks have time assistance with further +1 reviews would be appreciated as that would help in accelerating confidence is getting +2 and merging. Traditionally the project has relied on Arm folks but for some time now all contributors have had +1 rights on each other patches and the new project maintenance proposal is set up to take us in the direction of enabling all contributors helping each other. Thanks Joanna From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Pankaj Gupta via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta(a)nxp.com> Date: Monday, 30 March 2020 at 20:48 To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] [EXT] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA Please find the link to the review request. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3370 Regards Pankaj From: Pankaj Gupta via TF-A Sent: Monday, 30 March, 22:57 Subject: [EXT] [TF-A] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Caution: EXT Email Hi All, Please pick this review request so that code changes can be merged before code freeze. Thanks. Regards Pankaj IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Event Log for Measured Boot

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi, Please review and provide your comments for the patch which adds Event Log generation for the Measured Boot. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3806 Thanks. Alexei IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

1
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Re: [TF-A] [EXT] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA

by Pankaj Gupta

Please find the link to the review request. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3370 Regards Pankaj From: Pankaj Gupta via TF-A Sent: Monday, 30 March, 22:57 Subject: [EXT] [TF-A] Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Caution: EXT Email Hi All, Please pick this review request so that code changes can be merged before code freeze. Thanks. Regards Pankaj

6 years, 1 month

1
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Patch-set review request: New NXP Platform LX2120ARDB support on TFA

by Pankaj Gupta

Hi All, Please pick this review request so that code changes can be merged before code freeze. Thanks. Regards Pankaj

6 years, 1 month

1
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RFR: Tegra fixes for v2.3

by Varun Wadekar

Hello team, Please help review and merge the following bug fixes before v2.3 is released. * https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3731: Tegra: fixup GIC init from the 'on_finish' handler * https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3770: Tegra186: increase memory mapped regions Thanks. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6 years, 1 month

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GICv3 driver makefile

by Alexei Fedorov

Hello, As the prepartion for the series of patches for adding GICv3.1 and GICv4 support, please review and provide your comments for the patch which introduces GICv3 makefile and adds configuration options for the driver. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3754 Regards. Alexei IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Proposal for Measured Boot Implementation

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Raghu, Thanks for reviewing the proposal. Please find my answers below. 1) The idea was to use the same hash algorithm throughout all TF-A code for consistency and not introduce any new build flags. One of the initial implementations even didn't calculate the hash itself but was reading verified data provided by the Chain of Trust (CoT) for the purpose of optimisation. Existing definition of TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID in 'drivers\auth\mbedtls\mbedtls_common.mk' at line #76: ifeq (${HASH_ALG}, sha384) TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID := TF_MBEDTLS_SHA384 else ifeq (${HASH_ALG}, sha512) TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID := TF_MBEDTLS_SHA512 else TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID := TF_MBEDTLS_SHA256 endif passed to 'include\drivers\auth\mbedtls\mbedtls_config.h', line #72 #define MBEDTLS_SHA256_C #if (TF_MBEDTLS_HASH_ALG_ID != TF_MBEDTLS_SHA256) #define MBEDTLS_SHA512_C #endif and used in Mbed TLS to define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE in 'include\mbedtls\md.h': #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA512_C) #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 64 /* longest known is SHA512 */ #else #define MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE 32 /* longest known is SHA256 or less */ #endif makes impossible usage HASH_ALG=sha256 for TF-A and sha512 for Measured Boot calculations, because the following chain of function calls arm_bl1_set_bl2_hash() -> crypto_mod_calc_hash() -> crypto_lib_desc.calc_hash() -> calc_hash() -> mbedtls_md_info_from_type() returns CRYPTO_ERR_HASH error caused by insufficient space in internal Mbed TLS buffers and fixing this issue needs extra modifications in make and header files. Upgrading/changing the hash algorithm will require re-building of TF-A and re-flashing BL1 in ROM, so please explain what you mean by "potentially break measured boot on old devices in case a hash algorithm is broken" The functionality for getting the hash algorithm from the platform (e.g. eFuses) can be added later as a platform build option and requires fixing the issue described above. 2) Yes, Measured Boot requires TF-A built with TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT option enabled, and as BL2 image is a part of CoT it is verified by BL1. 3) Yes. Event Log implementation is based on TCG Specifications. BL2 loads images, calculates their hashes and writes data into Event Log stored in Secure memory. 4) It is planned to add fTPM service implementation to TF-A, see Javier's message: https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-March/000339.html Stuart could also comment on the naming convention. 5) N/A 6) Event Log is a complex structure with entries of different lengths, and TFTF test checks the length of each field against the remaining size of the Event Log's data to be processed before accessing and printing the actual data. Thanks. Alexei. ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 21 March 2020 05:53 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal for Measured Boot Implementation Hi Alexei, Thanks. This looks good at first glance. However, i do have some questions that aren't obvious to me by reading the description below and looking at code. Questions are numbered based on your original email. Perhaps these can be discussed in the TF-A forum if it is inconvenient over email. 1) Would be good if the hash alg comes from the config file. This will make the implementation "crypto agile" from the very beginning. It is common to want to upgrade/change the hash algorithm and since BL1 is in ROM, you potentially break measured boot on old devices in case a hash algorithm is broken. The other option is to get the hash algorithm from the platform, perhaps a platform gets it from eFuses as opposed to config files. 2) It looks like you are using memory allocated in the loaded DTB as the equivalent of a TPM "PCR". How is this protected from direct modification by BL2? Or is it not protected because BL2 forms a part of the Root-of-Trust for Measurement(RTM)?(since it's signature is verified by BL1?) 3) What does "Event Log" refer to? Is it the same event log proposed by TCG in the platform firmware profile ? As a general question, how close is the measured boot in TF-A/PSA going to be to TCG ? Will BL2 extend measurements for other images ? 4) Would be great not to refer to "TPM" in the measured boot implementation. Here we are implementing measured boot without a TPM, but it could be implemented with a TPM. Maybe it should be tcg event log? 5) OK. 6) What does validate event log mean here? More details ? Thanks -Raghu On 3/20/20 7:15 AM, Alexei Fedorov via TF-A wrote: > Hello, > > I'm preparing the next set of patches for Measured Boot support in TF-A, > please find some details on design and implementation below. > > 1. SHA256/384/512 hash algorithm for Measured Boot related hash calculations > is passed as an existing build 'HASH_ALG' build parameter. > > 2. BL1 calculates BL2 image hash and passes these data to BL2 via > FW_CONFIG/TB_FW_CONFIG device tree in new 'bl2_hash_data' byte array > added > in 'fvp_fw_config.dts'. > > These changes are part of the patch under review, please see > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3555 > > 3. Event Log is calculated by BL2 in Secure Memory and copied to > Non-secure memory. Address in Non-secure memory is calculated as: > > "nt_fw_config_addr + nt_fw_config_max_size" > > with values obtained from 'tb_fw_config': > > nt_fw_config_addr = <0x0 0x80000000>; > nt_fw_config_max_size = <0x200>; > > 4. Event Log address and size is passed by TOS_FW_CONFIG and NT_FW_CONFIG > device tree in 2 new added properties: > > Property name: 'tpm_event_log_addr' > Value type is an unsigned 64-bit integer specifying the physical address > of the Event Log. > > Property name: 'tpm_event_log_size' > Value type is an unsigned 32-bit integer specifying the size of the > Event Log. > > /* TPM Event Log Config */ > tpm_event_log { > compatible = "arm,nt_fw"; > tpm_event_log_addr = <0x0 0x0>; > tpm_event_log_size = <0x0>; > }; > > 5. TF-A provides Event Log to the BL33 (TFTF/UEFI/U-boot) in 'nt_fw_config' > device tree, which address is passed by BL31 as 'arg0' parameter, > see TFTF patch: > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/tf-a-tests/+/3327 > > 6. A new test which validates and prints Event Log data passed > in 'nt_fw_config' to BL33 will be added to TFTF. > > Please review and provide your comments on the proposed design. > > Regards. > Alexei. > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy > the information in any medium. Thank you. > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Andrej Butok

Hello, >But I am worried that a self-review is rarely as good as a peer review On practice, unfortunately, some TF-M tasks are waiting weeks and even months for review and following approvals. If I were a maintainer & owner of my own TFM area, I do not want to wait & push & remind somebody else. Better to have a post-merge review for these cases, which does not limit and slow down the development. Thanks, Andrej Butok -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandrine Bailleux via TF-M Sent: Thursday, March 26, 2020 10:28 AM To: Christian Daudt <Christian.Daudt(a)cypress.com>; tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; op-tee(a)linaro.org Cc: nd(a)arm.com Subject: Re: [TF-M] Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects Hi Christian, Thanks a lot for the read and the comments! On 3/25/20 7:05 PM, Christian Daudt wrote: > ï¿½The maintenance proposal looks great ! I have some feedback on > specific portions: > ï¿½1. maintainer/owner/author patches. " Note that roles can be > cumulative, in particular the same individual can be both a code owner > and a maintainer. In such a scenario, the individual would be able to > self-merge a patch solely affecting his module, having the authority > to approve it from both a code owner and maintainer's point of view.": > I'm always leery of people self-approving their patches. At a minimum, > all self-patches should be published and a minimum wait time provided > for feedback. Or preferably that another maintainer does the merge (it > does not need to be mandated but should be suggested). Yes, actually this is something that generated some disagreement inside Arm as well and I am glad you're bringing this up here, as I'd like to hear more opinions on this. I too have concerns about allowing self-reviewing. I am not so much concerned about people potentially abusing of this situation to silently merge patches, as I think we should trust our maintainers. But I am worried that a self-review is rarely as good as a peer review, simply because it is so easy to miss things when it's your own work. I believe several pair of eyes is always better, as different people think differently, have different perspectives and backgrounds, and are able to catch different issues. But to pull this off, we need enough people to do all these reviews. The proposal currently allows self-review because some of us feared that mandating 2 reviewers for every patch (especially pure platform patches) would be impractical and too heavyweight, especially for the TF-M project in its current contributors organization, as I understand. It would be great to get more feedback from the TF-M community as to whether they think it could work in the end. It's a difficult balance between having the best possible code review practices, and realistically getting all the review work done in a timely manner, avoiding bottlenecks on specific people and keeping the flow of patches smooth. I like your idea of a minimum wait time provided for feedback. I think it could be a good middle ground solution. Your other suggestion of having a different maintainer doing the merge would work as well IMO but requires more workforce. Again this comes down to whether this can realistically be achieved for each project. This solution was actually suggested within Arm as well (and even called out at the end of the proposal ;) ). Bottom line is, in an ideal world I would like to condemn self-review because I consider this as bad practice, but I do not know whether this will be practical and will work for TF-M as well. > ï¿½2. 'timely manner': This expectation should be more explicit - > when the author can start requesting other maintainers to merge on > assumption that silence == approval (or not). Such timeliness > expectations are probably best set per project however. Yes, "timely manner" is definitely too vague and was actually left that way on purpose at this stage to avoid touching upon what I think is a sensitive subject! I am aware that some patches sometimes spend a long time in review, definitely longer than they should and it understandably generates some frustration. This is something we absolutely need to improve on IMO and hopefully a bigger pool of maintainers will help solve this issue. But I agree that the expected review timeline should be clearly established and it is probably best to let each project decides theirs. > ï¿½3. The proposal does not address branching strategies. i.e. will > there be separate maintainers for dev/master/stable branches? I don't > think it needs to address it yet - keep it simpler for a start. But a > todo saying something like "in the future this project maintenance > proposal might be expanded to address multi-branch maintainership" would be good. Good point. A todo sounds good, I will add one in the last section of the document. > ï¿½4. The platform lifecycle state machine has too many transitions. > "Fully maintained" <-> "orphan" -> "out" seems sufficient to me. Hmm OK. There might be too many transitions but I feel we need something between fully maintained and out, i.e. the limited support one. Julius Werner also pointed out on Thursday that orphan might be misplaced, as all these other stages deal with some degrees of feature support (what's known to work), whereas orphan is an orthogonal topic that is not directly related to the level of supported features. For example, a platform could have recently become orphan but all features and tests still work for some time. Regards, Sandrine -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru…

6 years, 1 month

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fTPM service implementation to test Measured Boot

by Javier Almansa Sobrino

Hello, Following up with the Proposal for Measured Boot Implementation described in https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-March/000332.html , I am working on the implementation of a test fTPM service to exercise Measured Boot on TF-A. Some details about the implementation can be found below: 1.- The service will be based on Microsoft's reference implementation of the TPM 2.0 Specification by TCG. It will be implemented as an OP- TEE TA. 2.- During service initialisation, the fTPM service will read the TPM Event Log stored by Measured Boot in Secure Memory and it will extend it into the PCR specified by the log header. 3.- Alongside with the fTPM service, a test framework based on OP-TEE Toolkit is being implemented as well. This test framework will generate and run a Linux/Buildroot environment over a Foundation Model so the fTPM's PCRs can be accessed to verify its content. It is important here to highlight that this fTPM service and the related test framework are meant to be used only for demonstration purposes, it is not meant to be used as a production implementation. Please, let me know any comment or query you might have with regards this. Best regards, Javier

6 years, 1 month

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Forthcoming Trusted Firmware-A 2.3 release

by Bipin Ravi

Hi, This is to notify that we are planning to target the Trusted Firmware-A 2.3 release during the third week of April as part of the regular 6 month cadence. The aim is to consolidate all TF-A work since the 2.2 release. As part of this, a release candidate tag will be created and release activities will commence from Monday April 6th. Essentially we will not merge any major enhancements from this date until the release is made. Please ensure any Pull Requests (PR's) desired to make the 2.2 release are submitted in good time to be complete by Friday April 3rd. Any major enhancement PR's still open after that date will not be merged until after the release. Thanks & best regards, [cid:image001.jpg@01D5F78C.8108B010] Bipin Ravi | Principal Design Enginee Bipin.ravi(a)arm.com<mailto:Bipin.ravi@arm.com> | Skype: Bipin.Ravi.ARM Direct: +1-512-225 -1071 | Mobile: +1-214-212-0794 5707 Southwest Parkway, Suite 100, Austin, TX 78735

6 years, 1 month

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Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hello all, As the developers community at trustedfirmware.org is growing, there is an increasing need to have work processes that are clearly documented, feel smooth and scale well. We think that there is an opportunity to improve the way the trustedfirmware.org projects are managed today. That's why we are sharing a project maintenance proposal, focusing on the TF-A and TF-M projects initially. The aim of this document is to propose a set of rules, guidelines and processes to try and improve the way we work together as a community today. Note that this is an early draft at this stage. This is put up for further discussion within the trustedfirmware.org community. Nothing is set in stone yet and it is expected to go under change as feedback from the community is incorporated. Please find the initial proposal here: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p… Please provide any feedback you may have by replying to this email thread, keeping all 4 mailing lists in the recipients list. I will collate comments from the community and try to incorporate them in the document, keeping you updated on changes made between revisions. Regards, Sandrine

6 years, 1 month

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Trusted Firmware Keynote @Linaro TechDays (Wed 25 Mar, 16:00-16:30 GMT)

by Matteo Carlini

Hi all, Trusted Firmware will be opening the Linaro Tech Days event on Wed 25th March at 4pm (16:00) GMT with a keynote presenting all the latest exciting news from the project. https://connect.linaro.org/resources/ltd20/ltd20-200k/ and, once registered, on sched: https://linarotechdays.sched.com/event/ZZFK/ltd20-200k-keynote-trusted-firm… The session will be live streamed and recorded (links in the above resources) and slides will be attached there too. Don't miss it! Thanks Matteo

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Trusted Debug Control

by Matteo Carlini

Hi Victor, There's currently no plan to support Trusted Debug Control, primarily for the lack of an available platform IP component requiring it. Are you aware of a specific need for a real platform, that could also be available for testing the implementation? Thanks Matteo From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Victor Duan via TF-A Sent: 18 March 2020 01:35 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Trusted Debug Control Trusted Debug Control specified by TBBR CLIENT is as not supported in the current TF-A v2.2. Is there any plan to support it in the future? Thank you!

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Proposal for Measured Boot Implementation

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

Hi Alexei, Thanks. This looks good at first glance. However, i do have some questions that aren't obvious to me by reading the description below and looking at code. Questions are numbered based on your original email. Perhaps these can be discussed in the TF-A forum if it is inconvenient over email. 1) Would be good if the hash alg comes from the config file. This will make the implementation "crypto agile" from the very beginning. It is common to want to upgrade/change the hash algorithm and since BL1 is in ROM, you potentially break measured boot on old devices in case a hash algorithm is broken. The other option is to get the hash algorithm from the platform, perhaps a platform gets it from eFuses as opposed to config files. 2) It looks like you are using memory allocated in the loaded DTB as the equivalent of a TPM "PCR". How is this protected from direct modification by BL2? Or is it not protected because BL2 forms a part of the Root-of-Trust for Measurement(RTM)?(since it's signature is verified by BL1?) 3) What does "Event Log" refer to? Is it the same event log proposed by TCG in the platform firmware profile ? As a general question, how close is the measured boot in TF-A/PSA going to be to TCG ? Will BL2 extend measurements for other images ? 4) Would be great not to refer to "TPM" in the measured boot implementation. Here we are implementing measured boot without a TPM, but it could be implemented with a TPM. Maybe it should be tcg event log? 5) OK. 6) What does validate event log mean here? More details ? Thanks -Raghu On 3/20/20 7:15 AM, Alexei Fedorov via TF-A wrote: > Hello, > > I'm preparing the next set of patches for Measured Boot support in TF-A, > please find some details on design and implementation below. > > 1. SHA256/384/512 hash algorithm for Measured Boot related hash calculations > is passed as an existing build 'HASH_ALG' build parameter. > > 2. BL1 calculates BL2 image hash and passes these data to BL2 via > FW_CONFIG/TB_FW_CONFIG device tree in new 'bl2_hash_data' byte array > added > in 'fvp_fw_config.dts'. > > These changes are part of the patch under review, please see > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3555 > > 3. Event Log is calculated by BL2 in Secure Memory and copied to > Non-secure memory. Address in Non-secure memory is calculated as: > > "nt_fw_config_addr + nt_fw_config_max_size" > > with values obtained from 'tb_fw_config': > > nt_fw_config_addr = <0x0 0x80000000>; > nt_fw_config_max_size = <0x200>; > > 4. Event Log address and size is passed by TOS_FW_CONFIG and NT_FW_CONFIG > device tree in 2 new added properties: > > Property name: 'tpm_event_log_addr' > Value type is an unsigned 64-bit integer specifying the physical address > of the Event Log. > > Property name: 'tpm_event_log_size' > Value type is an unsigned 32-bit integer specifying the size of the > Event Log. > > /* TPM Event Log Config */ > tpm_event_log { > compatible = "arm,nt_fw"; > tpm_event_log_addr = <0x0 0x0>; > tpm_event_log_size = <0x0>; > }; > > 5. TF-A provides Event Log to the BL33 (TFTF/UEFI/U-boot) in 'nt_fw_config' > device tree, which address is passed by BL31 as 'arg0' parameter, > see TFTF patch: > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/tf-a-tests/+/3327 > > 6. A new test which validates and prints Event Log data passed > in 'nt_fw_config' to BL33 will be added to TFTF. > > Please review and provide your comments on the proposed design. > > Regards. > Alexei. > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy > the information in any medium. Thank you. >

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Platforms to maintain their own Change Log files following 2.3 Release

by Varun Wadekar

>> As a general reminder, it is up to the developer to document changes in common TF-A code that is relevant in the "Upcoming Change Log" file. Thanks for highlighting this. For Tegra platforms, we will provide up to date information to the platform change log after 2.3. We will have to live with the current state of the log for 2.3. >> Reviewers please continue to help determine if documentation is required for a given patch. Curious, have there been discussions around automating this somehow? E.g. add a tag to the commit message for a script to pick later. From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Lauren Wehrmeister via TF-A Sent: Tuesday, March 17, 2020 10:51 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Platforms to maintain their own Change Log files following 2.3 Release External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hi All, Following the TF-A release planned for April, platforms will be expected to maintain their own Change Log files to document relevant changes in platform specific code. The common TF-A Change Log will no longer document Platform specific updates after the 2.3 release. As a general reminder, it is up to the developer to document changes in common TF-A code that is relevant in the "Upcoming Change Log" file. Reviewers please continue to help determine if documentation is required for a given patch. During each code freeze for a release the documentation in the upcoming change log will be moved to the change log corresponding to the release. Thanks, Lauren Wehrmeister ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6 years, 1 month

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Proposal for Measured Boot Implementation

by Alexei Fedorov

Hello, I'm preparing the next set of patches for Measured Boot support in TF-A, please find some details on design and implementation below. 1. SHA256/384/512 hash algorithm for Measured Boot related hash calculations is passed as an existing build 'HASH_ALG' build parameter. 2. BL1 calculates BL2 image hash and passes these data to BL2 via FW_CONFIG/TB_FW_CONFIG device tree in new 'bl2_hash_data' byte array added in 'fvp_fw_config.dts'. These changes are part of the patch under review, please see https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3555 3. Event Log is calculated by BL2 in Secure Memory and copied to Non-secure memory. Address in Non-secure memory is calculated as: "nt_fw_config_addr + nt_fw_config_max_size" with values obtained from 'tb_fw_config': nt_fw_config_addr = <0x0 0x80000000>; nt_fw_config_max_size = <0x200>; 4. Event Log address and size is passed by TOS_FW_CONFIG and NT_FW_CONFIG device tree in 2 new added properties: Property name: 'tpm_event_log_addr' Value type is an unsigned 64-bit integer specifying the physical address of the Event Log. Property name: 'tpm_event_log_size' Value type is an unsigned 32-bit integer specifying the size of the Event Log. /* TPM Event Log Config */ tpm_event_log { compatible = "arm,nt_fw"; tpm_event_log_addr = <0x0 0x0>; tpm_event_log_size = <0x0>; }; 5. TF-A provides Event Log to the BL33 (TFTF/UEFI/U-boot) in 'nt_fw_config' device tree, which address is passed by BL31 as 'arg0' parameter, see TFTF patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/tf-a-tests/+/3327 6. A new test which validates and prints Event Log data passed in 'nt_fw_config' to BL33 will be added to TFTF. Please review and provide your comments on the proposed design. Regards. Alexei. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 26 Mar 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT)

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The second TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for next week for Thu 26 Mar 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. I have an agenda for next week however for future meetings if other project contributors would also like to present on topics please reach out to me and I will look to schedule. Agenda: * Technical Overview of the Fconf (Firmware Configuration) Feature by Louis Mayencourt * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions Thanks Joanna IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Invitation: TF-A Tech Forum @ Every 2 weeks from 17:00 to 18:00 on Thursday (GMT) (tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Bill Fletcher

You have been invited to the following event. Title: TF-A Tech Forum We run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Invites are via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h   When: Every 2 weeks from 17:00 to 18:00 on Thursday United Kingdom Time Where: Zoom Calendar: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: (Guest list has been hidden at organiser's request) Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=N3ZoNDBuZzZnM2k4cGszY… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

6 years, 1 month

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Trusted Debug Control

by Victor Duan

Trusted Debug Control specified by TBBR CLIENT is as not supported in the current TF-A v2.2. Is there any plan to support it in the future? Thank you!

6 years, 1 month

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Platforms to maintain their own Change Log files following 2.3 Release

by Lauren Wehrmeister

Hi All, Following the TF-A release planned for April, platforms will be expected to maintain their own Change Log files to document relevant changes in platform specific code. The common TF-A Change Log will no longer document Platform specific updates after the 2.3 release. As a general reminder, it is up to the developer to document changes in common TF-A code that is relevant in the "Upcoming Change Log" file. Reviewers please continue to help determine if documentation is required for a given patch. During each code freeze for a release the documentation in the upcoming change log will be moved to the change log corresponding to the release. Thanks, Lauren Wehrmeister

6 years, 1 month

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RFR: Tegra changes for review pushed on 03/12/2020

by Varun Wadekar

Hello team, This is an email requesting reviews for the latest Tegra platform changes [1] from our downstream branch. Please review these changes at the earliest and help us get them merged before the release candidate tag is generated. We hope to push one more batch for v2.3, after [1] gets merged. Thanks in advance. Varun [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22tegra-downstream-03122020%22+… ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6 years, 2 months

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 1 of 1 defect(s) ** CID 354931: Parse warnings (PARSE_ERROR) /lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c: 34 in () ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 354931: Parse warnings (PARSE_ERROR) /lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c: 34 in () 28 #if PLAT_RO_XLAT_TABLES 29 #define BASE_XLAT_TABLE_SECTION ".rodata" 30 #else 31 #define BASE_XLAT_TABLE_SECTION ".bss" 32 #endif 33 >>> CID 354931: Parse warnings (PARSE_ERROR) >>> expected a string literal 34 REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT(tf, MAX_MMAP_REGIONS, MAX_XLAT_TABLES, 35 PLAT_VIRT_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, PLAT_PHY_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE, 36 BASE_XLAT_TABLE_SECTION); 37 38 void mmap_add_region(unsigned long long base_pa, uintptr_t base_va, size_t size, 39 unsigned int attr) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads: address implementation concerns

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Sumit, On 3/4/20 4:55 PM, Sumit Garg via TF-A wrote: >> The last remaining item would be to address the MISRA violations >> that Coverity found, which I've copied & pasted for you on Gerrit in the >> top patch. > > I have tried to address most of MISRA violations and updated the > patch-set. But since I don't have access to Coverity tool you are > using, so can you please check if there is any relevant MISRA > violation that I missed? Sure, I will re-run the tool in our internal CI and let you know the results. >> Also, this feature is only used on QEMU right now and I am not aware of >> anyone trying to enable it for their platforms just yet. Thus there is a >> risk we might have overlooked some issues that we'll discover at that time. > > Socionext being a silicon vendor is actively looking for this feature > and I think they will build upon this feature to enable firmware > encryption on their platforms to meet DRM robustness rules. Interesting, thanks for sharing this information. >> Furthermore, I know that you've done some testing of this feature on >> QEMU but this is not integrated into the CI loop right now. Thus, there >> is a risk that we might break it in the future and this will go >> unnoticed, unless you plan to test it regularly on your end. > > Yeah we should plan to enable testing for this feature in CI loop. For now, I've added in our internal CI a simple build test based on the build instructions you've provided in the patch set. This will at least make sure we do not break the build inadvertently in the future. But as you say, going forward, we should plan for proper testing on QEMU. I am hoping we will soon be able to extend the OpenCI [1] and add this support there. [1] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-February/000264.html >> * Saying so in the (upcoming) change log. > > I hope you can take care of this. Actually this is something you have access to, it's a matter of adding a line in docs/change-log-upcoming.rst in the TF-A source tree. Regards, Sandrine

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads: address implementation concerns

by Sumit Garg

Hi Everyone, I have tried to address most of the implementation concerns with updated patch-set [1] as follows: *Concern*: Firmware encryption bit needs to be signed *Address*: Moved the firmware encryption bit from FIP ToC header to "io_uuid_spec_t" struct which is part of "plat_io_policy" that is embedded in the boot-loader (BL1 or BL2) and hence firmware encryption bit is signed. Also, with this implementation fip_tool is no longer aware of encryption and just encrypted binaries are piped to fip_tool. *Concern*: Capability to encrypt with different keys for different images *Address*: Passed "img_id" buffer reference as an argument of "plat_get_enc_key_info()" API. So that platforms may choose to either provide a unique key per firmware image or just derive a key from HUK per firmware using "img_id" buffer as a salt. *Concern*: Coupling of FIP and encryption layer *Address*: Firstly I think we all can agree that encryption layer provides confidentiality protection specific to IO storage. Secondly FIP is actually a packaging layer that sits over actual IO layer and having the encryption layer coupled with FIP provides an abstraction layer for any FIP payload which in turn provides the following features: 1. Allows the firmware certificates to be encrypted as well to protect against cloning satisfying R050_TBBR_PROTECTION requirement. 2. Allows the firmware configuration data to be encrypted as well. 3. Provides a capability to have a secure key store as FIP payload which is protected using HUK. *Concern*: Allow usage of alternative verify-then-decrypt method *Address*: A platform could disable this encryption layer and implement decryption as part of "bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load()". Please let me know in case I missed any implementation concerns and feel free to provide your feedback on updated patch-set [1]. [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22tbbr%252Ffw_enc%22+(status:op… Regards, Sumit

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Incorrect section attributes with ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1

by Petre-Ionut Tudor

Hi Masahiro, That warning is expected. GCC complains about this, since tf_base_xlat_table is not constant and we are asking it to be put in a read-only section (see the REGISTER_XLAT_CONTEXT_RO_BASE_TABLE macro). This is fine since: * We only want the base table to be read-only after the tables have been initialized. The only time we change tf_base_xlat_table is when we initialize it, and at that point in the platform setup sequence the MMU is off, so permissions have no effect. * We never write to this with the MMU on (it's the level 1 translation table), so there is no danger of generating MMU faults. I hope this answers your question. Thanks Petre ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Masahiro Yamada via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 06 March 2020 12:30 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Incorrect section attributes with ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1 Hi. If I build TF-A with ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1, the base xlat table goes into .rodata section instead of .bss section. Then, I see a warning like: /tmp/ccswitLr.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/ccswitLr.s:297: Warning: setting incorrect section attributes for .rodata Is this a know issue? [Reproduce Command] make PLAT=fvp CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1 The full build log is below: masahiro@pug:~/ref/trusted-firmware-a$ make PLAT=fvp CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1 CC lib/libfdt/fdt.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_addresses.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_empty_tree.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_ro.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_rw.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_strerror.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_sw.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_wip.c AR build/fvp/release/lib/libfdt.a Building fvp CC lib/libc/abort.c CC lib/libc/assert.c CC lib/libc/exit.c CC lib/libc/memchr.c CC lib/libc/memcmp.c CC lib/libc/memcpy.c CC lib/libc/memmove.c CC lib/libc/memrchr.c CC lib/libc/memset.c CC lib/libc/printf.c CC lib/libc/putchar.c CC lib/libc/puts.c CC lib/libc/snprintf.c CC lib/libc/strchr.c CC lib/libc/strcmp.c CC lib/libc/strlcpy.c CC lib/libc/strlen.c CC lib/libc/strncmp.c CC lib/libc/strnlen.c CC lib/libc/strrchr.c AS lib/libc/aarch64/setjmp.S AR build/fvp/release/lib/libc.a CC drivers/arm/smmu/smmu_v3.c CC drivers/arm/sp805/sp805.c CC drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c CC drivers/io/io_semihosting.c CC lib/semihosting/semihosting.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl1_setup.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_err.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_io_storage.c CC drivers/arm/cci/cci.c CC drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c CC drivers/cfi/v2m/v2m_flash.c CC drivers/io/io_fip.c CC drivers/io/io_memmap.c CC drivers/io/io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_setup.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_err.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_fconf_io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/fconf/arm_fconf_io.c CC lib/fconf/fconf.c CC lib/fconf/fconf_dyn_cfg_getter.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_dyn_cfg.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_dyn_cfg_helpers.c CC common/fdt_wrappers.c CC bl1/bl1_main.c CC bl1/aarch64/bl1_arch_setup.c CC bl1/aarch64/bl1_context_mgmt.c CC lib/cpus/errata_report.c CC lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c CC plat/common/plat_bl1_common.c CC common/bl_common.c CC common/tf_log.c CC drivers/console/multi_console.c CC plat/common/plat_bl_common.c CC plat/common/plat_log_common.c CC plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountdi2.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountsi2.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_console.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c AS lib/semihosting/aarch64/semihosting_call.S AS plat/arm/board/fvp/aarch64/fvp_helpers.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/aem_generic.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a35.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a53.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a57.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a72.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a73.S AS bl1/aarch64/bl1_entrypoint.S AS bl1/aarch64/bl1_exceptions.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cpu_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/dsu_helpers.S AS lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S AS common/aarch64/debug.S AS lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S AS lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_helpers.S AS drivers/arm/pl011/aarch64/pl011_console.S AS plat/arm/board/common/aarch64/board_arm_helpers.S AS plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_helpers.S AS lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/enable_mmu.S PP bl1/bl1.ld.S LD build/fvp/release/bl1/bl1.elf BIN build/fvp/release/bl1.bin Built build/fvp/release/bl1.bin successfully OD build/fvp/release/bl1/bl1.dump CC drivers/arm/sp805/sp805.c CC drivers/io/io_semihosting.c CC lib/utils/mem_region.c CC lib/semihosting/semihosting.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl2_setup.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_err.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_nor_psci_mem_protect.c CC drivers/arm/tzc/tzc400.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_security.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_tzc400.c CC drivers/cfi/v2m/v2m_flash.c CC drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c CC drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c CC drivers/io/io_fip.c CC drivers/io/io_memmap.c CC drivers/io/io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_bl2_setup.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_err.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_fconf_io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/fconf/arm_fconf_io.c CC lib/fconf/fconf.c CC lib/fconf/fconf_dyn_cfg_getter.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_dyn_cfg.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_dyn_cfg_helpers.c CC common/fdt_wrappers.c CC plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_image_load.c CC common/desc_image_load.c CC bl2/bl2_image_load_v2.c CC bl2/bl2_main.c CC bl2/aarch64/bl2_arch_setup.c CC common/bl_common.c CC common/tf_log.c CC drivers/console/multi_console.c CC plat/common/plat_bl_common.c CC plat/common/plat_log_common.c CC plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountdi2.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountsi2.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_console.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c AS lib/semihosting/aarch64/semihosting_call.S AS lib/locks/exclusive/aarch64/spinlock.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S AS common/aarch64/early_exceptions.S AS bl2/aarch64/bl2_entrypoint.S AS common/aarch64/debug.S AS lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S AS lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_helpers.S AS drivers/arm/pl011/aarch64/pl011_console.S AS plat/arm/board/common/aarch64/board_arm_helpers.S AS plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_helpers.S AS lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/enable_mmu.S PP bl2/bl2.ld.S LD build/fvp/release/bl2/bl2.elf BIN build/fvp/release/bl2.bin Built build/fvp/release/bl2.bin successfully OD build/fvp/release/bl2/bl2.dump CC drivers/arm/fvp/fvp_pwrc.c CC drivers/arm/smmu/smmu_v3.c CC drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c CC drivers/cfi/v2m/v2m_flash.c CC lib/utils/mem_region.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl31_setup.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_pm.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_topology.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_nor_psci_mem_protect.c CC drivers/arm/gic/common/gic_common.c CC drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3_main.c CC drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3_helpers.c CC plat/common/plat_gicv3.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_gicv3.c CC drivers/arm/gic/v3/gic500.c CC drivers/arm/cci/cci.c CC drivers/arm/tzc/tzc400.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_security.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_tzc400.c CC drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c CC lib/cpus/aarch64/cpuamu.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_bl31_setup.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_pm.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_topology.c CC plat/common/plat_psci_common.c CC plat/arm/common/aarch64/execution_state_switch.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_sip_svc.c CC lib/pmf/pmf_smc.c CC bl31/bl31_main.c CC bl31/interrupt_mgmt.c CC bl31/bl31_context_mgmt.c CC common/runtime_svc.c CC services/arm_arch_svc/arm_arch_svc_setup.c CC services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c CC lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data_array.c CC lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c CC lib/cpus/errata_report.c CC lib/psci/psci_off.c CC lib/psci/psci_on.c CC lib/psci/psci_suspend.c CC lib/psci/psci_common.c CC lib/psci/psci_main.c CC lib/psci/psci_setup.c CC lib/psci/psci_system_off.c CC lib/psci/psci_mem_protect.c CC lib/locks/bakery/bakery_lock_coherent.c CC lib/psci/psci_stat.c CC lib/pmf/pmf_main.c CC lib/extensions/spe/spe.c CC lib/extensions/amu/aarch64/amu.c CC lib/extensions/sve/sve.c CC common/bl_common.c CC common/tf_log.c CC drivers/console/multi_console.c CC plat/common/plat_bl_common.c CC plat/common/plat_log_common.c CC plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountdi2.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountsi2.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_console.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c /tmp/ccswitLr.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/ccswitLr.s:297: Warning: setting incorrect section attributes for .rodata CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c AS plat/arm/board/fvp/aarch64/fvp_helpers.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/aem_generic.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a35.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a53.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a57.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a72.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a73.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cpuamu_helpers.S AS bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S AS bl31/aarch64/crash_reporting.S AS bl31/aarch64/ea_delegate.S AS bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/dsu_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_mp_stack.S AS lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/cpu_data.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cpu_helpers.S AS lib/locks/exclusive/aarch64/spinlock.S AS lib/psci/aarch64/psci_helpers.S AS lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S AS lib/extensions/amu/aarch64/amu_helpers.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/wa_cve_2017_5715_mmu.S AS common/aarch64/debug.S AS lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S AS lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_helpers.S AS drivers/arm/pl011/aarch64/pl011_console.S AS plat/arm/board/common/aarch64/board_arm_helpers.S AS plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_helpers.S AS lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/enable_mmu.S PP bl31/bl31.ld.S LD build/fvp/release/bl31/bl31.elf BIN build/fvp/release/bl31.bin Built build/fvp/release/bl31.bin successfully OD build/fvp/release/bl31/bl31.dump CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl2u_setup.c CC drivers/arm/tzc/tzc400.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_security.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_tzc400.c CC drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c CC drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_bl2u_setup.c CC bl2u/bl2u_main.c CC common/bl_common.c CC common/tf_log.c CC drivers/console/multi_console.c CC plat/common/plat_bl_common.c CC plat/common/plat_log_common.c CC plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountdi2.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountsi2.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_console.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c AS bl2u/aarch64/bl2u_entrypoint.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S AS common/aarch64/early_exceptions.S AS common/aarch64/debug.S AS lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S AS lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_helpers.S AS drivers/arm/pl011/aarch64/pl011_console.S AS plat/arm/board/common/aarch64/board_arm_helpers.S AS plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_helpers.S AS lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/enable_mmu.S PP bl2u/bl2u.ld.S LD build/fvp/release/bl2u/bl2u.elf BIN build/fvp/release/bl2u.bin Built build/fvp/release/bl2u.bin successfully OD build/fvp/release/bl2u/bl2u.dump CPP plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_fw_config.dts DTC plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_fw_config.dts CPP plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_soc_fw_config.dts DTC plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_soc_fw_config.dts CPP plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_nt_fw_config.dts DTC plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_nt_fw_config.dts CPP fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.dts DTC fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.dts ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:215.20-220.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/flash@0,00000000: simple-bus unit address format error, expected "0" ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:221.19-224.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/vram@2,00000000: simple-bus unit address format error, expected "200000000" ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:225.23-229.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/ethernet@2,02000000: simple-bus unit address format error, expected "202000000" ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:230.26-235.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/clk24mhz: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:236.30-241.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/refclk1mhz: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:242.32-247.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/refclk32khz: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:248.21-370.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/iofpga@3,00000000: simple-bus unit address format error, expected "300000000" ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:371.33-377.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/fixedregulator: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:381.21-387.6: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/mcc/osc: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:388.12-391.6: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/mcc/muxfpga: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:392.12-395.6: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/mcc/dvimode: missing or empty reg/ranges property -- Best Regards Masahiro Yamada -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

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Incorrect section attributes with ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1

by Masahiro Yamada

Hi. If I build TF-A with ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1, the base xlat table goes into .rodata section instead of .bss section. Then, I see a warning like: /tmp/ccswitLr.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/ccswitLr.s:297: Warning: setting incorrect section attributes for .rodata Is this a know issue? [Reproduce Command] make PLAT=fvp CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1 The full build log is below: masahiro@pug:~/ref/trusted-firmware-a$ make PLAT=fvp CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- ALLOW_RO_XLAT_TABLES=1 CC lib/libfdt/fdt.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_addresses.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_empty_tree.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_ro.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_rw.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_strerror.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_sw.c CC lib/libfdt/fdt_wip.c AR build/fvp/release/lib/libfdt.a Building fvp CC lib/libc/abort.c CC lib/libc/assert.c CC lib/libc/exit.c CC lib/libc/memchr.c CC lib/libc/memcmp.c CC lib/libc/memcpy.c CC lib/libc/memmove.c CC lib/libc/memrchr.c CC lib/libc/memset.c CC lib/libc/printf.c CC lib/libc/putchar.c CC lib/libc/puts.c CC lib/libc/snprintf.c CC lib/libc/strchr.c CC lib/libc/strcmp.c CC lib/libc/strlcpy.c CC lib/libc/strlen.c CC lib/libc/strncmp.c CC lib/libc/strnlen.c CC lib/libc/strrchr.c AS lib/libc/aarch64/setjmp.S AR build/fvp/release/lib/libc.a CC drivers/arm/smmu/smmu_v3.c CC drivers/arm/sp805/sp805.c CC drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c CC drivers/io/io_semihosting.c CC lib/semihosting/semihosting.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl1_setup.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_err.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_io_storage.c CC drivers/arm/cci/cci.c CC drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c CC drivers/cfi/v2m/v2m_flash.c CC drivers/io/io_fip.c CC drivers/io/io_memmap.c CC drivers/io/io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_bl1_setup.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_err.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_fconf_io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/fconf/arm_fconf_io.c CC lib/fconf/fconf.c CC lib/fconf/fconf_dyn_cfg_getter.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_dyn_cfg.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_dyn_cfg_helpers.c CC common/fdt_wrappers.c CC bl1/bl1_main.c CC bl1/aarch64/bl1_arch_setup.c CC bl1/aarch64/bl1_context_mgmt.c CC lib/cpus/errata_report.c CC lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c CC plat/common/plat_bl1_common.c CC common/bl_common.c CC common/tf_log.c CC drivers/console/multi_console.c CC plat/common/plat_bl_common.c CC plat/common/plat_log_common.c CC plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountdi2.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountsi2.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_console.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c AS lib/semihosting/aarch64/semihosting_call.S AS plat/arm/board/fvp/aarch64/fvp_helpers.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/aem_generic.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a35.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a53.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a57.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a72.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a73.S AS bl1/aarch64/bl1_entrypoint.S AS bl1/aarch64/bl1_exceptions.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cpu_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/dsu_helpers.S AS lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S AS common/aarch64/debug.S AS lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S AS lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_helpers.S AS drivers/arm/pl011/aarch64/pl011_console.S AS plat/arm/board/common/aarch64/board_arm_helpers.S AS plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_helpers.S AS lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/enable_mmu.S PP bl1/bl1.ld.S LD build/fvp/release/bl1/bl1.elf BIN build/fvp/release/bl1.bin Built build/fvp/release/bl1.bin successfully OD build/fvp/release/bl1/bl1.dump CC drivers/arm/sp805/sp805.c CC drivers/io/io_semihosting.c CC lib/utils/mem_region.c CC lib/semihosting/semihosting.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl2_setup.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_err.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_nor_psci_mem_protect.c CC drivers/arm/tzc/tzc400.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_security.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_tzc400.c CC drivers/cfi/v2m/v2m_flash.c CC drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c CC drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c CC drivers/io/io_fip.c CC drivers/io/io_memmap.c CC drivers/io/io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_bl2_setup.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_err.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_fconf_io_storage.c CC plat/arm/common/fconf/arm_fconf_io.c CC lib/fconf/fconf.c CC lib/fconf/fconf_dyn_cfg_getter.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_dyn_cfg.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_dyn_cfg_helpers.c CC common/fdt_wrappers.c CC plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_image_load.c CC common/desc_image_load.c CC bl2/bl2_image_load_v2.c CC bl2/bl2_main.c CC bl2/aarch64/bl2_arch_setup.c CC common/bl_common.c CC common/tf_log.c CC drivers/console/multi_console.c CC plat/common/plat_bl_common.c CC plat/common/plat_log_common.c CC plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountdi2.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountsi2.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_console.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c AS lib/semihosting/aarch64/semihosting_call.S AS lib/locks/exclusive/aarch64/spinlock.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S AS common/aarch64/early_exceptions.S AS bl2/aarch64/bl2_entrypoint.S AS common/aarch64/debug.S AS lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S AS lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_helpers.S AS drivers/arm/pl011/aarch64/pl011_console.S AS plat/arm/board/common/aarch64/board_arm_helpers.S AS plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_helpers.S AS lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/enable_mmu.S PP bl2/bl2.ld.S LD build/fvp/release/bl2/bl2.elf BIN build/fvp/release/bl2.bin Built build/fvp/release/bl2.bin successfully OD build/fvp/release/bl2/bl2.dump CC drivers/arm/fvp/fvp_pwrc.c CC drivers/arm/smmu/smmu_v3.c CC drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c CC drivers/cfi/v2m/v2m_flash.c CC lib/utils/mem_region.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl31_setup.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_pm.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_topology.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_nor_psci_mem_protect.c CC drivers/arm/gic/common/gic_common.c CC drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3_main.c CC drivers/arm/gic/v3/gicv3_helpers.c CC plat/common/plat_gicv3.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_gicv3.c CC drivers/arm/gic/v3/gic500.c CC drivers/arm/cci/cci.c CC drivers/arm/tzc/tzc400.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_security.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_tzc400.c CC drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c CC lib/cpus/aarch64/cpuamu.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_bl31_setup.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_pm.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_topology.c CC plat/common/plat_psci_common.c CC plat/arm/common/aarch64/execution_state_switch.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_sip_svc.c CC lib/pmf/pmf_smc.c CC bl31/bl31_main.c CC bl31/interrupt_mgmt.c CC bl31/bl31_context_mgmt.c CC common/runtime_svc.c CC services/arm_arch_svc/arm_arch_svc_setup.c CC services/std_svc/std_svc_setup.c CC lib/el3_runtime/cpu_data_array.c CC lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context_mgmt.c CC lib/cpus/errata_report.c CC lib/psci/psci_off.c CC lib/psci/psci_on.c CC lib/psci/psci_suspend.c CC lib/psci/psci_common.c CC lib/psci/psci_main.c CC lib/psci/psci_setup.c CC lib/psci/psci_system_off.c CC lib/psci/psci_mem_protect.c CC lib/locks/bakery/bakery_lock_coherent.c CC lib/psci/psci_stat.c CC lib/pmf/pmf_main.c CC lib/extensions/spe/spe.c CC lib/extensions/amu/aarch64/amu.c CC lib/extensions/sve/sve.c CC common/bl_common.c CC common/tf_log.c CC drivers/console/multi_console.c CC plat/common/plat_bl_common.c CC plat/common/plat_log_common.c CC plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountdi2.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountsi2.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_console.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c /tmp/ccswitLr.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/ccswitLr.s:297: Warning: setting incorrect section attributes for .rodata CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c AS plat/arm/board/fvp/aarch64/fvp_helpers.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/aem_generic.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a35.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a53.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a57.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a72.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cortex_a73.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cpuamu_helpers.S AS bl31/aarch64/bl31_entrypoint.S AS bl31/aarch64/crash_reporting.S AS bl31/aarch64/ea_delegate.S AS bl31/aarch64/runtime_exceptions.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/dsu_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_mp_stack.S AS lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/cpu_data.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/cpu_helpers.S AS lib/locks/exclusive/aarch64/spinlock.S AS lib/psci/aarch64/psci_helpers.S AS lib/el3_runtime/aarch64/context.S AS lib/extensions/amu/aarch64/amu_helpers.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/wa_cve_2017_5715_bpiall.S AS lib/cpus/aarch64/wa_cve_2017_5715_mmu.S AS common/aarch64/debug.S AS lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S AS lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_helpers.S AS drivers/arm/pl011/aarch64/pl011_console.S AS plat/arm/board/common/aarch64/board_arm_helpers.S AS plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_helpers.S AS lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/enable_mmu.S PP bl31/bl31.ld.S LD build/fvp/release/bl31/bl31.elf BIN build/fvp/release/bl31.bin Built build/fvp/release/bl31.bin successfully OD build/fvp/release/bl31/bl31.dump CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_bl2u_setup.c CC drivers/arm/tzc/tzc400.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_security.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_tzc400.c CC drivers/delay_timer/delay_timer.c CC drivers/delay_timer/generic_delay_timer.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_bl2u_setup.c CC bl2u/bl2u_main.c CC common/bl_common.c CC common/tf_log.c CC drivers/console/multi_console.c CC plat/common/plat_bl_common.c CC plat/common/plat_log_common.c CC plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountdi2.c CC lib/compiler-rt/builtins/popcountsi2.c CC plat/arm/board/fvp/fvp_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_common.c CC plat/arm/common/arm_console.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/xlat_tables_arch.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_context.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c CC lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_utils.c AS bl2u/aarch64/bl2u_entrypoint.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_up_stack.S AS common/aarch64/early_exceptions.S AS common/aarch64/debug.S AS lib/aarch64/cache_helpers.S AS lib/aarch64/misc_helpers.S AS plat/common/aarch64/platform_helpers.S AS drivers/arm/pl011/aarch64/pl011_console.S AS plat/arm/board/common/aarch64/board_arm_helpers.S AS plat/arm/common/aarch64/arm_helpers.S AS lib/xlat_tables_v2/aarch64/enable_mmu.S PP bl2u/bl2u.ld.S LD build/fvp/release/bl2u/bl2u.elf BIN build/fvp/release/bl2u.bin Built build/fvp/release/bl2u.bin successfully OD build/fvp/release/bl2u/bl2u.dump CPP plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_fw_config.dts DTC plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_fw_config.dts CPP plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_soc_fw_config.dts DTC plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_soc_fw_config.dts CPP plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_nt_fw_config.dts DTC plat/arm/board/fvp/fdts/fvp_nt_fw_config.dts CPP fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.dts DTC fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.dts ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:215.20-220.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/flash@0,00000000: simple-bus unit address format error, expected "0" ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:221.19-224.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/vram@2,00000000: simple-bus unit address format error, expected "200000000" ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:225.23-229.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/ethernet@2,02000000: simple-bus unit address format error, expected "202000000" ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:230.26-235.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/clk24mhz: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:236.30-241.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/refclk1mhz: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:242.32-247.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/refclk32khz: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:248.21-370.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/iofpga@3,00000000: simple-bus unit address format error, expected "300000000" ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:371.33-377.5: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/fixedregulator: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:381.21-387.6: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/mcc/osc: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:388.12-391.6: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/mcc/muxfpga: missing or empty reg/ranges property ./build/fvp/release/fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci.pre.dts:392.12-395.6: Warning (simple_bus_reg): /smb@0,0/motherboard/mcc/dvimode: missing or empty reg/ranges property -- Best Regards Masahiro Yamada

6 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-A] Updated invitation: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 12 Mar 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) (tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, I’ll be running the TF-A Tech Forum next week and I wanted to give an idea of what to expect in this inaugural meeting. While in future meetings I will want to seek input of what the agenda will be before the meeting with the option for other project contributors to present on topics in this first one I have a set agenda which is influenced by the format used in the counterpart TF-M Tech Forum. Agenda: * Introduction to the TF-A Technical Forum Meeting * Technical Overview of the Debug-FS Feature * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions Thanks Joanna From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Bill Fletcher via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Bill Fletcher <bill.fletcher(a)linaro.org> Date: Friday, 28 February 2020 at 15:25 To: <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Updated invitation: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 12 Mar 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) (tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org) This event has been changed. TF-A Tech Forum When Thu 12 Mar 2020 17:00 – 18:00 United Kingdom Time Calendar tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who (Guest list has been hidden at organiser's request) more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MGVhNDdsMGVqNnEzZ3BpY…> Changed: We are starting an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Future invites will be via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.trustedfirmware.org%2Fmeetin…> Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/9159704974<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fzoom.us%2Fj%2F9159704974&sa=D&us…> Meeting ID: 915 970 4974 One tap mobile +16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York) +16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 915 970 4974 Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fzoom.us%2Fu%2Fad27hc6t7h&sa=D&us…> (updated due to content filtering issues) Going (tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org)? Yes<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=MGVhNDdsMGVqNnEzZ3…> - Maybe<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=MGVhNDdsMGVqNnEzZ3…> - No<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=MGVhNDdsMGVqNnEzZ3…> more options »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MGVhNDdsMGVqNnEzZ3BpY…> Invitation from Google Calendar<https://www.google.com/calendar/> You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more<https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

GICv3 driver changes

by Alexei Fedorov

Hello, I'm preparing a set of patches for GICv3 driver for GICv3.1 and GICv4 support. Please review and provide your comments for the 1st patch which separates GICD and GICR accessor functions and adds new macros for GICv3 registers access. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3550 Regards. Alexei IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

debug

by Iñigo Vicente Waliño

Hi, Is there any way to see through the console or to debug the TFA on the imx8m board? Best

6 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

Imx8m mini boot

by Iñigo Vicente Waliño

Hi, Is there any way to see the traceability or registers by the command line of the secure boot on my imx8m mini board with u-boot? Thanks Iñigo

6 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

Review request

by Pramod Kumar

Hi All, Please help me reviewing below patches- https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3493 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3580 Regards, Pramod

6 years, 2 months

1
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Tentatively Accepted: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu Mar 12, 2020 10:30pm - 11:30pm (IST) (Bill Fletcher via TF-A)

by sandeep.tripathy＠broadcom.com

sandeep.tripathy(a)broadcom.com has replied "Maybe" to this invitation. Title: TF-A Tech Forum This meeting originally contained an attachment. Please contact your organizer for the attachment. This event has been changed. TF-A Tech Forum When Thu 12 Mar 2020 17:00 – 18:00 United Kingdom Time Calendar tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who (Guest list has been hidden at organiser's request) more details » Changed: We are starting an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Future invites will be via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Join Zoom Meeting https://zoom.us/j/9159704974 Meeting ID: 915 970 4974 One tap mobile +16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York) +16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose) Dial by your location +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) 877 853 5247 US Toll-free 888 788 0099 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 915 970 4974 Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h (updated due to content filtering issues) Going (tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org)? Yes - Maybe - No more options » Invitation from Google Calendar You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more . When: Thu Mar 12, 2020 10:30pm – 11:30pm India Standard Time - Kolkata Calendar: Bill Fletcher via TF-A Who: * Bill Fletcher via TF-A - organizer * sandeep.tripathy(a)broadcom.com - creator Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

6 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

Updated invitation: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 12 Mar 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) (tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Bill Fletcher

This event has been changed. Title: TF-A Tech Forum We are starting an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Future invites will be via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h  (updated due to content filtering issues) (changed) When: Thu 12 Mar 2020 17:00 – 18:00 United Kingdom Time Calendar: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: (Guest list has been hidden at organiser's request) Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MGVhNDdsMGVqNnEzZ3BpY… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

6 years, 2 months

1
0
0 0

Invitation: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 12 Mar 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) (tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Bill Fletcher

You have been invited to the following event. Title: TF-A Tech Forum We are starting an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Future invites will be via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h   When: Thu 12 Mar 2020 17:00 – 18:00 United Kingdom Time Calendar: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: (Guest list has been hidden at organiser's request) Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=MGVhNDdsMGVqNnEzZ3BpY… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] FIP header flags available for feature selection

by Soby Mathew

Hi Scott Please add the platform specific flags as a field in fip_dev_state_t. typedef struct { uintptr_t dev_spec; uint32_t plat_toc_flag; } fip_dev_state_t; Then this field can be updated as part of verifying the FIP header. This header needs to be cleared when the device is closed. Introduce a helper in fip driver to query the flags: int fip_dev_get_plat_toc_flag(io_dev_info_t *dev_info, uint32_t *plat_toc_flag); That should satisfy your requirement. Best Regards Soby Mathew > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Scott > Branden via TF-A > Sent: 07 February 2020 18:57 > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-A] FIP header flags available for feature selection > > Hello, > > The fip header has reserved fields available for platform specific use. > The fiptool allows these header fields to be filled in using the --plat-toc-flags. > > A call needs to be available in the ATF framework to get these flags without > accessing the FIP file again to get these flags. > We have a solution we've used for ATF for quite some time to access these > flags. > > It's finally being upstreamed here: > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2839 > > If there are any other efficient methods to access these flags or a better > proposal please suggest. > > Thanks, > Scott > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] Multiple Signing Domains

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi Raghu, Thanks a lot for the review comments and feedback! On 2/25/20 3:45 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A wrote: > The patch stack looks great! I do have a suggestion for the long term > evolution/future work on root's of trust and cert_create. It would be > great to generalize "dual-root" to "multi-root". It is conceivable that > firmware supporting secure partitions/SPCI etc, could move to having > multiple root's of trust. Here we have the silicon provider, and the > platform owner as two roots, but a more complex system could contain > silicon firmware, platform firmware and multiple secure partitions, each > signed by different entities. To remove the signing dependencies between > each of these entities, we could have a ROTPK for each of these entities > and the same solution used here, can be applied to solve multiple root's > of trust and is summarized very well by your statement -"As long as > there is a defined contract between BL2 and the (P)(*)ROTK-rooted images > as to how/where to securely get this key or hash, there should not be > any need for the two vendors to do any cross-signing." >> To do this, If possible, we should start moving away from tables such as > the ones in cert_create/src/dualroot/cot.c and have platforms provide > the certificate dependencies and keys used to sign them in a config > file. This achieves two things: it makes cert_create independent of the > cert chain a platform wants to use and the number of roots of trust, > and, makes cert_create more usable by reducing the number of command > line arguments to be provided, which is a long list today. You could > potentially use the config file provided to auto generate the tbbr_cot.c > file being linked into the firmware too. > > Let me know what you think. I agree with everything you said above. Indeed, there's no reason to stop at 2 roots of trust and as you pointed out there are real use cases to enable more. The dualroot chain of trust is only the first step in that direction and is a useful way to experiment with extending the TBBR implementation and chain of trust, while addressing a real use case. Also completely agree with the lack of flexibility of the hard-coded chain of trust in cert_create/src/dualroot/cot.c and drivers/auth/dualroot/cot.c for that matter. In fact, we (at Arm) are thinking along the same lines as you and have had similar ideas boiling for some time. We are making gradual changes to introduce more flexibility into TF-A, not just for the chain of trust, but for any platform-specific data. Maybe you've seen the recent FConf framework patches, which is a key piece into enabling platform layers to move platform-specific data into configuration files. There is still work to do but down the line we are already thinking about moving the chain of trust description into such a configuration file. Moving the CoT into a configuration file has many advantages: - It could constitute the single input source for the chain of trust, serving both the cert_create tool and the firmware. Today, the CoT is described and duplicated in both places and there is really no good reason to keep things like that IMO. As you said, we could auto-generate the tbbr_cot.c file and build into the firmware, or even have the firmware dynamically parse the configuration file at runtime and extract its CoT. - It could simplify the description of the CoT. Today, I think that the C data structures in tbbr_cot.c are quite complex and not straight-forward to understand at first. If we described them using some configuration language, I believe we could abstract some of these details away or at least organize them in a more intuitive way. Regards, Sandrine

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] Multiple Signing Domains

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

Hi Sandrine, The patch stack looks great! I do have a suggestion for the long term evolution/future work on root's of trust and cert_create. It would be great to generalize "dual-root" to "multi-root". It is conceivable that firmware supporting secure partitions/SPCI etc, could move to having multiple root's of trust. Here we have the silicon provider, and the platform owner as two roots, but a more complex system could contain silicon firmware, platform firmware and multiple secure partitions, each signed by different entities. To remove the signing dependencies between each of these entities, we could have a ROTPK for each of these entities and the same solution used here, can be applied to solve multiple root's of trust and is summarized very well by your statement -"As long as there is a defined contract between BL2 and the (P)(*)ROTK-rooted images as to how/where to securely get this key or hash, there should not be any need for the two vendors to do any cross-signing." To do this, If possible, we should start moving away from tables such as the ones in cert_create/src/dualroot/cot.c and have platforms provide the certificate dependencies and keys used to sign them in a config file. This achieves two things: it makes cert_create independent of the cert chain a platform wants to use and the number of roots of trust, and, makes cert_create more usable by reducing the number of command line arguments to be provided, which is a long list today. You could potentially use the config file provided to auto generate the tbbr_cot.c file being linked into the firmware too. Let me know what you think. Thanks Raghu On 2/24/20 3:43 AM, Sandrine Bailleux via TF-A wrote: > Hi, > > Following up on my email sent in November 2019: > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2019-November/000124.html > > and the proof-of-concept code and documentation shared at that time: > [1] > https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/poc-multiple-signing-domains/ > [2] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2443 > > I've made a number of improvements and cleanups in the code. I am > posting a new version that introduces this new chain of trust (called > "dualroot", as it has 2 roots of trust) as an alternative to the default > TBBR one. Right now, it is only enabled on some Arm platforms but it > should be pretty straight-forward to extend this to other platforms. > > The code is available there: > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22sb%252Fdualroot%22 > > and is comprised of the following patches: > - Introduce a new "dualroot" chain of trust > - cert_create: Define the dualroot CoT > - Build system: Changes to drive cert_create for dualroot CoT > - plat/arm: Provide some PROTK files for development > - plat/arm: Add support for dualroot CoT > - plat/arm: Pass cookie argument down to arm_get_rotpk_info() > - plat/arm: Retrieve the right ROTPK when using the dualroot CoT > > This patch stack is based on preparatory work (which has already been > merged) to select a different CoT. This patch stack: > - Did some build system refactoring. > - Introduced a new 'COT' build option to select the chosen chain of trust. > - Made no functional change. > See > http://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=dcd03… > > Note that I've not updated the TF-A documentation just yet to reflect > these changes. I will do that once I've had some initial feedback from > the community and feel that we're reaching a consensus (in the interest > of saving time keeping documentation aligned with code going under rework). > > > Changes Compared to the Proof-of-Concept Patch [2] > -------------------------------------------------- > > - Introduced a proper, separate chain of trust rather than hijacking the > TBBR one. It also has its own header file for certificate extensions > OIDs now. > > - NS-ROTPK has been renamed into "Platform ROTPK", or PROTPK for short. > Going forward, this key would sign both non-trusted images (such as > BL33) and secure partitions. The NS- prefix did not fit well this use > case. The "Platform" prefix instead refers to the owner of this key, > i.e. the platform owner, as opposed to the Silicon Provider. > > - Removed Non-Trusted World Bootloader Key Certificate. > This didn't seem needed in this context and simplifies the CoT. > > - Removed the Non-Trusted Key from the Trusted Key Certificate, as it's > not used in this CoT (the PROTPK signs all non-trusted images instead). > > - As a consequence, the corresponding option for feeding the PROTPK to > the cert_create tool has been renamed into --prot-key (was --ns-rot-key). > > - The hash of the PROTPK is now provided in a file rather than being > hard-coded into the code. This is cleaner than polluting the code with a > byte array. > > - Proper integration in the build system. > Using the dualroot chain of trust is achieved through the COT build > option: > > make <usual trusted boot build options> COT=dualroot > > - plat_get_rotpk_info() is unchanged if using the TBBR CoT. > The alternative implementation managing both ROTPK or PROTPK is > selected only if the dualroot CoT has been chosen at build time. > > > Testing and Supported Platforms > ------------------------------- > > Tested on AEMv8-A Base Platform (AArch32 and AArch64 execution states), > rde1edge, rdn1edge, SGI-575 and SGM-775 FVPs (all available on > https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fixed-virtua…). > > Arm Juno is not supported right now because it has its own > implementation of plat_get_arm_rotpk_info() instead of piggy-backing on > the Arm common one. > > Ran the standard set of tests available in the TF-A-Tests repository: > http://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/about/ > > Also ran the firmware update tests available in the same repository. See > > https://trustedfirmware-a-tests.readthedocs.io/en/latest/user-guide.html#ns… > for more information. > > Finally, performed some end-to-end boot tests to Linux. > > And of course, ran our regression tests to make sure that existing > configurations using the TBBR chain of trust are still working as expected. > > > Caveats > ------- > > The PROTPK hash is embedded into the firmware. It's unlikely that a real > system would like to do that. The use case targeted here is to remove > the need for the primary ROTPK owner to interact with the PROTPK owner. > If BL2 embeds the hash, this defeats the purpose, as now the BL2 owner > (which is expected to be the primary ROTPK owner) has to get the PROTPK > from the other vendor. > > In a real system, we would expect the PROTPK to be provisioned in such a > way that BL2 is able to retrieve it. For example, the PROTPK owner might > burn it (or a hash of it) in some OTP memory. As long as there is a > defined contract between BL2 and the PROTK-rooted images as to how/where > to securely get this key or hash, there should not be any need for the > two vendors to do any cross-signing. > > This caveat was already present in the proof-of-concept [2] and stays > out of the scope for this work, as this ties into broader topics such as > key provisioning. Right now, the onus is on the platform layer to handle > this appropriately. > > > Future work > ----------- > > We have plans to change the "dualroot" CoT further and extend the PROTPK > signing domain with a secure partition. This would demonstrate the use > of several secure partitions, some owned by the silicon provider, others > owned by the platform owner. > > > Regards, > Sandrine >

6 years, 2 months

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 3 defect(s), reported by Coverity Scan earlier, were marked fixed in the recent build analyzed by Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 1 of 1 defect(s) ** CID 354288: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 354288: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /plat/intel/soc/common/socfpga_psci.c: 138 in socfpga_system_reset() 132 133 extern uint64_t intel_rsu_update_address; 134 135 static void __dead2 socfpga_system_reset(void) 136 { 137 if (intel_rsu_update_address) >>> CID 354288: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) >>> Overrunning buffer pointed to by "&intel_rsu_update_address" of 8 bytes by passing it to a function which accesses it at byte offset 15. 138 mailbox_rsu_update(&intel_rsu_update_address); 139 else 140 mailbox_reset_cold(); 141 142 while (1) 143 wfi(); ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] Multiple Signing Domains

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi, Following up on my email sent in November 2019: https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2019-November/000124.html and the proof-of-concept code and documentation shared at that time: [1] https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/poc-multiple-signing-domains/ [2] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2443 I've made a number of improvements and cleanups in the code. I am posting a new version that introduces this new chain of trust (called "dualroot", as it has 2 roots of trust) as an alternative to the default TBBR one. Right now, it is only enabled on some Arm platforms but it should be pretty straight-forward to extend this to other platforms. The code is available there: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22sb%252Fdualroot%22 and is comprised of the following patches: - Introduce a new "dualroot" chain of trust - cert_create: Define the dualroot CoT - Build system: Changes to drive cert_create for dualroot CoT - plat/arm: Provide some PROTK files for development - plat/arm: Add support for dualroot CoT - plat/arm: Pass cookie argument down to arm_get_rotpk_info() - plat/arm: Retrieve the right ROTPK when using the dualroot CoT This patch stack is based on preparatory work (which has already been merged) to select a different CoT. This patch stack: - Did some build system refactoring. - Introduced a new 'COT' build option to select the chosen chain of trust. - Made no functional change. See http://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=dcd03… Note that I've not updated the TF-A documentation just yet to reflect these changes. I will do that once I've had some initial feedback from the community and feel that we're reaching a consensus (in the interest of saving time keeping documentation aligned with code going under rework). Changes Compared to the Proof-of-Concept Patch [2] -------------------------------------------------- - Introduced a proper, separate chain of trust rather than hijacking the TBBR one. It also has its own header file for certificate extensions OIDs now. - NS-ROTPK has been renamed into "Platform ROTPK", or PROTPK for short. Going forward, this key would sign both non-trusted images (such as BL33) and secure partitions. The NS- prefix did not fit well this use case. The "Platform" prefix instead refers to the owner of this key, i.e. the platform owner, as opposed to the Silicon Provider. - Removed Non-Trusted World Bootloader Key Certificate. This didn't seem needed in this context and simplifies the CoT. - Removed the Non-Trusted Key from the Trusted Key Certificate, as it's not used in this CoT (the PROTPK signs all non-trusted images instead). - As a consequence, the corresponding option for feeding the PROTPK to the cert_create tool has been renamed into --prot-key (was --ns-rot-key). - The hash of the PROTPK is now provided in a file rather than being hard-coded into the code. This is cleaner than polluting the code with a byte array. - Proper integration in the build system. Using the dualroot chain of trust is achieved through the COT build option: make <usual trusted boot build options> COT=dualroot - plat_get_rotpk_info() is unchanged if using the TBBR CoT. The alternative implementation managing both ROTPK or PROTPK is selected only if the dualroot CoT has been chosen at build time. Testing and Supported Platforms ------------------------------- Tested on AEMv8-A Base Platform (AArch32 and AArch64 execution states), rde1edge, rdn1edge, SGI-575 and SGM-775 FVPs (all available on https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/simulation-models/fixed-virtua…). Arm Juno is not supported right now because it has its own implementation of plat_get_arm_rotpk_info() instead of piggy-backing on the Arm common one. Ran the standard set of tests available in the TF-A-Tests repository: http://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/about/ Also ran the firmware update tests available in the same repository. See https://trustedfirmware-a-tests.readthedocs.io/en/latest/user-guide.html#ns… for more information. Finally, performed some end-to-end boot tests to Linux. And of course, ran our regression tests to make sure that existing configurations using the TBBR chain of trust are still working as expected. Caveats ------- The PROTPK hash is embedded into the firmware. It's unlikely that a real system would like to do that. The use case targeted here is to remove the need for the primary ROTPK owner to interact with the PROTPK owner. If BL2 embeds the hash, this defeats the purpose, as now the BL2 owner (which is expected to be the primary ROTPK owner) has to get the PROTPK from the other vendor. In a real system, we would expect the PROTPK to be provisioned in such a way that BL2 is able to retrieve it. For example, the PROTPK owner might burn it (or a hash of it) in some OTP memory. As long as there is a defined contract between BL2 and the PROTK-rooted images as to how/where to securely get this key or hash, there should not be any need for the two vendors to do any cross-signing. This caveat was already present in the proof-of-concept [2] and stays out of the scope for this work, as this ties into broader topics such as key provisioning. Right now, the onus is on the platform layer to handle this appropriately. Future work ----------- We have plans to change the "dualroot" CoT further and extend the PROTPK signing domain with a secure partition. This would demonstrate the use of several secure partitions, some owned by the silicon provider, others owned by the platform owner. Regards, Sandrine

6 years, 2 months

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Need to synchronize pending EA

by Madhukar Pappireddy

Hi, I have pushed a patch [1] to use a barrier to synchronize pending EA at the entry and exit of exception handlers in BL31(EL3S). There is an interesting discussion as seen in the gerrit review comments of the patch. It looks like this patch is just enabling early panic/crash of the system in the event of SErrors but it does come with performance penalty (due to DSBs) for common exceptions like SMC calls. We believe this needs broader discussion to understand the practical approach to handle SErrors, especially in SoCs without RAS support. Please let us know your thoughts on this patch. [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3440 Thanks, Madhukar

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables

by Petre-Ionut Tudor

Hi Raghu, Thank you for your comments. My own comments are inline. ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 18 February 2020 00:16 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables I think it is worth implementing this to raise the bar for successful attacks. To Varun's point, in today's systems without S-EL2(<v8.4), it would be less effective as pointed out, since EL3 memory can be completely accessed by SEL1 and SEL1 code tends to have a larger code base on mobile devices(OPTEE, tlk etc). However, on systems with very thin SEL1 shims(typically servers), this would definitely raise the bar for attacks, since you effectively only have SEL0 and EL3. SEL1 cannot be exploited practically. For new SoCs with SEL2, this mitigation can still be very effective if we can ensure future SEL2 implementations have much smaller code bases and implements this mitigation itself. Effectively, i view SEL2 and EL3 as being equally privileged(it is no different than SEL1 because SEL2 can barf all over EL3 memory and TZ resources if exploited). SEL2 extensions, however, gives EL3 protection from SEL1 and can prevent SEL1 from accessing ALL TZ resources. If you view SEL2 and EL3 as equally privileged and view both together as a single entity, v8.4 systems effectively have EL3, SEL1, SEL0 AND the ability for EL3 to protect itself and other TZ resources from SEL1. In such a system, EL3(and SEL2) having this mitigation will definitely raise the bar for successful attacks. Also, the cost to implement this mitigation is relatively low for a fairly significant raise in the bar for successful attacks. PS - I say significantly raise the bar since an attacker will potentially require gadgets to modify TTBRx, invalidate TLB's, and enough gadgets in the code base to have a successful attack. If code in TF-A EL3 is fairly small, and code that writes to TTBR_EL3 can be in some section of the image that can be reclaimed/erased after initial setup, the attacker would have no gadget to modify TTBR_EL3, so there would be virtually no way to change TTBR_EL3. On a default build of FVP, there is a grand total of 1 instruction that writes to TTBR0_EL3 in enable_mmu_direct_el3. This might be a nice follow up change to this mitigation, if others think it is worth it. The same could be extended to other system registers that don't ever need to be changed(VBAR_EL3? SCTLR_EL3?). Petre: enable_mmu_direct_el3 is also used in the read-only xlat tables API, because the change is made while the MMU is on (so it must be disabled first). I decided to implement it this way in order to allow a platform to make any changes it needs to the translation tables (e.g. for reclaiming initialization code) before calling this API. So, it is kind of "dynamic"...but after it is called nothing can be done to the tables from that EL. This means that we have to reclaim before using this API (otherwise we would have to choose between reclaiming and this feature since RO tables won't allow changing the memory map). I was afraid the change might impose too much rigidity on the initialization of platform BL images, so I went with this approach instead of making the tables read-only at creation by the init_xlat_tables* functions. Thanks Raghu On 2/17/20 12:35 PM, Varun Wadekar via TF-A wrote: > Hello Petre, > > Thanks for the patch. Before I review the actual code, would like to understand how effective this patch will be and if you have seen a real world attack that this patch mitigates. > > AFAIU, the ARM architecture provides the TZ bit as the only protection to create "partitions" on a CPU core. So, potentially S-EL1 can access almost all TZ resources that EL3 can access. Thus, creating a silo inside EL3 exception mode is not an effective mitigation against any other TZ component writing to the physical memory where the page tables are stored. For the scope of this attack vector, are we assuming that the system cannot be compromised by attacking other TZ software components in the system? > > I feel until we have a way to distinguish between CPU realms (EL3 v S-EL2 v S-EL1) at the hardware bus level (ARM v9?), these mitigations are not that effective. > > Thoughts? > > -Varun > > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Petre-Ionut Tudor via TF-A > Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 9:40 AM > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables > > External email: Use caution opening links or attachments > > > Hello Everyone, > > For quite some time I have been working on a security hardening feature that offers extra protection against tampering with the Secure world translation tables. An example would be using a gadget that can perform writes to arbitrary Secure memory locations to change memory attributes and/or the memory map. > > A real world exploit that uses read/write gadgets to tamper with translation tables can be found here: https://vimeo.com/335948808. If you only want the slide deck, it's available here: https://speakerdeck.com/hhj4ck/el3-tour-get-the-ultimate-privilege-of-andro…. > > A patch implementing this feature has been recently pushed upstream here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3349. It extends v2 of the translation tables library with an API that can be called by a BL image any time after the initialization of the xlat tables to make them read-only. > > It would be great to hear your opinions about this, particularly whether or not it is a desirable feature to have in TF-A and what extra work needs to be done for it to meet the use cases that you consider most relevant. > > Best wishes > Petre > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain > confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution > is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by > reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables

by Petre-Ionut Tudor

Hi Varun, Thank you for the suggestions. My comments are inline. Petre ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 18 February 2020 05:44 To: Raghu Krishnamurthy <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables Thanks Raghu. I agree that this patch reduces the attack surface and would be a good addition, if we consider use cases where EL3 code runs in a silo. Since S-EL1 can contain any third party code, there is an opportunity to change memory contents without EL3 ever noticing the change. A hash for the RO page tables would improve this change immensely IMO. > Petre: Thank you for the suggestion. Sounds like an interesting improvement to make (maybe in a follow-up to this change?, since my rotation in the TF-A team is nearing its end). This change is not effective for platforms that use dynamic page tables e.g. Tegra platforms, so we won't be enabling it. But if other maintainers think this is a good addition to their platforms, I don’t have any objection. > Petre: Do you think it would be worth making this feature play more nicely with the dynamic translation library? I'm thinking providing a counter-API to make tables writable again. So that, every time a dynamic API is needed, since the translation context will be aware of the tables being RO, it first calls a make_tables_writable API before doing whatever it needs to and after it completes (whether successfully or not) calls make_tables_readonly. Essentially, it would act like a wrapper around the dynamic library functions. What do you think of this? Is the disable MMU + cache flush penalty too severe (incurred twice for each dynamic xlat API call)? -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 4:16 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables External email: Use caution opening links or attachments I think it is worth implementing this to raise the bar for successful attacks. To Varun's point, in today's systems without S-EL2(<v8.4), it would be less effective as pointed out, since EL3 memory can be completely accessed by SEL1 and SEL1 code tends to have a larger code base on mobile devices(OPTEE, tlk etc). However, on systems with very thin SEL1 shims(typically servers), this would definitely raise the bar for attacks, since you effectively only have SEL0 and EL3. SEL1 cannot be exploited practically. For new SoCs with SEL2, this mitigation can still be very effective if we can ensure future SEL2 implementations have much smaller code bases and implements this mitigation itself. Effectively, i view SEL2 and EL3 as being equally privileged(it is no different than SEL1 because SEL2 can barf all over EL3 memory and TZ resources if exploited). SEL2 extensions, however, gives EL3 protection from SEL1 and can prevent SEL1 from accessing ALL TZ resources. If you view SEL2 and EL3 as equally privileged and view both together as a single entity, v8.4 systems effectively have EL3, SEL1, SEL0 AND the ability for EL3 to protect itself and other TZ resources from SEL1. In such a system, EL3(and SEL2) having this mitigation will definitely raise the bar for successful attacks. Also, the cost to implement this mitigation is relatively low for a fairly significant raise in the bar for successful attacks. PS - I say significantly raise the bar since an attacker will potentially require gadgets to modify TTBRx, invalidate TLB's, and enough gadgets in the code base to have a successful attack. If code in TF-A EL3 is fairly small, and code that writes to TTBR_EL3 can be in some section of the image that can be reclaimed/erased after initial setup, the attacker would have no gadget to modify TTBR_EL3, so there would be virtually no way to change TTBR_EL3. On a default build of FVP, there is a grand total of 1 instruction that writes to TTBR0_EL3 in enable_mmu_direct_el3. This might be a nice follow up change to this mitigation, if others think it is worth it. The same could be extended to other system registers that don't ever need to be changed(VBAR_EL3? SCTLR_EL3?). Thanks Raghu On 2/17/20 12:35 PM, Varun Wadekar via TF-A wrote: > Hello Petre, > > Thanks for the patch. Before I review the actual code, would like to understand how effective this patch will be and if you have seen a real world attack that this patch mitigates. > > AFAIU, the ARM architecture provides the TZ bit as the only protection to create "partitions" on a CPU core. So, potentially S-EL1 can access almost all TZ resources that EL3 can access. Thus, creating a silo inside EL3 exception mode is not an effective mitigation against any other TZ component writing to the physical memory where the page tables are stored. For the scope of this attack vector, are we assuming that the system cannot be compromised by attacking other TZ software components in the system? > > I feel until we have a way to distinguish between CPU realms (EL3 v S-EL2 v S-EL1) at the hardware bus level (ARM v9?), these mitigations are not that effective. > > Thoughts? > > -Varun > > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > Petre-Ionut Tudor via TF-A > Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 9:40 AM > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables > > External email: Use caution opening links or attachments > > > Hello Everyone, > > For quite some time I have been working on a security hardening feature that offers extra protection against tampering with the Secure world translation tables. An example would be using a gadget that can perform writes to arbitrary Secure memory locations to change memory attributes and/or the memory map. > > A real world exploit that uses read/write gadgets to tamper with translation tables can be found here: https://vimeo.com/335948808. If you only want the slide deck, it's available here: https://speakerdeck.com/hhj4ck/el3-tour-get-the-ultimate-privilege-of-andro…. > > A patch implementing this feature has been recently pushed upstream here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3349. It extends v2 of the translation tables library with an API that can be called by a BL image any time after the initialization of the xlat tables to make them read-only. > > It would be great to hear your opinions about this, particularly whether or not it is a desirable feature to have in TF-A and what extra work needs to be done for it to meet the use cases that you consider most relevant. > > Best wishes > Petre > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > ------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended > recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any > unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. > If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by > reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > ------------- > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables

by Varun Wadekar

Hello Petre, Thanks for the patch. Before I review the actual code, would like to understand how effective this patch will be and if you have seen a real world attack that this patch mitigates. AFAIU, the ARM architecture provides the TZ bit as the only protection to create "partitions" on a CPU core. So, potentially S-EL1 can access almost all TZ resources that EL3 can access. Thus, creating a silo inside EL3 exception mode is not an effective mitigation against any other TZ component writing to the physical memory where the page tables are stored. For the scope of this attack vector, are we assuming that the system cannot be compromised by attacking other TZ software components in the system? I feel until we have a way to distinguish between CPU realms (EL3 v S-EL2 v S-EL1) at the hardware bus level (ARM v9?), these mitigations are not that effective. Thoughts? -Varun -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Petre-Ionut Tudor via TF-A Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 9:40 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hello Everyone, For quite some time I have been working on a security hardening feature that offers extra protection against tampering with the Secure world translation tables. An example would be using a gadget that can perform writes to arbitrary Secure memory locations to change memory attributes and/or the memory map. A real world exploit that uses read/write gadgets to tamper with translation tables can be found here: https://vimeo.com/335948808. If you only want the slide deck, it's available here: https://speakerdeck.com/hhj4ck/el3-tour-get-the-ultimate-privilege-of-andro…. A patch implementing this feature has been recently pushed upstream here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3349. It extends v2 of the translation tables library with an API that can be called by a BL image any time after the initialization of the xlat tables to make them read-only. It would be great to hear your opinions about this, particularly whether or not it is a desirable feature to have in TF-A and what extra work needs to be done for it to meet the use cases that you consider most relevant. Best wishes Petre IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads

by Soby Mathew

On 18/02/2020 05:52, Sumit Garg wrote: > On Tue, 18 Feb 2020 at 00:44, Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> wrote: >> >> Hi Everyone, >> I have confirmation from the TBFU architect that both decrypt-then-verify and verify-then-decrypt is acceptable and neither case affects boot integrity. > > Thanks for this confirmation. > >> So I think the flexibility should be given to the platform to choose this. >> >> @Sumit Garg, could you please rework the patches as I mentioned in my previous feedback and submit again? > > Sure I will try to address implementation specific concerns. Actually > earlier I was waiting for above design specific confirmation. > > -Sumit [Adding back the tf-a list] OK, Thanks Sumit. >> >> Best Regards >> Soby Mathew >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raghupathy >>> Krishnamurthy via TF-A >>> Sent: 28 January 2020 14:58 >>> To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> >>> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org>; Miklos Balint >>> <Miklos.Balint(a)arm.com>; Kiyoshi Owada <owada.kiyoshi(a)socionext.com>; tf- >>> a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Joakim Bech <joakim.bech(a)linaro.org>; nd >>> <nd(a)arm.com>; Sandrine Bailleux <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> >>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads >>> >>> Hi Sumit, >>> >>> >>> I completely agree with you! All i'm asking for is that what you are proposing is >>> ratified in the spec clearly, without any ambiguities and that we don't >>> implement what we *think* is correct, but implement the spec. If the spec >>> specifies encryption, we should implement encryption, not authenticated >>> encryption. One is not a direct substitute for the other and requires careful >>> thinking. Similarly, the order of signing, encryption, decryption and >>> authentication must be specified and explained clearly, specifically to avoid >>> these kinds of discussions. >>> >>> >>> Thanks >>> -Raghu >>> >>> On January 27, 2020 at 10:49 PM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Mon, 27 Jan 2020 at 22:54, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy >>> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Sumit, >>> >>> >>> Great point. This perhaps needs to be added to the list of things that need >>> clarification(Sandrine can you help with this too?) in the PSA-TBFU . I believe >>> the answer to your concern lies in the PSA-TBFU in section 3.5, where it talks >>> about optimizing the trusted boot process. To overcome the problem you're >>> talking about, you would: >>> 1) Verify asymmetric signature. >>> 2) Decrypt firmware using SSK on successful signature verification. >>> 3) Rekey the firmware using BSSK(or as the PSA specifies, a key derived from >>> the HUK using a KDF). >>> You will only verify the asymmetric signature on every firmware update, and >>> use the rekeyed firmware(encrypted and mac;d with device specific key) on >>> normal boot. >>> >>> >>> >>> Following is the quote from PSA-TBFU spec: >>> >>> "An implementation **can** optimize the trusted boot process at the expense >>> of **simplicity**" >>> >>> It doesn't seems to be a recommended practice from spec. And especially for >>> DRM use-cases, this approach is NOT recommended due to following concerns >>> raised by DRM vendors (original concerns were with respect to TAs but will >>> equally apply for firmware as well): >>> - allows the device to self sign code authorized to run on the device. >>> - increase the attack surface by having two different ways to load firmware. >>> - allow a break once break forever situation, if you defeat the RSA 'install' once, >>> no matter how hard it is, now your firmware is nicely transformed in a secure >>> firmware and can be reused. >>> >>> Whereas on the other hand, considering >>> "sign-then-encrypt-then-authenticate", it provides two mutually exclusive >>> crypto layers (signature layer and authenticated encryption >>> layer) which in turns provides implementation flexibility as follows: >>> >>> Firmware update: >>> - Require both layers. >>> >>> Normal boot: >>> - DRM use-case, require both layers. >>> - Boot time optimization required, can use only authenticated encryption. >>> - Platform provides secure on-chip NVM and boot time optimization required, >>> can use only signature verification (or simply hash stored in secure on-chip >>> NVM memory). >>> >>> -Sumit >>> >>> >>> Thanks >>> Raghu >>> >>> >>> On January 26, 2020 at 10:34 PM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Fri, 24 Jan 2020 at 16:36, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, 24 Jan 2020 at 04:02, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy >>> >>> >>> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> I also just realized that both the TBBR and ARM PSA only talk about >>> encryption of the image, and not authenticated encryption. The guarantees >>> provided by both are completely different. Your >>> review(https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2495/) >>> talks about the requirement R060_TBBR_FUNCTION being implemented, which >>> is technically not true(and potentially misleading). We must make a note of this >>> difference and use the appropriate terminology, without mixing the two, in the >>> documentation, commit messages, source code comments and error prints. >>> The tool is also called 'encrypt_fw ' but should maybe be named appropriately >>> to indicate it is doing authenticated encryption. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I wouldn't call it misleading. Since firmware encryption feature >>> >>> >>> essentially provides confidentiality protection and authenticated >>> >>> >>> encryption is the type of crypto algorithm which we have used to >>> >>> >>> implement it. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> BTW, ARM PSA(file:///home/raghu/repos/fvp/DEN0072-PSA_TBFU_1-0- >>> REL.pdf) expects that the image manifest(X509 certificate) contain the hash of >>> the ENCRYPTED image(Table 2 and as described in my answer to your question >>> "How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext"). The TBBR spec completely >>> misses this fact, and is a crucial detail if we only implement encryption(as >>> opposed to authenticated encryption).Build_macros.mk, in your change, passes >>> the un-encrypted image to cert-tool. You can get away with it in your >>> implementation, since you are using authenticated encryption, not if you were >>> only implementing firmware encryption. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I have already highlighted the issue with signing the ciphertext in my >>> >>> >>> previous reply which deviates from security properties provided by >>> >>> >>> signature verification of plain firmware. So I think we need to >>> >>> >>> revisit ARM PSA TBFU spec. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> In addition to this, there are implementation specific issues with "signing the >>> ciphertext" too. It simply makes the ciphertext immutable for device and >>> disallows meeting following firmware re-encryption requirement as per TBBR >>> spec: >>> >>> >>> R070_TBBR_PROTECTION. The Trusted boot firmware may do the binding of >>> software image updates at run- time by decrypting the updated SoC certificates >>> and software images using the OTP/Fuse Secret Symmetric Key (SSK), followed >>> by the re-encrypting these SoC certificates and software images using a >>> reproducible secret unique per device symmetric key (BSSK), and then updating >>> the ToC correspondingly. >>> >>> >>> Also, externally signing every firmware image encrypted with BSSK doesn't >>> seem scalable as well. It also hampers the case where encryption key is never >>> exposed out from device eg. encryption key is only accessible to hardware >>> crypto engine etc. >>> >>> >>> -Sumit >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Is it possible for somebody from ARM to have the TBBR spec updated to >>> reflect this? Also perhaps talk to the spec writers about incorporating >>> authenticated encryption into TBBR and PSA? This patch set is somewhat >>> trailblazing in this regard. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -Raghu >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On January 23, 2020 at 12:08 PM, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf- >>> a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Sumit, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Thanks for your response. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> So firstly I would suggest you to revisit TBBR spec [1], >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] I'm very familiar with the TBBR spec and the requirements. Note >>>> that not all SoC's adhere perfectly to the TBBR spec, since it does >>>> not apply to devices in all market segments. However, these devices do >>>> use arm trusted firmware and TBBR CoT in a slightly modified form, >>>> which is still perfectly valid. Also, the TBBR spec can be changed if >>>> required :) >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Why would one use authenticated decryption only to establish TBBR >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Chain of Trust providing device the capability to self sign its firmware? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] Fair point. However, you may have devices that don't have the >>> processing power or hardware budget or cost factors(paying for HSM's to store >>> private asymmetric keys), to implement asymmetric verification, in which case >>> using authenticated decryption to verify firmware authenticity and integrity is >>> perfectly valid. The attacks on devices that use symmetric keys to verify >>> firmware authenticity and integrity are usually related to exploiting firmware >>> flaws that leak the key or insiders leaking keys, but that is a different problem >>> and requires different solutions. Fundamentally, there is nothing wrong with >>> using symmetric keys for this purpose, so long as the key is well protected. Also >>> note, security requirements and guarantees are different for different systems. >>> The risk is taken by the system designer and should not be imposed by >>> framework code. I don't advocate doing this but it is an option that your >>> implementation does not provide(and perhaps rightly so). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] You sign the ciphertext. In your design, you pass bl31_enc.bin to >>> cert_tool to sign. You don't decrypt the encrypted cipher text until you have >>> verified the asymmetric signature(which provides integrity). As far as signature >>> verification is concerned, whether you sign the plain text or ciphertext is >>> immaterial, since you are simply verifying that the absolute bits you loaded >>> have not been modified(assuming you use a secure signature scheme). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Have a look at some defective sign and encrypt techniques here [2] >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] Again, very familiar with [2]. In the S/MIME case, you have multiple >>> parties. With secure boot, you have one party, effectively verifying its own >>> messages across time. There is only one key used to verify signatures. 1.1 and >>> 1.2 does not apply. Also you are encrypting and signing with completely >>> different keys and algorithms. Section 1.2 applies when you use RSA/El-gamal >>> encryption. Here you use symmetric encryption and asymmetric signing. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Why would one not use TBBR CoT here? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] see above. Not all systems are designed equal. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> and why would one like to hardcode in a device during >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> provisioning to boot only either an encrypted or a plain firmware >>> >>> >>>> image? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] Why would you not? You typically want to have the same security policy >>> for a class of devices and not be modifiable by an attacker. It isn't common for >>> the same class of devices to use encrypted firmware some times, and un- >>> encrypted firmware other times. If it is common, there is no problem with >>> setting the bit in the FIP header, as long as verified boot is mandatory. The only >>> concern(as my original email said) is the coupling of the FIP layer and the >>> crypto module, in the implementation. I still don't like that fact that the bit >>> saying the file is encrypted is not signed and this may require talking to the >>> TBBR spec writers. Page 22 of the TBBR spec calls out ToC as "Trusted Table of >>> Contents". The FIP header cannot be "trusted", if it is not in ROM or its integrity >>> is verified by some means! R010_TBBR_TOC should perhaps be mandatory >>> then. Also see R080_TBBR_TOC that says the TOC MUST be ROM'ed or tied by >>> hardware in readable registers. This requirement seems contradictory to >>> R010_TBBR_TOC, given that the FIP header(TOC) is copied from mutable NVM >>> by ROM or some boot stage and then ROM'd or loaded into registers. I may be >>> misunderstanding R080_TBBR_TOC, but i'd interpret it as the TOC(FIP header >>> in ATF implementation of TBBR) as being in ROM or integrity verified. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> How would one handle a case where BL31 is in plain format and BL32 is in >>> encrypted format? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK]TBBR CoT is equipped to do this. The table is defined on a per image >>> basis. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> If you are really paranoid about authentication of FIP header... >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] I don't mean to pontificate but there are real world customers buying >>> real hardware, running ATF code, who care about such details and ask about >>> such things routinely. It is not just me being paranoid and is definitely not a >>> minor matter to think of such details. We should discuss more and consider the >>> implications of R080_TBBR_TOC and R010_TBBR_TOC, perhaps on a different >>> thread, without blocking your code review. Can somebody from ARM clarify >>> these requirements with the spec writers? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Thanks >>> >>> >>>> -Raghu >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On January 23, 2020 at 12:38 AM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Raghu, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> I guess you have completely misunderstood this feature. This is an >>> >>> >>>> optional feature which allows to load encrypted FIP payloads using >>> >>> >>>> authenticated decryption which MUST be used along with signature >>> >>> >>>> verification (or TBBR CoT). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> So firstly I would suggest you to revisit TBBR spec [1], especially >>> >>> >>>> requirements: R040_TBBR_TOC, R060_TBBR_FUNCTION etc. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 at 00:14, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy >>> >>> >>>> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hello, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> The patch stack looks good. The only comment i have is that the FIP layer has >>> now become security aware and supports authenticated decryption(only). This >>> is a deviation from the secure/signed/verified boot design, where we use the >>> TBBR COT to dictate the security operations on the file. This is nice, because >>> file IO is decoupled from the security policy. This may be a big deviation(i >>> apologize if this was considered and shot down for some other reason), but it >>> may be worthwhile to consider making authenticated decryption a part of the >>> authentication framework as opposed to coupling it with the FIP layer. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> It looks like you have mixed both TBBR CoT and this authenticated >>> >>> >>>> decryption feature. They both are completely different and rather >>> >>> >>>> complement each other where TBBR CoT establishes >>> >>> >>>> secure/signed/verified boot and this authenticated decryption feature >>> >>> >>>> provides confidentiality protection for FIP payloads. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> At a high level, this would mean adding a new authentication >>> method(perhaps AUTH_METHOD_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION), and having >>> the platform specify that the image is using authenticated encryption in the >>> TBBR COT. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Why would one use authenticated decryption only to establish TBBR >>> >>> >>>> Chain of Trust providing device the capability to self sign its >>> >>> >>>> firmwares? We must use signature verification for TBBR CoT (see >>> >>> >>>> section: 2.1 Authentication of Code Images by Certificate in TBBR spec >>> >>> >>>> [1]). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> The authentication framework is already well designed and well equipped to >>> handle these types of extensions. >>> >>> >>>> 1) This would make the change simpler, since you would not require changes >>> to the FIP tool and the FIP layer. >>> >>> >>>> 2) This would also allow for future cases where a platform may want to only >>> encrypt the file and use public key authentication on the encrypted file(for ex. >>> the soc does not have a crypto accelerator for aes-gcm but only for AES and >>> public key verification, for whatever reason). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext? This approach may be >>> >>> >>>> vulnerable to Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs). Authentication tag as >>> >>> >>>> part of AES-GCM provides integrity protection for ciphertext. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> 3) This would let you choose the order in which you want to do the >>> authenticated decryption(or just decryption) and signature verification, if you >>> use both, one or the other. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Have a look at some defective sign and encrypt techniques here [2]. >>> >>> >>>> The order can't be any arbitrary one, we need to be careful about >>> >>> >>>> this. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> One other thing i'm not entirely comfortable with is that the flag indicating if >>> there are encrypted files or not in the FIP, is in the *unsigned* portion of the >>> FIP header. An attacker could simply flip bits that dictate security policy in the >>> header and avoid detection(in this case, the indication that the file needs >>> authenticated decryption). If a platform only uses authenticated encryption, but >>> not verified boot, an attacker could flip the bit in the FIP header and have any >>> image loaded on the platform. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Why would one not use TBBR CoT here? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> If authenticated encryption cannot be used without verified boot(which >>> requires build time flags), having a flag to indicate that there are encrypted >>> files in the FIP header is moot, since this can come at build time through the >>> TBBR COT. In any case, it seems like the security policy that firmware images >>> need to be decrypted or authenticated with authenticated decryption, seems >>> like a firmware build time or manufacturing time decision(perhaps a bit set in >>> the e-fuses). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Again you are confusing TBBR CoT with authenticated decryption >>> >>> >>>> feature. And why would one like to hardcode in a device during >>> >>> >>>> provisioning to boot only either an encrypted or a plain firmware >>> >>> >>>> image? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> There seems to be no benefit to having a flag in the FIP header. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> How would one handle a case where BL31 is in plain format and BL32 is >>> >>> >>>> in encrypted format? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Otherwise, I cant think of any attacks due to this and it may be completely >>> okay, but generally, consuming data that dictates security policy/operations >>> before verifying its integrity seems like a recipe for disaster. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> If you are really paranoid about authentication of FIP header then you >>> >>> >>>> should look at implementing optional requirement: R010_TBBR_TOC as per >>> >>> >>>> TBBR spec [1]. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [1] >>>> https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0006/latest/trusted-board-boot-requi >>>> rements-client-tbbr-client-armv8-a >>> >>> >>>> [2] http://world.std.com/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.html >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -Sumit >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -Raghu >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On January 22, 2020 at 3:51 AM, Sumit Garg via TF-A <tf- >>> a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Sandrine, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 at 15:43, Sandrine Bailleux >>> >>> >>>> <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hello Sumit, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Thank you for reworking the patches and addressing all of my review >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> comments. I am happy with the latest version of these and consider >>>> them >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> ready to go. I plan to leave them in Gerrit for another week to give >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> extra time for other potential reviewers to have a look and comment. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Thanks for your review. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> To everyone on the list: Please raise any concerns you may have about >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> these patches in the coming week. If I don't hear anything by 29th >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> January 2020, I will merge these patches. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> @Sumit: One of the next actions for this patch stack would be to have >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> some level of testing in the CI system to detect any potential >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> regressions. We (at Arm) can quite easily add a few build tests but >>>> then >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> testing the software stack on QEMU is a bit more involved for various >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> reasons (first instance of QEMU testing, dependencies on OPTEE, UEFI, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> ...) so this might have to wait for some time. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Okay, will wait for CI testing. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -Sumit >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Regards, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Sandrine >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -- >>> >>> >>>> TF-A mailing list >>> >>> >>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>> >>> >>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >>> >>> >>>> -- >>> >>> >>>> TF-A mailing list >>> >>> >>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>> >>> >>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >>> -- >>> TF-A mailing list >>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads

by Soby Mathew

On 17/02/2020 23:25, Raghu Krishnamurthy wrote: > Thanks Soby. Couple of questions: > 1) Is this going to be clarified in the PSA-TBFU ? Hi Raghu, Yes, this clarification will added to the spec. > 2) Is authenticated encryption/decryption going to be addressed ? One of > the issues i had was the fact that AES-GCM was being used here instead > of just encryption such as aes-cbc/ctr etc. I think it is worth adding a > note in the spec stating that it can be used safely instead of > encryption, and probably preferred. Yes, clarification regarding using AEAD algorithms/AES-GCM will be provided as I understand. Best Regards Soby Mathew > > Thanks > Raghu > > On 2/17/20 11:14 AM, Soby Mathew wrote: >> Hi Everyone, >> I have confirmation from the TBFU architect that both decrypt-then-verify and verify-then-decrypt is acceptable and neither case affects boot integrity. So I think the flexibility should be given to the platform to choose this. >> >> @Sumit Garg, could you please rework the patches as I mentioned in my previous feedback and submit again? >> >> Best Regards >> Soby Mathew >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raghupathy >>> Krishnamurthy via TF-A >>> Sent: 28 January 2020 14:58 >>> To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> >>> Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org>; Miklos Balint >>> <Miklos.Balint(a)arm.com>; Kiyoshi Owada <owada.kiyoshi(a)socionext.com>; tf- >>> a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Joakim Bech <joakim.bech(a)linaro.org>; nd >>> <nd(a)arm.com>; Sandrine Bailleux <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> >>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads >>> >>> Hi Sumit, >>> >>> >>> I completely agree with you! All i'm asking for is that what you are proposing is >>> ratified in the spec clearly, without any ambiguities and that we don't >>> implement what we *think* is correct, but implement the spec. If the spec >>> specifies encryption, we should implement encryption, not authenticated >>> encryption. One is not a direct substitute for the other and requires careful >>> thinking. Similarly, the order of signing, encryption, decryption and >>> authentication must be specified and explained clearly, specifically to avoid >>> these kinds of discussions. >>> >>> >>> Thanks >>> -Raghu >>> >>> On January 27, 2020 at 10:49 PM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Mon, 27 Jan 2020 at 22:54, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy >>> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> Sumit, >>> >>> >>> Great point. This perhaps needs to be added to the list of things that need >>> clarification(Sandrine can you help with this too?) in the PSA-TBFU . I believe >>> the answer to your concern lies in the PSA-TBFU in section 3.5, where it talks >>> about optimizing the trusted boot process. To overcome the problem you're >>> talking about, you would: >>> 1) Verify asymmetric signature. >>> 2) Decrypt firmware using SSK on successful signature verification. >>> 3) Rekey the firmware using BSSK(or as the PSA specifies, a key derived from >>> the HUK using a KDF). >>> You will only verify the asymmetric signature on every firmware update, and >>> use the rekeyed firmware(encrypted and mac;d with device specific key) on >>> normal boot. >>> >>> >>> >>> Following is the quote from PSA-TBFU spec: >>> >>> "An implementation **can** optimize the trusted boot process at the expense >>> of **simplicity**" >>> >>> It doesn't seems to be a recommended practice from spec. And especially for >>> DRM use-cases, this approach is NOT recommended due to following concerns >>> raised by DRM vendors (original concerns were with respect to TAs but will >>> equally apply for firmware as well): >>> - allows the device to self sign code authorized to run on the device. >>> - increase the attack surface by having two different ways to load firmware. >>> - allow a break once break forever situation, if you defeat the RSA 'install' once, >>> no matter how hard it is, now your firmware is nicely transformed in a secure >>> firmware and can be reused. >>> >>> Whereas on the other hand, considering >>> "sign-then-encrypt-then-authenticate", it provides two mutually exclusive >>> crypto layers (signature layer and authenticated encryption >>> layer) which in turns provides implementation flexibility as follows: >>> >>> Firmware update: >>> - Require both layers. >>> >>> Normal boot: >>> - DRM use-case, require both layers. >>> - Boot time optimization required, can use only authenticated encryption. >>> - Platform provides secure on-chip NVM and boot time optimization required, >>> can use only signature verification (or simply hash stored in secure on-chip >>> NVM memory). >>> >>> -Sumit >>> >>> >>> Thanks >>> Raghu >>> >>> >>> On January 26, 2020 at 10:34 PM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On Fri, 24 Jan 2020 at 16:36, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, 24 Jan 2020 at 04:02, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy >>> >>> >>> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> I also just realized that both the TBBR and ARM PSA only talk about >>> encryption of the image, and not authenticated encryption. The guarantees >>> provided by both are completely different. Your >>> review(https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2495/) >>> talks about the requirement R060_TBBR_FUNCTION being implemented, which >>> is technically not true(and potentially misleading). We must make a note of this >>> difference and use the appropriate terminology, without mixing the two, in the >>> documentation, commit messages, source code comments and error prints. >>> The tool is also called 'encrypt_fw ' but should maybe be named appropriately >>> to indicate it is doing authenticated encryption. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I wouldn't call it misleading. Since firmware encryption feature >>> >>> >>> essentially provides confidentiality protection and authenticated >>> >>> >>> encryption is the type of crypto algorithm which we have used to >>> >>> >>> implement it. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> BTW, ARM PSA(file:///home/raghu/repos/fvp/DEN0072-PSA_TBFU_1-0- >>> REL.pdf) expects that the image manifest(X509 certificate) contain the hash of >>> the ENCRYPTED image(Table 2 and as described in my answer to your question >>> "How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext"). The TBBR spec completely >>> misses this fact, and is a crucial detail if we only implement encryption(as >>> opposed to authenticated encryption).Build_macros.mk, in your change, passes >>> the un-encrypted image to cert-tool. You can get away with it in your >>> implementation, since you are using authenticated encryption, not if you were >>> only implementing firmware encryption. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> I have already highlighted the issue with signing the ciphertext in my >>> >>> >>> previous reply which deviates from security properties provided by >>> >>> >>> signature verification of plain firmware. So I think we need to >>> >>> >>> revisit ARM PSA TBFU spec. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> In addition to this, there are implementation specific issues with "signing the >>> ciphertext" too. It simply makes the ciphertext immutable for device and >>> disallows meeting following firmware re-encryption requirement as per TBBR >>> spec: >>> >>> >>> R070_TBBR_PROTECTION. The Trusted boot firmware may do the binding of >>> software image updates at run- time by decrypting the updated SoC certificates >>> and software images using the OTP/Fuse Secret Symmetric Key (SSK), followed >>> by the re-encrypting these SoC certificates and software images using a >>> reproducible secret unique per device symmetric key (BSSK), and then updating >>> the ToC correspondingly. >>> >>> >>> Also, externally signing every firmware image encrypted with BSSK doesn't >>> seem scalable as well. It also hampers the case where encryption key is never >>> exposed out from device eg. encryption key is only accessible to hardware >>> crypto engine etc. >>> >>> >>> -Sumit >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Is it possible for somebody from ARM to have the TBBR spec updated to >>> reflect this? Also perhaps talk to the spec writers about incorporating >>> authenticated encryption into TBBR and PSA? This patch set is somewhat >>> trailblazing in this regard. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -Raghu >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On January 23, 2020 at 12:08 PM, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf- >>> a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Sumit, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Thanks for your response. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> So firstly I would suggest you to revisit TBBR spec [1], >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] I'm very familiar with the TBBR spec and the requirements. Note >>>> that not all SoC's adhere perfectly to the TBBR spec, since it does >>>> not apply to devices in all market segments. However, these devices do >>>> use arm trusted firmware and TBBR CoT in a slightly modified form, >>>> which is still perfectly valid. Also, the TBBR spec can be changed if >>>> required :) >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Why would one use authenticated decryption only to establish TBBR >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Chain of Trust providing device the capability to self sign its firmware? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] Fair point. However, you may have devices that don't have the >>> processing power or hardware budget or cost factors(paying for HSM's to store >>> private asymmetric keys), to implement asymmetric verification, in which case >>> using authenticated decryption to verify firmware authenticity and integrity is >>> perfectly valid. The attacks on devices that use symmetric keys to verify >>> firmware authenticity and integrity are usually related to exploiting firmware >>> flaws that leak the key or insiders leaking keys, but that is a different problem >>> and requires different solutions. Fundamentally, there is nothing wrong with >>> using symmetric keys for this purpose, so long as the key is well protected. Also >>> note, security requirements and guarantees are different for different systems. >>> The risk is taken by the system designer and should not be imposed by >>> framework code. I don't advocate doing this but it is an option that your >>> implementation does not provide(and perhaps rightly so). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] You sign the ciphertext. In your design, you pass bl31_enc.bin to >>> cert_tool to sign. You don't decrypt the encrypted cipher text until you have >>> verified the asymmetric signature(which provides integrity). As far as signature >>> verification is concerned, whether you sign the plain text or ciphertext is >>> immaterial, since you are simply verifying that the absolute bits you loaded >>> have not been modified(assuming you use a secure signature scheme). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Have a look at some defective sign and encrypt techniques here [2] >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] Again, very familiar with [2]. In the S/MIME case, you have multiple >>> parties. With secure boot, you have one party, effectively verifying its own >>> messages across time. There is only one key used to verify signatures. 1.1 and >>> 1.2 does not apply. Also you are encrypting and signing with completely >>> different keys and algorithms. Section 1.2 applies when you use RSA/El-gamal >>> encryption. Here you use symmetric encryption and asymmetric signing. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Why would one not use TBBR CoT here? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] see above. Not all systems are designed equal. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> and why would one like to hardcode in a device during >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> provisioning to boot only either an encrypted or a plain firmware >>> >>> >>>> image? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] Why would you not? You typically want to have the same security policy >>> for a class of devices and not be modifiable by an attacker. It isn't common for >>> the same class of devices to use encrypted firmware some times, and un- >>> encrypted firmware other times. If it is common, there is no problem with >>> setting the bit in the FIP header, as long as verified boot is mandatory. The only >>> concern(as my original email said) is the coupling of the FIP layer and the >>> crypto module, in the implementation. I still don't like that fact that the bit >>> saying the file is encrypted is not signed and this may require talking to the >>> TBBR spec writers. Page 22 of the TBBR spec calls out ToC as "Trusted Table of >>> Contents". The FIP header cannot be "trusted", if it is not in ROM or its integrity >>> is verified by some means! R010_TBBR_TOC should perhaps be mandatory >>> then. Also see R080_TBBR_TOC that says the TOC MUST be ROM'ed or tied by >>> hardware in readable registers. This requirement seems contradictory to >>> R010_TBBR_TOC, given that the FIP header(TOC) is copied from mutable NVM >>> by ROM or some boot stage and then ROM'd or loaded into registers. I may be >>> misunderstanding R080_TBBR_TOC, but i'd interpret it as the TOC(FIP header >>> in ATF implementation of TBBR) as being in ROM or integrity verified. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> How would one handle a case where BL31 is in plain format and BL32 is in >>> encrypted format? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK]TBBR CoT is equipped to do this. The table is defined on a per image >>> basis. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> If you are really paranoid about authentication of FIP header... >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [RK] I don't mean to pontificate but there are real world customers buying >>> real hardware, running ATF code, who care about such details and ask about >>> such things routinely. It is not just me being paranoid and is definitely not a >>> minor matter to think of such details. We should discuss more and consider the >>> implications of R080_TBBR_TOC and R010_TBBR_TOC, perhaps on a different >>> thread, without blocking your code review. Can somebody from ARM clarify >>> these requirements with the spec writers? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Thanks >>> >>> >>>> -Raghu >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On January 23, 2020 at 12:38 AM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Raghu, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> I guess you have completely misunderstood this feature. This is an >>> >>> >>>> optional feature which allows to load encrypted FIP payloads using >>> >>> >>>> authenticated decryption which MUST be used along with signature >>> >>> >>>> verification (or TBBR CoT). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> So firstly I would suggest you to revisit TBBR spec [1], especially >>> >>> >>>> requirements: R040_TBBR_TOC, R060_TBBR_FUNCTION etc. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 at 00:14, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy >>> >>> >>>> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hello, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> The patch stack looks good. The only comment i have is that the FIP layer has >>> now become security aware and supports authenticated decryption(only). This >>> is a deviation from the secure/signed/verified boot design, where we use the >>> TBBR COT to dictate the security operations on the file. This is nice, because >>> file IO is decoupled from the security policy. This may be a big deviation(i >>> apologize if this was considered and shot down for some other reason), but it >>> may be worthwhile to consider making authenticated decryption a part of the >>> authentication framework as opposed to coupling it with the FIP layer. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> It looks like you have mixed both TBBR CoT and this authenticated >>> >>> >>>> decryption feature. They both are completely different and rather >>> >>> >>>> complement each other where TBBR CoT establishes >>> >>> >>>> secure/signed/verified boot and this authenticated decryption feature >>> >>> >>>> provides confidentiality protection for FIP payloads. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> At a high level, this would mean adding a new authentication >>> method(perhaps AUTH_METHOD_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION), and having >>> the platform specify that the image is using authenticated encryption in the >>> TBBR COT. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Why would one use authenticated decryption only to establish TBBR >>> >>> >>>> Chain of Trust providing device the capability to self sign its >>> >>> >>>> firmwares? We must use signature verification for TBBR CoT (see >>> >>> >>>> section: 2.1 Authentication of Code Images by Certificate in TBBR spec >>> >>> >>>> [1]). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> The authentication framework is already well designed and well equipped to >>> handle these types of extensions. >>> >>> >>>> 1) This would make the change simpler, since you would not require changes >>> to the FIP tool and the FIP layer. >>> >>> >>>> 2) This would also allow for future cases where a platform may want to only >>> encrypt the file and use public key authentication on the encrypted file(for ex. >>> the soc does not have a crypto accelerator for aes-gcm but only for AES and >>> public key verification, for whatever reason). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext? This approach may be >>> >>> >>>> vulnerable to Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs). Authentication tag as >>> >>> >>>> part of AES-GCM provides integrity protection for ciphertext. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> 3) This would let you choose the order in which you want to do the >>> authenticated decryption(or just decryption) and signature verification, if you >>> use both, one or the other. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Have a look at some defective sign and encrypt techniques here [2]. >>> >>> >>>> The order can't be any arbitrary one, we need to be careful about >>> >>> >>>> this. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> One other thing i'm not entirely comfortable with is that the flag indicating if >>> there are encrypted files or not in the FIP, is in the *unsigned* portion of the >>> FIP header. An attacker could simply flip bits that dictate security policy in the >>> header and avoid detection(in this case, the indication that the file needs >>> authenticated decryption). If a platform only uses authenticated encryption, but >>> not verified boot, an attacker could flip the bit in the FIP header and have any >>> image loaded on the platform. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Why would one not use TBBR CoT here? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> If authenticated encryption cannot be used without verified boot(which >>> requires build time flags), having a flag to indicate that there are encrypted >>> files in the FIP header is moot, since this can come at build time through the >>> TBBR COT. In any case, it seems like the security policy that firmware images >>> need to be decrypted or authenticated with authenticated decryption, seems >>> like a firmware build time or manufacturing time decision(perhaps a bit set in >>> the e-fuses). >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Again you are confusing TBBR CoT with authenticated decryption >>> >>> >>>> feature. And why would one like to hardcode in a device during >>> >>> >>>> provisioning to boot only either an encrypted or a plain firmware >>> >>> >>>> image? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> There seems to be no benefit to having a flag in the FIP header. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> How would one handle a case where BL31 is in plain format and BL32 is >>> >>> >>>> in encrypted format? >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Otherwise, I cant think of any attacks due to this and it may be completely >>> okay, but generally, consuming data that dictates security policy/operations >>> before verifying its integrity seems like a recipe for disaster. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> If you are really paranoid about authentication of FIP header then you >>> >>> >>>> should look at implementing optional requirement: R010_TBBR_TOC as per >>> >>> >>>> TBBR spec [1]. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> [1] >>>> https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0006/latest/trusted-board-boot-requi >>>> rements-client-tbbr-client-armv8-a >>> >>> >>>> [2] http://world.std.com/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.html >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -Sumit >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -Raghu >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On January 22, 2020 at 3:51 AM, Sumit Garg via TF-A <tf- >>> a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hi Sandrine, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 at 15:43, Sandrine Bailleux >>> >>> >>>> <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Hello Sumit, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Thank you for reworking the patches and addressing all of my review >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> comments. I am happy with the latest version of these and consider >>>> them >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> ready to go. I plan to leave them in Gerrit for another week to give >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> extra time for other potential reviewers to have a look and comment. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Thanks for your review. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> To everyone on the list: Please raise any concerns you may have about >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> these patches in the coming week. If I don't hear anything by 29th >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> January 2020, I will merge these patches. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> @Sumit: One of the next actions for this patch stack would be to have >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> some level of testing in the CI system to detect any potential >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> regressions. We (at Arm) can quite easily add a few build tests but >>>> then >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> testing the software stack on QEMU is a bit more involved for various >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> reasons (first instance of QEMU testing, dependencies on OPTEE, UEFI, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> ...) so this might have to wait for some time. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Okay, will wait for CI testing. >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -Sumit >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Regards, >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> Sandrine >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>> >>>> -- >>> >>> >>>> TF-A mailing list >>> >>> >>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>> >>> >>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >>> >>> >>>> -- >>> >>> >>>> TF-A mailing list >>> >>> >>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>> >>> >>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >>> -- >>> TF-A mailing list >>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads

by Soby Mathew

Adding back tf-a list, > Hi Everyone, > I have confirmation from the TBFU architect that both decrypt-then-verify and > verify-then-decrypt is acceptable and neither case affects boot integrity. So I > think the flexibility should be given to the platform to choose this. > > @Sumit Garg, could you please rework the patches as I mentioned in my > previous feedback and submit again? > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > > Raghupathy Krishnamurthy via TF-A > > Sent: 28 January 2020 14:58 > > To: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> > > Cc: Daniel Thompson <daniel.thompson(a)linaro.org>; Miklos Balint > > <Miklos.Balint(a)arm.com>; Kiyoshi Owada <owada.kiyoshi(a)socionext.com>; > > tf- a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Joakim Bech <joakim.bech(a)linaro.org>; > > nd <nd(a)arm.com>; Sandrine Bailleux <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> > > Subject: Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP > > payloads > > > > Hi Sumit, > > > > > > I completely agree with you! All i'm asking for is that what you are > > proposing is ratified in the spec clearly, without any ambiguities and > > that we don't implement what we *think* is correct, but implement the > > spec. If the spec specifies encryption, we should implement > > encryption, not authenticated encryption. One is not a direct > > substitute for the other and requires careful thinking. Similarly, the > > order of signing, encryption, decryption and authentication must be > > specified and explained clearly, specifically to avoid these kinds of discussions. > > > > > > Thanks > > -Raghu > > > > On January 27, 2020 at 10:49 PM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, 27 Jan 2020 at 22:54, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy > > <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > Sumit, > > > > > > Great point. This perhaps needs to be added to the list of things that > > need clarification(Sandrine can you help with this too?) in the > > PSA-TBFU . I believe the answer to your concern lies in the PSA-TBFU > > in section 3.5, where it talks about optimizing the trusted boot > > process. To overcome the problem you're talking about, you would: > > 1) Verify asymmetric signature. > > 2) Decrypt firmware using SSK on successful signature verification. > > 3) Rekey the firmware using BSSK(or as the PSA specifies, a key > > derived from the HUK using a KDF). > > You will only verify the asymmetric signature on every firmware > > update, and use the rekeyed firmware(encrypted and mac;d with device > > specific key) on normal boot. > > > > > > > > Following is the quote from PSA-TBFU spec: > > > > "An implementation **can** optimize the trusted boot process at the > > expense of **simplicity**" > > > > It doesn't seems to be a recommended practice from spec. And > > especially for DRM use-cases, this approach is NOT recommended due to > > following concerns raised by DRM vendors (original concerns were with > > respect to TAs but will equally apply for firmware as well): > > - allows the device to self sign code authorized to run on the device. > > - increase the attack surface by having two different ways to load firmware. > > - allow a break once break forever situation, if you defeat the RSA > > 'install' once, no matter how hard it is, now your firmware is nicely > > transformed in a secure firmware and can be reused. > > > > Whereas on the other hand, considering > > "sign-then-encrypt-then-authenticate", it provides two mutually > > exclusive crypto layers (signature layer and authenticated encryption > > layer) which in turns provides implementation flexibility as follows: > > > > Firmware update: > > - Require both layers. > > > > Normal boot: > > - DRM use-case, require both layers. > > - Boot time optimization required, can use only authenticated encryption. > > - Platform provides secure on-chip NVM and boot time optimization > > required, can use only signature verification (or simply hash stored > > in secure on-chip NVM memory). > > > > -Sumit > > > > > > Thanks > > Raghu > > > > > > On January 26, 2020 at 10:34 PM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Fri, 24 Jan 2020 at 16:36, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, 24 Jan 2020 at 04:02, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy > > > > > > <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I also just realized that both the TBBR and ARM PSA only talk about > > encryption of the image, and not authenticated encryption. The > > guarantees provided by both are completely different. Your > > review(https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/ > > 2495/) talks about the requirement R060_TBBR_FUNCTION being > > implemented, which is technically not true(and potentially > > misleading). We must make a note of this difference and use the > > appropriate terminology, without mixing the two, in the documentation, > > commit messages, source code comments and error prints. > > The tool is also called 'encrypt_fw ' but should maybe be named > > appropriately to indicate it is doing authenticated encryption. > > > > > > > > > > I wouldn't call it misleading. Since firmware encryption feature > > > > > > essentially provides confidentiality protection and authenticated > > > > > > encryption is the type of crypto algorithm which we have used to > > > > > > implement it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > BTW, ARM PSA(file:///home/raghu/repos/fvp/DEN0072-PSA_TBFU_1-0- > > REL.pdf) expects that the image manifest(X509 certificate) contain the > > hash of the ENCRYPTED image(Table 2 and as described in my answer to > > your question "How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext"). The > > TBBR spec completely misses this fact, and is a crucial detail if we > > only implement encryption(as opposed to authenticated > > encryption).Build_macros.mk, in your change, passes the un-encrypted > > image to cert-tool. You can get away with it in your implementation, > > since you are using authenticated encryption, not if you were only > implementing firmware encryption. > > > > > > > > > > I have already highlighted the issue with signing the ciphertext in my > > > > > > previous reply which deviates from security properties provided by > > > > > > signature verification of plain firmware. So I think we need to > > > > > > revisit ARM PSA TBFU spec. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In addition to this, there are implementation specific issues with > > "signing the ciphertext" too. It simply makes the ciphertext immutable > > for device and disallows meeting following firmware re-encryption > > requirement as per TBBR > > spec: > > > > > > R070_TBBR_PROTECTION. The Trusted boot firmware may do the binding of > > software image updates at run- time by decrypting the updated SoC > > certificates and software images using the OTP/Fuse Secret Symmetric > > Key (SSK), followed by the re-encrypting these SoC certificates and > > software images using a reproducible secret unique per device > > symmetric key (BSSK), and then updating the ToC correspondingly. > > > > > > Also, externally signing every firmware image encrypted with BSSK > > doesn't seem scalable as well. It also hampers the case where > > encryption key is never exposed out from device eg. encryption key is > > only accessible to hardware crypto engine etc. > > > > > > -Sumit > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Is it possible for somebody from ARM to have the TBBR spec updated > > > to > > reflect this? Also perhaps talk to the spec writers about > > incorporating authenticated encryption into TBBR and PSA? This patch > > set is somewhat trailblazing in this regard. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -Raghu > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On January 23, 2020 at 12:08 PM, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy via TF-A > > > <tf- > > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Sumit, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks for your response. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So firstly I would suggest you to revisit TBBR spec [1], > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [RK] I'm very familiar with the TBBR spec and the requirements. Note > > > that not all SoC's adhere perfectly to the TBBR spec, since it does > > > not apply to devices in all market segments. However, these devices > > > do use arm trusted firmware and TBBR CoT in a slightly modified > > > form, which is still perfectly valid. Also, the TBBR spec can be > > > changed if required :) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why would one use authenticated decryption only to establish TBBR > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Chain of Trust providing device the capability to self sign its firmware? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [RK] Fair point. However, you may have devices that don't have the > > processing power or hardware budget or cost factors(paying for HSM's > > to store private asymmetric keys), to implement asymmetric > > verification, in which case using authenticated decryption to verify > > firmware authenticity and integrity is perfectly valid. The attacks on > > devices that use symmetric keys to verify firmware authenticity and > > integrity are usually related to exploiting firmware flaws that leak > > the key or insiders leaking keys, but that is a different problem and > > requires different solutions. Fundamentally, there is nothing wrong > > with using symmetric keys for this purpose, so long as the key is well > protected. Also note, security requirements and guarantees are different for > different systems. > > The risk is taken by the system designer and should not be imposed by > > framework code. I don't advocate doing this but it is an option that > > your implementation does not provide(and perhaps rightly so). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [RK] You sign the ciphertext. In your design, you pass bl31_enc.bin > > > to > > cert_tool to sign. You don't decrypt the encrypted cipher text until > > you have verified the asymmetric signature(which provides integrity). > > As far as signature verification is concerned, whether you sign the > > plain text or ciphertext is immaterial, since you are simply verifying > > that the absolute bits you loaded have not been modified(assuming you use a > secure signature scheme). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Have a look at some defective sign and encrypt techniques here [2] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [RK] Again, very familiar with [2]. In the S/MIME case, you have > > > multiple > > parties. With secure boot, you have one party, effectively verifying > > its own messages across time. There is only one key used to verify > > signatures. 1.1 and > > 1.2 does not apply. Also you are encrypting and signing with > > completely different keys and algorithms. Section 1.2 applies when you > > use RSA/El-gamal encryption. Here you use symmetric encryption and > asymmetric signing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why would one not use TBBR CoT here? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [RK] see above. Not all systems are designed equal. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and why would one like to hardcode in a device during > > > > > > > > > > > > > > provisioning to boot only either an encrypted or a plain firmware > > > > > > > image? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [RK] Why would you not? You typically want to have the same security > > > policy > > for a class of devices and not be modifiable by an attacker. It isn't > > common for the same class of devices to use encrypted firmware some > > times, and un- encrypted firmware other times. If it is common, there > > is no problem with setting the bit in the FIP header, as long as > > verified boot is mandatory. The only concern(as my original email > > said) is the coupling of the FIP layer and the crypto module, in the > > implementation. I still don't like that fact that the bit saying the > > file is encrypted is not signed and this may require talking to the > > TBBR spec writers. Page 22 of the TBBR spec calls out ToC as "Trusted > > Table of Contents". The FIP header cannot be "trusted", if it is not > > in ROM or its integrity is verified by some means! R010_TBBR_TOC > > should perhaps be mandatory then. Also see R080_TBBR_TOC that says the > > TOC MUST be ROM'ed or tied by hardware in readable registers. This > > requirement seems contradictory to R010_TBBR_TOC, given that the FIP > > header(TOC) is copied from mutable NVM by ROM or some boot stage and > > then ROM'd or loaded into registers. I may be misunderstanding > R080_TBBR_TOC, but i'd interpret it as the TOC(FIP header in ATF > implementation of TBBR) as being in ROM or integrity verified. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > How would one handle a case where BL31 is in plain format and BL32 > > > is in > > encrypted format? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [RK]TBBR CoT is equipped to do this. The table is defined on a per > > > image > > basis. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If you are really paranoid about authentication of FIP header... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [RK] I don't mean to pontificate but there are real world customers > > > buying > > real hardware, running ATF code, who care about such details and ask > > about such things routinely. It is not just me being paranoid and is > > definitely not a minor matter to think of such details. We should > > discuss more and consider the implications of R080_TBBR_TOC and > > R010_TBBR_TOC, perhaps on a different thread, without blocking your > > code review. Can somebody from ARM clarify these requirements with the > spec writers? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks > > > > > > > -Raghu > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On January 23, 2020 at 12:38 AM, Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Raghu, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I guess you have completely misunderstood this feature. This is an > > > > > > > optional feature which allows to load encrypted FIP payloads using > > > > > > > authenticated decryption which MUST be used along with signature > > > > > > > verification (or TBBR CoT). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > So firstly I would suggest you to revisit TBBR spec [1], especially > > > > > > > requirements: R040_TBBR_TOC, R060_TBBR_FUNCTION etc. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, 23 Jan 2020 at 00:14, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy > > > > > > > <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The patch stack looks good. The only comment i have is that the FIP > > > layer has > > now become security aware and supports authenticated decryption(only). > > This is a deviation from the secure/signed/verified boot design, where > > we use the TBBR COT to dictate the security operations on the file. > > This is nice, because file IO is decoupled from the security policy. > > This may be a big deviation(i apologize if this was considered and > > shot down for some other reason), but it may be worthwhile to consider > > making authenticated decryption a part of the authentication framework as > opposed to coupling it with the FIP layer. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It looks like you have mixed both TBBR CoT and this authenticated > > > > > > > decryption feature. They both are completely different and rather > > > > > > > complement each other where TBBR CoT establishes > > > > > > > secure/signed/verified boot and this authenticated decryption > > > feature > > > > > > > provides confidentiality protection for FIP payloads. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > At a high level, this would mean adding a new authentication > > method(perhaps AUTH_METHOD_AUTHENTICATED_DECRYPTION), and > having the > > platform specify that the image is using authenticated encryption in > > the TBBR COT. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why would one use authenticated decryption only to establish TBBR > > > > > > > Chain of Trust providing device the capability to self sign its > > > > > > > firmwares? We must use signature verification for TBBR CoT (see > > > > > > > section: 2.1 Authentication of Code Images by Certificate in TBBR > > > spec > > > > > > > [1]). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The authentication framework is already well designed and well > > > equipped to > > handle these types of extensions. > > > > > > > 1) This would make the change simpler, since you would not require > > > changes > > to the FIP tool and the FIP layer. > > > > > > > 2) This would also allow for future cases where a platform may want > > > to only > > encrypt the file and use public key authentication on the encrypted file(for ex. > > the soc does not have a crypto accelerator for aes-gcm but only for > > AES and public key verification, for whatever reason). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > How would this ensure integrity of ciphertext? This approach may be > > > > > > > vulnerable to Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCAs). Authentication tag > > > as > > > > > > > part of AES-GCM provides integrity protection for ciphertext. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 3) This would let you choose the order in which you want to do the > > authenticated decryption(or just decryption) and signature > > verification, if you use both, one or the other. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Have a look at some defective sign and encrypt techniques here [2]. > > > > > > > The order can't be any arbitrary one, we need to be careful about > > > > > > > this. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > One other thing i'm not entirely comfortable with is that the flag > > > indicating if > > there are encrypted files or not in the FIP, is in the *unsigned* > > portion of the FIP header. An attacker could simply flip bits that > > dictate security policy in the header and avoid detection(in this > > case, the indication that the file needs authenticated decryption). If > > a platform only uses authenticated encryption, but not verified boot, > > an attacker could flip the bit in the FIP header and have any image loaded on > the platform. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why would one not use TBBR CoT here? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If authenticated encryption cannot be used without verified > > > boot(which > > requires build time flags), having a flag to indicate that there are > > encrypted files in the FIP header is moot, since this can come at > > build time through the TBBR COT. In any case, it seems like the > > security policy that firmware images need to be decrypted or > > authenticated with authenticated decryption, seems like a firmware > > build time or manufacturing time decision(perhaps a bit set in the e-fuses). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Again you are confusing TBBR CoT with authenticated decryption > > > > > > > feature. And why would one like to hardcode in a device during > > > > > > > provisioning to boot only either an encrypted or a plain firmware > > > > > > > image? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > There seems to be no benefit to having a flag in the FIP header. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > How would one handle a case where BL31 is in plain format and BL32 > > > is > > > > > > > in encrypted format? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Otherwise, I cant think of any attacks due to this and it may be > > > completely > > okay, but generally, consuming data that dictates security > > policy/operations before verifying its integrity seems like a recipe for disaster. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If you are really paranoid about authentication of FIP header then > > > you > > > > > > > should look at implementing optional requirement: R010_TBBR_TOC as > > > per > > > > > > > TBBR spec [1]. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > [1] > > > https://developer.arm.com/docs/den0006/latest/trusted-board-boot-req > > > ui > > > rements-client-tbbr-client-armv8-a > > > > > > > [2] http://world.std.com/~dtd/sign_encrypt/sign_encrypt7.html > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -Sumit > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -Raghu > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On January 22, 2020 at 3:51 AM, Sumit Garg via TF-A <tf- > > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Sandrine, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, 22 Jan 2020 at 15:43, Sandrine Bailleux > > > > > > > <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hello Sumit, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you for reworking the patches and addressing all of my review > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > comments. I am happy with the latest version of these and consider > > > them > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ready to go. I plan to leave them in Gerrit for another week to give > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > extra time for other potential reviewers to have a look and comment. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks for your review. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To everyone on the list: Please raise any concerns you may have > > > about > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > these patches in the coming week. If I don't hear anything by 29th > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > January 2020, I will merge these patches. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > @Sumit: One of the next actions for this patch stack would be to > > > have > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > some level of testing in the CI system to detect any potential > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > regressions. We (at Arm) can quite easily add a few build tests but > > > then > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > testing the software stack on QEMU is a bit more involved for > > > various > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > reasons (first instance of QEMU testing, dependencies on OPTEE, > > > UEFI, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ...) so this might have to wait for some time. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Okay, will wait for CI testing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -Sumit > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Sandrine > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > TF-A mailing list > > > > > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > > > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > TF-A mailing list > > > > > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > > > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables

by Varun Wadekar

Thanks Raghu. I agree that this patch reduces the attack surface and would be a good addition, if we consider use cases where EL3 code runs in a silo. Since S-EL1 can contain any third party code, there is an opportunity to change memory contents without EL3 ever noticing the change. A hash for the RO page tables would improve this change immensely IMO. This change is not effective for platforms that use dynamic page tables e.g. Tegra platforms, so we won't be enabling it. But if other maintainers think this is a good addition to their platforms, I don’t have any objection. -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 4:16 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables External email: Use caution opening links or attachments I think it is worth implementing this to raise the bar for successful attacks. To Varun's point, in today's systems without S-EL2(<v8.4), it would be less effective as pointed out, since EL3 memory can be completely accessed by SEL1 and SEL1 code tends to have a larger code base on mobile devices(OPTEE, tlk etc). However, on systems with very thin SEL1 shims(typically servers), this would definitely raise the bar for attacks, since you effectively only have SEL0 and EL3. SEL1 cannot be exploited practically. For new SoCs with SEL2, this mitigation can still be very effective if we can ensure future SEL2 implementations have much smaller code bases and implements this mitigation itself. Effectively, i view SEL2 and EL3 as being equally privileged(it is no different than SEL1 because SEL2 can barf all over EL3 memory and TZ resources if exploited). SEL2 extensions, however, gives EL3 protection from SEL1 and can prevent SEL1 from accessing ALL TZ resources. If you view SEL2 and EL3 as equally privileged and view both together as a single entity, v8.4 systems effectively have EL3, SEL1, SEL0 AND the ability for EL3 to protect itself and other TZ resources from SEL1. In such a system, EL3(and SEL2) having this mitigation will definitely raise the bar for successful attacks. Also, the cost to implement this mitigation is relatively low for a fairly significant raise in the bar for successful attacks. PS - I say significantly raise the bar since an attacker will potentially require gadgets to modify TTBRx, invalidate TLB's, and enough gadgets in the code base to have a successful attack. If code in TF-A EL3 is fairly small, and code that writes to TTBR_EL3 can be in some section of the image that can be reclaimed/erased after initial setup, the attacker would have no gadget to modify TTBR_EL3, so there would be virtually no way to change TTBR_EL3. On a default build of FVP, there is a grand total of 1 instruction that writes to TTBR0_EL3 in enable_mmu_direct_el3. This might be a nice follow up change to this mitigation, if others think it is worth it. The same could be extended to other system registers that don't ever need to be changed(VBAR_EL3? SCTLR_EL3?). Thanks Raghu On 2/17/20 12:35 PM, Varun Wadekar via TF-A wrote: > Hello Petre, > > Thanks for the patch. Before I review the actual code, would like to understand how effective this patch will be and if you have seen a real world attack that this patch mitigates. > > AFAIU, the ARM architecture provides the TZ bit as the only protection to create "partitions" on a CPU core. So, potentially S-EL1 can access almost all TZ resources that EL3 can access. Thus, creating a silo inside EL3 exception mode is not an effective mitigation against any other TZ component writing to the physical memory where the page tables are stored. For the scope of this attack vector, are we assuming that the system cannot be compromised by attacking other TZ software components in the system? > > I feel until we have a way to distinguish between CPU realms (EL3 v S-EL2 v S-EL1) at the hardware bus level (ARM v9?), these mitigations are not that effective. > > Thoughts? > > -Varun > > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > Petre-Ionut Tudor via TF-A > Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 9:40 AM > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables > > External email: Use caution opening links or attachments > > > Hello Everyone, > > For quite some time I have been working on a security hardening feature that offers extra protection against tampering with the Secure world translation tables. An example would be using a gadget that can perform writes to arbitrary Secure memory locations to change memory attributes and/or the memory map. > > A real world exploit that uses read/write gadgets to tamper with translation tables can be found here: https://vimeo.com/335948808. If you only want the slide deck, it's available here: https://speakerdeck.com/hhj4ck/el3-tour-get-the-ultimate-privilege-of-andro…. > > A patch implementing this feature has been recently pushed upstream here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3349. It extends v2 of the translation tables library with an API that can be called by a BL image any time after the initialization of the xlat tables to make them read-only. > > It would be great to hear your opinions about this, particularly whether or not it is a desirable feature to have in TF-A and what extra work needs to be done for it to meet the use cases that you consider most relevant. > > Best wishes > Petre > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > ------------- This email message is for the sole use of the intended > recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any > unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. > If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by > reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > ------------- > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 2 months

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Re: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables

by Raghu Krishnamurthy

I think it is worth implementing this to raise the bar for successful attacks. To Varun's point, in today's systems without S-EL2(<v8.4), it would be less effective as pointed out, since EL3 memory can be completely accessed by SEL1 and SEL1 code tends to have a larger code base on mobile devices(OPTEE, tlk etc). However, on systems with very thin SEL1 shims(typically servers), this would definitely raise the bar for attacks, since you effectively only have SEL0 and EL3. SEL1 cannot be exploited practically. For new SoCs with SEL2, this mitigation can still be very effective if we can ensure future SEL2 implementations have much smaller code bases and implements this mitigation itself. Effectively, i view SEL2 and EL3 as being equally privileged(it is no different than SEL1 because SEL2 can barf all over EL3 memory and TZ resources if exploited). SEL2 extensions, however, gives EL3 protection from SEL1 and can prevent SEL1 from accessing ALL TZ resources. If you view SEL2 and EL3 as equally privileged and view both together as a single entity, v8.4 systems effectively have EL3, SEL1, SEL0 AND the ability for EL3 to protect itself and other TZ resources from SEL1. In such a system, EL3(and SEL2) having this mitigation will definitely raise the bar for successful attacks. Also, the cost to implement this mitigation is relatively low for a fairly significant raise in the bar for successful attacks. PS - I say significantly raise the bar since an attacker will potentially require gadgets to modify TTBRx, invalidate TLB's, and enough gadgets in the code base to have a successful attack. If code in TF-A EL3 is fairly small, and code that writes to TTBR_EL3 can be in some section of the image that can be reclaimed/erased after initial setup, the attacker would have no gadget to modify TTBR_EL3, so there would be virtually no way to change TTBR_EL3. On a default build of FVP, there is a grand total of 1 instruction that writes to TTBR0_EL3 in enable_mmu_direct_el3. This might be a nice follow up change to this mitigation, if others think it is worth it. The same could be extended to other system registers that don't ever need to be changed(VBAR_EL3? SCTLR_EL3?). Thanks Raghu On 2/17/20 12:35 PM, Varun Wadekar via TF-A wrote: > Hello Petre, > > Thanks for the patch. Before I review the actual code, would like to understand how effective this patch will be and if you have seen a real world attack that this patch mitigates. > > AFAIU, the ARM architecture provides the TZ bit as the only protection to create "partitions" on a CPU core. So, potentially S-EL1 can access almost all TZ resources that EL3 can access. Thus, creating a silo inside EL3 exception mode is not an effective mitigation against any other TZ component writing to the physical memory where the page tables are stored. For the scope of this attack vector, are we assuming that the system cannot be compromised by attacking other TZ software components in the system? > > I feel until we have a way to distinguish between CPU realms (EL3 v S-EL2 v S-EL1) at the hardware bus level (ARM v9?), these mitigations are not that effective. > > Thoughts? > > -Varun > > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Petre-Ionut Tudor via TF-A > Sent: Monday, February 17, 2020 9:40 AM > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-A] Protecting Secure World Translation Tables > > External email: Use caution opening links or attachments > > > Hello Everyone, > > For quite some time I have been working on a security hardening feature that offers extra protection against tampering with the Secure world translation tables. An example would be using a gadget that can perform writes to arbitrary Secure memory locations to change memory attributes and/or the memory map. > > A real world exploit that uses read/write gadgets to tamper with translation tables can be found here: https://vimeo.com/335948808. If you only want the slide deck, it's available here: https://speakerdeck.com/hhj4ck/el3-tour-get-the-ultimate-privilege-of-andro…. > > A patch implementing this feature has been recently pushed upstream here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3349. It extends v2 of the translation tables library with an API that can be called by a BL image any time after the initialization of the xlat tables to make them read-only. > > It would be great to hear your opinions about this, particularly whether or not it is a desirable feature to have in TF-A and what extra work needs to be done for it to meet the use cases that you consider most relevant. > > Best wishes > Petre > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain > confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution > is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by > reply email and destroy all copies of the original message. > ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- >

6 years, 2 months

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Protecting Secure World Translation Tables

by Petre-Ionut Tudor

Hello Everyone, For quite some time I have been working on a security hardening feature that offers extra protection against tampering with the Secure world translation tables. An example would be using a gadget that can perform writes to arbitrary Secure memory locations to change memory attributes and/or the memory map. A real world exploit that uses read/write gadgets to tamper with translation tables can be found here: https://vimeo.com/335948808. If you only want the slide deck, it's available here: https://speakerdeck.com/hhj4ck/el3-tour-get-the-ultimate-privilege-of-andro…. A patch implementing this feature has been recently pushed upstream here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3349. It extends v2 of the translation tables library with an API that can be called by a BL image any time after the initialization of the xlat tables to make them read-only. It would be great to hear your opinions about this, particularly whether or not it is a desirable feature to have in TF-A and what extra work needs to be done for it to meet the use cases that you consider most relevant. Best wishes Petre IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 2 months

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 1 of 1 defect(s) ** CID 354061: Memory - illegal accesses (OVERRUN) /plat/amlogic/axg/axg_pm.c: 124 in axg_pwr_domain_off() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 354061: Memory - illegal accesses (OVERRUN) /plat/amlogic/axg/axg_pm.c: 124 in axg_pwr_domain_off() 118 PLAT_LOCAL_STATE_OFF); 119 120 axg_pm_reset(mpidr, -1); 121 122 gicv2_cpuif_disable(); 123 >>> CID 354061: Memory - illegal accesses (OVERRUN) >>> Overrunning array "target_state->pwr_domain_state" of 2 bytes at byte offset 2 using index "2ULL". 124 if (target_state->pwr_domain_state[MPIDR_AFFLVL2] == 125 PLAT_LOCAL_STATE_OFF) 126 system_state = SCPI_POWER_OFF; 127 128 if (target_state->pwr_domain_state[MPIDR_AFFLVL1] == 129 PLAT_LOCAL_STATE_OFF) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…

6 years, 2 months

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TF-A on iMX8M Mini

by Iñigo Vicente Waliño

Hi, I am using an iMX8M mini, I have flashed the image with uuu.auto of L4.14.98_2.0.0_ga_images_MX8MMEVK and I have a Linux image with OP-TEE. Now I want to use TF-A but I don't know the steps to continue. I am reading this document ( https://source.codeaurora.org/external/imx/uboot-imx/tree/doc/imx/habv4/gui… and https : //trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/plat/imx8m.html <https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/plat/imx8m.html>) but I don't know how to get these files: u-boot.bin, u-boot-nodtb.bin, u-boot-spl.bin , DTB U-Boot file (for example, fsl-imx8mq-evk.dtb). Can anyone tell me the steps to follow? Thanks, best regards Iñigo.

6 years, 3 months

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 2 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 2 of 2 defect(s) ** CID 354003: Integer handling issues (NO_EFFECT) /drivers/arm/css/scp/css_pm_scmi.c: 228 in css_scp_on() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 354003: Integer handling issues (NO_EFFECT) /drivers/arm/css/scp/css_pm_scmi.c: 228 in css_scp_on() 222 SCMI_SET_PWR_STATE_LVL(scmi_pwr_state, lvl, 223 scmi_power_state_on); 224 225 SCMI_SET_PWR_STATE_MAX_PWR_LVL(scmi_pwr_state, lvl - 1); 226 227 core_pos = plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr); >>> CID 354003: Integer handling issues (NO_EFFECT) >>> This greater-than-or-equal-to-zero comparison of an unsigned value is always true. "core_pos >= 0U". 228 assert(core_pos >= 0 && (core_pos < PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT)); 229 230 css_scp_core_pos_to_scmi_channel(core_pos, &domain_id, 231 &channel_id); 232 ret = scmi_pwr_state_set(scmi_handles[channel_id], 233 domain_id, scmi_pwr_state); ** CID 354002: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /plat/arm/css/sgi/sgi_bl31_setup.c: 80 in plat_css_get_scmi_info() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 354002: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /plat/arm/css/sgi/sgi_bl31_setup.c: 80 in plat_css_get_scmi_info() 74 scmi_channel_plat_info_t *plat_css_get_scmi_info(int channel_id) 75 { 76 if (sgi_plat_info.platform_id == RD_N1E1_EDGE_SID_VER_PART_NUM || 77 sgi_plat_info.platform_id == RD_DANIEL_SID_VER_PART_NUM) { 78 if (channel_id >= sizeof(rd_n1e1_edge_scmi_plat_info)) 79 panic(); >>> CID 354002: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) >>> "&rd_n1e1_edge_scmi_plat_info[channel_id]" evaluates to an address that is at byte offset 1560 of an array of 40 bytes. 80 return &rd_n1e1_edge_scmi_plat_info[channel_id]; 81 } 82 else if (sgi_plat_info.platform_id == SGI575_SSC_VER_PART_NUM) 83 return &sgi575_scmi_plat_info; 84 else 85 panic(); ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…

6 years, 3 months

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 2 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 2 of 2 defect(s) ** CID 353989: Integer handling issues (INCOMPATIBLE_CAST) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 353989: Integer handling issues (INCOMPATIBLE_CAST) /plat/intel/soc/common/socfpga_psci.c: 138 in socfpga_system_reset() 132 133 extern uint64_t intel_rsu_update_address; 134 135 static void __dead2 socfpga_system_reset(void) 136 { 137 if (intel_rsu_update_address) >>> CID 353989: Integer handling issues (INCOMPATIBLE_CAST) >>> Pointer "&intel_rsu_update_address" points to an object whose effective type is "unsigned long long" (64 bits, unsigned) but is dereferenced as a narrower "unsigned int" (32 bits, unsigned). This may lead to unexpected results depending on machine endianness. 138 mailbox_rsu_update((uint32_t *)&intel_rsu_update_address); 139 else 140 mailbox_reset_cold(); 141 142 while (1) 143 wfi(); ** CID 353988: Integer handling issues (INCOMPATIBLE_CAST) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 353988: Integer handling issues (INCOMPATIBLE_CAST) /plat/intel/soc/common/socfpga_sip_svc.c: 526 in sip_smc_handler() 520 521 case INTEL_SIP_SMC_RSU_NOTIFY: 522 status = intel_rsu_notify(x1); 523 SMC_RET1(handle, status); 524 525 case INTEL_SIP_SMC_RSU_RETRY_COUNTER: >>> CID 353988: Integer handling issues (INCOMPATIBLE_CAST) >>> Pointer "rsu_respbuf" points to an object whose effective type is "unsigned long long" (64 bits, unsigned) but is dereferenced as a narrower "unsigned int" (32 bits, unsigned). This may lead to unexpected results depending on machine endianness. 526 status = intel_rsu_retry_counter((uint32_t *)rsu_respbuf, 527 ARRAY_SIZE(rsu_respbuf), &val); 528 if (status) { 529 SMC_RET1(handle, status); 530 } else { 531 SMC_RET2(handle, status, val); ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…

6 years, 3 months

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FIP header flags available for feature selection

by Scott Branden

Hello, The fip header has reserved fields available for platform specific use. The fiptool allows these header fields to be filled in using the --plat-toc-flags. A call needs to be available in the ATF framework to get these flags without accessing the FIP file again to get these flags. We have a solution we've used for ATF for quite some time to access these flags. It's finally being upstreamed here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2839 If there are any other efficient methods to access these flags or a better proposal please suggest. Thanks, Scott

6 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-A] [EXT] RE: Issue with addition of NXP Platform support on TFA v2.2

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Pankaj, Would it be possible to provide more information on your platform (what CPU, its revision, number of clusters/CPUs per cluster, etc.)? Is your platform code publically available? Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Pankaj Gupta via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 07 February 2020 10:57 To: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] [EXT] RE: Issue with addition of NXP Platform support on TFA v2.2 Hi, Please find the comments in-line. Regards Pankaj -----Original Message----- From: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> Sent: Wednesday, February 5, 2020 6:54 PM To: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta(a)nxp.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [EXT] RE: Issue with addition of NXP Platform support on TFA v2.2 >Caution: EXT Email >Hi Pankaj, >Can you pls provide a bit more background: >Which boot stage (BL1/BL2/BL31...) get affected? BL2 >Is there any crash report to console? No. But, using the external debugger, it is found that core gets to non-responding. >Is this an aarch64/or aarch32 platform? aarch64 >There can be different root causes to this e.g. >1. a stale translation in TLB, or a dirty cache line remnant from earlier boot stages. If this is the case, it would need invalidating TLB and/or caches on BL entry. >2. the empty table ptr given by xlat_table_get_empty is pointing nowhere sensible because of this specific platform layout >There are multiple calls to xlat_clean_dcache_range in this file, do you confirm the crash happen within xlat_tables_map_region? Yes. Basis of saying 'yes' is: if this function is commented, the BL2 comes up successfully. Flow in the code base is : mmap_add_dynamic_region -> mmap_add_dynamic_region_ctx -> xlat_tables_map_region-> xlat_table_get_empty //....issue is seen. >Can you try one or both statements below after the call to xlat_table_get_empty (and uncomment calls to clean_dcache_range): > > inv_dcache_range((uintptr_t)subtable, XLAT_TABLE_SIZE); > > xlat_arch_tlbi_va((uintptr_t)subtable, ctx->xlat_regime); > xlat_arch_tlbi_va_sync(); mmap_add_dynamic_region -> mmap_add_dynamic_region_ctx -> xlat_tables_map_region-> xlat_table_get_empty-> xlat_arch_tlbi_va //issue is resolved. The root cause of this issue is race condition. Please correct me if I am wrong. Another observation: mmap_add_dynamic_region -> mmap_add_dynamic_region_ctx (Putting console debug logs in this function)-> xlat_tables_map_region-> xlat_table_get_empty //issue is resolved. Please share your view for this observation as well. Regards, Olivier. -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Pankaj Gupta via TF-A Sent: 05 February 2020 11:45 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Issue with addition of NXP Platform support on TFA v2.2 Hi, In the TFA v2.2 code base, the file "lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c" has the implementation for function "xlat_tables_map_region()". The implementation for this function is changed in TFAv2.2 (compared TFAv1.5), with addition of function "xlat_clean_dcache_range()". Due to this addition, my earlier* working platform on TFAv1.5, is hanging here. If the function call for the function "xlat_clean_dcache_range()", is comment, then the platform works well. Code snippet: static inline __attribute__((unused)) void xlat_clean_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size) { if (is_dcache_enabled()) clean_dcache_range(addr, size); // On commenting this line, my platform works fine with TFAv2.2 } Please share your views on what could I be missing here. Thanks. Regards Pankaj *Earlier raised patch for this platform was not merged due to review comments are not disposed-off in time; and TF-A got migrated from github to gerrit. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru… -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-A] Issue with addition of NXP Platform support on TFA v2.2

by Olivier Deprez

Hi Pankaj, Can you pls provide a bit more background: Which boot stage (BL1/BL2/BL31...) get affected? Is there any crash report to console? Is this an aarch64/or aarch32 platform? There can be different root causes to this e.g. 1. a stale translation in TLB, or a dirty cache line remnant from earlier boot stages. If this is the case, it would need invalidating TLB and/or caches on BL entry. 2. the empty table ptr given by xlat_table_get_empty is pointing nowhere sensible because of this specific platform layout There are multiple calls to xlat_clean_dcache_range in this file, do you confirm the crash happen within xlat_tables_map_region? Can you try one or both statements below after the call to xlat_table_get_empty (and uncomment calls to clean_dcache_range): inv_dcache_range((uintptr_t)subtable, XLAT_TABLE_SIZE); xlat_arch_tlbi_va((uintptr_t)subtable, ctx->xlat_regime); xlat_arch_tlbi_va_sync(); Regards, Olivier. -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Pankaj Gupta via TF-A Sent: 05 February 2020 11:45 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Issue with addition of NXP Platform support on TFA v2.2 Hi, In the TFA v2.2 code base, the file "lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c" has the implementation for function "xlat_tables_map_region()". The implementation for this function is changed in TFAv2.2 (compared TFAv1.5), with addition of function "xlat_clean_dcache_range()". Due to this addition, my earlier* working platform on TFAv1.5, is hanging here. If the function call for the function "xlat_clean_dcache_range()", is comment, then the platform works well. Code snippet: static inline __attribute__((unused)) void xlat_clean_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size) { if (is_dcache_enabled()) clean_dcache_range(addr, size); // On commenting this line, my platform works fine with TFAv2.2 } Please share your views on what could I be missing here. Thanks. Regards Pankaj *Earlier raised patch for this platform was not merged due to review comments are not disposed-off in time; and TF-A got migrated from github to gerrit. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-A] CI status update - end to end boot testing on Juno

by Matteo Carlini

Hi Fathi, Thanks for the below write-up, this is really great news! > Note: this is in silent mode (links to the build job are currently disabled, > and will be re-enableb today). Please go ahead in re-enabling those jobs, so that people can see the results of the build jobs (while we work on propagating back to Gerrit also the results of the LAVA boot jobs). Thanks Matteo > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Fathi > Boudra via TF-A > Sent: 05 February 2020 12:45 > To: TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Cc: Ryan Arnold <ryan.arnold(a)linaro.org> > Subject: [TF-A] CI status update - end to end boot testing on Juno > > Hi, > > The end-to-end testing prototype is now completed and enabled. > This encompases an end-to-end testing pipeline whereby TF-A code > submission to gerrit results in a TF build (based on the code submission) > being injected into a file system (recovery image) and booted on a Juno > device in the Linaro TF LAVA instance with the results of the boot test > available in the LAVA instance. > > Here's the explanation of the CI pipeline: > 1. Trigger - capture gerrit events: > https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/trigger-tf-a-builder/ > All changes made to the trusted-firmware A repository are captured by > the trigger event and result in a build. > e.g., triggering commit: > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3100 > Note: this is in silent mode (links to the build job are currently disabled, > and will be re-enableb today). > 2. Build Binary Artifacts - Binary artifacts built via: > https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder/ > e.g., https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder/631/ > (with a link to the accompanying LAVA job and a link to the trigger job in > gerrit) 3. Recovery/Flash submission to LAVA - Used to flash the binary to the > board: > https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/post-build-lava/ > 4. LAVA tests results > e.g., Specific example of the template applied to a specific build > (631 above) > https://tf.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/job/895/definition > Results: https://tf.validation.linaro.org/results/895 > Link to all jobs: https://tf.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/alljobs > > Some additional information: > * tf-a-ci-scripts git repository has been set up and contains the CI scripts for > TF-A. > https://git.trustedfirmware.org/ci/tf-a-ci-scripts.git/ > * tf-a-job-configs git repository has been set up and contains the Jenkins jobs > configurations automatically deployed on https://ci.trustedfirmware.org > Jenkins instance. > https://git.trustedfirmware.org/ci/tf-a-job-configs.git/ > > Cheers, > -- > Fathi Boudra > Linaro.org | Open source software for ARM SoCs > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 3 months

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CI status update - end to end boot testing on Juno

by Fathi Boudra

Hi, The end-to-end testing prototype is now completed and enabled. This encompases an end-to-end testing pipeline whereby TF-A code submission to gerrit results in a TF build (based on the code submission) being injected into a file system (recovery image) and booted on a Juno device in the Linaro TF LAVA instance with the results of the boot test available in the LAVA instance. Here's the explanation of the CI pipeline: 1. Trigger - capture gerrit events: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/trigger-tf-a-builder/ All changes made to the trusted-firmware A repository are captured by the trigger event and result in a build. e.g., triggering commit: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3100 Note: this is in silent mode (links to the build job are currently disabled, and will be re-enableb today). 2. Build Binary Artifacts - Binary artifacts built via: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder/ e.g., https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder/631/ (with a link to the accompanying LAVA job and a link to the trigger job in gerrit) 3. Recovery/Flash submission to LAVA - Used to flash the binary to the board: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/post-build-lava/ 4. LAVA tests results e.g., Specific example of the template applied to a specific build (631 above) https://tf.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/job/895/definition Results: https://tf.validation.linaro.org/results/895 Link to all jobs: https://tf.validation.linaro.org/scheduler/alljobs Some additional information: * tf-a-ci-scripts git repository has been set up and contains the CI scripts for TF-A. https://git.trustedfirmware.org/ci/tf-a-ci-scripts.git/ * tf-a-job-configs git repository has been set up and contains the Jenkins jobs configurations automatically deployed on https://ci.trustedfirmware.org Jenkins instance. https://git.trustedfirmware.org/ci/tf-a-job-configs.git/ Cheers, -- Fathi Boudra Linaro.org | Open source software for ARM SoCs

6 years, 3 months

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Issue with addition of NXP Platform support on TFA v2.2

by Pankaj Gupta

Hi, In the TFA v2.2 code base, the file "lib/xlat_tables_v2/xlat_tables_core.c" has the implementation for function "xlat_tables_map_region()". The implementation for this function is changed in TFAv2.2 (compared TFAv1.5), with addition of function "xlat_clean_dcache_range()". Due to this addition, my earlier* working platform on TFAv1.5, is hanging here. If the function call for the function "xlat_clean_dcache_range()", is comment, then the platform works well. Code snippet: static inline __attribute__((unused)) void xlat_clean_dcache_range(uintptr_t addr, size_t size) { if (is_dcache_enabled()) clean_dcache_range(addr, size); // On commenting this line, my platform works fine with TFAv2.2 } Please share your views on what could I be missing here. Thanks. Regards Pankaj *Earlier raised patch for this platform was not merged due to review comments are not disposed-off in time; and TF-A got migrated from github to gerrit.

6 years, 3 months

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] New feature in TF-A to load encrypted FIP payloads

by Sandrine Bailleux

Hi all, On Tue, 2020-01-28 at 14:57 +0000, Raghupathy Krishnamurthy via TF-A wrote: > I completely agree with you! All i'm asking for is that what you are > proposing is ratified in the spec clearly, without any ambiguities > and that we don't implement what we *think* is correct, but implement > the spec. If the spec specifies encryption, we should implement > encryption, not authenticated encryption. One is not a direct > substitute for the other and requires careful thinking. Similarly, > the order of signing, encryption, decryption and authentication must > be specified and explained clearly, specifically to avoid these kinds > of discussions. Just to keep everyone in the loop, we are currently having some internal discussions within Arm about TBBR/TBFU and all the questions/concerns that have been raised in this thread. I will update you ASAP. Best regards, Sandrine

6 years, 3 months

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