Hi Anton,
Option 3 is a good.
Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we:
* Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or
* Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1
Thanks.
Regards,
David Wang
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning
Hi Anton,
Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage.
Best regards,
Kevin
On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi,
I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum.
Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A.
There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning.
Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 :
1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes,
2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and
3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes.
This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed:
1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only.
2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between.
3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version.
4. Other ideas?
Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input.
Thanks,
Anton.
--
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Option 3 +1.
/Ken
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M
Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning
Hi Anton,
Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage.
Best regards,
Kevin
On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi,
I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum.
Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A.
There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning.
Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 :
1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes,
2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and
3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes.
This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed:
1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only.
2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between.
3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version.
4. Other ideas?
Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input.
Thanks,
Anton.
--
TF-M mailing list
TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Hi Anton,
Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this
stage.
Best regards,
Kevin
On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <
tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> Hi,
>
>
>
> I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning
> started on the last tech forum.
>
> Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and
> minor versions, following TF-A.
>
> There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning.
>
> Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 :
>
> 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes,
> 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible
> manner, and
> 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes.
>
>
>
> This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from
> everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the
> forum and several options were proposed:
>
> 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only.
> 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0.
> So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between.
> 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered
> within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream
> project relay on a fixed version.
> 4. Other ideas?
>
>
>
> Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Anton.
>
> --
> TF-M mailing list
> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
>
Hi,
I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum.
Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A.
There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning.
Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 :
1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes,
2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and
3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes.
This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed:
1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only.
2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between.
3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version.
4. Other ideas?
Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input.
Thanks,
Anton.
Hi Antonio,
This might be helpful in addition to Tamas:
https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/view/TF-M/job/tf-m-build-docs-nightly/lastSt…
The best,
Anton
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Tamas Ban via TF-M
Sent: 13 November 2020 15:36
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image
Hi Antonio,
Required steps on Musca-A (only single image boot is supported by MCUboot due to RAM_LOAD upgrade mode limitation):
- Concatenate zephyr.bin + tfm_s.bin.
[ 93%] Generating tfm_s_ns.bin
cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/assemble.py --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -s /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_s.bin -n /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_ns.bin -o tfm_s_ns.bin
* Signing the concatenated binary:
[ 94%] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin
cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.1.0 --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -k /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin
* Combine bl2.bin and tfm_s_ns.bin:
srec_cat build/bin/bl2.bin -Binary -offset 0x200000 build/bin/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin -Binary -offset 0x220000 -o tfm.hex -Intel
Tamas
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M
Sent: 2020. november 13., péntek 16:33
To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu<mailto:antonioken.iannillo@uni.lu>>
Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image
Hi Antonio,
I'm not sure if this helps, but here is an example of how we sign the binaries for the MPS2 AN521, for example, after building the TF-M and Zephyr NS images, plus MCUBoot:
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/blob/966015f503d1438c25d597937…
Best regards,
Kevin
On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 16:19, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi all,
I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations.
Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them.
I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout.
To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives):
* I built TF-M
* I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a
* I build my zephyr application
Now (I suppose) I have to
· merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin
· sign the merged binary
· concatenate with bl2
I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps.
Best,
--
Antonio Ken Iannillo
Research Scientist – SEDAN group
SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust
UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG
CAMPUS KIRCHBERG
29, avenue John F. Kennedy
L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg
T +352 46 66 44 9660
Join the conversation
News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/>
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https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Hi Antonio,
Required steps on Musca-A (only single image boot is supported by MCUboot due to RAM_LOAD upgrade mode limitation):
- Concatenate zephyr.bin + tfm_s.bin.
[ 93%] Generating tfm_s_ns.bin
cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/assemble.py --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -s /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_s.bin -n /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_ns.bin -o tfm_s_ns.bin
* Signing the concatenated binary:
[ 94%] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin
cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.1.0 --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -k /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin
* Combine bl2.bin and tfm_s_ns.bin:
srec_cat build/bin/bl2.bin -Binary -offset 0x200000 build/bin/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin -Binary -offset 0x220000 -o tfm.hex -Intel
Tamas
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M
Sent: 2020. november 13., péntek 16:33
To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu>
Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image
Hi Antonio,
I'm not sure if this helps, but here is an example of how we sign the binaries for the MPS2 AN521, for example, after building the TF-M and Zephyr NS images, plus MCUBoot:
https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/blob/966015f503d1438c25d597937…
Best regards,
Kevin
On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 16:19, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi all,
I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations.
Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them.
I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout.
To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives):
* I built TF-M
* I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a
* I build my zephyr application
Now (I suppose) I have to
· merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin
· sign the merged binary
· concatenate with bl2
I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps.
Best,
--
Antonio Ken Iannillo
Research Scientist – SEDAN group
SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust
UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG
CAMPUS KIRCHBERG
29, avenue John F. Kennedy
L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg
T +352 46 66 44 9660
Join the conversation
News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/>
www.uni.lu/snt<http://www.uni.lu/snt>
--
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https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Hi all,
I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations.
Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them.
I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout.
To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives):
I built TF-M
I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a
I build my zephyr application
Now (I suppose) I have to
merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin
sign the merged binary
concatenate with bl2
I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps.
Best,
--
Antonio Ken Iannillo
Research Scientist – SEDAN group
SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust
UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG
CAMPUS KIRCHBERG
29, avenue John F. Kennedy
L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg
T +352 46 66 44 9660
Join the conversation
News | Twitter | Linkedin
www.uni.lu/snt
Hi,
As an intermediate step, we've made a modification to the file generation code
so that file can be generated without cmake being run.
This generation can be run by:
```
python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml -o <output dir>
```
Which will output the files into the specified output directory. if the `-o` flag is not provided then the files will be generated into the TFM source tree.
Note that this method still requires knowledge of the location of some
dependencies, as this cannot be provided by cmake. When run in standalone mode,
these paths are gathered from environment variables, and generation will fail if
those variables are not set. Thus:
```
env TFM_TEST_PATH=$(realpath ../tf-m-tests/test) python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml
```
Raef
________________________________________
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 20 October 2020 08:39
To: Anton Komlev
Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location
Hi Anton
If it’s not possible to avoid a file generation now, it’s good to have pre-generated files for a most typical configuration (l2, IPC etc.).
As I mentioned before, ideally to use TFM as a real component/framework without generation of any source code.
BUT If you believe, this requirement breaks a TFM concept, just tell us.
Thanks,
Andrej
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 9:27 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location
Hi Andrej,
Essentially, do you mean to move the files back to code tree and synch them with templates manually as it was ?
Cheers,
Anton
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com<mailto:andrey.butok@nxp.com>>
Sent: 19 October 2020 16:15
To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>
Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: RE: Generated files location
Hi Anton,
Another option:
3. Avoid the mandatory on-the-fly generation.
Try to make TFM a component/framework, which is configurable by compile & run time parameters.
Thanks,
Andrej
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M
Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 5:00 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>
Subject: [TF-M] Generated files location
Hi,
Some source files in TF-M are templated and generated inside /<build_dir>/generated/ on the fly as a part of build process. This guaranty consistency between templates and generated but might make a trouble for IDE, where not all source files exist at the first run.
I see 2 options for solution:
1. Explicitly generate those files via cmake as a part of IDE project creation (1 time action)
2. Relay on CMSIS Pack for IDE, where generated files must be presents
Any alternative thoughts?
Anton
Hi Robert,
Thanks for the bug report. I have pushed a fix for review: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6986
Kind regards,
Jamie
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Robert Rostohar via TF-M
Sent: 12 November 2020 13:57
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Typo in return value (ps_object_system.c)
Hi,
I believe there is a small typo in the return value of function ps_read_object (ps_object_system.c). This results in build failure of Non-encrypted Protected Storage.
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/secure_fw/…
The define used should be "PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT" and not "PSA_PS_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT".
Best regards,
Robert
Hi,
I believe there is a small typo in the return value of function ps_read_object (ps_object_system.c). This results in build failure of Non-encrypted Protected Storage.
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/secure_fw/…
The define used should be "PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT" and not "PSA_PS_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT".
Best regards,
Robert
