Open CI infrastructure has been down since this morning and currently still not working. Will post updates to the mailing list once they are available.
Thanks,
Antonio
Hi All
I am quite new to TF-M and would like some insight into the query below. I appreciate any help you can provide.
We're adding encryption support for ITS and for nonce requirement, we're thinking of accessing TRNG which is part of the crypto partition. Now, we're aware of the possible cyclic dependency issue with the IPC model but since we're using the SFN model, will it be okay to access crypto service(TRNG) from ITS? In other words, would cyclic dependency be a concern in SFN model provided there are no limitations on hardware?
Thanks in advance.
Saurabh
Hi all,
A heads up that the Total Compute 2022 (TC2) platform is due to be deprecated. If there is no objection, I will go ahead and remove TC2 from the TF-M codebase a month from now (25/11/24). Thank you.
Thanks,
Jackson
Hi all,
I'm currently looking into an issue reported internally where the maximum latency for a zero-latency, priority 0 interrupt dramatically increases during a call to the PSA Protected Storage (PS) API.
The maximum interrupt latency goes up ~10-fold, or even some more at times (it varies), and this is not acceptable to code running on the NS side for normal operation.
It's as simple as calling psa_ps_set(1, 4, buf, PSA_STORAGE_FLAG_NONE) once.
During that call (which I am told was also seen to be unreasonably long: 600ms for 4 bytes, 1s for 1000 bytes), the maximum interrupt latency goes up.
It (the maximum) seems to not vary too much even if increasing the size of stored assets (tested up to 4000 bytes), though it can get up to 20 times higher than the normal interrupt latency.
Also, other functions were tested (psa_generate_random(), psa_hash_compute()).
Those don't provoke an increased interrupt latency. Maybe it's only about the PS, or maybe some other calls can provoke that as well.
Does someone have an explanation for that?
And even more importantly, can that interrupt latency be reduced, ideally down to normal levels?
Thanks in advance.
Tomi
Hi,
We are going to set the PSA_2_0_0 profile as the default for the initial attestation service. This will impact which claims are included in the token and their key values.
More details are here:
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-tschofenig-rats-psa-token-24.html
Changes on review:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22attest_profile_update%22
As a follow-up action, the PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 is being deprecated.
We are planning to remove it from the code base as well.
To figure out the timing of this we would like to collect some data:
* If you are using the PSA_IOT_PROFILE_1 please let us know what would be a feasible time for you to switch over the PSA_2_0_0 profile. Thanks!
Best regards,
Tamas Ban
Hello,
This email is a notification of a new security vulnerability reported to TF-M by Infineon Technologies AG, in collaboration with: Tobias Scharnowski, Simon Wörner and Johannes Willbold from fuzzware.io.
Unchecked user-supplied pointer via mailbox messages may cause write of arbitrary address.
Please find the security advisory attached. The fix has been merged on the latest main branch tfm_spe_mailbox: Do not write-back on input vectors checks failure<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/31512>
We're preparing a hotfix release v2.1.1 to include fixes for this vulnerability and bugs reported till that date via TF-M issue tracker: https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/issues?q=is%3Aissue
Thanks and best regards
Author
Hi everyone,
It has come to our attention that QEMU is no longer able to run the regression tests in a timely manner, and before we go ahead and outright disable them, we would like to know if anyone is using QEMU for their platform testing.
If so, please reply to this message and we can have further discussion on the point.
Thanks, Matt
+ TF-M mailing list
From: David Horstmann via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2024 5:14 PM
To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Lee, William <William.Lee(a)garmin.com>
Subject: [mbed-tls] Re: Looking for suggestions about make Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m
Hi William,
Since Mbed TLS is a cross-platform library, we don't deal directly with TrustZone-M.
However, if I have understood correctly, I think your usecase is solved by the Trusted Firmware M (TF-M) project[1], which is an implementation of secure firmware that provides cryptography services via non-secure-callable APIs.
TF-M uses Mbed TLS internally and implements the PSA Certified Cryptography API[2]. The Crypto Service Integration Guide[3] in the documentation should be a good starting point for what you are trying to do.
I hope that helps,
David Horstmann
Mbed TLS developer
[1] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m
[2] https://www.psacertified.org/getting-certified/crypto-api-compliance/
[3] https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/integration_guide/servic…
[https://www.trustedfirmware.org/images/social-media-image.png]<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m>
TrustedFirmware-M (TF-M)<https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m>
TrustedFirmware-M (TF-M) implements the Secure Processing Environment (SPE) for Armv8-M, Armv8.1-M architectures or dual-core platforms.
www.trustedfirmware.org<http://www.trustedfirmware.org>
________________________________
From: Lee, William via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: 24 September 2024 15:08
To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Subject: [mbed-tls] Looking for suggestions about make Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m
Hi Mbed TLS,
I am looking for some suggestions about make some (or all) Mbed TLS APIs non-secure callable APIs on armv8m.
The background is that I am going to have a secure firmware that provides encryption services by building part (or whole) of Mbed TLS into that firmware and make those original mbedtls_x APIs non-secure callable, so the existing non-secure firmware could link those non-secure callable APIs and use them.
Some of my thoughts:
(1) The easiest way to do it I can think of is just add the attribute "cmse_nonsecure_call" to those APIs' declaration (or use a macro to wrap the attribute for conditional build to not impact others don't want it), but I do not think this modification could be accepted by upstream 🙂.
(2) So my another thought is duplicate all header files and put them under another folder, assuming it is my-include folder, then I can do whatever I want to my-include folder, but there is also a problem I can think of: a merge/compare burden between include and my-include folder after I have updated Mbed TLS.
I really appreciate other suggestions!
Thanks,
William