Hello
We are trying to enable & compile TFM Core tests.
But it looks like they are only for MPS2 platform:
1) tfm_ss_core_test.c:
....
#include "smm_mps2.h"
...
static psa_status_t test_peripheral_access(void)
{
struct arm_mps2_fpgaio_t *fpgaio = SEC_MPS2_FPGAIO;
...
etc.
2) tfm_partition_list.inc
...
#ifdef TFM_PARTITION_TEST_CORE
...
PARTITION_ADD_PERIPHERAL(TFM_SP_CORE_TEST, TFM_PERIPHERAL_FPGA_IO);
#endif /* TFM_PARTITION_TEST_CORE */
...
What do you suggest ?
What is the plan?
Should we to skip/ignore the TFM Core regression tests now?
Thanks
Andrej Butok
SW Tech Lead
Security & Connectivity, Microcontrollers
NXP Semiconductors
Thank you, Antonio
Looking forward for the 100% Crypto Service usage, it will solve the mbedTLS duplication issue.
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Antonio De Angelis via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 26, 2019 4:37 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi,
Regarding the below:
> Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
Attestation already calls the PSA Crypto APIs, and we are working actively on implementing the crypto bindings for SST to call the corresponding PSA Crypto API's.
Thanks,
Antonio
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Wang (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: 26 March 2019 08:18
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) <Ken.Liu(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi Andrej,
Yes, I agree this is a useful design to mitigate the code size issue. Just sharing the advice from security perspective. Basically, we need to review the shared libs carefully(one of the focus of threat modelling).
It's not a mandatory limit. From PSA FF spec v1.0 beta1 section 3.1.4 (Mandatory isolation rules) and 3.1.5 (Optional isolation rules), it's OK to have the shared RO code sections.
It doesn't break the mandatory isolation rule I3 - If domain A needs protection from domain B, then Private data in domain A cannot be accessed by domain B.
But it's worth to notice/mention that this will break optional isolation rules I4 and I5.
I4 - If domain A needs protection from domain B, then Code and Constant data in domain A is not readable or executable by domain B.
I5 - Code in a domain is not executable by any other domain.
It makes sense to give the choice to the users. (may notify the user about the potential security risk)
> Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
I think the experts of the modules might be more suitable than me to answer this question. 😊
Thanks.
Hi @Ken Liu (Arm Technology China),
I got your reply in another thread, so just to gather them here.
>For first point, we can take a security analysis on this part and check if there are vulnerabilities.
>The security requirement for these code are quite high, you can take 'memset' as example, it is read-only, caller stack based so no footprint would leave to another caller.
Yes, like I mentioned above it's one of the focus of threat modelling.
>For seconds point, it is do-able -- but need big change everywhere; and it back to the per-partition library design while we move to isolation level 3.
Understand. Just thinking if we can keep the shared libs in the same protection domain. (to avoid breaking optional isolation rules)
BTW, from PSA FF spec v1.0 beta1 section 3.1.2(memory access rules) rule l1, we may need to consider the separation of RO-Code and RO-data(execution never).
Thanks.
Regards,
David Wang
Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 7:04 PM
To: TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi David,
> Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities.
Yes, you are right.
BUT Code size may be a very critical parameter especially for constrained MCUs.
Please do not give any mandatory limits. If any, they should be configurable. Let's give a possibility to choose for final users.
BTW:
1) Current TF-M is using library approach with mbedTLS copy per each service. OK, security => but wasting of resources.
In our code, we are using one copy of mbedTLS to avoid this type of wasting, but it requires original code modification.
Please, give more freedom to final TFM users!
2) Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
It will eliminates mbedTLS duplication.
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Wang (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 10:57 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi Ken,
Some comments from security review's perspective.
* Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities. App RoT can analyze the shared lib to find out the useable vulnerabilities for attacking PSA RoT.
* Is it a good idea to have two separate shared libs - one for all app RoT and one for all PSA RoT for isolation level2? (can still share one copy for level1.)
Regards,
David Wang
Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 5:05 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi,
The document is updated due to a change in MPU regions part:
In original design, some partition libraries like 'thread_exit' is going to be linked with partition statically, which means there would be multiple copies of these libraries for each partition. This provided strict protection of isolation but it looks over-protect.
If we keep one shared code region for each partition to call these libraries, we could:
* Save memory
* The protection is enough if we mark the code area as read-only.
In this case, the unprivileged code and RO region needs to be kept and these shared codes could be put there.
The requirement of these codes are:
* These codes must be thread safe and reentrant
* These codes must be put in read-only region
The change mainly happen under section "Linker script sections re-arrangement". Please help to comment.
Thanks!
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken
> Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 3:20 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hi,
> The document is updated, and keep open for comments ; )
>
> The updated content is:
>
> 1. Available MPU regions for peripheral has number limitation based
> on platform. If a SP needs many un-continuous peripheral registers and
> the number exceeds available MPU number, it needs further investigation.
> 2. Rely on linker to clean the unused object files instead of
> remove them in scatter before the dependency is fully figured out.
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Ken
>
> From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2019 6:44 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hello,
> The first IPC implementation works under isolation level 1. The high
> isolation levels need to be there to get compatible with PSA Firmware
> Framework. A design document is created about implementing isolation level 2 for IPC model:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeve
> loper.trustedfirmware.org%2Fw%2Ftf_m%2Fdesign%2Ftrusted_firmware-&
> data=02%7C01%7Candrey.butok%40nxp.com%7C6a9c2cb6a5034aec48b908d6b10845
> 48%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636891046406628979&
> ;sdata=yPus0lkd4L71ng5Z5o2hu2bDEMBAzSwUxAm1fyYf564%3D&reserved=0
> m_isolation_level_2/
>
> The mainly change of isolation level 2 compare to isolation level 1 is:
> * Put AppRoT Secure Partitions' components with same attribute (code,
> read- only data, read-write data) into the same region, which helps
> MPU setting region attributes.
> * Change Secure Partition privileged setting based on Secure Partition
> type while scheduling.
> * Change mechanism of privileged API, such as printf.
>
> If you have any comments please share it. You can reply in mailing
> list if there is no place for putting comments on the page.
>
> Thank you!
>
> -Ken
>
> --
> TF-M mailing list
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> b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636891046406638984&sdata=7Wva1R6Lv
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Hi,
Regarding the below:
> Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
Attestation already calls the PSA Crypto APIs, and we are working actively on implementing the crypto bindings for SST to call the corresponding PSA Crypto API's.
Thanks,
Antonio
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Wang (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: 26 March 2019 08:18
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) <Ken.Liu(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi Andrej,
Yes, I agree this is a useful design to mitigate the code size issue. Just sharing the advice from security perspective. Basically, we need to review the shared libs carefully(one of the focus of threat modelling).
It's not a mandatory limit. From PSA FF spec v1.0 beta1 section 3.1.4 (Mandatory isolation rules) and 3.1.5 (Optional isolation rules), it's OK to have the shared RO code sections.
It doesn't break the mandatory isolation rule I3 - If domain A needs protection from domain B, then Private data in domain A cannot be accessed by domain B.
But it's worth to notice/mention that this will break optional isolation rules I4 and I5.
I4 - If domain A needs protection from domain B, then Code and Constant data in domain A is not readable or executable by domain B.
I5 - Code in a domain is not executable by any other domain.
It makes sense to give the choice to the users. (may notify the user about the potential security risk)
> Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
I think the experts of the modules might be more suitable than me to answer this question. 😊
Thanks.
Hi @Ken Liu (Arm Technology China),
I got your reply in another thread, so just to gather them here.
>For first point, we can take a security analysis on this part and check if there are vulnerabilities.
>The security requirement for these code are quite high, you can take 'memset' as example, it is read-only, caller stack based so no footprint would leave to another caller.
Yes, like I mentioned above it's one of the focus of threat modelling.
>For seconds point, it is do-able -- but need big change everywhere; and it back to the per-partition library design while we move to isolation level 3.
Understand. Just thinking if we can keep the shared libs in the same protection domain. (to avoid breaking optional isolation rules)
BTW, from PSA FF spec v1.0 beta1 section 3.1.2(memory access rules) rule l1, we may need to consider the separation of RO-Code and RO-data(execution never).
Thanks.
Regards,
David Wang
Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 7:04 PM
To: TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi David,
> Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities.
Yes, you are right.
BUT Code size may be a very critical parameter especially for constrained MCUs.
Please do not give any mandatory limits. If any, they should be configurable. Let's give a possibility to choose for final users.
BTW:
1) Current TF-M is using library approach with mbedTLS copy per each service. OK, security => but wasting of resources.
In our code, we are using one copy of mbedTLS to avoid this type of wasting, but it requires original code modification.
Please, give more freedom to final TFM users!
2) Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
It will eliminates mbedTLS duplication.
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Wang (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 10:57 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi Ken,
Some comments from security review's perspective.
* Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities. App RoT can analyze the shared lib to find out the useable vulnerabilities for attacking PSA RoT.
* Is it a good idea to have two separate shared libs - one for all app RoT and one for all PSA RoT for isolation level2? (can still share one copy for level1.)
Regards,
David Wang
Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 5:05 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi,
The document is updated due to a change in MPU regions part:
In original design, some partition libraries like 'thread_exit' is going to be linked with partition statically, which means there would be multiple copies of these libraries for each partition. This provided strict protection of isolation but it looks over-protect.
If we keep one shared code region for each partition to call these libraries, we could:
* Save memory
* The protection is enough if we mark the code area as read-only.
In this case, the unprivileged code and RO region needs to be kept and these shared codes could be put there.
The requirement of these codes are:
* These codes must be thread safe and reentrant
* These codes must be put in read-only region
The change mainly happen under section "Linker script sections re-arrangement". Please help to comment.
Thanks!
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken
> Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 3:20 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hi,
> The document is updated, and keep open for comments ; )
>
> The updated content is:
>
> 1. Available MPU regions for peripheral has number limitation based
> on platform. If a SP needs many un-continuous peripheral registers and
> the number exceeds available MPU number, it needs further investigation.
> 2. Rely on linker to clean the unused object files instead of
> remove them in scatter before the dependency is fully figured out.
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Ken
>
> From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2019 6:44 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hello,
> The first IPC implementation works under isolation level 1. The high
> isolation levels need to be there to get compatible with PSA Firmware
> Framework. A design document is created about implementing isolation level 2 for IPC model:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeve
> loper.trustedfirmware.org%2Fw%2Ftf_m%2Fdesign%2Ftrusted_firmware-&
> data=02%7C01%7Candrey.butok%40nxp.com%7C6a9c2cb6a5034aec48b908d6b10845
> 48%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636891046406628979&
> ;sdata=yPus0lkd4L71ng5Z5o2hu2bDEMBAzSwUxAm1fyYf564%3D&reserved=0
> m_isolation_level_2/
>
> The mainly change of isolation level 2 compare to isolation level 1 is:
> * Put AppRoT Secure Partitions' components with same attribute (code,
> read- only data, read-write data) into the same region, which helps
> MPU setting region attributes.
> * Change Secure Partition privileged setting based on Secure Partition
> type while scheduling.
> * Change mechanism of privileged API, such as printf.
>
> If you have any comments please share it. You can reply in mailing
> list if there is no place for putting comments on the page.
>
> Thank you!
>
> -Ken
>
> --
> TF-M mailing list
> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flist
> s.trustedfirmware.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ftf-m&data=02%7C01%7Ca
> ndrey.butok%40nxp.com%7C6a9c2cb6a5034aec48b908d6b1084548%7C686ea1d3bc2
> b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636891046406638984&sdata=7Wva1R6Lv
> EKMxCpaVr6gRE26Fodub%2FPTQlLOiB2YvX0%3D&reserved=0
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Hi Andrej,
Yes, I agree this is a useful design to mitigate the code size issue. Just sharing the advice from security perspective. Basically, we need to review the shared libs carefully(one of the focus of threat modelling).
It's not a mandatory limit. From PSA FF spec v1.0 beta1 section 3.1.4 (Mandatory isolation rules) and 3.1.5 (Optional isolation rules), it's OK to have the shared RO code sections.
It doesn't break the mandatory isolation rule I3 - If domain A needs protection from domain B, then Private data in domain A cannot be accessed by domain B.
But it's worth to notice/mention that this will break optional isolation rules I4 and I5.
I4 - If domain A needs protection from domain B, then Code and Constant data in domain A is not readable or executable by domain B.
I5 - Code in a domain is not executable by any other domain.
It makes sense to give the choice to the users. (may notify the user about the potential security risk)
> Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
I think the experts of the modules might be more suitable than me to answer this question. 😊
Thanks.
Hi @Ken Liu (Arm Technology China),
I got your reply in another thread, so just to gather them here.
>For first point, we can take a security analysis on this part and check if there are vulnerabilities.
>The security requirement for these code are quite high, you can take 'memset' as example, it is read-only, caller stack based so no footprint would leave to another caller.
Yes, like I mentioned above it's one of the focus of threat modelling.
>For seconds point, it is do-able -- but need big change everywhere; and it back to the per-partition library design while we move to isolation level 3.
Understand. Just thinking if we can keep the shared libs in the same protection domain. (to avoid breaking optional isolation rules)
BTW, from PSA FF spec v1.0 beta1 section 3.1.2(memory access rules) rule l1, we may need to consider the separation of RO-Code and RO-data(execution never).
Thanks.
Regards,
David Wang
Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 7:04 PM
To: TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi David,
> Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities.
Yes, you are right.
BUT Code size may be a very critical parameter especially for constrained MCUs.
Please do not give any mandatory limits. If any, they should be configurable. Let's give a possibility to choose for final users.
BTW:
1) Current TF-M is using library approach with mbedTLS copy per each service. OK, security => but wasting of resources.
In our code, we are using one copy of mbedTLS to avoid this type of wasting, but it requires original code modification.
Please, give more freedom to final TFM users!
2) Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
It will eliminates mbedTLS duplication.
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Wang (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 10:57 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi Ken,
Some comments from security review's perspective.
* Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities. App RoT can analyze the shared lib to find out the useable vulnerabilities for attacking PSA RoT.
* Is it a good idea to have two separate shared libs - one for all app RoT and one for all PSA RoT for isolation level2? (can still share one copy for level1.)
Regards,
David Wang
Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 5:05 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi,
The document is updated due to a change in MPU regions part:
In original design, some partition libraries like 'thread_exit' is going to be linked with partition statically, which means there would be multiple copies of these libraries for each partition. This provided strict protection of isolation but it looks over-protect.
If we keep one shared code region for each partition to call these libraries, we could:
* Save memory
* The protection is enough if we mark the code area as read-only.
In this case, the unprivileged code and RO region needs to be kept and these shared codes could be put there.
The requirement of these codes are:
* These codes must be thread safe and reentrant
* These codes must be put in read-only region
The change mainly happen under section "Linker script sections re-arrangement". Please help to comment.
Thanks!
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken
> Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 3:20 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hi,
> The document is updated, and keep open for comments ; )
>
> The updated content is:
>
> 1. Available MPU regions for peripheral has number limitation based
> on platform. If a SP needs many un-continuous peripheral registers and
> the number exceeds available MPU number, it needs further investigation.
> 2. Rely on linker to clean the unused object files instead of
> remove them in scatter before the dependency is fully figured out.
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Ken
>
> From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2019 6:44 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hello,
> The first IPC implementation works under isolation level 1. The high
> isolation levels need to be there to get compatible with PSA Firmware
> Framework. A design document is created about implementing isolation level 2 for IPC model:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeve
> loper.trustedfirmware.org%2Fw%2Ftf_m%2Fdesign%2Ftrusted_firmware-&
> data=02%7C01%7Candrey.butok%40nxp.com%7C6a9c2cb6a5034aec48b908d6b10845
> 48%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636891046406628979&
> ;sdata=yPus0lkd4L71ng5Z5o2hu2bDEMBAzSwUxAm1fyYf564%3D&reserved=0
> m_isolation_level_2/
>
> The mainly change of isolation level 2 compare to isolation level 1 is:
> * Put AppRoT Secure Partitions' components with same attribute (code,
> read- only data, read-write data) into the same region, which helps
> MPU setting region attributes.
> * Change Secure Partition privileged setting based on Secure Partition
> type while scheduling.
> * Change mechanism of privileged API, such as printf.
>
> If you have any comments please share it. You can reply in mailing
> list if there is no place for putting comments on the page.
>
> Thank you!
>
> -Ken
>
> --
> TF-M mailing list
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> s.trustedfirmware.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ftf-m&data=02%7C01%7Ca
> ndrey.butok%40nxp.com%7C6a9c2cb6a5034aec48b908d6b1084548%7C686ea1d3bc2
> b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636891046406638984&sdata=7Wva1R6Lv
> EKMxCpaVr6gRE26Fodub%2FPTQlLOiB2YvX0%3D&reserved=0
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Hi,
For first point, we can take a security analysis on this part and check if there are vulnerabilities.
The security requirement for these code are quite high, you can take 'memset' as example,
it is read-only, caller stack based so no footprint would leave to another caller.
For seconds point, it is do-able -- but need big change everywhere; and it back to the
per-partition library design while we move to isolation level 3.
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David
> Wang (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 5:57 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hi Ken,
> Some comments from security review's perspective.
> * Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities. App
> RoT can analyze the shared lib to find out the useable vulnerabilities for
> attacking PSA RoT.
> * Is it a good idea to have two separate shared libs - one for all app RoT and one
> for all PSA RoT for isolation level2? (can still share one copy for level1.)
>
> Regards,
> David Wang
> Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
> Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu
> (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 5:05 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hi,
>
> The document is updated due to a change in MPU regions part:
>
> In original design, some partition libraries like 'thread_exit' is going to be linked
> with partition statically, which means there would be multiple copies of these
> libraries for each partition. This provided strict protection of isolation but it
> looks over-protect.
>
> If we keep one shared code region for each partition to call these libraries, we
> could:
> * Save memory
> * The protection is enough if we mark the code area as read-only.
>
> In this case, the unprivileged code and RO region needs to be kept and these
> shared codes could be put there.
> The requirement of these codes are:
> * These codes must be thread safe and reentrant
> * These codes must be put in read-only region
>
> The change mainly happen under section "Linker script sections re-arrangement".
> Please help to comment.
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Ken
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken
> > Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> > Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 3:20 PM
> > To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> > Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> > Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
> >
> > Hi,
> > The document is updated, and keep open for comments ; )
> >
> > The updated content is:
> >
> > 1. Available MPU regions for peripheral has number limitation based
> > on platform. If a SP needs many un-continuous peripheral registers and
> > the number exceeds available MPU number, it needs further investigation.
> > 2. Rely on linker to clean the unused object files instead of
> > remove them in scatter before the dependency is fully figured out.
> >
> > Thanks!
> >
> > -Ken
> >
> > From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)
> > Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2019 6:44 PM
> > To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> > Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> > Subject: [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
> >
> > Hello,
> > The first IPC implementation works under isolation level 1. The high
> > isolation levels need to be there to get compatible with PSA Firmware
> > Framework. A design document is created about implementing isolation level 2
> for IPC model:
> > https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/trusted_firmware-
> > m_isolation_level_2/
> >
> > The mainly change of isolation level 2 compare to isolation level 1 is:
> > * Put AppRoT Secure Partitions' components with same attribute (code,
> > read- only data, read-write data) into the same region, which helps
> > MPU setting region attributes.
> > * Change Secure Partition privileged setting based on Secure Partition
> > type while scheduling.
> > * Change mechanism of privileged API, such as printf.
> >
> > If you have any comments please share it. You can reply in mailing
> > list if there is no place for putting comments on the page.
> >
> > Thank you!
> >
> > -Ken
> >
> > --
> > TF-M mailing list
> > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
> --
> TF-M mailing list
> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
> --
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> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
As currently specified, I don't see a simple way to invoke the tfm_register_client_id() API ONLY ONCE for each NS client thread.
It appears that tfm_register_client_id() must be called after TZ_LoadContext_S() because the clientId provided by tfm_register_client_id() is always associated with the CURRENT NS MemoryId.
However, TZ_LoadContext_S() is designed to be called only when the NS OS actually switches to a new NS thread. This creates pressure for tfm_register_client_id() to be called during a NS thread switch. However, calling tfm_register_client_id() on EVERY NS context switch is redundant and CPU wasteful. Adding code to test whether tfm_register_client_id() has already been called for a particular NS thread also seems wasteful.
What seems natural to me is to add a MemoryId argument to tfm_register_client_id() so that the clientID can be mapped to the MemoryId provided by TZ_AllocModuleContext_S() right after TZ_AllocModuleContext_S() is called (ie only once).
Please correct my understanding of how tfm_register_client_id() is intended to be used if the above analysis is off base.
Alan
Hi David,
> Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities.
Yes, you are right.
BUT Code size may be a very critical parameter especially for constrained MCUs.
Please do not give any mandatory limits. If any, they should be configurable. Let's give a possibility to choose for final users.
BTW:
1) Current TF-M is using library approach with mbedTLS copy per each service. OK, security => but wasting of resources.
In our code, we are using one copy of mbedTLS to avoid this type of wasting, but it requires original code modification.
Please, give more freedom to final TFM users!
2) Why the TFM services (SST, attestation) do not call PSA Crypto API?
It will eliminates mbedTLS duplication.
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Wang (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 10:57 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi Ken,
Some comments from security review's perspective.
* Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities. App RoT can analyze the shared lib to find out the useable vulnerabilities for attacking PSA RoT.
* Is it a good idea to have two separate shared libs - one for all app RoT and one for all PSA RoT for isolation level2? (can still share one copy for level1.)
Regards,
David Wang
Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 5:05 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi,
The document is updated due to a change in MPU regions part:
In original design, some partition libraries like 'thread_exit' is going to be linked with partition statically, which means there would be multiple copies of these libraries for each partition. This provided strict protection of isolation but it looks over-protect.
If we keep one shared code region for each partition to call these libraries, we could:
* Save memory
* The protection is enough if we mark the code area as read-only.
In this case, the unprivileged code and RO region needs to be kept and these shared codes could be put there.
The requirement of these codes are:
* These codes must be thread safe and reentrant
* These codes must be put in read-only region
The change mainly happen under section "Linker script sections re-arrangement". Please help to comment.
Thanks!
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken
> Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 3:20 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hi,
> The document is updated, and keep open for comments ; )
>
> The updated content is:
>
> 1. Available MPU regions for peripheral has number limitation based
> on platform. If a SP needs many un-continuous peripheral registers and
> the number exceeds available MPU number, it needs further investigation.
> 2. Rely on linker to clean the unused object files instead of
> remove them in scatter before the dependency is fully figured out.
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Ken
>
> From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2019 6:44 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hello,
> The first IPC implementation works under isolation level 1. The high
> isolation levels need to be there to get compatible with PSA Firmware
> Framework. A design document is created about implementing isolation level 2 for IPC model:
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fdeve
> loper.trustedfirmware.org%2Fw%2Ftf_m%2Fdesign%2Ftrusted_firmware-&
> data=02%7C01%7Candrey.butok%40nxp.com%7C6a9c2cb6a5034aec48b908d6b10845
> 48%7C686ea1d3bc2b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636891046406628979&
> ;sdata=yPus0lkd4L71ng5Z5o2hu2bDEMBAzSwUxAm1fyYf564%3D&reserved=0
> m_isolation_level_2/
>
> The mainly change of isolation level 2 compare to isolation level 1 is:
> * Put AppRoT Secure Partitions' components with same attribute (code,
> read- only data, read-write data) into the same region, which helps
> MPU setting region attributes.
> * Change Secure Partition privileged setting based on Secure Partition
> type while scheduling.
> * Change mechanism of privileged API, such as printf.
>
> If you have any comments please share it. You can reply in mailing
> list if there is no place for putting comments on the page.
>
> Thank you!
>
> -Ken
>
> --
> TF-M mailing list
> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flist
> s.trustedfirmware.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Ftf-m&data=02%7C01%7Ca
> ndrey.butok%40nxp.com%7C6a9c2cb6a5034aec48b908d6b1084548%7C686ea1d3bc2
> b4c6fa92cd99c5c301635%7C0%7C0%7C636891046406638984&sdata=7Wva1R6Lv
> EKMxCpaVr6gRE26Fodub%2FPTQlLOiB2YvX0%3D&reserved=0
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Hi Ken,
Some comments from security review's perspective.
* Using shared libraries may give the window to exploit the vulnerabilities. App RoT can analyze the shared lib to find out the useable vulnerabilities for attacking PSA RoT.
* Is it a good idea to have two separate shared libs - one for all app RoT and one for all PSA RoT for isolation level2? (can still share one copy for level1.)
Regards,
David Wang
Arm Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd
Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Monday, March 25, 2019 5:05 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
Hi,
The document is updated due to a change in MPU regions part:
In original design, some partition libraries like 'thread_exit' is going to be linked with partition statically, which means there would be multiple copies of these libraries for each partition. This provided strict protection of isolation but it looks over-protect.
If we keep one shared code region for each partition to call these libraries, we could:
* Save memory
* The protection is enough if we mark the code area as read-only.
In this case, the unprivileged code and RO region needs to be kept and these shared codes could be put there.
The requirement of these codes are:
* These codes must be thread safe and reentrant
* These codes must be put in read-only region
The change mainly happen under section "Linker script sections re-arrangement". Please help to comment.
Thanks!
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken
> Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 3:20 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hi,
> The document is updated, and keep open for comments ; )
>
> The updated content is:
>
> 1. Available MPU regions for peripheral has number limitation based
> on platform. If a SP needs many un-continuous peripheral registers and
> the number exceeds available MPU number, it needs further investigation.
> 2. Rely on linker to clean the unused object files instead of
> remove them in scatter before the dependency is fully figured out.
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Ken
>
> From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2019 6:44 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hello,
> The first IPC implementation works under isolation level 1. The high
> isolation levels need to be there to get compatible with PSA Firmware
> Framework. A design document is created about implementing isolation level 2 for IPC model:
> https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/trusted_firmware-
> m_isolation_level_2/
>
> The mainly change of isolation level 2 compare to isolation level 1 is:
> * Put AppRoT Secure Partitions' components with same attribute (code,
> read- only data, read-write data) into the same region, which helps
> MPU setting region attributes.
> * Change Secure Partition privileged setting based on Secure Partition
> type while scheduling.
> * Change mechanism of privileged API, such as printf.
>
> If you have any comments please share it. You can reply in mailing
> list if there is no place for putting comments on the page.
>
> Thank you!
>
> -Ken
>
> --
> TF-M mailing list
> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
--
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Hi,
The document is updated due to a change in MPU regions part:
In original design, some partition libraries like 'thread_exit' is going to be linked with partition statically,
which means there would be multiple copies of these libraries for each partition. This provided strict protection
of isolation but it looks over-protect.
If we keep one shared code region for each partition to call these libraries, we could:
* Save memory
* The protection is enough if we mark the code area as read-only.
In this case, the unprivileged code and RO region needs to be kept and these shared codes could be put there.
The requirement of these codes are:
* These codes must be thread safe and reentrant
* These codes must be put in read-only region
The change mainly happen under section "Linker script sections re-arrangement". Please help to comment.
Thanks!
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu
> (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2019 3:20 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hi,
> The document is updated, and keep open for comments ; )
>
> The updated content is:
>
> 1. Available MPU regions for peripheral has number limitation based on
> platform. If a SP needs many un-continuous peripheral registers and the number
> exceeds available MPU number, it needs further investigation.
> 2. Rely on linker to clean the unused object files instead of remove them in
> scatter before the dependency is fully figured out.
>
> Thanks!
>
> -Ken
>
> From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)
> Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2019 6:44 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: [RFC] Design document of isolation level 2 on TF-M
>
> Hello,
> The first IPC implementation works under isolation level 1. The high isolation
> levels need to be there to get compatible with PSA Firmware Framework. A
> design document is created about implementing isolation level 2 for IPC model:
> https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/trusted_firmware-
> m_isolation_level_2/
>
> The mainly change of isolation level 2 compare to isolation level 1 is:
> * Put AppRoT Secure Partitions' components with same attribute (code, read-
> only data, read-write data) into the same region, which helps MPU setting
> region attributes.
> * Change Secure Partition privileged setting based on Secure Partition type while
> scheduling.
> * Change mechanism of privileged API, such as printf.
>
> If you have any comments please share it. You can reply in mailing list if there is
> no place for putting comments on the page.
>
> Thank you!
>
> -Ken
>
> --
> TF-M mailing list
> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Really sorry! sent by mistake.
On 3/21/19, 5:41 PM, "TF-M on behalf of Summer Qin (Arm Technology China) via TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
--
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IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hello,
The first IPC implementation works under isolation level 1. The high isolation levels need to be there to get compatible with PSA Firmware Framework. A design document is created about implementing isolation level 2 for IPC model:
https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/trusted_firmware-m_isol…
The mainly change of isolation level 2 compare to isolation level 1 is:
* Put AppRoT Secure Partitions' components with same attribute (code, read-only data, read-write data) into the same region, which helps MPU setting region attributes.
* Change Secure Partition privileged setting based on Secure Partition type while scheduling.
* Change mechanism of privileged API, such as printf.
If you have any comments please share it. You can reply in mailing list if there is no place for putting comments on the page.
Thank you!
-Ken
Hi Andrej,
For you question, please see my comments:
If I understand well, the Crypto, SST and Attestation services do not use IPC, so far. Right?
- Yes.
Should the SST/Crypto/Attestation services be disabled when IPC is enabled?
- No, we do not have to disable them.
May the Library and IPC APIs be used simultaneously?
- Yes. When using " ConfigCoreIPC.cmake" configure file with enabling the " REGRESSION", you can see all the regression test can work.
What part of TFM is using IPC?
- There are two IPC test partitions to use the IPC: trusted-firmware-m/test/test_services/tfm_ipc_client and trusted-firmware-m/test/test_services/tfm_ipc_service. They are used to do basic IPC function tests.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 3:36 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Edison,
If I understand well, the Crypto, SST and Attestation services do not use IPC, so far. Right?
Should the SST/Crypto/Attestation services be disabled when IPC is enabled?
May the Library and IPC APIs be used simultaneously?
What part of TFM is using IPC?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 8:22 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
We tested the IPC works on Musca A but not try it on Musca B yet.
The current IPC related patches are used to enable IPC mechanism, but services such as crypto, protect storage and attestation are yet to make use of IPC.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 6:06 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Edison,
OK. So, according to https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr… the armclang IPC was added only to one platform (target/mps2/an521/armclang/mps2_an521_s.sct).
What about Musca A and Musca B?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:52 AM
To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
You can see the log history of master branch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust…p;reserved=0.
All the IPC patches had been existed in master branch.
You can use the master branch now, all the IPC functions had been ready for GCC and ARMCLANG.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 4:43 PM
To: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Edison,
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust… master head the latest commit is still 4-day old (4 days Core: Retrieve extra parameter from correct positionHEADmaster Summer Qin).
Should I wait some time till it will be propagated to the public git?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:26 AM
To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
You are welcome.
Now, the "feature-ipc" branch had been merge into the master branch with the merge patch mentioned below. So all the patches in "feature-ipc" branch had been merge into master too. You can find the related IPC patch in the log history of master branch.
The IPC can works rightly in GCC and ARMCLANG on master branch.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 4:10 PM
To: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Thanks Adison,
Yes, we are using the master branch.
When are you planning to merge the mentioned fix to the mainline?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:00 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
I think you mention the "Merge remote-tracking branch 'feature-ipc' into 'master" patch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…p;reserved=0.
This is a merge patch to fix the merge conflicts. The original patch to support to change the linker file is here: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…p;reserved=0. You can see both the linker files for GCC and ARMCLANG are changed.
IPC had been developed and tested on both the GCC and ARMLANG already.
Thanks for your question.
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 3:35 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hello,
I have noticed, that with adding the IPC feature to master branch, it were updated GCC linker files (#ifdef TFM_PSA_API sections), but ARMCLANG linker files are without any change.
Does it mean that IPC was developed and tested only using GCC? Is there a plan to updated the armclang linker files?
Thanks,
Andrej Butok
--
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Hi Edison,
If I understand well, the Crypto, SST and Attestation services do not use IPC, so far. Right?
Should the SST/Crypto/Attestation services be disabled when IPC is enabled?
May the Library and IPC APIs be used simultaneously?
What part of TFM is using IPC?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2019 8:22 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
We tested the IPC works on Musca A but not try it on Musca B yet.
The current IPC related patches are used to enable IPC mechanism, but services such as crypto, protect storage and attestation are yet to make use of IPC.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 6:06 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Edison,
OK. So, according to https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr… the armclang IPC was added only to one platform (target/mps2/an521/armclang/mps2_an521_s.sct).
What about Musca A and Musca B?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:52 AM
To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
You can see the log history of master branch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust…p;reserved=0.
All the IPC patches had been existed in master branch.
You can use the master branch now, all the IPC functions had been ready for GCC and ARMCLANG.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 4:43 PM
To: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Edison,
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust… master head the latest commit is still 4-day old (4 days Core: Retrieve extra parameter from correct positionHEADmaster Summer Qin).
Should I wait some time till it will be propagated to the public git?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:26 AM
To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
You are welcome.
Now, the "feature-ipc" branch had been merge into the master branch with the merge patch mentioned below. So all the patches in "feature-ipc" branch had been merge into master too. You can find the related IPC patch in the log history of master branch.
The IPC can works rightly in GCC and ARMCLANG on master branch.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 4:10 PM
To: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Thanks Adison,
Yes, we are using the master branch.
When are you planning to merge the mentioned fix to the mainline?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:00 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
I think you mention the "Merge remote-tracking branch 'feature-ipc' into 'master" patch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…p;reserved=0.
This is a merge patch to fix the merge conflicts. The original patch to support to change the linker file is here: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…p;reserved=0. You can see both the linker files for GCC and ARMCLANG are changed.
IPC had been developed and tested on both the GCC and ARMLANG already.
Thanks for your question.
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 3:35 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hello,
I have noticed, that with adding the IPC feature to master branch, it were updated GCC linker files (#ifdef TFM_PSA_API sections), but ARMCLANG linker files are without any change.
Does it mean that IPC was developed and tested only using GCC? Is there a plan to updated the armclang linker files?
Thanks,
Andrej Butok
--
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https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru…
--
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--
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Hi,
The patch for applying Jinja2 to generate custom code has been merged into branch 'master'.
With these two patches, scatter loader template are also supported.
IMPORTANT: Please install Jinja2 before using this feature.
You can check ' docs/user_guides/tfm_sw_requirement.md' for installation.
Thanks.
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)
> Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 7:09 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: RE: Replace custom code generating scripts with Jinja2
>
> Hi,
> I saw there is no concern raised about applying Jinja2 into TF-M project, and
> some code review is done on these patches.
> Plan to merge it at end of Mar 19th, if you have something please just shout 😉
>
> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/507/
> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/509/
>
> Thanks
>
> -Ken
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken
> > Liu (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> > Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2019 2:18 PM
> > To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> > Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> > Subject: Re: [Tf-m] Replace custom code generating scripts with Jinja2
> >
> > Hi Mate,
> > I have checked your change and the document, it looks quite easy to
> > support conditional including.
> > I am OK for this tool.
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> > -Ken
> >
> > From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) <Ken.Liu(a)arm.com>
> > Sent: Monday, January 21, 2019 9:35 PM
> > To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> > Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> > Subject: Re: Replace custom code generating scripts with Jinja2
> >
> >
> > Hi Mate,
> >
> > Thanks for the proposal. It looks nice.
> >
> > I have read the "Improvements over the current solution" part and I
> > think the "More advanced functionality" is the point I am interested
> > in. There are some necessary jobs to be done in the code generating
> > scripts for IPC; hope using this tool could help on that. One thing we are
> investigating is:
> >
> > * We need to put PSA RoT and APP RoT into different groups in linker script;
> > current tool just put all partitions together and ignores partition type.
> >
> >
> >
> > Can you help to check if the new tool could make this change easier?
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> >
> > -Ken
> >
> > ________________________________
> > From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-
> > bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Mate Toth-Pal via
> > TF-M <tf-
> > m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
> > Sent: Monday, January 21, 2019 8:37:58 PM
> > To:
> > tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> > Cc: nd
> > Subject: [Tf-m] Replace custom code generating scripts with Jinja2
> >
> > Hi All,
> >
> > Based on the design proposal published here:
> > https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/code_generation_wi
> > th_j inja2/ I am planning to replace the code generation tool
> > currently used in the TF- M with the Jinja2 template engine.
> >
> > I already prepared the change that implements this. It is available
> > for review and testing in this gerrit review:
> > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-
> > firmware-m/+/507/
> >
> > Please note, that this introduces a new tool dependency: jinja2 v2.10
> > python library have to be installed to generate code from the
> > partition manifests. Earlier than 2.10 versions won't work, as one of
> > the templates relies on the namespace feature introduced in this version.
> >
> > Based on this change I also would like to make the secure sct files
> > automatically generated (just like the secure ld files). The gerrit review for this
> change is here:
> > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/509/
> >
> > Should you have any questions, suggestions, objections, please do not
> > hesitate to contact!
> >
> > Thanks,
> > Mate
> > --
> > TF-M mailing list
> > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
> > --
> > TF-M mailing list
> > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Hi Andrej,
We tested the IPC works on Musca A but not try it on Musca B yet.
The current IPC related patches are used to enable IPC mechanism, but services such as crypto, protect storage and attestation are yet to make use of IPC.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 6:06 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Edison,
OK. So, according to https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/463/ the armclang IPC was added only to one platform (target/mps2/an521/armclang/mps2_an521_s.sct).
What about Musca A and Musca B?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:52 AM
To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
You can see the log history of master branch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust…p;reserved=0.
All the IPC patches had been existed in master branch.
You can use the master branch now, all the IPC functions had been ready for GCC and ARMCLANG.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 4:43 PM
To: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Edison,
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust… master head the latest commit is still 4-day old (4 days Core: Retrieve extra parameter from correct positionHEADmaster Summer Qin).
Should I wait some time till it will be propagated to the public git?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:26 AM
To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
You are welcome.
Now, the "feature-ipc" branch had been merge into the master branch with the merge patch mentioned below. So all the patches in "feature-ipc" branch had been merge into master too. You can find the related IPC patch in the log history of master branch.
The IPC can works rightly in GCC and ARMCLANG on master branch.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 4:10 PM
To: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Thanks Adison,
Yes, we are using the master branch.
When are you planning to merge the mentioned fix to the mainline?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:00 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
I think you mention the "Merge remote-tracking branch 'feature-ipc' into 'master" patch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…p;reserved=0.
This is a merge patch to fix the merge conflicts. The original patch to support to change the linker file is here: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…p;reserved=0. You can see both the linker files for GCC and ARMCLANG are changed.
IPC had been developed and tested on both the GCC and ARMLANG already.
Thanks for your question.
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 3:35 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hello,
I have noticed, that with adding the IPC feature to master branch, it were updated GCC linker files (#ifdef TFM_PSA_API sections), but ARMCLANG linker files are without any change.
Does it mean that IPC was developed and tested only using GCC? Is there a plan to updated the armclang linker files?
Thanks,
Andrej Butok
--
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TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru…
--
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--
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https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Hi,
I saw there is no concern raised about applying Jinja2 into TF-M project, and some code review is done on these patches.
Plan to merge it at end of Mar 19th, if you have something please just shout 😉
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/507/https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/509/
Thanks
-Ken
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu
> (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
> Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2019 2:18 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: [Tf-m] Replace custom code generating scripts with Jinja2
>
> Hi Mate,
> I have checked your change and the document, it looks quite easy to support
> conditional including.
> I am OK for this tool.
>
> Thanks.
>
> -Ken
>
> From: Ken Liu (Arm Technology China) <Ken.Liu(a)arm.com>
> Sent: Monday, January 21, 2019 9:35 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
> Subject: Re: Replace custom code generating scripts with Jinja2
>
>
> Hi Mate,
>
> Thanks for the proposal. It looks nice.
>
> I have read the "Improvements over the current solution" part and I think the
> "More advanced functionality" is the point I am interested in. There are some
> necessary jobs to be done in the code generating scripts for IPC; hope using this
> tool could help on that. One thing we are investigating is:
>
> * We need to put PSA RoT and APP RoT into different groups in linker script;
> current tool just put all partitions together and ignores partition type.
>
>
>
> Can you help to check if the new tool could make this change easier?
>
>
>
> Thanks.
>
>
> -Ken
>
> ________________________________
> From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-
> bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Mate Toth-Pal via TF-M <tf-
> m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
> Sent: Monday, January 21, 2019 8:37:58 PM
> To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> Cc: nd
> Subject: [Tf-m] Replace custom code generating scripts with Jinja2
>
> Hi All,
>
> Based on the design proposal published here:
> https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/code_generation_with_j
> inja2/ I am planning to replace the code generation tool currently used in the TF-
> M with the Jinja2 template engine.
>
> I already prepared the change that implements this. It is available for review and
> testing in this gerrit review: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-
> firmware-m/+/507/
>
> Please note, that this introduces a new tool dependency: jinja2 v2.10 python
> library have to be installed to generate code from the partition manifests. Earlier
> than 2.10 versions won't work, as one of the templates relies on the namespace
> feature introduced in this version.
>
> Based on this change I also would like to make the secure sct files automatically
> generated (just like the secure ld files). The gerrit review for this change is here:
> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/509/
>
> Should you have any questions, suggestions, objections, please do not hesitate
> to contact!
>
> Thanks,
> Mate
> --
> TF-M mailing list
> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
> --
> TF-M mailing list
> TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Hi Edison,
OK. So, according to https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/463/ the armclang IPC was added only to one platform (target/mps2/an521/armclang/mps2_an521_s.sct).
What about Musca A and Musca B?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:52 AM
To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
You can see the log history of master branch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust…p;reserved=0.
All the IPC patches had been existed in master branch.
You can use the master branch now, all the IPC functions had been ready for GCC and ARMCLANG.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 4:43 PM
To: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Edison,
https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgit.trust… master head the latest commit is still 4-day old (4 days Core: Retrieve extra parameter from correct positionHEADmaster Summer Qin).
Should I wait some time till it will be propagated to the public git?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:26 AM
To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
You are welcome.
Now, the "feature-ipc" branch had been merge into the master branch with the merge patch mentioned below. So all the patches in "feature-ipc" branch had been merge into master too. You can find the related IPC patch in the log history of master branch.
The IPC can works rightly in GCC and ARMCLANG on master branch.
Thanks,
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 4:10 PM
To: Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) <Edison.Ai(a)arm.com>
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: RE: IPC and clang
Thanks Adison,
Yes, we are using the master branch.
When are you planning to merge the mentioned fix to the mainline?
Thanks,
Andrej
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edison Ai (Arm Technology China) via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 9:00 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hi Andrej,
I think you mention the "Merge remote-tracking branch 'feature-ipc' into 'master" patch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…p;reserved=0.
This is a merge patch to fix the merge conflicts. The original patch to support to change the linker file is here: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Freview.tr…p;reserved=0. You can see both the linker files for GCC and ARMCLANG are changed.
IPC had been developed and tested on both the GCC and ARMLANG already.
Thanks for your question.
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 3:35 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hello,
I have noticed, that with adding the IPC feature to master branch, it were updated GCC linker files (#ifdef TFM_PSA_API sections), but ARMCLANG linker files are without any change.
Does it mean that IPC was developed and tested only using GCC? Is there a plan to updated the armclang linker files?
Thanks,
Andrej Butok
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Hi Andrej,
I think you mention the "Merge remote-tracking branch 'feature-ipc' into 'master" patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/677/-1..2.
This is a merge patch to fix the merge conflicts. The original patch to support to change the linker file is here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/463/. You can see both the linker files for GCC and ARMCLANG are changed.
IPC had been developed and tested on both the GCC and ARMLANG already.
Thanks for your question.
Edison
-----Original Message-----
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 3:35 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] IPC and clang
Hello,
I have noticed, that with adding the IPC feature to master branch, it were updated GCC linker files (#ifdef TFM_PSA_API sections), but ARMCLANG linker files are without any change.
Does it mean that IPC was developed and tested only using GCC? Is there a plan to updated the armclang linker files?
Thanks,
Andrej Butok
--
TF-M mailing list
TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Hello,
I have noticed, that with adding the IPC feature to master branch, it were updated GCC linker files (#ifdef TFM_PSA_API sections), but ARMCLANG linker files are without any change.
Does it mean that IPC was developed and tested only using GCC? Is there a plan to updated the armclang linker files?
Thanks,
Andrej Butok
On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 06:51:04PM +0000, Christopher Brand via TF-M wrote:
>I've posted a design document for bootloader changes to support twin
>cpu at
>https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/twin-cpu/bootloader/
There are efforts underway to get the TF-M changes to the bootloader
contributed back to the upstream MCUboot project.
We should be trying to make sure that we continue this effort, as well
as to make sure that any efforts to extend the bootloader are done
upstream, and not in the TF-M-specific branch.
Are you expecting to be running the non-secure CPU before the secure
CPU has finished verifying the images?
David