- TF-M - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Andrej Butok

Hi Antonio, > For the newer API version, the psa-arch-test team will provide a new tag on the master branch in the coming days (this is still not available yet). Please ping me when this tag will appear. Thank you, Andrej -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Antonio De Angelis via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, May 28, 2019 2:19 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hi Andrej, please find my replies inline in red. ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 28 May 2019 07:38 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hi Antonio, > TF-M Crypto has moved to use the same API as the latest available *release* of Mbed Crypto which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 If to follow the latest development branch of Mbed-Crypto, actually it has started using of "handles" instead of "slots" (the obsolete version is using handles). So by using the old mbed-Crypto release, you have downgraded the Crypto API. [Antonio] Not sure exactly what you mean here. This is the latest Crypto API header used in the development branch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co… And it uses handles instead of slots as I have explained earlier, handles being a newer concept. Also, please bear in mind that the PSA Crypto API development happens on this branch: https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co… , Mbed Crypto being a reference implementation of the API, which means that the API itself can have new concepts which are not part of the reference implementation yet. Please use the latest available mbed-Crypto (do not afraid - it is functional, checked) and avoid this created mess and desynchronization between all PSA related projects. [Antonio] TF-M Crypto service is indeed aligned to latest available release of Mbed Crypto, which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 (dated 1st April 2019): https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co… As soon as there will be new releases, TF-M Crypto will align to those. The TF-M Crypto service is not aligned to the development branch because, as mentioned, that branch undergoes active daily development and would be too difficult to track. > The psa-arch-test team is in the process of providing an update on the master branch The master branch, as was declared by PSA Test Suite team, is not used for PSA Functional API certification. Instead, as was declared by PSA Test Suite team, it have to be used the ew_beta0 branch. Please clarify what PSA-TestSuite branch must be used with TFM now? [Antonio] The ew_beta0 branch was used as a temporary milestone which was using the old 0.1.0beta API. For the newer API version, the psa-arch-test team will provide a new tag on the master branch in the coming days (this is still not available yet). Best regards, Antonio Thanks, Andrej -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Antonio De Angelis via TF-M Sent: Monday, May 27, 2019 6:22 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hi Andrej, TF-M Crypto has moved to use the same API as the latest available *release* of Mbed Crypto which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 . Mbed Crypto is a reference implementation of the PSA Crypto API, which are under active development. TF-M Crypto will align to newest release of Mbed Crypto when they will become available; these new releases will incorporate the new features which are developed as part of the PSA Crypto API, and there will be cases where the new features will break legacy code (i.e. API changes). Regarding the change that you mention, i.e. psa_key_slot_t vs psa_key_handle_t . The concept of psa_key_handle_t that TF-M Crypto is using now is indeed a newer (updated) concept introduced with later versions of the PSA Crypto API to replace the outdated concept of psa_key_slot_t. For example, if you look at the current latest development version of the PSA Crypto API, you will see that psa_key_handle_t is used to handle keys. This is an example of a breaking change in the API that has been introduced by newer releases of the PSA Crypto API. You are right, this change will break regression / PSA API compliance tests, in fact as part of the latest set of patches you can see that the Regression tests are upgraded to use the new concept of psa_key_handle_t instead of psa_key_slot_t. From these updated tests, you can get an idea of how to use the psa_key_handle_t. After this update, TF-M Crypto can't support the PSA API compliance tests (ACK) which were run previously (i.e. the ew_beta0 branch). The psa-arch-test team is in the process of providing an update on the master branch which will enable TF-M Crypto to run compliance tests from there. This should happen in the next couple of weeks. Please let me know in case you need any more clarification. Best regards, Antonio ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 27 May 2019 12:52 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hello, tfm_build_instruction.rst tells to use mbed-Crypto instead of mbedTLS: git clone https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co… -b mbedcrypto-1.0<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co…>.0 But the issue is that it references to the obsolete (3 month old) Mbed-Crypto library. Also, it looks like this old MbedCrypto has downgraded TFM/PSA Crypto API (from key-slot to key-handle) => this is step back in PSA TFM API, which should break crypto regression and PSA tests. We do not want to downgrade our SDK MbedCrypto, better to freeze TFM. Any plans to use the last Crypto Lib and to revert the PSA API degradation? Thanks, Andrej Butok -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru… -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru… -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru… -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru…

6 years, 5 months

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Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library?

by Antonio De Angelis

Hi Andrej, please find my replies inline in red. ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 28 May 2019 07:38 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hi Antonio, > TF-M Crypto has moved to use the same API as the latest available *release* of Mbed Crypto which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 If to follow the latest development branch of Mbed-Crypto, actually it has started using of "handles" instead of "slots" (the obsolete version is using handles). So by using the old mbed-Crypto release, you have downgraded the Crypto API. [Antonio] Not sure exactly what you mean here. This is the latest Crypto API header used in the development branch: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/blob/development/include/psa/crypto.h And it uses handles instead of slots as I have explained earlier, handles being a newer concept. Also, please bear in mind that the PSA Crypto API development happens on this branch: https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/tree/psa-api-1.0-beta , Mbed Crypto being a reference implementation of the API, which means that the API itself can have new concepts which are not part of the reference implementation yet. Please use the latest available mbed-Crypto (do not afraid - it is functional, checked) and avoid this created mess and desynchronization between all PSA related projects. [Antonio] TF-M Crypto service is indeed aligned to latest available release of Mbed Crypto, which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 (dated 1st April 2019): https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto/releases As soon as there will be new releases, TF-M Crypto will align to those. The TF-M Crypto service is not aligned to the development branch because, as mentioned, that branch undergoes active daily development and would be too difficult to track. > The psa-arch-test team is in the process of providing an update on the master branch The master branch, as was declared by PSA Test Suite team, is not used for PSA Functional API certification. Instead, as was declared by PSA Test Suite team, it have to be used the ew_beta0 branch. Please clarify what PSA-TestSuite branch must be used with TFM now? [Antonio] The ew_beta0 branch was used as a temporary milestone which was using the old 0.1.0beta API. For the newer API version, the psa-arch-test team will provide a new tag on the master branch in the coming days (this is still not available yet). Best regards, Antonio Thanks, Andrej -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Antonio De Angelis via TF-M Sent: Monday, May 27, 2019 6:22 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hi Andrej, TF-M Crypto has moved to use the same API as the latest available *release* of Mbed Crypto which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 . Mbed Crypto is a reference implementation of the PSA Crypto API, which are under active development. TF-M Crypto will align to newest release of Mbed Crypto when they will become available; these new releases will incorporate the new features which are developed as part of the PSA Crypto API, and there will be cases where the new features will break legacy code (i.e. API changes). Regarding the change that you mention, i.e. psa_key_slot_t vs psa_key_handle_t . The concept of psa_key_handle_t that TF-M Crypto is using now is indeed a newer (updated) concept introduced with later versions of the PSA Crypto API to replace the outdated concept of psa_key_slot_t. For example, if you look at the current latest development version of the PSA Crypto API, you will see that psa_key_handle_t is used to handle keys. This is an example of a breaking change in the API that has been introduced by newer releases of the PSA Crypto API. You are right, this change will break regression / PSA API compliance tests, in fact as part of the latest set of patches you can see that the Regression tests are upgraded to use the new concept of psa_key_handle_t instead of psa_key_slot_t. From these updated tests, you can get an idea of how to use the psa_key_handle_t. After this update, TF-M Crypto can't support the PSA API compliance tests (ACK) which were run previously (i.e. the ew_beta0 branch). The psa-arch-test team is in the process of providing an update on the master branch which will enable TF-M Crypto to run compliance tests from there. This should happen in the next couple of weeks. Please let me know in case you need any more clarification. Best regards, Antonio ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 27 May 2019 12:52 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hello, tfm_build_instruction.rst tells to use mbed-Crypto instead of mbedTLS: git clone https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co… -b mbedcrypto-1.0<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co…>.0 But the issue is that it references to the obsolete (3 month old) Mbed-Crypto library. Also, it looks like this old MbedCrypto has downgraded TFM/PSA Crypto API (from key-slot to key-handle) => this is step back in PSA TFM API, which should break crypto regression and PSA tests. We do not want to downgrade our SDK MbedCrypto, better to freeze TFM. Any plans to use the last Crypto Lib and to revert the PSA API degradation? Thanks, Andrej Butok -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru… -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru… -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 5 months

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Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library?

by Andrej Butok

Hi Antonio, > TF-M Crypto has moved to use the same API as the latest available *release* of Mbed Crypto which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 If to follow the latest development branch of Mbed-Crypto, actually it has started using of "handles" instead of "slots" (the obsolete version is using handles). So by using the old mbed-Crypto release, you have downgraded the Crypto API. Please use the latest available mbed-Crypto (do not afraid - it is functional, checked) and avoid this created mess and desynchronization between all PSA related projects. > The psa-arch-test team is in the process of providing an update on the master branch The master branch, as was declared by PSA Test Suite team, is not used for PSA Functional API certification. Instead, as was declared by PSA Test Suite team, it have to be used the ew_beta0 branch. Please clarify what PSA-TestSuite branch must be used with TFM now? Thanks, Andrej -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Antonio De Angelis via TF-M Sent: Monday, May 27, 2019 6:22 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hi Andrej, TF-M Crypto has moved to use the same API as the latest available *release* of Mbed Crypto which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 . Mbed Crypto is a reference implementation of the PSA Crypto API, which are under active development. TF-M Crypto will align to newest release of Mbed Crypto when they will become available; these new releases will incorporate the new features which are developed as part of the PSA Crypto API, and there will be cases where the new features will break legacy code (i.e. API changes). Regarding the change that you mention, i.e. psa_key_slot_t vs psa_key_handle_t . The concept of psa_key_handle_t that TF-M Crypto is using now is indeed a newer (updated) concept introduced with later versions of the PSA Crypto API to replace the outdated concept of psa_key_slot_t. For example, if you look at the current latest development version of the PSA Crypto API, you will see that psa_key_handle_t is used to handle keys. This is an example of a breaking change in the API that has been introduced by newer releases of the PSA Crypto API. You are right, this change will break regression / PSA API compliance tests, in fact as part of the latest set of patches you can see that the Regression tests are upgraded to use the new concept of psa_key_handle_t instead of psa_key_slot_t. From these updated tests, you can get an idea of how to use the psa_key_handle_t. After this update, TF-M Crypto can't support the PSA API compliance tests (ACK) which were run previously (i.e. the ew_beta0 branch). The psa-arch-test team is in the process of providing an update on the master branch which will enable TF-M Crypto to run compliance tests from there. This should happen in the next couple of weeks. Please let me know in case you need any more clarification. Best regards, Antonio ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 27 May 2019 12:52 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hello, tfm_build_instruction.rst tells to use mbed-Crypto instead of mbedTLS: git clone https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co… -b mbedcrypto-1.0<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co…>.0 But the issue is that it references to the obsolete (3 month old) Mbed-Crypto library. Also, it looks like this old MbedCrypto has downgraded TFM/PSA Crypto API (from key-slot to key-handle) => this is step back in PSA TFM API, which should break crypto regression and PSA tests. We do not want to downgrade our SDK MbedCrypto, better to freeze TFM. Any plans to use the last Crypto Lib and to revert the PSA API degradation? Thanks, Andrej Butok -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru… -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru…

6 years, 5 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library?

by Antonio De Angelis

Hi Andrej, TF-M Crypto has moved to use the same API as the latest available *release* of Mbed Crypto which is Mbed Crypto 1.0.0 . Mbed Crypto is a reference implementation of the PSA Crypto API, which are under active development. TF-M Crypto will align to newest release of Mbed Crypto when they will become available; these new releases will incorporate the new features which are developed as part of the PSA Crypto API, and there will be cases where the new features will break legacy code (i.e. API changes). Regarding the change that you mention, i.e. psa_key_slot_t vs psa_key_handle_t . The concept of psa_key_handle_t that TF-M Crypto is using now is indeed a newer (updated) concept introduced with later versions of the PSA Crypto API to replace the outdated concept of psa_key_slot_t. For example, if you look at the current latest development version of the PSA Crypto API, you will see that psa_key_handle_t is used to handle keys. This is an example of a breaking change in the API that has been introduced by newer releases of the PSA Crypto API. You are right, this change will break regression / PSA API compliance tests, in fact as part of the latest set of patches you can see that the Regression tests are upgraded to use the new concept of psa_key_handle_t instead of psa_key_slot_t. From these updated tests, you can get an idea of how to use the psa_key_handle_t. After this update, TF-M Crypto can't support the PSA API compliance tests (ACK) which were run previously (i.e. the ew_beta0 branch). The psa-arch-test team is in the process of providing an update on the master branch which will enable TF-M Crypto to run compliance tests from there. This should happen in the next couple of weeks. Please let me know in case you need any more clarification. Best regards, Antonio ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 27 May 2019 12:52 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Old Mbed-Crypto library? Hello, tfm_build_instruction.rst tells to use mbed-Crypto instead of mbedTLS: git clone https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto.git -b mbedcrypto-1.0<https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto.git%20-b%20mbedcrypto-1.0>.0 But the issue is that it references to the obsolete (3 month old) Mbed-Crypto library. Also, it looks like this old MbedCrypto has downgraded TFM/PSA Crypto API (from key-slot to key-handle) => this is step back in PSA TFM API, which should break crypto regression and PSA tests. We do not want to downgrade our SDK MbedCrypto, better to freeze TFM. Any plans to use the last Crypto Lib and to revert the PSA API degradation? Thanks, Andrej Butok -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 5 months

1
0
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Old Mbed-Crypto library?

by Andrej Butok

Hello, tfm_build_instruction.rst tells to use mbed-Crypto instead of mbedTLS: git clone https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto.git -b mbedcrypto-1.0<https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbed-crypto.git%20-b%20mbedcrypto-1.0>.0 But the issue is that it references to the obsolete (3 month old) Mbed-Crypto library. Also, it looks like this old MbedCrypto has downgraded TFM/PSA Crypto API (from key-slot to key-handle) => this is step back in PSA TFM API, which should break crypto regression and PSA tests. We do not want to downgrade our SDK MbedCrypto, better to freeze TFM. Any plans to use the last Crypto Lib and to revert the PSA API degradation? Thanks, Andrej Butok

6 years, 5 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Trusted boot - rollback protection

by David Brown

On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 01:43:19PM +0000, Tamas Ban via TF-M wrote: >Please see the following link for a design proposal on anti-rollback protection in trusted boot: > >https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/trusted_boot/rollback_p… Somewhat related, as I've been working through a prototype implementation of SUIT, the SUIT manifest also wants what they call a "sequence number", which is a monotonically increasing number associated with each version. They've kind of decided they don't want to have to do anything like semantic version parsing as part of the firmware upgrade. I think this sequence number serves the same purpose as this security counter (except that the sequence number is required to increase with each software relase). One of the goals of the MCUboot community is to make sure that however the SUIT manifest is implemented, it must be semantically the same as the existing TLV-format manifest. An easy solution is to just treat the existing version as a 32-bit number (ignoring the build-id, which I think is supposed to be the case, anyway). As far as the possibility of re-using the same security counter value, I don't think that is something that should be done. In general, it isn't possible to know where security bugs will be found in an image. If we always increase the security counter value, someone still running the immediately following image will be prevented from rolling back to the version with the security flaw, whereas if we reused the values, it might be necessary to try to force them to upgrade to a new version that has the counter increased. Also, I think it is important to clarify that the security counter is not required for anti-rollback, it only protects the anti-rollback implementation from a specific threat: something that is able to replace the primary firmware image outside of the control of the bootloader. The cost is that implementing a security counter generally requires specific hardware just for that purpose. An entirely software anti-rollback protects against other threats, including the common case of using the ordinary firmware upgrade process. David

6 years, 5 months

2
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Re: [TF-M] TFM and FreeRTOS

by Andrej Butok

Hello, So, the RTX was replaced by FreeRTOS (regression and psa-tests passed). Required changes: 1) Use CMSIS-FreeRTOS adapter from: https://github.com/ARM-software/CMSIS-FreeRTOS 2) Do not call os_wrapper_join_thread()/osThreadJoin() and do not use osThreadJoinable flag. It is not supported by FreeRTOS 3) Add missing osThreadExit(). 4) Add osDelay(1) to tfm_sst_run_test(), as FreeRTOS free some allocated resources only in the idle task. 5) Disable TFM_NS_CLIENT_IDENTIFICATION to avoid SVC conflict. 5) Other minor changes. Proposals for general TFM code: 1) Delete os_wrapper_join_thread()/osThreadJoin() as it is optional. It works without it and not supported by all RTOSes. 2) Add missing osThreadExit() to test_task_runner(). 3) Do not call each SST test in separate task, or to allow switching to idle task after each SST test. 4) Find other TFM_NS_CLIENT_IDENTIFICATION mechanism, which will not use SVC. Thanks, Andrej Butok -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: Friday, May 3, 2019 9:36 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] [EXT] Re: TFM and FreeRTOS Hello, So, even if the unique User ID is optional, it is mandatory for the case when different NS users must have different security asset policies for SST resources. Is it possible to find another mechanism for the user ID assignment which does not use SVC? To avoid unwanted limitation for FreeRTOS and any other NS application using SVC. Thanks, Andrej -----Original Message----- From: Miklos Balint <Miklos.Balint(a)arm.com> Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2019 5:19 PM To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: [TF-M] [EXT] Re: TFM and FreeRTOS Caution: EXT Email Hi Andrej, Your interpretation is correct: if NS client identification is disabled, all non-secure threads are assigned the default non-secure client id (-1). That means that secure services cannot differentiate between various non-secure threads, i.e. they would all be provided the same access policies when requesting secure services. This is in line with PSA Firmware Framework. As described in chapter 3.3.3 of PSA FF 1.0 beta Release 0, "In implementations where NSPE client_id values are provided by the SPM, the same negative client_id must be used for all connections." Note that according to that specification each connection and message would still have their own unique handles - see chapter 3.3.4. Note also that this does not impact the client ID assignments for secure partitions, so any service would be able to identify if it was called by a non-secure entity or a secure one, and if a secure one, then which one. Let me know if you need further assistance in this matter. Regards Miklos -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 25 April 2019 12:47 To: David Hu (Arm Technology China) <David.Hu(a)arm.com> Cc: TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] [EXT] Re: TFM and FreeRTOS Hi David, OK. We may try to limit FreeRTOS to the case when it starts and runs only in non-secure world and its tasks will call secure world only via PSA/TFM API. In this case, if I understand well, to avoid conflict for non-secure SVC, it is enough to disable TFM_NS_CLIENT_IDENTIFICATION. It means that all user tasks will be assigned to the default user id = DEFAULT_NS_CLIENT_ID. What does it mean? How does it limits the functionality? Is it OK from PSA point of view? Thanks, Andrej -----Original Message----- From: David Hu (Arm Technology China) <David.Hu(a)arm.com> Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2019 11:26 AM To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [EXT] Re: [TF-M] TFM and FreeRTOS Caution: EXT Email Hi Andrej, I guess that you may ask about the SVCalls communication between secure world and non-secure world in FreeRTOS. If I misunderstood your question, please ignore the following. In my very own opinion, FreeRTOS has a different concept of how to manage secure stack/context from TF-M does. FreeRTOS prefers to allocate and manage a dedicated secure stack/context for each non-secure task requiring secure service. In its implementation, each time when it does context switch, it invokes SVCalls to also switch the secure stack/context for the next non-secure task. FreeRTOS implements several own APIs to accomplish those functionalities. By contrast, TF-M as a trusted firmware, naturally, manages all the secure resource by its own. Therefore, there is no such dedicated stack in secure world mapping to each non-secure task. Currently, TF-M implements CMSIS RTOS thread context management APIs to execute some management work between non-secure world and secure world, on Armv8-M core. Hope it can hlep you. Best regards, Hu Ziji On 4/25/2019 3:45 PM, Andrej Butok via TF-M wrote: > Hello, > > Do you know about any existing port of FreeRTOS (instead of RTX) to TFM? Did somebody a feasibility study? > I have just started to look at it, and immediately detected a conflict, both are using Supervisor Calls (SVC) for own needs. > > Thanks, > Andrej > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru… -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Flists.tru…

6 years, 5 months

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Fixing implicit casting of C enumeration in TF-M: design document

by Hugues De Valon

Hi All, Please find under the following link: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/1040 the review of a design document which aim is to fix the implicit casting happening with enumerations in TF-M. Feel free to add any comments you want on the review! Kind regards, Hugues IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 5 months

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TF-M Crypto service design document

by Antonio De Angelis

Hi all, I have uploaded the design document for the TF-M Crypto service at the following Gerrit code review in RST format: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/1023 It can be possible to render the HTML format of the design document by checking out the patch above and build the docs (in particular, by building the install_userguide target) Comments are welcome, here in this thread or preferably in the Gerrit review for better tracking. Thanks, Antonio

6 years, 5 months

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SST 512B write support?

by Andrej Butok

Hello, Current TFM SST service supports 1, 2, 4 and 8 Byte minimum write. Do you have any plan to add the 512 Byte minimal write support to the TFM SST? LPC55S69 Flash has the 512Bytes program size. Guess, all flash modules with ECC has the same requirement. Thanks, Andrej Butok

6 years, 5 months

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Update to contribution guide

by Ashutosh Singh

Hi, Contribution guide has been updated to reflect current way of working. More details have been added to clarify the steps. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/1007/ Feedback welcome and appreciated! Thanks, Ashu

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [TF-M] FW: Trusted boot - rollback protection

by David Brown

On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 02:52:56PM +0000, Tamas Ban via TF-M wrote: >Actually the design doc propose to use a distinct security counter from image version (ih_ver in header). But in the most simple case this security counter can be derived from the image version, to have the exact same value (ignoring the build number). > >The image signature cover these continues blocks in memory: >- image header >- image >- some part of TLV section (currently not covered, but due to multi image support it is planned to introduce a signed TLV section) > >Because these are contiguous regions in the memory it is not possible >to place only the (header + TLV section) to the trusted memory but >miss out the image itself (at least I cannot see how to solve) Could the trusted memory contain a version field, and perhaps a hash of the image? David

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [TF-M] [EXT] Re: TFM and FreeRTOS

by Miklos Balint

Hi Andrej, Your interpretation is correct: if NS client identification is disabled, all non-secure threads are assigned the default non-secure client id (-1). That means that secure services cannot differentiate between various non-secure threads, i.e. they would all be provided the same access policies when requesting secure services. This is in line with PSA Firmware Framework. As described in chapter 3.3.3 of PSA FF 1.0 beta Release 0, "In implementations where NSPE client_id values are provided by the SPM, the same negative client_id must be used for all connections." Note that according to that specification each connection and message would still have their own unique handles - see chapter 3.3.4. Note also that this does not impact the client ID assignments for secure partitions, so any service would be able to identify if it was called by a non-secure entity or a secure one, and if a secure one, then which one. Let me know if you need further assistance in this matter. Regards Miklos -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 25 April 2019 12:47 To: David Hu (Arm Technology China) <David.Hu(a)arm.com> Cc: TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] [EXT] Re: TFM and FreeRTOS Hi David, OK. We may try to limit FreeRTOS to the case when it starts and runs only in non-secure world and its tasks will call secure world only via PSA/TFM API. In this case, if I understand well, to avoid conflict for non-secure SVC, it is enough to disable TFM_NS_CLIENT_IDENTIFICATION. It means that all user tasks will be assigned to the default user id = DEFAULT_NS_CLIENT_ID. What does it mean? How does it limits the functionality? Is it OK from PSA point of view? Thanks, Andrej -----Original Message----- From: David Hu (Arm Technology China) <David.Hu(a)arm.com> Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2019 11:26 AM To: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [EXT] Re: [TF-M] TFM and FreeRTOS Caution: EXT Email Hi Andrej, I guess that you may ask about the SVCalls communication between secure world and non-secure world in FreeRTOS. If I misunderstood your question, please ignore the following. In my very own opinion, FreeRTOS has a different concept of how to manage secure stack/context from TF-M does. FreeRTOS prefers to allocate and manage a dedicated secure stack/context for each non-secure task requiring secure service. In its implementation, each time when it does context switch, it invokes SVCalls to also switch the secure stack/context for the next non-secure task. FreeRTOS implements several own APIs to accomplish those functionalities. By contrast, TF-M as a trusted firmware, naturally, manages all the secure resource by its own. Therefore, there is no such dedicated stack in secure world mapping to each non-secure task. Currently, TF-M implements CMSIS RTOS thread context management APIs to execute some management work between non-secure world and secure world, on Armv8-M core. Hope it can hlep you. Best regards, Hu Ziji On 4/25/2019 3:45 PM, Andrej Butok via TF-M wrote: > Hello, > > Do you know about any existing port of FreeRTOS (instead of RTX) to TFM? Did somebody a feasibility study? > I have just started to look at it, and immediately detected a conflict, both are using Supervisor Calls (SVC) for own needs. > > Thanks, > Andrej > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [TF-M] Avoid osThreadJoin()

by Jamie Fox

Hi Andrej, The idea of the OS wrapper layer is to abstract the underlying OS, so that the test app can use generic wrapper APIs, which are implemented using OS-specific APIs. In os_wrapper_rtx.c, we provide an example implementation that targets the CMSIS-RTOS2 APIs for RTX. As osThreadJoinable is not supported by FreeRTOS, you can remove that attribute in your port, and implement os_wrapper_join_thread() as a no-op. We use semaphores for synchronisation in the test app anyway, so os_wrapper_join_thread() only needs to be implemented if threads are joinable and so need join() to be called to free up resources associated with the thread. I do think we could make the OS wrapper layer a bit more generic though. We could replace the only call to os_wrapper_join_thread() that currently exists with a call to a new function os_wrapper_delete_thread(), which is defined to release the resources associated with a thread context. For CMSIS-RTOS2 this can be empty because this happens automatically, but for other RTOS APIs there may be some delete() function that needs to be called. Let me know what you think. Best wishes, Jamie -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 02 May 2019 15:04 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Avoid osThreadJoin() Hello, The TFM test applications are using CMSIS-RTOS2 API. And this is good. But could you delete os_wrapper_join_thread()and avoid using of osThreadJoin(). If I understand well, its support by RTOS tasks is optional (via osThreadJoinable flag). The problem is that the osThreadJoin() functionality is not supported by FreeRTOS (https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS-FreeRTOS/General/html/tech_data.html). It is critical obstacle. Could you tell what are you going to do with this requirement? To understand, if to continue with a FreeRTOS port. Thank you Andrej Butok -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 6 months

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Avoid osThreadJoin()

by Andrej Butok

Hello, The TFM test applications are using CMSIS-RTOS2 API. And this is good. But could you delete os_wrapper_join_thread()and avoid using of osThreadJoin(). If I understand well, its support by RTOS tasks is optional (via osThreadJoinable flag). The problem is that the osThreadJoin() functionality is not supported by FreeRTOS (https://arm-software.github.io/CMSIS-FreeRTOS/General/html/tech_data.html). It is critical obstacle. Could you tell what are you going to do with this requirement? To understand, if to continue with a FreeRTOS port. Thank you Andrej Butok

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [TF-M] NS application privilege mode

by Miklos Balint

Hi Andrej, TF-M has no requirement on NS thread execution being unprivileged, nor is it mandated by PSA. It is one of a set of measures that make non-secure thread isolation possible, reduce attack surface and provide a degree of tolerance against programming errors, but its absence does not invalidate the security measures provided by TF-M, so it is a fully valid implementation to make NSPE a single protection domain and all non-secure code execution privileged. Regards Miklos -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: 02 May 2019 14:19 To: TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] NS application privilege mode Hello, May a non-secure TFM user application stay in the privilege mode after start-up? It's needed, as some system registers are accessible only in the privilege mode. Asking, because the TFM NS Musca start-up code is switching to the unprivileged mode from very beginning: MRS R0, control ; Get control value ORR R0, R0, #1 ; Select switch to unprivilage mode ORR R0, R0, #2 ; Select switch to PSP MSR control, R0 Hope, it is not mandatory. Thanks, Andrej Butok -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 6 months

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NS application privilege mode

by Andrej Butok

Hello, May a non-secure TFM user application stay in the privilege mode after start-up? It's needed, as some system registers are accessible only in the privilege mode. Asking, because the TFM NS Musca start-up code is switching to the unprivileged mode from very beginning: MRS R0, control ; Get control value ORR R0, R0, #1 ; Select switch to unprivilage mode ORR R0, R0, #2 ; Select switch to PSP MSR control, R0 Hope, it is not mandatory. Thanks, Andrej Butok

6 years, 6 months

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TF-M Cooperative Scheduler Design - Scheduling Rules

by Ashutosh Singh

Hi, This is a proposal that introduces scheduling rules in TF-M. Introduction: On ArmV8-M CPUs, NSPE and SPE share the same physical processing element(PE). A TF-M enabled system need to be able to handle asynchronous events (interrupts) regardless of current security state of the PE; and that may lead to scheduling decisions. This introduces significant complexity into TF-M. To keep the integrity of (NSPE and SPE) schedulers and call paths between NSPE and SPE, following set of rules are imposed on the TF-M scheduler design. https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/cooperative_scheduling/ Feedback welcome! Thanks, Ashu

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [TF-M] Non-secure interrupt handling design proposal

by Mate Toth-Pal

Hi All, The parts that refer to the BASEPRI_NS register being set on return from Secure services has been removed from the document (marked with strikethrough), as the attack surfaces introduced by not doing it are mitigated by the veneer stack checking on secure function entry. Sorry for the inconvenience. Best regards, Mate -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Mate Toth-Pal via TF-M Sent: 29 April 2019 15:21 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Non-secure interrupt handling design proposal Hi All, The design proposal for the Non-secure interrupt handling is available for review at the following link: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/ns_interrupt_handling/ Please share your thoughts in this mail thread. Thank you! Best regards, Mate -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 6 months

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Non-secure interrupt handling design proposal

by Mate Toth-Pal

Hi All, The design proposal for the Non-secure interrupt handling is available for review at the following link: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_m/design/ns_interrupt_handling/ Please share your thoughts in this mail thread. Thank you! Best regards, Mate

6 years, 6 months

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The cmake response file patch

by Ken Liu (Arm Technology China)

Hi, There was a cmake response file patch to fix the linker error especially in windows: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/237 In this patch I set proper flags for linkers, but also enable response file as default, which caused some concerns about: is the response file option stable enough, will it break the build? So I created an updated one, which just set correct response file switch for linkers, and do not enable response file as default. In the case if ARMCLANG response is enabled by cmake automatically, cmake could apply correct response flag for ARMCLANG: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/925 Because they are pushed towards different branches, so a new gerrit item is generated which lost the history...The only difference with previous one is removed below line : set(CMAKE_${lang}_USE_RESPONSE_FILE_FOR_OBJECTS 1) The reason I raise this patch is because, this problem happens every time in my PC so I have to cherry-pick this patch before building anything. I had seen someone got the same issue, and want to check how you solve this. Call for volunteers to help verifying this patch (925) in your side and provide feedback to ensure it will not break the building, is there anyone could help? Just cherry-pick this patch into your environment is OK. Thanks. -Ken

6 years, 6 months

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Platform: ioctl function for platform-specific services

by Miklos Balint

Hi all, I've created a change as a follow-on from the mail discussion below to provide a design pattern proposal: IOCTL for platform-specific services. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/951/ Brief problem statement: Some platforms required services and HAL functions that were not generic to warrant their dedicated generic HAL API functions as that implied a requirement for *all* platforms to implement - essentially stub - the implementation if the functionality was not applicable to that platform. The existing solution doesn't scale so I propose to introduce a single mandatory function that serves as a platform-specific wrapper/arbiter for services that are specific to a single platform, or a family of similar platforms. Note that at present the change IS the design proposal - I felt it would make more sense to present it this time as code changes and documentation updates instead of a single linear design document. Let me know your thought in this mail thread for generic observations or on the review page for specific details of the implementation. Thanks Regards, Miklos -----Original Message----- From: Michel JAOUEN <michel.jaouen(a)st.com> Sent: 11 April 2019 17:38 To: Miklos Balint <Miklos.Balint(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: Platform: Create platform service for pin functions Hello, You should detail your proposal with single entry. It should help to implement the function really required for dedicated platform. Regards -----Original Message----- From: Miklos Balint <Miklos.Balint(a)arm.com> Sent: jeudi 11 avril 2019 17:28 To: Michel JAOUEN <michel.jaouen(a)st.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: Platform: Create platform service for pin functions Michel, I agree there is a need for a more generic design pattern for such platform-specific features. I think that there should be a single entry point for any platform specific service request to the platform/ directory and each platform should/could list the specific features it supports. Then the specific function type would be encoded in an invec to the service request. But I think a more detailed design proposal is needed with enough room for discussion before committing to a new pattern, and I'd prefer to avoid introducing platform dependencies in the services/ folder. That folder should ideally just have an indirection across HAL to a platform-specific service request arbiter. Any opinions or should I produce a more detailed proposal to show what I mean? Regards Miklos -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Michel JAOUEN via TF-M Sent: 11 April 2019 13:57 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Platform: Create platform service for pin functions I see that there is https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/825/ On review , it adds some dummy functions for the platform not requiring these services Can we think about introducing some configuration on platform basis. As example , I post https://review.trustedfirmware.org/#/c/trusted-firmware-m/+/854/ Best regards From: Michel JAOUEN Sent: mercredi 10 avril 2019 13:05 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Platform: Create platform service for pin functions Hello, I noticed the merge of this api, which seems require only for platform Musca_a. This create the need to implement dummy functions for the other platform. would it be better to make this configurable for each platform ? I think for the interface connected to platform partition, it is important to have a flexibility. As example some platform , may require an API requesting a pin to be configureable from non secure . Best regards -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M ARM GCC PSA Test 014 fail

by Jamie Fox

Hi Stanislav, Thanks for reporting the issue. As the issue seems to be in the PSA Tests rather than TF-M, please can you report it directly to the psa-arch-tests project here https://github.com/arm-software/psa-arch-tests as we in the TF-M team do not maintain that code. Best wishes, Jamie -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Stanislav Jancik via TF-M Sent: 25 April 2019 12:51 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] TF-M ARM GCC PSA Test 014 fail Hi, I use "7 2018-q2-update" ARMGCC compiler. The PSA Tests code works when it is compiled by ARMGLANG, but a fail occurs when the same code is compiled by ARMGCC. Issue: When TEST: 414 runs, I've got secure violation fault. See report bellow: TEST: 414 | DESCRIPTION: Optional APIs not supported check [Info] Executing tests from non-secure Optional PS APIs are not supported. [Check 1] Call to create API should fail as API not supported [Check 2] Create valid storage with set API [Check 3] Call to set_extended API call should fail [Check 4] Verify data is unchanged Oops... Secure fault!!! You're not going anywhere! Reason: The valtest_entry_p014 is overwritten by read_buff variable and this caused this fail. Workaround: When I changed read_buff declaration in test_p014.c from static uint8_t read_buff[TEST_BUFF_SIZE/4] = {0}; to static uint32_t read_buff[TEST_BUFF_SIZE/4] = {0}; the code is running correctly. But I think, that it should be officially fixed. Best Regards Stanislav -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

6 years, 6 months

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TF-M ARM GCC PSA Test 014 fail

by Stanislav Jancik

Hi, I use "7 2018-q2-update" ARMGCC compiler. The PSA Tests code works when it is compiled by ARMGLANG, but a fail occurs when the same code is compiled by ARMGCC. Issue: When TEST: 414 runs, I've got secure violation fault. See report bellow: TEST: 414 | DESCRIPTION: Optional APIs not supported check [Info] Executing tests from non-secure Optional PS APIs are not supported. [Check 1] Call to create API should fail as API not supported [Check 2] Create valid storage with set API [Check 3] Call to set_extended API call should fail [Check 4] Verify data is unchanged Oops... Secure fault!!! You're not going anywhere! Reason: The valtest_entry_p014 is overwritten by read_buff variable and this caused this fail. Workaround: When I changed read_buff declaration in test_p014.c from static uint8_t read_buff[TEST_BUFF_SIZE/4] = {0}; to static uint32_t read_buff[TEST_BUFF_SIZE/4] = {0}; the code is running correctly. But I think, that it should be officially fixed. Best Regards Stanislav

6 years, 6 months

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Re: [TF-M] TFM and FreeRTOS

by David Hu (Arm Technology China)

Hi Andrej, I guess that you may ask about the SVCalls communication between secure world and non-secure world in FreeRTOS. If I misunderstood your question, please ignore the following. In my very own opinion, FreeRTOS has a different concept of how to manage secure stack/context from TF-M does. FreeRTOS prefers to allocate and manage a dedicated secure stack/context for each non-secure task requiring secure service. In its implementation, each time when it does context switch, it invokes SVCalls to also switch the secure stack/context for the next non-secure task. FreeRTOS implements several own APIs to accomplish those functionalities. By contrast, TF-M as a trusted firmware, naturally, manages all the secure resource by its own. Therefore, there is no such dedicated stack in secure world mapping to each non-secure task. Currently, TF-M implements CMSIS RTOS thread context management APIs to execute some management work between non-secure world and secure world, on Armv8-M core. Hope it can hlep you. Best regards, Hu Ziji On 4/25/2019 3:45 PM, Andrej Butok via TF-M wrote: > Hello, > > Do you know about any existing port of FreeRTOS (instead of RTX) to TFM? Did somebody a feasibility study? > I have just started to look at it, and immediately detected a conflict, both are using Supervisor Calls (SVC) for own needs. > > Thanks, > Andrej > > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 6 months

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