Hi all,
I just wanted to bring to your attention that TF-M has switched<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22t_cose_upstream%22> to using the upstream t_cose library (which is used during creating and validating
attestation tokens). The main reason for this change is to remove the forked t_cose code from the TF-M repository, along with its maintenance needs
(similarly to the QCBOR library). Additionally, it will also allow us having consistent library code across all tf.org projects.
Under normal circumstances, this change should not have any impact on you – the library code is fetched automatically during build. It might happen
that you encounter CI failures in connection with this change, but you will only need to rebase your patches to align with the changes in the CI.
Best regards,
David Vincze
Hi All,
I have several questions. Thanks in advance for helping out.
1. I am trying to build a TF-M application for my platform with small profile with asymmetric signing module enabled. I tried using following command
cmake -S . -B build -G Ninja -DTFM_PLATFORM=MY/PLATFORM -DTFM_PROFILE="profile_small" -DCRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED=y.
However, the asymmetric signing module is not included. More specifically, in trusted-firmware-m/secure_fw/partitions/crypto/crypto_asymmetric.c, the #if CRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED is not true.
From what I understand, the -DCRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED=y only define the macro, but not set it to 1, therefore, the #if CRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED is not true. I am wondering if there is any way I can enable -DCRYPTO_ASYM_SIGN_MODULE_ENABLED module while still staying in small profile. I am aware that the default CRYPTO_ENGINE_BUF_SIZE might not be enough and I am willing to override it with a command line flag. Preferably, I would not want to enable asymmetric module in config.cmake as I only want to enable it for one specific application.
1. If to build with Zephyr and have TF-M as a module, is there anyway to enable asymmetric signing module given a small profile (I actually care more about this question than first question)
1. Just out of curiosity, how do you use menuconfig in TF-M. I did try -DMENUCONFIG=ON, but the compiler complains
CMake Error at config/kconfig.cmake:31 (file):
file STRINGS file
"trusted-firmware-m/config/../platform/ext/target/MY/PLATFORM/preload.cmake"
cannot be read.
Call Stack (most recent call first):
config/kconfig.cmake:174 (convert_normal_cmake_config_to_kconfig)
CMakeLists.txt:26 (include)
I thought preload.cmake is no longer required.
Thank you very much!
Best regards,
Hao
Hi,
I noticed this FIXME note in platform_sp.c. Is it still valid? If so, why does it only work with Isolation level 1? I thought system reset is typically an NVIC register write and platform SP should be able to do that.
enum tfm_platform_err_t platform_sp_system_reset(void)
{
/* FIXME: The system reset functionality is only supported in isolation
* level 1.
*/
tfm_platform_hal_system_reset();
return TFM_PLATFORM_ERR_SUCCESS;
}
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hi,
I'm doing a PoC on initial attestation for an university project using a
RP2350 board and I'm not really understanding why boot seed is stored in
OTP, shouldn't it be a value changing on each boot?
Pico SDK conveniently exposes one via a ROM function (rom_get_boot_random).
Another similar doubt I have is w.r.t. implementation id, couldn't it be
read from the board id (pico_get_unique_board_id)? Board id is factory
programmed in otp so it should actually be unique.
Best Regards,
Augusto Zanellato
Hi, is GCC 13.3 supported by the TFM build? Has anyone tried it? I see the documentation says v7.3.1+.
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
Hi Anton
Thank you for your response.
Let me break it down a bit.
1. We have several subsystems running on the non-secure side that require certain sensitive metadata to be stored in ITS.
2. Default values of ITS parameters are insufficient.
3. While building the Zephyr app with TF-M, NS-side (during build) passes these overriding values to CMake, which adds the specified preprocessor definitions to the compiler flags of TF-M, ensuring they are available during compilation.
4. Zephyr already has the harness for this flow.
This entire flow currently doesn’t work if we don’t explicitly use these preprocessors in TF-M CMake files.
Using a custom profile is not feasible for us because the overriding values are provided by the NS side based on their specific needs.
Additionally, even when we attempt to provide these parameters through the command line while building only TF-M (without NS-side), we encounter the same warning: "Manually-specified variables were not used by the project."
This warning indicates that these parameters are not being utilized in the CMake scripts (which make sense).
I guess the question would be is there a way to override these parameters from command-line, while being platform agnostic? If not, is there any specific reason we chose not to, other than this approach could potentially override the platform specific configuration, like you suggested?
We would appreciate any guidance or suggestions on how to properly handle this scenario. If needed, we can discuss this further in the next TF-M Tech forum, like you suggested.
Regards
Saurabh
On 1/24/25, 12:47 PM, "Anton Komlev via TF-M" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hi Saurabh,
If I understand you correctly, you're looking to modify the ITS_MAX_ASSET definition, which is a build-time option and cannot be changed post S-side build. Could you please explain your scenario for wanting to update it from the NS-side?
You're correct that a platform can redefine certain options which is intended behavior, allowing platforms to either override or verify these settings. For more details, you can refer to the TF-M configuration priorities here: https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/configuration/index.html… <https://trustedfirmware-m.readthedocs.io/en/latest/configuration/index.html…>.
The highest priority is the command line, which can override options even those defined in platforms. We should proceed cautiously with this approach, as there might be reasons why platforms alter the default configuration.
A recommended alternative is to create a custom profile and place all your options there, though some platforms might still overwrite them as expected.
We can discuss this further in the next TF-M Tech forum if you wish.
Hope that helps,
Anton
-----Original Message-----
From: Jain, Saurabh via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
Sent: Thursday, January 23, 2025 7:47 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-M] Inquiry on Overriding ITS Parameters in TF-M via Zephyr
Hi All,
We are developing a platform using TF-M with Zephyr running on the Non-Secure (NS) side. As part of our requirements, we need to override certain ITS-related parameters, such as ITS_MAX_ASSET, from the NS side.
Zephyr provides a mechanism for this through Kconfig.tfm under modules/trusted-firmware-m, which includes symbols like TFM_ITS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE_OVERRIDE. When enabled, these configurations are passed to the TF-M build system via TFM_CMAKE_ARGS through CMake under modules/trusted-firmware-m. However, we observe that TF-M does not seem to support external overrides for these parameters. This results in the CMake warning:
"Manually-specified variables were not used by the project."
As a result, the overrides are ignored.
Currently, we address this by explicitly checking for external definitions of ITS_MAX_ASSET in platform-specific TF-M CMake files. While this works, it is platform-specific.
We would like to confirm:
1. Is there an existing platform-independent method to achieve such overrides that we may have missed?
2. If not, would the community be open to adding support for this functionality so it can be upstreamed and benefit other platforms?
Looking forward to your input.
Best regards,
Saurabh
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Hi All,
We are developing a platform using TF-M with Zephyr running on the Non-Secure (NS) side. As part of our requirements, we need to override certain ITS-related parameters, such as ITS_MAX_ASSET, from the NS side.
Zephyr provides a mechanism for this through Kconfig.tfm under modules/trusted-firmware-m, which includes symbols like TFM_ITS_MAX_ASSET_SIZE_OVERRIDE. When enabled, these configurations are passed to the TF-M build system via TFM_CMAKE_ARGS through CMake under modules/trusted-firmware-m. However, we observe that TF-M does not seem to support external overrides for these parameters. This results in the CMake warning:
"Manually-specified variables were not used by the project."
As a result, the overrides are ignored.
Currently, we address this by explicitly checking for external definitions of ITS_MAX_ASSET in platform-specific TF-M CMake files. While this works, it is platform-specific.
We would like to confirm:
1. Is there an existing platform-independent method to achieve such overrides that we may have missed?
2. If not, would the community be open to adding support for this functionality so it can be upstreamed and benefit other platforms?
Looking forward to your input.
Best regards,
Saurabh
Hi Everyone,
During our investigation into the slow write operations of the PSA Protected Storage (PS) API, we identified that numerous (>10) flash erase calls occur when executing psa_ps_set() or psa_ps_remove(). A significant portion of these erase calls is linked to the rollback protection mechanism, specifically for updating Non-Volatile (NV) counters.
A potential improvement we are considering is to differentiate rollback protection requirements based on the type of flash memory being used.
*
For systems utilizing internal flash, we suggest possibility to disable rollback protection when encryption is enabled. This improves speed of write and remove operations and reduces the flash wear.
*
Rollback protection should be enabled when protected storage is located in external flash to ensure data integrity and security
Currently, there is a Kconfig option, CONFIG_TFM_PS_ROLLBACK_PROTECTION, to disable rollback protection. However, a build-time check requires that PS encryption is also disabled, as referenced here:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…
To better align rollback protection with the type of flash memory, there is the possibility of updating the macro rule. This could involve either removing the existing rollback protection check or adding a new rule based on the flash type, enforcing rollback protection only for external flash. While introducing a Kconfig option for the flash memory type is a potential solution, it raises concerns about reduced security in cases of misconfiguration.
Your insights on how to address this would be invaluable. Thank you in advance for your input!
Best regards,
Juha Ylinen
Hi all,
When TF-M RPC callbacks were introduced to support multi-core mailbox handling, typically only a single mailbox interrupt source was available on a multi-core system.
Therefore, in the initial design, RPC callback handle_req(void) doesn't pass any information of mailbox interrupt source to platform mailbox drivers.
Recently, some platforms, such as RSE based ones, consists of multiple mailbox interrupt sources.
I notice that those platforms fetch and parse mailbox messages in their mailbox IRQ handlers. It can take quite a long time in IRQ handlers and doesn't get full benefits from Second-Level Interrupt Handling.
Due to the limitation of RPC callback handle_req(void), those platforms are unable to move mailbox message handling to threaded NS Agent Mailbox SP context.
I'd propose to add a new RPC callback handle_req_irq_src(irq_src) to pass mailbox interrupt source information to platform drivers. With this information, platform drivers can identify the source and select the corresponding handler to fetch, parse and dispatch mailbox messages in NS Agent Mailbox SP context, instead of in IRQ handlers.
If platform owners are all satisfied with this new RPC callback, I also wonder if it can replace the existing handle_req() in future, assumed no backward compatible issues are raised.
Please can you review the patches: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/34317/1?
Any comment is welcome. Thank you.
Best regards,
David Hu
Hi All,
I pushed for initial testing and review a series of patches to support the Scheduling-NSPE Hybrid Platform Solution (aka Solution-2).
A "Hybrid Platform" is an extension of the MULTICORE case where applications also run in the NS-side of the core that hosts TF-M SPE.
Patches can be found at this gerrit topic (hybrid-plat-nspe): https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22hybrid-plat-nspe%22.
All the patches are Request-For-Comments (RFC) and the community is welcome to provide feedback on such changes/proposal.
The "Hybrid Platform" support coming to TF-M has been discussed a few times in the past and slides and recordings are available in the technical forum past events: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/.
This presented solution follows the main ideas presented in the past.
However, since the last presentations, some adjustments have been done, in particular around:
- naming: we won't use numbers for solutions, like Sol.1, 2 etc, but instead we name them: _SPE, _NSPE etc, to make immediately clear the use-case.
- "simple first" approach: we aim to provide a "simple" solution in the attempt to provide an initial reference and keep the core code readable, compact and testable. If there are significant use-cases to be included, please share your feedback and we'll find a best solution.
Kindly expect some changes on these proposed patches above while I rebase, perform some other tests and need to refactor some portions.
Expected timeline for Hybrid Platform Solution:
- SPE-support: already merged into mainline
- NSPE-support (this series above), merge within two months (end of Feb-25), provided that there will be no disruptive changes
- BALANCED-support: a new set will be available around the middle of 2025 (subject to change).
Many thanks in advance and happy New Year.
Best regards,
Nicola
Nicola Mazzucato (7):
[RFC 1/7] SPM: tfm_rpc: Add `process_new_msg handler`
[RFC 2/7] tfm_spe_mailbox: Add `mailbox_process_new_msg` handler
[RFC 3/7] ns_agent_mailbox: Add NS_AGENT_MBOX_PROCESS_NEW_MSG_SIGNAL aux service
[RFC 4/7] SPM: backend_ipc: Conditionally assert MBOX signal on SCHED_TYPE
[RFC 5/7] SPM: tfm_multi_core: Record and clear mailbox IRQ via multi_core API
[RFC 6/7] docs: hybrid_platform: Add documentation
[RFC 7/7] Config Base for Hybrid Platform
Nicola Mazzucato (he/him/his) | CE-Software Group | Arm
110 Fulbourn Rd, CB1 9NJ, Cambridge UK
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Hi all,
We found the problem with FPU S16-S31 registers if FPU is enabled and compiler uses S16-S31 FPU registers on CM33 non-secure code with TZ agent. SPM doesn't save/restore S16-S31 registers properly nor by PendSV neither by FLIH SVC handler. I created a patch for this problem:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/34202
The second problem I found is related to lazy stacking. It's possible that float point context will be stacked by MCU when FLIH is switching to/from background thread after a new boundary is applied. As result it's possible that the non-privileged code will no have access to PSP stack of suspended partition because a new MPU settings are applied. Please review a patch for this problem:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/34203
Regards,
Roman.
Hello,
We are facing the same compatibility break issues, during a TF-M 1.7.0 -> 2.1.0 migration.
- About the problem [1] (commit ffd13c3)
Is there any plan to implement a mechanism, to migrate old Protected Storage objects, to the new format?
- About the problem [2] (client id).
There is also a compatibility break, on keys stored in Internal Trusted Storage (ITS). A key generated from NS, with TF-M 1.7.0, can not be read anymore after TF-M 2.1.0 migration (psa_key_attributes returns PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE).
Changing client_id_limit from value -0x3c000000 to -1 makes old keys available.
Is there a cleaner option, to support backward compatibility with keys created with client id = -1?
Best regards,
T. FLOC'H
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Hi,
I am trying to use connection-based (instead of SFN) Crypto service with MMIOVEC, but I noticed that iovec_status is not automatically cleared so the second psa_call causes a TFM panic due to detection of a previously mapped IOVEC.
FF spec says:
[cid:image001.png@01DB3B6B.1D4E93F0]
In tfm_crypto_call_srv(), I see the output vecs are unmapped but not the input vectors. Should the inputs be unmapped here as well? (psa_attest_get_token also does not unmap input vecs)
status = tfm_crypto_init_iovecs(msg, in_vec, in_len, out_vec, out_len);
if (status != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return status;
}
tfm_crypto_set_caller_id(msg->client_id);
/* Call the dispatcher to the functions that implement the PSA Crypto API */
status = tfm_crypto_api_dispatcher(in_vec, in_len, out_vec, out_len);
#if PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC == 1
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
if (out_vec[i].base != NULL) {
psa_unmap_outvec(msg->handle, i, out_vec[i].len);
}
}
#else
/* Write into the IPC framework outputs from the scratch */
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
psa_write(msg->handle, i, out_vec[i].base, out_vec[i].len);
}
Currently, to clear the connection's iovec_status, I have to call psa_close() after every psa_call() and reconnect with psa_connect() before the next psa_call() which adds overhead. Is this behavior of not automatically clearing iovec_status for connection-based services by design?
As an alternative to calling psa_unmap_invecs(), I was wondering if spm_get_connection()/spm_get_idle_connection() could be modified with the following workaround to avoid needing to close/connect:
#if CONFIG_TFM_CONNECTION_BASED_SERVICE_API == 1
connection = handle_to_connection(handle);
if (!connection) {
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
if (spm_validate_connection(connection) != PSA_SUCCESS) {
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
/* WORKAROUND */
#if PSA_FRAMEWORK_HAS_MM_IOVEC
connection->iovec_status &= 0xFFFF0000; // Clear status of input vecs
#endif
/* Validate the caller id in the connection handle equals client_id. */
if (connection->msg.client_id != client_id) {
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
/*
* It is a PROGRAMMER ERROR if the connection is currently
* handling a request.
*/
if (connection->status != TFM_HANDLE_STATUS_IDLE) {
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
if (!(connection->service)) {
/* FixMe: Need to implement a mechanism to resolve this failure. */
return PSA_ERROR_PROGRAMMER_ERROR;
}
#else
Regards,
Brian Quach
SimpleLink MCU
Texas Instruments Inc.
12500 TI Blvd, MS F-4000
Dallas, TX 75243
214-479-4076
Hi Anton and Chris,
Thank you for your replies.
I have TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID set to off. That does not prevent client_id
translation to happen. `tfm_nspm_get_current_client_id` seems to do
translation unconditionally here:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git….
But as said, setting client_id_limit in code to -1 helps. Maybe there could
be additional configuration #define whether to do translation
when TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID is off.
Transition approach to convert the old PS data format to new one on the
flash when reading data in new format fails sounds reasonable assuming
there's no security problems involved in retrying to read the objects using
the old format after a failure. Probably not. It anyways sounds better than
supporting the old one "forever". At least to me, being able to do that
transition would require a bit of learning what exactly was the old and
what is the new layout. If there's some material in addition to source
code, I'd be happy to check that.
-Miika
ke 27.11.2024 klo 23.01 Chris.Brand--- via TF-M (
tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org) kirjoitti:
> Hi Miika,
>
>
>
> Unfortunately there have been a couple of changes to the way that PS data
> is stored in flash. I hope that we are getting better at considering
> backwards compatibility. In general I think that whenever we do introduce a
> change like this, we need to ensure that data stored with the old layout
> can still be read by newer code.
>
>
>
> I believe the patch that you’ve identified was part of the work to make PS
> encryption optional. Looking at it now, I don’t see that the layout was a
> necessary part of that work. Unfortunately, we’re now in a position where
> there could be PS data stored on devices in this new format, so just
> reverting that part of that patch would cause other problems.
>
>
>
> The bad news is that there’s another stored format change post-v2.1.1. The
> good news is that we did think about existing data and introduced a build
> option to read the old format.
>
>
>
> One solution to your problem would be similar to
> https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/commit/e8d48d78c166…
> - a build option to support reading the old format, with stores then using
> the new format. Another option would be to introduce the 1.8.1 format as an
> alternative implementation i.e. a second struct inside union ps_crypto_t
> and provide the 1.8.1 code as well as the current code (this would mean
> picking a storage format at build time and using it forever).
>
>
>
> Regarding the client_id. You’re correct that the client_id is used as a
> kind of access control (the client_id and UID together identify the stored
> object). Yes, there was a major change to the way that client_ids are used,
> with the mapping being added. Do you have TFM_NS_MANAGE_NSID set to ON? I
> believe that if it is set to OFF then -1 is used inside TF-M to represent
> all non-secure clients, which sounds like it may be what you need.
>
>
>
> Chris
>
Hi all,
just to point out that the coding guidelines are being updated to reflect feedback received over the years about the point of variable declaration. The majority of the code already follows this style, changing the guidelines to avoid further confusion.
…/coding_guide.rst · Gerrit Code Review<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/33807/1/docs…>
Please let us know if any feedback.
Thanks,
Antonio
Hi Team
I am investigating the move from MbedTLS 2.25 to 3.6, however, our client uses the 2.25 currently (looks like they prefer to stay with it) and I need to provide convincing proof to move to 3.6 considering the upgrade issues that might arise. Any suggestions here that is convincing proof to do the migration to 3.6? I would appreciate your comments. Thanks
Michael
Hi,
I am working on an update from TF-M 1.8.1 to TF-M 2.1.1 on a board that
uses encrypted Protected Storage. The board used is stm32 b_u585i_iot02a,
NSPE side using Zephyr OS. I want to support field updates as well for
devices already having Protected Storage objects created from NSPE. In my
case, Protected Storage is created and used by TF-M 1.8.1, and I want it to
remain functional after upgrading to TF-M 2.1.1. PS_CRYPTO_AEAD_ALG is set
to (default) PSA_ALG_GCM.
I have faced two issues with the uplift:
1. It seems commit ffd13c3 (
https://github.com/TrustedFirmware-M/trusted-firmware-m/commit/ffd13c31d5e6…)
has changed the layout how Protected Storage objects are stored into flash.
With TF-M 2.1.1 and old PS data, PS init fails (or gets recreated if
PS_CREATE_FLASH_LAYOUT, which I don't want since then all the existing
objects would get erased). If I revert the commit (and
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…
as not to have conflicts), then the PS initialization can pass and objects
are decrypted successfully.
I have not been able to understand this thoroughly, but at least change in
`union ps_crypto_t` struct member order is changing padding (sizeof 48 ->
40), and that in turn seems to shift at least additional data by 8 bytes
via `#define PS_NON_AUTH_OBJ_TABLE_SIZE sizeof(union ps_crypto_t)`. Is
this compatibility issue "a bug" in 2.1.1 or expected by design?
2. PS objects in 1.8.1 were storing client id to the object table entry to
implement access control (?). With 1.8.1, the client id that got stored was
-1. With 2.1.1, likely due to the Mailbox NS Agent Design Update (
https://tf-m-user-guide.trustedfirmware.org/design_docs/dual-cpu/mailbox_ns…),
non-secure requests to get an object seems to pass client ID -0x3c000000 to
the Protected Storage implementation. That is, client id -1 seems to be
transformed to `client_id_limit`. Due to this, `psa_ps_get_info()` fails to
get an object that has been previously made with 1.8.1 FW.
I am able to get reading of old stored objects working by changing
`client_id_limit` from value -0x3c000000 to -1 which changes to use 1-to-1
mapping when using client_id=-1. But I am unsure if this change causes some
unwanted side effects. Is this the correct way to gain backwards
compatibility? And if it is, would it make sense to pick
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git…
into 2.1.x branch and add a configuration flag for the 1-to-1 mapping
support without code change for backwards compatibility?
Thanks,
Miika
Hi TF-M Maintainers,
I am trying to build tf-m regression tests with fpu tests on for an521 and musca_s1 (I manually enable allow fpu tests for musca_s1) from Zephyr's west build. I did that by
1.
set(CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP ON) in config.cmake
2.
set(TEST_NS_FPU ON) in tfm_test_config.cmake
But both build fails with
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: secure_fw/partitions/partitions/service_5/libtfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service.a(tfm_fpu_service_test.o): in function `fpu_service_check_fp_register':
~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:48: undefined reference to `dump_fp_callee'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: ~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:39: undefined reference to `dump_fp_callee'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: ~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:42: undefined reference to `populate_callee_fp_regs'
~/zephyr-sdk-0.16.4/arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/../lib/gcc/arm-zephyr-eabi/12.2.0/../../../../arm-zephyr-eabi/bin/ld: secure_fw/partitions/partitions/service_5/libtfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service.a(tfm_fpu_service_test.o): in function `fpu_service_check_fp_register_after_ns_inturrept':
~/work/zephyrproject_adi/modules/tee/tf-m/tf-m-tests/tests_reg/test/secure_fw/suites/fpu/service/tfm_fpu_service_test.c:92: undefined reference to `fp_func_jump_template'.
I modified line 16-19 of https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/tf-m-tests/blob/a1a178d8c1f3c75763511… to below
target_sources(tfm_app_rot_partition_fpu_service
PRIVATE
tfm_fpu_service_test.c
../fpu_tests_common.c
)
Then, it starts building successfully. Is there anything particular I am missing. Thank you!
My tf-m tests version is 502ea90105ee18f20c78f710e2ba2ded0fc0756e (Merge pull request #11 from tomi-font/update_2.1.1)for https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/tf-m-tests.
Best regards,
Hao
Hi
We’re developing a platform using TF-M and would like to get some clarity on using FPU on Secure and Non-Secure side. The idea is to let NS application decide if it wants to use FPU.
Currently, we are enabling CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP which means we’re setting CPACR.CP10, CPACR.CP11 and enabling NSACR.CP10, NSACR.CP11.
With this configuration:
1. Is it okay if SE perform some FP operation which would set CONTROL.FPCA and return to NSE (CPACR_NS.CP10 and CPACR_NS.CP11 are not set) while CONTROL.FPCA is still set?
2. With the above configuration, if NSE wants to use FPU, it simply needs to enable CPACR_NS.CP10 and CPACR_NS.CP11. Is this correct?
3. If SE doesn’t require FPU, we could simply enable CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_CP10CP11 (CONFIG_TFM_ENABLE_FP is OFF) and NS app would still be able access FPU after enabling CPACR_NS bits?
4. There is a hard requirement for the -mfloat-abi to be consistent for S, NS and all the static libraries used?
Thank you in advance!
Best
Saurabh Jain
Hi all,
I have found this interesting repo repo https://github.com/Linaro/freertos-ota-pal-psa
I was wondering whether this is official PSA FW UPDATE API support for FreeRTOS, and is it still supported/maintained?
Regards,
Bohdan Hunko
Cypress Semiconductor Ukraine
Engineer
CSUKR CSS ICW SW FW
Mobile: +38099 50 19 714
Bohdan.Hunko(a)infineon.com<mailto:Bohdan.Hunko@infineon.com>
Hello,
I have been trying to test the initial attestation feature using the regression build for a platform that we are developing. TF-M small profile has been configured, which enables symmetric key-based attestation. On running the regression tests, the TFM_NS_ATTEST_TEST_2001 testcase fails.
On further debugging, I found that the static buffer that mbedtls uses for its allocation is not sufficient (
CRYPTO_ENGINE_BUF_SIZE = 0x400 in small profile). When I increase the buffer size to 0x500, the testcase passes.
Therefore, I wanted to know if this change needs to be adopted upstream or if I might be overlooking something on my end. Any leads in this regard would be helpful.
Thanks,
Jayashree
Hi Team,
Thanks for you helps. This this time I want to know how does PPC functions will be called from application to set a possible feature? The question is how PPC functions are exposed to outside world? I know we have a common ARM API in under platform/ext/driver/Driver_PPC.h
I am mapping my PPCs to this API, however wondering how they might be called that refer to my specific PPCs ? I am not using the ARM naming for my PPCs drivers, for example not using the name Driver_AHB_PPCEXP0 (using the name Driver_APB_PPCBASE0). Thank you again.
Michael
Hi all,
I am getting to know the TF-M, yet I do not understand the following comment and code where ROM (Read Only) is mentioned and its address used to store Code Data (flash_layout.h)!! Can someone help me understand this better? Thanks
BR
Michael
/* Use flash memory to store Code data */
#define S_ROM_ALIAS_BASE (0x10000000)
#define NS_ROM_ALIAS_BASE (0x00000000)