- TF-M - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Review on Firmware Update service in TF-M

by Sherry Zhang

Hi, I created the patchset of adding the Firmware Update service in TF-M feature branch. I would like to ask you to review this patchset if you are interested in it. Top of the patchset: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7883 Regards, Sherry Zhang

4 years, 9 months

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Arm Firmware Framework for M 1.1 Extensions Alpha specification

by Andrew Thoelke

Hi all, The PSA Firmware Framework for M 1.1 Extensions specification is now published on Arm Developer. This document introduces a set of updates and extensions to the Arm® Platform Security Architecture Firmware Framework (FF-M) specification, designed to build on the capabilities provided in version 1.0. This is an initial ALPHA release in order to enable wider review and feedback on the changes proposed to be included in the v1.1 specification. At this quality level, the changes and interfaces defined are not stable enough for product development. When the proposed extensions are sufficiently stable to be classed as Beta, they will be integrated into the FF-M version 1.1 specification. The 1.1 Extensions document can be downloaded from: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/aes0039/latest Both the 1.0 Specification and the 1.1 Extensions document are linked from the main PSA architecture page: https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-sec… Ken and I have presented a number of times at last year's Tech Forums on the proposals in the specification, most recently I provided a summary of the whole document on 10th December 2020. If you have any feedback, please provide it to arm.psa-feedback(a)arm.com, or discuss the proposals here in the TF-M mailing list. Regards, Andrew

4 years, 9 months

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Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7

by Kevin Peng

I'd like give a proposal on how to manage the version of tf-m-tests repo in auto-download mode of the build system. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:33 PM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7 Hi Anton, I'd like to give a brief introduction to TF-M generic threat model. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:30 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 7 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 9 months

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Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation

by Ken Liu

I think the link needs to be updated into: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22static_linker_scripts%22+(sta… This would make the components arrangement more simpler than using a templating. But for level 3 we still have to using a templating as now there is no 'foreach' like functionalities supported in the ld/sct/icf. /Ken -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raef Coles via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 11:44 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] [RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation Hi everyone I'd like to request comments on an upcoming change to the linker scripts. Because of some recent changes to the memory layout for level 1 and level 2 isolation, it's now possible to avoid the generation step via tfm_parse_manifest_lists.py for those linker files. This means that the files are static and have been committed into the source tree (as they used to be). We anticipate this change will make integrating TF-M into non-cmake buildsystems easier, as it will avoid one of the places where files need to be generated at build-time. The reason this is an RFC is that it is a potentially breaking change, but only for integrators _not_ using the cmake buildsystem. Currently the linker uses a large variety of pattern matches to organise the partition symbols, with these patterns being defined in the tfm_manifest_list.yaml. After this change, the linker will only look for two patterns: `*app_rot_partition*` and `*psa_rot_partition*` With the intention that the secure partitions will be compiled into a static library, where the filename is (for example) `libtfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.a`. The cmake buildsystem will be updated to generate these filenames, but other integrators will need to adjust their compilation steps else the linking will fail. Any comments or concerns would be appreciated. Patches can be found at: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%23static_linker_scripts%22 Raef -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 9 months

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Technical Forum call - January 21

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 21 at 15:00-16:00 UTC (US time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 9 months

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[RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation

by Raef Coles

Hi everyone I'd like to request comments on an upcoming change to the linker scripts. Because of some recent changes to the memory layout for level 1 and level 2 isolation, it's now possible to avoid the generation step via tfm_parse_manifest_lists.py for those linker files. This means that the files are static and have been committed into the source tree (as they used to be). We anticipate this change will make integrating TF-M into non-cmake buildsystems easier, as it will avoid one of the places where files need to be generated at build-time. The reason this is an RFC is that it is a potentially breaking change, but only for integrators _not_ using the cmake buildsystem. Currently the linker uses a large variety of pattern matches to organise the partition symbols, with these patterns being defined in the tfm_manifest_list.yaml. After this change, the linker will only look for two patterns: `*app_rot_partition*` and `*psa_rot_partition*` With the intention that the secure partitions will be compiled into a static library, where the filename is (for example) `libtfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.a`. The cmake buildsystem will be updated to generate these filenames, but other integrators will need to adjust their compilation steps else the linking will fail. Any comments or concerns would be appreciated. Patches can be found at: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%23static_linker_scripts%22 Raef

4 years, 9 months

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[RFC] Variable naming refinement in manifest tool

by Kevin Peng

Hi all, I made a patch<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7817> to refine the variable naming in manifest tooling, specifically the "manifest.manifest" in templates. I'm changing it to "partition.manifest" which should be more accurate and easy understanding. Broadcasting here for anyone has out-of-tree templates. And any comments are welcome. Best Regards, Kevin

4 years, 9 months

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model

by David Hu

Hi Antonio, Thanks a lot for reviewing the threat model and bringing up this topic. To fully mitigate the threat you mentioned, NSPE shall enforce NS tasks isolation and assign/manage NS identifications. IMHO, It mainly relies on non-secure side implementation. Therefore that threat can be covered in the scope of another threat model against NS side. TF-M is trying to figure out how to assist NSPE to manage and transfer NS identifications. Any suggestion or comment is welcome and helpful! 😊 Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:13 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model Hi Hu, I read the threat model and I have a question regarding a potential threat. I’m not sure it should belong to this generic threat model or it is already included in one of those presented. The scenario is the following: a NS App X uses a RoT Service that store data private to X. Another NS App Y can fool the SPE to impersonate X and retrieve its private data. For example, X save a value in the secure storage and Y retrieves this value. TF-M prevents this using non secure client identification mechanism. This is a classic confused deputy problem. Can this be considered a threat in this model or should it belong to another model/TOE? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 https://akiannillo.github.io/

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7

by David Hu

Hi Anton, I'd like to give a brief introduction to TF-M generic threat model. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:30 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 7 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

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Technical Forum call - Jan 7

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 7 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

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[RFC] Remove unused section 'TFM_UNPRIV_DATA'

by Ken Liu

Hi, The existing section 'TFM_UNPRIV_DATA' now holds nothing - it was designed for holding some data belong to the unprivileged code block, while now the unprivileged code is required as read-only and no place for its read-write data. Remove this section as it is unused; also remove those code objects exists in the unprivileged code section but has read-write data: 'platform_retarget_dev.o' and 'device_definition.o'. This patch changes some sources inside the platforms, so the platform owner please help to check if that matters: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7754 Thanks. /Ken

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model

by Antonio Ken IANNILLO

Hi Hu, I read the threat model and I have a question regarding a potential threat. I’m not sure it should belong to this generic threat model or it is already included in one of those presented. The scenario is the following: a NS App X uses a RoT Service that store data private to X. Another NS App Y can fool the SPE to impersonate X and retrieve its private data. For example, X save a value in the secure storage and Y retrieves this value. TF-M prevents this using non secure client identification mechanism. This is a classic confused deputy problem. Can this be considered a threat in this model or should it belong to another model/TOE? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 https://akiannillo.github.io/

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] RFC on changes to install directory structure

by Xinyu Zhang

Hi Raef, Please merge this patch for CI together with your patches. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/ci/tf-m-ci-scripts/+/7755 BR, Xinyu -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raef Coles via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 7:56 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] RFC on changes to install directory structure Hi everyone I'd like to request for comment on some changes to the TF-M installed files. Since this is an interface change (though minor), changes to it might cause issues with existing TF-M integrations. The current install directory looks like: install ├── export │ └── tfm └── outputs This doesn't give any useful information about what is contained in each directory. The proposed replacement is: install ├── image_signing ├── interface └── outputs Where the contents of `export/tfm` have been moved into `interface`, which better captures the contents of that directory. `image_signing` is new in the patchset, and contains the scripts, layouts and keys needed to sign an NS image. The final improvement in the patchset is the ability to control the location of the `install` directory via TFM_INSTALL_PATH which could be useful for integrators. Feedback would be appreciated if you feel that these new directory names could be improved, or if this change would cause significant breakage for your TF-M integration. Patchset here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7398/6 Raef -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 10 months

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RFC on changes to install directory structure

by Raef Coles

Hi everyone I'd like to request for comment on some changes to the TF-M installed files. Since this is an interface change (though minor), changes to it might cause issues with existing TF-M integrations. The current install directory looks like: install ├── export │ └── tfm └── outputs This doesn't give any useful information about what is contained in each directory. The proposed replacement is: install ├── image_signing ├── interface └── outputs Where the contents of `export/tfm` have been moved into `interface`, which better captures the contents of that directory. `image_signing` is new in the patchset, and contains the scripts, layouts and keys needed to sign an NS image. The final improvement in the patchset is the ability to control the location of the `install` directory via TFM_INSTALL_PATH which could be useful for integrators. Feedback would be appreciated if you feel that these new directory names could be improved, or if this change would cause significant breakage for your TF-M integration. Patchset here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7398/6 Raef

4 years, 10 months

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Changes to TF-M NS interface build

by David Hu

Hi all, Happy holiday! I'd like to let you know that non-secure interface build has been moved from TF-M to tf-m-tests in following patches: TF-M: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22move-ns-api%22+(status:open%2… Tf-m-tests: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22add-ns-api%22+(status:open%20… After that change, the .c files under TF-M interface/src are built during non-secure side build. It aligns with the actual process of NS integration with TF-M. Moreover, non-secure specific flags, which control TF-M NS interface, can be configured and managed in non-secure side build, without affecting TF-M secure part. Please modify tf-m-tests app/CMakeLists.txt for future changes to non-secure interface build. Thanks. Best regards, Hu Ziji

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by David Hu

Hi Poppy, Some rough ideas about secure Flash support in TF-M. IMHO, there can be two options: 1. Based on ITS service Secure Flash acts as the flash driver at the backend of ITS service. The secure Flash driver can invoke Crypto secure service instead of mbedTLS to avoid building two duplicates of mbedTLS library. The cryptographic operation and key management are implemented in secure Flash driver and can be transparent to ITS service while some initialization can be necessary. But it cannot support persistent keys otherwise it will generate a circular dependency between ITS and Crypto services. 1. Based on PS service With PS service, the cryptographic operations can be implemented by PS crypto steps, such as encryption and authentication. Secure Flash driver only covers communication with remote device. We don’t have to worry about the circular dependency with Crypto service. However, there are some limitations of PS service currently: * PS service cannot support multiple asset keys for cryptography. * PS service cannot work alone without ITS service. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 1:22 PM To: Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com<mailto:Jamie.Fox@arm.com>> Cc: Julien Su <juliensu(a)mxic.com.tw<mailto:juliensu@mxic.com.tw>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Aaron Zhu <AaronZhu(a)mxic.com.cn<mailto:AaronZhu@mxic.com.cn>>; TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Hi Jamie, >As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. The crypto keys you mentioned in your previous reply are the crypto keys used to encrypt the communication channel between host MCU with the secure Flash? Or the secrets such as (public/private)key pairs used in TLS protocol? If the former,I think these keys may be stored in NVM memories such as OTP or internal flash of MCU,and these keys can be loaded and imported as transient keys in RAM with a key handle during such as secure boot, then we can call PSA Crypto service with these key handles, in this case, the dependency from Crypto to secure flash doesn't exist. Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> Poppy Wu/CHINA/MXIC 2020/12/16 14:20 To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn<mailto:EdwardYang@mxic.com.cn>> cc Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-MLink<Notes://cnmail01/482583DD001E2E02/DABA975B9FB113EB852564B5001283EA/6BDCE39917970ADF4825863F00689523> Hi Jamie, Thank you for your reply. You are right,the secure Flash can be used to store sensitive information like TLS private keys,in this application, during TLS handshake,Crypto service depends on secure Flash driver to get these private keys,so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. And you mentioned implementation of crypto functions varies depending on the platform(some platforms have hardware crypto module while the others have to depend on software crypto library), platfrom without HW crypto module could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). As I understand, currently tfm Crypto service also uses Mbed TLS as the backend software crypto library by default. I am wondering if secure Flash driver could call this Mbed TLS library APIs (such as mbedtls_aes_encrypt（）) directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> Jamie Fox via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> 2020/12/16 03:02 Please respond to Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com<mailto:Jamie.Fox@arm.com>> To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn<mailto:EdwardYang@mxic.com.cn>> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Hi, The trouble with calling the PSA Crypto functions from your secure flash driver is that it will create a circular dependency between the ITS service and the Crypto service. Crypto uses ITS to store its keys, but then the secure flash driver calls the Crypto service again to encrypt the data. These circular dependencies between partitions are forbidden in TF-M. As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. That means the dependency on the Crypto service in the secure flash driver needs to be avoided. I think ideally the best way to do this would be to use hardware crypto functions available in the platform instead of PSA Crypto APIs inside the flash driver, but if no crypto hardware is available then you could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). Hope that helps. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 15 December 2020 10:08 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. [cid:image001.gif@01D6D91C.DAC89B20] If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model

by David Hu

Hi all, I’d like to merge the generic threat model by the end of this week if no further comment. I’m also going to give a brief introduction to TF-M threat modeling in future technical forum. 😊 Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2020 9:37 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model Hi all, A generic threat model of TF-M has been uploaded to gerrit. It is a key step in TF-M Threat Modeling. Please help review the threat model document via the link below. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7492 Any question or comment is welcome! Best regards, Hu Ziji

4 years, 10 months

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Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi Jamie, >As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. The crypto keys you mentioned in your previous reply are the crypto keys used to encrypt the communication channel between host MCU with the secure Flash? Or the secrets such as (public/private)key pairs used in TLS protocol? If the former,I think these keys may be stored in NVM memories such as OTP or internal flash of MCU,and these keys can be loaded and imported as transient keys in RAM with a key handle during such as secure boot, then we can call PSA Crypto service with these key handles, in this case, the dependency from Crypto to secure flash doesn't exist. Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn Poppy Wu/CHINA/MXIC 2020/12/16 14:20 To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn> cc Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-MLink Hi Jamie, Thank you for your reply. You are right,the secure Flash can be used to store sensitive information like TLS private keys,in this application, during TLS handshake,Crypto service depends on secure Flash driver to get these private keys,so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. And you mentioned implementation of crypto functions varies depending on the platform(some platforms have hardware crypto module while the others have to depend on software crypto library), platfrom without HW crypto module could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). As I understand, currently tfm Crypto service also uses Mbed TLS as the backend software crypto library by default. I am wondering if secure Flash driver could call this Mbed TLS library APIs (such as mbedtls_aes_encrypt（）) directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn Jamie Fox via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 2020/12/16 03:02 Please respond to Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com> To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Hi, The trouble with calling the PSA Crypto functions from your secure flash driver is that it will create a circular dependency between the ITS service and the Crypto service. Crypto uses ITS to store its keys, but then the secure flash driver calls the Crypto service again to encrypt the data. These circular dependencies between partitions are forbidden in TF-M. As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. That means the dependency on the Crypto service in the secure flash driver needs to be avoided. I think ideally the best way to do this would be to use hardware crypto functions available in the platform instead of PSA Crypto APIs inside the flash driver, but if no crypto hardware is available then you could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). Hope that helps. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 15 December 2020 10:08 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 10 months

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Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi Jamie, Thank you for your reply. You are right,the secure Flash can be used to store sensitive information like TLS private keys,in this application, during TLS handshake,Crypto service depends on secure Flash driver to get these private keys,so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. And you mentioned implementation of crypto functions varies depending on the platform(some platforms have hardware crypto module while the others have to depend on software crypto library), platfrom without HW crypto module could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). As I understand, currently tfm Crypto service also uses Mbed TLS as the backend software crypto library by default. I am wondering if secure Flash driver could call this Mbed TLS library APIs (such as mbedtls_aes_encrypt（）) directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn Jamie Fox via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 2020/12/16 03:02 Please respond to Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com> To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Hi, The trouble with calling the PSA Crypto functions from your secure flash driver is that it will create a circular dependency between the ITS service and the Crypto service. Crypto uses ITS to store its keys, but then the secure flash driver calls the Crypto service again to encrypt the data. These circular dependencies between partitions are forbidden in TF-M. As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. That means the dependency on the Crypto service in the secure flash driver needs to be avoided. I think ideally the best way to do this would be to use hardware crypto functions available in the platform instead of PSA Crypto APIs inside the flash driver, but if no crypto hardware is available then you could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). Hope that helps. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 15 December 2020 10:08 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 10 months

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[CANCELLED] TF-M Technical Forum - December 24

by Anton Komlev

Hello, Probably the next Technical Forum will not be very popular, planned on Thursday, Dec 24 (US friendly time zone). Let's cancel this slot to meet again in January 7. Wish you pleasant holidays and Happy New Year. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

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Tiny update on the code review guidelines

by Ken Liu

Hi, The purpose of code review guidelines is trying to provide some reference for reviewers. It is still in the evaluation stage. After it gets matured then we can pointer to this document as a required reference. I updated some part of it, the main changes: - The private symbol (static inside a source file) can have a prefix for easier source viewing, a reader would know it is a symbol in the file he/she is viewing which can avoid cross-files 'find reference' operation in the editor. - Clarifies the header file types and the usage: A 'interface' header file is for abstraction, and a typical 'include' header contains exported functionalities for external module usage. Please help to take a look if you have time - as this is one of the upcoming updates, I will treat the review contents out of the changed lines into a new patch if it is possible. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7577 Thanks. /Ken

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by Jamie Fox

Hi, The trouble with calling the PSA Crypto functions from your secure flash driver is that it will create a circular dependency between the ITS service and the Crypto service. Crypto uses ITS to store its keys, but then the secure flash driver calls the Crypto service again to encrypt the data. These circular dependencies between partitions are forbidden in TF-M. As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. That means the dependency on the Crypto service in the secure flash driver needs to be avoided. I think ideally the best way to do this would be to use hardware crypto functions available in the platform instead of PSA Crypto APIs inside the flash driver, but if no crypto hardware is available then you could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). Hope that helps. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 15 December 2020 10:08 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. [cid:image001.gif@01D6D313.1B0E4E10] If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 10 months

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Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 10 months

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ITS and PS HALs pushed for review

by Jamie Fox

Hi all, I have pushed for review the new Internal Trusted Storage and Protected Storage HAL designs, as well as an initial implementation for AN521. I will update the change for all other platforms once the design has settled down. It expands the ITS and PS HALs to cover all flash and filesystem configuration parameters required from the platform. The CMSIS Flash Driver is exposed to abstract the flash device itself. ITS is updated to use the new HALs, with its_flash_info_external.c, its_flash_info_internal.c and its_flash.c removed. The ITS filesystem is updated to take a configuration struct as an initialisation parameter, which is filled using values from the HAL. The gerrit reviews are: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/4781 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7598 Kind regards, Jamie

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Moving partition stack into partition BSS/ZI.

by Ken Liu

😉 No response got yet, as it is closing to Xmas, plan to merge them before end of this week (18th Dec) if there is no more voice. Thanks. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Monday, December 7, 2020 3:22 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] [RFC] Moving partition stack into partition BSS/ZI. Hi, We are now allocating partition’s stack inside linker script file, and there are two external patches trying to move these stack definitions into partition’s BSS/ZI: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5374/5 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6508/1 The advantages: - Simplify the linker script/sct templating, stack items can be saved. - Stack as global just uses 8 bytes alignment instead of wider bytes alignment (such as 32 bytes in most of the cases). - Stack is private data, putting private data together is a direct way. And the disadvantages: - Stack memory and global memory may affect each other – actually we don’t apply such protecting mechanism now? Anything I missed? Any feedbacks are welcome. We would collect your feedbacks and update the patches if they are still available after your comments. Other proposals are welcome, too. Thanks. /Ken

4 years, 10 months

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Proposal to fix the version of tf-m-tests for auto-downloading in build system

by Kevin Peng

Hi all, The build system currently fetches the latest "master" of tf-m-tests repo for building, if auto-download dependencies mode is used (which is the default). This would break the building when: * TF-M and tf-m-tests have dependency changes got merged * A developer is working with a local copy of TF-M that has not been updated to the latest. * The developer does a clean build with auto-downloading * The build system fetch the latest tf-m-tests repo which is not compatible with the local copy of TF-M We've seen this kind of issue reported in mailing list. To solve this problem, the proposal<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7550> of fixing the "TFM_TEST_REPO_VERSION" to a hash or tag is raised. With this change, the build system would download a compatible version always. The version of the test repo is not required to be updated for every commit in the test repo. (Guide line on when to update the version is required and it's still under discussion - welcome for ideas.) Developers want a different version can always override "TFM_TEST_REPO_PATH" to a local copy to build. Best Regards, Kevin

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M + New path for Musca-B1 platform

by Mark Horvath

Dear All, The Secure Enclave patches have been merged and caused a minor source structure change. The platform so far named musca_b1 became musca_b1/sse_200, because we added support to the other subsystem on the Musca-B1 board, musca_b1/secure_enclave. So to build onto the old Musca-B1 platform the -DTFM_PLATFORM=musca_b1/sse_200 flag will be needed. All information about the Secure Enclave topic can be found in these rsts: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/desig… https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/refer… https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/platform/e… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 09 December 2020 10:11 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, The patches for the Secure Enclave topic are planned to be merged soon if no further comments raised. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 03 December 2020 16:38 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, I would like to merge the Secure Enclave topic at about middle of next week, feel free to give any feedback. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 14 September 2020 21:00 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, Following the tech forum presentation (back in 6th August) I uploaded the draft design document for the Secure Enclave topic: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5653 I also updated the first implementation of the proposed solution for the Musca-B1 board with minimal features, marked as WIP: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Limitations, missing features, notes: * No support for isolation level2 on SSE-200 * Protected Storage is an Application RoT partition, but PS also moved to Secure Enclave * Some regression tests running on secure side of SSE-200 fail as all messages are forwarded with the same client ID to Secure Enclave * All IPC message forwarding is a blocking call * Only one message is put into the mailbox at a time * Musca-B1 related documentation is not complete yet * Generated files are not committed, manifest parser should be run before build. * The BL0 component mentioned in the tech forum presentation is not uploaded, as it is based on the new cmake system, and not so interesting right now * Cmake changes are rudimentary, will be rebased to new cmake system. Any feedback very welcomed! Best regards, Márk Horváth Senior Software Engineer Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com> Arm Hungary Kft., Corvin Offices II, Crystal Tower, Budapest, Futó u. 45. H-1082 Hungary www.arm.com<http://www.arm.com/>

4 years, 10 months

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TF-M generic threat model

by David Hu

Hi all, A generic threat model of TF-M has been uploaded to gerrit. It is a key step in TF-M Threat Modeling. Please help review the threat model document via the link below. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7492 Any question or comment is welcome! Best regards, Hu Ziji

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10

by Anton Komlev

Hi All The agenda for the forum: 1. PSA FF-M v1.1 alpha specification overview. Do not miss it! 2. AOB Thanks, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrew Thoelke via TF-M Sent: 09 December 2020 15:42 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10 Hi all, The proposed version 1.1 extensions to PSA FF-M version 1.0 will be published as an alpha specification in the next few weeks. I would like to update the Technical Forum on the final set of features for v1.1. (Some of these have already been presented earlier this year to the forum) Kind regards, Andrew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 December 2020 15:45 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, December 10 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

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SW countermeasure against physical attacks in SPE

by Tamas Ban

Hi, PSA Level 3 certification mandates protection against physical attack at a certain extent. MCUboot v1.7.0 release already contains SW countermeasures against fault injection attacks. These can be used at device boot-up time. But fault injection attacks are not targeting only the device boot-up time, instead they could be applied against the runtime firmware. The following design proposal is addressing this threat: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7476 Prototype implementation on AN521 and Musca-B1 target (top of the patch set): https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7475/1 Review and comments are welcome! BR, Tamas Ban

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10

by Andrew Thoelke

Hi all, The proposed version 1.1 extensions to PSA FF-M version 1.0 will be published as an alpha specification in the next few weeks. I would like to update the Technical Forum on the final set of features for v1.1. (Some of these have already been presented earlier this year to the forum) Kind regards, Andrew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 December 2020 15:45 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, December 10 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M

by Mark Horvath

Dear All, The patches for the Secure Enclave topic are planned to be merged soon if no further comments raised. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 03 December 2020 16:38 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, I would like to merge the Secure Enclave topic at about middle of next week, feel free to give any feedback. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 14 September 2020 21:00 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, Following the tech forum presentation (back in 6th August) I uploaded the draft design document for the Secure Enclave topic: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5653 I also updated the first implementation of the proposed solution for the Musca-B1 board with minimal features, marked as WIP: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Limitations, missing features, notes: * No support for isolation level2 on SSE-200 * Protected Storage is an Application RoT partition, but PS also moved to Secure Enclave * Some regression tests running on secure side of SSE-200 fail as all messages are forwarded with the same client ID to Secure Enclave * All IPC message forwarding is a blocking call * Only one message is put into the mailbox at a time * Musca-B1 related documentation is not complete yet * Generated files are not committed, manifest parser should be run before build. * The BL0 component mentioned in the tech forum presentation is not uploaded, as it is based on the new cmake system, and not so interesting right now * Cmake changes are rudimentary, will be rebased to new cmake system. Any feedback very welcomed! Best regards, Márk Horváth Senior Software Engineer Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com> Arm Hungary Kft., Corvin Offices II, Crystal Tower, Budapest, Futó u. 45. H-1082 Hungary www.arm.com<http://www.arm.com/>

4 years, 10 months

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TF-M openCI nightly notification mail list is ready to subscribe

by Karl Zhang

Hi, There is a CI notification mail list enabled, it aims to send the failure info of TF-M nightly job to the subscribers without spam to a big group. If you are interested in the master branch nightly verification status, feel free to add your email to the list. Subscribing: https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m-ci-notifications The notification only triggers a notification when CI build or test fail occur from the nightly job. Thanks Karl

4 years, 10 months

1
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IAR, problems building with 8.50.9

by Thomas Törnblom

IAR released a new service pack late last week, version 8.50.9. This service pack includes a new compiler version, which although thoroughly tested, apparently introduced a new intricate bug, which causes at least the musca_a mcuboot to fail. The issue has been identified and fixed, and the next release should have this fix. I have no date for when this will be released or in what form. So for the time being, please do not upgrade above version 8.50.7. Thanks, Thomas -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 10 months

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[RFC] Moving partition stack into partition BSS/ZI.

by Ken Liu

Hi, We are now allocating partition's stack inside linker script file, and there are two external patches trying to move these stack definitions into partition's BSS/ZI: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5374/5 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6508/1 The advantages: - Simplify the linker script/sct templating, stack items can be saved. - Stack as global just uses 8 bytes alignment instead of wider bytes alignment (such as 32 bytes in most of the cases). - Stack is private data, putting private data together is a direct way. And the disadvantages: - Stack memory and global memory may affect each other - actually we don't apply such protecting mechanism now? Anything I missed? Any feedbacks are welcome. We would collect your feedbacks and update the patches if they are still available after your comments. Other proposals are welcome, too. Thanks. /Ken

4 years, 10 months

1
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[RFC] Build: Move UART symbols to SPRTL

by Kevin Peng

Hi Platform owners, explicitly ST, Nordic and NXP owners. Could you confirm that this patch<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6678> wouldn't break your platforms. The patch changes the build system to put the UART drivers to the SPRTL. It is important to improve the isolation implementations. For more details, please see the patch. We will wait for one more week and merge it as is if no feedbacks. Any feedbacks from others are welcome always. Best Regards, Kevin

4 years, 11 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M

by Mark Horvath

Dear All, I would like to merge the Secure Enclave topic at about middle of next week, feel free to give any feedback. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 14 September 2020 21:00 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, Following the tech forum presentation (back in 6th August) I uploaded the draft design document for the Secure Enclave topic: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5653 I also updated the first implementation of the proposed solution for the Musca-B1 board with minimal features, marked as WIP: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Limitations, missing features, notes: * No support for isolation level2 on SSE-200 * Protected Storage is an Application RoT partition, but PS also moved to Secure Enclave * Some regression tests running on secure side of SSE-200 fail as all messages are forwarded with the same client ID to Secure Enclave * All IPC message forwarding is a blocking call * Only one message is put into the mailbox at a time * Musca-B1 related documentation is not complete yet * Generated files are not committed, manifest parser should be run before build. * The BL0 component mentioned in the tech forum presentation is not uploaded, as it is based on the new cmake system, and not so interesting right now * Cmake changes are rudimentary, will be rebased to new cmake system. Any feedback very welcomed! Best regards, Márk Horváth Senior Software Engineer Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com> Arm Hungary Kft., Corvin Offices II, Crystal Tower, Budapest, Futó u. 45. H-1082 Hungary www.arm.com<http://www.arm.com/>

4 years, 11 months

1
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Review request of TF-M dual-cpu mailbox enhancement

by David Hu

Hi all, Could you please help the patches to enhance TF-M dual-cpu mailbox, as discussed in last Technical Forum? Improvements to make NS RTOS port easier: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mailbox-enhance%22+(status:op… A new working model to support NS RTOS application isolation better: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mailbox-dedicated-thread%22+(… Any comment is welcome! Please see the slides for the basic ideas of the enhancements mentioned above. Slides link: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/TF-M_Dual-cpu_NSPE_mailbox_enhancement… Best regards, Hu Ziji

4 years, 11 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Review request for adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M

by Jamie Fox

Hi, Thank you for the proposal, I have commented in the Gerrit review. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 02 December 2020 14:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Review request for adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M Hi everyone, Please help review the following design proposal of adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M,any comments and suggestions will be appreciated. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7295 Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> ======================================================== CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 11 months

1
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TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, December 10 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?)

by Rønningstad, Øyvind

I've created a proof of concept for allowing out-of-tree platforms here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7301 It was simpler than I had thought :) Øyvind From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2020 07:57 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?) Hi, In the ideal case with HAL API, the platform itself can decide which variant's layout to be applied, selected by build system switches or just some header files. Because SPM could get what it needed by HAL API run-time. It can be mostly done inside the platform folder if one platform has the variants management already. Others please give inputs as this is a very useful topic, we can list down the problem we met during integration first. BR /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Rønningstad, Øyvind via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2020 3:47 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: Rasmussen, Torsten <Torsten.Rasmussen(a)nordicsemi.no<mailto:Torsten.Rasmussen@nordicsemi.no>> Subject: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?) Hi all In our work integrating TFM into Zephyr and the nRF Connect SDK, it's apparent that the integration would be a lot smoother if we could specify TFM's flash layout externally. Looking into it a bit, I came up with a draft proposal here: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/pull/18/files<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co…> We could just modify our own platforms to this and be happy, but I'm wondering if there would be interest in standardizing something. Now, a related problem is: How can we make it easier to add multiple boards based on a single chip. For the Nordic platforms we've already separated the chip-specific code (nRF9160/nRF5340) from the board specific code (DK/PDK), and for the boards, it really boils down to pin configurations. We could allow to specify pins via Cmake instead, to easily allow users to support their production PCBs. But (this was brought up in the above PR) we can also solve both problems by adding support for out-of-tree platforms. For example, allow TFM to be built like so: cmake -DTFM_PLATFORM=../../../../my_custom_board ... This would probably be less work that designing a new interface for overriding flash layouts and pin configurations. What are your thoughts? BR, Øyvind Rønningstad

4 years, 11 months

1
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Review request for adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi everyone, Please help review the following design proposal of adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M,any comments and suggestions will be appreciated. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7295 Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd http://www.mxic.com.cn ======================================================== ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 11 months

1
0
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Review request for adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi everyone, Please help review the following design proposal of adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M,any comments and suggestions will be appreciated. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7295 Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd http://www.mxic.com.cn ======================================================== ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 11 months

1
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Deprecation of platform MPS2/SSE-200_AWS

by Marton Berke

Hi Everyone, I would like to propose the deprecation of platform MPS2/SSE-200_AWS because the platform is no longer available to use: https://aws.amazon.com/marketplace/pp/ARM-Ltd-DesignStart-FPGA-on-Cloud-Cor… As per the process, this proposal is open for discussion for a period of 4 weeks and if there are no major objections, the platform should be marked as deprecated and removed from TF-M master after next release. Thanks and Best regards, Marton Berke

4 years, 11 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26

by Karl Zhang

Hi Anton I would have an introduction to TF-M openCI. Thanks Karl ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of David Hu via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 2:10 PM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26 Hi Anton, I’d like to share a proposal to improve dual-cpu mailbox. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2020 4:59 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 26 at 15:00-16:00 GMT (US friendly time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

2
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Re: [TF-M] gcc compiler requirement documentation

by Shawn Shan

Hi Chris, Thanks for point out this. Here is the fix: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7226 Regards, Shawn From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Christopher Brand via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2020 2:55 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] gcc compiler requirement documentation Looking at docs/getting_started//tfm_sw_requirement.rst it says that the version requirement for gcc is "GNU Arm compiler v7.3.1+". then it describes where to get that toolchain, but in that section the two versions it suggests are "GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain: 6-2017-q1-update" and "GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain: 7-2018-q2-update". The former is gcc version 6.3.1, which doesn't actually meet the requirements. Chris Brand Sr Prin Software Engr, MCD: WIRELESS Cypress Semiconductor Corp. An Infineon Technologies Company #320-13700 International Place, Richmond, British Columbia V6V 2X8 Canada www.infineon.com<http://www.infineon.com> www.cypress.com<http://www.cypress.com> This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?)

by Ken Liu

Hi, In the ideal case with HAL API, the platform itself can decide which variant's layout to be applied, selected by build system switches or just some header files. Because SPM could get what it needed by HAL API run-time. It can be mostly done inside the platform folder if one platform has the variants management already. Others please give inputs as this is a very useful topic, we can list down the problem we met during integration first. BR /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Rønningstad, Øyvind via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2020 3:47 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Rasmussen, Torsten <Torsten.Rasmussen(a)nordicsemi.no> Subject: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?) Hi all In our work integrating TFM into Zephyr and the nRF Connect SDK, it's apparent that the integration would be a lot smoother if we could specify TFM's flash layout externally. Looking into it a bit, I came up with a draft proposal here: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/pull/18/files We could just modify our own platforms to this and be happy, but I'm wondering if there would be interest in standardizing something. Now, a related problem is: How can we make it easier to add multiple boards based on a single chip. For the Nordic platforms we've already separated the chip-specific code (nRF9160/nRF5340) from the board specific code (DK/PDK), and for the boards, it really boils down to pin configurations. We could allow to specify pins via Cmake instead, to easily allow users to support their production PCBs. But (this was brought up in the above PR) we can also solve both problems by adding support for out-of-tree platforms. For example, allow TFM to be built like so: cmake -DTFM_PLATFORM=../../../../my_custom_board ... This would probably be less work that designing a new interface for overriding flash layouts and pin configurations. What are your thoughts? BR, Øyvind Rønningstad

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?)

by Rønningstad, Øyvind

Hi all In our work integrating TFM into Zephyr and the nRF Connect SDK, it's apparent that the integration would be a lot smoother if we could specify TFM's flash layout externally. Looking into it a bit, I came up with a draft proposal here: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/pull/18/files We could just modify our own platforms to this and be happy, but I'm wondering if there would be interest in standardizing something. Now, a related problem is: How can we make it easier to add multiple boards based on a single chip. For the Nordic platforms we've already separated the chip-specific code (nRF9160/nRF5340) from the board specific code (DK/PDK), and for the boards, it really boils down to pin configurations. We could allow to specify pins via Cmake instead, to easily allow users to support their production PCBs. But (this was brought up in the above PR) we can also solve both problems by adding support for out-of-tree platforms. For example, allow TFM to be built like so: cmake -DTFM_PLATFORM=../../../../my_custom_board ... This would probably be less work that designing a new interface for overriding flash layouts and pin configurations. What are your thoughts? BR, Øyvind Rønningstad

4 years, 11 months

1
0
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gcc compiler requirement documentation

by Christopher Brand

Looking at docs/getting_started//tfm_sw_requirement.rst it says that the version requirement for gcc is "GNU Arm compiler v7.3.1+". then it describes where to get that toolchain, but in that section the two versions it suggests are "GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain: 6-2017-q1-update" and "GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain: 7-2018-q2-update". The former is gcc version 6.3.1, which doesn't actually meet the requirements. Chris Brand Sr Prin Software Engr, MCD: WIRELESS Cypress Semiconductor Corp. An Infineon Technologies Company #320-13700 International Place, Richmond, British Columbia V6V 2X8 Canada www.infineon.com<http://www.infineon.com> www.cypress.com<http://www.cypress.com> This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL description confusing/wrong

by Tamas Ban

Hi Thomas, Here is the fix: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7196 Actually since the CMake refactor the default value can be overridden from the command line, so it is possible to enable the logging even in Release builds. BR Tamas -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M Sent: 2020. november 25., szerda 8:50 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL description confusing/wrong The description of how to set MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL in tfm_secure_boot.rst appears wrong, or at least unclear. --- - MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL: Can be used to configure the level of logging in MCUBoot. The possible values are the following: - **LOG_LEVEL_OFF** - **LOG_LEVEL_ERROR** - **LOG_LEVEL_WARNING** - **LOG_LEVEL_INFO** - **LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG** The logging in MCUBoot can be disabled and thus the code size can be reduced by setting it to ``LOG_LEVEL_OFF``. Its value depends on the build type. If the build type is ``Debug`` and a value has been provided (e.g. through the command line or the CMake GUI) then that value will be used, otherwise it is ``LOG_LEVEL_INFO`` by default. In case of different kinds of ``Release`` builds its value is set to ``LOG_LEVEL_OFF`` (any other value will be overridden). --- I tried enabling MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG by adding -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG to the cmake command line, but that set the level to -1. I also tried -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=4, which also set it to -1. I then noticed that the default setting in CMakeCache.txt is "MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL:STRING=INFO", so I instead used -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG, which worked. I would also like to be able to use logging for Release builds, as this may assist chasing down optimization issues. Thomas -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

1
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TF-M v1.2.0 release

by Anton Komlev

Hello, TF-M project released version v1.2.0, tagged as TF-Mv1.2.0. This release has started using adopted semantic versioning as described in the release_process.rst<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/contr…> Please take a look into the release notes for the new features and changes. Thanks to everyone who directly and indirectly contributed to this milestone. Anton Komlev TF-M technical lead Arm Ltd.

4 years, 11 months

1
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MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL description confusing/wrong

by Thomas Törnblom

The description of how to set MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL in tfm_secure_boot.rst appears wrong, or at least unclear. --- - MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL: Can be used to configure the level of logging in MCUBoot. The possible values are the following: - **LOG_LEVEL_OFF** - **LOG_LEVEL_ERROR** - **LOG_LEVEL_WARNING** - **LOG_LEVEL_INFO** - **LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG** The logging in MCUBoot can be disabled and thus the code size can be reduced by setting it to ``LOG_LEVEL_OFF``. Its value depends on the build type. If the build type is ``Debug`` and a value has been provided (e.g. through the command line or the CMake GUI) then that value will be used, otherwise it is ``LOG_LEVEL_INFO`` by default. In case of different kinds of ``Release`` builds its value is set to ``LOG_LEVEL_OFF`` (any other value will be overridden). --- I tried enabling MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG by adding -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG to the cmake command line, but that set the level to -1. I also tried -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=4, which also set it to -1. I then noticed that the default setting in CMakeCache.txt is "MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL:STRING=INFO", so I instead used -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG, which worked. I would also like to be able to use logging for Release builds, as this may assist chasing down optimization issues. Thomas

4 years, 11 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26

by David Hu

Hi Anton, I'd like to share a proposal to improve dual-cpu mailbox. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2020 4:59 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 26 at 15:00-16:00 GMT (US friendly time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

1
0
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Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2

by Anton Komlev

Hi, New TF-M Release Candidate 3 is tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC3 Please update all repositories as it contain all fixes for issues found in RC2. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 11 November 2020 15:34 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi, New TF-M Release Candidate 2 is tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC2. Please update all repositories as it contain fixes for issues found in RC1. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 04 November 2020 16:35 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi, All TF-M repositories are tagged with TF-Mv1.2-RC1 tag, marking the code freeze and beginning of the release candidate testing. 1. tf-m-tools 2. tf-m-tests 3. trusted-firmware-m 4. tf-m-ci-scripts 5. tf-m-job-configs Please use this tag for tests and report all issues found here. The best, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 November 2020 14:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi All, This is a reminder and heads up that TF-Mv1.2 release is planned for the end of November and TF-M code repository is aimed for freeze on Nov 4th (Wed), tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC1 for testing. Availability of the tag will be notified via this mailing list. Thanks, Anton

4 years, 11 months

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Technical Forum call - November 26

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 26 at 15:00-16:00 GMT (US friendly time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Minos Galanakis

Hi, Following up the current discussions on semantic versioning, I have prepared a patch <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7075/1> . Feel free to review and comment. Expanded patch link: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7075/1 Minos ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Gyorgy Szing via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 16 November 2020 17:32 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi, Well, yes. Not sure what backwards compatibility would mean in a complex application with a configurable set of services and service capabilities. Semantic versioning could work quite well for components (i.e. secure service implementations) though. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 18:04 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi George, All, Thanks for the thoughts. Can I assume that you suggest to stay with option 1? The semantic versioning was proposed several times and sounds reasonable because it gives a meaning to each version component so downstream projects could rely on it. Yes, a version of a product represents some quality status but in my view that depends on convention. For downstream projects reference, TF-M issues releases periodically so a version represents a stable point in time and occasionally brings new features / fixes. Cheers, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Gyorgy Szing via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 08:17 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi, I miss something here. What is being discussed, what is the purpose of changing version numbering? * Is more granularity needed and each or some lesser quality levels should be assigned a version number too? Currently a new version number is assigned if a new SW set reaches “Release” quality level. (Whatever that might be.) * Is there need for expressing backwards compatibility better? * Is the aim to enhance existing version numbers just by making them following a well-defined standard? I have the feeling different people are talking about different sub-topics. I think the most important purpose or having release numbers is to express quality. It could help on version numbers if quality would be defined cleaner. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 09:06 To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Hu@arm.com>>; David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

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Blog for Amazon FreeRTOS Gateway Demo based on TF-M Profile Small

by David Wang

Hi, In Linaro Virtual Connect 20 (LVC20), Shebu and I presented a session "Scalable Security Using Trusted Firmware-M Profiles" (ref[1]). It basically shows an example of using FreeRTOS+TF-M Profile Small on armv8m devices to connect to AWS cloud through a Gateway. The key features demonstrated in the example: * Symmetric cipher based secure connection - TLS PSK * Usage of (symmetric) attestation * Device-Gateway-Cloud secure channel example A blog (https://www.trustedfirmware.org/blog/amazon-freertos-tfm-blog/) is shared in tf.org if you want to know more details of the design. Thanks. Ref: [1] Scalable Security Using Trusted Firmware-M Profiles - https://connect.linaro.org/resources/lvc20/lvc20-213/ Regards, David Wang ARM Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Generated files location

by Ken Liu

Hi Andrej, Thanks for reporting this. It looks like the dependency on TFM_TEST_PATH matters. We need to define something for managing these generated files. /Ken -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: Friday, November 13, 2020 9:54 PM To: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi, FYI: For Windows (not Liniux) users, the command have to be: ... set TFM_TEST_PATH=../tf-m-tests/test python tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml -o <output> ... Also, all required Python modules have to be installed before (PyYAML, Jinja2) Best regards, Andrej Butok -----Original Message----- From: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com> Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 2:11 PM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: Generated files location Hi, As an intermediate step, we've made a modification to the file generation code so that file can be generated without cmake being run. This generation can be run by: ``` python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml -o <output dir> ``` Which will output the files into the specified output directory. if the `-o` flag is not provided then the files will be generated into the TFM source tree. Note that this method still requires knowledge of the location of some dependencies, as this cannot be provided by cmake. When run in standalone mode, these paths are gathered from environment variables, and generation will fail if those variables are not set. Thus: ``` env TFM_TEST_PATH=$(realpath ../tf-m-tests/test) python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml ``` Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 20 October 2020 08:39 To: Anton Komlev Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi Anton If it's not possible to avoid a file generation now, it's good to have pre-generated files for a most typical configuration (l2, IPC etc.). As I mentioned before, ideally to use TFM as a real component/framework without generation of any source code. BUT If you believe, this requirement breaks a TFM concept, just tell us. Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 9:27 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi Andrej, Essentially, do you mean to move the files back to code tree and synch them with templates manually as it was ? Cheers, Anton From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com<mailto:andrey.butok@nxp.com>> Sent: 19 October 2020 16:15 To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: RE: Generated files location Hi Anton, Another option: 3. Avoid the mandatory on-the-fly generation. Try to make TFM a component/framework, which is configurable by compile & run time parameters. Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 5:00 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi, Some source files in TF-M are templated and generated inside /<build_dir>/generated/ on the fly as a part of build process. This guaranty consistency between templates and generated but might make a trouble for IDE, where not all source files exist at the first run. I see 2 options for solution: 1. Explicitly generate those files via cmake as a part of IDE project creation (1 time action) 2. Relay on CMSIS Pack for IDE, where generated files must be presents Any alternative thoughts? Anton -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Gyorgy Szing

Hi, Well, yes. Not sure what backwards compatibility would mean in a complex application with a configurable set of services and service capabilities. Semantic versioning could work quite well for components (i.e. secure service implementations) though. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 18:04 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi George, All, Thanks for the thoughts. Can I assume that you suggest to stay with option 1? The semantic versioning was proposed several times and sounds reasonable because it gives a meaning to each version component so downstream projects could rely on it. Yes, a version of a product represents some quality status but in my view that depends on convention. For downstream projects reference, TF-M issues releases periodically so a version represents a stable point in time and occasionally brings new features / fixes. Cheers, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Gyorgy Szing via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 08:17 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi, I miss something here. What is being discussed, what is the purpose of changing version numbering? * Is more granularity needed and each or some lesser quality levels should be assigned a version number too? Currently a new version number is assigned if a new SW set reaches “Release” quality level. (Whatever that might be.) * Is there need for expressing backwards compatibility better? * Is the aim to enhance existing version numbers just by making them following a well-defined standard? I have the feeling different people are talking about different sub-topics. I think the most important purpose or having release numbers is to express quality. It could help on version numbers if quality would be defined cleaner. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 09:06 To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Hu@arm.com>>; David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Anton Komlev

Hi George, All, Thanks for the thoughts. Can I assume that you suggest to stay with option 1? The semantic versioning was proposed several times and sounds reasonable because it gives a meaning to each version component so downstream projects could rely on it. Yes, a version of a product represents some quality status but in my view that depends on convention. For downstream projects reference, TF-M issues releases periodically so a version represents a stable point in time and occasionally brings new features / fixes. Cheers, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Gyorgy Szing via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 08:17 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi, I miss something here. What is being discussed, what is the purpose of changing version numbering? * Is more granularity needed and each or some lesser quality levels should be assigned a version number too? Currently a new version number is assigned if a new SW set reaches “Release” quality level. (Whatever that might be.) * Is there need for expressing backwards compatibility better? * Is the aim to enhance existing version numbers just by making them following a well-defined standard? I have the feeling different people are talking about different sub-topics. I think the most important purpose or having release numbers is to express quality. It could help on version numbers if quality would be defined cleaner. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 09:06 To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Hu@arm.com>>; David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image

by Kevin Townsend

Hi Antonio, I'm not sure if this helps, but here is an example of how we sign the binaries for the MPS2 AN521, for example, after building the TF-M and Zephyr NS images, plus MCUBoot: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/blob/966015f503d1438c25d597937… Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 16:19, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi all, > > I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to > separated compilations. > > Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to > concatenate and sign them. > > I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct > one or where to find the signing_layout. > > > > To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to > musca-s as soon as it arrives): > > - I built TF-M > - I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a > and libtfm_s_veneers.a > - I build my zephyr application > > Now (I suppose) I have to > > - merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin > - sign the merged binary > - concatenate with bl2 > > I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps. > > > > Best, > > -- > > *Antonio Ken Iannillo* > > Research Scientist – SEDAN group > > SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust > > UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG > > > > CAMPUS KIRCHBERG > 29, avenue John F. Kennedy > L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg > T +352 46 66 44 9660 > > > > Join the conversation > > News <https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter > <https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin > <https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> > > www.uni.lu/snt > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

4 years, 11 months

3
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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Gyorgy Szing

Hi, I miss something here. What is being discussed, what is the purpose of changing version numbering? * Is more granularity needed and each or some lesser quality levels should be assigned a version number too? Currently a new version number is assigned if a new SW set reaches “Release” quality level. (Whatever that might be.) * Is there need for expressing backwards compatibility better? * Is the aim to enhance existing version numbers just by making them following a well-defined standard? I have the feeling different people are talking about different sub-topics. I think the most important purpose or having release numbers is to express quality. It could help on version numbers if quality would be defined cleaner. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 09:06 To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com>; David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Kevin Peng

I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

1
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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by David Hu

Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

1
0
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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by David Wang

Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

1
0
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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Ken Liu

Option 3 +1. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

1
0
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Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Kevin Townsend

Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi, > > > > I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning > started on the last tech forum. > > Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and > minor versions, following TF-A. > > There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. > > Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : > > 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, > 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible > manner, and > 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. > > > > This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from > everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the > forum and several options were proposed: > > 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. > 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. > So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. > 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered > within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream > project relay on a fixed version. > 4. Other ideas? > > > > Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. > > > > Thanks, > > Anton. > > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Semantic versioning

by Anton Komlev

Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton.

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image

by Anton Komlev

Hi Antonio, This might be helpful in addition to Tamas: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/view/TF-M/job/tf-m-build-docs-nightly/lastSt… The best, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Tamas Ban via TF-M Sent: 13 November 2020 15:36 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image Hi Antonio, Required steps on Musca-A (only single image boot is supported by MCUboot due to RAM_LOAD upgrade mode limitation): - Concatenate zephyr.bin + tfm_s.bin. [ 93%] Generating tfm_s_ns.bin cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/assemble.py --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -s /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_s.bin -n /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_ns.bin -o tfm_s_ns.bin * Signing the concatenated binary: [ 94%] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.1.0 --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -k /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin * Combine bl2.bin and tfm_s_ns.bin: srec_cat build/bin/bl2.bin -Binary -offset 0x200000 build/bin/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin -Binary -offset 0x220000 -o tfm.hex -Intel Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: 2020. november 13., péntek 16:33 To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu<mailto:antonioken.iannillo@uni.lu>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image Hi Antonio, I'm not sure if this helps, but here is an example of how we sign the binaries for the MPS2 AN521, for example, after building the TF-M and Zephyr NS images, plus MCUBoot: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/blob/966015f503d1438c25d597937… Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 16:19, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi all, I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations. Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them. I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout. To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives): * I built TF-M * I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a * I build my zephyr application Now (I suppose) I have to · merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin · sign the merged binary · concatenate with bl2 I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps. Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> www.uni.lu/snt<http://www.uni.lu/snt> -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image

by Tamas Ban

Hi Antonio, Required steps on Musca-A (only single image boot is supported by MCUboot due to RAM_LOAD upgrade mode limitation): - Concatenate zephyr.bin + tfm_s.bin. [ 93%] Generating tfm_s_ns.bin cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/assemble.py --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -s /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_s.bin -n /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_ns.bin -o tfm_s_ns.bin * Signing the concatenated binary: [ 94%] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.1.0 --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -k /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin * Combine bl2.bin and tfm_s_ns.bin: srec_cat build/bin/bl2.bin -Binary -offset 0x200000 build/bin/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin -Binary -offset 0x220000 -o tfm.hex -Intel Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: 2020. november 13., péntek 16:33 To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image Hi Antonio, I'm not sure if this helps, but here is an example of how we sign the binaries for the MPS2 AN521, for example, after building the TF-M and Zephyr NS images, plus MCUBoot: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/blob/966015f503d1438c25d597937… Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 16:19, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi all, I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations. Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them. I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout. To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives): * I built TF-M * I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a * I build my zephyr application Now (I suppose) I have to · merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin · sign the merged binary · concatenate with bl2 I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps. Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> www.uni.lu/snt<http://www.uni.lu/snt> -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

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Combine secure and non-secure image

by Antonio Ken IANNILLO

Hi all, I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations. Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them. I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout. To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives): I built TF-M I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a I build my zephyr application Now (I suppose) I have to merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin sign the merged binary concatenate with bl2 I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps. Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News | Twitter | Linkedin www.uni.lu/snt

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Generated files location

by Raef Coles

Hi, As an intermediate step, we've made a modification to the file generation code so that file can be generated without cmake being run. This generation can be run by: ``` python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml -o <output dir> ``` Which will output the files into the specified output directory. if the `-o` flag is not provided then the files will be generated into the TFM source tree. Note that this method still requires knowledge of the location of some dependencies, as this cannot be provided by cmake. When run in standalone mode, these paths are gathered from environment variables, and generation will fail if those variables are not set. Thus: ``` env TFM_TEST_PATH=$(realpath ../tf-m-tests/test) python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml ``` Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 20 October 2020 08:39 To: Anton Komlev Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi Anton If it’s not possible to avoid a file generation now, it’s good to have pre-generated files for a most typical configuration (l2, IPC etc.). As I mentioned before, ideally to use TFM as a real component/framework without generation of any source code. BUT If you believe, this requirement breaks a TFM concept, just tell us. Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 9:27 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi Andrej, Essentially, do you mean to move the files back to code tree and synch them with templates manually as it was ? Cheers, Anton From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com<mailto:andrey.butok@nxp.com>> Sent: 19 October 2020 16:15 To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: RE: Generated files location Hi Anton, Another option: 3. Avoid the mandatory on-the-fly generation. Try to make TFM a component/framework, which is configurable by compile & run time parameters. Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 5:00 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi, Some source files in TF-M are templated and generated inside /<build_dir>/generated/ on the fly as a part of build process. This guaranty consistency between templates and generated but might make a trouble for IDE, where not all source files exist at the first run. I see 2 options for solution: 1. Explicitly generate those files via cmake as a part of IDE project creation (1 time action) 2. Relay on CMSIS Pack for IDE, where generated files must be presents Any alternative thoughts? Anton

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Typo in return value (ps_object_system.c)

by Jamie Fox

Hi Robert, Thanks for the bug report. I have pushed a fix for review: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6986 Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Robert Rostohar via TF-M Sent: 12 November 2020 13:57 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Typo in return value (ps_object_system.c) Hi, I believe there is a small typo in the return value of function ps_read_object (ps_object_system.c). This results in build failure of Non-encrypted Protected Storage. https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/secure_fw/… The define used should be "PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT" and not "PSA_PS_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT". Best regards, Robert

4 years, 11 months

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Typo in return value (ps_object_system.c)

by Robert Rostohar

Hi, I believe there is a small typo in the return value of function ps_read_object (ps_object_system.c). This results in build failure of Non-encrypted Protected Storage. https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/secure_fw/… The define used should be "PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT" and not "PSA_PS_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT". Best regards, Robert

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 12

by Mingyang Sun

Hi Anton, I have a topic, Partition Storage Arrangement, to introduce partition data storage briefly, for about 20 minutes. Thanks, Mingyang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 10:17 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 12 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 12 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2

by Anton Komlev

Hi, New TF-M Release Candidate 2 is tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC2. Please update all repositories as it contain fixes for issues found in RC1. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 04 November 2020 16:35 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi, All TF-M repositories are tagged with TF-Mv1.2-RC1 tag, marking the code freeze and beginning of the release candidate testing. 1. tf-m-tools 2. tf-m-tests 3. trusted-firmware-m 4. tf-m-ci-scripts 5. tf-m-job-configs Please use this tag for tests and report all issues found here. The best, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 November 2020 14:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi All, This is a reminder and heads up that TF-Mv1.2 release is planned for the end of November and TF-M code repository is aimed for freeze on Nov 4th (Wed), tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC1 for testing. Availability of the tag will be notified via this mailing list. Thanks, Anton

4 years, 11 months

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GNU Arm compiler v6.3.1 deprecation heads up

by Minos Galanakis

Hi, With the upcoming release of TF-M 1.2, we are considering deprecating the GNU Arm compiler v6.3.1 to be able to reallocate testing bandwidth to newer and more up to date versions ( 7+ ) Before doing so I would like to ask for the community's feedback. Is anyone using this compiler, and if so, would you be affected by the change? Are there any other reasons we should consider keeping it in to the test plan? Regards, Minos

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2

by Anton Komlev

Hi, All TF-M repositories are tagged with TF-Mv1.2-RC1 tag, marking the code freeze and beginning of the release candidate testing. 1. tf-m-tools 2. tf-m-tests 3. trusted-firmware-m 4. tf-m-ci-scripts 5. tf-m-job-configs Please use this tag for tests and report all issues found here. The best, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 November 2020 14:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi All, This is a reminder and heads up that TF-Mv1.2 release is planned for the end of November and TF-M code repository is aimed for freeze on Nov 4th (Wed), tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC1 for testing. Availability of the tag will be notified via this mailing list. Thanks, Anton

4 years, 12 months

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Technical Forum call - November 12

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 12 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test

by Kevin Peng

Just adding some hints from the TF-M point of view. The TF-M test cases are RTOS independent. And test entry functions are provided for integrating the tests to any RTOS - test_app() You just need to call them in your application thread. Of course, you need to implement the os_wrapper APIs as well. You can refer to the os_wrapper_cmsis_rtos_v2.c for details. The old build system of TF-M used to provide libraries of the tests. The new build system is not having those yet. So the source codes need to be built. The test case libraries should be added back to the new build system and then integrating tf-m tests to RTOS should be much more direct. Best Regards, Kevin -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raef Coles via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 11:19 PM To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu>; Kevin Townsend (kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org) <kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Good spot Antonio, those docs are out of date. I'll try to get them updated before the code freeze. Raef ________________________________________ From: Antonio Ken IANNILLO Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2020 14:35 To: Raef Coles; Kevin Townsend (kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org) Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Hi Raef, I agree with you, also reading the documentation https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/view/TF-M/job/tf-m-build-docs-nightly/lastSt… (even if it seems obsolete since some files are missing). For example, are now the static library for the test included in the one you mentioned? I'm using the module offered by zephyr to build and import the tfm, but I get a lot of missing references. Further, I searched in the install directory built by tfm and I cannot really find all of them. -- Antonio Ken Iannillo On 03/11/2020, 15:08, "Raef Coles" <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com> wrote: One of the things tfm produces is the NS api static library, which should be found in `interface/libpsa_api_ns.a`. There is also a ns platforms static lib in the same directory. I'm not sure how easy it is to pick these up from the zephyr buildsystem, but those should contain the symbols you want. Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 03 November 2020 11:45 To: Kevin Townsend (kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org) Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Hi Kevin, Thank you for your message. I’m trying to create a zephyr application copying the tfm-test non secure application (https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/master/tf-m-t…). The only thing that is not clear is how to include the tfm platform code (e.g., https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/master/truste…). I suppose as a static library from the zephyr tfm module but I cannot really find how. Can you point me to the right direction? Or do you have a different way to run the tfm-tests? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo From: Kevin Townsend <kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org> Date: Monday, 2 November 2020 at 13:08 To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu> Cc: "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Hi Antonio, There is currently an issue filed in Zephyr to add a new sample application that will make it easy to run the PSA API tests via Zephyr, but it we're currently working on finalizing higher priority changes before the 1.2 code freeze later this week: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/issues/29476 So, there isn't an 'easy' way to build these tests in Zephyr today out of the box using Zephyr as the RTOS on the NS side, unless you want to have a go at it yourself in the short term while we try to make sure Zephyr is ready for the changes in T-M 1.2. Best regards, Kevin On Mon, 2 Nov 2020 at 10:29, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi all, I wanted to use some other RTOS in the NS side while testing tf-m. Is there a simple way to use the Zephyr kernel or FreeRTOS in the tf-m-test (-DTEST_S=ON, -DTEST_NS=ON) instead of the default RTX? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> www.uni.lu/snt<http://www.uni.lu/snt> -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test

by Raef Coles

Good spot Antonio, those docs are out of date. I'll try to get them updated before the code freeze. Raef ________________________________________ From: Antonio Ken IANNILLO Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2020 14:35 To: Raef Coles; Kevin Townsend (kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org) Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Hi Raef, I agree with you, also reading the documentation https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/view/TF-M/job/tf-m-build-docs-nightly/lastSt… (even if it seems obsolete since some files are missing). For example, are now the static library for the test included in the one you mentioned? I'm using the module offered by zephyr to build and import the tfm, but I get a lot of missing references. Further, I searched in the install directory built by tfm and I cannot really find all of them. -- Antonio Ken Iannillo On 03/11/2020, 15:08, "Raef Coles" <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com> wrote: One of the things tfm produces is the NS api static library, which should be found in `interface/libpsa_api_ns.a`. There is also a ns platforms static lib in the same directory. I'm not sure how easy it is to pick these up from the zephyr buildsystem, but those should contain the symbols you want. Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 03 November 2020 11:45 To: Kevin Townsend (kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org) Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Hi Kevin, Thank you for your message. I’m trying to create a zephyr application copying the tfm-test non secure application (https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/master/tf-m-t…). The only thing that is not clear is how to include the tfm platform code (e.g., https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/master/truste…). I suppose as a static library from the zephyr tfm module but I cannot really find how. Can you point me to the right direction? Or do you have a different way to run the tfm-tests? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo From: Kevin Townsend <kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org> Date: Monday, 2 November 2020 at 13:08 To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu> Cc: "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Hi Antonio, There is currently an issue filed in Zephyr to add a new sample application that will make it easy to run the PSA API tests via Zephyr, but it we're currently working on finalizing higher priority changes before the 1.2 code freeze later this week: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/issues/29476 So, there isn't an 'easy' way to build these tests in Zephyr today out of the box using Zephyr as the RTOS on the NS side, unless you want to have a go at it yourself in the short term while we try to make sure Zephyr is ready for the changes in T-M 1.2. Best regards, Kevin On Mon, 2 Nov 2020 at 10:29, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi all, I wanted to use some other RTOS in the NS side while testing tf-m. Is there a simple way to use the Zephyr kernel or FreeRTOS in the tf-m-test (-DTEST_S=ON, -DTEST_NS=ON) instead of the default RTX? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> www.uni.lu/snt<http://www.uni.lu/snt> -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test

by Raef Coles

One of the things tfm produces is the NS api static library, which should be found in `interface/libpsa_api_ns.a`. There is also a ns platforms static lib in the same directory. I'm not sure how easy it is to pick these up from the zephyr buildsystem, but those should contain the symbols you want. Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 03 November 2020 11:45 To: Kevin Townsend (kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org) Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Hi Kevin, Thank you for your message. I’m trying to create a zephyr application copying the tfm-test non secure application (https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/master/tf-m-t…). The only thing that is not clear is how to include the tfm platform code (e.g., https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/blob/master/truste…). I suppose as a static library from the zephyr tfm module but I cannot really find how. Can you point me to the right direction? Or do you have a different way to run the tfm-tests? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo From: Kevin Townsend <kevin.townsend(a)linaro.org> Date: Monday, 2 November 2020 at 13:08 To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu> Cc: "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test Hi Antonio, There is currently an issue filed in Zephyr to add a new sample application that will make it easy to run the PSA API tests via Zephyr, but it we're currently working on finalizing higher priority changes before the 1.2 code freeze later this week: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/issues/29476 So, there isn't an 'easy' way to build these tests in Zephyr today out of the box using Zephyr as the RTOS on the NS side, unless you want to have a go at it yourself in the short term while we try to make sure Zephyr is ready for the changes in T-M 1.2. Best regards, Kevin On Mon, 2 Nov 2020 at 10:29, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi all, I wanted to use some other RTOS in the NS side while testing tf-m. Is there a simple way to use the Zephyr kernel or FreeRTOS in the tf-m-test (-DTEST_S=ON, -DTEST_NS=ON) instead of the default RTX? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> www.uni.lu/snt<http://www.uni.lu/snt> -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] Current IAR support

by Raef Coles

Sorry Thomas - Someday I'll get that IAR license working and stop breaking support every 5 seconds. Thanks for all the hard work and fixes. Patches look good, have reviewed. Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 03 November 2020 12:22 To: DeMars, Alan via TF-M Subject: [TF-M] Current IAR support Just when you think you have nailed everfything down, you decide to start with a fresh clone and stuff don't build anymore ;) See: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6766 I have now gone over and tried building everything that has IAR support and here are my findings. I have used the following patches: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/tf-m-tests/+/5978 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6766 I have built for the following targets: musca_a mps2/an519 mps2/an521 mps2/an539 mps2/sse-200_aws mps3/an524 cypress/psoc64 nxp/lpcxpresso55s69 (-DBL2=False as bl2 support appears to have been added recently to this target) stm/nucleo_l552ze_q stm/stm32l562e_dk The mps2/fvp_sse300 requires a compiler with support for the M55, and the IAR compiler with support for this is not yet released. I have run tests on the following targets: musca_a mps2/an519 mps2/an521 mps2/an539 The cypress/psoc64 board I have appears to be obsolete now and I could not flash the secure image to it. The nuvoton/m2351 appears to have IAR support, but it appears untested as it gives linking errors for the bl2 and NS startup files. There are some old and new warnings for type issues and some other minor things. The QCBOR NaN tests are still failing, see: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T700 This really is an issue where the ARM ABI and IEEE 754 are incompatible and we are following the ARM ABI. In reality neither ARMCLANG nor GNUARM are fully ARM ABI compliant as they are not ignoring the relevant bits. Thomas -- Thomas Törnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 12 months

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Current IAR support

by Thomas Törnblom

Just when you think you have nailed everfything down, you decide to start with a fresh clone and stuff don't build anymore ;) See: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6766 I have now gone over and tried building everything that has IAR support and here are my findings. I have used the following patches: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/tf-m-tests/+/5978 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6766 I have built for the following targets: musca_a mps2/an519 mps2/an521 mps2/an539 mps2/sse-200_aws mps3/an524 cypress/psoc64 nxp/lpcxpresso55s69 (-DBL2=False as bl2 support appears to have been added recently to this target) stm/nucleo_l552ze_q stm/stm32l562e_dk The mps2/fvp_sse300 requires a compiler with support for the M55, and the IAR compiler with support for this is not yet released. I have run tests on the following targets: musca_a mps2/an519 mps2/an521 mps2/an539 The cypress/psoc64 board I have appears to be obsolete now and I could not flash the secure image to it. The nuvoton/m2351 appears to have IAR support, but it appears untested as it gives linking errors for the bl2 and NS startup files. There are some old and new warnings for type issues and some other minor things. The QCBOR NaN tests are still failing, see: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/T700 This really is an issue where the ARM ABI and IEEE 754 are incompatible and we are following the ARM ABI. In reality neither ARMCLANG nor GNUARM are fully ARM ABI compliant as they are not ignoring the relevant bits. Thomas -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test

by Kevin Townsend

Hi Antonio, There is currently an issue filed in Zephyr to add a new sample application that will make it easy to run the PSA API tests via Zephyr, but it we're currently working on finalizing higher priority changes before the 1.2 code freeze later this week: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/issues/29476 So, there isn't an 'easy' way to build these tests in Zephyr today out of the box using Zephyr as the RTOS on the NS side, unless you want to have a go at it yourself in the short term while we try to make sure Zephyr is ready for the changes in T-M 1.2. Best regards, Kevin On Mon, 2 Nov 2020 at 10:29, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi all, > > I wanted to use some other RTOS in the NS side while testing tf-m. > > Is there a simple way to use the Zephyr kernel or FreeRTOS in the > tf-m-test (-DTEST_S=ON, -DTEST_NS=ON) instead of the default RTX? > > > > Best, > > -- > > *Antonio Ken Iannillo* > > Research Scientist – SEDAN group > > SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust > > UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG > > > > CAMPUS KIRCHBERG > 29, avenue John F. Kennedy > L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg > T +352 46 66 44 9660 > > > > Join the conversation > > News <https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter > <https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin > <https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> > > www.uni.lu/snt > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] cmake error

by Malcolm Fernandes

I've verified that reverting the tf-m-tests patch fixes the build failures that Chris outlined. Cheers, Mal On Mon, Nov 2, 2020 at 6:16 PM David Hu via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi Chris, > > > > Sorry for the build failure. A patch is merged into tf-m-tests but its > peer ones in TF-M haven’t been approved yet. > > I have temporarily reverted that tf-m-tests patch. Please have another try. > > > > Best regards, > > Hu Ziji > > > > *From:* TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> * On Behalf Of *Christopher > Brand via TF-M > *Sent:* Tuesday, November 3, 2020 1:54 AM > *To:* tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > *Subject:* [TF-M] cmake error > > > > I just fetched the latest master > (1655ef5120e99c62782575d0a8b3707ebfc2148e), and I’m now getting a cmake > error: > > $ cmake -S . -B build_GNUARM_Relwithdebinfo '-GUnix Makefiles' > -DTFM_PLATFORM=cypress/psoc64 -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=toolchain_GNUARM.cmake > -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Relwithdebinfo -DTEST_NS=ON -DTEST_S=ON -DTFM_IRQ_TEST=ON > > […] > > CMake Error at > build_GNUARM_Relwithdebinfo/lib/ext/tfm_test_repo-src/app/CMakeLists.txt:17 > (tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler): > > Unknown CMake command "tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler". > > > > Looks like tf-tests commit c41f3a078713b17b5654851329d63bcc0672874b > introduced calls to tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler(), which I don’t see > declared anywhere. > > > > I can work around it by using a local checkout of tf-m-tests at HEAD~. > > > > Chris Brand > > Sr Prin Software Engr, MCD: WIRELESS > > > > Cypress Semiconductor Corp. > > An Infineon Technologies Company > > #320-13700 International Place, Richmond, British Columbia V6V 2X8 Canada > > www.infineon.com www.cypress.com > > > > > This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from > Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please > advise the sender and immediately delete this message. > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] cmake error

by David Hu

Hi Chris, Sorry for the build failure. A patch is merged into tf-m-tests but its peer ones in TF-M haven't been approved yet. I have temporarily reverted that tf-m-tests patch. Please have another try. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Christopher Brand via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 1:54 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] cmake error I just fetched the latest master (1655ef5120e99c62782575d0a8b3707ebfc2148e), and I'm now getting a cmake error: $ cmake -S . -B build_GNUARM_Relwithdebinfo '-GUnix Makefiles' -DTFM_PLATFORM=cypress/psoc64 -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=toolchain_GNUARM.cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Relwithdebinfo -DTEST_NS=ON -DTEST_S=ON -DTFM_IRQ_TEST=ON [...] CMake Error at build_GNUARM_Relwithdebinfo/lib/ext/tfm_test_repo-src/app/CMakeLists.txt:17 (tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler): Unknown CMake command "tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler". Looks like tf-tests commit c41f3a078713b17b5654851329d63bcc0672874b introduced calls to tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler(), which I don't see declared anywhere. I can work around it by using a local checkout of tf-m-tests at HEAD~. Chris Brand Sr Prin Software Engr, MCD: WIRELESS Cypress Semiconductor Corp. An Infineon Technologies Company #320-13700 International Place, Richmond, British Columbia V6V 2X8 Canada www.infineon.com<http://www.infineon.com> www.cypress.com<http://www.cypress.com> This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

4 years, 12 months

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Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi All, Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, November 3rd) from 2 to 6pm GMT. See agenda and zoom link here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Thanks, Shebu -----Original Appointment----- From: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Don Harbin; psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Dave Rodgman Subject: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. Where: Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… You have been invited to the following event. Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… (map<https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) Calendar shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> Who • Don Harbin - creator • shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> • mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • dave.rodgman(a)arm.com<mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Hi, Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss * The future direction of the project and * Ways to improve community collaboration Here is the agenda for the workshop. Topic Time (in GMT) Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm Break Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm How do I contribute my first review and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm Regards, Don Harbin Trusted Firmware Community Manager ==============Zoom details below:==================== Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Passcode: 143755 One tap mobile +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) Dial by your location +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? Yes<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - Maybe<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - No<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> more options »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Invitation from Google Calendar<https://www.google.com/calendar/> You are receiving this courtesy email at the account shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn More<https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>.

4 years, 12 months

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cmake error

by Christopher Brand

I just fetched the latest master (1655ef5120e99c62782575d0a8b3707ebfc2148e), and I'm now getting a cmake error: $ cmake -S . -B build_GNUARM_Relwithdebinfo '-GUnix Makefiles' -DTFM_PLATFORM=cypress/psoc64 -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=toolchain_GNUARM.cmake -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Relwithdebinfo -DTEST_NS=ON -DTEST_S=ON -DTFM_IRQ_TEST=ON [...] CMake Error at build_GNUARM_Relwithdebinfo/lib/ext/tfm_test_repo-src/app/CMakeLists.txt:17 (tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler): Unknown CMake command "tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler". Looks like tf-tests commit c41f3a078713b17b5654851329d63bcc0672874b introduced calls to tfm_toolchain_reload_compiler(), which I don't see declared anywhere. I can work around it by using a local checkout of tf-m-tests at HEAD~. Chris Brand Sr Prin Software Engr, MCD: WIRELESS Cypress Semiconductor Corp. An Infineon Technologies Company #320-13700 International Place, Richmond, British Columbia V6V 2X8 Canada www.infineon.com<http://www.infineon.com> www.cypress.com<http://www.cypress.com> This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

4 years, 12 months

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Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2

by Anton Komlev

Hi All, This is a reminder and heads up that TF-Mv1.2 release is planned for the end of November and TF-M code repository is aimed for freeze on Nov 4th (Wed), tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC1 for testing. Availability of the tag will be notified via this mailing list. Thanks, Anton

4 years, 12 months

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Integrating a different RTOS in tf-m-test

by Antonio Ken IANNILLO

Hi all, I wanted to use some other RTOS in the NS side while testing tf-m. Is there a simple way to use the Zephyr kernel or FreeRTOS in the tf-m-test (-DTEST_S=ON, -DTEST_NS=ON) instead of the default RTX? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News | Twitter | Linkedin www.uni.lu/snt

4 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-M] Feature branch 'feature-isolation-level3' is created for related patches merging

by Kevin Peng

Hi all, As the isolation level 3 PoC targets for AN521 and MUSCA_B1 only at the first stage, two level-3-specific linker script files are created for these two platforms. And the common linker scripts are not changed now. This would avoid affecting the platforms who do not support isolation level 3 with a big changed linker script. The patch for specific linker scripts can be found here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6717 Best Regards, Kevin From: Kevin Peng Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 5:27 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: RE: Feature branch 'feature-isolation-level3' is created for related patches merging Hi all, We've finished the PoC of isolation level 3 along with the new TFM HAL on the feature branch. And now we are migrating the patches to master branch by cherry-picking, squashing and refining. Here are the several topics ongoing parallel: * Linker script changes for isolation L3<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22linker_script_isolation%22+(s…> * Isolation HAL API<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22isolation_api_implementation%…> * SPM log<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22SPM_LOG%22+(status:open%20OR%…> * SP log<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22tfm_sp_log%22+(status:open%20…> And the HAL API docs: * Docs: Design of the TF-M isolation HAL<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/4829> More patches will be coming soon, will keep you update-to-date. Please help on reviews, thanks. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, September 9, 2020 3:21 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Feature branch 'feature-isolation-level3' is created for related patches merging Hi, A new branch created for two repos 'TF-M/tf-m-tests' and 'TF-M/trusted-firmware-m', this feature branch is for isolation related patches merging. The POC patches would come in following days, first platform would be AN521. If you want to try this branch, please: IMPORTANT: Checkout 'feature-isoaltion-level3' branch for both 'TF-M/tf-m-tests' and 'TF-M/trusted-firmware-m'. BR /Ken

4 years, 12 months

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Upgrade crypto to mbedtls-2.24 tag

by Soby Mathew

Hi Everyone This is a heads to notify that we have some patches to upgrade to mbedtls-2.24 tag and we hope to merge them today. The patches can be found here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mbedtls-2.24%22+(status:open%… Please be aware that there is a change in tf-m-tests as well which means that if the build system is setup to download latest master of tf-m-tests, you need to update TF-M to latest master as well for the build to succeed. This is not ideal workflow, but we are thinking about some system to avoid this kind of problems. Best Regards Soby Mathew

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] Deprecate AN539 platform

by Soby Mathew

An update on this: The platform has been deprecated and is scheduled for removal from upstream after TFvMv1.2 release. Patches to warn about deprecation of this platform have been merged https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6516 Best Regards Soby Mathew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Soby Mathew via TF-M Sent: 17 August 2020 15:12 To: TF-M mailing list <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Deprecate AN539 platform Hi Everyone, As mentioned in https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/contr…, we would like to propose the deprecation of AN539 MPS2 platform and remove the same from TF-M master after next release. As per the process, this proposal will be open for discussion for a period of 4 weeks and if there are no major objections, the platform will be marked as deprecated. Thanks & Regards Soby Mathew

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] [RFC] TF-M Documentation Contribution Format

by Gyorgy Szing

Hi, I think this effort should be done together with other tf.org projects using the same technology (Sphinx). Can you pls sync up with the TF-A team? Related to the details: * I suggest referring to the RTD style guide [1] instead of Python. The text is much smaller, does not cover topics we don’t need and your points 1-5 are aligned. Point 6 is conflicting as RTD allows 6 levels. * I disagree on 11. “A drawing is worth 1e3 words”, and hiding these at the end is not a good practice. * 12: do we really need this? How often are people doing such things? * 13 is ok 😊 * 14: might be too strict. What if a term is over used and may have a different meaning is some sections (i.e. platform, host, etc...). [1] https://documentation-style-guide-sphinx.readthedocs.io/en/latest/style-gui… /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Minos Galanakis via TF-M Sent: 30 June 2020 16:23 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] [RFC] TF-M Documentation Contribution Format Hi, As the project matures, and the community grows, I would like to revive an old discussion and suggest that we set some guidelines for contributing to the project's documentation. I would like to propose that we establish a minimal sub-set of rules, based on the official Python guidelines<https://devguide.python.org/documenting/#style-guide> which is the most widely used notation. This offers compatibility with existing tools for proofing and producing said documentation. The following rules should be considered: 1. H1 document title headers should be expressed by # with over-line (rows on top and bottom) of the text 2. Only ONE H1 header should allowed per document, ideally placed on top of the page. 3. H2 headers should be expressed by * with over-line 4. H2 header's text should be UNIQUE in per document basis 5. H3 headers should be expressed by a row of '=' 6. H4 headers should be expressed by a row of '-' 7. H3 and H4 headers have no limitation about naming. They can have similar names on the same document, as long as they have different parents. 8. H5 headers should be expressed by a row of '^' 9. H5 headers will be rendered in document body but not in menus on the navigation bar. 10. Do not use more than 5 level of heading 11. When writing guide, which are expected to be able to be readable by command line tools, it would be best practice to add long complicated tables, and UML diagrams in the bottom of the page and using internal references(auto-label). Please refer to the `tfm_sw_requirement.rst<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/getti…>` as an example 12. No special formatting should be allowed in Headers ( code, underline, strike-through etc ) 13. Long URLs and external references should be placed at the bottom of the page and referenced in the body of the document 14. New introduced terms and abbreviations should be added to Glossary and directly linked by the `:term:` notation across all documents using it. When something new, which is not covered is required, the rule should be first to follow the any reference to of an existing document, and the Python Documentation rules otherwise. Please let me know if you have any questions/objection or proposals or new rules you would like to consider. Any feedback is more than welcome. Minos

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call – October 29

by Tamas Ban

Hi Anton, I would like to give an overview about the code sharing feature. Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Shawn Shan via TF-M Sent: 2020. október 26., hétfő 3:30 To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call – October 29 Hi Anton, I would like to briefly introduce the update of TF-M log system, about 20 minutes. Best regards, Shawn From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 5:56 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call – October 29 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, October 29 (for US time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] Feature branch 'feature-isolation-level3' is created for related patches merging

by Ken Liu

Hi, Reminder the isolation design document which will be merged before code freeze, too: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/4730 Thanks. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 5:32 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Feature branch 'feature-isolation-level3' is created for related patches merging Another topic added: New isolation implementation<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22isolation-implement%22+(statu…> based on the isolation APIs. We are opening for new review comments before the end of October to catch the TF-M v1.2 release code freeze. Best Regards, Kevin From: Kevin Peng Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2020 5:27 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: RE: Feature branch 'feature-isolation-level3' is created for related patches merging Hi all, We've finished the PoC of isolation level 3 along with the new TFM HAL on the feature branch. And now we are migrating the patches to master branch by cherry-picking, squashing and refining. Here are the several topics ongoing parallel: * Linker script changes for isolation L3<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22linker_script_isolation%22+(s…> * Isolation HAL API<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22isolation_api_implementation%…> * SPM log<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22SPM_LOG%22+(status:open%20OR%…> * SP log<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22tfm_sp_log%22+(status:open%20…> And the HAL API docs: * Docs: Design of the TF-M isolation HAL<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/4829> More patches will be coming soon, will keep you update-to-date. Please help on reviews, thanks. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, September 9, 2020 3:21 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Feature branch 'feature-isolation-level3' is created for related patches merging Hi, A new branch created for two repos 'TF-M/tf-m-tests' and 'TF-M/trusted-firmware-m', this feature branch is for isolation related patches merging. The POC patches would come in following days, first platform would be AN521. If you want to try this branch, please: IMPORTANT: Checkout 'feature-isoaltion-level3' branch for both 'TF-M/tf-m-tests' and 'TF-M/trusted-firmware-m'. BR /Ken

5 years

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Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call – October 29

by Shawn Shan

Hi Anton, I would like to briefly introduce the update of TF-M log system, about 20 minutes. Best regards, Shawn From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 5:56 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call – October 29 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, October 29 (for US time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years

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Invitation: TF-M Tech forum @ Every 4 weeks from 8am to 9am on Thursday from Thu Oct 29 to Fri Mar 26, 2021 (MST) (tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Don Harbin

You have been invited to the following event. Title: TF-M Tech forum This is an open forum for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC.Feel free to forward it to colleagues.Details of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/==… Info====Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Topic: TF-M Tech forum - US Time Zone FriendlyTime: Oct 29, 2020 03:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time        Every 4 weeks on Thu, until Mar 18, 2021, 6 occurrence(s)        Oct 29, 2020 03:00 PM        Nov 26, 2020 03:00 PM        Dec 24, 2020 03:00 PM        Jan 21, 2021 03:00 PM        Feb 18, 2021 03:00 PM        Mar 18, 2021 03:00 PMPlease download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system.Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJEocOmvpz4tHtYu0Wvn2fOsG91u0kv_ECPd/ics… Zoom Meetinghttps://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95570795742?pwd=N21YWHJpUjZyS3Fzd0tkOG9hanpidz09Meeting ID: 955 7079 5742Passcode: 177658One tap mobile+12532158782,,95570795742# US (Tacoma)+13462487799,,95570795742# US (Houston)Dial by your location        +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma)        +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown)        +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago)        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 955 7079 5742Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/abx3I7IoRq When: Every 4 weeks from 8am to 9am on Thursday from Thu Oct 29 to Fri Mar 26, 2021 Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95570795742?pwd=N21YWHJpUjZyS3Fzd0tkOG9hanpidz… Calendar: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * anton.komlev(a)arm.com Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NjQzcnZwcmEwNnV2cGoxN… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

5 years

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Invitation: TF-M Tech forum @ Every 4 weeks from 12am to 1am on Thursday from Thu Nov 12 to Fri May 28, 2021 (MST) (tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Don Harbin

You have been invited to the following event. Title: TF-M Tech forum About TF-M Tech forum:This is an open forum for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC.Feel free to forward it to colleagues.Details of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/==…Topic: TF-M Tech forum - Asia Time Zone FriendlyTime: Nov 12, 2020 07:00 AM Greenwich Mean Time        Every 4 weeks on Thu, until Mar 4, 2021, 5 occurrence(s)        Nov 12, 2020 07:00 AM        Dec 10, 2020 07:00 AM        Jan 7, 2021 07:00 AM        Feb 4, 2021 07:00 AM        Mar 4, 2021 07:00 AMPlease download and import the following iCalendar (.ics) files to your calendar system.Weekly: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/meeting/tJYodOyvpz8jGNEc_1ykVap8Zg6oTLqZZSeJ/ics… Zoom Meetinghttps://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/92535794925?pwd=TTl0cmo4R2hTNm8wcHo1M3ZKdjlnUT09Meeting ID: 925 3579 4925Passcode: 414410One tap mobile+12532158782,,92535794925# US (Tacoma)+13462487799,,92535794925# US (Houston)Dial by your location        +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma)        +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown)        +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago)        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        888 788 0099 US Toll-free        877 853 5247 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 925 3579 4925Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/aesS64I7GW When: Every 4 weeks from 12am to 1am on Thursday from Thu Nov 12 to Fri May 28, 2021 Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/92535794925?pwd=TTl0cmo4R2hTNm8wcHo1M3ZKdjlnUT… Calendar: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Don Harbin - creator * tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org * anton.komlev(a)arm.com Event details: https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NTAyYXB1M2xsYzJ2MzU3M… Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

5 years

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