- TF-M - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [TF-M] NXP lpcxpresso55s69 appears broken

by Jamie Fox

Hi Thomas, Sorry about that. I have reproduced the issue on AN521 by copying over the lpcxpresso55s69 storage config. I'll investigate a fix on that platform, but will need you to verify it for me afterwards as I don't have that platform. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M Sent: 03 February 2021 13:30 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] NXP lpcxpresso55s69 appears broken Looks like this is the commit that breaks the nxp/lpcxpresso55s69 support: --- PS C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m> git bisect good 6a3946aa017fa4da3953a825991f8ce755114637 is the first bad commit commit 6a3946aa017fa4da3953a825991f8ce755114637 Author: Jamie Fox <jamie.fox(a)arm.com><mailto:jamie.fox@arm.com> Date: Mon Dec 7 21:50:31 2020 +0000 Platform: TF-M ITS and PS HAL ... --- Den 2021-02-03 kl. 13:54, skrev Thomas Törnblom via TF-M: I have just fixed an IAR linking issue for the nxp/lpcxpresso55s69, see https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/8251 I tried using the current sources, but it seems that there is some issues causing the board to run into a hard fault when built with GNUARM. Not sure what commit caused the breakage. Cheers, Thomas -- Thomas Törnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems> -- Thomas Törnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 10 months

2
1
0 0

Re: [TF-M] NXP lpcxpresso55s69 appears broken

by Kevin Townsend

Hi Jamie, I’ll be happy to test here as well if you add me to the change request. Best regards, Kevin On Wed, 3 Feb 2021 at 16:10, Jamie Fox via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi Thomas, > > > > Sorry about that. I have reproduced the issue on AN521 by copying over the > lpcxpresso55s69 storage config. I’ll investigate a fix on that platform, > but will need you to verify it for me afterwards as I don’t have that > platform. > > > > Kind regards, > > Jamie > > > > *From:* TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> *On Behalf Of *Thomas > Törnblom via TF-M > *Sent:* 03 February 2021 13:30 > *To:* tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > *Subject:* Re: [TF-M] NXP lpcxpresso55s69 appears broken > > > > Looks like this is the commit that breaks the nxp/lpcxpresso55s69 support: > --- > PS C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m> git bisect good > 6a3946aa017fa4da3953a825991f8ce755114637 is the first bad commit > commit 6a3946aa017fa4da3953a825991f8ce755114637 > Author: Jamie Fox <jamie.fox(a)arm.com> <jamie.fox(a)arm.com> > Date: Mon Dec 7 21:50:31 2020 +0000 > > Platform: TF-M ITS and PS HAL > ... > --- > > Den 2021-02-03 kl. 13:54, skrev Thomas Törnblom via TF-M: > > I have just fixed an IAR linking issue for the nxp/lpcxpresso55s69, see > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/8251 > > I tried using the current sources, but it seems that there is some issues > causing the board to run into a hard fault when built with GNUARM. > > Not sure what commit caused the breakage. > > Cheers, > Thomas > > -- > > *Thomas Törnblom*, *Product Engineer* > IAR Systems AB > Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 > SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN > Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 > E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com Website: www.iar.com > Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems > > > > > > -- > > *Thomas Törnblom*, *Product Engineer* > IAR Systems AB > Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 > SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN > Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 > E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com Website: www.iar.com > Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] NXP lpcxpresso55s69 appears broken

by Thomas Törnblom

Looks like this is the commit that breaks the nxp/lpcxpresso55s69 support: --- PS C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m> git bisect good 6a3946aa017fa4da3953a825991f8ce755114637 is the first bad commit commit 6a3946aa017fa4da3953a825991f8ce755114637 Author: Jamie Fox <jamie.fox(a)arm.com> Date: Mon Dec 7 21:50:31 2020 +0000 Platform: TF-M ITS and PS HAL ... --- Den 2021-02-03 kl. 13:54, skrev Thomas Törnblom via TF-M: > I have just fixed an IAR linking issue for the nxp/lpcxpresso55s69, > see https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/8251 > > I tried using the current sources, but it seems that there is some > issues causing the board to run into a hard fault when built with GNUARM. > > Not sure what commit caused the breakage. > > Cheers, > Thomas > > -- > > *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ > IAR Systems AB > Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 > SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN > Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 > E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> > Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> > Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems> > -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

NXP lpcxpresso55s69 appears broken

by Thomas Törnblom

I have just fixed an IAR linking issue for the nxp/lpcxpresso55s69, see https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/8251 I tried using the current sources, but it seems that there is some issues causing the board to run into a hard fault when built with GNUARM. Not sure what commit caused the breakage. Cheers, Thomas -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Ask for final review on physical attack mitigation design

by David Hu

Hi all, I'd like to merge the design document of physical attack mitigation in TF-M this week if no further comment. May I ask you to take another look at the following document patch? https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7476 Best regards, Hu Ziji

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Fatal error handler in secure FW - review request

by Kevin Townsend

Oyvind, Thanks for putting this together. Looks quite useful, and saves some monotony debugging. I put together a similar script but as a Python function for GDB: https://gist.github.com/microbuilder/1677a27e4566a28b36a79f954f1dede6 ... having this in C, however, means you don't need to have a Python-enabled version of GDB. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 29 Jan 2021 at 11:33, Rønningstad, Øyvind via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi everyone > > I wanted to make it easier to debug HardFaults/BusFaults/SecureFaults in > TFM, since I’ve gotten quite a few of them while adding the nrf platforms. > > I have created a proposal in > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7891 and > would like to get some comments on the general idea. > > The proposal gathers a number of different values, especially the ones > that are harder to retrieve in a debugger, like the fault status registers > in SCB. > > The values are placed in memory so they can be inspected in a debugger, > and if built with -DTFM_SPM_LOG_LEVEL=TFM_SPM_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG they are also > printed. > > Here is an example of the printout: > > FATAL ERROR: HardFault > > Here is some context for the exception: > > EXC_RETURN (LR): 0xFFFFFFBD > > Exception came from non-secure FW in thread mode. > > MSP(_S): 0x200007F8 > > PSP(_S): 0x20000F28 > > Exception frame at: 0x200176D8 > > R0: 0x0000003E > > R1: 0x00000001 > > R2: 0x00000001 > > R3: 0xFFFFFFFF > > R12: 0x00000000 > > LR: 0x00050623 > > PC: 0x00050626 > > CFSR: 0x00000000 > > BFAR: Not Valid > > MMFAR: Not Valid > > HFSR: 0x40000000 > > SFSR: 0x00000000 > > SFAR: Not Valid > > > > BR, Øyvind Rønningstad > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Fatal error handler in secure FW - review request

by Rønningstad, Øyvind

Hi everyone I wanted to make it easier to debug HardFaults/BusFaults/SecureFaults in TFM, since I've gotten quite a few of them while adding the nrf platforms. I have created a proposal in https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7891 and would like to get some comments on the general idea. The proposal gathers a number of different values, especially the ones that are harder to retrieve in a debugger, like the fault status registers in SCB. The values are placed in memory so they can be inspected in a debugger, and if built with -DTFM_SPM_LOG_LEVEL=TFM_SPM_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG they are also printed. Here is an example of the printout: FATAL ERROR: HardFault Here is some context for the exception: EXC_RETURN (LR): 0xFFFFFFBD Exception came from non-secure FW in thread mode. MSP(_S): 0x200007F8 PSP(_S): 0x20000F28 Exception frame at: 0x200176D8 R0: 0x0000003E R1: 0x00000001 R2: 0x00000001 R3: 0xFFFFFFFF R12: 0x00000000 LR: 0x00050623 PC: 0x00050626 CFSR: 0x00000000 BFAR: Not Valid MMFAR: Not Valid HFSR: 0x40000000 SFSR: 0x00000000 SFAR: Not Valid BR, Øyvind Rønningstad

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Technical Forum call - February 4

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, Feb 4 at 7:00-8:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already?

by Gyorgy Szing

Hi, Just a humble suggestion: capability could be added to cmake to generate a build environment manifest. This could be a JSON or simple text file listing the location and version of each dependency (tool or software). The manifest file could simplify tracking down similar issues. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M Sent: 28 January 2021 08:38 To: Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already? Thanks Sherry, Appears the current "cysecuretools" has a dependency on imgtool 1.7.0a1, which is likely where it came from. I did build for musca_a last week and I may have updated cysecuretools since then as I had issues with flashing the psoc64, and that must have installed 1.7.0a1. I installed 1.7.1, which caused a dependency error on cysecuretools 3.0.0. Works now! Cheers, Thomas Den 2021-01-28 kl. 03:50, skrev Sherry Zhang: Hi Thomas, The issue is caused by the imgtool package itself. The version 1.7.0a1 is a pre-release version. If you check the line 378 of image.py of the imgtool package of version 1.7.0a1, it does not check the 'None' before accessing the custom_tlvs.items: [cid:image003.jpg@01D6F552.951E90A0] In the version of 1.7.1, it has added the 'None' check at line 389 in image.py: [cid:image004.jpg@01D6F552.951E90A0] In TF-M build system, the custom_tlvs should be 'None'. To solve your issue, I suggest you use a release version of the imgtool package, such as 1.7.1, other than a pre-release one. Please let me know how it goes. Regards, Sherry Zhang From: Thomas Törnblom <thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com><mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2021 4:46 PM To: Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com><mailto:Sherry.Zhang2@arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com><mailto:nd@arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already? Hi Sherry, Looks like I have version 1.7.0a1. PS C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\cmake_build_iar> imgtool version 1.7.0a1 Cheers, Thomas Den 2021-01-27 kl. 09:22, skrev Sherry Zhang: Hi Thomas, Can you share the version of the imgtool package you used? The recommended version is >=1.6.0. We run the build command on Linux locally and it works well. An alternative option is to use the imgtool script from the upstream MCUBoot repo. To achieve that you can copy the folder ./build_dir/lib/ext/mcuboot-src/scripts/imgtool to bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/. Regards, Sherry Zhang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org><mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Thomas Tï¿½rnblom via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2021 12:28 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already? I'm working on some IAR brokenness for the cypress/psoc64 and for comparison I'm attempting to build for my favorite board, the musca_a, but it seems builds fails now. I think it was working last week, but today I'm unable to build with any of the toolchains. I get the following errors frmo all of them. Here's a gcc build: --- [629/629] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin FAILED: bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin cmd.exe /C "cd /D C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\cmake_build_armclang\bl2\ext\mcuboot && C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\python.exe C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.2.0 --layout C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/./signing_layout_s_ns.o -k C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin && "C:\Program Files\CMake\bin\cmake.exe" -E copy C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bin" Traceback (most recent call last): File "C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\bl2\ext\mcuboot\scripts\wrapper\wrapper.py", line 126, in <module> wrap() File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 829, in __call__ return self.main(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 782, in main rv = self.invoke(ctx) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 1066, in invoke return ctx.invoke(self.callback, **ctx.params) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 610, in invoke return callback(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\bl2\ext\mcuboot\scripts\wrapper\wrapper.py", line 121, in wrap img.create(key, public_key_format, enckey, dependencies, boot_record) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\imgtool\image.py", line 378, in create for tag, value in custom_tlvs.items(): AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'items' ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed. --- cmake line: cmake -GNinja -S .. -B . -DTFM_PLATFORM=musca_a "-DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=..\toolchain_GNUARM.cmake" -DTEST_NS=ON -DTEST_S=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG -DTFM_PSA_API=ON I've tested building for several of the other targets, which seems to work, but I don't have any of these here. Ideas? Thanks, Thomas -- Thomas Tï¿½rnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems> -- Thomas Tï¿½rnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems> -- Thomas Törnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already?

by Sherry Zhang

Hi Thomas, Can you share the version of the imgtool package you used? The recommended version is >=1.6.0. We run the build command on Linux locally and it works well. An alternative option is to use the imgtool script from the upstream MCUBoot repo. To achieve that you can copy the folder ./build_dir/lib/ext/mcuboot-src/scripts/imgtool to bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/. Regards, Sherry Zhang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2021 12:28 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already? I'm working on some IAR brokenness for the cypress/psoc64 and for comparison I'm attempting to build for my favorite board, the musca_a, but it seems builds fails now. I think it was working last week, but today I'm unable to build with any of the toolchains. I get the following errors frmo all of them. Here's a gcc build: --- [629/629] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin FAILED: bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin cmd.exe /C "cd /D C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\cmake_build_armclang\bl2\ext\mcuboot && C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\python.exe C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.2.0 --layout C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/./signing_layout_s_ns.o -k C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin && "C:\Program Files\CMake\bin\cmake.exe" -E copy C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bin" Traceback (most recent call last): File "C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\bl2\ext\mcuboot\scripts\wrapper\wrapper.py", line 126, in <module> wrap() File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 829, in __call__ return self.main(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 782, in main rv = self.invoke(ctx) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 1066, in invoke return ctx.invoke(self.callback, **ctx.params) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 610, in invoke return callback(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\bl2\ext\mcuboot\scripts\wrapper\wrapper.py", line 121, in wrap img.create(key, public_key_format, enckey, dependencies, boot_record) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\imgtool\image.py", line 378, in create for tag, value in custom_tlvs.items(): AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'items' ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed. --- cmake line: cmake -GNinja -S .. -B . -DTFM_PLATFORM=musca_a "-DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=..\toolchain_GNUARM.cmake" -DTEST_NS=ON -DTEST_S=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG -DTFM_PSA_API=ON I've tested building for several of the other targets, which seems to work, but I don't have any of these here. Ideas? Thanks, Thomas -- Thomas Törnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 10 months

2
3
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already?

by Minos Galanakis

Hi Thomas, I can also confirm that the build works on a system with the linked environment<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/plugins/gitiles/ci/dockerfiles/+/refs/he…> setup. I have tested your command, as well as the two methods listed in the documentation and all appear to be working. Given this opportunity I would like to share that in accordance to the TrustedFirmware.org project maintenance proposal<https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p…>, the project should not be removing a platform in without fair notice. In TF-M we try to do so in three steps between releases: * Adding a deprecation warning patch<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6516> which will notify the users during compilation and runtime. * Marking is as soon to be deprecated in documentation. * Removing the files on or after the marked release. Back to your problem, I would also confirm that there are no environment variables setting a pre-downloaded repository for TF-M tests. Please let us know how it goes. Minos ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 27 January 2021 08:46 To: Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already? Hi Sherry, Looks like I have version 1.7.0a1. PS C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\cmake_build_iar> imgtool version 1.7.0a1 Cheers, Thomas Den 2021-01-27 kl. 09:22, skrev Sherry Zhang: Hi Thomas, Can you share the version of the imgtool package you used? The recommended version is >=1.6.0. We run the build command on Linux locally and it works well. An alternative option is to use the imgtool script from the upstream MCUBoot repo. To achieve that you can copy the folder ./build_dir/lib/ext/mcuboot-src/scripts/imgtool to bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/. Regards, Sherry Zhang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org><mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, January 27, 2021 12:28 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Is Musca-A deprecated already? I'm working on some IAR brokenness for the cypress/psoc64 and for comparison I'm attempting to build for my favorite board, the musca_a, but it seems builds fails now. I think it was working last week, but today I'm unable to build with any of the toolchains. I get the following errors frmo all of them. Here's a gcc build: --- [629/629] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin FAILED: bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin cmd.exe /C "cd /D C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\cmake_build_armclang\bl2\ext\mcuboot && C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\python.exe C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.2.0 --layout C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/./signing_layout_s_ns.o -k C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin && "C:\Program Files\CMake\bin\cmake.exe" -E copy C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bin" Traceback (most recent call last): File "C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\bl2\ext\mcuboot\scripts\wrapper\wrapper.py", line 126, in <module> wrap() File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 829, in __call__ return self.main(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 782, in main rv = self.invoke(ctx) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 1066, in invoke return ctx.invoke(self.callback, **ctx.params) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 610, in invoke return callback(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\bl2\ext\mcuboot\scripts\wrapper\wrapper.py", line 121, in wrap img.create(key, public_key_format, enckey, dependencies, boot_record) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\imgtool\image.py", line 378, in create for tag, value in custom_tlvs.items(): AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'items' ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed. --- cmake line: cmake -GNinja -S .. -B . -DTFM_PLATFORM=musca_a "-DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=..\toolchain_GNUARM.cmake" -DTEST_NS=ON -DTEST_S=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG -DTFM_PSA_API=ON I've tested building for several of the other targets, which seems to work, but I don't have any of these here. Ideas? Thanks, Thomas -- Thomas Törnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems> -- Thomas Törnblom, Product Engineer IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com<mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com<http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems<http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Is Musca-A deprecated already?

by Thomas Törnblom

I'm working on some IAR brokenness for the cypress/psoc64 and for comparison I'm attempting to build for my favorite board, the musca_a, but it seems builds fails now. I think it was working last week, but today I'm unable to build with any of the toolchains. I get the following errors frmo all of them. Here's a gcc build: --- [629/629] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin FAILED: bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin cmd.exe /C "cd /D C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\cmake_build_armclang\bl2\ext\mcuboot && C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\python.exe C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.2.0 --layout C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/./signing_layout_s_ns.o -k C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin && "C:\Program Files\CMake\bin\cmake.exe" -E copy C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin C:/Users/thomasto/Projects/tf-m4/trusted-firmware-m/cmake_build_armclang/bin" Traceback (most recent call last): File "C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\bl2\ext\mcuboot\scripts\wrapper\wrapper.py", line 126, in <module> wrap() File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 829, in __call__ return self.main(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 782, in main rv = self.invoke(ctx) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 1066, in invoke return ctx.invoke(self.callback, **ctx.params) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\click\core.py", line 610, in invoke return callback(*args, **kwargs) File "C:\Users\thomasto\Projects\tf-m4\trusted-firmware-m\bl2\ext\mcuboot\scripts\wrapper\wrapper.py", line 121, in wrap img.create(key, public_key_format, enckey, dependencies, boot_record) File "C:\Users\thomasto\AppData\Local\Programs\Python\Python39\lib\site-packages\imgtool\image.py", line 378, in create for tag, value in custom_tlvs.items(): AttributeError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'items' ninja: build stopped: subcommand failed. --- cmake line: cmake -GNinja -S .. -B . -DTFM_PLATFORM=musca_a "-DTFM_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=..\toolchain_GNUARM.cmake" -DTEST_NS=ON -DTEST_S=ON -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Debug -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG -DTFM_PSA_API=ON I've tested building for several of the other targets, which seems to work, but I don't have any of these here. Ideas? Thanks, Thomas -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Arm Firmware Framework for M 1.1 Extensions Alpha specification

by Kevin Peng

Hi all, Per the off-line discussion with Andrew, I’d like to start a wider discussion on the interrupt APIs, specifically the Secure Partition API changes for interrupt control in chapter 6.3.3. There are the following APIs: * uint32_t psa_irq_is_enabled (psa_signal_t irq_signal); This API returns 0 if the interrupt is disabled and 1 if the interrupt is enabled. * psa_irq_status_t psa_irq_disable(psa_signal_t irq_signal); This API returns the status of the interrupt prior to this call with an implementation defined value Note the return type of the interrupt status is different. The first one is only to tell whether the interrupt is enabled (1) or not (0) – an equivalent to bool type. The second one could be any value to indicate an interrupt status. And that value is intended to be passed to psa_irq_restore to write to the interrupt control register directly. * void psa_irq_restore(psa_signal_t irq_signal, psa_irq_status_t saved_status); The typical usage: psa_irq_status irq2_state = psa_irq_disable(IRQ2_SIGNAL) ; // manipulate data shared with IRQ2 … psa_irq_restore(IRQ2_SIGNAL, irq2_state); This is a very efficient design as the 'saved status value' can be the exact value that needs to be written to an interrupt control register to restore the previous state. But TF-M seems to be unable to take that advantage. Because the most common interrupt controller is the NVIC provided by the core. The NVIC takes 1/0 to enable or disable the interrupt and one register for 32 interrupts. The underlying NVIC operation provided by CMSIS is NVIC_Enable/DisableIRQ. So the psa_irq_status_t in TF-M would simply 1 or 0 for a specific interrupt signal. Then the psa_irq_restore could be unnecessary if psa_irq_disable returns uint32_t just like psa_irq_is_enabled: uint32_t irq_status = psa_irq_disable(IRQ); ... // critical section if (irq_status) psa_irq_enable(IRQ); Any thoughts on the necessity of the psa_irq_restore API? The draft implementation of the current APIs for easy understanding: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22psa_interrupt_api%22+(status:… Best Regards, Kevin -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrew Thoelke via TF-M Sent: Friday, January 15, 2021 1:25 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Arm Firmware Framework for M 1.1 Extensions Alpha specification Hi all, The PSA Firmware Framework for M 1.1 Extensions specification is now published on Arm Developer. This document introduces a set of updates and extensions to the Arm® Platform Security Architecture Firmware Framework (FF-M) specification, designed to build on the capabilities provided in version 1.0. This is an initial ALPHA release in order to enable wider review and feedback on the changes proposed to be included in the v1.1 specification. At this quality level, the changes and interfaces defined are not stable enough for product development. When the proposed extensions are sufficiently stable to be classed as Beta, they will be integrated into the FF-M version 1.1 specification. The 1.1 Extensions document can be downloaded from: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/aes0039/latest Both the 1.0 Specification and the 1.1 Extensions document are linked from the main PSA architecture page: https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-sec… Ken and I have presented a number of times at last year's Tech Forums on the proposals in the specification, most recently I provided a summary of the whole document on 10th December 2020. If you have any feedback, please provide it to arm.psa-feedback(a)arm.com<mailto:arm.psa-feedback@arm.com>, or discuss the proposals here in the TF-M mailing list. Regards, Andrew -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC] Doxygen usage

by Ken Liu

Hi, As mentioned in Tech Forum, call for feedbacks for doxygen usage: - Anyone is checking doxygen documents? - Which API are you checking with doxygen documents? The service APIs, or even some internal static API for SPM? - When you are reading code, will you check the docs or you just open them in editors and then read it? The background is we put many efforts on docs, it costs effort to maintain the doxygen format comments for all sources even the concept is covered in the docs folder, we are trying to find a balance to help mitigate the effort spent on internal logics (such as those static APIs inside SPM fewer people would update). For the interfaces API, doxygen would be always there so user can find them easily. Thanks /Ken

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Review request on design proposal of adding secure Flash support in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi everyone, The design proposal of adding secure Flash support in TF-M has been updated, I would like to ask for a review, any comments and suggestions will be appreciated. Link of the design proposal: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/8033 Best Regards, 杨雪松 Edward Yang 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 Macronix Microelectronics(Suzhou) Co., Ltd. 地址：中国苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 No.55，Su Hong Xi Road，Suzhou Industrail Park，Suzhou 215021 P.R.China TEL: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3102 FAX: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 E-mail: edwardyang(a)mxic.com.cn Http: //www.mxic.com.cn ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The agenda for the forum: 1. Proposal for changes to the OpenCI job coverage 2. Proposal to reduce Doxygen coverage to the interfaces only 3. Ongoing open issues: * Musca-A platform deprecation * Arm Firmware Framework for M 1.1 Extensions Alpha specification Regards,, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: 20 January 2021 14:18 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21 Hi Anton, I would like to raise a discussion about doxygen usage. I think it is acceptable to apply doxygen usage in interfaces only if we want to keep alignment with CMSIS code since it applied doxygen result as reference manual; but for other logics, the doxygen is almost not used. Wondered how many users would generate reference manual from doxygen; or they just open an editor then start reading code from sources. Thanks. /Ken ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Karl Zhang via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: Wednesday, January 20, 2021 7:54 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21 Hi Anton, I would like to propose some changes to the openCI job coverage, it may take ~20 mins. BR Karl ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 4:19 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 21 at 15:00-16:00 UTC (US time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21

by Ken Liu

Hi Anton, I would like to raise a discussion about doxygen usage. I think it is acceptable to apply doxygen usage in interfaces only if we want to keep alignment with CMSIS code since it applied doxygen result as reference manual; but for other logics, the doxygen is almost not used. Wondered how many users would generate reference manual from doxygen; or they just open an editor then start reading code from sources. Thanks. /Ken ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Karl Zhang via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Wednesday, January 20, 2021 7:54 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21 Hi Anton, I would like to propose some changes to the openCI job coverage, it may take ~20 mins. BR Karl ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 4:19 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 21 at 15:00-16:00 UTC (US time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21

by Karl Zhang

Hi Anton, I would like to propose some changes to the openCI job coverage, it may take ~20 mins. BR Karl ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 4:19 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - January 21 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 21 at 15:00-16:00 UTC (US time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Couple of adjustment patches coming

by Ken Liu

Hi, For implementing coming features and optimization, there would be couples of adjustment patches coming, this is the first one (the number looks good): https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/8000 The idea is to get these patches to come in first so that we can have more time before the next release to fix spotted issues. Please help to review the patches and provide different thinking if you have. Thanks. /Ken

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation

by Ken Liu

Hi, I have merged these patches so they took place now. For lv1 and lv2 users, they don’t need the linker script template any more. The next step is syncing lv3 with lv1/lv2. This change may miss verification on some platforms, please report the build & run issue if you have, thanks. BR /Ken -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Thursday, January 14, 2021 9:49 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation I think the link needs to be updated into: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22static_linker_scripts%22+(sta… This would make the components arrangement more simpler than using a templating. But for level 3 we still have to using a templating as now there is no 'foreach' like functionalities supported in the ld/sct/icf. /Ken -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raef Coles via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 11:44 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] [RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation Hi everyone I'd like to request comments on an upcoming change to the linker scripts. Because of some recent changes to the memory layout for level 1 and level 2 isolation, it's now possible to avoid the generation step via tfm_parse_manifest_lists.py for those linker files. This means that the files are static and have been committed into the source tree (as they used to be). We anticipate this change will make integrating TF-M into non-cmake buildsystems easier, as it will avoid one of the places where files need to be generated at build-time. The reason this is an RFC is that it is a potentially breaking change, but only for integrators _not_ using the cmake buildsystem. Currently the linker uses a large variety of pattern matches to organise the partition symbols, with these patterns being defined in the tfm_manifest_list.yaml. After this change, the linker will only look for two patterns: `*app_rot_partition*` and `*psa_rot_partition*` With the intention that the secure partitions will be compiled into a static library, where the filename is (for example) `libtfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.a`. The cmake buildsystem will be updated to generate these filenames, but other integrators will need to adjust their compilation steps else the linking will fail. Any comments or concerns would be appreciated. Patches can be found at: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%23static_linker_scripts%22 Raef -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Musca-A platform deprecation announcement

by Thomas Törnblom

Hi Anton, The Musca-A is my first choice for testing new things with TF-M, mainly because that’s the simplest Arm board I have access to. What alternative do you recommend? Cheers, Thomas 18 jan. 2021 kl. 18:01 skrev Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>: Hello, I would like to propose the deprecation of Musca-A platform. With whole respect to the first HW platform supported TF-M, it became quite old and difficult to access. The current plan is to remove Musca-A from support and TF-M master code in the next release v1.3.0. Please reply to this mail until Feb 16 (in 4 weeks) having any objection for deprecation. Thanks and Best regards Anton Komlev -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 10 months

2
1
0 0

Musca-A platform deprecation announcement

by Anton Komlev

Hello, I would like to propose the deprecation of Musca-A platform. With whole respect to the first HW platform supported TF-M, it became quite old and difficult to access. The current plan is to remove Musca-A from support and TF-M master code in the next release v1.3.0. Please reply to this mail until Feb 16 (in 4 weeks) having any objection for deprecation. Thanks and Best regards Anton Komlev

4 years, 10 months

1
0
0 0

Review on Firmware Update service in TF-M

by Sherry Zhang

Hi, I created the patchset of adding the Firmware Update service in TF-M feature branch. I would like to ask you to review this patchset if you are interested in it. Top of the patchset: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7883 Regards, Sherry Zhang

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Arm Firmware Framework for M 1.1 Extensions Alpha specification

by Andrew Thoelke

Hi all, The PSA Firmware Framework for M 1.1 Extensions specification is now published on Arm Developer. This document introduces a set of updates and extensions to the Arm® Platform Security Architecture Firmware Framework (FF-M) specification, designed to build on the capabilities provided in version 1.0. This is an initial ALPHA release in order to enable wider review and feedback on the changes proposed to be included in the v1.1 specification. At this quality level, the changes and interfaces defined are not stable enough for product development. When the proposed extensions are sufficiently stable to be classed as Beta, they will be integrated into the FF-M version 1.1 specification. The 1.1 Extensions document can be downloaded from: https://developer.arm.com/documentation/aes0039/latest Both the 1.0 Specification and the 1.1 Extensions document are linked from the main PSA architecture page: https://developer.arm.com/architectures/security-architectures/platform-sec… Ken and I have presented a number of times at last year's Tech Forums on the proposals in the specification, most recently I provided a summary of the whole document on 10th December 2020. If you have any feedback, please provide it to arm.psa-feedback(a)arm.com, or discuss the proposals here in the TF-M mailing list. Regards, Andrew

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7

by Kevin Peng

I'd like give a proposal on how to manage the version of tf-m-tests repo in auto-download mode of the build system. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:33 PM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7 Hi Anton, I'd like to give a brief introduction to TF-M generic threat model. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:30 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 7 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

2
3
0 0

Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation

by Ken Liu

I think the link needs to be updated into: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22static_linker_scripts%22+(sta… This would make the components arrangement more simpler than using a templating. But for level 3 we still have to using a templating as now there is no 'foreach' like functionalities supported in the ld/sct/icf. /Ken -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raef Coles via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, January 13, 2021 11:44 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] [RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation Hi everyone I'd like to request comments on an upcoming change to the linker scripts. Because of some recent changes to the memory layout for level 1 and level 2 isolation, it's now possible to avoid the generation step via tfm_parse_manifest_lists.py for those linker files. This means that the files are static and have been committed into the source tree (as they used to be). We anticipate this change will make integrating TF-M into non-cmake buildsystems easier, as it will avoid one of the places where files need to be generated at build-time. The reason this is an RFC is that it is a potentially breaking change, but only for integrators _not_ using the cmake buildsystem. Currently the linker uses a large variety of pattern matches to organise the partition symbols, with these patterns being defined in the tfm_manifest_list.yaml. After this change, the linker will only look for two patterns: `*app_rot_partition*` and `*psa_rot_partition*` With the intention that the secure partitions will be compiled into a static library, where the filename is (for example) `libtfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.a`. The cmake buildsystem will be updated to generate these filenames, but other integrators will need to adjust their compilation steps else the linking will fail. Any comments or concerns would be appreciated. Patches can be found at: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%23static_linker_scripts%22 Raef -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Technical Forum call - January 21

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 21 at 15:00-16:00 UTC (US time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC] Static linker scripts for level 1 and 2 isolation

by Raef Coles

Hi everyone I'd like to request comments on an upcoming change to the linker scripts. Because of some recent changes to the memory layout for level 1 and level 2 isolation, it's now possible to avoid the generation step via tfm_parse_manifest_lists.py for those linker files. This means that the files are static and have been committed into the source tree (as they used to be). We anticipate this change will make integrating TF-M into non-cmake buildsystems easier, as it will avoid one of the places where files need to be generated at build-time. The reason this is an RFC is that it is a potentially breaking change, but only for integrators _not_ using the cmake buildsystem. Currently the linker uses a large variety of pattern matches to organise the partition symbols, with these patterns being defined in the tfm_manifest_list.yaml. After this change, the linker will only look for two patterns: `*app_rot_partition*` and `*psa_rot_partition*` With the intention that the secure partitions will be compiled into a static library, where the filename is (for example) `libtfm_psa_rot_partition_crypto.a`. The cmake buildsystem will be updated to generate these filenames, but other integrators will need to adjust their compilation steps else the linking will fail. Any comments or concerns would be appreciated. Patches can be found at: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%23static_linker_scripts%22 Raef

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC] Variable naming refinement in manifest tool

by Kevin Peng

Hi all, I made a patch<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7817> to refine the variable naming in manifest tooling, specifically the "manifest.manifest" in templates. I'm changing it to "partition.manifest" which should be more accurate and easy understanding. Broadcasting here for anyone has out-of-tree templates. And any comments are welcome. Best Regards, Kevin

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model

by David Hu

Hi Antonio, Thanks a lot for reviewing the threat model and bringing up this topic. To fully mitigate the threat you mentioned, NSPE shall enforce NS tasks isolation and assign/manage NS identifications. IMHO, It mainly relies on non-secure side implementation. Therefore that threat can be covered in the scope of another threat model against NS side. TF-M is trying to figure out how to assist NSPE to manage and transfer NS identifications. Any suggestion or comment is welcome and helpful! 😊 Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, December 30, 2020 7:13 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model Hi Hu, I read the threat model and I have a question regarding a potential threat. I’m not sure it should belong to this generic threat model or it is already included in one of those presented. The scenario is the following: a NS App X uses a RoT Service that store data private to X. Another NS App Y can fool the SPE to impersonate X and retrieve its private data. For example, X save a value in the secure storage and Y retrieves this value. TF-M prevents this using non secure client identification mechanism. This is a classic confused deputy problem. Can this be considered a threat in this model or should it belong to another model/TOE? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 https://akiannillo.github.io/

4 years, 11 months

2
2
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7

by David Hu

Hi Anton, I'd like to give a brief introduction to TF-M generic threat model. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, January 4, 2021 5:30 PM To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - Jan 7 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 7 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Technical Forum call - Jan 7

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, January 7 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

[RFC] Remove unused section 'TFM_UNPRIV_DATA'

by Ken Liu

Hi, The existing section 'TFM_UNPRIV_DATA' now holds nothing - it was designed for holding some data belong to the unprivileged code block, while now the unprivileged code is required as read-only and no place for its read-write data. Remove this section as it is unused; also remove those code objects exists in the unprivileged code section but has read-write data: 'platform_retarget_dev.o' and 'device_definition.o'. This patch changes some sources inside the platforms, so the platform owner please help to check if that matters: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7754 Thanks. /Ken

4 years, 11 months

1
1
0 0

Re: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model

by Antonio Ken IANNILLO

Hi Hu, I read the threat model and I have a question regarding a potential threat. I’m not sure it should belong to this generic threat model or it is already included in one of those presented. The scenario is the following: a NS App X uses a RoT Service that store data private to X. Another NS App Y can fool the SPE to impersonate X and retrieve its private data. For example, X save a value in the secure storage and Y retrieves this value. TF-M prevents this using non secure client identification mechanism. This is a classic confused deputy problem. Can this be considered a threat in this model or should it belong to another model/TOE? Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 https://akiannillo.github.io/

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] RFC on changes to install directory structure

by Xinyu Zhang

Hi Raef, Please merge this patch for CI together with your patches. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/ci/tf-m-ci-scripts/+/7755 BR, Xinyu -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Raef Coles via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2020 7:56 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] RFC on changes to install directory structure Hi everyone I'd like to request for comment on some changes to the TF-M installed files. Since this is an interface change (though minor), changes to it might cause issues with existing TF-M integrations. The current install directory looks like: install ├── export │ └── tfm └── outputs This doesn't give any useful information about what is contained in each directory. The proposed replacement is: install ├── image_signing ├── interface └── outputs Where the contents of `export/tfm` have been moved into `interface`, which better captures the contents of that directory. `image_signing` is new in the patchset, and contains the scripts, layouts and keys needed to sign an NS image. The final improvement in the patchset is the ability to control the location of the `install` directory via TFM_INSTALL_PATH which could be useful for integrators. Feedback would be appreciated if you feel that these new directory names could be improved, or if this change would cause significant breakage for your TF-M integration. Patchset here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7398/6 Raef -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

RFC on changes to install directory structure

by Raef Coles

Hi everyone I'd like to request for comment on some changes to the TF-M installed files. Since this is an interface change (though minor), changes to it might cause issues with existing TF-M integrations. The current install directory looks like: install ├── export │ └── tfm └── outputs This doesn't give any useful information about what is contained in each directory. The proposed replacement is: install ├── image_signing ├── interface └── outputs Where the contents of `export/tfm` have been moved into `interface`, which better captures the contents of that directory. `image_signing` is new in the patchset, and contains the scripts, layouts and keys needed to sign an NS image. The final improvement in the patchset is the ability to control the location of the `install` directory via TFM_INSTALL_PATH which could be useful for integrators. Feedback would be appreciated if you feel that these new directory names could be improved, or if this change would cause significant breakage for your TF-M integration. Patchset here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7398/6 Raef

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Changes to TF-M NS interface build

by David Hu

Hi all, Happy holiday! I'd like to let you know that non-secure interface build has been moved from TF-M to tf-m-tests in following patches: TF-M: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22move-ns-api%22+(status:open%2… Tf-m-tests: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22add-ns-api%22+(status:open%20… After that change, the .c files under TF-M interface/src are built during non-secure side build. It aligns with the actual process of NS integration with TF-M. Moreover, non-secure specific flags, which control TF-M NS interface, can be configured and managed in non-secure side build, without affecting TF-M secure part. Please modify tf-m-tests app/CMakeLists.txt for future changes to non-secure interface build. Thanks. Best regards, Hu Ziji

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by David Hu

Hi Poppy, Some rough ideas about secure Flash support in TF-M. IMHO, there can be two options: 1. Based on ITS service Secure Flash acts as the flash driver at the backend of ITS service. The secure Flash driver can invoke Crypto secure service instead of mbedTLS to avoid building two duplicates of mbedTLS library. The cryptographic operation and key management are implemented in secure Flash driver and can be transparent to ITS service while some initialization can be necessary. But it cannot support persistent keys otherwise it will generate a circular dependency between ITS and Crypto services. 1. Based on PS service With PS service, the cryptographic operations can be implemented by PS crypto steps, such as encryption and authentication. Secure Flash driver only covers communication with remote device. We don’t have to worry about the circular dependency with Crypto service. However, there are some limitations of PS service currently: * PS service cannot support multiple asset keys for cryptography. * PS service cannot work alone without ITS service. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: Monday, December 21, 2020 1:22 PM To: Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com<mailto:Jamie.Fox@arm.com>> Cc: Julien Su <juliensu(a)mxic.com.tw<mailto:juliensu@mxic.com.tw>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Aaron Zhu <AaronZhu(a)mxic.com.cn<mailto:AaronZhu@mxic.com.cn>>; TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>; nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Hi Jamie, >As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. The crypto keys you mentioned in your previous reply are the crypto keys used to encrypt the communication channel between host MCU with the secure Flash? Or the secrets such as (public/private)key pairs used in TLS protocol? If the former,I think these keys may be stored in NVM memories such as OTP or internal flash of MCU,and these keys can be loaded and imported as transient keys in RAM with a key handle during such as secure boot, then we can call PSA Crypto service with these key handles, in this case, the dependency from Crypto to secure flash doesn't exist. Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> Poppy Wu/CHINA/MXIC 2020/12/16 14:20 To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn<mailto:EdwardYang@mxic.com.cn>> cc Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-MLink<Notes://cnmail01/482583DD001E2E02/DABA975B9FB113EB852564B5001283EA/6BDCE39917970ADF4825863F00689523> Hi Jamie, Thank you for your reply. You are right,the secure Flash can be used to store sensitive information like TLS private keys,in this application, during TLS handshake,Crypto service depends on secure Flash driver to get these private keys,so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. And you mentioned implementation of crypto functions varies depending on the platform(some platforms have hardware crypto module while the others have to depend on software crypto library), platfrom without HW crypto module could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). As I understand, currently tfm Crypto service also uses Mbed TLS as the backend software crypto library by default. I am wondering if secure Flash driver could call this Mbed TLS library APIs (such as mbedtls_aes_encrypt（）) directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> Jamie Fox via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> 2020/12/16 03:02 Please respond to Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com<mailto:Jamie.Fox@arm.com>> To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn<mailto:EdwardYang@mxic.com.cn>> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Hi, The trouble with calling the PSA Crypto functions from your secure flash driver is that it will create a circular dependency between the ITS service and the Crypto service. Crypto uses ITS to store its keys, but then the secure flash driver calls the Crypto service again to encrypt the data. These circular dependencies between partitions are forbidden in TF-M. As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. That means the dependency on the Crypto service in the secure flash driver needs to be avoided. I think ideally the best way to do this would be to use hardware crypto functions available in the platform instead of PSA Crypto APIs inside the flash driver, but if no crypto hardware is available then you could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). Hope that helps. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 15 December 2020 10:08 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. [cid:image001.gif@01D6D91C.DAC89B20] If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model

by David Hu

Hi all, I’d like to merge the generic threat model by the end of this week if no further comment. I’m also going to give a brief introduction to TF-M threat modeling in future technical forum. 😊 Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Thursday, December 10, 2020 9:37 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M generic threat model Hi all, A generic threat model of TF-M has been uploaded to gerrit. It is a key step in TF-M Threat Modeling. Please help review the threat model document via the link below. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7492 Any question or comment is welcome! Best regards, Hu Ziji

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi Jamie, >As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. The crypto keys you mentioned in your previous reply are the crypto keys used to encrypt the communication channel between host MCU with the secure Flash? Or the secrets such as (public/private)key pairs used in TLS protocol? If the former,I think these keys may be stored in NVM memories such as OTP or internal flash of MCU,and these keys can be loaded and imported as transient keys in RAM with a key handle during such as secure boot, then we can call PSA Crypto service with these key handles, in this case, the dependency from Crypto to secure flash doesn't exist. Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn Poppy Wu/CHINA/MXIC 2020/12/16 14:20 To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn> cc Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-MLink Hi Jamie, Thank you for your reply. You are right,the secure Flash can be used to store sensitive information like TLS private keys,in this application, during TLS handshake,Crypto service depends on secure Flash driver to get these private keys,so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. And you mentioned implementation of crypto functions varies depending on the platform(some platforms have hardware crypto module while the others have to depend on software crypto library), platfrom without HW crypto module could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). As I understand, currently tfm Crypto service also uses Mbed TLS as the backend software crypto library by default. I am wondering if secure Flash driver could call this Mbed TLS library APIs (such as mbedtls_aes_encrypt（）) directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn Jamie Fox via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 2020/12/16 03:02 Please respond to Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com> To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Hi, The trouble with calling the PSA Crypto functions from your secure flash driver is that it will create a circular dependency between the ITS service and the Crypto service. Crypto uses ITS to store its keys, but then the secure flash driver calls the Crypto service again to encrypt the data. These circular dependencies between partitions are forbidden in TF-M. As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. That means the dependency on the Crypto service in the secure flash driver needs to be avoided. I think ideally the best way to do this would be to use hardware crypto functions available in the platform instead of PSA Crypto APIs inside the flash driver, but if no crypto hardware is available then you could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). Hope that helps. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 15 December 2020 10:08 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 11 months

1
0
0 0

Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi Jamie, Thank you for your reply. You are right,the secure Flash can be used to store sensitive information like TLS private keys,in this application, during TLS handshake,Crypto service depends on secure Flash driver to get these private keys,so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. And you mentioned implementation of crypto functions varies depending on the platform(some platforms have hardware crypto module while the others have to depend on software crypto library), platfrom without HW crypto module could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). As I understand, currently tfm Crypto service also uses Mbed TLS as the backend software crypto library by default. I am wondering if secure Flash driver could call this Mbed TLS library APIs (such as mbedtls_aes_encrypt（）) directly? Best Regards, Poppy Wu 吴偏偏 Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd 旺宏微电子（苏州）有限公司 No. 55, Su Hong Xi Road ,SIP, Suzhou, PRC, 215021 苏州工业园区苏虹西路55号 Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn Jamie Fox via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 2020/12/16 03:02 Please respond to Jamie Fox <Jamie.Fox(a)arm.com> To Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn> cc nd <nd(a)arm.com>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Hi, The trouble with calling the PSA Crypto functions from your secure flash driver is that it will create a circular dependency between the ITS service and the Crypto service. Crypto uses ITS to store its keys, but then the secure flash driver calls the Crypto service again to encrypt the data. These circular dependencies between partitions are forbidden in TF-M. As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. That means the dependency on the Crypto service in the secure flash driver needs to be avoided. I think ideally the best way to do this would be to use hardware crypto functions available in the platform instead of PSA Crypto APIs inside the flash driver, but if no crypto hardware is available then you could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). Hope that helps. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 15 December 2020 10:08 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================-- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 12 months

2
1
0 0

[CANCELLED] TF-M Technical Forum - December 24

by Anton Komlev

Hello, Probably the next Technical Forum will not be very popular, planned on Thursday, Dec 24 (US friendly time zone). Let's cancel this slot to meet again in January 7. Wish you pleasant holidays and Happy New Year. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

4 years, 12 months

1
0
0 0

Tiny update on the code review guidelines

by Ken Liu

Hi, The purpose of code review guidelines is trying to provide some reference for reviewers. It is still in the evaluation stage. After it gets matured then we can pointer to this document as a required reference. I updated some part of it, the main changes: - The private symbol (static inside a source file) can have a prefix for easier source viewing, a reader would know it is a symbol in the file he/she is viewing which can avoid cross-files 'find reference' operation in the editor. - Clarifies the header file types and the usage: A 'interface' header file is for abstraction, and a typical 'include' header contains exported functionalities for external module usage. Please help to take a look if you have time - as this is one of the upcoming updates, I will treat the review contents out of the changed lines into a new patch if it is possible. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7577 Thanks. /Ken

4 years, 12 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by Jamie Fox

Hi, The trouble with calling the PSA Crypto functions from your secure flash driver is that it will create a circular dependency between the ITS service and the Crypto service. Crypto uses ITS to store its keys, but then the secure flash driver calls the Crypto service again to encrypt the data. These circular dependencies between partitions are forbidden in TF-M. As I understand it, one of the uses of the secure flash is to store crypto keys, so the dependency from Crypto to the secure flash needs to be kept. That means the dependency on the Crypto service in the secure flash driver needs to be avoided. I think ideally the best way to do this would be to use hardware crypto functions available in the platform instead of PSA Crypto APIs inside the flash driver, but if no crypto hardware is available then you could use AES encrypt/decrypt functions from a software crypto library (e.g. Mbed TLS). Hope that helps. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 15 December 2020 10:08 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. [cid:image001.gif@01D6D313.1B0E4E10] If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 12 months

1
0
0 0

Discuss how to support secure Flash in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Dear all, I would like to discuss how to add secure Flash support in TF-M. Firstly, I want to describe the motivation of adding secure Flash support in TF-M. Currently ARM TF-M provides protected storage service(PS service for short) to implement security protection on external normal storage, however this type external normal storage is still vulnerable to unauthorized physical modifications/erasing and cloning.Macronix and other Flash memory suppliers have developed secure Flash products to enhance the security in external flash devices. Secure Flash enables mutual authentication between itself and host MCU/SoC and only permits the authorised host to perform access, besides, the communication channel between host MCU/SoC and secure Flash is protected by encryption, authentication, data scrambling, and frame sequencing with monotonic counters as shown below, so the secure Flash provides dependable defense against unauthorised access, man-in-the-middle, replay, sniffing and other security threats. If we port TF-M to a platform which uses secure Flash as external flash,then secure Flash driver should be added to TF-M.However,compared with nomal external flash driver,secure Flash driver needs extra crypto functions(such as calling AES crypto functions to encrypt/decrypt data), if the secure Flash driver is placed in platform folder in TF-M code structure as a backend of ITS service, I don't know whether secure Flash driver is allowed to call Crypto service(such as psa_aead_encrypt(), psa_aead_decrypt() )directly.If not, are there any other solutions to perform crypto operations in secure Flash driver? Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd Tel: 86-512-62580888 EXT: 3147 Fax: 86-512-62585399 ZIP: 215021 http://www.mxic.com.cn ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

4 years, 12 months

1
0
0 0

ITS and PS HALs pushed for review

by Jamie Fox

Hi all, I have pushed for review the new Internal Trusted Storage and Protected Storage HAL designs, as well as an initial implementation for AN521. I will update the change for all other platforms once the design has settled down. It expands the ITS and PS HALs to cover all flash and filesystem configuration parameters required from the platform. The CMSIS Flash Driver is exposed to abstract the flash device itself. ITS is updated to use the new HALs, with its_flash_info_external.c, its_flash_info_internal.c and its_flash.c removed. The ITS filesystem is updated to take a configuration struct as an initialisation parameter, which is filled using values from the HAL. The gerrit reviews are: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/4781 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7598 Kind regards, Jamie

4 years, 12 months

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] [RFC] Moving partition stack into partition BSS/ZI.

by Ken Liu

😉 No response got yet, as it is closing to Xmas, plan to merge them before end of this week (18th Dec) if there is no more voice. Thanks. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Monday, December 7, 2020 3:22 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] [RFC] Moving partition stack into partition BSS/ZI. Hi, We are now allocating partition’s stack inside linker script file, and there are two external patches trying to move these stack definitions into partition’s BSS/ZI: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5374/5 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6508/1 The advantages: - Simplify the linker script/sct templating, stack items can be saved. - Stack as global just uses 8 bytes alignment instead of wider bytes alignment (such as 32 bytes in most of the cases). - Stack is private data, putting private data together is a direct way. And the disadvantages: - Stack memory and global memory may affect each other – actually we don’t apply such protecting mechanism now? Anything I missed? Any feedbacks are welcome. We would collect your feedbacks and update the patches if they are still available after your comments. Other proposals are welcome, too. Thanks. /Ken

5 years

1
0
0 0

Proposal to fix the version of tf-m-tests for auto-downloading in build system

by Kevin Peng

Hi all, The build system currently fetches the latest "master" of tf-m-tests repo for building, if auto-download dependencies mode is used (which is the default). This would break the building when: * TF-M and tf-m-tests have dependency changes got merged * A developer is working with a local copy of TF-M that has not been updated to the latest. * The developer does a clean build with auto-downloading * The build system fetch the latest tf-m-tests repo which is not compatible with the local copy of TF-M We've seen this kind of issue reported in mailing list. To solve this problem, the proposal<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7550> of fixing the "TFM_TEST_REPO_VERSION" to a hash or tag is raised. With this change, the build system would download a compatible version always. The version of the test repo is not required to be updated for every commit in the test repo. (Guide line on when to update the version is required and it's still under discussion - welcome for ideas.) Developers want a different version can always override "TFM_TEST_REPO_PATH" to a local copy to build. Best Regards, Kevin

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M + New path for Musca-B1 platform

by Mark Horvath

Dear All, The Secure Enclave patches have been merged and caused a minor source structure change. The platform so far named musca_b1 became musca_b1/sse_200, because we added support to the other subsystem on the Musca-B1 board, musca_b1/secure_enclave. So to build onto the old Musca-B1 platform the -DTFM_PLATFORM=musca_b1/sse_200 flag will be needed. All information about the Secure Enclave topic can be found in these rsts: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/desig… https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/refer… https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/platform/e… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 09 December 2020 10:11 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, The patches for the Secure Enclave topic are planned to be merged soon if no further comments raised. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 03 December 2020 16:38 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, I would like to merge the Secure Enclave topic at about middle of next week, feel free to give any feedback. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 14 September 2020 21:00 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, Following the tech forum presentation (back in 6th August) I uploaded the draft design document for the Secure Enclave topic: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5653 I also updated the first implementation of the proposed solution for the Musca-B1 board with minimal features, marked as WIP: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Limitations, missing features, notes: * No support for isolation level2 on SSE-200 * Protected Storage is an Application RoT partition, but PS also moved to Secure Enclave * Some regression tests running on secure side of SSE-200 fail as all messages are forwarded with the same client ID to Secure Enclave * All IPC message forwarding is a blocking call * Only one message is put into the mailbox at a time * Musca-B1 related documentation is not complete yet * Generated files are not committed, manifest parser should be run before build. * The BL0 component mentioned in the tech forum presentation is not uploaded, as it is based on the new cmake system, and not so interesting right now * Cmake changes are rudimentary, will be rebased to new cmake system. Any feedback very welcomed! Best regards, Márk Horváth Senior Software Engineer Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com> Arm Hungary Kft., Corvin Offices II, Crystal Tower, Budapest, Futó u. 45. H-1082 Hungary www.arm.com<http://www.arm.com/>

5 years

1
0
0 0

TF-M generic threat model

by David Hu

Hi all, A generic threat model of TF-M has been uploaded to gerrit. It is a key step in TF-M Threat Modeling. Please help review the threat model document via the link below. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7492 Any question or comment is welcome! Best regards, Hu Ziji

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10

by Anton Komlev

Hi All The agenda for the forum: 1. PSA FF-M v1.1 alpha specification overview. Do not miss it! 2. AOB Thanks, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrew Thoelke via TF-M Sent: 09 December 2020 15:42 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10 Hi all, The proposed version 1.1 extensions to PSA FF-M version 1.0 will be published as an alpha specification in the next few weeks. I would like to update the Technical Forum on the final set of features for v1.1. (Some of these have already been presented earlier this year to the forum) Kind regards, Andrew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 December 2020 15:45 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, December 10 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years

1
0
0 0

SW countermeasure against physical attacks in SPE

by Tamas Ban

Hi, PSA Level 3 certification mandates protection against physical attack at a certain extent. MCUboot v1.7.0 release already contains SW countermeasures against fault injection attacks. These can be used at device boot-up time. But fault injection attacks are not targeting only the device boot-up time, instead they could be applied against the runtime firmware. The following design proposal is addressing this threat: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7476 Prototype implementation on AN521 and Musca-B1 target (top of the patch set): https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7475/1 Review and comments are welcome! BR, Tamas Ban

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10

by Andrew Thoelke

Hi all, The proposed version 1.1 extensions to PSA FF-M version 1.0 will be published as an alpha specification in the next few weeks. I would like to update the Technical Forum on the final set of features for v1.1. (Some of these have already been presented earlier this year to the forum) Kind regards, Andrew From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 December 2020 15:45 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, December 10 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M

by Mark Horvath

Dear All, The patches for the Secure Enclave topic are planned to be merged soon if no further comments raised. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 03 December 2020 16:38 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, I would like to merge the Secure Enclave topic at about middle of next week, feel free to give any feedback. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 14 September 2020 21:00 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, Following the tech forum presentation (back in 6th August) I uploaded the draft design document for the Secure Enclave topic: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5653 I also updated the first implementation of the proposed solution for the Musca-B1 board with minimal features, marked as WIP: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Limitations, missing features, notes: * No support for isolation level2 on SSE-200 * Protected Storage is an Application RoT partition, but PS also moved to Secure Enclave * Some regression tests running on secure side of SSE-200 fail as all messages are forwarded with the same client ID to Secure Enclave * All IPC message forwarding is a blocking call * Only one message is put into the mailbox at a time * Musca-B1 related documentation is not complete yet * Generated files are not committed, manifest parser should be run before build. * The BL0 component mentioned in the tech forum presentation is not uploaded, as it is based on the new cmake system, and not so interesting right now * Cmake changes are rudimentary, will be rebased to new cmake system. Any feedback very welcomed! Best regards, Márk Horváth Senior Software Engineer Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com> Arm Hungary Kft., Corvin Offices II, Crystal Tower, Budapest, Futó u. 45. H-1082 Hungary www.arm.com<http://www.arm.com/>

5 years

1
0
0 0

TF-M openCI nightly notification mail list is ready to subscribe

by Karl Zhang

Hi, There is a CI notification mail list enabled, it aims to send the failure info of TF-M nightly job to the subscribers without spam to a big group. If you are interested in the master branch nightly verification status, feel free to add your email to the list. Subscribing: https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m-ci-notifications The notification only triggers a notification when CI build or test fail occur from the nightly job. Thanks Karl

5 years

1
0
0 0

IAR, problems building with 8.50.9

by Thomas Törnblom

IAR released a new service pack late last week, version 8.50.9. This service pack includes a new compiler version, which although thoroughly tested, apparently introduced a new intricate bug, which causes at least the musca_a mcuboot to fail. The issue has been identified and fixed, and the next release should have this fix. I have no date for when this will be released or in what form. So for the time being, please do not upgrade above version 8.50.7. Thanks, Thomas -- *Thomas Törnblom*, /Product Engineer/ IAR Systems AB Box 23051, Strandbodgatan 1 SE-750 23 Uppsala, SWEDEN Mobile: +46 76 180 17 80 Fax: +46 18 16 78 01 E-mail: thomas.tornblom(a)iar.com <mailto:thomas.tornblom@iar.com> Website: www.iar.com <http://www.iar.com> Twitter: www.twitter.com/iarsystems <http://www.twitter.com/iarsystems>

5 years

1
0
0 0

[RFC] Moving partition stack into partition BSS/ZI.

by Ken Liu

Hi, We are now allocating partition's stack inside linker script file, and there are two external patches trying to move these stack definitions into partition's BSS/ZI: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5374/5 https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6508/1 The advantages: - Simplify the linker script/sct templating, stack items can be saved. - Stack as global just uses 8 bytes alignment instead of wider bytes alignment (such as 32 bytes in most of the cases). - Stack is private data, putting private data together is a direct way. And the disadvantages: - Stack memory and global memory may affect each other - actually we don't apply such protecting mechanism now? Anything I missed? Any feedbacks are welcome. We would collect your feedbacks and update the patches if they are still available after your comments. Other proposals are welcome, too. Thanks. /Ken

5 years

1
0
0 0

[RFC] Build: Move UART symbols to SPRTL

by Kevin Peng

Hi Platform owners, explicitly ST, Nordic and NXP owners. Could you confirm that this patch<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6678> wouldn't break your platforms. The patch changes the build system to put the UART drivers to the SPRTL. It is important to improve the isolation implementations. For more details, please see the patch. We will wait for one more week and merge it as is if no feedbacks. Any feedbacks from others are welcome always. Best Regards, Kevin

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M

by Mark Horvath

Dear All, I would like to merge the Secure Enclave topic at about middle of next week, feel free to give any feedback. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Best regards, Mark From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Mark Horvath via TF-M Sent: 14 September 2020 21:00 To: 'tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org' <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-M] Secure Enclave solution in TF-M Dear All, Following the tech forum presentation (back in 6th August) I uploaded the draft design document for the Secure Enclave topic: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/5653 I also updated the first implementation of the proposed solution for the Musca-B1 board with minimal features, marked as WIP: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22Secure+Enclave%22+(status:ope… Limitations, missing features, notes: * No support for isolation level2 on SSE-200 * Protected Storage is an Application RoT partition, but PS also moved to Secure Enclave * Some regression tests running on secure side of SSE-200 fail as all messages are forwarded with the same client ID to Secure Enclave * All IPC message forwarding is a blocking call * Only one message is put into the mailbox at a time * Musca-B1 related documentation is not complete yet * Generated files are not committed, manifest parser should be run before build. * The BL0 component mentioned in the tech forum presentation is not uploaded, as it is based on the new cmake system, and not so interesting right now * Cmake changes are rudimentary, will be rebased to new cmake system. Any feedback very welcomed! Best regards, Márk Horváth Senior Software Engineer Mark.Horvath(a)arm.com<mailto:Mark.Horvath@arm.com> Arm Hungary Kft., Corvin Offices II, Crystal Tower, Budapest, Futó u. 45. H-1082 Hungary www.arm.com<http://www.arm.com/>

5 years

1
0
0 0

Review request of TF-M dual-cpu mailbox enhancement

by David Hu

Hi all, Could you please help the patches to enhance TF-M dual-cpu mailbox, as discussed in last Technical Forum? Improvements to make NS RTOS port easier: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mailbox-enhance%22+(status:op… A new working model to support NS RTOS application isolation better: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22mailbox-dedicated-thread%22+(… Any comment is welcome! Please see the slides for the basic ideas of the enhancements mentioned above. Slides link: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/TF-M_Dual-cpu_NSPE_mailbox_enhancement… Best regards, Hu Ziji

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Review request for adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M

by Jamie Fox

Hi, Thank you for the proposal, I have commented in the Gerrit review. Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M Sent: 02 December 2020 14:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Review request for adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M Hi everyone, Please help review the following design proposal of adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M,any comments and suggestions will be appreciated. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7295 Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/> ======================================================== CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

5 years

1
0
0 0

TF-M Technical Forum call - December 10

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, December 10 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?)

by Rønningstad, Øyvind

I've created a proof of concept for allowing out-of-tree platforms here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7301 It was simpler than I had thought :) Øyvind From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Ken Liu via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2020 07:57 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?) Hi, In the ideal case with HAL API, the platform itself can decide which variant's layout to be applied, selected by build system switches or just some header files. Because SPM could get what it needed by HAL API run-time. It can be mostly done inside the platform folder if one platform has the variants management already. Others please give inputs as this is a very useful topic, we can list down the problem we met during integration first. BR /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Rønningstad, Øyvind via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2020 3:47 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: Rasmussen, Torsten <Torsten.Rasmussen(a)nordicsemi.no<mailto:Torsten.Rasmussen@nordicsemi.no>> Subject: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?) Hi all In our work integrating TFM into Zephyr and the nRF Connect SDK, it's apparent that the integration would be a lot smoother if we could specify TFM's flash layout externally. Looking into it a bit, I came up with a draft proposal here: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/pull/18/files<https://eur03.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fgithub.co…> We could just modify our own platforms to this and be happy, but I'm wondering if there would be interest in standardizing something. Now, a related problem is: How can we make it easier to add multiple boards based on a single chip. For the Nordic platforms we've already separated the chip-specific code (nRF9160/nRF5340) from the board specific code (DK/PDK), and for the boards, it really boils down to pin configurations. We could allow to specify pins via Cmake instead, to easily allow users to support their production PCBs. But (this was brought up in the above PR) we can also solve both problems by adding support for out-of-tree platforms. For example, allow TFM to be built like so: cmake -DTFM_PLATFORM=../../../../my_custom_board ... This would probably be less work that designing a new interface for overriding flash layouts and pin configurations. What are your thoughts? BR, Øyvind Rønningstad

5 years

1
0
0 0

Review request for adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi everyone, Please help review the following design proposal of adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M,any comments and suggestions will be appreciated. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7295 Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd http://www.mxic.com.cn ======================================================== ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

5 years

1
0
0 0

Review request for adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M

by Edward Yang

Hi everyone, Please help review the following design proposal of adding External Trusted Secure Storage service in TF-M,any comments and suggestions will be appreciated. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7295 Best Regards, Poppy Wu Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd http://www.mxic.com.cn ======================================================== ============================================================================ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE: This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation. Macronix International Co., Ltd. =====================================================================

5 years

1
0
0 0

Deprecation of platform MPS2/SSE-200_AWS

by Marton Berke

Hi Everyone, I would like to propose the deprecation of platform MPS2/SSE-200_AWS because the platform is no longer available to use: https://aws.amazon.com/marketplace/pp/ARM-Ltd-DesignStart-FPGA-on-Cloud-Cor… As per the process, this proposal is open for discussion for a period of 4 weeks and if there are no major objections, the platform should be marked as deprecated and removed from TF-M master after next release. Thanks and Best regards, Marton Berke

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26

by Karl Zhang

Hi Anton I would have an introduction to TF-M openCI. Thanks Karl ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of David Hu via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 2:10 PM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26 Hi Anton, I’d like to share a proposal to improve dual-cpu mailbox. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2020 4:59 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 26 at 15:00-16:00 GMT (US friendly time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years

2
1
0 0

Re: [TF-M] gcc compiler requirement documentation

by Shawn Shan

Hi Chris, Thanks for point out this. Here is the fix: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7226 Regards, Shawn From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Christopher Brand via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2020 2:55 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] gcc compiler requirement documentation Looking at docs/getting_started//tfm_sw_requirement.rst it says that the version requirement for gcc is "GNU Arm compiler v7.3.1+". then it describes where to get that toolchain, but in that section the two versions it suggests are "GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain: 6-2017-q1-update" and "GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain: 7-2018-q2-update". The former is gcc version 6.3.1, which doesn't actually meet the requirements. Chris Brand Sr Prin Software Engr, MCD: WIRELESS Cypress Semiconductor Corp. An Infineon Technologies Company #320-13700 International Place, Richmond, British Columbia V6V 2X8 Canada www.infineon.com<http://www.infineon.com> www.cypress.com<http://www.cypress.com> This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?)

by Ken Liu

Hi, In the ideal case with HAL API, the platform itself can decide which variant's layout to be applied, selected by build system switches or just some header files. Because SPM could get what it needed by HAL API run-time. It can be mostly done inside the platform folder if one platform has the variants management already. Others please give inputs as this is a very useful topic, we can list down the problem we met during integration first. BR /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Rønningstad, Øyvind via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 26, 2020 3:47 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Rasmussen, Torsten <Torsten.Rasmussen(a)nordicsemi.no> Subject: [TF-M] Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?) Hi all In our work integrating TFM into Zephyr and the nRF Connect SDK, it's apparent that the integration would be a lot smoother if we could specify TFM's flash layout externally. Looking into it a bit, I came up with a draft proposal here: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/pull/18/files We could just modify our own platforms to this and be happy, but I'm wondering if there would be interest in standardizing something. Now, a related problem is: How can we make it easier to add multiple boards based on a single chip. For the Nordic platforms we've already separated the chip-specific code (nRF9160/nRF5340) from the board specific code (DK/PDK), and for the boards, it really boils down to pin configurations. We could allow to specify pins via Cmake instead, to easily allow users to support their production PCBs. But (this was brought up in the above PR) we can also solve both problems by adding support for out-of-tree platforms. For example, allow TFM to be built like so: cmake -DTFM_PLATFORM=../../../../my_custom_board ... This would probably be less work that designing a new interface for overriding flash layouts and pin configurations. What are your thoughts? BR, Øyvind Rønningstad

5 years

1
0
0 0

Externally override flash layout and pin configurations (out-of-tree platforms?)

by Rønningstad, Øyvind

Hi all In our work integrating TFM into Zephyr and the nRF Connect SDK, it's apparent that the integration would be a lot smoother if we could specify TFM's flash layout externally. Looking into it a bit, I came up with a draft proposal here: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/trusted-firmware-m/pull/18/files We could just modify our own platforms to this and be happy, but I'm wondering if there would be interest in standardizing something. Now, a related problem is: How can we make it easier to add multiple boards based on a single chip. For the Nordic platforms we've already separated the chip-specific code (nRF9160/nRF5340) from the board specific code (DK/PDK), and for the boards, it really boils down to pin configurations. We could allow to specify pins via Cmake instead, to easily allow users to support their production PCBs. But (this was brought up in the above PR) we can also solve both problems by adding support for out-of-tree platforms. For example, allow TFM to be built like so: cmake -DTFM_PLATFORM=../../../../my_custom_board ... This would probably be less work that designing a new interface for overriding flash layouts and pin configurations. What are your thoughts? BR, Øyvind Rønningstad

5 years

1
0
0 0

gcc compiler requirement documentation

by Christopher Brand

Looking at docs/getting_started//tfm_sw_requirement.rst it says that the version requirement for gcc is "GNU Arm compiler v7.3.1+". then it describes where to get that toolchain, but in that section the two versions it suggests are "GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain: 6-2017-q1-update" and "GNU Arm Embedded Toolchain: 7-2018-q2-update". The former is gcc version 6.3.1, which doesn't actually meet the requirements. Chris Brand Sr Prin Software Engr, MCD: WIRELESS Cypress Semiconductor Corp. An Infineon Technologies Company #320-13700 International Place, Richmond, British Columbia V6V 2X8 Canada www.infineon.com<http://www.infineon.com> www.cypress.com<http://www.cypress.com> This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL description confusing/wrong

by Tamas Ban

Hi Thomas, Here is the fix: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7196 Actually since the CMake refactor the default value can be overridden from the command line, so it is possible to enable the logging even in Release builds. BR Tamas -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Thomas Törnblom via TF-M Sent: 2020. november 25., szerda 8:50 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL description confusing/wrong The description of how to set MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL in tfm_secure_boot.rst appears wrong, or at least unclear. --- - MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL: Can be used to configure the level of logging in MCUBoot. The possible values are the following: - **LOG_LEVEL_OFF** - **LOG_LEVEL_ERROR** - **LOG_LEVEL_WARNING** - **LOG_LEVEL_INFO** - **LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG** The logging in MCUBoot can be disabled and thus the code size can be reduced by setting it to ``LOG_LEVEL_OFF``. Its value depends on the build type. If the build type is ``Debug`` and a value has been provided (e.g. through the command line or the CMake GUI) then that value will be used, otherwise it is ``LOG_LEVEL_INFO`` by default. In case of different kinds of ``Release`` builds its value is set to ``LOG_LEVEL_OFF`` (any other value will be overridden). --- I tried enabling MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG by adding -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG to the cmake command line, but that set the level to -1. I also tried -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=4, which also set it to -1. I then noticed that the default setting in CMakeCache.txt is "MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL:STRING=INFO", so I instead used -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG, which worked. I would also like to be able to use logging for Release builds, as this may assist chasing down optimization issues. Thomas -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

TF-M v1.2.0 release

by Anton Komlev

Hello, TF-M project released version v1.2.0, tagged as TF-Mv1.2.0. This release has started using adopted semantic versioning as described in the release_process.rst<https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/docs/contr…> Please take a look into the release notes for the new features and changes. Thanks to everyone who directly and indirectly contributed to this milestone. Anton Komlev TF-M technical lead Arm Ltd.

5 years

1
0
0 0

MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL description confusing/wrong

by Thomas Törnblom

The description of how to set MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL in tfm_secure_boot.rst appears wrong, or at least unclear. --- - MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL: Can be used to configure the level of logging in MCUBoot. The possible values are the following: - **LOG_LEVEL_OFF** - **LOG_LEVEL_ERROR** - **LOG_LEVEL_WARNING** - **LOG_LEVEL_INFO** - **LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG** The logging in MCUBoot can be disabled and thus the code size can be reduced by setting it to ``LOG_LEVEL_OFF``. Its value depends on the build type. If the build type is ``Debug`` and a value has been provided (e.g. through the command line or the CMake GUI) then that value will be used, otherwise it is ``LOG_LEVEL_INFO`` by default. In case of different kinds of ``Release`` builds its value is set to ``LOG_LEVEL_OFF`` (any other value will be overridden). --- I tried enabling MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG by adding -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG to the cmake command line, but that set the level to -1. I also tried -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=4, which also set it to -1. I then noticed that the default setting in CMakeCache.txt is "MCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL:STRING=INFO", so I instead used -DMCUBOOT_LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG, which worked. I would also like to be able to use logging for Release builds, as this may assist chasing down optimization issues. Thomas

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26

by David Hu

Hi Anton, I'd like to share a proposal to improve dual-cpu mailbox. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Thursday, November 19, 2020 4:59 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 26 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 26 at 15:00-16:00 GMT (US friendly time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2

by Anton Komlev

Hi, New TF-M Release Candidate 3 is tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC3 Please update all repositories as it contain all fixes for issues found in RC2. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 11 November 2020 15:34 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi, New TF-M Release Candidate 2 is tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC2. Please update all repositories as it contain fixes for issues found in RC1. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 04 November 2020 16:35 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi, All TF-M repositories are tagged with TF-Mv1.2-RC1 tag, marking the code freeze and beginning of the release candidate testing. 1. tf-m-tools 2. tf-m-tests 3. trusted-firmware-m 4. tf-m-ci-scripts 5. tf-m-job-configs Please use this tag for tests and report all issues found here. The best, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 November 2020 14:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi All, This is a reminder and heads up that TF-Mv1.2 release is planned for the end of November and TF-M code repository is aimed for freeze on Nov 4th (Wed), tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC1 for testing. Availability of the tag will be notified via this mailing list. Thanks, Anton

5 years

1
0
0 0

Technical Forum call - November 26

by Anton Komlev

Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 26 at 15:00-16:00 GMT (US friendly time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Minos Galanakis

Hi, Following up the current discussions on semantic versioning, I have prepared a patch <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7075/1> . Feel free to review and comment. Expanded patch link: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/7075/1 Minos ________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Gyorgy Szing via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 16 November 2020 17:32 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi, Well, yes. Not sure what backwards compatibility would mean in a complex application with a configurable set of services and service capabilities. Semantic versioning could work quite well for components (i.e. secure service implementations) though. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 18:04 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi George, All, Thanks for the thoughts. Can I assume that you suggest to stay with option 1? The semantic versioning was proposed several times and sounds reasonable because it gives a meaning to each version component so downstream projects could rely on it. Yes, a version of a product represents some quality status but in my view that depends on convention. For downstream projects reference, TF-M issues releases periodically so a version represents a stable point in time and occasionally brings new features / fixes. Cheers, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Gyorgy Szing via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 08:17 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi, I miss something here. What is being discussed, what is the purpose of changing version numbering? * Is more granularity needed and each or some lesser quality levels should be assigned a version number too? Currently a new version number is assigned if a new SW set reaches “Release” quality level. (Whatever that might be.) * Is there need for expressing backwards compatibility better? * Is the aim to enhance existing version numbers just by making them following a well-defined standard? I have the feeling different people are talking about different sub-topics. I think the most important purpose or having release numbers is to express quality. It could help on version numbers if quality would be defined cleaner. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 09:06 To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Hu@arm.com>>; David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

2
1
0 0

Blog for Amazon FreeRTOS Gateway Demo based on TF-M Profile Small

by David Wang

Hi, In Linaro Virtual Connect 20 (LVC20), Shebu and I presented a session "Scalable Security Using Trusted Firmware-M Profiles" (ref[1]). It basically shows an example of using FreeRTOS+TF-M Profile Small on armv8m devices to connect to AWS cloud through a Gateway. The key features demonstrated in the example: * Symmetric cipher based secure connection - TLS PSK * Usage of (symmetric) attestation * Device-Gateway-Cloud secure channel example A blog (https://www.trustedfirmware.org/blog/amazon-freertos-tfm-blog/) is shared in tf.org if you want to know more details of the design. Thanks. Ref: [1] Scalable Security Using Trusted Firmware-M Profiles - https://connect.linaro.org/resources/lvc20/lvc20-213/ Regards, David Wang ARM Electronic Technology (Shanghai) Co., Ltd Phone: +86-21-6154 9142 (ext. 59142)

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Generated files location

by Ken Liu

Hi Andrej, Thanks for reporting this. It looks like the dependency on TFM_TEST_PATH matters. We need to define something for managing these generated files. /Ken -----Original Message----- From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Andrej Butok via TF-M Sent: Friday, November 13, 2020 9:54 PM To: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi, FYI: For Windows (not Liniux) users, the command have to be: ... set TFM_TEST_PATH=../tf-m-tests/test python tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml -o <output> ... Also, all required Python modules have to be installed before (PyYAML, Jinja2) Best regards, Andrej Butok -----Original Message----- From: Raef Coles <Raef.Coles(a)arm.com> Sent: Thursday, November 12, 2020 2:11 PM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: Generated files location Hi, As an intermediate step, we've made a modification to the file generation code so that file can be generated without cmake being run. This generation can be run by: ``` python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml -o <output dir> ``` Which will output the files into the specified output directory. if the `-o` flag is not provided then the files will be generated into the TFM source tree. Note that this method still requires knowledge of the location of some dependencies, as this cannot be provided by cmake. When run in standalone mode, these paths are gathered from environment variables, and generation will fail if those variables are not set. Thus: ``` env TFM_TEST_PATH=$(realpath ../tf-m-tests/test) python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml ``` Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 20 October 2020 08:39 To: Anton Komlev Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi Anton If it's not possible to avoid a file generation now, it's good to have pre-generated files for a most typical configuration (l2, IPC etc.). As I mentioned before, ideally to use TFM as a real component/framework without generation of any source code. BUT If you believe, this requirement breaks a TFM concept, just tell us. Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 9:27 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi Andrej, Essentially, do you mean to move the files back to code tree and synch them with templates manually as it was ? Cheers, Anton From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com<mailto:andrey.butok@nxp.com>> Sent: 19 October 2020 16:15 To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: RE: Generated files location Hi Anton, Another option: 3. Avoid the mandatory on-the-fly generation. Try to make TFM a component/framework, which is configurable by compile & run time parameters. Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 5:00 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi, Some source files in TF-M are templated and generated inside /<build_dir>/generated/ on the fly as a part of build process. This guaranty consistency between templates and generated but might make a trouble for IDE, where not all source files exist at the first run. I see 2 options for solution: 1. Explicitly generate those files via cmake as a part of IDE project creation (1 time action) 2. Relay on CMSIS Pack for IDE, where generated files must be presents Any alternative thoughts? Anton -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Gyorgy Szing

Hi, Well, yes. Not sure what backwards compatibility would mean in a complex application with a configurable set of services and service capabilities. Semantic versioning could work quite well for components (i.e. secure service implementations) though. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 18:04 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi George, All, Thanks for the thoughts. Can I assume that you suggest to stay with option 1? The semantic versioning was proposed several times and sounds reasonable because it gives a meaning to each version component so downstream projects could rely on it. Yes, a version of a product represents some quality status but in my view that depends on convention. For downstream projects reference, TF-M issues releases periodically so a version represents a stable point in time and occasionally brings new features / fixes. Cheers, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Gyorgy Szing via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 08:17 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi, I miss something here. What is being discussed, what is the purpose of changing version numbering? * Is more granularity needed and each or some lesser quality levels should be assigned a version number too? Currently a new version number is assigned if a new SW set reaches “Release” quality level. (Whatever that might be.) * Is there need for expressing backwards compatibility better? * Is the aim to enhance existing version numbers just by making them following a well-defined standard? I have the feeling different people are talking about different sub-topics. I think the most important purpose or having release numbers is to express quality. It could help on version numbers if quality would be defined cleaner. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 09:06 To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Hu@arm.com>>; David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Anton Komlev

Hi George, All, Thanks for the thoughts. Can I assume that you suggest to stay with option 1? The semantic versioning was proposed several times and sounds reasonable because it gives a meaning to each version component so downstream projects could rely on it. Yes, a version of a product represents some quality status but in my view that depends on convention. For downstream projects reference, TF-M issues releases periodically so a version represents a stable point in time and occasionally brings new features / fixes. Cheers, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Gyorgy Szing via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 08:17 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi, I miss something here. What is being discussed, what is the purpose of changing version numbering? * Is more granularity needed and each or some lesser quality levels should be assigned a version number too? Currently a new version number is assigned if a new SW set reaches “Release” quality level. (Whatever that might be.) * Is there need for expressing backwards compatibility better? * Is the aim to enhance existing version numbers just by making them following a well-defined standard? I have the feeling different people are talking about different sub-topics. I think the most important purpose or having release numbers is to express quality. It could help on version numbers if quality would be defined cleaner. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 09:06 To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Hu@arm.com>>; David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image

by Kevin Townsend

Hi Antonio, I'm not sure if this helps, but here is an example of how we sign the binaries for the MPS2 AN521, for example, after building the TF-M and Zephyr NS images, plus MCUBoot: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/blob/966015f503d1438c25d597937… Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 16:19, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi all, > > I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to > separated compilations. > > Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to > concatenate and sign them. > > I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct > one or where to find the signing_layout. > > > > To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to > musca-s as soon as it arrives): > > - I built TF-M > - I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a > and libtfm_s_veneers.a > - I build my zephyr application > > Now (I suppose) I have to > > - merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin > - sign the merged binary > - concatenate with bl2 > > I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps. > > > > Best, > > -- > > *Antonio Ken Iannillo* > > Research Scientist – SEDAN group > > SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust > > UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG > > > > CAMPUS KIRCHBERG > 29, avenue John F. Kennedy > L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg > T +352 46 66 44 9660 > > > > Join the conversation > > News <https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter > <https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin > <https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> > > www.uni.lu/snt > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

5 years

3
2
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Gyorgy Szing

Hi, I miss something here. What is being discussed, what is the purpose of changing version numbering? * Is more granularity needed and each or some lesser quality levels should be assigned a version number too? Currently a new version number is assigned if a new SW set reaches “Release” quality level. (Whatever that might be.) * Is there need for expressing backwards compatibility better? * Is the aim to enhance existing version numbers just by making them following a well-defined standard? I have the feeling different people are talking about different sub-topics. I think the most important purpose or having release numbers is to express quality. It could help on version numbers if quality would be defined cleaner. /George From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Peng via TF-M Sent: 16 November 2020 09:06 To: David Hu <David.Hu(a)arm.com>; David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com<mailto:David.Wang@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Kevin Peng

I would vote for Option 3, and “.2” - Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag. – This provides the flexibility to have a released version with critical fixes only. If TF-M users want all the changes between the release and the fix they can take the master branch as well. Best Regards, Kevin From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Hu via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 3:45 PM To: David Wang <David.Wang(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by David Hu

Hi Anton, Option 3 seems more reasonable to me. Hi David, I think we can leave tag v1.x.0 as it is and create a new tag v1.x.1 for this critical fix on master branch. It can be more easier to distinguish between tags. Best regards, Hu Ziji From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of David Wang via TF-M Sent: Monday, November 16, 2020 2:53 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by David Wang

Hi Anton, Option 3 is a good. Just to clarify, for example, if v1.x.0 released, and we got a critical fix 2 months later. Then in your proposal, we: * Tag the current master which includes the fixing patch (and may also include some other merged/ongoing features after last release) as v1.x.1, or * Backport the fixing patches to the existing v1.x.0 tag (keep it in a new branch) and tag the tip of the v1.x release branch as v1.x.1 Thanks. Regards, David Wang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Ken Liu

Option 3 +1. /Ken From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: Saturday, November 14, 2020 3:45 AM To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com>; tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton. -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Semantic versioning

by Kevin Townsend

Hi Anton, Option 3 seems the most sensible to me for a project like TF-M at this stage. Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 20:19, Anton Komlev via TF-M < tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi, > > > > I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning > started on the last tech forum. > > Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and > minor versions, following TF-A. > > There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. > > Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : > > 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, > 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible > manner, and > 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. > > > > This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from > everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the > forum and several options were proposed: > > 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. > 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. > So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. > 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered > within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream > project relay on a fixed version. > 4. Other ideas? > > > > Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. > > > > Thanks, > > Anton. > > -- > TF-M mailing list > TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m >

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Semantic versioning

by Anton Komlev

Hi, I would like to continue the discussion on TF-M semantic versioning started on the last tech forum. Currently TF-M uses a loosely defined versioning schema with major and minor versions, following TF-A. There are several calls to switch TF-M to semantic versioning. Here is the reminder of the meaning: (https://semver.org/) v1.2.3 : 1. MAJOR version when you make incompatible API changes, 2. MINOR version when you add functionality in a backwards compatible manner, and 3. PATCH version when you make backwards compatible bug fixes. This is a good way to go for a mature project but TF-M will overkill from everyday re-versioning because of new patches. It was discussed on the forum and several options were proposed: 1. Do nothing, reasonably bumping up versions on release time only. 2. Use semantic versioning ignoring changes in PATCH by keeping it 0. So upcoming version could be: v1.2.0, next v1.3.0 and nothing in between. 3. Use option 2 but change PATCH when critical code change delivered within release cadence like a security vulnerability fix to let down-stream project relay on a fixed version. 4. Other ideas? Personally I tend to follow option 3 but looking for the community input. Thanks, Anton.

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image

by Anton Komlev

Hi Antonio, This might be helpful in addition to Tamas: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/view/TF-M/job/tf-m-build-docs-nightly/lastSt… The best, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Tamas Ban via TF-M Sent: 13 November 2020 15:36 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image Hi Antonio, Required steps on Musca-A (only single image boot is supported by MCUboot due to RAM_LOAD upgrade mode limitation): - Concatenate zephyr.bin + tfm_s.bin. [ 93%] Generating tfm_s_ns.bin cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/assemble.py --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -s /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_s.bin -n /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_ns.bin -o tfm_s_ns.bin * Signing the concatenated binary: [ 94%] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.1.0 --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -k /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin * Combine bl2.bin and tfm_s_ns.bin: srec_cat build/bin/bl2.bin -Binary -offset 0x200000 build/bin/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin -Binary -offset 0x220000 -o tfm.hex -Intel Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: 2020. november 13., péntek 16:33 To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu<mailto:antonioken.iannillo@uni.lu>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image Hi Antonio, I'm not sure if this helps, but here is an example of how we sign the binaries for the MPS2 AN521, for example, after building the TF-M and Zephyr NS images, plus MCUBoot: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/blob/966015f503d1438c25d597937… Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 16:19, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi all, I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations. Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them. I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout. To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives): * I built TF-M * I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a * I build my zephyr application Now (I suppose) I have to · merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin · sign the merged binary · concatenate with bl2 I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps. Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> www.uni.lu/snt<http://www.uni.lu/snt> -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image

by Tamas Ban

Hi Antonio, Required steps on Musca-A (only single image boot is supported by MCUboot due to RAM_LOAD upgrade mode limitation): - Concatenate zephyr.bin + tfm_s.bin. [ 93%] Generating tfm_s_ns.bin cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/assemble.py --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -s /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_s.bin -n /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bin/tfm_ns.bin -o tfm_s_ns.bin * Signing the concatenated binary: [ 94%] Generating tfm_s_ns_signed.bin cd /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot && ../../../../py_env/bin/python3 /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/scripts/wrapper/wrapper.py -v 1.1.0 --layout /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/CMakeFiles/signing_layout_s.dir/signing_layout_s_ns.o -k /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/bl2/ext/mcuboot/root-RSA-3072.pem --public-key-format full --align 1 --pad --pad-header -H 0x400 -s auto -d "(0, 0.0.0+0)" -d "(1, 0.0.0+0)" tfm_s_ns.bin /home/tamban01/repo/tf-m/build/bl2/ext/mcuboot/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin * Combine bl2.bin and tfm_s_ns.bin: srec_cat build/bin/bl2.bin -Binary -offset 0x200000 build/bin/tfm_s_ns_signed.bin -Binary -offset 0x220000 -o tfm.hex -Intel Tamas From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Kevin Townsend via TF-M Sent: 2020. november 13., péntek 16:33 To: Antonio Ken IANNILLO <antonioken.iannillo(a)uni.lu> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Combine secure and non-secure image Hi Antonio, I'm not sure if this helps, but here is an example of how we sign the binaries for the MPS2 AN521, for example, after building the TF-M and Zephyr NS images, plus MCUBoot: https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/blob/966015f503d1438c25d597937… Best regards, Kevin On Fri, 13 Nov 2020 at 16:19, Antonio Ken IANNILLO via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi all, I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations. Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them. I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout. To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives): * I built TF-M * I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a * I build my zephyr application Now (I suppose) I have to · merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin · sign the merged binary · concatenate with bl2 I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps. Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News<https://wwwen.uni.lu/snt/news_events> | Twitter<https://twitter.com/SnT_uni_lu> | Linkedin<https://www.linkedin.com/school/snt-lu/> www.uni.lu/snt<http://www.uni.lu/snt> -- TF-M mailing list TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-M@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Combine secure and non-secure image

by Antonio Ken IANNILLO

Hi all, I abandoned the idea to build at once tf-m and zephyr and switched to separated compilations. Now, I have both secure and non-secure binaries but I’m not sure how to concatenate and sign them. I found the assemble.py script but I don’t know whether it is the correct one or where to find the signing_layout. To be more specific, for my current target musca-a (going to switch to musca-s as soon as it arrives): I built TF-M I imported and included in my zephyr application both libpsa_api_ns.a and libtfm_s_veneers.a I build my zephyr application Now (I suppose) I have to merge zephyr.bin with tfm_s.bin sign the merged binary concatenate with bl2 I could not find any reference how to correctly do these last steps. Best, -- Antonio Ken Iannillo Research Scientist – SEDAN group SnT – Interdisciplinary Centre for Security, Reliability and Trust UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG CAMPUS KIRCHBERG 29, avenue John F. Kennedy L-1855 Luxembourg Kirchberg T +352 46 66 44 9660 Join the conversation News | Twitter | Linkedin www.uni.lu/snt

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Generated files location

by Raef Coles

Hi, As an intermediate step, we've made a modification to the file generation code so that file can be generated without cmake being run. This generation can be run by: ``` python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml -o <output dir> ``` Which will output the files into the specified output directory. if the `-o` flag is not provided then the files will be generated into the TFM source tree. Note that this method still requires knowledge of the location of some dependencies, as this cannot be provided by cmake. When run in standalone mode, these paths are gathered from environment variables, and generation will fail if those variables are not set. Thus: ``` env TFM_TEST_PATH=$(realpath ../tf-m-tests/test) python3 tools/tfm_parse_manifest_list.py -m tools/tfm_manifest_list.yaml -f tools/tfm_generated_file_list.yaml ``` Raef ________________________________________ From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Andrej Butok via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 20 October 2020 08:39 To: Anton Komlev Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi Anton If it’s not possible to avoid a file generation now, it’s good to have pre-generated files for a most typical configuration (l2, IPC etc.). As I mentioned before, ideally to use TFM as a real component/framework without generation of any source code. BUT If you believe, this requirement breaks a TFM concept, just tell us. Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2020 9:27 AM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi Andrej, Essentially, do you mean to move the files back to code tree and synch them with templates manually as it was ? Cheers, Anton From: Andrej Butok <andrey.butok(a)nxp.com<mailto:andrey.butok@nxp.com>> Sent: 19 October 2020 16:15 To: Anton Komlev <Anton.Komlev(a)arm.com<mailto:Anton.Komlev@arm.com>> Cc: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: RE: Generated files location Hi Anton, Another option: 3. Avoid the mandatory on-the-fly generation. Try to make TFM a component/framework, which is configurable by compile & run time parameters. Thanks, Andrej From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Monday, October 19, 2020 5:00 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Generated files location Hi, Some source files in TF-M are templated and generated inside /<build_dir>/generated/ on the fly as a part of build process. This guaranty consistency between templates and generated but might make a trouble for IDE, where not all source files exist at the first run. I see 2 options for solution: 1. Explicitly generate those files via cmake as a part of IDE project creation (1 time action) 2. Relay on CMSIS Pack for IDE, where generated files must be presents Any alternative thoughts? Anton

5 years, 1 month

2
1
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Typo in return value (ps_object_system.c)

by Jamie Fox

Hi Robert, Thanks for the bug report. I have pushed a fix for review: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m/+/6986 Kind regards, Jamie From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Robert Rostohar via TF-M Sent: 12 November 2020 13:57 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-M] Typo in return value (ps_object_system.c) Hi, I believe there is a small typo in the return value of function ps_read_object (ps_object_system.c). This results in build failure of Non-encrypted Protected Storage. https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/secure_fw/… The define used should be "PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT" and not "PSA_PS_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT". Best regards, Robert

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Typo in return value (ps_object_system.c)

by Robert Rostohar

Hi, I believe there is a small typo in the return value of function ps_read_object (ps_object_system.c). This results in build failure of Non-encrypted Protected Storage. https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/secure_fw/… The define used should be "PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT" and not "PSA_PS_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT". Best regards, Robert

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 12

by Mingyang Sun

Hi Anton, I have a topic, Partition Storage Arrangement, to introduce partition data storage briefly, for about 20 minutes. Thanks, Mingyang From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 10:17 PM To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Technical Forum call - November 12 Hello, The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, November 12 at 6:00-07:00 UTC (Asia time zone). Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics. Recording and slides of previous meetings are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/ Best regards, Anton

5 years, 1 month

2
1
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2

by Anton Komlev

Hi, New TF-M Release Candidate 2 is tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC2. Please update all repositories as it contain fixes for issues found in RC1. Best regards, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 04 November 2020 16:35 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi, All TF-M repositories are tagged with TF-Mv1.2-RC1 tag, marking the code freeze and beginning of the release candidate testing. 1. tf-m-tools 2. tf-m-tests 3. trusted-firmware-m 4. tf-m-ci-scripts 5. tf-m-job-configs Please use this tag for tests and report all issues found here. The best, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 November 2020 14:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com<mailto:nd@arm.com>> Subject: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi All, This is a reminder and heads up that TF-Mv1.2 release is planned for the end of November and TF-M code repository is aimed for freeze on Nov 4th (Wed), tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC1 for testing. Availability of the tag will be notified via this mailing list. Thanks, Anton

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

GNU Arm compiler v6.3.1 deprecation heads up

by Minos Galanakis

Hi, With the upcoming release of TF-M 1.2, we are considering deprecating the GNU Arm compiler v6.3.1 to be able to reallocate testing bandwidth to newer and more up to date versions ( 7+ ) Before doing so I would like to ask for the community's feedback. Is anyone using this compiler, and if so, would you be affected by the change? Are there any other reasons we should consider keeping it in to the test plan? Regards, Minos

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

Re: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2

by Anton Komlev

Hi, All TF-M repositories are tagged with TF-Mv1.2-RC1 tag, marking the code freeze and beginning of the release candidate testing. 1. tf-m-tools 2. tf-m-tests 3. trusted-firmware-m 4. tf-m-ci-scripts 5. tf-m-job-configs Please use this tag for tests and report all issues found here. The best, Anton From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Anton Komlev via TF-M Sent: 02 November 2020 14:28 To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> Subject: [TF-M] Code freeze heads up for TF-M v1.2 Hi All, This is a reminder and heads up that TF-Mv1.2 release is planned for the end of November and TF-M code repository is aimed for freeze on Nov 4th (Wed), tagged by TF-Mv1.2-RC1 for testing. Availability of the tag will be notified via this mailing list. Thanks, Anton

5 years, 1 month

1
0
0 0

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

TF-M