Hi,
We have moved all arm platforms into arm folder which will make the platform folder more clear.
One thing needs to pay attention to is that you need to change the TFM_PLATFORM when building arm platforms.
For example:
'-DTFM_PLATFORM=mps2/an521' --> '-DTFM_PLATFORM=arm/mps2/an521'.
It does not influence partner platforms build commands, only for arm platforms.
Best Regards,
Summer
Hi Poppy Wu
> the macro TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR below may be a pointer to the shared HUK
data(stored in secure RAM) from secure boot?
Yes, this is a pointer to a HUK, provisioned in a secure memory region.
Best regards,
Andrej Butok
SW Tech Lead
Edge Processing
NXP Semiconductors
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang
via TF-M
Sent: Thursday, June 3, 2021 12:13 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Sherry,
Thanks a lot for your reply,it's a big help.
So with current tf-m crypto service implementation,if I want to use
psa_aead_encrypt() to do encryption with a persistent key which is
provisioned before the reset,I need to use psa_open_key() as a temporary
method.
Besides,the implementation of key derivation from HUK on NXP platform,I
suppose in actual development ,the macro TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR below may be a
pointer to the shared HUK data(stored in secure RAM) from secure boot?
+#ifndef TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR
+static const uint8_t sample_tfm_key[] =
+ {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, \
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F};
+
+#define TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR sample_tfm_key
+#endif
status = psa_import_key(&attributes, (const uint8_t *)TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR,
TFM_HUK_KEY_LEN, &base_key);
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mxic.c
om.cn%2F&data=04%7C01%7Candrey.butok%40nxp.com%7Ca93215d45b04467d08a008d9267
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d=0> http://www.mxic.com.cn
Sherry Zhang via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >
Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
<mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >
2021/06/03 14:23
Please respond to
Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com <mailto:Sherry.Zhang2@arm.com> >
To
Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn <mailto:EdwardYang@mxic.com.cn> >,
"tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> "
<tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >
cc
nd <nd(a)arm.com <mailto:nd@arm.com> >
Subject
Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Poppy,
The updated PSA crypto spec supports calling psa_aead_encrypt to do
encryption with a persistent key which is provisioned before the reset. But
currently, the TF-M crypto service has not been updated to the updated PSA
crypto spec version in which the psa_open_key is removed. Currently, in TFM,
the persistent key should be opened by calling psa_open_key before using
this key to do crypto operations which follows the older version of spec.
The tfm_crypto_check_handle_owner() API is used for the isolation between
the clients. When aligning to the new PSA crypto spec, the isolation
implementation should be updated accordingly.
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
From: Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn <mailto:EdwardYang@mxic.com.cn> >
Sent: Thursday, June 3, 2021 11:03 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> ;
Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com <mailto:Sherry.Zhang2@arm.com> >
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Sherry,
Import persistent key with a specified key_id is indeed supported in the
updated crypto spec..
I mean,if a key created by derivation functions,and this key is imported as
a persistent key with s specific key id such as KEY_ID_EXAMPLE,then this key
is stored in internal Flash with its service.
After the reset,this persistent key still exists,but this persisten key
cannot be used to do encryption directly,for example,call
psa_aead_encrypt(KEY_ID_EXAMPLE,alg,nonce,...),unless import this key with
psa_import() once again.
Call psa_aead_encrypt(SSKEY_ID,alg,nonce,...) without calling
psa_import_key() in advance is not allowed,because in
tfm_crypto_check_handle_owner()(why this API is needed?)it will check this
key_id with handle_owner[] array.
So I am wondering what's the intended use of persistent keys? After
creation, this persistent keys can only be used to derive other encryption
keys,rather than used to encrypt data with themselves?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mxic.c
om.cn%2F&data=04%7C01%7Candrey.butok%40nxp.com%7Ca93215d45b04467d08a008d9267
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d=0> http://www.mxic.com.cn
Sherry Zhang via TF-M < <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent by: "TF-M" < <mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
2021/06/02 17:37
Please respond to
Sherry Zhang < <mailto:Sherry.Zhang2@arm.com> Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com>
To
" <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <
<mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
cc
nd < <mailto:nd@arm.com> nd(a)arm.com>
Subject
Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Poppy,
Some feedback from my understanding on the first question.
1. Import persistent key with a key_id is still supported in the
updated PSA crypto spec.
In the version of PSA crypto spec in which psa_open_key is supported, the
persistent key can be opened after the reset with the key_id which is
specified in the key attributes in key creation. This is not very friendly.
The reason is that each time the user calls the psa_open_key, the crypto
service loads the key material from slot to running area(ram or flash) thus
a new associated resources is allocated. The application must eventually
call psa_close_key to release the allocated associated resources. It can
happen that multiple applications call psa_open_key multile times as they
may do not know whether the key is opened by other applications. So it can
happen that multiple copies of associated resources are allocated for the
same key. This is not user friendly.
In the updated PSA crypto spec, the key material management strategy is
changed. The user does not need to call the psa_open_key to load the key
from slot to ram/flash. See the section of "9.4 Key identifies" of the spec:
```
Key identifiers are output from a successful call to one of the key creation
functions. For persistent keys,
this is the same identifier as the one specified in the key attributes used
to create the key. The key
indenter remains valid until it is invalidated by passing it to
psa_destroy_key(). A volatile key identifier
must not be used after it has been invalidated.
```
So I think the user can use the key_id directly to call crypto
operations, such as means encrypt, decrypt.
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
From: TF-M < <mailto:tf-m-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 1:30 PM
To: <mailto:tf-m@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Experts,
I have some questions about crypto persisten keys.
1. psa_open_key() is removed in psa crypto spec,so it is impossible to
import a persistent key into key slot with key_id,which means
encrypt/decrypt data directly with a persistent key is not allowed,these
persistent keys can only be
used to derive volatile keys which will be used for encryption/decryption, I
am not sure if I understand correctly.
2. Besides,HUK can be used to derive the other crypto keys,such as ps crypto
key.HUK may be stored in OTP area of MCU(without crypto element such as
cc312),then what's intended flow to derive crypto keys from HUK via calling
PSA crypto service?There is no reference implementation in tf-m code.
tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(){
get HUK from OTP
||
||
\/
how to derive crypto key from HUK with calling crypto service?
}
3. BTW,HUK has a persistent key id TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK defined in
tfm_crypto_defs.h,but I haven't seen any reference to this macro. What's the
intended use of this key id?And what's the key owner of HUK?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
<https://eur01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mxic.c
om.cn%2F&data=04%7C01%7Candrey.butok%40nxp.com%7Ca93215d45b04467d08a008d9267
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attention and cooperation.
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https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
Hi Sherry,
Thanks a lot for your reply,it's a big help.
So with current tf-m crypto service implementation,if I want to use
psa_aead_encrypt() to do encryption with a persistent key which is
provisioned before the reset,I need to use psa_open_key() as a temporary
method.
Besides,the implementation of key derivation from HUK on NXP platform,I
suppose in actual development ,the macro TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR below may be a
pointer to the shared HUK data(stored in secure RAM) from secure boot?
+#ifndef TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR
+static const uint8_t sample_tfm_key[] =
+ {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, \
+ 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F};
+
+#define TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR sample_tfm_key
+#endif
status = psa_import_key(&attributes, (const uint8_t *)TFM_HUK_KEY_ADDR,
TFM_HUK_KEY_LEN, &base_key);
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn
Sherry Zhang via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
2021/06/03 14:23
Please respond to
Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com>
To
Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org"
<tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
cc
nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject
Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Poppy,
The updated PSA crypto spec supports calling psa_aead_encrypt to do
encryption with a persistent key which is provisioned before the reset.
But currently, the TF-M crypto service has not been updated to the updated
PSA crypto spec version in which the psa_open_key is removed. Currently,
in TFM, the persistent key should be opened by calling psa_open_key before
using this key to do crypto operations which follows the older version of
spec. The tfm_crypto_check_handle_owner() API is used for the isolation
between the clients. When aligning to the new PSA crypto spec, the
isolation implementation should be updated accordingly.
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
From: Edward Yang <EdwardYang(a)mxic.com.cn>
Sent: Thursday, June 3, 2021 11:03 AM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Sherry,
Import persistent key with a specified key_id is indeed supported in the
updated crypto spec..
I mean,if a key created by derivation functions,and this key is imported
as a persistent key with s specific key id such as KEY_ID_EXAMPLE,then
this key is stored in internal Flash with its service.
After the reset,this persistent key still exists,but this persisten key
cannot be used to do encryption directly,for example,call
psa_aead_encrypt(KEY_ID_EXAMPLE,alg,nonce,...),unless import this key with
psa_import() once again.
Call psa_aead_encrypt(SSKEY_ID,alg,nonce,...) without calling
psa_import_key() in advance is not allowed,because in
tfm_crypto_check_handle_owner()(why this API is needed?)it will check this
key_id with handle_owner[] array.
So I am wondering what's the intended use of persistent keys? After
creation, this persistent keys can only be used to derive other encryption
keys,rather than used to encrypt data with themselves?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn
Sherry Zhang via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
2021/06/02 17:37
Please respond to
Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com>
To
"tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
cc
nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject
Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Poppy,
Some feedback from my understanding on the first question.
1. Import persistent key with a key_id is still supported in the
updated PSA crypto spec.
In the version of PSA crypto spec in which psa_open_key is supported, the
persistent key can be opened after the reset with the key_id which is
specified in the key attributes in key creation. This is not very
friendly. The reason is that each time the user calls the psa_open_key,
the crypto service loads the key material from slot to running area(ram or
flash) thus a new associated resources is allocated. The application must
eventually call psa_close_key to release the allocated associated
resources. It can happen that multiple applications call psa_open_key
multile times as they may do not know whether the key is opened by other
applications. So it can happen that multiple copies of associated
resources are allocated for the same key. This is not user friendly.
In the updated PSA crypto spec, the key material management strategy is
changed. The user does not need to call the psa_open_key to load the key
from slot to ram/flash. See the section of “9.4 Key identifies” of the
spec:
```
Key identifiers are output from a successful call to one of the key
creation functions. For persistent keys,
this is the same identifier as the one specified in the key attributes
used to create the key. The key
indenter remains valid until it is invalidated by passing it to
psa_destroy_key(). A volatile key identifier
must not be used after it has been invalidated.
```
So I think the user can use the key_id directly to call
crypto operations, such as means encrypt, decrypt.
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward
Yang via TF-M
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 1:30 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Experts,
I have some questions about crypto persisten keys.
1. psa_open_key() is removed in psa crypto spec,so it is impossible to
import a persistent key into key slot with key_id,which means
encrypt/decrypt data directly with a persistent key is not allowed,these
persistent keys can only be
used to derive volatile keys which will be used for encryption/decryption,
I am not sure if I understand correctly.
2. Besides,HUK can be used to derive the other crypto keys,such as ps
crypto key.HUK may be stored in OTP area of MCU(without crypto element
such as cc312),then what's intended flow to derive crypto keys from HUK
via calling PSA crypto service?There is no reference implementation in
tf-m code.
tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(){
get HUK from OTP
||
||
\/
how to derive crypto key from HUK with calling crypto service?
}
3. BTW,HUK has a persistent key id TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK defined in
tfm_crypto_defs.h,but I haven't seen any reference to this macro. What's
the intended use of this key id?And what's the key owner of HUK?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE:
This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information
and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be
reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail
(and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive
this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as
well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed
that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited
unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for
your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================--
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https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m--
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This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================
Hi Poppy,
Question 2 and 3:
In the PSA crypto spec, the Key derivation function section describes the steps to perform a key derivation. Also I think you can take the implementation of the key generation based on HUK on NXP platform as a reference at https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-M/trusted-firmware-m.git/tree/platform/e….
TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK defined in tfm_crypto_defs.h is a temp work before persistent key APIs support in general. It should be removed now.
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 1:30 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Experts,
I have some questions about crypto persisten keys.
1. psa_open_key() is removed in psa crypto spec,so it is impossible to import a persistent key into key slot with key_id,which means encrypt/decrypt data directly with a persistent key is not allowed,these persistent keys can only be
used to derive volatile keys which will be used for encryption/decryption, I am not sure if I understand correctly.
2. Besides,HUK can be used to derive the other crypto keys,such as ps crypto key.HUK may be stored in OTP area of MCU(without crypto element such as cc312),then what's intended flow to derive crypto keys from HUK via calling PSA crypto service?There is no reference implementation in tf-m code.
tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(){
get HUK from OTP
||
||
\/
how to derive crypto key from HUK with calling crypto service?
}
3. BTW,HUK has a persistent key id TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK defined in tfm_crypto_defs.h,but I haven't seen any reference to this macro. What's the intended use of this key id?And what's the key owner of HUK?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/>
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE:
This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================
Hi Sherry,
Import persistent key with a specified key_id is indeed supported in the
updated crypto spec..
I mean,if a key created by derivation functions,and this key is imported
as a persistent key with s specific key id such as KEY_ID_EXAMPLE,then
this key is stored in internal Flash with its service.
After the reset,this persistent key still exists,but this persisten key
cannot be used to do encryption directly,for example,call
psa_aead_encrypt(KEY_ID_EXAMPLE,alg,nonce,...),unless import this key with
psa_import() once again.
Call psa_aead_encrypt(SSKEY_ID,alg,nonce,...) without calling
psa_import_key() in advance is not allowed,because in
tfm_crypto_check_handle_owner()(why this API is needed?)it will check this
key_id with handle_owner[] array.
So I am wondering what's the intended use of persistent keys? After
creation, this persistent keys can only be used to derive other encryption
keys,rather than used to encrypt data with themselves?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn
Sherry Zhang via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
2021/06/02 17:37
Please respond to
Sherry Zhang <Sherry.Zhang2(a)arm.com>
To
"tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
cc
nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject
Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Poppy,
Some feedback from my understanding on the first question.
1. Import persistent key with a key_id is still supported in the
updated PSA crypto spec.
In the version of PSA crypto spec in which psa_open_key is supported, the
persistent key can be opened after the reset with the key_id which is
specified in the key attributes in key creation. This is not very
friendly. The reason is that each time the user calls the psa_open_key,
the crypto service loads the key material from slot to running area(ram or
flash) thus a new associated resources is allocated. The application must
eventually call psa_close_key to release the allocated associated
resources. It can happen that multiple applications call psa_open_key
multile times as they may do not know whether the key is opened by other
applications. So it can happen that multiple copies of associated
resources are allocated for the same key. This is not user friendly.
In the updated PSA crypto spec, the key material management strategy is
changed. The user does not need to call the psa_open_key to load the key
from slot to ram/flash. See the section of “9.4 Key identifies” of the
spec:
```
Key identifiers are output from a successful call to one of the key
creation functions. For persistent keys,
this is the same identifier as the one specified in the key attributes
used to create the key. The key
indenter remains valid until it is invalidated by passing it to
psa_destroy_key(). A volatile key identifier
must not be used after it has been invalidated.
```
So I think the user can use the key_id directly to call
crypto operations, such as means encrypt, decrypt.
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward
Yang via TF-M
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 1:30 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Experts,
I have some questions about crypto persisten keys.
1. psa_open_key() is removed in psa crypto spec,so it is impossible to
import a persistent key into key slot with key_id,which means
encrypt/decrypt data directly with a persistent key is not allowed,these
persistent keys can only be
used to derive volatile keys which will be used for encryption/decryption,
I am not sure if I understand correctly.
2. Besides,HUK can be used to derive the other crypto keys,such as ps
crypto key.HUK may be stored in OTP area of MCU(without crypto element
such as cc312),then what's intended flow to derive crypto keys from HUK
via calling PSA crypto service?There is no reference implementation in
tf-m code.
tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(){
get HUK from OTP
||
||
\/
how to derive crypto key from HUK with calling crypto service?
}
3. BTW,HUK has a persistent key id TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK defined in
tfm_crypto_defs.h,but I haven't seen any reference to this macro. What's
the intended use of this key id?And what's the key owner of HUK?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE:
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(and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive
this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as
well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed
that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited
unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for
your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================--
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https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
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This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================
Hi Andrew,
“built-in keys with a pre-defined key_id” ,I take this to mean that HUK
is a built-in key with the pre-defined key_id TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK,which
can be stored in OTP,EEPROM or embedded Flash of MCU.
There is no ownership of these built-in keys,however,application persisten
keys are created by an application,so application persisten keys are owned
by relevant applications.
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn
Andrew Thoelke via TF-M <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent by: "TF-M" <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
2021/06/02 17:33
Please respond to
Andrew Thoelke <Andrew.Thoelke(a)arm.com>
To
"tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, nd
<nd(a)arm.com>
cc
Subject
Re: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Poppy Wu,
In the v1.0.0 PSA Crypto spec, key handles were removed, and keys are now
always referred to by a key identifier.
After creating a persistent key with a key_id specified by the application
(by import, generation or derivation), the key can be used in a
cryptographic operation by passing the key_id to the operation function.
No key handles are needed anymore. See
https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/lifetimes.html#persiste…
.
An implementation can provide some built-in keys with a pre-defined
key_id. Depending on the key attributes and policy, these can be used by
an application in appropriate cryptographic operations. Built-in keys can
behave differently to application persistent keys:
They cannot be destroyed by an application
They might be accessible to multiple applications
They might have different values in different applications
The implementation should provide documentation on the expected use of any
built-in keys.
We’ll need one of the TF-M team to comment on the expected use for
TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK.
Regards,
Andrew Thoelke
Andrew Thoelke
Software Systems Architect | Arm
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arm.com
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward
Yang via TF-M
Sent: 02 June 2021 06:30
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Experts,
I have some questions about crypto persisten keys.
1. psa_open_key() is removed in psa crypto spec,so it is impossible to
import a persistent key into key slot with key_id,which means
encrypt/decrypt data directly with a persistent key is not allowed,these
persistent keys can only be
used to derive volatile keys which will be used for encryption/decryption,
I am not sure if I understand correctly.
2. Besides,HUK can be used to derive the other crypto keys,such as ps
crypto key.HUK may be stored in OTP area of MCU(without crypto element
such as cc312),then what's intended flow to derive crypto keys from HUK
via calling PSA crypto service?There is no reference implementation in
tf-m code.
tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(){
get HUK from OTP
||
||
\/
how to derive crypto key from HUK with calling crypto service?
}
3. BTW,HUK has a persistent key id TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK defined in
tfm_crypto_defs.h,but I haven't seen any reference to this macro. What's
the intended use of this key id?And what's the key owner of HUK?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE:
This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information
and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be
reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail
(and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive
this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as
well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed
that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited
unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for
your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================--
TF-M mailing list
TF-M(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-m
============================================================================
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE:
This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as its attachment(s) from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================
Hi,
The next Technical Forum is planned on Thursday, June 10, 15:00-16:00 UTC (US time zone).
Please reply on this email with your proposals for agenda topics.
Recording and slides of previous meetings are here:
https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-m-technical-forum/
Best regards,
Anton
Hi Poppy,
Some feedback from my understanding on the first question.
1. Import persistent key with a key_id is still supported in the updated PSA crypto spec.
In the version of PSA crypto spec in which psa_open_key is supported, the persistent key can be opened after the reset with the key_id which is specified in the key attributes in key creation. This is not very friendly. The reason is that each time the user calls the psa_open_key, the crypto service loads the key material from slot to running area(ram or flash) thus a new associated resources is allocated. The application must eventually call psa_close_key to release the allocated associated resources. It can happen that multiple applications call psa_open_key multile times as they may do not know whether the key is opened by other applications. So it can happen that multiple copies of associated resources are allocated for the same key. This is not user friendly.
In the updated PSA crypto spec, the key material management strategy is changed. The user does not need to call the psa_open_key to load the key from slot to ram/flash. See the section of "9.4 Key identifies" of the spec:
```
Key identifiers are output from a successful call to one of the key creation functions. For persistent keys,
this is the same identifier as the one specified in the key attributes used to create the key. The key
indenter remains valid until it is invalidated by passing it to psa_destroy_key(). A volatile key identifier
must not be used after it has been invalidated.
```
So I think the user can use the key_id directly to call crypto operations, such as means encrypt, decrypt.
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M
Sent: Wednesday, June 2, 2021 1:30 PM
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Experts,
I have some questions about crypto persisten keys.
1. psa_open_key() is removed in psa crypto spec,so it is impossible to import a persistent key into key slot with key_id,which means encrypt/decrypt data directly with a persistent key is not allowed,these persistent keys can only be
used to derive volatile keys which will be used for encryption/decryption, I am not sure if I understand correctly.
2. Besides,HUK can be used to derive the other crypto keys,such as ps crypto key.HUK may be stored in OTP area of MCU(without crypto element such as cc312),then what's intended flow to derive crypto keys from HUK via calling PSA crypto service?There is no reference implementation in tf-m code.
tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(){
get HUK from OTP
||
||
\/
how to derive crypto key from HUK with calling crypto service?
}
3. BTW,HUK has a persistent key id TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK defined in tfm_crypto_defs.h,but I haven't seen any reference to this macro. What's the intended use of this key id?And what's the key owner of HUK?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/>
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE:
This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================
Hi Poppy Wu,
In the v1.0.0 PSA Crypto spec, key handles were removed, and keys are now always referred to by a key identifier.
After creating a persistent key with a key_id specified by the application (by import, generation or derivation), the key can be used in a cryptographic operation by passing the key_id to the operation function. No key handles are needed anymore. See https://armmbed.github.io/mbed-crypto/html/api/keys/lifetimes.html#persiste….
An implementation can provide some built-in keys with a pre-defined key_id. Depending on the key attributes and policy, these can be used by an application in appropriate cryptographic operations. Built-in keys can behave differently to application persistent keys:
* They cannot be destroyed by an application
* They might be accessible to multiple applications
* They might have different values in different applications
The implementation should provide documentation on the expected use of any built-in keys.
We'll need one of the TF-M team to comment on the expected use for TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK.
Regards,
Andrew Thoelke
Andrew Thoelke
Software Systems Architect | Arm
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arm.com
From: TF-M <tf-m-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Edward Yang via TF-M
Sent: 02 June 2021 06:30
To: tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-M] Questions about psa crypto persistent key
Hi Experts,
I have some questions about crypto persisten keys.
1. psa_open_key() is removed in psa crypto spec,so it is impossible to import a persistent key into key slot with key_id,which means encrypt/decrypt data directly with a persistent key is not allowed,these persistent keys can only be
used to derive volatile keys which will be used for encryption/decryption, I am not sure if I understand correctly.
2. Besides,HUK can be used to derive the other crypto keys,such as ps crypto key.HUK may be stored in OTP area of MCU(without crypto element such as cc312),then what's intended flow to derive crypto keys from HUK via calling PSA crypto service?There is no reference implementation in tf-m code.
tfm_plat_get_huk_derived_key(){
get HUK from OTP
||
||
\/
how to derive crypto key from HUK with calling crypto service?
}
3. BTW,HUK has a persistent key id TFM_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_HUK defined in tfm_crypto_defs.h,but I haven't seen any reference to this macro. What's the intended use of this key id?And what's the key owner of HUK?
Best Regards,
Poppy Wu
Macronix Microelectronics (Suzhou) Co.,Ltd
http://www.mxic.com.cn<http://www.mxic.com.cn/>
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTE:
This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential information and/or personal data, which is protected by applicable laws. Please be reminded that duplication, disclosure, distribution, or use of this e-mail (and/or its attachments) or any part thereof is prohibited. If you receive this e-mail in error, please notify us immediately and delete this mail as well as it attachments from your system. In addition, please be informed that collection, processing, and/or use of personal data is prohibited unless expressly permitted by personal data protection laws. Thank you for your attention and cooperation.
Macronix International Co., Ltd.
=====================================================================
Hi,
I want to talk about whether TFM should support the PEM key format in crypto operation. In the PSA crypto spec, it describes:
```
This specification supports a single format for each key type. Implementations may support other formats as long as the standard format is supported.
```
The PEM format is not the standard format described in the spec. However, in the tfm_mbedcrypto_config_default.h, the MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C and the MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C is defined which leads to that PEM key format operation is enabled in TFM crypto service.
In isolation level1, about more than 2000 bytes code is introduced by this feature:
.ER_TFM_CODE 0x2a01c // MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C and the MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C enabled
.ER_TFM_CODE 0x29848 // MBEDTLS_PEM_PARSE_C and the MBEDTLS_PEM_WRITE_C disabled
Is it necessary to support the PEM format in the key operation in crypto service at the cost of more than 2000 bytes?
Any comments on that?
Regards,
Sherry Zhang
