On Mon, 20 Apr 2020 at 15:50, Achin Gupta achin.gupta@arm.com wrote:
On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 03:37:23PM +0200, François Ozog wrote:
On Mon, 20 Apr 2020 at 15:27, Achin Gupta <[1]achin.gupta@arm.com> wrote:
Hi Francois, On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 11:45:02AM +0000, Fran�ois Ozog via TF-A wrote: > Hi, > > I am trying to identify a mechanism to enforce a form of two-way > isolation between BL33 runtime services in OS, for instance: > - a pair of 2MB areas that could be RO by one entity and RW by the other > - an execute only BL33 2MB area? Stupid Q! Are you referring to isolation between EFI runtime services and the OS? It is not clear what you mean by BL33 runtime services?Not a stupid Q. I concentrate effectively on EFI runtime but more generally this is the non-trusted firmware component that delivers runtime services to OS. (My flow is somewhat convoluted: TFA loads minimal Linux as BL33, Linux kexecs a UEFI reduced U-Boot (without drivers) which bootefi the distro).
Thanks! I see and IIUC, this is about two separately provisioned SW components that share an EL (EL1 in this case) at the same time in the same image. We want component A to have permission X on a memory region and component B to have permission Y on the same memory region. If so, then this would require a cooperation between the two components?
Yes. Well cooperation is what happens today: Component A (UEFI compliant FW) tells component B not to use memory it occupies. I wish an EL(+n) component to make that a guarantee. Yet I don't want to have "virtualization".
I might be still missing the obvious but I am wondering how a SW entity at a higher EL (Hypervisor in EL2 or TF-A in EL3) could create and enforce the separation between the two components. It would not have visibility of what is happening inside the EL at the very least.
I hoped that by installing a page mapping "power play", we could enforce some policy. Performance here is not important because those data and context changes seldomly happen. I assume components A and B have a different mapping for the same "physical page": - EL1_A(VA)-> IA1; EL1_B(VA)->IA2 - EL2(IA1) -> PA (RW), EL2(IA2)->PA(RO) or "not present" A collaboration between UEFI FW and EL2/3 would allow that to happen. A call to UEFI runtime service from SystemTable would result in a swap of TTBR1 (from EL1_B to EL1_A) so that execution can continue in UEFI. (I have no solution, just trying to check if we can find one).
cheers, Achin
cheers, Achin > > This is similar to hypervisor except it only deals with memory, no > vCPU, no GIC virtualization... > > Could EL3 or EL2 install protective mappings ? BL33 could ask either > EL2 hypervisor or SecureMonitor to actually install them. > > Cordially, > > FF > -- > TF-A mailing list > [2]TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org > [3]https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.-- [uc?id=0BxTAygkus3RgQVhuNHMwUi1mYWc&export=download] Fran�ois-Fr�d�ric Ozog | Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group T: +33.67221.6485 [4]francois.ozog@linaro.org | Skype: ffozog
References
- mailto:achin.gupta@arm.com
- mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org
- https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
- mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.