Hi all,
Trusted Firmware version 2.2 is now available and can be found here:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tag/?h=v2.2
Please refer to the readme and change log for further information.
Thanks & best regards,
[cid:image001.jpg@01D588EA.577B7090]
Bipin Ravi | Principal Design Engineer
Bipin.Ravi(a)arm.com<mailto:Joshua.Sunil@arm.com> | Skype: Bipin.Ravi.ARM
Direct: +1-512-225 -1071 | Mobile: +1-214-212-0794
5707 Southwest Parkway, Suite 100, Austin, TX 78735
Hello Maintainers,
I've sent a patch series around MTD framework management into BL2 stage (cf https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/2283).
This patch series will add following frameworks:
- a raw NAND framework implementation to support SLC NAND devices. Current implementation is limited to read operations without ECC corrections. Overrides are available to use hardware ECC from controller or low-level drivers. It also supports ONFI detection management but this can also be disabled or overridden by platform specific data.
- a SPI-MEM framework (inspired from kernel/u-boot implementation) that encapsulates all SPI operations to SPI low level drivers.
- a SPI-NAND framework based on SPI-MEM to support SPI NAND devices. This framework is also limited to the read operation. It uses single command, address and data bus width as legacy but can be overridden by platform.
- a SPI-NOR framework based on SPI-MEM to manage SPI NOR devices. It is also limited to read operations using single command, address and data bus width as legacy (override still possible by platform). The framework embeds some specific implementations for manufacturers specific behavior in case of quad mode configuration activation.
This patch series also includes:
- a new io_mtd interface to manage a generic access to all these frameworks.
- a NAND core driver that accesses independently to raw NAND or SPI-NAND framework. This core driver requires a scratch buffer defined by platform to manage unaligned pages (could be defined to 0 in case of aligned page) and limits access to a single NAND instance management.
- a complete integration is available based on STM32MP1 platform.
Tests have been performed with the following devices:
SLC NAND:
- Micron MT29F8G08ABACAH4 (ONFI)
- Micron MT29F8G16ABACAH4 (ONFI)
- Toshiba TH58NVG3S0HTAI0 (Non ONFI)
- Toshiba TC58BVG1S3HTAI0 (On die ECC)
SPI NOR:
- Macronix MX25L51245G
- Cypress/Spansion S25FL512
- Micron n25q512ax3
SPI-NAND:
- Micron MT29F2G01ABAGD
Waiting for your comments.
Best regards, Lionel
Hi Hugh,
Ccing the Rockchip maintainers from https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/docs/maint… as neither appear to be subscribed to this mailing list.
Joanna
On 08/10/2019, 21:45, "TF-A on behalf of Hugh Cole-Baker via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
Hi folks,
I've been using TF-A with mainline U-Boot recently as firmware & boot
loader for a RK3399 Rockpro64 board. I'm compiling TF-A and U-boot based
on this guide [1], using gcc 8.3.0 from Debian.
TF-A v2.1 works fine for this, but I recently tried to switch to TF-A
latest master and found U-Boot gets stuck with this version.
The symptoms are: U-Boot TPL and SPL print starting messages like this:
U-Boot TPL 2019.10-rc4-00037-gdac51e9aaf (Oct 06 2019 - 21:42:50)
Trying to boot from BOOTROM
Returning to boot ROM...
U-Boot SPL 2019.10-rc4-00037-gdac51e9aaf (Oct 06 2019 - 21:42:50 +0000)
Trying to boot from MMC2
...and then there is no more output when normally U-Boot proper would
start, and go on to load the Linux kernel, etc.
Starting from v2.1, with git bisect I found the first 'bad' commit is:
0aad563c7480 rockchip: Update BL31_BASE to 0x40000
and that commit does change some RK3399-related files so seems likely.
I'm not sure how to debug further, any ideas on why boot is hanging
after that change or how to get more debugging information?
Best regards,
Hugh Cole-Baker
[1] https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.rockchip
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Hi Varun,
TF-A v1.4 is rather old codebase, can you provide the exact patchset you cherry-picked on top of it?
e.g. you need the Hercules CPU support patch (a4668c36f1fca75b), but possibly also all which is related to HW_ASSISTED_COHERENCY option?
Also, can you pls provide your build cmd line?
Thanks & Regards,
Olivier.
________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Soby Mathew via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 11 October 2019 11:21
To: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com>; Joanna Farley <Joanna.Farley(a)arm.com>; Matteo Carlini <Matteo.Carlini(a)arm.com>
Cc: Julius Werner via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; nd <nd(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Hercules-AE I$ problems
On 10/10/2019 20:46, Varun Wadekar wrote:
> Hello,
>
> First of all, thanks a lot for posting the Hercules-AE patches.
>
> We picked them up and used them internally. Unfortunately, the CPU sees
> garbage in it's I$ when we enable the I cache for the processor. If we
> keep I$ disabled, TF-A boots properly. We are using TF-A v1.4 for
> verification.
>
> We booted Linux kernel v4.14 on the processor and don't see this problem
> there. So, we suspect something going wrong inside TF-A. Have you seen
> this problem internally? Any hints or clues to solve it would be helpful.
>
> Thanks.
Hi Varun,
As indicated in the commit message of the patch, we have not tested the
CPU support internally due to non-availability of FVP for the CPU.
TF-A assumes that I$ will be invalidated when CPU is reset. Perhaps this
is not true for your setup. Could you try adding a `IC IALLU` in the CPU
reset handler prior to I$ enable and see if that improves anything ?
Best Regards
Soby Mathew
>
>
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Hello,
First of all, thanks a lot for posting the Hercules-AE patches.
We picked them up and used them internally. Unfortunately, the CPU sees garbage in it's I$ when we enable the I cache for the processor. If we keep I$ disabled, TF-A boots properly. We are using TF-A v1.4 for verification.
We booted Linux kernel v4.14 on the processor and don't see this problem there. So, we suspect something going wrong inside TF-A. Have you seen this problem internally? Any hints or clues to solve it would be helpful.
Thanks.
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Hi everyone,
This post is to let you know about some changes to the TrustedFirmware.org website and to the TF-A documentation. It briefly covers what's new, what has moved, and what happens to any existing resources you may be using.
First of all, we are making it more obvious where to access the documentation and the Gerrit review system. The front page of trustedfirmware.org has grown new "Documentation" and "Review" menus with links to this content. Dashboard and Wiki items have moved under the Documentation menu.
Secondly, the online version of the documentation has moved to www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/tf-a<http://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/tf-a>. This is a pre-rendered, HTML copy of the content that is found under the "docs" directory of the TF-A repository. The content here will remain synchronised with the master branch of the repository. Following the v2.2 release, you will also be able to access a static version of the documentation that corresponds to that tag, via a version selection drop-down menu on the site.
The intention behind this change is to make it easier to find the docs, to improve the output quality and to make the content more modular and readable. The new setup has a persistent table of contents (displayed to the left of the page content) and a search feature, making it easier to find what you're looking for and easier to move between documents and topics.
You may be used to viewing the docs through either the git viewer (https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/about/) or through the Github mirror (https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/). The landing pages of these sites now contain links to the new content. While you can still use these sites to access other documentation content, you may find that there are some formatting warnings displayed if you do so.
Finally, if you prefer to read a local copy of the documentation on your machine then you can build the same HTML output following the instructions at https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/docs-bui… (or docs/getting_started/docs-build.rst, for the equivalent file in the repository).
As always, let us know if you have any comments or if there are other changes you would like to see.
Thanks,
Paul
Hi folks,
I've been using TF-A with mainline U-Boot recently as firmware & boot
loader for a RK3399 Rockpro64 board. I'm compiling TF-A and U-boot based
on this guide [1], using gcc 8.3.0 from Debian.
TF-A v2.1 works fine for this, but I recently tried to switch to TF-A
latest master and found U-Boot gets stuck with this version.
The symptoms are: U-Boot TPL and SPL print starting messages like this:
U-Boot TPL 2019.10-rc4-00037-gdac51e9aaf (Oct 06 2019 - 21:42:50)
Trying to boot from BOOTROM
Returning to boot ROM...
U-Boot SPL 2019.10-rc4-00037-gdac51e9aaf (Oct 06 2019 - 21:42:50 +0000)
Trying to boot from MMC2
...and then there is no more output when normally U-Boot proper would
start, and go on to load the Linux kernel, etc.
Starting from v2.1, with git bisect I found the first 'bad' commit is:
0aad563c7480 rockchip: Update BL31_BASE to 0x40000
and that commit does change some RK3399-related files so seems likely.
I'm not sure how to debug further, any ideas on why boot is hanging
after that change or how to get more debugging information?
Best regards,
Hugh Cole-Baker
[1] https://github.com/u-boot/u-boot/blob/master/doc/README.rockchip
Hi,
This is to notify that we are planning to target the Trusted Firmware-A 2.2 release during the third week of October as part of the regular 6 month cadence. The aim is to consolidate all TF-A work since the 2.1 release. As part of this, a release candidate tag will be created and release activities will commence from Monday October 7th. Essentially we will not merge any major enhancements from this date until the release is made. Please ensure any Pull Requests (PR's) desired to make the 2.2 release are submitted in good time to be complete by Friday October 4th. Any major enhancement PR's still open after that date will not be merged until after the release.
Thanks & best regards,
[cid:image001.jpg@01D57244.98C07530]
Bipin Ravi | Principal Design Engineer
Bipin.Ravi(a)arm.com<mailto:Joshua.Sunil@arm.com> | Skype: Bipin.Ravi.ARM
Direct: +1-512-225 -1071 | Mobile: +1-214-212-0794
5707 Southwest Parkway, Suite 100, Austin, TX 78735
Hi,
We are going to configure Coverity Scan Online to make it send
notifications to this mailing list. This way, everyone subscribed on
this mailing list will be aware of newly detected/eliminated defects
found by the tool.
The report will provide a summary of the findings (their nature,
location in the source code). In order to look up the details or to
triage them, you will still need to access the database through the web
portal on
https://scan.coverity.com/projects/arm-software-arm-trusted-firmware .
As a reminder, you will need to create an account to view the defects
there (it's possible to use your Github account).
This is expected to generate a low volume of emails, as we typically do
1 analysis per week day.
As a heads up, the web interface mentions that "an authorization
confirmation will be sent to each newly provided email address and must
be acknowledged before notifications will be sent". In which case,
please ignore these emails.
Regards,
Sandrine
Hi Tristan,
Can you please clarify what your exact concern is? Which files and what text exactly? That will help us answer your concern.
Thanks
Joanna
On 16/09/2019, 23:48, "TF-A on behalf of Tristan Muntsinger via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
Hello all,
It looks like the copyright guidance on this project changed about a year
ago (Nov 13, 2018) to a placeholder and hasn't been corrected yet. Can
this be fixed to make the license valid so the project can be legally
redistributed per BSD-3 as intended?
Thanks,
Tristan Muntsinger
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Hi Dan,
Whoops, sorry, this fell through the cracks for me since I wasn't on
the to: line. Thanks for your response!
> OK I can see the use of that, although I'd be a bit concerned about such a thing being available as a general service in case it gets used as an attack vector. For example, a test program could aggressively use this service to try to get the firmware to leak secure world information or something about its behaviour.
Yes, of course, we can gate this with a build option so it would only
be available where desired.
> However, I think there might already be support for what you need. PSCI is part of the standard service and the function SYSTEM_RESET2 allows for both architectural and vendor-specific resets. The latter allows for vendor-specific semantics, which could include crashing the firmware as you suggest.
>
> Chrome OS could specify what such a vendor-specific reset looks like and each Chromebook's platform PSCI hooks could be implemented accordingly.
Right, but defining a separate vendor-specific reset type for each
platform is roughly the same as defining a separate SiP SMC for each
of them. It's the same problem that the SMC/PSCI spec and the TF
repository layout is only designed to deal with generic vs.
SoC-vendor-specific differentiation. If the normal world OS needs a
feature, we can only make it generic or duplicate it across all
vendors running that OS.
> Alternatively, this could potentially be defined as an additional architectural reset. This would enable a generic implementation but would require approval/definition by Arm's Architecture team. Like me they might have concerns about this being defined at a generic architectural level.
Yes, I think that would be the best option. Could you kick off that
process with the Architecture team? Or tell me who I should talk to
about this?
Thanks,
Julius
Hello all,
It looks like the copyright guidance on this project changed about a year
ago (Nov 13, 2018) to a placeholder and hasn't been corrected yet. Can
this be fixed to make the license valid so the project can be legally
redistributed per BSD-3 as intended?
Thanks,
Tristan Muntsinger
Hi Yann,
You are quite correct. We will be looking to create a v2.2 tag release sometime early to mid October. You can expect a more formal notification and a request to get any patches submitted in the next week or so. As in previous releases master will be generally locked for a week or so while closedown testing is performed although we will assess incoming patches to see if they can be taken with low risk.
Joanna
On 16/09/2019, 13:19, "TF-A on behalf of Yann GAUTIER via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
Hi,
From the wiki page https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a_release_information/, the next v2.2 tag may be released soon.
But the exact timeframe is not yet published.
The wiki page might be updated if you have more information.
When do you expect to release tag v2.2?
What will be the deadline to send patches upstream?
Thanks,
Yann
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Hi,
>From the wiki page https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a_release_information/, the next v2.2 tag may be released soon.
But the exact timeframe is not yet published.
The wiki page might be updated if you have more information.
When do you expect to release tag v2.2?
What will be the deadline to send patches upstream?
Thanks,
Yann
Hi Soby,
> Hi Julius,
> Apologize for the radio silence as I was on sabbatical. Yes, I agree the
> project needs to have a clear policy around platforms. We will get this
> started on our end and send a policy proposal for review.
No problem, thanks to Sandrine for taking care of it so quickly.
Unfortunately we now discovered that we're still stuck on the same
issue with MT8173. Could one of you please help getting
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/990/31
landed to fix that too?
Thanks,
Julius
Hello Soby/Joanna,
We would like to upstream support for a new Tegra platform along with some other changes. The last time I checked, there were more than 400 changes waiting to be upstreamed.
Can someone help me with the best/fastest approach to start upstreaming? Previously, we would upstream changes in big chunks (as branches) but I don't know if that approach still works.
Thanks.
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Hi Soby,
> Hmm, if we merge a non-trivial patch and ensure the build works, then we
> do not know whether it runs correctly, whether there are any runtime
> effects that would affect stability/robustness of the platform that even
> might have security implications. Hence, in my view, it is better to
> have a broken build for the platform, rather than have runtime problems.
>
> The project could form a policy that if a platform remains broken for
> more than 2 releases (1 year by current release intervals), then it will
> get removed from the tree after giving enough notifications.
Thanks, yes, I think it would be good to have a clear policy on this,
whatever it is.
I would still like to make a case for keeping these platforms in the
tree on a best-effort basis. You're right that there's a chance for
untested patches to cause all sorts of runtime errors, but I think
that may still be better than a platform that doesn't build at all. A
platform that doesn't build doesn't benefit anyone. A platform that
may have errors still has a chance of working, and even if it doesn't
it gives a third-party contributor or hobby developer who wants to
start using it a chance to fix it up again. This is something we
occasionally see happening with some of our older, less maintained
platforms in coreboot. But if it doesn't even build, the chance of
someone coming along to fix it seem very slim, because then more and
more build issues will keep piling up over time. (In fact, I doubt
there's even any point in keeping broken stuff in the tree for another
year as you proposed... likely all that would do is confuse people who
are trying to refactor project-wide APIs. Code that's never
build-tested just bit rots very quickly. I think at that point you
might as well remove it from the repo immediately.)
It's true that there may also be security issues (which is more
serious), but I'm skeptical that this really makes a lot of
difference. After all, this may happen even while the platform is
still actively maintained. Just testing whether it boots doesn't make
sure you have no security issues anyway. Maybe a way to make this more
visible instead could be to introduce a new
ALLOW_UNMAINTAINED_PLATFORM=1 make variable that the user has to
explicitly set to build a platform without active maintainer? That
could serve as a warning that the code may not be safe to use for
critical applications anymore while still giving developers access to
something if they're willing to deal with possible issues.
Anyway, whatever the policy may be, a more defined process would help.
I think the initial messaging around the console deprecation plan was
fine, but it would have been good to have another explicit
announcement when the CI actually gets turned off for a platform.
Hi Julius,
On 8/27/19 9:55 PM, Julius Werner via TF-A wrote:
> Could either of you please help get the Tegra fix in
> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/1192
> landed (and subsequently CI for Tegra re-enabled)? It has been
> reviewed and approved for two weeks but nobody is merging it. This is
> blocking more and more work across all coreboot-based platforms so I
> would appreciate if we could get it resolved quickly.
Apologies for the delay. As you may have seen, the patch has now been
merged, and we've also re-enabled the Tegra builds in the CI.
Regards,
Sandrine
Hi Soby, Joanna,
Could either of you please help get the Tegra fix in
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/1192
landed (and subsequently CI for Tegra re-enabled)? It has been
reviewed and approved for two weeks but nobody is merging it. This is
blocking more and more work across all coreboot-based platforms so I
would appreciate if we could get it resolved quickly.
Thanks,
Julius
Hi Julius
> -----Original Message-----
> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Julius
> Werner via TF-A
> Sent: 20 August 2019 02:15
>
> Hi Soby et. al.,
>
> I'd like to implement a small new feature and ask some guidance for how to go
> about it: Chrome OS has the ability to automatically collect crash reports
> from runtime crashes in Trusted Firmware, and we would like to set up
> automated tests to ensure this feature stays working.
> In order to do this we need a way for the non-secure OS to intentionally
> trigger a panic in EL3. The obvious solution would be to implement a new SMC
> for that. (It's common for operating systems to have similar facilities, e.g.
> Linux can force a kernel panic by writing 'c' into /proc/sysrq-trigger.)
>
OK I can see the use of that, although I'd be a bit concerned about such a thing being available as a general service in case it gets used as an attack vector. For example, a test program could aggressively use this service to try to get the firmware to leak secure world information or something about its behaviour.
> My main question is: where should I get an SMC function ID for this?
> This is not a silicon or OEM specific feature, so the SiP Service Calls and
> OEM Service Calls ID ranges seem inappropriate (or do you think it would make
> sense to treat Google or Chrome OS as the "OEM"
> here, even though that's not quite accurate?).
I guess in theory you could mandate that all Chrome OS SiPs provide a specific function ID in their own specific SiP service, but I don't think that's the right solution here...
> There are ranges for Trusted
> Applications and the Trusted OS but unfortunately none for the normal world
> OS.
I don't think the TOS range is right either.
> Is this something that would make sense to allocate under Standard
> Service Calls? Could you just find an ID for me to use there or does
> everything in that range need a big specification document written by Arm?
>
For sure everything in the standard or architectural ranges require specification by Arm, although this does not necessarily need to be big.
However, I think there might already be support for what you need. PSCI is part of the standard service and the function SYSTEM_RESET2 allows for both architectural and vendor-specific resets. The latter allows for vendor-specific semantics, which could include crashing the firmware as you suggest.
Chrome OS could specify what such a vendor-specific reset looks like and each Chromebook's platform PSCI hooks could be implemented accordingly.
Alternatively, this could potentially be defined as an additional architectural reset. This would enable a generic implementation but would require approval/definition by Arm's Architecture team. Like me they might have concerns about this being defined at a generic architectural level.
Regards
Dan.
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