Hi all,
Trusted Firmware-A and TF-A tests version 2.3 is now available and can be found here:
TF-A:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tag/?h=v2.3
TF-A-tests:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git/tag/?h=v2.3
Please refer to the readme and change log for further information.
Thanks & best regards,
[cid:image001.jpg@01D6170F.64702DF0]
Bipin Ravi | Principal Design Engineer
Bipin.Ravi(a)arm.com<mailto:Bipin.Ravi@arm.com> | Mobile: +1-214-212-0794
5707 Southwest Parkway, Suite 100, Austin, TX 78735
Hi Raghu and Varun,
This patch is a complete, tested and verified reference implementation for FVP platform.
Splitting it will create a set of separate non-buildable patches causing more complexity in following
and understanding the code changes and dependencies.
The whole patch with all the code present in it should be reviewed anyway, and the time spent will be less
than the time used for reviewing separate patches (mass defect).
Alexei
________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 02 April 2020 05:11
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Event Log for Measured Boot
Hi Alexei,
I second Varun on this. The patch is huge. I recommend breaking it up
into multiple commits. I've reviewed it but since it is a large patch,
it might require a few more sittings to grasp all the changes(which also
means there may be some stupid review comments :)).
-Raghu
On 3/31/20 10:28 AM, Varun Wadekar via TF-A wrote:
> Hello Alexei,
>
> Just curious, the patch is huge and will take some time to review. Do
> you expect this change to be merged before the v2.3 release?
>
> -Varun
>
> *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> *On Behalf Of
> *Alexei Fedorov via TF-A
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 31, 2020 7:19 AM
> *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> *Subject:* [TF-A] Event Log for Measured Boot
>
> *External email: Use caution opening links or attachments*
>
> Hi,
>
> Please review and provide your comments for the patch which adds
>
> Event Log generation for the Measured Boot.
>
> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3806
>
> Thanks.
>
> Alexei
>
> IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are
> confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended
> recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the
> contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy
> the information in any medium. Thank you.
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and
> may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use,
> disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended
> recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all
> copies of the original message.
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hi,
If buffers are to be consumed by NWd only, it's probably better to contain the isolation at NS-EL2 (through Stage-2 MMU mapping).
Though from your statements I'm not clear if you wish to use an hypervisor, or not?
If yes, which implementation or kind do you want to use?
If not, I wonder if you could re-use OS facilities like shared mem with different permissions for two child processes (might be tricky)?
I don't think execute-only regions exist in Cortex-A (unless implementing additional hardware). If executable it's probably also readable. Maybe you meant execute-never?
Regards,
Olivier.
________________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 20 April 2020 13:45
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-A] [RFC] isolation between runtime BL33 services and OS
Hi,
I am trying to identify a mechanism to enforce a form of two-way
isolation between BL33 runtime services in OS, for instance:
- a pair of 2MB areas that could be RO by one entity and RW by the other
- an execute only BL33 2MB area?
This is similar to hypervisor except it only deals with memory, no
vCPU, no GIC virtualization...
Could EL3 or EL2 install protective mappings ? BL33 could ask either
EL2 hypervisor or SecureMonitor to actually install them.
Cordially,
FF
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
Hi,
I am trying to identify a mechanism to enforce a form of two-way
isolation between BL33 runtime services in OS, for instance:
- a pair of 2MB areas that could be RO by one entity and RW by the other
- an execute only BL33 2MB area?
This is similar to hypervisor except it only deals with memory, no
vCPU, no GIC virtualization...
Could EL3 or EL2 install protective mappings ? BL33 could ask either
EL2 hypervisor or SecureMonitor to actually install them.
Cordially,
FF
Hi,
As part of integrating Hafnium within Trusted Firmware projects, a new mailing list has been created:
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/hafnium
You can register this list to participate to Hafnium in general, and coming S-EL2 firmware design discussions.
Regards,
Olivier.
Hi @François<mailto:francois.ozog@linaro.org>,
<quote>
Now, I changed U-Boot to Image, added code to ensure arg0 is 0 (DTB) but Linux does not start (zero printk visible).
I don't find kernel text base anymore, may be it disappeared: any suggestion to get the kernel start when loaded at 64KB offset?
the kernel image with embedded initrd is 10MB, SRAM is at 64MB so there should be enough space to decompress initrd...
</quote>
I recommend reading through the arm64 Linux booting requirements if you haven’t already; you’ll need to ensure all of those conditions are met before entering the kernel [1].
For example have you correctly set text_offset in the image header?
<quote>
u32 code0; /* Executable code */
u32 code1; /* Executable code */
u64 text_offset; /* Image load offset, little endian */
u64 image_size; /* Effective Image size, little endian */
u64 flags; /* kernel flags, little endian */
u64 res2 = 0; /* reserved */
u64 res3 = 0; /* reserved */
u64 res4 = 0; /* reserved */
u32 magic = 0x644d5241; /* Magic number, little endian, "ARM\x64" */
u32 res5; /* reserved (used for PE COFF offset) */
</quote>
<quote>
The Image must be placed text_offset bytes from a 2MB aligned base address anywhere in usable system RAM and called there.
</quote>
Kind regards,
Ash.
[1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/latest/source/Documentation/arm64/booting.…
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hi Feng,
This is standard practice for operating systems, hypervisors, and firmware running on Armv8-A systems. A key distinction between SPSel,#0 and SPSel,#1 is that you can tell which stack pointer you were using when you took an exception as they correspond to different offsets in the vector table. Often times, taking an exception from the same EL when using SPSel,#0 is non-terminal whereas taking an exception from the same EL when already using SPSel,#1 is considered terminal.
Take for example the scenario where your operating system, hypervisor, or firmware is running some task/thread code at EL1/EL2/EL3 and runs out of stack space, triggering a translation fault and attempting to stack some data (we’ll probably be using unmapped guard pages at the stack boundaries). The first thing the exception handler will try to do is stack the GPRs. If the reason you took the exception is because the stack pointed to by SP_EL1/2/3 has itself overflowed, this attempt to stack the GPRs will itself cause a translation fault and you’ll get stuck in a recursive exception.
In contrast, if the reason you took the exception is because the stack pointed to by SP_EL0 has overflowed, the exception handler will successfully stack the GPRs to the SP_EL1/2/3 stack and be able to diagnose + log what went wrong before rebooting gracefully.
Hope that helps,
Ash.
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Chen Feng via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Reply to: Chen Feng <puck.chen(a)hisilicon.com>
Date: Friday, 17 April 2020 at 09:02
To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com>, Yatharth Kochar <Yatharth.Kochar(a)arm.com>, Sandrine Bailleux <Sandrine.Bailleux(a)arm.com>
Cc: "puck.chen(a)hisilicon.com" <puck.chen(a)hisilicon.com>, "lizhong11(a)hisilicon.com" <lizhong11(a)hisilicon.com>
Subject: [TF-A] sp select in atf
Hello all,
I see the atf use different sp, and special for smc64 it use the sp_el0.
So for the unhandled-exception handler, it must switch to sp_el0 to do
the back-trace-dump. Since it default used sp_el3 when exception happen.
My question here is why using different sp in atf code? Just use the
sp_el3 for all scenes seems more simpler.
Cheers,
- feng
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hello all,
I see the atf use different sp, and special for smc64 it use the sp_el0.
So for the unhandled-exception handler, it must switch to sp_el0 to do
the back-trace-dump. Since it default used sp_el3 when exception happen.
My question here is why using different sp in atf code? Just use the
sp_el3 for all scenes seems more simpler.
Cheers,
- feng
As of now ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33 is only supported when RESET_TO_BL31=1, along with it you need to pass PRELOADED_BL33_BASE as well as ARM_PRELOADED_DTB_BASE.
AFAIK This feature is not tested for platforms which uses all the BL(1/2/31) stages from TF-A . The most likely reason for this is loading and authentication of Linux Image.
BL2 which is responsible for loading of various images, does not have support to load linux image.
With platforms having RESET_TO_BL31, TF-A relies on prior loader which loads kernel and device tree blobs at respective address.
In short, if your platform has RESET_TO_BL31=1, it will be quite easy else you need to understand the BL2 loading mechanism and see if you can extend it for loading Linux and DTB.
Kernel Output format zImage/Image should work.
Hope this helps!
________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of François Ozog via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 15 April 2020 13:31
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-A] Linux as BL33
I want to use Linux as BL33 on a Marvell Macchiatobin.
Currently I have the successful boot flow:
TFA (mainline v2.2) -> U-Boot (Mainline 2020.04rc5) -> Kernel (5.6.3)
with U-root initrd (6.0.0, https://github.com/u-root/u-root ) ->
Ubuntu 19.10
The 5.6.3 "intermediary" kernel is 5.5MB uncompressed , u-root initrd
is 3.5MB compressed (some form of golang based busybox).
I was pointed to the ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33 option which is not
supported on the Macchiatobin.
It does not look too difficult to add, but I'd like to have some
feedback/guidance on how to do it:
- how to add the option to the TFA platform
- how to generate a usable kernel (compile options? non relocatable
kernel? output format, i.e. Image, zImage, uImage...)
Thanks for your help
-FF
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
+Harb
________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Vivek Prasad via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Thursday, April 16, 2020 10:19 AM
To: Stuart Yoder <stuart.yoder(a)arm.com>; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com>; tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Raghu Krishnamurthy <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>
Cc: Loc Ho <loc.ho(a)amperecomputing.com>; Vivek Kumar <vivek(a)amperecomputing.com>; Benjamin Chaffin <bchaffin(a)amperecomputing.com>; Ard Biesheuvel <Ard.Biesheuvel(a)arm.com>; Mohamad Ammar <moe(a)amperecomputing.com>; Charles Garcia-Tobin <Charles.Garcia-Tobin(a)arm.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Proposal for Measured Boot Implementation
Hello Stuart, Alexei,
Chiming-in here on Ampere's behalf...
We analysed this proposal internally. And we see a number issues with this, some of which was already raised by Raghu in the previous threads.
Here is a summary of the main issues that we see.
* Only supporting mbedtls, and this is fixed config at compile time.
* We propose that there should be a variable for the algorithm to be used, which can be setup at initialization time.
* This solution relies on taking the hash directly from the digest as the measurement, instead of the computed hash. This is not safe, especially considering measured boot may use a different hash bank, so digest hash may not be correct/valid.
* Only measuring the BL2 image, per the ARM SBSG we must be measuring and logging *all* images/boot phases
* BL31
* BL32 (all secure partitions)
* BL33 (UEFI or any other non-secure boot loader)
* Once we ERET into BL33, the measure boot flow continues and is owned by that boot loader
* Only see support for PCR0, any/all unsigned config data must be logged to PCR1.
* Passing PCRs to non-secure software before logging is not compliant with TCG Static-Root-of-Trust Measurement (SRTM) requirements
* It was discussed before in separate conversations… especially in systems where you are talked about two different signing domains where BL33 is a different trust/signing domain.
* BL33 should only do hash-log-extend… there is no need for BL33 to be aware of the current PCR value (beyond what is provided in the boot event log).
* Based on comments on the mail thread, there seem to be bad assumptions/expectations around TPM accessibility from non-secure world.
* Expecting SPI/I2C TPMs to be directly accessed from non-secure world instead of abstracting hardware details via the TCG CRB interface (which has been already standardized as the defacto mechanism for ARM on past mobile, client, and server solutions).
* CRB will "just work" for Aptio/EDK2/Linux/Windows/Hyper-V/VMWare
* NOTE: This goes back to what is a “productizable” TPM solution. We want it to be turn-key solution for customers without having to support/develop proprietary drivers.
-Vivek/Harb
Hi all,
Thanks to all who have commented on this proposal so far. I've edited
the original document to try and incorporate all feedback gathered so
far (through the TSC meeting, this email thread and the TF-A tech call).
Please have another look and flag anything I might have missed:
https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p…
The major changes are:
== Removed concept of self-review ==
This is proving too controversial, several people do not want to allow
self-review.
Roles of maintainer and code owner are still cumulative but cannot be
both exercised for the same patch.
The exact method of dealing with review bottleneck is still to be
decided. In addition to the current proposal of increasing the
maintainers pool, the most popular alternatives mentioned so far are:
- Set a minimum wait time for feedback before a patch can be merged
without any further delay.
- Mandate distinct reviewers for a patch.
== Enhanced the section "Patch contribution Guidelines" ==
Mentioned that patches should be small, on-topic, with comprehensive
commit messages.
== Added a note about how to deal with disagreement ==
If reviewers cannot find a common ground, the proposal is to call out a
3rd-party maintainer.
== Removed "out-of-date" platform state ==
Squashed it into "limited support" to reduce the number of states.
== Removed "orphan" state from platform support life cycle ==
This concept is orthogonal to the level of functionality.
Added a note in the "Code Owner" section instead.
== Per-project guidelines as a complementary document ==
Added a list of things that it would typically cover.
== Added requirement on fully supported platforms to document the
features they support ==
== Added todo mentioning that the proposal might cover branching
strategies in the future ==
The full diff may be seen here:
https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/phriction/diff/73/?l=4&r=5
This proposal is still open for discussion at this stage and further
feedback is most welcome!
Regards,
Sandrine
I want to use Linux as BL33 on a Marvell Macchiatobin.
Currently I have the successful boot flow:
TFA (mainline v2.2) -> U-Boot (Mainline 2020.04rc5) -> Kernel (5.6.3)
with U-root initrd (6.0.0, https://github.com/u-root/u-root ) ->
Ubuntu 19.10
The 5.6.3 "intermediary" kernel is 5.5MB uncompressed , u-root initrd
is 3.5MB compressed (some form of golang based busybox).
I was pointed to the ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33 option which is not
supported on the Macchiatobin.
It does not look too difficult to add, but I'd like to have some
feedback/guidance on how to do it:
- how to add the option to the TFA platform
- how to generate a usable kernel (compile options? non relocatable
kernel? output format, i.e. Image, zImage, uImage...)
Thanks for your help
-FF
Looping-in Thomas & Deepak, responsible for the RD-N1 landing team platforms releases. They might be able to help.
Thanks
Matteo
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of ??(??) via TF-A
Sent: 14 April 2020 06:47
To: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-A] 回复:Re: [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed
Hi RagHu,
Really appreciate your help.
I was downloaded this software stack from git.linaro.org. This software stack include ATF, kernel, edk2 and so on.
The user guide i used from linaro is:https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/arm-reference-platforms…
1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced
outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU?
A: I am running on ARM N1-Edge FVP platform. It can reproduced on this FVP platform.
2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the
commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code.
A: TF-A: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/arm-tf.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0
StandloneMM seems build from edk2 & edk2-platform. so i just put edk2 and edk2-platform version information. if anything i missed, please let me know.
edk2: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2.git<https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2.git/> tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0
edk2-platform: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2-platforms.git<https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2-platforms.git/> tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0
3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used?
A: kernel-release: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/kernel-release.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0
The sdei driver was included in kernel, do i need to provide sdei driver version? If need please let me know.
4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123
to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external
abort through memory access ?
A: Sorry, linaro only refered it will inject the DMC-620 single-bit RAS error. So I am also not sure which exception type it will trigger.
BRs,
Bin Wu
------------------原始邮件 ------------------
发件人:TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
发送时间:Tue Apr 14 01:25:47 2020
收件人:Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>
主题:Re: [TF-A] [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed
Hello,
>>Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again?
I don't think it will. It is really odd that
0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) ever reaches the BL32/MM handler.
This is from looking at the upstream code quickly but it definitely
depends on the platform you are running, what version of TF-A you are
using, build options used. Is it possible that the unhandled exception
is occurring after successful handling of the DMC620 error but there is
a following issue that occurs right after, causing the crash?
From the register dump it looks like there was an Instruction abort
exception at address 0 while running in EL3. Something seems to have
gone seriously wrong to have 0xC4000061 ever go back to BL32 and to get
an instruction abort at address 0.
>>Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash.
See above. The answer really depends on the factors mentioned above.
The following would be helpful to know:
1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced
outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU?
2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the
commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code.
3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used?
4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123
to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external
abort through memory access ?
Thanks
Raghu
On 4/13/20 12:16 AM, 吴斌(郅隆) via TF-A wrote:
> Dear Friends,
>
> I am using TF-A to test RAS feature.
> When I triggered DMC620 RAS error in Linux(echo 0x123 >
> /sys/kernel/debug/sdei_ras_poison).
> BL32 will recieve
> UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) and finally
> BL31 crashed.
>
> In my understanding, this 0xC4000061 should consumed by BL31, not send
> it to BL32 again.
>
> A piece of error log as below:
>
> *************************************
>
> CperWrite - CperAddress@0xFF610064
> CperWrite - 1 Section@FFBE91A8, Length 80, SectionType@FFBE9138
> CperWrite - Got Error Section: Platform Memory.
> MmEntryPoint Done
> Received delegated event
> X0 : 0xC4000061
> X1 : 0x0
> X2 : 0x0
> X3 : 0x0
> Received event - 0xC4000061 on cpu 0
> UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061
> Failed delegated event 0xC4000061, Status 0x2
> Unhandled Exception in EL3.
> x30 = 0x0000000000000000
> x0 = 0x00000000ff007e00
> x1 = 0xfffffffffffffffe
> x2 = 0x00000000600003c0
> x3 = 0x0000000000000000
> x4 = 0x0000000000000000
> x5 = 0x0000000000000000
> x6 = 0x00000000ff015080
> x7 = 0x0000000000000000
> x8 = 0x00000000c4000061
> x9 = 0x0000000000000021
> x10 = 0x0000000000000040
> x11 = 0x00000000ff00f2b0
> x12 = 0x00000000ff0118c0
> x13 = 0x0000000000000002
> x14 = 0x00000000ff016b70
> x15 = 0x00000000ff003f20
> x16 = 0x0000000000000044
> x17 = 0x00000000ff010430
> x18 = 0x0000000000000e3c
> x19 = 0x0000000000000000
> More error log please refer to attachment.
>
> My question is,
> 1. Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again?
> 2. Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash.
>
> Appreciate your help.
>
> BRs,
> Bin Wu
>
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org>
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
Hi RagHu,
Really appreciate your help.
I was downloaded this software stack from git.linaro.org. This software stack include ATF, kernel, edk2 and so on.
The user guide i used from linaro is:https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/arm-reference-platforms…
1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced
outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU?
A: I am running on ARM N1-Edge FVP platform. It can reproduced on this FVP platform.
2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the
commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code.
A: TF-A: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/arm-tf.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0
StandloneMM seems build from edk2 & edk2-platform. so i just put edk2 and edk2-platform version information. if anything i missed, please let me know.
edk2: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0
edk2-platform: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/edk2-platforms.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0
3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used?
A: kernel-release: https://git.linaro.org/landing-teams/working/arm/kernel-release.git tag:RD-INFRA-20191024-RC0
The sdei driver was included in kernel, do i need to provide sdei driver version? If need please let me know.
4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123
to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external
abort through memory access ?
A: Sorry, linaro only refered it will inject the DMC-620 single-bit RAS error. So I am also not sure which exception type it will trigger.
BRs,
Bin Wu
------------------原始邮件 ------------------
发件人:TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
发送时间:Tue Apr 14 01:25:47 2020
收件人:Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
主题:Re: [TF-A] [RAS] BL32 UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061 and BL31 Crashed
Hello,
>>Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again?
I don't think it will. It is really odd that
0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) ever reaches the BL32/MM handler.
This is from looking at the upstream code quickly but it definitely
depends on the platform you are running, what version of TF-A you are
using, build options used. Is it possible that the unhandled exception
is occurring after successful handling of the DMC620 error but there is
a following issue that occurs right after, causing the crash?
From the register dump it looks like there was an Instruction abort
exception at address 0 while running in EL3. Something seems to have
gone seriously wrong to have 0xC4000061 ever go back to BL32 and to get
an instruction abort at address 0.
>>Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash.
See above. The answer really depends on the factors mentioned above.
The following would be helpful to know:
1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced
outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU?
2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the
commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code.
3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used?
4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123
to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external
abort through memory access ?
Thanks
Raghu
On 4/13/20 12:16 AM, 吴斌(郅隆) via TF-A wrote:
> Dear Friends,
>
> I am using TF-A to test RAS feature.
> When I triggered DMC620 RAS error in Linux(echo 0x123 >
> /sys/kernel/debug/sdei_ras_poison).
> BL32 will recieve
> UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) and finally
> BL31 crashed.
>
> In my understanding, this 0xC4000061 should consumed by BL31, not send
> it to BL32 again.
>
> A piece of error log as below:
>
> *************************************
>
> CperWrite - CperAddress@0xFF610064
> CperWrite - 1 Section@FFBE91A8, Length 80, SectionType@FFBE9138
> CperWrite - Got Error Section: Platform Memory.
> MmEntryPoint Done
> Received delegated event
> X0 : 0xC4000061
> X1 : 0x0
> X2 : 0x0
> X3 : 0x0
> Received event - 0xC4000061 on cpu 0
> UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061
> Failed delegated event 0xC4000061, Status 0x2
> Unhandled Exception in EL3.
> x30 = 0x0000000000000000
> x0 = 0x00000000ff007e00
> x1 = 0xfffffffffffffffe
> x2 = 0x00000000600003c0
> x3 = 0x0000000000000000
> x4 = 0x0000000000000000
> x5 = 0x0000000000000000
> x6 = 0x00000000ff015080
> x7 = 0x0000000000000000
> x8 = 0x00000000c4000061
> x9 = 0x0000000000000021
> x10 = 0x0000000000000040
> x11 = 0x00000000ff00f2b0
> x12 = 0x00000000ff0118c0
> x13 = 0x0000000000000002
> x14 = 0x00000000ff016b70
> x15 = 0x00000000ff003f20
> x16 = 0x0000000000000044
> x17 = 0x00000000ff010430
> x18 = 0x0000000000000e3c
> x19 = 0x0000000000000000
> More error log please refer to attachment.
>
> My question is,
> 1. Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again?
> 2. Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash.
>
> Appreciate your help.
>
> BRs,
> Bin Wu
>
--
TF-A mailing list
TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
Hi Varun,
1. The value of '1' sets ‘standard’ type of BP which according to GCC documentation:
"turns on all types of branch protection features. If a feature has additional tuning options, then ‘standard’ sets it to its standard level. "
It equals to "bti+pac-ret".
2. Yes. See above and use option value of '1'.
Regards.
Alexei
________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 10 April 2020 19:28
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com>; Anthony Zhou <anzhou(a)nvidia.com>
Subject: Re: [TF-A] BRANCH_PROTECTION
Hello,
Can someone please help clarify?
-Varun
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Varun Wadekar via TF-A
Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 9:58 PM
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com>; Anthony Zhou <anzhou(a)nvidia.com>
Subject: [TF-A] BRANCH_PROTECTION
External email: Use caution opening links or attachments
Hello,
Can someone please help me understand if
1. a ‘value’ of ‘1’ for BRANCH_PROTECTION covers the PAuth protection provided by a value of ‘2’ and/or ‘3’?
2. there is a way to enable BTI and “pac-ret” at the same time?
The docs provide this information.
<snip>
- ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication
and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves.
If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option
``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use:
- 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection
- 1: Enables all types of branch protection features
- 2: Return address signing to its standard level
- 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions
The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options
and resulting PAuth/BTI<https://tegra-sw-opengrok.nvidia.com/source/s?path=PAuth/BTI&project=stage-…> features.
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI |
+=======+==============+=======+=====+
| 0 | none | N | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 1 | standard | Y | Y |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 2 | pac-ret | Y | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature.
Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world
irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it.
<snip>
Thanks,
Varun
________________________________
This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message.
________________________________
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hello,
>>Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again?
I don't think it will. It is really odd that
0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) ever reaches the BL32/MM handler.
This is from looking at the upstream code quickly but it definitely
depends on the platform you are running, what version of TF-A you are
using, build options used. Is it possible that the unhandled exception
is occurring after successful handling of the DMC620 error but there is
a following issue that occurs right after, causing the crash?
From the register dump it looks like there was an Instruction abort
exception at address 0 while running in EL3. Something seems to have
gone seriously wrong to have 0xC4000061 ever go back to BL32 and to get
an instruction abort at address 0.
>>Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash.
See above. The answer really depends on the factors mentioned above.
The following would be helpful to know:
1) What platform you are running on? Can this issue be reproduced
outside your testing environment, perhaps on FVP or QEMU?
2) What version of TF-A and StandaloneMM is being used? Preferably the
commit-id, so that we can be sure we are looking at the same code.
3) What version of the kernel and sdei driver is being used?
4) I can't tell from looking at the log but do you know if writing 0x123
to sde_ras_poison causes a DMC620 interrupt or an SError or external
abort through memory access ?
Thanks
Raghu
On 4/13/20 12:16 AM, 吴斌(郅隆) via TF-A wrote:
> Dear Friends,
>
> I am using TF-A to test RAS feature.
> When I triggered DMC620 RAS error in Linux(echo 0x123 >
> /sys/kernel/debug/sdei_ras_poison).
> BL32 will recieve
> UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) and finally
> BL31 crashed.
>
> In my understanding, this 0xC4000061 should consumed by BL31, not send
> it to BL32 again.
>
> A piece of error log as below:
>
> *************************************
>
> CperWrite - CperAddress@0xFF610064
> CperWrite - 1 Section@FFBE91A8, Length 80, SectionType@FFBE9138
> CperWrite - Got Error Section: Platform Memory.
> MmEntryPoint Done
> Received delegated event
> X0 : 0xC4000061
> X1 : 0x0
> X2 : 0x0
> X3 : 0x0
> Received event - 0xC4000061 on cpu 0
> UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061
> Failed delegated event 0xC4000061, Status 0x2
> Unhandled Exception in EL3.
> x30 = 0x0000000000000000
> x0 = 0x00000000ff007e00
> x1 = 0xfffffffffffffffe
> x2 = 0x00000000600003c0
> x3 = 0x0000000000000000
> x4 = 0x0000000000000000
> x5 = 0x0000000000000000
> x6 = 0x00000000ff015080
> x7 = 0x0000000000000000
> x8 = 0x00000000c4000061
> x9 = 0x0000000000000021
> x10 = 0x0000000000000040
> x11 = 0x00000000ff00f2b0
> x12 = 0x00000000ff0118c0
> x13 = 0x0000000000000002
> x14 = 0x00000000ff016b70
> x15 = 0x00000000ff003f20
> x16 = 0x0000000000000044
> x17 = 0x00000000ff010430
> x18 = 0x0000000000000e3c
> x19 = 0x0000000000000000
> More error log please refer to attachment.
>
> My question is,
> 1. Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again?
> 2. Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash.
>
> Appreciate your help.
>
> BRs,
> Bin Wu
>
Dear Friends,
I am using TF-A to test RAS feature.
When I triggered DMC620 RAS error in Linux(echo 0x123 > /sys/kernel/debug/sdei_ras_poison).
BL32 will recieve UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061(SP_EVENT_COMPLETE_AARCH64) and finally BL31 crashed.
In my understanding, this 0xC4000061 should consumed by BL31, not send it to BL32 again.
A piece of error log as below:
*************************************
CperWrite - CperAddress@0xFF610064
CperWrite - 1 Section@FFBE91A8, Length 80, SectionType@FFBE9138
CperWrite - Got Error Section: Platform Memory.
MmEntryPoint Done
Received delegated event
X0 : 0xC4000061
X1 : 0x0
X2 : 0x0
X3 : 0x0
Received event - 0xC4000061 on cpu 0
UnRecognized Event - 0xC4000061
Failed delegated event 0xC4000061, Status 0x2
Unhandled Exception in EL3.
x30 = 0x0000000000000000
x0 = 0x00000000ff007e00
x1 = 0xfffffffffffffffe
x2 = 0x00000000600003c0
x3 = 0x0000000000000000
x4 = 0x0000000000000000
x5 = 0x0000000000000000
x6 = 0x00000000ff015080
x7 = 0x0000000000000000
x8 = 0x00000000c4000061
x9 = 0x0000000000000021
x10 = 0x0000000000000040
x11 = 0x00000000ff00f2b0
x12 = 0x00000000ff0118c0
x13 = 0x0000000000000002
x14 = 0x00000000ff016b70
x15 = 0x00000000ff003f20
x16 = 0x0000000000000044
x17 = 0x00000000ff010430
x18 = 0x0000000000000e3c
x19 = 0x0000000000000000
More error log please refer to attachment.
My question is,
1. Does BL31 need to send 0xC4000061 event to BL32 again?
2. Does current TF-A support to run RAS test? It seems BL31 will crash.
Appreciate your help.
BRs,
Bin Wu
Hello,
Can someone please help clarify?
-Varun
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Varun Wadekar via TF-A
Sent: Tuesday, April 7, 2020 9:58 PM
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Cc: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com>; Anthony Zhou <anzhou(a)nvidia.com>
Subject: [TF-A] BRANCH_PROTECTION
External email: Use caution opening links or attachments
Hello,
Can someone please help me understand if
1. a 'value' of '1' for BRANCH_PROTECTION covers the PAuth protection provided by a value of '2' and/or '3'?
2. there is a way to enable BTI and "pac-ret" at the same time?
The docs provide this information.
<snip>
- ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication
and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves.
If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option
``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use:
- 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection
- 1: Enables all types of branch protection features
- 2: Return address signing to its standard level
- 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions
The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options
and resulting PAuth/BTI<https://tegra-sw-opengrok.nvidia.com/source/s?path=PAuth/BTI&project=stage-…> features.
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI |
+=======+==============+=======+=====+
| 0 | none | N | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 1 | standard | Y | Y |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 2 | pac-ret | Y | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature.
Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world
irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it.
<snip>
Thanks,
Varun
________________________________
This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply email and destroy all copies of the original message.
________________________________
Hi,
Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan.
3 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan.
New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan
Showing 3 of 3 defect(s)
** CID 355490: Uninitialized variables (UNINIT)
/plat/brcm/board/stingray/src/paxb.c: 516 in pcie_cores_init()
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 355490: Uninitialized variables (UNINIT)
/plat/brcm/board/stingray/src/paxb.c: 516 in pcie_cores_init()
510
511 pcie_core_soft_reset(core_idx);
512
513 VERBOSE("PCIe core %u is powered up\n", core_idx);
514 }
515
>>> CID 355490: Uninitialized variables (UNINIT)
>>> Using uninitialized value "ret".
516 return ret;
517 }
518
519 void paxb_rc_cfg_write(unsigned int core_idx, unsigned int where,
520 uint32_t val)
521 {
** CID 355489: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT)
/plat/brcm/board/stingray/src/bl2_setup.c: 685 in plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup()
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 355489: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT)
/plat/brcm/board/stingray/src/bl2_setup.c: 685 in plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup()
679 EMMC_ERASE_PARTITION);
680 #endif
681
682 bcm_board_detect();
683 #ifdef DRIVER_EMMC_ENABLE
684 /* Initialize the card, if it is not */
>>> CID 355489: Control flow issues (NO_EFFECT)
>>> This less-than-zero comparison of an unsigned value is never true. "bcm_emmc_init(true) < 0U".
685 if (bcm_emmc_init(true) < 0)
686 WARN("eMMC Card Initialization Failed!!!\n");
687 #endif
688
689 #if BL2_TEST_I2C
690 i2c_test();
** CID 355488: (VARARGS)
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 251 in bcm_elog()
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 253 in bcm_elog()
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 241 in bcm_elog()
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 234 in bcm_elog()
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 223 in bcm_elog()
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 239 in bcm_elog()
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
*** CID 355488: (VARARGS)
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 251 in bcm_elog()
245 case 'l':
246 bit64 = 1;
247 fmt++;
248 goto loop;
249 case 'u':
250 if (bit64)
>>> CID 355488: (VARARGS)
>>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start().
251 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
252 else
253 unum = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
254
255 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 10);
256 break;
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 253 in bcm_elog()
247 fmt++;
248 goto loop;
249 case 'u':
250 if (bit64)
251 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
252 else
>>> CID 355488: (VARARGS)
>>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start().
253 unum = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
254
255 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 10);
256 break;
257 default:
258 /* Exit on any other format specifier */
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 241 in bcm_elog()
235 elog_string(elog, str);
236 break;
237 case 'x':
238 if (bit64)
239 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
240 else
>>> CID 355488: (VARARGS)
>>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start().
241 unum = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
242
243 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 16);
244 break;
245 case 'l':
246 bit64 = 1;
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 234 in bcm_elog()
228 } else
229 unum = (unsigned long)num;
230
231 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 10);
232 break;
233 case 's':
>>> CID 355488: (VARARGS)
>>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start().
234 str = va_arg(args, char *);
235 elog_string(elog, str);
236 break;
237 case 'x':
238 if (bit64)
239 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 223 in bcm_elog()
217 switch (*fmt) {
218 case 'i': /* Fall through to next one */
219 case 'd':
220 if (bit64)
221 num = va_arg(args, int64_t);
222 else
>>> CID 355488: (VARARGS)
>>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start().
223 num = va_arg(args, int32_t);
224
225 if (num < 0) {
226 elog_putchar(elog, '-');
227 unum = (unsigned long)-num;
228 } else
/plat/brcm/board/common/bcm_elog.c: 239 in bcm_elog()
233 case 's':
234 str = va_arg(args, char *);
235 elog_string(elog, str);
236 break;
237 case 'x':
238 if (bit64)
>>> CID 355488: (VARARGS)
>>> Calling va_arg on va_list "args", which has not been prepared with va_start().
239 unum = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
240 else
241 unum = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
242
243 elog_unsigned_num(elog, unum, 16);
244 break;
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u2389337.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=nJaKvJSIH-2FPAfmty-2BK5tYpPkl…
Hello,
Can someone please help me understand if
1. a 'value' of '1' for BRANCH_PROTECTION covers the PAuth protection provided by a value of '2' and/or '3'?
2. there is a way to enable BTI and "pac-ret" at the same time?
The docs provide this information.
<snip>
- ``BRANCH_PROTECTION``: Numeric value to enable ARMv8.3 Pointer Authentication
and ARMv8.5 Branch Target Identification support for TF-A BL images themselves.
If enabled, it is needed to use a compiler that supports the option
``-mbranch-protection``. Selects the branch protection features to use:
- 0: Default value turns off all types of branch protection
- 1: Enables all types of branch protection features
- 2: Return address signing to its standard level
- 3: Extend the signing to include leaf functions
The table below summarizes ``BRANCH_PROTECTION`` values, GCC compilation options
and resulting PAuth/BTI<https://tegra-sw-opengrok.nvidia.com/source/s?path=PAuth/BTI&project=stage-…> features.
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| Value | GCC option | PAuth | BTI |
+=======+==============+=======+=====+
| 0 | none | N | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 1 | standard | Y | Y |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 2 | pac-ret | Y | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
| 3 | pac-ret+leaf | Y | N |
+-------+--------------+-------+-----+
This option defaults to 0 and this is an experimental feature.
Note that Pointer Authentication is enabled for Non-secure world
irrespective of the value of this option if the CPU supports it.
<snip>
Thanks,
Varun
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
This email message is for the sole use of the intended recipient(s) and may contain
confidential information. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution
is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by
reply email and destroy all copies of the original message.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I realise non TF-A people may not have access to session conference details. These can be found here:
https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-March/000330.html
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Joanna Farley via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Reply to: Joanna Farley <Joanna.Farley(a)arm.com>
Date: Tuesday, 7 April 2020 at 18:10
To: tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: "tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, "tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-m(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>, "op-tee(a)linaro.org" <op-tee(a)linaro.org>
Subject: [TF-A] TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 9 Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT) - Special session on Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org
Hi All,
The third TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 9th Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know.
For this special session I have also copied the TF-M, TSC and OPTEE mailing lists as the subject may interest the people subscribed to those lists as there is a cross mailing list discussion currently ongoing.
Agenda:
* Overview of the Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects by Sandrine Bailleux
* Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions
Thanks
Joanna
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hi All,
The third TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 9th Apr 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (GMT). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know.
For this special session I have also copied the TF-M, TSC and OPTEE mailing lists as the subject may interest the people subscribed to those lists as there is a cross mailing list discussion currently ongoing.
Agenda:
* Overview of the Project Maintenance Proposal for tf.org Projects by Sandrine Bailleux
* Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions
Thanks
Joanna
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hi Joakim,
On 4/2/20 10:18 AM, Joakim Bech via TF-A wrote:
> Hi Sandrine,
>
> On Wed, Apr 01, 2020 at 11:46:20AM +0200, Sandrine Bailleux wrote:
>> Hi Joakim,
>>
>> On 4/1/20 10:08 AM, Joakim Bech via TSC wrote:
>>> How that works in practice is that all OP-TEE maintainers are adding
>>> their "Tested-by" (see example [2]) tag for the platform they maintain
>>> when we're doing a release. If there are platforms with no "Tested-by"
>>> tag, then they simply end up with the "last known version".
>>
>> I think that's a very good idea!
>>
> The "Tested-by" part for OP-TEE releases has been working pretty good,
> not sure how scalable it is the long run though. To give some more
> info regarding the "last known version", we even at one point had some
> stop-light for that. I.e. if a maintainer missed testing a release once,
> then it became "orange". If missed twice, then it became "red" and we
> showed last know supported version. But we dropped that idea a short
> while after introducing it.
May I know why you dropped the idea? Was it too much maintenance? If
that's the reason I guess again this could be addressed with some
automation work (generating the stop-light status from the commit
message info).
>>> However, to keep that up-to-date, it requires some discipline from the
>>> people maintaining such a table ... something that we in the OP-TEE
>>> project haven't been very good at :)
>>
>> Can't this be automated, such that it doesn't need to be manually kept
>> up-to-date? I imagine we could have some tools generating the platform
>> support table out of such a commit message.
>>
> Indeed it could, it's just a matter of doing some scripting if one
> doesn't want to do it manually. I already have Python scripts pulling
> all tags from GitHub pull requests. But there are of course several
> other ways how one could pull that kind of information.
Regards,
Sandrine