Hi Sandeep,
gicv3_end_of_interrupt_sel1 is a static access helper macro. Its naming precisely tells what it does at gicv3 module level. It is called from the weak plat_ic_end_of_interrupt function for BL32 image.
I tend to think it is the driver responsibility to ensure the module interrupt acknowledge register write is reaching HW in order (or "be visible to all observers").
Also I suspect adding a dsb might not be required generically for all kind of IP. Adding a barrier in generic code might incur an unnecessary bottleneck.
Thus wouldn't it be better to add the barrier to the overridden platform function rather than in generic gicv3 code?
I have a put a comment in the review, we can continue the discussion there.
Regards,
Olivier.
________________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Sandeep Tripathy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 05 June 2020 19:43
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: [TF-A] GICV3: system interface EOI ordering RFC
Hi,
In a typical interrupt handling sequence we do
1-Read IAR
2-Do interrupt handling
3-Clear the interrupt at source , so that the device de-asserts IRQ request to GIC
>> I am suggesting a need of DSB here in case of GICv3 +.
4-Write to GIC cpu interface to do EOI.
Till GICv2 and with GICv3 legacy interface ICC_EOI write is a write over AMBA interface. The
Addresses are mapped with (nR) attribute. Hence the write transfers from the core will be
generated at step 3 and 4 in order. Please ignore the additional buffers/bridges in path from
core till peripheral which has to be dealt separately as per SOC.
Query: I understand GICv3 system interface accesses are not over this protocol and core will not
follow the ordering rule ?
I have observed spurious interrupt issue/manifestation ( I don’t have the transfers probed) in
RTOS environment where I have a primitive GICv3 driver but I wonder why things does
not fail in Linux or tf-a. If it is working because from step(3) to step(4) we have barriers by chace
due to other device register writes then I would suggest to have one in the EOI clearing API itself.
RFC: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/4454
Thanks
Sandeep
Hi Walter,
Am Freitag, 5. Juni 2020, 22:45:25 CEST schrieb Walter Lozano via TF-A:
> I have noticed that default baudrate for rk3399 board RK3399_BAUDRATE
> defined in plat/rockchip/rk3399/rk3399_def.h is 115200 while U-boot
> default value and most documentation points to a value of 1500000 for
> console.
console baudrate on rk3399 differ a lot between boards. There are a
number using the 1.5MHz and another big number using 115200
(including but not limited to the ChromeOS devices from the Gru line).
Hence we have the code that selects the actual baudrate from the
devicetree attached by u-boot when calling TF-A.
So I guess it should stay as it is right now.
Heiko
> This of course means that messages printed by ATF are not visible by
> default in this context.
>
> The change from 1500000 to 115200 was introduced in
> 0c05748bdebfad9fa43a80962186438bb8fbce62,
>
> https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=0c05…
>
> with the following message
>
> commit 0c05748bdebfad9fa43a80962186438bb8fbce62
> Author: Caesar Wang <wxt(a)rock-chips.com>
> Date: Tue Apr 19 20:42:17 2016 +0800
>
> rockchip: fixes for the required
>
> This patch has the following change for rk3399.
>
> * Set the uart to 115200 since the loader decide to set
> uart baud to 115200Hz. So the ATF also should set uart baud to 115200.
> [..]
>
> However, I'm not sure it this still applies.
>
> I'll be happy to submit a patch to update the value if it is OK.
>
> Regards,
>
> Walter
>
>
I have noticed that default baudrate for rk3399 board RK3399_BAUDRATE
defined in plat/rockchip/rk3399/rk3399_def.h is 115200 while U-boot
default value and most documentation points to a value of 1500000 for
console.
This of course means that messages printed by ATF are not visible by
default in this context.
The change from 1500000 to 115200 was introduced in
0c05748bdebfad9fa43a80962186438bb8fbce62,
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=0c05…
with the following message
commit 0c05748bdebfad9fa43a80962186438bb8fbce62
Author: Caesar Wang <wxt(a)rock-chips.com>
Date: Tue Apr 19 20:42:17 2016 +0800
rockchip: fixes for the required
This patch has the following change for rk3399.
* Set the uart to 115200 since the loader decide to set
uart baud to 115200Hz. So the ATF also should set uart baud to 115200.
[..]
However, I'm not sure it this still applies.
I'll be happy to submit a patch to update the value if it is OK.
Regards,
Walter
Hi,
In a typical interrupt handling sequence we do
1-Read IAR
2-Do interrupt handling
3-Clear the interrupt at source , so that the device de-asserts IRQ
request to GIC
>> I am suggesting a need of DSB here in case of GICv3 +.
4-Write to GIC cpu interface to do EOI.
Till GICv2 and with GICv3 legacy interface ICC_EOI write is a write over
AMBA interface. The
Addresses are mapped with (nR) attribute. Hence the write transfers from
the core will be
generated at step 3 and 4 in order. Please ignore the additional
buffers/bridges in path from
core till peripheral which has to be dealt separately as per SOC.
Query: I understand GICv3 system interface accesses are not over this
protocol and core will not
follow the ordering rule ?
I have observed spurious interrupt issue/manifestation ( I don’t have the
transfers probed) in
RTOS environment where I have a primitive GICv3 driver but I wonder why
things does
not fail in Linux or tf-a. If it is working because from step(3) to step(4)
we have barriers by chace
due to other device register writes then I would suggest to have one in the
EOI clearing API itself.
RFC: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/4454
Thanks
Sandeep
Hi Okash,
These are generally provided on https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ however they are missing from 7th May onwards at the moment. I have an update pending approval on tf.org for adding the details of that session and then I need to add the information from the session on 21st May and the session yesterday.
Joanna
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Okash Khawaja via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Reply to: Okash Khawaja <okash.khawaja(a)gmail.com>
Date: Friday, 5 June 2020 at 11:29
To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-A] Slides for recent TF-A Forums
Hi,
Where can I find slides for recent TF-A Forum presentations?
Thanks,
Okash
Hi Bill,
I continue to the error while trying to invoke “Allow-CI” or other votes as part of gerrit review. I tried multiple browsers as well and logged out before attempting again.
Thanks,
Madhu
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Bill Fletcher via TF-A
Sent: Tuesday, June 2, 2020 12:13 PM
To: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com>
Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
Subject: Re: [TF-A] Gerrit seems to be broken
Hi Varun,
Do you still see the problem? It has been reported before.
Regards
Bill
On Tue, 2 Jun 2020 at 18:01, Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote:
Hello,
The TF gerrit review dashboard seems to be broken this morning. I see “Server error” and it does not allow me to post scores or comments. Tried different browsers, but same issue persists.
Anyone else seeing the same problem? Is this is a known issue? If yes, is anyone working on it?
-Varun
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Bill Fletcher | Field Engineering
T: +44 7833 498336<tel:+44+7833+498336>
bill.fletcher(a)linaro.org<mailto:bill.fletcher@linaro.org> | Skype: billfletcher2020
Hi Varun,
Do you still see the problem? It has been reported before.
Regards
Bill
On Tue, 2 Jun 2020 at 18:01, Varun Wadekar via TF-A <
tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> Hello,
>
>
>
> The TF gerrit review dashboard seems to be broken this morning. I see
> “Server error” and it does not allow me to post scores or comments. Tried
> different browsers, but same issue persists.
>
>
>
> Anyone else seeing the same problem? Is this is a known issue? If yes, is
> anyone working on it?
>
>
>
> -Varun
> --
> TF-A mailing list
> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
>
--
[image: Linaro] <http://www.linaro.org/>
*Bill Fletcher* | *Field Engineering*
T: +44 7833 498336 <+44+7833+498336>
bill.fletcher(a)linaro.org | Skype: billfletcher2020
Working for me, the main and additional dashboards.
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/admin/repos/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a,dash…
I posted comments earlier ok as well.
Joanna
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Reply to: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com>
Date: Tuesday, 2 June 2020 at 18:02
To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-A] Gerrit seems to be broken
Hello,
The TF gerrit review dashboard seems to be broken this morning. I see “Server error” and it does not allow me to post scores or comments. Tried different browsers, but same issue persists.
Anyone else seeing the same problem? Is this is a known issue? If yes, is anyone working on it?
-Varun
Hello,
The TF gerrit review dashboard seems to be broken this morning. I see "Server error" and it does not allow me to post scores or comments. Tried different browsers, but same issue persists.
Anyone else seeing the same problem? Is this is a known issue? If yes, is anyone working on it?
-Varun
Hi All,
The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 4th June 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (BST). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know.
Agenda:
* TF-A SMC fuzzing module overview - Presented by Mark Dykes
* General explanation of the approach taken to randomize the type and timing of the SMC calls in TF-A to provide a Fuzz testing capability.
* Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions
Thanks
Joanna
Hi Andrzej
I think recent patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/3493 which is currently in review may be solution for your issue where SCU presence is being checked before accessing CLUSTERCFR_EL1 register.
Thanks
Manish Badarkhe
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of "Witkowski, Andrzej via TF-A" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Reply to: "Witkowski, Andrzej" <andrzej.witkowski(a)intel.com>
Date: Monday, 1 June 2020 at 19:38
To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Cc: "Witkowski, Andrzej" <andrzej.witkowski(a)intel.com>, "Lessnau, Adam" <adam.lessnau(a)intel.com>
Subject: [TF-A] Unhandled Exception at EL3 in BL31 for Neoverse N1 with direct connect of DSU
Hi,
I work on project which uses ARM CPU Neoverse N1 with direct connect of DSU.
I noticed the following error “Unhandled Exception at EL3” in BL31 bootloader after switching from ATF 2.1 to 2.2.
The root cause is that after invoking neoverse_n1_errata-report function in lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_n1.S file and reaching the line 525, the function check_errata_dsu_934 in lib/cpus/aarch64/dsu_helpers.S file is always invoked regardless of whether ERRATA_DSU_936184 is set to 0 or to 1.
In our case, ERRATA_DSU_936184 := 0.
[cid:image001.png@01D6384E.C183C050]
[cid:image002.png@01D6384E.C183C050]
Neoverse N1 with direct connect version of DSU doesn’t contain SCU/L3 cache and CLUSTERCFR_EL1 register.
The error “Unhandled Exception at EL3” appears in BL31 bootloader during attempt to read the CLUSTERCFR_EL1 register which doesn’t exist in our RTL HW.
Andrzej Witkowskie
Intel Technology Poland
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This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all copies; any review or distribution by others is strictly prohibited.
Hi,
I work on project which uses ARM CPU Neoverse N1 with direct connect of DSU.
I noticed the following error "Unhandled Exception at EL3" in BL31 bootloader after switching from ATF 2.1 to 2.2.
The root cause is that after invoking neoverse_n1_errata-report function in lib/cpus/aarch64/neoverse_n1.S file and reaching the line 525, the function check_errata_dsu_934 in lib/cpus/aarch64/dsu_helpers.S file is always invoked regardless of whether ERRATA_DSU_936184 is set to 0 or to 1.
In our case, ERRATA_DSU_936184 := 0.
[cid:image001.png@01D63828.FA4B1440]
[cid:image002.png@01D6382A.B84A0950]
Neoverse N1 with direct connect version of DSU doesn't contain SCU/L3 cache and CLUSTERCFR_EL1 register.
The error "Unhandled Exception at EL3" appears in BL31 bootloader during attempt to read the CLUSTERCFR_EL1 register which doesn't exist in our RTL HW.
Andrzej Witkowskie
Intel Technology Poland
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Intel Technology Poland sp. z o.o.
ul. Sowackiego 173 | 80-298 Gdask | Sd Rejonowy Gdask Pnoc | VII Wydzia Gospodarczy Krajowego Rejestru Sdowego - KRS 101882 | NIP 957-07-52-316 | Kapita zakadowy 200.000 PLN.
Ta wiadomo wraz z zacznikami jest przeznaczona dla okrelonego adresata i moe zawiera informacje poufne. W razie przypadkowego otrzymania tej wiadomoci, prosimy o powiadomienie nadawcy oraz trwae jej usunicie; jakiekolwiek przegldanie lub rozpowszechnianie jest zabronione.
This e-mail and any attachments may contain confidential material for the sole use of the intended recipient(s). If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all copies; any review or distribution by others is strictly prohibited.
Hi all,
Now that the tf.org project maintenance process [1] has been finalized,
it is time to think about electing new maintainers for the project. We
are delighted to announce that the following contributors have been
appointed maintainers by their peers:
- Julius Werner (Google)
- Varun Wadekar (NVIDIA)
- Andre Przywara (Arm)
- Lauren Wehrmeister (Arm)
- Madhukar Pappireddy (Arm)
As outlined in [1], here is the definition and responsibilities of
maintainers:
------------8<------------
There are a number of maintainers assigned to the project. The project
keeps a list of them along with their contact information. Maintainers
don't necessarily need a deep domain expertise of all areas of the
project, instead they look at the project from a high level perspective.
They are expected to ensure that changes adhere to the project's quality
criteria, to its architectural direction, to its threat model and so on.
Code owners and maintainers are complementary roles.
Unlike code owners, maintainers can approve any patch, no matter what
module it concerns. They are responsible for ensuring patches have had
enough overall review and adding their own approval in a timely manner.
They also have merge rights, i.e. the ability to merge a patch in the
tree once it has received all required approvals.
------------8<------------
These people have been granted Code-Review -2/+2 rights in Gerrit and
have been added in the maintainers.rst file as part of this patch:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/4298
Congratulations to them!
Best regards,
Sandrine
[1]
https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p…
Hi Pankaj,
Can you please send the specific NOTICE messages which are missing, may be sending 1.5 and 2.3 logs will help.
thanks
Manish
________________________________
From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Pankaj Gupta via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 27 May 2020 09:36
To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [TF-A] After migrating from TFA-1.5 to TFA2.3, parts of NOTICE messages are missed, which comes as part of boot-up logs.
Hi
After migrating from TFA-1.5 to TFA2.3, parts of NOTICE messages are missed, which comes as part of boot-up logs.
Any pointers on how to fix this issue.
Thanks.
Regards
Pankaj
Hi
After migrating from TFA-1.5 to TFA2.3, parts of NOTICE messages are missed, which comes as part of boot-up logs.
Any pointers on how to fix this issue.
Thanks.
Regards
Pankaj
Hi Raghu
We have plan to work on this and come up with some design which handles
mandatory/critical properties.
On 13/05/2020, 22:18, "TF-A on behalf of Raghu K via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
Hi All,
Since the 2.3 release is done, can we revisit this topic? I think we
left this with finalizing on how to handle bad/incorrect DTB's.
Sandrine's latest proposal below:
"A bad DTB seems more like an integration error than a
programming error to me, and thus should be handled with runtime checks
according to the current guidelines. Incorrect values for mandatory
properties should probably be treated as unrecoverable errors (causing a
panic) and incorrect/missing optional properties as recoverable errors
(issuing a warning message)."
I agree with this proposal and think we should follow this. This
addresses my original concern of handling errors consistently and being
safe by verifying mandatory/critical properties at run-time.
Thoughts ?
Thanks
Raghu
On 4/13/20 10:27 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy wrote:
> Thanks Sandrine. Revisiting after v2.3 is sounds fine.
>
> -Raghu
>
> On 4/10/20 2:25 AM, Sandrine Bailleux wrote:
>> Hi Raghu,
>>
>> On 4/8/20 12:50 AM, Raghu Krishnamurthy wrote:
>>> Thanks Sandrine, Louis,
>>>
>>> Agree with both of you. I'm fine with using asserts or panics, as
>>> long as we uniformly use it. The change i sent out(review 3845) was
>>> because i noticed inconsistency in handling errors. If we do use
>>> asserts, all code that checks for mandatory properties, should be
>>> changed to assert as opposed to return error code. For optional
>>> properties, we can continue to return an error code or print
>>> warnings etc.
>>
>> Yes, I too think consistency is key here. As you said, we need to
>> settle on the expected behaviour and enforce it uniformly across the
>> fconf code. Let's revisit this code after the v2.3 release.
>>
>>> I would like to point out that using asserts here is different from
>>> what is documented in the coding guidelines. The guidelines
>>> explicitly spells out using asserts for "programming errors".
>>> Now, is having a bad DTB considered a programming error? ;) The DTB
>>> is platform data as opposed to code. The guidelines might need to be
>>> updated based on the conclusion here.
>>
>> Now that you point it out, and after taking a closer look at [1], I
>> think I was wrong. A bad DTB seems more like an integration error
>> than a programming error to me, and thus should be handled with
>> runtime checks according to the current guidelines. Incorrect values
>> for mandatory properties should probably be treated as unrecoverable
>> errors (causing a panic) and incorrect/missing optional properties as
>> recoverable errors (issuing a warning message).
>>
>> [1]
>> https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/process/coding-guideline…
>>
>>
>>> Also note the couple of scenarios i mentioned in an earlier email.
>>> Platforms like RPI4 don't generally enable TBBR and the DTB image
>>> could get corrupt or be modified on purpose. On a release build,
>>> this could cause silent corruption. Panic() would avoid this.
>>>
>>> In any case, it would be good to settle on the expected behavior for
>>> each of these abnormal cases. I don't have a strong preference for
>>> asserts or panics here, since each has its pros and cons as both of
>>> you called out.
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>> Raghu
>
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Hi All,
The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 21st May 2020 17:00 - 18:00 (BST). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know.
Agenda:
* Firmware Configuration Framework (FConf) Update - Presented by Manish Badarkhe and Madhukar Pappireddy
* Discussion on how we have leveraged FConf framework in making statically configured components of TF-A to be dynamic.
A number of such components have already been identified which potentially use FConf framework. Patches for such
components are either merged or in-review
* Design discussion on CoT descriptors movement to device tree using FConf framework.
* Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions
Thanks
Joanna
Hi Florian,
I can give some general answers to your questions and hopefully get to
answering your real questions with further discussion. Please feel free
to ask more questions if this does not help.
>> I noticed that TF-A is designed to load FIP Image but the U-Boot
Environment have a different format. How to access the QSPI NOR memory?
NXP specific driver?
[RK] TF-A generally provides frameworks to do most things and does not
provide device specific drivers but for SPI NOR, there are drivers under
drivers/mtd/nor that could potentially be used. You will likely need to
implement the appropriate platform hooks for the SPI bus itself to use
it. The TF-A IO framework has the io_mtd layer that can be hooked into a
nor device. drivers/st/spi/stm32_qspi.c seems to use all of this and
should be a good example(perhaps some one from ST can chime in too). if
you hook you SPI driver to the TF-A layers correctly, there should be
nothing preventing you from accessing the uboot environment partition.
Also, TF-A's primary/default format for firmware images is FIP but
definitely does not preclude a platform from using it's own format.
>>The bl2 is designed to load only one FIP image, is it possible to add
an additional entry ?
[RK] Not really. BL2 is fairly generic and you should be able to hook
any image format to it. If you must use the FIP format, you can map your
images to existing image id's to create a FIP with any image that you
have. Once again, FIP is fairly flexible and generally treats firmware
images in the package as blob's.
>>if we want to use a secure boot in the future
[RK] Like with the above things, the Trusted Board Boot framework is
flexible and you should be able to implement secure boot on FIP and
other formats. TF-A provides an implementation of the TBBR specification
for secure boot.
It should be possible to implement the algorithm below, if you have an
appropriate platform port, from what i gather in your question below.
Thanks
-Raghu
On 5/13/20 5:40 AM, florian.manoel--- via TF-A wrote:
>
> Hello TF-A mail list,
>
> I’m new here, so I quickly introduce myself.
> I am Florian Manoel, working as firmware developer at Siemens in
> Karlsruhe, Germany. Recently, we decided to start some development
> based on ARM processor, the theme TF-A is new for us.
>
> Currently, we have a custom board equipped with the processor NXP
> Layerscape LS1043a. So far, everything is working as planned, the
> PreBootLoader (TF-A) boots the bootloader (U-Boot) that’s boots linux
> on top.
> However, we want to have the possibility to boot an alternative u-boot
> FIP image, I explain:
> We use as boot source a QSPI NOR memory. In this memory are stored
> ‘bl2_qspi.pbl’, 2 times ‘fip.bin’, the u-boot environment and some
> micro-code.
> We want to select the u-boot image to be booted according to the value
> of a specific variable stored in the u-boot environment ‘u-boot-select’.
> The algo is, for my eye, relatively simple :
>
> Start
> - Check value of the u-boot variable ‘u-boot-select’
>
> - Check if the corresponding u-boot image is valid, if not select the
> alternative one
> - Boot selected u-boot image
> End
>
>
> We want this functionality in case an u-boot image is broken (ex:
> power OFF during U-Boot update).
>
> I already went through the source code and it rose more question than
> it answered. For example:
> I noticed that TF-A is designed to load FIP Image but the U-Boot
> Environment have a different format. How to access the QSPI NOR
> memory? NXP specific driver?
> The bl2 is designed to load only one FIP image, is it possible to add
> an additional entry ?
> On top of it come the question of the reliability and what will happen
> if we want to use a secure boot in the future..
>
> I am looking for advice and support on this specific topic.
> Thanks for your support,
>
> Mit freundlichen Grüßen
> Florian Manoël
>
> Siemens AG
> Digital Industries
> Process Automation
> Software House Khe
> DI PA CI R&D 2
> Östliche Rheinbrückenstr. 50
> 76187 Karlsruhe, Deutschland
> Tel.: +49 721 595-1433
> mailto:florian.manoel@siemens.com
> www.siemens.com/ingenuityforlife <https://siemens.com/ingenuityforlife>
>
> Siemens Aktiengesellschaft: Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats: Jim
> Hagemann Snabe; Vorstand: Joe Kaeser, Vorsitzender; Roland Busch,
> Klaus Helmrich, Cedrik Neike, Ralf P. Thomas; Sitz der Gesellschaft:
> Berlin und München, Deutschland; Registergericht: Berlin
> Charlottenburg, HRB 12300, München, HRB 6684; WEEE-Reg.-Nr. DE 23691322
>
>
Hi Raghu and Louis,
On 4/7/20 12:14 PM, Louis Mayencourt via TF-A wrote:
> I do agree with you: case 2 and 3 are similar (wrongly formed DTB) and
> should lead to the same behavior.
>
> A mandatory property miss or a hit with a structurally incorrect node
> means that the DTB doesn't follow the provided binding document. Such a
> DTB shouldn't be considered as valid and should trigger a build failure
> and/or a code panic.
That's what still confuses me... Agree on cases 2 and 3 triggering a
build failure if possible, but not a code panic. A code panic stays in a
release build. With what we've been discussing so far, it would seem
more appropriate to me to have debug assertions to catch cases 2 and 3.
These debug assertions can help catching structural problems in the DTB
during the development phase and can be eliminated for a production
build, leaving no checks whatsoever in the code.
This is the strategy we've been using so far in TF-A. For lots of
platform interfaces, the generic code includes debug assertions to check
the correct implementation of these interfaces by platform integrators.
For example, checking the range of their return values. I would say this
is deeply embedded into the threat model TF-A uses today. See
https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/process/coding-guideline…
On one hand, it makes sense to me. On the other hand, I take Raghu's
point that it would be unrealistic to assume that 100% of code has been
covered by tests. This is very hard to achieve in practice, especially
to cover all error cases ; thus, it seems utopian to assume that all
debug assertions have been exercised during development and can be
safely removed.
TF-A does provide a way to keep debug assertions in a release build
(using the ENABLE_ASSERTIONS build flag) if platform integrators judge
they would rather keep them but this is not the default behaviour.
Regards,
Sandrine
Hello TF-A mail list,
I'm new here, so I quickly introduce myself.
I am Florian Manoel, working as firmware developer at Siemens in Karlsruhe, Germany. Recently, we decided to start some development based on ARM processor, the theme TF-A is new for us.
Currently, we have a custom board equipped with the processor NXP Layerscape LS1043a. So far, everything is working as planned, the PreBootLoader (TF-A) boots the bootloader (U-Boot) that's boots linux on top.
However, we want to have the possibility to boot an alternative u-boot FIP image, I explain:
We use as boot source a QSPI NOR memory. In this memory are stored 'bl2_qspi.pbl', 2 times 'fip.bin', the u-boot environment and some micro-code.
We want to select the u-boot image to be booted according to the value of a specific variable stored in the u-boot environment 'u-boot-select'.
The algo is, for my eye, relatively simple :
Start
- Check value of the u-boot variable 'u-boot-select'
- Check if the corresponding u-boot image is valid, if not select the alternative one
- Boot selected u-boot image
End
We want this functionality in case an u-boot image is broken (ex: power OFF during U-Boot update).
I already went through the source code and it rose more question than it answered. For example:
I noticed that TF-A is designed to load FIP Image but the U-Boot Environment have a different format. How to access the QSPI NOR memory? NXP specific driver?
The bl2 is designed to load only one FIP image, is it possible to add an additional entry ?
On top of it come the question of the reliability and what will happen if we want to use a secure boot in the future..
I am looking for advice and support on this specific topic.
Thanks for your support,
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Florian Manoël
Siemens AG
Digital Industries
Process Automation
Software House Khe
DI PA CI R&D 2
Östliche Rheinbrückenstr. 50
76187 Karlsruhe, Deutschland
Tel.: +49 721 595-1433
mailto:florian.manoel@siemens.com
www.siemens.com/ingenuityforlife<https://siemens.com/ingenuityforlife>
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft: Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats: Jim Hagemann Snabe; Vorstand: Joe Kaeser, Vorsitzender; Roland Busch, Klaus Helmrich, Cedrik Neike, Ralf P. Thomas; Sitz der Gesellschaft: Berlin und München, Deutschland; Registergericht: Berlin Charlottenburg, HRB 12300, München, HRB 6684; WEEE-Reg.-Nr. DE 23691322
Hello all,
As the trustedfirmware.org project maintenance process [1] is now live,
it would be good if we start adopting it in our development flow for TF-A.
I would like to highlight the main changes that will have an impact on
our day-to-day work on the project.
1. Patch submitters to explicit choose their reviewers
------------------------------------------------------
All patches should now have dedicated reviewers. The patch submitter is
responsible for adding them in the reviewers field of their Gerrit review.
Each patch should have 2 types of reviewers:
- Code owners.
- Maintainers.
There needs to be 1 code owner per module modified by the patch as well
as 1 maintainer.
The maintainers and code owners are listed here:
https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/about/maintainers.html
Ideally, we would have at least 2 code owners per module so that they
can review each other's patches. Unfortunately we're not there yet
(especially for platform ports) so we need a work around for patches
submitted by the sole code owner of a module itself.
In this scenario, I would like to suggest we leave it to the patch
submitter to decide on a case by case basis whether they want to
nominate someone to do the detailed technical review or skip it
entirely. In any case, a maintainer will still need to review and
approve the patch.
If this proves not to be working well over time (either because it
creates unnecessary review bottlenecks or lowers the code quality too
much), we can revisit that in the future.
If you've got patches in review right now, may I please request you to
add reviewers accordingly? The sooner we start adopting this process the
better, as it will allow us to see how this works in practice and come
up with adjustments if need be.
2. Reviewers to provide feedback in a timely manner
---------------------------------------------------
If someone asks you to do a review, please try to do it in a timely
manner. There is no timeline guidelines set just yet for TF-A but I
think a good rule of thumb would be to aim to provide feedback in a
week's time. This does not mean that the review has to be completed in a
week (complex patches might need a lot of discussion and/or rounds of
review & rework), just that there's some progress and activity at least
once per week.
If for some reason, you know you won't be able to honour a review
request, please say so on Gerrit ASAP so that the patch submitter can
choose another reviewer.
3. What's next?
---------------
In the coming weeks or months, we'd like to:
- Extend the list of code owners.
- Extend the list of maintainers.
- Come up with TF-A specific contribution guidelines that complement the
tf.org process [1]. We already have some here [2] but would like to
expand them and possibly revisit some of them. Obviously, this will be a
community effort, much like the tf.org process was, and all TF-A
contributors will have a say in defining this so that we end up with
something that works for everyone (as much as possible).
Best regards,
Sandrine
[1]
https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/project-maintenance-p…
[2]
https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/process/contributing.html