Hello,
This is a courtesy notification that we plan to deprecate Arm
CryptoCell-712 and CryptoCell-713 drivers in TF-A release v2.9, with the
goal to remove their source code from the tree in the following TF-A
release after that.
This won't affect any upstream platforms beyond Arm Ltd platforms (under
plat/arm/ folder).
If you have any concerns with this, please raise them by Monday, April 24th.
Best regards,
Sandrine
Hi, I'm using TF-A 2.8 on mt7986 board, enable TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT using mbedtls-3.4.0,
TF-A BL2 hanged when loading BL31, it seems that BL2 failed to get correct oid in function get_ext(drivers/auth/mbedtls/mbedtls_x509_parser.c) after calling mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string
mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string in 3.4.0 uses %c to print part of oid,
(https://github.com/Mbed-TLS/mbedtls/blob/v3.4.0/library/oid.c#L864)
but seems that ATF libc's snprintf doesn't support %c format, which causes mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string to return incorrect oid
oid_str dump in get_ext
oid_str=%c.49.6.1.4.1.4128.2100.1 (mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string)
oid_str=1.3.6.1.4.1.4128.2100.1 (TRUSTED_FW_NVCOUNTER_OID)
I try to change snprintf format %c to %u in mbedtls_oid_get_numeric_string, TF-A boots successfully
Thanks
Hi,
Concerning the following Fast Model Component:
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/100964/1121/Fast-Models-components/…
This component is already publicly documented although it is not integrated yet into the AEM FVP.
The main usage is to identify software mis-programming, where the same Physical address is accessed through more than one Physical Address Space (PAS). As such, it is intended as a development / debugging tool only. If such a mis-programming scenario happened then the memory page corresponding to the accessed physical address would get corrupted.
Notice memory encryption is not yet supported in TF-A's SW stacks. You won't find a reference for this feature in TF-A / TF-a-tests just now.
Best regards,
Sandrine
This event has been updated
Changed: description
TF-A Tech Forum
Thursday Apr 20, 2023 ⋅ 4pm – 5pm
United Kingdom Time
This session will no longer take place on this date. It will be
rescheduled.This slot is now free for another session although nothing has
yet been identified.======================================Reserving for a
discussion on Signer-id Extraction Design for Manish Badarkhe. More details
of this session will be sent closer to the session date.-----------------We
run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not
restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the
guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues.
Invites are via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted
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Hi, I'm working in TF-A 2.8 with mbedtls, I notice that mbedtls-3.4.0 starts to support AES crypto extension(MBEDTLS_AESCE_C) for some security reasons,
I upgrade mbedtls from 2.28.0 to 3.4.0, and try to enable MBEDTLS_AESCE_C in TF-A. I fail to compile mbedtls aesce.c in TF-A build environment.
I use CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-gcc-7.5.0.
It seems that AESCE needs some std libraries(e.g. arm_neon.h) supported by aarch64 gcc, while TF-A disables std libraries,
and some compile flags(e.g. -mgeneral-regs-only) are conflict with current TF-A.
I wonder is TF-A going to support MBEDTLS_AESCE_C option?
Thanks
Hi all,
I want to test the memory encryption functions in Arm CCA. Currently,
I find that Arm FVP supports a PVMemoryProtectionEngine. Thus, can I
use this engine in current TF-A or TF-A-Tests? If yes, how to use this
engine?
Sincerely,
WANG Chenxu
This event has been updated
Changed: description
TF-A Tech Forum
Thursday Apr 20, 2023 ⋅ 4pm – 5pm
United Kingdom Time
Reserving for a discussion on Signer-id Extraction Design for
Manish Badarkhe. More details of this session will be sent closer to the
session date.-----------------We run an open technical forum call for
anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project
members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to
forward this invite to colleagues. Invites are via the TF-A mailing list
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Hi,
I have talked to a couple of people to figure out what TF-A project is
using for code documentation. Because I see at least in our platform
that our documentation is somewhere between doxygen and kernel-doc but
actually with a lot of mismatches.
Sanbrine mentioned sending an email to the mailing list to start to
have discussion about it.
That's why I want to know the official code documentation format and
how we should be checking that everything matches to make sure that
documentation is not out of sync from code itself.
When this is clear I will ask my team to fix all these issues.
Thanks,
Michal
--
Michal Simek, Ing. (M.Eng), OpenPGP -> KeyID: FE3D1F91
w: www.monstr.eu p: +42-0-721842854
Maintainer of Linux kernel - Xilinx Microblaze
Maintainer of Linux kernel - Xilinx Zynq ARM and ZynqMP ARM64 SoCs
U-Boot custodian - Xilinx Microblaze/Zynq/ZynqMP/Versal SoCs
Hello all,
We are sending this note to notify you of one of the breaking changes related to the enablement of FEAT_SVE in TF-A. This mainly impacts platforms which are configurable (FVP, QEMU, Total Compute).
FEAT_SVE has now been moved under the Feature detection mechanism wherein a CPU feature macro can have 3 possible states
* 0: FEAT_STATE_DISABLED
* 1: FEAT_STATE_ALWAYS ( Always enabled, no runtime check)
* 2: FEAT_STATE_CHECK (Dynamically check based on ID registers, done each time when feature registers are being accessed)
For platforms which have a single configuration, it's better to choose either disabled or enabled (as it is a bit faster as there is no dynamic check).
For platforms which can have different HW configurations, it makes sense to put them under FEAT_STATE_CHECK(=2), so that they will boot with any configuration of HW.
Keeping this in mind, all configurable platforms (FVP, QEMU, TC) have been modified to adopt dynamic detection(FEAT_STATE_CHECK) for FEAT_SVE. [1]
SVE Patch Reference:
[1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/20306
Best regards,
Jayanth
Hello Kever,
on a rk3399, booting current U-Boot SPL with mainline TF-A leads to
missing DMA (and no sound) on Linux.
However, when using rockchip its so called mini-loader
(rk3399_miniloader_v1.26.bin) and their BL31 (rk3399_bl31_v1.35.elf) to
boot, DMA works perfectly fine.
Tested on a custom rk3399 board and on ROCK Pi4.
Attached to this mail are two boot logs with some debug prints:
- good_amba_log.txt (DMA works)
- no_amba_log.txt (no DMA device)
The main difference I can spot between the two logs is that on Linux
(drivers/amba/bus.c) AMBA_CID (0xb105f00d) cannot be found. Instead,
only some CORESIGHT_CIDs (presumably for debugging) and four 0x00000000
CIDs are detected.
As a result, the "PL330 DMAC-241330" driver does not load. My theory is
that DMA needs to be allowed somewhere in the undocumented syscon-
registers, similar to what U-Boot is already doing for eMMC in
arch_cpu_init() (arch/arm/mach-rockchip/rk3399/rk3399.c).
Any ideas?
Or maybe I'm just missing some configuration?
Since multiple software projects are involved (TF-A, OP-TEE, U-Boot,
Linux), I Cc'ed a bit.
Thanks
-- Christoph
This event has been canceled with a note:
"No topics this week so cancelling."
TF-A Tech Forum
Thursday Apr 6, 2023 ⋅ 4pm – 5pm
United Kingdom Time
We run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not
restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the
guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to
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Hi Folks,
I’ve just updated the Techforum session information (Slides and Recording) from the RAS Handing session last week on https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ which will be deployed soon once the patch is approved.
The next TF-A Tech forum is due on Thursday 6th April at 4pm BST.
At this time I don’t have any topics for that session. If anybody in the community has anything they would like to present please do reach out to me.
Thanks
Joanna
Hi,
according to the current erratum document for the ARM Cortex-A78AE [0], the workaround for erratum 1941500 says:
"This erratum can be avoided by setting CPUECTLR_EL1[8] to 1."
However, the current code on branch "master" (git hash 5906d97a832b6f6 ) at
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/lib/cpus/a…
executes a "bic" instruction with an immediate, which is a synthetic instruction to clear the bit, instead of setting it. Moreover, the comment above says "Set bit 8 in ECTLR_EL1", which is inconsistent to the code.
The equivalent workaround for the Cortex-A78 non-AE (erratum 1941498) uses the correct "orr" (bitwise-or) instruction to set the bit:
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/lib/cpus/a…
Please confirm if this is an error.
Thank you.
Best Regards,
Matthias
[0] "Arm Cortex-A78AE (MP105) Software Developer Errata Notice", Document version: v14.0, Document ID: SDEN-1707912,
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/SDEN1707912/latest
Hi all,
I try to enable the smmu of Juno R2 development board but face two
great challenges. I am working on them and I still need some hints.
Here are my problems:
1. By reading the SMMUv1 manuals I find that several registers are
related to secure state (e.g., SMMU_sCR0). But in my TF-A and the
latest version I can only find the SMMUv3 configurations, not
SMMUv1/2. Thus, how to config these registers? Any reference?
2. For the non-secure GPU SMMU regs, I try to map and read them based
on the Juno R2 manual. I know the GPU SMMU is a MMU-400, and its mmio
is in 0x2b40_0000 - 0x2b40_ffff. Then in EL1 I first do
ioremap(0x2b400000,0x10000) and then ioread32(). However I get the
SError as "Bad mode in Error handler detected on CPU1, code
0xbf000002". I also try to do it in EL2 (with a hvc call and reading
in the handler), but cannot get any valid number and still get SError
when exiting EL2. But when I access the other smmus (e.g., a PCIe
SMMU, in 0x2b50_0000), it works fine. Thus, is there something to
prevent the Non-secure World from accessing the GPU SMMU MMIO?
My source codes are downloaded from the arm-reference-platforms, in
which Linux is v4.14.59 and TF-A is v2.1.
Can someone help me?
Sincerely,
WANG Chenxu
This event has been updated with a note:
"Updated agenda"
Changed: description
TF-A Tech Forum
Thursday Mar 23, 2023 ⋅ 4pm – 5pm
United Kingdom Time
Discussion Topic: RAS Refactoring Presented by: Manish Pandey and Soby
MathewTopics to be discussed 1. Introduction to philosophies of handling
RAS errors(FFH/KFH) 2. Discussing exceptions caused by synchronization
barriers at execption boundries 3. Refactoring and enhancements in
TF-A(along with various build macros) 4. Tests introduced 5. Future
work----------------We run an open technical forum call for anyone to
participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members.
It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this
invite to colleagues. Invites are via the TF-A mailing list and also
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I have already created patch in tf-a for review, added plat Nuvoton
npcm845x, gerrit topic No. 20088.
How should I upload a scripts patch to support new added platform?
In documentation I didn't found how exactly should I send a scripts patch.
Thank you in advance.
Margarita Glushkin
Hi,
I would like to get some feedback on the gicv3 workaround [1] for NVIDIA erratum T241-FABRIC-4. The commit description describes the erratum and the fix in detail.
The patch is only to start a dialogue and gather feedback on the way forward.
Please advise.
Thanks.
[1] fix(gicv3): workaround for NVIDIA erratum T241-FABRIC-4 (I04e33ba6) * Gerrit Code Review (trustedfirmware.org)<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/19969>
Hi, experts,
I have another two other questions about this issue.
(1) What should I do if the current optee to load already exists or I want to update optee?
The most straightforward way I could think of is to reclaim the memory currently used by optee, then reload the optee image and initialize it.
(2) optee may use multiple cores. When and how to process the initialization of multiple cores?
Do you have any solutions or ideas?
Regards,
Yuye.
------------------------------------------------------------------
发件人:梅建强(禹夜) <meijianqiang.mjq(a)alibaba-inc.com>
发送时间:2023年3月11日(星期六) 21:44
收件人:Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org>; tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; OP-TEE TrustedFirmware <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
抄 送:Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com>; Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com>; jwerner <jwerner(a)chromium.org>; raghu.ncstate <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>; Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>
主 题:Re: Post-boot loading of OP-TEE
Hi, experts,
If I want to apply the code to the S-EL2 framework (Hafnium as SPMC),
What special processing should be added to spmd_handle_smc_load function or other function, such as context restore and save?
I'm not clear about the details of the process, can you give me some help?
Regards,
Yuye.
------------------------------------------------------------------
发件人:Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org>
发送时间:2023年1月9日(星期一) 15:39
收件人:tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; OP-TEE TrustedFirmware <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
抄 送:Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com>; Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com>; jwerner <jwerner(a)chromium.org>; raghu.ncstate <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>; Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>
主 题:Post-boot loading of OP-TEE
Hi,
The recent patch [1] for the OP-TEE Dispatcher in TF-A proposes a way
of post-boot loading OP-TEE by the Linux kernel with signature
verification in the normal world only. This has previously been
discussed in this mail thread [2] about half a year ago. Ultimately,
it was concluded that this should in principle be accepted upstream as
a platform choice to allow this or not. There are concerns that what
we have in upstream TF-A should serve as good examples, and trusting
the normal world to verify secure world software might not meet that
criterion. There are also concerns about adding signature verification
to BL31
Leaving the secure world wide open until the Linux kernel has been
able to successfully load and verify an OP-TEE binary seems very
risky. Even if it's claimed that the normal world can be trusted at
this point, we're still giving up a critical level of defense without
a good reason.
I've started to review [1], but it should not be accepted for merging
without support and approval from other maintainers.
I would like to explore other options in this mail thread. In [2] it
was suggested that a remnant of bl2 could be kept to verify OP-TEE
before starting to execute it. This could be taken one step further
and load a limited OP-TEE at boot which later is updated live, almost
like what's discussed in [3]. This should minimize the impact on TF-A
and also leave OP-TEE in charge of accepting an update instead of a
divided responsibility between the normal world and TF-A.
[1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 >
[2] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… >
[3] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 <https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 >
Thanks,
Jens
Hi, experts,
If I want to apply the code to the S-EL2 framework (Hafnium as SPMC),
What special processing should be added to spmd_handle_smc_load function or other function, such as context restore and save?
I'm not clear about the details of the process, can you give me some help?
Regards,
Yuye.
------------------------------------------------------------------
发件人:Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org>
发送时间:2023年1月9日(星期一) 15:39
收件人:tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; OP-TEE TrustedFirmware <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
抄 送:Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com>; Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com>; jwerner <jwerner(a)chromium.org>; raghu.ncstate <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>; Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>
主 题:Post-boot loading of OP-TEE
Hi,
The recent patch [1] for the OP-TEE Dispatcher in TF-A proposes a way
of post-boot loading OP-TEE by the Linux kernel with signature
verification in the normal world only. This has previously been
discussed in this mail thread [2] about half a year ago. Ultimately,
it was concluded that this should in principle be accepted upstream as
a platform choice to allow this or not. There are concerns that what
we have in upstream TF-A should serve as good examples, and trusting
the normal world to verify secure world software might not meet that
criterion. There are also concerns about adding signature verification
to BL31
Leaving the secure world wide open until the Linux kernel has been
able to successfully load and verify an OP-TEE binary seems very
risky. Even if it's claimed that the normal world can be trusted at
this point, we're still giving up a critical level of defense without
a good reason.
I've started to review [1], but it should not be accepted for merging
without support and approval from other maintainers.
I would like to explore other options in this mail thread. In [2] it
was suggested that a remnant of bl2 could be kept to verify OP-TEE
before starting to execute it. This could be taken one step further
and load a limited OP-TEE at boot which later is updated live, almost
like what's discussed in [3]. This should minimize the impact on TF-A
and also leave OP-TEE in charge of accepting an update instead of a
divided responsibility between the normal world and TF-A.
[1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 >
[2] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… >
[3] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 <https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 >
Thanks,
Jens
Hi all,
I presented the Errata ABI design and Implementation in this week's tech forum; the patches are available for review, and any feedback, discussions are welcome.
Link to the patch : feat(errata_abi): errata management firmware interface (I70f0e256) * Gerrit Code Review (trustedfirmware.org)<https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/19835>
The team would like to merge this feature by the end of March, kindly help review and provide feedback.
Thanks
-Sona
Hi all,
As presented on this week's tech forum, I have recently been working on
a framework to improve errata implementations, consolidate the disparate
requirements around them, and make errata information available at
runtime. This is related, but separate to the errata ABI which is being
worked on by Sona. Patches are available for review [1] and feedback is
welcome.
This email is to host discussion around the proposal, especially things
that came up during the tech forum. The team would like to merge this
sometime in April, but the sooner it is accepted, the sooner we can
start (and complete!) the migration.
[1]:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22bk%252Ferrata_refactor%22+
Hi James & TF-A guys,
When hest acpi table configure Hardware Error Notification type as
Software Delegated Exception(0x0B) for RAS event, kernel RAS interacts with
TF-A by SDEI mechanism. On the firmware first system, kernel was notified by
TF-A sdei call.
The calling flow like as below when fatal RAS error happens:
TF-A notify kernel flow:
sdei_dispatch_event()
ehf_activate_priority()
call sdei callback // callback registered by kerenl
ehf_deactivate_priority()
Kernel sdei callback:
sdei_asm_handler()
__sdei_handler()
_sdei_handler()
sdei_event_handler()
ghes_sdei_critical_callback()
ghes_in_nmi_queue_one_entry()
/* if RAS error is fatal */
__ghes_panic()
panic()
If fatal RAS error occured, panic was called in sdei_asm_handle()
without ehf_deactivate_priority executed, which lead interrupt masked.
If interrupt masked, system would be halted in kdump flow like this:
arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 65536 entries for cmdq
arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 32768 entries for evtq
arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 65536 entries for priq
arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: SMMU currently enabled! Resetting...
So interrupt should be restored before panic otherwise kdump will hang.
In the process of sdei, a SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE(or SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE_AND_RESUME)
call should be called before panic for a completed run of ehf_deactivate_priority().
The ehf_deactivate_priority() function restore pmr_el1 to original value(>0x80).
The SDEI dispatch flow was broken if SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE was not be called.
This will bring about two issue:
1 Kdump will hang for firmware reporting fatal RAS event by SDEI;
(as explain above)
2 For NMI scene,TF-A enable a secure timer, the PPI 29 will trigger periodically.
Kernel register a callback for hard lockup. The below code will not be
called when panic in kernel callback:
TF-A, services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c sdei_intr_handler():
/*
* We reach here when client completes the event.
*
* If the cause of dispatch originally interrupted the Secure world,
* resume Secure.
*
* No need to save the Non-secure context ahead of a world switch: the
* Non-secure context was fully saved before dispatch, and has been
* returned to its pre-dispatch state.
*/
if (sec_state == SECURE)
restore_and_resume_secure_context();
/*
* The event was dispatched after receiving SDEI interrupt. With
* the event handling completed, EOI the corresponding
* interrupt.
*/
if ((map->ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) && !is_map_bound(map)) {
ERROR("Invalid SDEI mapping: ev=%u\n", map->ev_num);
panic();
}
plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw);
How to fix above issues?
I think the root cause is that kernel broken the SDEI dispatch flow, so kernel
should modify to fix these issues.
Thanks,
Ming
Hello,
I am working on a board based on NXP LS1043 processor (arm64) with TPM2 on SPI interface.
I have the following boot sequence : TF-A + UBOOT + YOCTO.
I have a look on the code where the TF-A MEASURE_BOOT was implemented for the fvp arm platform using OPTEE fTPM.
As far as I understood, the event log is implemented based on the TCG2 EFI PROTOCOL from commit :
commit 3ee148d6439b69d326f8e6d2a4ce822604e0e64c
Merge: 43f7d8879 4a135bc33
Author: joanna.farley <joanna.farley(a)arm.com>
Date: Wed Jul 22 16:35:11 2020 +0000
Nevertheless, I am surprised because I did not find any TPM2 driver in the current TF-A code.
I would like to know :
1. How to port what was done for the fvp platform to my platform ?
2. What is code hashed in the TFA to create the event log ?
3. Why are there no TPM2 routine in the TF-A to expend PCR ?
Thanks in advance for your help
Benoit