Hi, In the TF-A Tech Forum today Feb, 22nd 4.00pm BST, Harrison Mutai and
Manish Pandey will present the Firmware hand-off framework: The
presentation will address the firmware handoff framework’s objectives, key
concepts, progress on FVP platform support, and plans for wider adoption
across other firmware components and Arm platforms. Regards, Olivier.
TF-A Tech Forum
Thursday Feb 22, 2024 ⋅ 5pm – 6pm
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We run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not
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Hi Olivier Deprez,
We have developed code based on the SPM_MM framework and do not want to reconstruct the code. However, we want to adapt the code to the SPMD framework.
What should we do?
________________________________
Hi Baopeng,
SPM_MM is the legacy implementation for a secure partition manager relying on the MM protocol. This implementation gets deprecated in favor of FF-A based implementations (what you refer to as SPMD + SPMC). Both implementations aren't compatible and it is discouraged to attempt co-locating both. It may be more palatable and future proof to transition all your SW stack to be compliant to FF-A standard.
We may help you better if you tell a bit more about the reason for mixing both implementations in the same build.
Regards, Olivier.
________________________________ From: baopeng (A) baopeng1(a)huawei.com<mailto:baopeng1@huawei.com> Sent: 20 February 2024 02:19 To: tf-a-owner(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org tf-a-owner(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-owner@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Request for help
Dear Sir/ Madam,
we need to support the simultaneous loading of SPMD and SPM_MM due to project reasons.
However, we notice that the makefile of SPM_MM of ATF does not support the simultaneous loading of SPMD and SPM_MM by default.
I would like to ask what is the main reason for making the current restrictions?
Hello,
I'm trying to understand the purpose of ENABLE_PIE build flag.
IIUC, it makes the BL* executables position-independent. But I could not find
any ASLR or some other addresses randomization support. Therefore, could you
please clarify, what is the point of building position-independent parts,
if (most of the time?) they will be loaded at the fixed addresses?
Thank you.
Hi Baopeng,
SPM_MM is the legacy implementation for a secure partition manager relying on the MM protocol.
This implementation gets deprecated in favor of FF-A based implementations (what you refer to as SPMD + SPMC).
Both implementations aren't compatible and it is discouraged to attempt co-locating both.
It may be more palatable and future proof to transition all your SW stack to be compliant to FF-A standard.
We may help you better if you tell a bit more about the reason for mixing both implementations in the same build.
Regards,
Olivier.
________________________________
From: baopeng (A) <baopeng1(a)huawei.com>
Sent: 20 February 2024 02:19
To: tf-a-owner(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a-owner(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Request for help
Dear Sir/ Madam,
we need to support the simultaneous loading of SPMD and SPM_MM due to project reasons.
However, we notice that the makefile of SPM_MM of ATF does not support the simultaneous loading of SPMD and SPM_MM by default.
I would like to ask what is the main reason for making the current restrictions?
This event has been canceled with a note:
"Hi, Cancelling as no topic planned. Regards, Olivier."
TF-A Tech Forum
Thursday Feb 8, 2024 ⋅ 5pm – 6pm
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Hi,
I am using hypervisors to allow execution of EL3 code directly and had to deal with MMIO caused by instructions that have post-indexing parameters.
Xen community had to deal with this in 2022: https://www.mail-archive.com/xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org/msg113335.html
This does not cause any trouble and have implemented ways to deal with this expeditiously.
Yet, I wonder if it is desirable to from a synchronisation perspective?
Cheers
FF
Compiling TFA 2.10 for PLAT=a80x0_mcbin
The following line
https://elixir.bootlin.com/arm-trusted-firmware/v2.10.0/source/drivers/marv…
Is compiled as:
win_reg = mmio_read_32(AMB_WIN_CR_OFFSET(win_id));
4026d9c: f9470260 ldr x0, [x19, #3584]
4026da0: 9100e002 add x2, x0, #0x38
4026da4: b9400001 ldr w1, [x0]
win_reg &= ~WIN_ENABLE_BIT;
4026da8: 121f7821 and w1, w1, #0xfffffffe
*(volatile uint32_t*)addr = value;
// post-indexing
4026dac: b8008401 str w1, [x0], #8
#gcc --version
gcc (Ubuntu 10.3.0-1ubuntu1) 10.3.0
Copyright (C) 2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO
warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
#objdump --version
GNU objdump (GNU Binutils for Ubuntu) 2.36.1
Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This program is free software; you may redistribute it under the terms of
the GNU General Public License version 3 or (at your option) any later version.
This program has absolutely no warranty.
#I can’t get access to latests compiler and binutils versions to overcome
# « ../.. array subscript 0 is outside array bounds of ‘volatile void[0] »
# « ../.. has a LOAD segment with RWX permissions »
# so I don’t know if this behaviour is changed when using this latests toolchain
Hi All,
Please note build option CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS is now replaced with ENABLE_FEAT_MTE[1]
To avoid breaking any builds for timebeing CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS usage will indirectly
enable ENABLE_FEAT_MTE but will produce a build warning.
Kindly request anyone using CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS to replace with ENABLE_FEAT_MTE
As option CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS backward support will be removed after next release
and going forward usage of CTX_INCLUDE_MTE_REGS will not be handled within build.
--
Thanks,
Govindraj R
[1]: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22gr/refac_mte%22
This event has been canceled with a note:
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TF-A Tech Forum
Thursday Jan 25, 2024 ⋅ 5pm – 6pm
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Hi,
Right now, TF-A coding guidelines advocate the use of strlcpy() over
strcpy()/strncpy() (see the banned libc functions [1]) for the following
reasons:
- strlcpy() always null-terminates the destination string, even if it
gets truncated. This is safer and less error-prone than leaving it
unterminated like strncpy() does in this case.
- With strlcpy(), it is possible to detect whether the string was
truncated. This is useful in some use cases.
- strlcpy() writes a single null-terminating byte into the destination
string, whereas strncpy() wastes time writing multiple null-terminating
bytes until it fills the destination string. Thus, strlcpy() is more
efficient in the case where the source string is shorter than the
destination one.
There exists another string copy variant: strscpy(). Just like
strlcpy(), it is not part of the C standard but most libc
implementations provide it. strscpy() has the following advantages over
strlcpy():
- strscpy() only reads the specified number of bytes from the source
string, whereas strlcpy() reads all of its bytes until it finds a
null-terminating byte (this is because it needs to return this information).
This opens up a potential security risk if the source string is
untrusted and controlled by an attacker, as we might end up reading a
lot of memory if proper safeguards are not put in place on the source
string prior to calling strlcpy().
Also it causes a performance penalty for reading "useless" bytes from
the source string.
- Checking for truncation is easier and less error-prone with strscpy()
: strscpy() returns an error code (-E2BIG) in case of truncation,
whereas strlcpy() requires comparing the return value with the
destination string size.
For these reasons, it seems to me we should prefer strscpy() over
strlcpy() in TF-A code base. Any thoughts?
Note that the Linux kernel coding style already goes in that direction.
The coding style verification script (checkpatch.pl), which TF-A reuses,
will print the following warning message if strlcpy() is used:
WARNING: Prefer strscpy over strlcpy - see:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHk-=wgfRnXz0W3D37d01q3JFkr_i_uTL=V6A6G1oUZcprmk…
This got flagged by the OpenCI into some TF-A code review already [2].
If we decide that strlcpy() is fine for TF-A codebase in the end, we'll
at least need to find a way to silence this checkpatch.pl warning.
AFAICS there is already a switch to this effect so it should just be a
matter of adding '--ignore STRLCPY' inside .checkpatch.conf file.
Best regards,
Sandrine
[1]
https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/process/coding-guideline…)
[2] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/25551
Hello,
In the file /plat/xilinx/zynqmp/aarch64/zynqmp_common.c, there is a function named plat_get_syscnt_freq2 with its definition. Simultaneously, the declaration of this function is included in include/plat/common/platform.h with the name plat_get_syscnt_freq2 and a different parameter type, leading to a violation when running the Coverity MISRA-C analysis for the Zynqmp platform. Declaration uses a different parameter type than the function Definition.
Addressing this issue by introducing a typedef for plat_get_syscnt_freq2 in platform.h and specifying its type as uint32_t resolves the violation. However, it introduces a challenge for other platforms, as this modification necessitates similar changes across various platforms, causing violations in those areas due to the adjusted typedef.
Is it possible to fix with the typedef? Please suggest.
Regards,
Nithin
Hello,
In the file /bl31/interrupt_mgmt.c and /include/drivers/arm/gicv2.h and other files getting misra_c_2012_rule_2_4_violation: Type has tag "intr_type_desc" but that tag is never used. during the Coverity MISRA-C analysis.
typedef struct intr_type_desc {
interrupt_type_handler_t handler;
u_register_t scr_el3[2];
uint32_t flags;
} intr_type_desc_t;
Resolution: Removed the intr_type_desc variable as it declared it's typedef intr_type_desc_t.
typedef struct {
interrupt_type_handler_t handler;
u_register_t scr_el3[2];
uint32_t flags;
} intr_type_desc_t;
Is It possible to remove the intr_type_desc variable since it is typedef. Please suggest?
Regards,
Nithin
Hi,
Patrick has sent 2 correction patches for PSCI stack in OSI mode there:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22fix_psci_osi%22
But when running CI+2, there are 2 platforms for which 2 PSCI OSI tests
are failing:
fvp-ext-pstate-ea-el3|fvp-default|fvp-tftf-fip.tftf-cortexa57x4a53x4-debug
fvp-ext-pstate-ea-el3|fvp-default|fvp-tftf-fip.tftf-aemv8a-debug
I'm not familiar with those test configs, but when checking lava logs,
I see those traces for failing tests:
2024-01-11T14:21:59 > Executing 'CPU suspend to powerdown at level 1 in
OSI mode'
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:21:59 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:00 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:00 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:00 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:00 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:00 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:00 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:00 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 TEST COMPLETE Failed
2024-01-11T14:22:03 Wrong value: expected 0, got -3
2024-01-11T14:22:03 > Executing 'CPU suspend to powerdown at level 2 in
OSI mode'
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Booting
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Registered IRQ handler 0x8801b274 for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Going into suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Saving system context
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Unregistered IRQ handler for IRQ #7
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Powering off
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Restoring system context
2024-01-11T14:22:03 INFO: Resumed from suspend state
2024-01-11T14:22:03 TEST COMPLETE Failed
2024-01-11T14:22:03 Wrong value: expected 0, got -3
The "Resumed from suspend state" message interleaved with "Going into
suspend state" seem strange, but I cannot say what could be wrong there.
Maybe there is something wrong with the TF-A patches?
Or the platforms tests or configs need to be updated?
If you have any clue that would be very helpful!
Thanks,
Yann
Hi,
I was looking at imx_hab_handler, which forwards calls into the BootROM on i.MX SoCs
in response to secure monitor calls. The BootROM call (and thus the SiP call) accepts
two pointers as arguments, where it writes data.
The plat/imx/imx8m/imx8m*/imx8m*_bl31_setup.c files map the RAM as MT_MEMORY | MT_RW,
which would mean that not only is it writable from TF-A side, but it's also mapped
cacheable.
I see no explicit cache maintenance in the i.MX SiP code for these two pointer
arguments and haven't been successful to find where in TF-A core code if at all,
complete D-Cache is flushed on SMC exit. Therefore I ask:
- Don't shared non-secure memory buffers between EL3 and lower EL require
explicit cache maintenance?
- Did I miss the place where this cache maintenance is done?
- How did it work so far? barebox does explicit flushing before HAB SiP,
invalidation after. U-Boot doesn't do cache maintenance.
Both apparently work...
Thanks,
Ahmad
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This event has been canceled with a note:
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TF-A Tech Forum
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1. misra_c_2012_rule_15_1_violation: Using "goto" statement.
In the file common/bl_common.c and other related files, getting misra_c_2012_rule_15_1_violation: Using "goto" statement. during the Coverity MISRA-C analysis.
if (...) {
goto exit;
}
exit:
some operation
Resolution: goto statement is replaced with exit_func() and new variable is introduced to store the return value of exit_func().
exit_func()
some operation
int ret;
if (...) {
ret = return value of exit func()
}
return ret;
Is it possible to fix MISRA 15.1 like this in open source? Please suggest.
2. misra_c_2012_rule_15_5_violation: This return statement is not the final statement in the compound statement that forms the body of the function.
In the file common/bl_common.c, lib/xlat_tables/aarch64/xlat_tables.c and other related files, getting misra_c_2012_rule_15_5_violation: This return statement is not the final statement in the compound statement that forms the body of the function. during the Coverity MISRA-C analysis.
if (...) {
return <something>
}
if (...) {
return <something>
}
return;
Resolution: Taken new variable and assign the return result to new variable and calling only one return statement in end of the function.
int result;
if (...) {
result = <something>
} else {
if (...) {
result = <something>
}
}
return result;
Is it possible to fix MISRA 15.5 like this in open source? Please suggest.
Thanks & Regards,
Nithin G
Hello,
Trusted Firmware-A LTS version 2.8.14 is now available. This release introduces errata workarounds for Cortex-A520, Cortex-A710, and Neoverse X2 CPUs.
The complete list of changes can be found here<https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/lts-v2.8.14/change-log.html>.
Thanks.
Hello TF-A and TF-M communities,
I've done 2 minor updates to the generic tf.org project maintenance
process, which TF-A and TF-M both use. Please see the pull request here:
https://github.com/TrustedFirmware/tf_docs/pull/1
Please provide your feedback on the pull request, if any.
Happy end-of-year celebrations to all!
Best regards,
Sandrine