- TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Piotr Lobacz

Hi All, i've been trying for a couple of days to load current optee together with atf from the github, with no luck. For that i have been using manuals (https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/plat/rockchip.html , http://opensource.rock-chips.com/wiki_ATF ) for rockchip and what i have succeded is to run very old atf tag 1.3 with optee blob from rockchip which i suspect is also very old. And if i try to use any newer atf >= 1.4 than i suspect that it does not load, because i do not see any LOGS from it, no matter that LOG_LEVEL was set to 50... Can anybody help me solving this issue or point me to some solution? Thanks in advance. BR Piotr Łobacz [https://softgent.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Zasob-14.png]<https://www.softgent.com> Softgent Sp. z o.o., Budowlanych 31d, 80-298 Gdansk, POLAND KRS: 0000674406, NIP: 9581679801, REGON: 367090912 www.softgent.com Sąd Rejonowy Gdańsk-Północ w Gdańsku, VII Wydział Gospodarczy Krajowego Rejestru Sądowego KRS 0000674406, Kapitał zakładowy: 25 000,00 zł wpłacony w całości.

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3

by Soby Mathew

Hi Julius, The TF-A build sets the `-mstrict-align` compiler option, that means that the compiler will generate only aligned accesses as default. So disabling the check at runtime, seems `unaligned` with the compiler option IMO. The programmer can induce unaligned access though, although I am struggling to understand why the programmer would want to do that. The case you have pointed out seems like an error which needs to be corrected in platform code IMO. > Well, my assumption is that performing an unaligned access cannot be a > vulnerability. TF-A has linker symbol references and non-trivial linker section manipulations at runtime and these have previously triggered alignment errors when binary layout changed due to code issues. Disabling the alignment check at runtime means these errors would have remained undetected and would have resulted in more obscure crash at runtime or even a vulnerablility. In some cases, only the RELEASE builds (DEBUG=0) triggered the alignment fault. > There are scenarios where unaligned accesses can be intentional, but I am not too worried about those -- there are ways to work around that, and if we make it policy that those accesses always need to be written that way I'm okay with that. What I am worried about is mistakes and oversights that slip through testing and then cause random or even attacker-controllable crashes in production. If the main reason you're enabling this flag is to help with early detection of coding mistakes, I wonder if the best approach would be to enable it for DEBUG=1 and disable it for DEBUG=0 (of course, if there are really security issues associated with it like you mentioned above, that wouldn't make sense). Agree. But I am failing to understand why the unaligned accesses came to be there in the first place. My worry is, if this was not intended by the programmer, this might as well be a bug that will remain undetected if the alignment check is disabled. Best Regards Soby Mathew > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Julius > Werner via TF-A > Sent: 10 November 2020 02:31 > To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com > Cc: tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3 > > > >>. What I am worried about is mistakes and oversights that slip > > >>through testing and then cause random or even attacker-controllable > > >>crashes in production > > > > Why would this not be the case even with SCTLR.A bit set? I'm not seeing > the relation between the crash and SCTLR.A bit. If there are oversights that > slip through testing and an attacker can cause a crash, there is > vulnerability/bug. > > If there is something that slipped through, that causes a data > abort(perhaps address not mapped in the translation tables), would we turn > off the MMU ? > > Well, my assumption is that performing an unaligned access cannot be a > vulnerability. If you have examples to the contrary please let me know, but > as far as I am aware letting an unaligned access through should always work > and will always result in the behavior the programmer intended (other than > maybe contrived cases where device address space is mapped with a non- > Device memory type, which is already very wrong for plenty of other reasons > and should never happen). The only negative consequence is that the access > may take slightly longer than if it were aligned. I do understand the desire to > be able to shake out unaligned accesses during development and testing > > I don't think the comparison to a data abort works because obviously with a > data abort the program usually can't just continue and still assume its internal > state is valid.

5 years, 10 months

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FW: [Linaro-open-discussions] Kickoff: Extend PSCI with OS-initiated mode in TF-A

by Matteo Carlini

Cross-posting on the TF-A mailing list too for interested people to attend the kickoff meeting listed below hosted by Linaro. Thanks Matteo -----Original Message----- From: Linaro-open-discussions <linaro-open-discussions-bounces(a)op-lists.linaro.org> On Behalf Of Ulf Hansson via Linaro-open-discussions Sent: 10 November 2020 10:21 To: linaro-open-discussions(a)op-lists.linaro.org Subject: [Linaro-open-discussions] Kickoff: Extend PSCI with OS-initiated mode in TF-A Hi all, As previously announced we are hosting a kickoff meeting for the above topic/project. The meeting has been added to the linaro-open-discussions calendar, according to the below. Feel free to join us on Thursday this week! Kind regards Ulf Hansson, Linaro KWG When: Thursday Nov 12, 16:00-17:00 CET. Agenda: 1. Introduction. 2. Update of the current support in Linux. 3. Collaborations. 4. Technical things. 5. Other matters. To join the Zoom Meeting: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/97261221687 Meeting ID: 972 6122 1687 One tap mobile +13462487799,,97261221687# US (Houston) +16465588656,,97261221687# US (New York) Dial by your location +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) Meeting ID: 972 6122 1687 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/acg3UrpmdE -- Linaro-open-discussions mailing list https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/LOD/Linaro+Open+Discussions+Home https://op-lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/linaro-open-discussions

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3

by Julius Werner

> >>. What I am worried about is mistakes and > >>oversights that slip through testing and then cause random or even > >>attacker-controllable crashes in production > > Why would this not be the case even with SCTLR.A bit set? I'm not seeing the relation between the crash and SCTLR.A bit. If there are oversights that slip through testing and an attacker can cause a crash, there is vulnerability/bug. > If there is something that slipped through, that causes a data abort(perhaps address not mapped in the translation tables), would we turn off the MMU ? Well, my assumption is that performing an unaligned access cannot be a vulnerability. If you have examples to the contrary please let me know, but as far as I am aware letting an unaligned access through should always work and will always result in the behavior the programmer intended (other than maybe contrived cases where device address space is mapped with a non-Device memory type, which is already very wrong for plenty of other reasons and should never happen). The only negative consequence is that the access may take slightly longer than if it were aligned. I do understand the desire to be able to shake out unaligned accesses during development and testing, but at least in a production build I think taking that performance hit would always be preferable to a crash. I don't think the comparison to a data abort works because obviously with a data abort the program usually can't just continue and still assume its internal state is valid.

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3

by Joanna Farley

Hi Julius, A lot of the rationale for the default initialization is not listed in the documentation and I do think perhaps we can do better as at the end of the day it’s decisions around platform ports and how they are going to be deployed in products that may influence decisions here for changing the defaults. Your thoughts around attacker control able crashes are a valid one. I don’t think any one setting is all pros with no cons and platform providers need to make decisions but I think the default code with the settings is more likely to flush out alignment bugs and although I don’t have specific examples any bug could play a part in future vulnerability so best to flush them out rather than lie hidden. It could be said that in the reference implementation a known crash may be better than a more nebulous unknown behaviour that could come with an undetected bug that could later be taken advantage of. The use a DEBUG flag is an idea but we have all seen debug builds not operating like production builds so the value may be lost here. It’s why on reviewing our documentation on seeing your post I think we could do better to explain the rationale for the settings in TF-A so platform owners can be better informed and override default settings if they really feel they have the need. Cheers Joanna ________________________________ From: Julius Werner Sent: Monday, November 9, 2020 10:42 PM To: Joanna Farley Cc: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3 Hi Joanna, Thank you for your detailed response. I was mostly wondering if this was a deliberate choice or just something someone wrote this way once and nobody ever thought about again. Since it sounds like it is intentional, I'll try to understand your rationale better. > Maintaining these settings in production is also advised as best practice as it is known any such defects can possibly play a part in allowing an actor to take advantage of the defect as part of a vulnerability and memory related defects in particular can be taken advantage of. So it seems prudent to guard against them. I'm curious, can you elaborate on that? I can't really think of a scenario where lack of alignment checking can really make code behave in an unintentional way. (I don't think Raghu's scenario of accessing MMIO registers works because those registers should be mapped with a Device memory type anyway, and that memory type enforces aligned accesses regardless of the SCTLR.A flag.) If there truly are security concerns with this I can understand your approach much better. > Saying all this for those few cases where unaligned accesses are correct and intentional we could look to define better ways to handle these and provide that in reference code as an option to try and get the best for robustness and debuggability which seemed a big part of the concern in your post. Team members in Arm have ideas on how that could be provided but it needs broader discussion on the implications for security and performance before taking forward. There are scenarios where unaligned accesses can be intentional, but I am not too worried about those -- there are ways to work around that, and if we make it policy that those accesses always need to be written that way I'm okay with that. What I am worried about is mistakes and oversights that slip through testing and then cause random or even attacker-controllable crashes in production. If the main reason you're enabling this flag is to help with early detection of coding mistakes, I wonder if the best approach would be to enable it for DEBUG=1 and disable it for DEBUG=0 (of course, if there are really security issues associated with it like you mentioned above, that wouldn't make sense).

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3

by Joanna Farley

Hi Julius, Talking to the team here its has always been felt it is best practise to forbid unaligned data accesses in Arm's embedded projects. That's the reason TF-A also enforces the build options: -mno-unaligned-access (AArch32) and -mstrict-align (AArch64). In the TF-A documentation [1] SCTLR_EL3.A and other settings are listed in the Architectural Initialisation section. There is thought to be only a few cases where unaligned access are correct and intentional and most are defects that should be caught early and not in production and as such it is better to detect unaligned data access conditions early in a platform porting, rather than in the field especially if there is no firmware update capability. Alignment faults should be treated as fatal as they should never happen in production when components have been designed as such from the beginning. Maintaining these settings in production is also advised as best practice as it is known any such defects can possibly play a part in allowing an actor to take advantage of the defect as part of a vulnerability and memory related defects in particular can be taken advantage of. So it seems prudent to guard against them. We can of course provide better rationalisation based on the above in our documentation to provide platforms porting efforts better guidance. It is after all up to partners in their platform ports to make appropriate decisions for their ports where settings could be changed however the upstreamed reference code should follow the settings we have which are felt to be best practices for TF-A. It is known other projects follow other practices and that is fine if that works for them. Once a project enables unaligned accesses, it's very hard to go back again since it's likely that code that does unaligned accesses will slowly get added to the project. However for TF-A maintaining the current settings is felt to be the best approach when weighing up the costs and benefits. Saying all this for those few cases where unaligned accesses are correct and intentional we could look to define better ways to handle these and provide that in reference code as an option to try and get the best for robustness and debuggability which seemed a big part of the concern in your post. Team members in Arm have ideas on how that could be provided but it needs broader discussion on the implications for security and performance before taking forward. Thanks Joanna [1] https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/design/firmware-design.h… On 09/11/2020, 17:47, "TF-A on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hi Julius, I tend to agree with your argument about not using SCTLR.A bit but I think the unexpected crashes or instability is due buggy code and insufficient validation of invariants such as aligned pointers, irrespective of whether SCTRLR.A is set or unset. Even if we allow unaligned accesses, we could have buggy code that access registers that typically have to be size aligned and we wouldn’t catch those bugs with SCTLR.A. Worse, some hardware implementations have undefined/impdef behavior when there are unaligned access to MMIO registers for ex, in which case, I would rather take an alignment fault at the core than allow triggering of undefined behavior. So I don’t think stability/reliability and the use of SCTLR.A bit are related. If TF-A's position is that we want to allow only aligned accesses in EL3(for whatever reason, I can only think of efficiency), it is the code's responsibility to enforce this invariants using asserts or explicit checks. >> I am still wondering why we choose to set the SCTLR_EL3.A I think this is the relevant question. If there are good security reasons(which I don’t know about), I would say we should keep it. If it is for efficiency, given the way recent ARM64 cores are performing, I wouldn't have a problem with SCTLR.A=0. Thanks Raghu -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Julius Werner via TF-A Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 6:38 PM To: tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3 Hi, I just debugged a TF-A boot crash that turned out to be caused by an alignment fault in platform code. Someone had defined some static storage space as a uint8_t array, and then accessed it by dereferencing uint16_t pointers. Of course this is ultimately a bug in the platform code that should be fixed, but I am still wondering why we choose to set the SCTLR_EL3.A (Alignment fault checking) flag in TF-A? In an ideal world, maybe we could say that code which can generate alignment faults should not exist -- but, unfortunately, people make mistakes, and this kind of mistake may linger unnoticed for a long time in the codebase before randomly getting triggered due to subtle shifts in the binary's memory layout. (Worse, in some situations this could get affected by SMC parameters passed in from lower exception levels, so it would only be noticeable and could possibly be intentionally triggered if the lower exception level passes in just the right values.) For that reason, most other environments I know (e.g. Linux) always keep that flag cleared. There's no harm in that -- as far as I'm aware all aarch64 cores are required to support unaligned accesses to cached memory types, and the worst that would happen is a slight performance penalty for the access. I think that flag is mostly meant as a debugging feature to be able to shake out accidental unaligned accesses from your code? If our goal is to be stable and reliable firmware, shouldn't we disable it to reduce the chance of unexpected crashes? -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3

by raghu.ncstate＠icloud.com

Hi Julius, I tend to agree with your argument about not using SCTLR.A bit but I think the unexpected crashes or instability is due buggy code and insufficient validation of invariants such as aligned pointers, irrespective of whether SCTRLR.A is set or unset. Even if we allow unaligned accesses, we could have buggy code that access registers that typically have to be size aligned and we wouldn’t catch those bugs with SCTLR.A. Worse, some hardware implementations have undefined/impdef behavior when there are unaligned access to MMIO registers for ex, in which case, I would rather take an alignment fault at the core than allow triggering of undefined behavior. So I don’t think stability/reliability and the use of SCTLR.A bit are related. If TF-A's position is that we want to allow only aligned accesses in EL3(for whatever reason, I can only think of efficiency), it is the code's responsibility to enforce this invariants using asserts or explicit checks. >> I am still wondering why we choose to set the SCTLR_EL3.A I think this is the relevant question. If there are good security reasons(which I don’t know about), I would say we should keep it. If it is for efficiency, given the way recent ARM64 cores are performing, I wouldn't have a problem with SCTLR.A=0. Thanks Raghu -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Julius Werner via TF-A Sent: Friday, November 6, 2020 6:38 PM To: tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Alignment fault checking in EL3 Hi, I just debugged a TF-A boot crash that turned out to be caused by an alignment fault in platform code. Someone had defined some static storage space as a uint8_t array, and then accessed it by dereferencing uint16_t pointers. Of course this is ultimately a bug in the platform code that should be fixed, but I am still wondering why we choose to set the SCTLR_EL3.A (Alignment fault checking) flag in TF-A? In an ideal world, maybe we could say that code which can generate alignment faults should not exist -- but, unfortunately, people make mistakes, and this kind of mistake may linger unnoticed for a long time in the codebase before randomly getting triggered due to subtle shifts in the binary's memory layout. (Worse, in some situations this could get affected by SMC parameters passed in from lower exception levels, so it would only be noticeable and could possibly be intentionally triggered if the lower exception level passes in just the right values.) For that reason, most other environments I know (e.g. Linux) always keep that flag cleared. There's no harm in that -- as far as I'm aware all aarch64 cores are required to support unaligned accesses to cached memory types, and the worst that would happen is a slight performance penalty for the access. I think that flag is mostly meant as a debugging feature to be able to shake out accidental unaligned accesses from your code? If our goal is to be stable and reliable firmware, shouldn't we disable it to reduce the chance of unexpected crashes?

5 years, 10 months

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Alignment fault checking in EL3

by Julius Werner

Hi, I just debugged a TF-A boot crash that turned out to be caused by an alignment fault in platform code. Someone had defined some static storage space as a uint8_t array, and then accessed it by dereferencing uint16_t pointers. Of course this is ultimately a bug in the platform code that should be fixed, but I am still wondering why we choose to set the SCTLR_EL3.A (Alignment fault checking) flag in TF-A? In an ideal world, maybe we could say that code which can generate alignment faults should not exist -- but, unfortunately, people make mistakes, and this kind of mistake may linger unnoticed for a long time in the codebase before randomly getting triggered due to subtle shifts in the binary's memory layout. (Worse, in some situations this could get affected by SMC parameters passed in from lower exception levels, so it would only be noticeable and could possibly be intentionally triggered if the lower exception level passes in just the right values.) For that reason, most other environments I know (e.g. Linux) always keep that flag cleared. There's no harm in that -- as far as I'm aware all aarch64 cores are required to support unaligned accesses to cached memory types, and the worst that would happen is a slight performance penalty for the access. I think that flag is mostly meant as a debugging feature to be able to shake out accidental unaligned accesses from your code? If our goal is to be stable and reliable firmware, shouldn't we disable it to reduce the chance of unexpected crashes?

5 years, 10 months

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[RFC PATCH] hw/arm/virt: use sbsa-ec for reboot and poweroff in secure mode

by Maxim Uvarov

If we're emulating EL3 then the EL3 guest firmware is responsible for providing the PSCI ABI, including reboot, core power down, etc. sbsa-ref machine has an embedded controller to do reboot, poweroff. Machine virt,secure=on can reuse this code to do reboot inside ATF. Signed-off-by: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> --- Hello, This patch implements reboot for the secure machine inside ATF firmware. I.e. current qemu patch should be used with [1] ATF patch. It looks like that Embedded Controller qemu driver (sbsa-ec) can be common and widely used for other emulated machines. While if there are plans to extend sbsa-ec then we might find some other solution. So for the long term it looks like machine virt was used as an initial playground for secure firmware. While the original intent was a runner for kvm guests. Relation between kvm guest and firmware is not very clear now. If everyone agree it might be good solution to move secure firmware things from virt machine to bsa-ref and make this machine reference for secure boot, firmware updates etc. [1] https://github.com/muvarov/arm-trusted-firmware/commit/6d3339a0081f6f2b45d9… Best regards, Maxim. hw/arm/virt.c | 9 +++++++++ include/hw/arm/virt.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/hw/arm/virt.c b/hw/arm/virt.c index e465a988d6..6b77912f02 100644 --- a/hw/arm/virt.c +++ b/hw/arm/virt.c @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ static const MemMapEntry base_memmap[] = { [VIRT_ACPI_GED] = { 0x09080000, ACPI_GED_EVT_SEL_LEN }, [VIRT_NVDIMM_ACPI] = { 0x09090000, NVDIMM_ACPI_IO_LEN}, [VIRT_PVTIME] = { 0x090a0000, 0x00010000 }, + [VIRT_EC] = { 0x090c0000, 0x00001000 }, [VIRT_MMIO] = { 0x0a000000, 0x00000200 }, /* ...repeating for a total of NUM_VIRTIO_TRANSPORTS, each of that size */ [VIRT_PLATFORM_BUS] = { 0x0c000000, 0x02000000 }, @@ -1729,6 +1730,13 @@ static void virt_cpu_post_init(VirtMachineState *vms, int max_cpus, } } +static void init_ec_controller(VirtMachineState *vms) +{ + vms->ec = qdev_new("sbsa-ec"); + + sysbus_mmio_map(SYS_BUS_DEVICE(vms->ec), 0, vms->memmap[VIRT_EC].base); +} + static void machvirt_init(MachineState *machine) { VirtMachineState *vms = VIRT_MACHINE(machine); @@ -1797,6 +1805,7 @@ static void machvirt_init(MachineState *machine) */ if (vms->secure && firmware_loaded) { vms->psci_conduit = QEMU_PSCI_CONDUIT_DISABLED; + init_ec_controller(vms); } else if (vms->virt) { vms->psci_conduit = QEMU_PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC; } else { diff --git a/include/hw/arm/virt.h b/include/hw/arm/virt.h index aad6d69841..6f2ce4e4ff 100644 --- a/include/hw/arm/virt.h +++ b/include/hw/arm/virt.h @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ enum { VIRT_ACPI_GED, VIRT_NVDIMM_ACPI, VIRT_PVTIME, + VIRT_EC, VIRT_LOWMEMMAP_LAST, }; @@ -163,6 +164,7 @@ struct VirtMachineState { DeviceState *gic; DeviceState *acpi_dev; Notifier powerdown_notifier; + DeviceState *ec; }; #define VIRT_ECAM_ID(high) (high ? VIRT_HIGH_PCIE_ECAM : VIRT_PCIE_ECAM) -- 2.17.1

5 years, 10 months

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TF-A Tech Forum Agenda @ Thr 5th November 2020 16:00-1700 GMT

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 5th November 2020 16:00 – 17:00 (GMT). Please note UK entered Daylight Saving on 25th October when clocks went back one hour to go to GMT from BST. A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. Agenda: * TF-A Tests Framework Overview * Presented by Varun Wadekar * Summary * Trusted Firmware-A Tests (TF-A Tests) is a suite of baremetal tests to exercise the Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) features from the Normal World. * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions If TF-A contributors have anything they wish to present at any future TF-A tech forum please contact me to have that scheduled. Previous sessions, both recording and presentation material can be found on the trustedfirmware.org TF-A Technical meeting webpage: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ A scheduling tracking page is also available to help track sessions suggested and being prepared: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a-tech-forum-scheduling/ Final decisions on what will be presented will be shared a few days before the next meeting and shared on the TF-A mailing list. Thanks Joanna

5 years, 10 months

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Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Tomorrow

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi All, Gentle reminder about the Mbed TLS workshop tomorrow (Tuesday, November 3rd) from 2 to 6pm GMT. See agenda and zoom link here - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/mbed-tls-workshop/ Thanks, Shebu -----Original Appointment----- From: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings <linaro.org_havjv2figrh5egaiurb229pd8c(a)group.calendar.google.com> Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 12:32 AM To: Trusted Firmware Public Meetings; Shebu Varghese Kuriakose; mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Don Harbin; psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Dave Rodgman Subject: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 2:00 PM-6:00 PM (UTC+00:00) Dublin, Edinburgh, Lisbon, London. Where: Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… You have been invited to the following event. Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop When Tue Nov 3, 2020 7am – 11am Mountain Standard Time - Phoenix Where Zoom: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT… (map<https://www.google.com/maps/search/Zoom:+https:%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj…>) Calendar shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> Who • Don Harbin - creator • shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> • mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:mbed-tls@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • psa-crypto(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:psa-crypto@lists.trustedfirmware.org> • dave.rodgman(a)arm.com<mailto:dave.rodgman@arm.com> more details »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Hi, Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop. The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss * The future direction of the project and * Ways to improve community collaboration Here is the agenda for the workshop. Topic Time (in GMT) Welcome 2.00 - 2.10pm Constant-time code 2.10 – 2.30pm Processes - how does work get scheduled? 2.30 – 2.50pm PSA Crypto APIs 2.50 – 3.20pm PSA Crypto for Silicon Labs Wireless MCUs - Why, What, Where and When 3.20 – 3.50pm Break Roadmap, TLS1.3 Update 4.10 – 4.30pm Mbed TLS 3.0 Plans, Scope 4.30 – 5.00pm How do I contribute my first review and be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer 5.00 – 5.30pm Regards, Don Harbin Trusted Firmware Community Manager ==============Zoom details below:==================== Trusted Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting. Topic: Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop Time: Nov 3, 2020 02:00 PM Greenwich Mean Time Join Zoom Meeting https://linaro-org.zoom.us/j/95315200315?pwd=ZDJGc1BZMHZLV29DTmpGUllmMjB1UT…<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fj%2F9531520…> Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Passcode: 143755 One tap mobile +16699009128,,95315200315# US (San Jose) +12532158782,,95315200315# US (Tacoma) Dial by your location +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose) +1 253 215 8782 US (Tacoma) +1 346 248 7799 US (Houston) +1 646 558 8656 US (New York) +1 301 715 8592 US (Germantown) +1 312 626 6799 US (Chicago) 888 788 0099 US Toll-free 877 853 5247 US Toll-free Meeting ID: 953 1520 0315 Find your local number: https://linaro-org.zoom.us/u/apL3hgti4<https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Flinaro-org.zoom.us%2Fu%2FapL3hgt…> Going (shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com>)? Yes<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - Maybe<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> - No<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=RESPOND&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MW…> more options »<https://www.google.com/calendar/event?action=VIEW&eid=NHVvY2FxY2o4Njk3MWZkd…> Invitation from Google Calendar<https://www.google.com/calendar/> You are receiving this courtesy email at the account shebu.varghesekuriakose(a)arm.com<mailto:shebu.varghesekuriakose@arm.com> because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively you can sign up for a Google account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organizer and be added to the guest list, or invite others regardless of their own invitation status, or to modify your RSVP. Learn More<https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding>.

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case

by Ruchika Gupta

Hi, *For [1] - Would be good if the test infrastructure(the TPM TA) can compile in AARCH64. I thought I heard on the tf-a call that there already is a Microsoft FW TPM port for aarch64 already. Please let me know if I misunderstood.* You can check the implementation at https://github.com/microsoft/MSRSec This compiles for aarch64. I had a few queries for chips having physical TPM. Case 1. Should all entities doing the measurement (BL1, BL2) have the TPM driver to extend the measurements as they are done. This would be the most secure flow. Case 2. If BL1 and BL2 don't have the TPM driver as mentioned in Case 1 above, who would be responsible for extending the measurements for secure world entities. -- Should there be a TPM driver in Secure EL0/EL1 which does this ? -- Event log is also passed to the BL33. In case there is no TPM driver at all in the secure world - is it expected that BL33 should extend the measurements in PCR ? Regards, Ruchika On Mon, 26 Oct 2020 at 21:03, Stuart Yoder via TF-A < tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Regarding measuring TB_FW_CONFIG-- > > BL1 could measure the unmodified TB_FW_CONFIG image as it was loaded from > flash. It could then update TB_FW_CONFIG with that measurement which > reflects the image as it was on flash. This could allow detection of > tampering with flash. I would recommend doing this, as TB_FW_CONFIG is > critical data. > > BL2 could make a measurement of the TB_FW_CONFIG image as it was passed to > it in memory. > > Thanks, > Stuart > > > On 10/26/20 6:16 AM, Alexei Fedorov wrote: > > Hi Javer, > > Please see my comments below. > > [3] Provide platform hooks in tpm_record_measurement function for a > platform to actually extend those measurements to a physical TPM right when > they are measured. > > These hooks can be implemented in the next phase #2 of Measured Boot > implementation. > > [4] On platforms that use FCONF, the FW_CONFIG and TB_FW_CONFIG should > also be measured since they are images being loaded as well. See > arm_bl1_setup.c where these images are loaded but not measured(unless I’m > missing something). > > FW_CONFIG and TB_FW_CONFIG images are loaded by BL1 but not BL2. > BL1 calculates BL2 hash and passes the measurement to BL2 in TB_FW_CONFIG. > It can also pass FW_CONFIG hash in the same DTB, but it is not clear how > own TB_FW_CONFIG hash can be passed in itself. > > Stuart, do you have opinion on that? > > Regards. > > Alexei > ------------------------------ > *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Javier Almansa > Sobrino via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Sent:* 26 October 2020 10:25 > *To:* raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> > <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> > *Cc:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > *Subject:* Re: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test > case > > Hi Raghu, > > Thank you very much for your comments and for your feedback. > > With regards to the (f)TPM service and as discussed during the last TF-A > Tech Forum call, we will discuss internally the need of a new > implementation, probably after the next TF-A release, and we will schedule > the work (in case we decide to go ahead with it) for the upcoming months. > We will announce any decision we make through the mailing list and/or on > future TF-A Tech Forum calls . > > Regarding to changes to TF-A to include extra functionality/APIs/hooks, I > guess my colleague Alexei can provide further details about the next > features planned for Measured Boot, if any. > > To finish, I would just like to clarify one of the questions raised on > your email: > > [1] Would be good if the test infrastructure(the TPM TA) can compile in > AARCH64. I thought I heard on the tf-a call that there already is a > Microsoft FW TPM port for aarch64 already. Please let me know if I > misunderstood. > > > - Microsoft has a reference implementation of the TPM 2.0 > specification. That implementation is in the form of an architecture > agnostic library that implements the specification. Along with the library, > there are a couple of example applications for different platforms built > around the former, one of them being the fTPM we used for testing. That > application was written for AARCH32 and seemed to be outdated (I don't know > if it was abandoned, actually), so we updated it and added support for > Measured Boot to it. > > > Best regards, > Javier > > -----Original Message----- > *From*: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com > *To*: 'Javier Almansa Sobrino' <Javier.AlmansaSobrino(a)arm.com > <'Javier%20Almansa%20Sobrino'%20%3cJavier.AlmansaSobrino(a)arm.com%3e>> > *Cc*: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > *Subject*: RE: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test > case > *Date*: Sun, 25 Oct 2020 14:31:10 -0700 > > Hi Javier, > > > > As discussed during the TF-A call, here are some suggestions/feedback that > can be incorporated when time permits based on priorities, schedule, > resources etc: > > 1. Would be good if the test infrastructure(the TPM TA) can compile in > AARCH64. I thought I heard on the tf-a call that there already is a > Microsoft FW TPM port for aarch64 already. Please let me know if I > misunderstood. > 2. Would be good if the TPM TA works on FF-A as opposed to proprietary > OPTEE API’s. > 3. Provide platform hooks in tpm_record_measurement function for a > platform to actually extend those measurements to a physical TPM right when > they are measured. This is a requirement from a security perspective to not > wait until the tpm TA is loaded to be able to extend the measurements into > a tpm. I understand this can be done in the platform hook that calls > tpm_record_measurement but it is convenient place to put tpm related > platform hooks. > 4. On platforms that use FCONF, the FW_CONFIG and TB_FW_CONFIG should > also be measured since they are images being loaded as well. See > arm_bl1_setup.c where these images are loaded but not measured(unless I’m > missing something). > > > > Thanks > > Raghu > > > > *From:* TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> *On Behalf Of *Javier Almansa > Sobrino via TF-A > *Sent:* Friday, October 9, 2020 10:51 AM > *To:* tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > *Subject:* [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case > > > > Hello all, > > > > Following up the question raised yesterday during the TF-A Tech Forum with > regards to any modification needed on the Linux Kernel to run the test case > that I was presenting (Measured Boot + fTPM service), I double checked > today and I ran some tests on system and I can confirm that the test case > works with the mainline Linux Kernel, with no modification other than > enabling the driver on the DTB. > > > > The modules involved on the interaction with the fTPM (for this particular > example) are: > > > > * optee.ko: Allows communication between the REE (unsecure world), the > Trusted OS (secure world) and the tee-supplicant (unsecure world). > > * tpm_ftpm_tee.ko: Module to communicate with a firmware TPM through a > char device. This also includes the reference implementation used on the > test case. > > > > In order to use the fTPM service, the test case makes use of IBM's TPM 2.0 > TSS, a user space TSS for TPM 2.0 that uses services provided by the fTPM. > > > > I would also like to highlight the following points: > > > > A) The test case is only meant to test the ability of the Measured Boot > Driver and a TPM 2.0 compliant device to interact with each other. As such, > we are not providing an fTPM meant to be used on a production environment. > Instead, we are using an existing reference implementation to which we > added support for Measured Boot to fulfil our needs for the test and use it > as a functional example. The implementation details on how to interact with > a particular TPM device (either firmware or discrete) can differ from the > ones used on the test case as those details can be platform dependent. For > example, we use an OPTEE TA fTPM on this example, but other platforms might > use a discrete TPM or an fTPM running on a different Trusted OS. > > > > B) As stated on the presentation, we are undergoing internal review of the > contributions done for the fTPM service to make it compatible with Measured > Boot. Once the review is completed and the changes merged into the TPM repo > mainline, we will update the TF-A documentation with instructions on how to > download and build all the components to run the tests manually. > > > > Please, let me know in case you have any more questions. > > > > Best regards, > > Javier > > > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] [Linaro-open-discussions] Extend TF-A with PSCI OS-initiated mode

by Matteo Carlini

Cross-posting to the TF-A mailing list as well for interested partners. > -----Original Message----- > From: Linaro-open-discussions <linaro-open-discussions-bounces@op- > lists.linaro.org> On Behalf Of Ulf Hansson via Linaro-open-discussions > Sent: 28 October 2020 15:45 > To: linaro-open-discussions(a)op-lists.linaro.org > Cc: Lauren Wehrmeister <Lauren.Wehrmeister(a)arm.com>; Lina Iyer > <ilina(a)codeaurora.org>; Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com>; Madhukar > Pappireddy <Madhukar.Pappireddy(a)arm.com>; Bhutada Harshad > <hbhutada(a)qti.qualcomm.com>; Gabriel FERNANDEZ > <gabriel.fernandez(a)st.com> > Subject: [Linaro-open-discussions] Extend TF-A with PSCI OS-initiated mode > > Hi all, > > In the Linux kernel v5.6, we introduced the basic support for PSCI OS-initiated > mode. Linaro is still working on evolving the support, step by step. > Additionally, we are helping some of our members with corresponding SoC > deployment, which is planned to continue for a while. > > Basically, the PSCI OS-initiated mode allows Linux to be in charge of idlestate > decisions for a group of CPUs (aka CPU cluster), which may share idlestates. > In some cases this enables improvements in regards to performance/energy, > but could also be used to help manage resources that may share power- > /clock-domains with CPUs. > > Moving forward, we are now planning to extend the corresponding PSCI > implementation in the Trusted Firmware-A (TF-A) with the OS-initiated mode, > together with our members and member engineers. Currently, only the > default PSCI platform-coordinated mode is supported by the TF-A. > > We seek for additional collaborations and input to the new project! > Please get in touch, if you have any feedback and/or find this project > interesting. > > Finally, a kickoff meeting is about to be scheduled and held within a few > weeks. Let me know if you want to join the discussions. > > Kind regards > Ulf Hansson, Linaro Kernel Working Group > -- > Linaro-open-discussions mailing list > https://collaborate.linaro.org/display/LOD/Linaro+Open+Discussions+Home > https://op-lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/linaro-open-discussions

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader

by rkohli2000 gmail

Hi Alexei, I'm able to eliminate the warning using the -j .text and see the image load and run ok. The issue I am seeing is that the bsp I am using expects my bot loader bl31.bin to power on the UART and do the low level init that makes PCIe controller accessible. I think at exit from bl31.bin I don't have this initialization. Can you point me the TFA code to enable LPUART and make PCIe controller accessible in imx8qm before handoff to BL33 ? Regards Ravi > On Oct 28, 2020, at 11:33 AM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi Alexei, Thanks for the hint. Yes, my App.bin image has a bunch of header info > and that's the root cause of the undef ARM instructions. I grabbed a pure ELF image > I built using the integrity compiler and see the following warning on trying to convert ELF to > raw binary on linux. The conversion is not permitted. Do I need some flags ? > > Regards > Ravi > > ravi:~/imx8qm/gcc-arm-9.2-2019.12-x86_64-aarch64-none-elf/bin$ ./aarch64-none-elf-readelf -h ~/imx8qm/imx-mkimage/iMX8QM/example_app.elf > ELF Header: > Magic: 7f 45 4c 46 02 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 > Class: ELF64 > Data: 2's complement, little endian > Version: 1 (current) > OS/ABI: UNIX - System V > ABI Version: 0 > Type: EXEC (Executable file) > Machine: AArch64 > Version: 0x1 > Entry point address: 0xffffff8080200000 > Start of program headers: 64 (bytes into file) > Start of section headers: 866208 (bytes into file) > Flags: 0x0 > Size of this header: 64 (bytes) > Size of program headers: 56 (bytes) > Number of program headers: 49 > Size of section headers: 64 (bytes) > Number of section headers: 78 > Section header string table index: 77 > > ravi:~/imx8qm/gcc-arm-9.2-2019.12-x86_64-aarch64-none-elf/bin$ ./aarch64-none-elf-objcopy -O binary ~/imx8qm/imx-mkimage/iMX8QM/example_app.elf ~/imx8qm/imx-mkimage/iMX8QM/dummy.bin > ./aarch64-none-elf-objcopy: warning: writing section `.example_virtual.text' at huge (ie negative) file offset > ./aarch64-none-elf-objcopy: warning: writing section `.example_virtual.rodata' at huge (ie negative) file offset > ./aarch64-none-elf-objcopy: warning: writing section `.example_virtual.rodata' at huge (ie negative) file offset > ./aarch64-none-elf-objcopy: warning: writing section `.example_virtual.data' at huge (ie negative) file offset > ./aarch64-none-elf-objcopy: warning: writing section `.boottable' at huge (ie negative) file offset > ./aarch64-none-elf-objcopy: warning: writing section `.secinfo' at huge (ie negative) file offset > ./aarch64-none-elf-objcopy:/home/ravi/imx8qm/imx-mkimage/iMX8QM/dummy.bin[.example_virtual.text]: file truncated > > > > > > On Wed, Oct 28, 2020 at 10:09 AM Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > Hi Ravi, > > Is App.bin generated by the tool you use is a "pure" binary or contains some extra entries at the start of the image (e.g. 0x7F 0x45 0x4C 0x46 = "ELF" )? > This might also help: > https://stackoverflow.com/questions/49814470/u-boot-how-to-run-a-standalone… <https://stackoverflow.com/questions/49814470/u-boot-how-to-run-a-standalone…> > > Alexei > From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > Sent: 27 October 2020 22:03 > To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > > Hi Alexei, > No, we don't see the same behavior when launching our hello world app (using Integrity178 rtos) > from U-boot. The only change uboot needed was related to size of the image (i don't have specifics about this change). > But, the hello app runs fine from U-boot printing normally on the imx8qm MEK board. > > I don't see this test app write to the UART launching from bl31.bin at 0x80020000. I can see the > handoff is successful setting a breakpoint at 0x80020000 from my Lauterbach debugger probe. > > The test app is prepared using the GHS tools (elf to bin) using gmemfile.exe and then uboot's mkimage > command: mkimage -A arm64 -O u-boot -T kernel -C none -a 0x80200000 -e 0x80200000 -n "INTEG" -d tmp.bin App.bin. > This generates the App.bin that tftpboots boots fine from any given address on my board. This very same image > does not work booting from bl31.bin. > > Can you suggest what could be going on ? > > Regards > Ravi > > > > > > On Oct 27, 2020, at 8:34 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > > > > Hi Ravi, > > > > It is good to know that you have some progress with your problem. > > > > "I'm seeing some undef instruction, etc, etc." > > Do you see the same behaviour when launching BL33 from U-Boot? > > > > Regards. > > Alexei > > From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > > Sent: 26 October 2020 20:23 > > To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > > > > Hi Alexei, Manish, > > > > I had some better luck with my debugger this time. I can see > > the handoff from bl31.bin (imx-atf) to BL33 entry point (0x80020000) > > in my debugger now. > > > > The problem was in setting up the debugger properly which was > > preventing me from seeing the breakpoint. My bad. > > > > Now, I can see the handoff and execution of instruction of the > > test app. This app is an integrity178 app and I'm seeing some undef > > instruction, etc, etc. Likely specific to the rtos we are using for this app. > > So, I will follow up on that end. Thanks for your debug support and > > helping me experiment with TFA for our product. > > > > Regards > > Ravi > > > > > >> On Oct 26, 2020, at 4:44 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > >> > >> Hi Ravi > >> > >> As you can see in debugger that memory at 0x80020000 address is populated correctly, can you set a breakpoint at it to check if execuion reaches it? If you cannot set a breakpoint I would suggest to add a few assembler instructions in the start of your BL33 entry point to write any specific character, e.g. '!' to debug UART data port and branch to the next instruction in an infinite loop with "b .". Seeing ! char on debug console would prove that control to BL33 image has been passed. > >> > >> Regards. > >> Alexei > >> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >> Sent: 24 October 2020 22:48 > >> To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > >> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > >> > >> Hi Alexei, Manish, > >> > >> I instrumented the imx8QM platform code and saw normal execution with bl31_main() > >> exiting normally with entry point for my BL33 image. But, I haven't seen the handoff > >> work yet. Can you suggest what else I can try to debug this ? I have an image copied > >> at 0x80020000 from what I can see in the debugger. Thanks in advance. > >> > >> Regards > >> Ravi > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 3:43 PM rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> Hi Manish, > >> > >> I have been able to copy the test app (BL33) to entry point address 0x80020000. > >> I confirmed from the Debugger that RAM address 0x80020000 is populated. I had to modify imx-atf > >> makefile target to use the "-data" option as follows: > >> flash_test_8: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin App.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb > >> ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -data App.bin 0x80020000 -data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin > >> The -data option appears to copy the image at the 0x80020000 address. Now, I think we should > >> be able to handoff since PC (program counter) is set : > >> bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); > >> > >> I don't see any serial console output using an image that works when using u-boot. I am not using > >> u-boot for certification reasons. Is there some way I can confirm that the handoff is happening from bl31.bin to > >> the App.bin ? At which BL31 function or module does the handoff occur ? > >> > >> I don't see my HW breakpoint trigger at location location 0x80020000. > >> > >> Regards > >> Ravi > >> > >>> On Oct 23, 2020, at 9:25 AM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: > >>> > >>> Hi Manish, > >>> > >>> Can you please point me to any example or a BL2 module which does the copy to RAM from Flash ? > >>> Maybe I can try to copy the image to 0x80020000 before exiting BL31 from bl31_main(). > >>> > >>> The bl31.bin image boot fine on the target board (imx8qm) from location 0x80000000 > >>> to start with. That copy to 0x80000000 must happen as well. I'm not sure where assuming > >>> its some NXP firmware doing it. Do you know where it could be ? > >>> > >>> Regards > >>> Ravi > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Oct 23, 2020, at 4:46 AM, Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Hi Ravi, > >>>> > >>>> This is normal behaviour when you RESET_TO_BL31. > >>>> The loading of images (from flash to RAM) is part of BL2 code and in case of directly jumping to BL31, you need a mechanism to Load these images at proper location. > >>>> Some platforms have a separate firmware which does this before starting execution of BL31, so that when BL31 hands over to BL33 it gets valid image there. > >>>> > >>>> thanks > >>>> Manish > >>>> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > >>>> Sent: 23 October 2020 05:08 > >>>> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>>; Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> > >>>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > >>>> > >>>> Hi Alexei, Manish, > >>>> > >>>> I repeated the test (below) a few times and see the same result. > >>>> > >>>> (1) Do I need to copy my BL33 (non-secure) image from > >>>> flash.bin some how to RAM 0x80020000 entry point address ? > >>>> Is there any example of how to copy the flash.bin image ? I not sure > >>>> what address or where to copy it from. > >>>> > >>>> (2) Is there some existing debug code that I can use > >>>> to dump/print the ARMv8 RAM address space from inside > >>>> BL31.bin ? > >>>> > >>>> I only found some TF-A tf_log macros in debug.h. > >>>> I would like to dump some memory address contents > >>>> (like 0x80020000) from inside bl31.bin to console just for > >>>> debugging at run-time. > >>>> > >>>>> On Oct 22, 2020, at 4:28 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Hi Alexei, > >>>>> > >>>>> I captured the LOG_LEVEL=50 log (attached putty-ser0.log) from TF-A bl31.bin. > >>>>> I see bl31 boots normally but never hands off to the BL33 normal world image (App.bin) > >>>>> > >>>>> The flash.bin image I am running is constructed using imx-mkimage tool with the following target: > >>>>>> flash_test_7: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin App.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb > >>>>>> ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c -flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -p3 -ap App.bin a53 0x80020000 -data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin > >>>>> > >>>>> I used UUU tool to flash eMMC with flash.bin on the imx8QM MEK board. > >>>>> > >>>>> I inspected RAM using a trace32 debugger SW after using a while (1) to halt the execution at the end of bl31.bin main function (bl31_main()). > >>>>>> diff --git a/bl31/bl31_main.c b/bl31/bl31_main.c > >>>>>> index 92a2027dd..51afb13ea 100644 > >>>>>> --- a/bl31/bl31_main.c > >>>>>> > >>>>>> +++ b/bl31/bl31_main.c > >>>>>> @@ -147,6 +147,11 @@ void bl31_main(void) > >>>>>> * from BL31 > >>>>>> */ > >>>>>> bl31_plat_runtime_setup(); > >>>>>> + > >>>>>> + INFO("BL31: leaving bl31_main\n"); > >>>>>> + INFO("entering while(1)\n"); > >>>>>> + > >>>>>> + while (1) {}; > >>>>>> } > >>>>> It appears that there's no data or image at 0x80020000 just before exiting bl31_main(). See the debugger RAM dump at > >>>>> address 0x80000000 (bl31.bin entry point) and 0x80020000 (BL33 or App.bin normal world app entry point). > >>>>> See the debugger output. > >>>>> > >>>>> When should the flash image provided in flash.bin get copied to the RAM entry point 0x80020000 ? Should bl31.bin > >>>>> copy the image from flash to RAM ? > >>>>> > >>>>> Can you suggest what could be going on ? > >>>>> > >>>>> Regards > >>>>> Ravi > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Oct 22, 2020, at 6:15 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Ravi, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> TFTF image can be built from https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git <https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> You can also try to increase TF-A log level by setting LOG_LEVEL=50 and check if BL33 memory region is mapped correctly. > >>>>>> Before passing control to BL33 and could add code to dump initial memory at BL33 start address to see if the image was loaded with no issues. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Regards. > >>>>>> Alexei > >>>>>> > >>>>>> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > >>>>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 19:59 > >>>>>> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> > >>>>>> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Alexei, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I don't have a DS-5 debugger setup/licensed. I am hoping > >>>>>> on getting something shortly. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Can you point me to the TFTF image that I can use to > >>>>>> test the BL33 handoff ? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Sorry, I'm not familiar at this time. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Regards > >>>>>> Ravi > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Oct 21, 2020, at 12:35 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> You can also use TFTF image as BL33. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Alexei > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> From: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> > >>>>>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 15:26 > >>>>>>> To: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>>; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> > >>>>>>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The best way to figure out whether handing off to BL33 happened or not is by attaching a debugger(DS-5). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? > >>>>>>> - You can use a linux image and device tree to test it > >>>>>>> Refer to plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c -> "brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup()" function > >>>>>>> For linux as BL33 payload please use coder under "ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33" > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > >>>>>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 12:12 > >>>>>>> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> > >>>>>>> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hi Alexei, Manish, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I tried the following patch to plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c: > >>>>>>>> @@ -483,11 +486,15 @@ void bl31_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1, > >>>>>>>> bl32_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = BL32_FDT_OVERLAY_ADDR; > >>>>>>>> #endif > >>>>>>>> #endif > >>>>>>>> + // DEBUG ONLY - FIXME > >>>>>>>> + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); > >>>>>>>> + > >>>>>>>> SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> /* init the first cluster's cci slave interface */ > >>>>>>>> cci_init(PLAT_CCI_BASE, imx8qm_cci_map, PLATFORM_CLUSTER_COUNT); > >>>>>>>> cci_enable_snoop_dvm_reqs(MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1())); > >>>>>>>> + > >>>>>>>> } > >>>>>>> But no luck. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Is there some way to confirm my bl31.bin is handing off to any BL33 (normal world) test image ? > >>>>>>> In other words, is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thanks. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:10 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi Ravi, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> You can take a look at arm_bl31_early_platform_setup() in plat\arm\common\arm_bl31_setup.c: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> /* Populate entry point information for BL33 */ > >>>>>>>> SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, > >>>>>>>> PARAM_EP, > >>>>>>>> VERSION_1, > >>>>>>>> 0); > >>>>>>>> /* > >>>>>>>> * Tell BL31 where the non-trusted software image > >>>>>>>> * is located and the entry state information > >>>>>>>> */ > >>>>>>>> bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> bl33_image_ep_info.spsr = arm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(); > >>>>>>>> SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Regards. > >>>>>>>> Alexei > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 10:57 > >>>>>>>> To: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> > >>>>>>>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi Manish, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The test image should not have any dependency on device tree (dtb?) > >>>>>>>> for console init. > >>>>>>>> I used the NXP provided imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb file which should match > >>>>>>>> the MEK board. > >>>>>>>> I have tested removing "--data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000" (below) > >>>>>>>> as well but no luck. > >>>>>>>> I don't believe PC is getting set to the 0x80020000 entry point. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The test image has validated with u-boot using these tftpboot settings: > >>>>>>>> setenv ipaddr x.x.x.x > >>>>>>>> setenv serverip x.x.x.x > >>>>>>>> tftpboot 0xf0000000 App.bin > >>>>>>>> bootm 0xf0000000 > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I don't see any console output on the screen running it with bl31.bin as below. > >>>>>>>> Is there any debug I can add somewhere to help troubleshoot? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Can you please provide me instructions on where to patch this missing code : > >>>>>>>> "SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0);" > >>>>>>>> I can try it to see if any change in behavior. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Thanks in advance. > >>>>>>>> Regards > >>>>>>>> Ravi > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 5:15 AM Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Hi Ravi, > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Can you please confirm if control reached "test image" ? I guess, yes, as PC has right value. > >>>>>>>> > Also, does your "test image" depends on device tree for console initialization? > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > One thing i see missing in "plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c +352" is bl33 header initialization > >>>>>>>> > SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > thanks > >>>>>>>> > Manish > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > ________________________________ > >>>>>>>> > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>>>> > Sent: 21 October 2020 00:10 > >>>>>>>> > To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > >>>>>>>> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>>>> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Hi Alexei, > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > I built my TF-A (imx-atf) b31.bin image using the RESET_TO_BL31 build option for the i.MX8QM MEK dev kit. > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > make DEBUG=1 RESET_TO_BL31=1 PLAT=imx8qm bl31 > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > I used the imx-mkimage tool to generate a flash.bin (flash bootable image) with the following target to run on the MEK: > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > flash_cortex_a53: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin MyA53Serial.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb > >>>>>>>> > ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -c -p3 -ap MyA53Serial.bin a53 0x80020000 -p4 --data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Here, I allocated bl31.bin to boot from 0x80000000 and a test image at BL33 (normal world) entry point 0x80020000 (both for Cortex-A53). > >>>>>>>> > I can see DEBUG console output from the bl31.bin image but no serial output from my test image I am trying to boot from 0x80020000. > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 3 0x38000000 -- 0x3bffffff > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 4 0x60000000 -- 0x6fffffff > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 5 0x70000000 -- 0x7fffffff > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 6 0x80000000 -- 0xffffffff > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 7 0x400000000 -- 0x43fffffff > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 8 0x880000000 -- 0x97fffffff > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: Non-secure Partitioning Succeeded > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: BL31: v2.2(debug):imx_5.4.24_er3-1-g06450210f-dirty > >>>>>>>> > NOTICE: BL31: Built : 17:33:32, Oct 20 2020 > >>>>>>>> > INFO: bl31_platform_setup is called > >>>>>>>> > INFO: GICv3 with legacy support detected. ARM GICv3 driver initialized in EL3 > >>>>>>>> > INFO: BL31: Initializing runtime services > >>>>>>>> > INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: CPU workaround for 855873 was applied > >>>>>>>> > INFO: BL31: Preparing for EL3 exit to normal world > >>>>>>>> > INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 > >>>>>>>> > INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 > >>>>>>>> > INFO: BL31: DEBUG: image_type is: normal > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Can anyone please suggest what could be the issue here that I don't see the test image console output ? > >>>>>>>> > Note, the same test image works fine using u-boot. > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Regards > >>>>>>>> > Ravi > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:43 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Hi Alexei, > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Thanks for your reply. I have not verified the RESET_TO_BL1 for imx8qm yet. > >>>>>>>> > I will try it out and confirm. And, thanks for this suggestion. > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Regards > >>>>>>>> > Ravi > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:12 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Hi Ravi, > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Regards. > >>>>>>>> > Alexei > >>>>>>>> > ________________________________ > >>>>>>>> > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>>>> > Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 > >>>>>>>> > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > >>>>>>>> > Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Hi, > >>>>>>>> > I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. > >>>>>>>> > I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can > >>>>>>>> > specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. > >>>>>>>> > This is without any security requirements or dependencies. > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch > >>>>>>>> > a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point > >>>>>>>> > 0x80020000 address ? > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > Thanks in advance. > >>>>>>>> > Ravi > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > -- > >>>>>>>> > TF-A mailing list > >>>>>>>> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > >>>>>>>> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > -- > >>>>>>>> > TF-A mailing list > >>>>>>>> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > >>>>>>>> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> TF-A mailing list > >>>>>>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > >>>>>>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> TF-A mailing list > >>>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > >>>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> TF-A mailing list > >>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > >>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Ravi As you can see in debugger that memory at 0x80020000 address is populated correctly, can you set a breakpoint at it to check if execuion reaches it? If you cannot set a breakpoint I would suggest to add a few assembler instructions in the start of your BL33 entry point to write any specific character, e.g. '!' to debug UART data port and branch to the next instruction in an infinite loop with "b .". Seeing ! char on debug console would prove that control to BL33 image has been passed. Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 24 October 2020 22:48 To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Hi Alexei, Manish, I instrumented the imx8QM platform code and saw normal execution with bl31_main() exiting normally with entry point for my BL33 image. But, I haven't seen the handoff work yet. Can you suggest what else I can try to debug this ? I have an image copied at 0x80020000 from what I can see in the debugger. Thanks in advance. Regards Ravi On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 3:43 PM rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com<mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> wrote: Hi Manish, I have been able to copy the test app (BL33) to entry point address 0x80020000. I confirmed from the Debugger that RAM address 0x80020000 is populated. I had to modify imx-atf makefile target to use the "-data" option as follows: flash_test_8: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin App.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -data App.bin 0x80020000 -data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin The -data option appears to copy the image at the 0x80020000 address. Now, I think we should be able to handoff since PC (program counter) is set : bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); I don't see any serial console output using an image that works when using u-boot. I am not using u-boot for certification reasons. Is there some way I can confirm that the handoff is happening from bl31.bin to the App.bin ? At which BL31 function or module does the handoff occur ? I don't see my HW breakpoint trigger at location location 0x80020000. Regards Ravi On Oct 23, 2020, at 9:25 AM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi Manish, Can you please point me to any example or a BL2 module which does the copy to RAM from Flash ? Maybe I can try to copy the image to 0x80020000 before exiting BL31 from bl31_main(). The bl31.bin image boot fine on the target board (imx8qm) from location 0x80000000 to start with. That copy to 0x80000000 must happen as well. I'm not sure where assuming its some NXP firmware doing it. Do you know where it could be ? Regards Ravi On Oct 23, 2020, at 4:46 AM, Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com<mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> wrote: Hi Ravi, This is normal behaviour when you RESET_TO_BL31. The loading of images (from flash to RAM) is part of BL2 code and in case of directly jumping to BL31, you need a mechanism to Load these images at proper location. Some platforms have a separate firmware which does this before starting execution of BL31, so that when BL31 hands over to BL33 it gets valid image there. thanks Manish ________________________________ From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com<mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> Sent: 23 October 2020 05:08 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>>; Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com<mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Hi Alexei, Manish, I repeated the test (below) a few times and see the same result. (1) Do I need to copy my BL33 (non-secure) image from flash.bin some how to RAM 0x80020000 entry point address ? Is there any example of how to copy the flash.bin image ? I not sure what address or where to copy it from. (2) Is there some existing debug code that I can use to dump/print the ARMv8 RAM address space from inside BL31.bin ? I only found some TF-A tf_log macros in debug.h. I would like to dump some memory address contents (like 0x80020000) from inside bl31.bin to console just for debugging at run-time. On Oct 22, 2020, at 4:28 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi Alexei, I captured the LOG_LEVEL=50 log (attached putty-ser0.log<https://www.dropbox.com/s/bi3hngmljksxl3a/putty-ser0.log?dl=0>) from TF-A bl31.bin. I see bl31 boots normally but never hands off to the BL33 normal world image (App.bin) The flash.bin image I am running is constructed using imx-mkimage<https://source.codeaurora.org/external/imx/imx-mkimage/tree/README?h=imx_4.…> tool with the following target: flash_test_7: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin App.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c -flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -p3 -ap App.bin a53 0x80020000 -data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin I used UUU tool to flash eMMC with flash.bin on the imx8QM MEK board. I inspected RAM using a trace32 debugger SW after using a while (1) to halt the execution at the end of bl31.bin main function (bl31_main()). diff --git a/bl31/bl31_main.c b/bl31/bl31_main.c index 92a2027dd..51afb13ea 100644 --- a/bl31/bl31_main.c +++ b/bl31/bl31_main.c @@ -147,6 +147,11 @@ void bl31_main(void) * from BL31 */ bl31_plat_runtime_setup(); + + INFO("BL31: leaving bl31_main\n"); + INFO("entering while(1)\n"); + + while (1) {}; } It appears that there's no data or image at 0x80020000 just before exiting bl31_main(). See the debugger RAM dump at address 0x80000000 (bl31.bin entry point) and 0x80020000 (BL33 or App.bin normal world app entry point). See the debugger output<https://www.dropbox.com/s/revv4qev2ky5djj/ksnip_20201022-153339.png?dl=0>. When should the flash image provided in flash.bin get copied to the RAM entry point 0x80020000 ? Should bl31.bin copy the image from flash to RAM ? Can you suggest what could be going on ? Regards Ravi On Oct 22, 2020, at 6:15 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: Hi Ravi, TFTF image can be built from https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git You can also try to increase TF-A log level by setting LOG_LEVEL=50 and check if BL33 memory region is mapped correctly. Before passing control to BL33 and could add code to dump initial memory at BL33 start address to see if the image was loaded with no issues. Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com<mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> Sent: 21 October 2020 19:59 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com<mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Alexei, I don't have a DS-5 debugger setup/licensed. I am hoping on getting something shortly. Can you point me to the TFTF image that I can use to test the BL33 handoff ? Sorry, I'm not familiar at this time. Regards Ravi On Oct 21, 2020, at 12:35 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: You can also use TFTF image as BL33. Alexei ________________________________ From: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com<mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> Sent: 21 October 2020 15:26 To: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com<mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>>; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader The best way to figure out whether handing off to BL33 happened or not is by attaching a debugger(DS-5). is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? - You can use a linux image and device tree to test it Refer to plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c -> "brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup()" function For linux as BL33 payload please use coder under "ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33" ________________________________ From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com<mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> Sent: 21 October 2020 12:12 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com<mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Hi Alexei, Manish, I tried the following patch to plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c: @@ -483,11 +486,15 @@ void bl31_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1, bl32_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = BL32_FDT_OVERLAY_ADDR; #endif #endif + // DEBUG ONLY - FIXME + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); + SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); /* init the first cluster's cci slave interface */ cci_init(PLAT_CCI_BASE, imx8qm_cci_map, PLATFORM_CLUSTER_COUNT); cci_enable_snoop_dvm_reqs(MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1())); + } But no luck. Is there some way to confirm my bl31.bin is handing off to any BL33 (normal world) test image ? In other words, is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? Thanks. On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:10 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: Hi Ravi, You can take a look at arm_bl31_early_platform_setup() in plat\arm\common\arm_bl31_setup.c: /* Populate entry point information for BL33 */ SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); /* * Tell BL31 where the non-trusted software image * is located and the entry state information */ bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); bl33_image_ep_info.spsr = arm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(); SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: 21 October 2020 10:57 To: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com<mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Hi Manish, The test image should not have any dependency on device tree (dtb?) for console init. I used the NXP provided imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb file which should match the MEK board. I have tested removing "--data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000" (below) as well but no luck. I don't believe PC is getting set to the 0x80020000 entry point. The test image has validated with u-boot using these tftpboot settings: setenv ipaddr x.x.x.x setenv serverip x.x.x.x tftpboot 0xf0000000 App.bin bootm 0xf0000000 I don't see any console output on the screen running it with bl31.bin as below. Is there any debug I can add somewhere to help troubleshoot? Can you please provide me instructions on where to patch this missing code : "SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0);" I can try it to see if any change in behavior. Thanks in advance. Regards Ravi On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 5:15 AM Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com<mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> wrote: > > Hi Ravi, > > Can you please confirm if control reached "test image" ? I guess, yes, as PC has right value. > Also, does your "test image" depends on device tree for console initialization? > > One thing i see missing in "plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c +352" is bl33 header initialization > SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); > > thanks > Manish > > ________________________________ > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > Sent: 21 October 2020 00:10 > To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com<mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > > Hi Alexei, > > I built my TF-A (imx-atf) b31.bin image using the RESET_TO_BL31 build option for the i.MX8QM MEK dev kit. > > make DEBUG=1 RESET_TO_BL31=1 PLAT=imx8qm bl31 > > I used the imx-mkimage tool to generate a flash.bin (flash bootable image) with the following target to run on the MEK: > > flash_cortex_a53: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin MyA53Serial.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb > ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -c -p3 -ap MyA53Serial.bin a53 0x80020000 -p4 --data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin > > Here, I allocated bl31.bin to boot from 0x80000000 and a test image at BL33 (normal world) entry point 0x80020000 (both for Cortex-A53). > I can see DEBUG console output from the bl31.bin image but no serial output from my test image I am trying to boot from 0x80020000. > > NOTICE: Memreg 3 0x38000000 -- 0x3bffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 4 0x60000000 -- 0x6fffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 5 0x70000000 -- 0x7fffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 6 0x80000000 -- 0xffffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 7 0x400000000 -- 0x43fffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 8 0x880000000 -- 0x97fffffff > NOTICE: Non-secure Partitioning Succeeded > NOTICE: BL31: v2.2(debug):imx_5.4.24_er3-1-g06450210f-dirty > NOTICE: BL31: Built : 17:33:32, Oct 20 2020 > INFO: bl31_platform_setup is called > INFO: GICv3 with legacy support detected. ARM GICv3 driver initialized in EL3 > INFO: BL31: Initializing runtime services > INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: CPU workaround for 855873 was applied > INFO: BL31: Preparing for EL3 exit to normal world > INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 > INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 > INFO: BL31: DEBUG: image_type is: normal > > > Can anyone please suggest what could be the issue here that I don't see the test image console output ? > Note, the same test image works fine using u-boot. > > Regards > Ravi > > > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:43 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: > > Hi Alexei, > > Thanks for your reply. I have not verified the RESET_TO_BL1 for imx8qm yet. > I will try it out and confirm. And, thanks for this suggestion. > > Regards > Ravi > > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:12 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > > Hi Ravi, > > Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? > > Regards. > Alexei > ________________________________ > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > > Hi, > I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. > > I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. > I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can > specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. > This is without any security requirements or dependencies. > > Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch > a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point > 0x80020000 address ? > > Thanks in advance. > Ravi > > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Javer, Please see my comments below. [3] Provide platform hooks in tpm_record_measurement function for a platform to actually extend those measurements to a physical TPM right when they are measured. These hooks can be implemented in the next phase #2 of Measured Boot implementation. [4] On platforms that use FCONF, the FW_CONFIG and TB_FW_CONFIG should also be measured since they are images being loaded as well. See arm_bl1_setup.c where these images are loaded but not measured(unless I’m missing something). FW_CONFIG and TB_FW_CONFIG images are loaded by BL1 but not BL2. BL1 calculates BL2 hash and passes the measurement to BL2 in TB_FW_CONFIG. It can also pass FW_CONFIG hash in the same DTB, but it is not clear how own TB_FW_CONFIG hash can be passed in itself. Stuart, do you have opinion on that? Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Javier Almansa Sobrino via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 26 October 2020 10:25 To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case Hi Raghu, Thank you very much for your comments and for your feedback. With regards to the (f)TPM service and as discussed during the last TF-A Tech Forum call, we will discuss internally the need of a new implementation, probably after the next TF-A release, and we will schedule the work (in case we decide to go ahead with it) for the upcoming months. We will announce any decision we make through the mailing list and/or on future TF-A Tech Forum calls . Regarding to changes to TF-A to include extra functionality/APIs/hooks, I guess my colleague Alexei can provide further details about the next features planned for Measured Boot, if any. To finish, I would just like to clarify one of the questions raised on your email: [1] Would be good if the test infrastructure(the TPM TA) can compile in AARCH64. I thought I heard on the tf-a call that there already is a Microsoft FW TPM port for aarch64 already. Please let me know if I misunderstood. * Microsoft has a reference implementation of the TPM 2.0 specification. That implementation is in the form of an architecture agnostic library that implements the specification. Along with the library, there are a couple of example applications for different platforms built around the former, one of them being the fTPM we used for testing. That application was written for AARCH32 and seemed to be outdated (I don't know if it was abandoned, actually), so we updated it and added support for Measured Boot to it. Best regards, Javier -----Original Message----- From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> To: 'Javier Almansa Sobrino' <Javier.AlmansaSobrino(a)arm.com<mailto:'Javier%20Almansa%20Sobrino'%20%3cJavier.AlmansaSobrino(a)arm.com%3e>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: RE: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2020 14:31:10 -0700 Hi Javier, As discussed during the TF-A call, here are some suggestions/feedback that can be incorporated when time permits based on priorities, schedule, resources etc: 1. Would be good if the test infrastructure(the TPM TA) can compile in AARCH64. I thought I heard on the tf-a call that there already is a Microsoft FW TPM port for aarch64 already. Please let me know if I misunderstood. 2. Would be good if the TPM TA works on FF-A as opposed to proprietary OPTEE API’s. 3. Provide platform hooks in tpm_record_measurement function for a platform to actually extend those measurements to a physical TPM right when they are measured. This is a requirement from a security perspective to not wait until the tpm TA is loaded to be able to extend the measurements into a tpm. I understand this can be done in the platform hook that calls tpm_record_measurement but it is convenient place to put tpm related platform hooks. 4. On platforms that use FCONF, the FW_CONFIG and TB_FW_CONFIG should also be measured since they are images being loaded as well. See arm_bl1_setup.c where these images are loaded but not measured(unless I’m missing something). Thanks Raghu From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Javier Almansa Sobrino via TF-A Sent: Friday, October 9, 2020 10:51 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case Hello all, Following up the question raised yesterday during the TF-A Tech Forum with regards to any modification needed on the Linux Kernel to run the test case that I was presenting (Measured Boot + fTPM service), I double checked today and I ran some tests on system and I can confirm that the test case works with the mainline Linux Kernel, with no modification other than enabling the driver on the DTB. The modules involved on the interaction with the fTPM (for this particular example) are: * optee.ko: Allows communication between the REE (unsecure world), the Trusted OS (secure world) and the tee-supplicant (unsecure world). * tpm_ftpm_tee.ko: Module to communicate with a firmware TPM through a char device. This also includes the reference implementation used on the test case. In order to use the fTPM service, the test case makes use of IBM's TPM 2.0 TSS, a user space TSS for TPM 2.0 that uses services provided by the fTPM. I would also like to highlight the following points: A) The test case is only meant to test the ability of the Measured Boot Driver and a TPM 2.0 compliant device to interact with each other. As such, we are not providing an fTPM meant to be used on a production environment. Instead, we are using an existing reference implementation to which we added support for Measured Boot to fulfil our needs for the test and use it as a functional example. The implementation details on how to interact with a particular TPM device (either firmware or discrete) can differ from the ones used on the test case as those details can be platform dependent. For example, we use an OPTEE TA fTPM on this example, but other platforms might use a discrete TPM or an fTPM running on a different Trusted OS. B) As stated on the presentation, we are undergoing internal review of the contributions done for the fTPM service to make it compatible with Measured Boot. Once the review is completed and the changes merged into the TPM repo mainline, we will update the TF-A documentation with instructions on how to download and build all the components to run the tests manually. Please, let me know in case you have any more questions. Best regards, Javier

5 years, 10 months

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Re: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case

by raghu.ncstate＠icloud.com

Hi Javier, As discussed during the TF-A call, here are some suggestions/feedback that can be incorporated when time permits based on priorities, schedule, resources etc: 1. Would be good if the test infrastructure(the TPM TA) can compile in AARCH64. I thought I heard on the tf-a call that there already is a Microsoft FW TPM port for aarch64 already. Please let me know if I misunderstood. 2. Would be good if the TPM TA works on FF-A as opposed to proprietary OPTEE API’s. 3. Provide platform hooks in tpm_record_measurement function for a platform to actually extend those measurements to a physical TPM right when they are measured. This is a requirement from a security perspective to not wait until the tpm TA is loaded to be able to extend the measurements into a tpm. I understand this can be done in the platform hook that calls tpm_record_measurement but it is convenient place to put tpm related platform hooks. 4. On platforms that use FCONF, the FW_CONFIG and TB_FW_CONFIG should also be measured since they are images being loaded as well. See arm_bl1_setup.c where these images are loaded but not measured(unless I’m missing something). Thanks Raghu From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Javier Almansa Sobrino via TF-A Sent: Friday, October 9, 2020 10:51 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case Hello all, Following up the question raised yesterday during the TF-A Tech Forum with regards to any modification needed on the Linux Kernel to run the test case that I was presenting (Measured Boot + fTPM service), I double checked today and I ran some tests on system and I can confirm that the test case works with the mainline Linux Kernel, with no modification other than enabling the driver on the DTB. The modules involved on the interaction with the fTPM (for this particular example) are: * optee.ko: Allows communication between the REE (unsecure world), the Trusted OS (secure world) and the tee-supplicant (unsecure world). * tpm_ftpm_tee.ko: Module to communicate with a firmware TPM through a char device. This also includes the reference implementation used on the test case. In order to use the fTPM service, the test case makes use of IBM's TPM 2.0 TSS, a user space TSS for TPM 2.0 that uses services provided by the fTPM. I would also like to highlight the following points: A) The test case is only meant to test the ability of the Measured Boot Driver and a TPM 2.0 compliant device to interact with each other. As such, we are not providing an fTPM meant to be used on a production environment. Instead, we are using an existing reference implementation to which we added support for Measured Boot to fulfil our needs for the test and use it as a functional example. The implementation details on how to interact with a particular TPM device (either firmware or discrete) can differ from the ones used on the test case as those details can be platform dependent. For example, we use an OPTEE TA fTPM on this example, but other platforms might use a discrete TPM or an fTPM running on a different Trusted OS. B) As stated on the presentation, we are undergoing internal review of the contributions done for the fTPM service to make it compatible with Measured Boot. Once the review is completed and the changes merged into the TPM repo mainline, we will update the TF-A documentation with instructions on how to download and build all the components to run the tests manually. Please, let me know in case you have any more questions. Best regards, Javier

5 years, 10 months

2
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Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader

by rkohli2000 gmail

Hi Manish, I have been able to copy the test app (BL33) to entry point address 0x80020000. I confirmed from the Debugger that RAM address 0x80020000 is populated. I had to modify imx-atf makefile target to use the "-data" option as follows: flash_test_8: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin App.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -data App.bin 0x80020000 -data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin The -data option appears to copy the image at the 0x80020000 address. Now, I think we should be able to handoff since PC (program counter) is set : bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); I don't see any serial console output using an image that works when using u-boot. I am not using u-boot for certification reasons. Is there some way I can confirm that the handoff is happening from bl31.bin to the App.bin ? At which BL31 function or module does the handoff occur ? I don't see my HW breakpoint trigger at location location 0x80020000. Regards Ravi > On Oct 23, 2020, at 9:25 AM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi Manish, > > Can you please point me to any example or a BL2 module which does the copy to RAM from Flash ? > Maybe I can try to copy the image to 0x80020000 before exiting BL31 from bl31_main(). > > The bl31.bin image boot fine on the target board (imx8qm) from location 0x80000000 > to start with. That copy to 0x80000000 must happen as well. I'm not sure where assuming > its some NXP firmware doing it. Do you know where it could be ? > > Regards > Ravi > > >> On Oct 23, 2020, at 4:46 AM, Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> wrote: >> >> Hi Ravi, >> >> This is normal behaviour when you RESET_TO_BL31. >> The loading of images (from flash to RAM) is part of BL2 code and in case of directly jumping to BL31, you need a mechanism to Load these images at proper location. >> Some platforms have a separate firmware which does this before starting execution of BL31, so that when BL31 hands over to BL33 it gets valid image there. >> >> thanks >> Manish >> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >> Sent: 23 October 2020 05:08 >> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>>; Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> >> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >> >> Hi Alexei, Manish, >> >> I repeated the test (below) a few times and see the same result. >> >> (1) Do I need to copy my BL33 (non-secure) image from >> flash.bin some how to RAM 0x80020000 entry point address ? >> Is there any example of how to copy the flash.bin image ? I not sure >> what address or where to copy it from. >> >> (2) Is there some existing debug code that I can use >> to dump/print the ARMv8 RAM address space from inside >> BL31.bin ? >> >> I only found some TF-A tf_log macros in debug.h. >> I would like to dump some memory address contents >> (like 0x80020000) from inside bl31.bin to console just for >> debugging at run-time. >> >>> On Oct 22, 2020, at 4:28 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Alexei, >>> >>> I captured the LOG_LEVEL=50 log (attached putty-ser0.log <https://www.dropbox.com/s/bi3hngmljksxl3a/putty-ser0.log?dl=0>) from TF-A bl31.bin. >>> I see bl31 boots normally but never hands off to the BL33 normal world image (App.bin) >>> >>> The flash.bin image I am running is constructed using imx-mkimage <https://source.codeaurora.org/external/imx/imx-mkimage/tree/README?h=imx_4.…> tool with the following target: >>>> flash_test_7: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin App.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb >>> >>>> ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c -flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -p3 -ap App.bin a53 0x80020000 -data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin >>> >>> >>> I used UUU tool to flash eMMC with flash.bin on the imx8QM MEK board. >>> >>> I inspected RAM using a trace32 debugger SW after using a while (1) to halt the execution at the end of bl31.bin main function (bl31_main()). >>>> diff --git a/bl31/bl31_main.c b/bl31/bl31_main.c >>> >>>> index 92a2027dd..51afb13ea 100644 >>> >>>> --- a/bl31/bl31_main.c >>> >>>> >>> >>>> +++ b/bl31/bl31_main.c >>> >>>> @@ -147,6 +147,11 @@ void bl31_main(void) >>> >>>> * from BL31 >>> >>>> */ >>> >>>> bl31_plat_runtime_setup(); >>> >>>> + >>> >>>> + INFO("BL31: leaving bl31_main\n"); >>> >>>> + INFO("entering while(1)\n"); >>> >>>> + >>> >>>> + while (1) {}; >>> >>>> } >>> >>> It appears that there's no data or image at 0x80020000 just before exiting bl31_main(). See the debugger RAM dump at >>> address 0x80000000 (bl31.bin entry point) and 0x80020000 (BL33 or App.bin normal world app entry point). >>> See the debugger output <https://www.dropbox.com/s/revv4qev2ky5djj/ksnip_20201022-153339.png?dl=0>. >>> >>> When should the flash image provided in flash.bin get copied to the RAM entry point 0x80020000 ? Should bl31.bin >>> copy the image from flash to RAM ? >>> >>> Can you suggest what could be going on ? >>> >>> Regards >>> Ravi >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Oct 22, 2020, at 6:15 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Ravi, >>>> >>>> TFTF image can be built from https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git <https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git> >>>> >>>> You can also try to increase TF-A log level by setting LOG_LEVEL=50 and check if BL33 memory region is mapped correctly. >>>> Before passing control to BL33 and could add code to dump initial memory at BL33 start address to see if the image was loaded with no issues. >>>> >>>> Regards. >>>> Alexei >>>> >>>> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 19:59 >>>> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> >>>> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>> >>>> Alexei, >>>> >>>> I don't have a DS-5 debugger setup/licensed. I am hoping >>>> on getting something shortly. >>>> >>>> Can you point me to the TFTF image that I can use to >>>> test the BL33 handoff ? >>>> >>>> Sorry, I'm not familiar at this time. >>>> >>>> Regards >>>> Ravi >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Oct 21, 2020, at 12:35 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> You can also use TFTF image as BL33. >>>>> >>>>> Alexei >>>>> >>>>> From: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> >>>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 15:26 >>>>> To: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>>; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> >>>>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>>> >>>>> The best way to figure out whether handing off to BL33 happened or not is by attaching a debugger(DS-5). >>>>> >>>>> is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? >>>>> - You can use a linux image and device tree to test it >>>>> Refer to plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c -> "brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup()" function >>>>> For linux as BL33 payload please use coder under "ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33" >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >>>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 12:12 >>>>> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> >>>>> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>>> >>>>> Hi Alexei, Manish, >>>>> >>>>> I tried the following patch to plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c: >>>>>> @@ -483,11 +486,15 @@ void bl31_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1, >>>>>> bl32_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = BL32_FDT_OVERLAY_ADDR; >>>>>> #endif >>>>>> #endif >>>>>> + // DEBUG ONLY - FIXME >>>>>> + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); >>>>>> + >>>>>> SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); >>>>>> >>>>>> /* init the first cluster's cci slave interface */ >>>>>> cci_init(PLAT_CCI_BASE, imx8qm_cci_map, PLATFORM_CLUSTER_COUNT); >>>>>> cci_enable_snoop_dvm_reqs(MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1())); >>>>>> + >>>>>> } >>>>> But no luck. >>>>> >>>>> Is there some way to confirm my bl31.bin is handing off to any BL33 (normal world) test image ? >>>>> In other words, is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? >>>>>> >>>>> Thanks. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:10 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Ravi, >>>>>> >>>>>> You can take a look at arm_bl31_early_platform_setup() in plat\arm\common\arm_bl31_setup.c: >>>>>> >>>>>> /* Populate entry point information for BL33 */ >>>>>> SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, >>>>>> PARAM_EP, >>>>>> VERSION_1, >>>>>> 0); >>>>>> /* >>>>>> * Tell BL31 where the non-trusted software image >>>>>> * is located and the entry state information >>>>>> */ >>>>>> bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); >>>>>> >>>>>> bl33_image_ep_info.spsr = arm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(); >>>>>> SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); >>>>>> >>>>>> Regards. >>>>>> Alexei >>>>>> >>>>>> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 10:57 >>>>>> To: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> >>>>>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Manish, >>>>>> >>>>>> The test image should not have any dependency on device tree (dtb?) >>>>>> for console init. >>>>>> I used the NXP provided imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb file which should match >>>>>> the MEK board. >>>>>> I have tested removing "--data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000" (below) >>>>>> as well but no luck. >>>>>> I don't believe PC is getting set to the 0x80020000 entry point. >>>>>> >>>>>> The test image has validated with u-boot using these tftpboot settings: >>>>>> setenv ipaddr x.x.x.x >>>>>> setenv serverip x.x.x.x >>>>>> tftpboot 0xf0000000 App.bin >>>>>> bootm 0xf0000000 >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't see any console output on the screen running it with bl31.bin as below. >>>>>> Is there any debug I can add somewhere to help troubleshoot? >>>>>> >>>>>> Can you please provide me instructions on where to patch this missing code : >>>>>> "SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0);" >>>>>> I can try it to see if any change in behavior. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks in advance. >>>>>> Regards >>>>>> Ravi >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 5:15 AM Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> wrote: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Hi Ravi, >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Can you please confirm if control reached "test image" ? I guess, yes, as PC has right value. >>>>>> > Also, does your "test image" depends on device tree for console initialization? >>>>>> > >>>>>> > One thing i see missing in "plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c +352" is bl33 header initialization >>>>>> > SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); >>>>>> > >>>>>> > thanks >>>>>> > Manish >>>>>> > >>>>>> > ________________________________ >>>>>> > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>>>> > Sent: 21 October 2020 00:10 >>>>>> > To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >>>>>> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>>>> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Hi Alexei, >>>>>> > >>>>>> > I built my TF-A (imx-atf) b31.bin image using the RESET_TO_BL31 build option for the i.MX8QM MEK dev kit. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > make DEBUG=1 RESET_TO_BL31=1 PLAT=imx8qm bl31 >>>>>> > >>>>>> > I used the imx-mkimage tool to generate a flash.bin (flash bootable image) with the following target to run on the MEK: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > flash_cortex_a53: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin MyA53Serial.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb >>>>>> > ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -c -p3 -ap MyA53Serial.bin a53 0x80020000 -p4 --data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Here, I allocated bl31.bin to boot from 0x80000000 and a test image at BL33 (normal world) entry point 0x80020000 (both for Cortex-A53). >>>>>> > I can see DEBUG console output from the bl31.bin image but no serial output from my test image I am trying to boot from 0x80020000. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 3 0x38000000 -- 0x3bffffff >>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 4 0x60000000 -- 0x6fffffff >>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 5 0x70000000 -- 0x7fffffff >>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 6 0x80000000 -- 0xffffffff >>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 7 0x400000000 -- 0x43fffffff >>>>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 8 0x880000000 -- 0x97fffffff >>>>>> > NOTICE: Non-secure Partitioning Succeeded >>>>>> > NOTICE: BL31: v2.2(debug):imx_5.4.24_er3-1-g06450210f-dirty >>>>>> > NOTICE: BL31: Built : 17:33:32, Oct 20 2020 >>>>>> > INFO: bl31_platform_setup is called >>>>>> > INFO: GICv3 with legacy support detected. ARM GICv3 driver initialized in EL3 >>>>>> > INFO: BL31: Initializing runtime services >>>>>> > INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: CPU workaround for 855873 was applied >>>>>> > INFO: BL31: Preparing for EL3 exit to normal world >>>>>> > INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 >>>>>> > INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 >>>>>> > INFO: BL31: DEBUG: image_type is: normal >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Can anyone please suggest what could be the issue here that I don't see the test image console output ? >>>>>> > Note, the same test image works fine using u-boot. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Regards >>>>>> > Ravi >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:43 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Hi Alexei, >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Thanks for your reply. I have not verified the RESET_TO_BL1 for imx8qm yet. >>>>>> > I will try it out and confirm. And, thanks for this suggestion. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Regards >>>>>> > Ravi >>>>>> > >>>>>> > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:12 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Hi Ravi, >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Regards. >>>>>> > Alexei >>>>>> > ________________________________ >>>>>> > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>>>> > Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 >>>>>> > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>>>> > Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Hi, >>>>>> > I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. >>>>>> > I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can >>>>>> > specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. >>>>>> > This is without any security requirements or dependencies. >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch >>>>>> > a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point >>>>>> > 0x80020000 address ? >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Thanks in advance. >>>>>> > Ravi >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > -- >>>>>> > TF-A mailing list >>>>>> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>>>>> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > -- >>>>>> > TF-A mailing list >>>>>> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>>>>> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- >>>>>> TF-A mailing list >>>>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>>>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> >>> >>> -- >>> TF-A mailing list >>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader

by rkohli2000 gmail

Hi Alexei, Manish, I repeated the test (below) a few times and see the same result. (1) Do I need to copy my BL33 (non-secure) image from flash.bin some how to RAM 0x80020000 entry point address ? Is there any example of how to copy the flash.bin image ? I not sure what address or where to copy it from. (2) Is there some existing debug code that I can use to dump/print the ARMv8 RAM address space from inside BL31.bin ? I only found some TF-A tf_log macros in debug.h. I would like to dump some memory address contents (like 0x80020000) from inside bl31.bin to console just for debugging at run-time. > On Oct 22, 2020, at 4:28 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi Alexei, > > I captured the LOG_LEVEL=50 log (attached putty-ser0.log <https://www.dropbox.com/s/bi3hngmljksxl3a/putty-ser0.log?dl=0>) from TF-A bl31.bin. > I see bl31 boots normally but never hands off to the BL33 normal world image (App.bin) > > The flash.bin image I am running is constructed using imx-mkimage <https://source.codeaurora.org/external/imx/imx-mkimage/tree/README?h=imx_4.…> tool with the following target: >> flash_test_7: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin App.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb > >> ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c -flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -p3 -ap App.bin a53 0x80020000 -data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin > > > I used UUU tool to flash eMMC with flash.bin on the imx8QM MEK board. > > I inspected RAM using a trace32 debugger SW after using a while (1) to halt the execution at the end of bl31.bin main function (bl31_main()). >> diff --git a/bl31/bl31_main.c b/bl31/bl31_main.c > >> index 92a2027dd..51afb13ea 100644 > >> --- a/bl31/bl31_main.c > >> > >> +++ b/bl31/bl31_main.c > >> @@ -147,6 +147,11 @@ void bl31_main(void) > >> * from BL31 > >> */ > >> bl31_plat_runtime_setup(); > >> + > >> + INFO("BL31: leaving bl31_main\n"); > >> + INFO("entering while(1)\n"); > >> + > >> + while (1) {}; > >> } > > It appears that there's no data or image at 0x80020000 just before exiting bl31_main(). See the debugger RAM dump at > address 0x80000000 (bl31.bin entry point) and 0x80020000 (BL33 or App.bin normal world app entry point). > See the debugger output <https://www.dropbox.com/s/revv4qev2ky5djj/ksnip_20201022-153339.png?dl=0>. > > When should the flash image provided in flash.bin get copied to the RAM entry point 0x80020000 ? Should bl31.bin > copy the image from flash to RAM ? > > Can you suggest what could be going on ? > > Regards > Ravi > > > >> On Oct 22, 2020, at 6:15 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >> >> Hi Ravi, >> >> TFTF image can be built from https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git <https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git> >> >> You can also try to increase TF-A log level by setting LOG_LEVEL=50 and check if BL33 memory region is mapped correctly. >> Before passing control to BL33 and could add code to dump initial memory at BL33 start address to see if the image was loaded with no issues. >> >> Regards. >> Alexei >> >> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >> Sent: 21 October 2020 19:59 >> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> >> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >> >> Alexei, >> >> I don't have a DS-5 debugger setup/licensed. I am hoping >> on getting something shortly. >> >> Can you point me to the TFTF image that I can use to >> test the BL33 handoff ? >> >> Sorry, I'm not familiar at this time. >> >> Regards >> Ravi >> >> >>> On Oct 21, 2020, at 12:35 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>> >>> You can also use TFTF image as BL33. >>> >>> Alexei >>> >>> From: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> >>> Sent: 21 October 2020 15:26 >>> To: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>>; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> >>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>> >>> The best way to figure out whether handing off to BL33 happened or not is by attaching a debugger(DS-5). >>> >>> is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? >>> - You can use a linux image and device tree to test it >>> Refer to plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c -> "brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup()" function >>> For linux as BL33 payload please use coder under "ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33" >>> >>> >>> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >>> Sent: 21 October 2020 12:12 >>> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> >>> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>> >>> Hi Alexei, Manish, >>> >>> I tried the following patch to plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c: >>>> @@ -483,11 +486,15 @@ void bl31_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1, >>>> bl32_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = BL32_FDT_OVERLAY_ADDR; >>>> #endif >>>> #endif >>>> + // DEBUG ONLY - FIXME >>>> + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); >>>> + >>>> SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); >>>> >>>> /* init the first cluster's cci slave interface */ >>>> cci_init(PLAT_CCI_BASE, imx8qm_cci_map, PLATFORM_CLUSTER_COUNT); >>>> cci_enable_snoop_dvm_reqs(MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1())); >>>> + >>>> } >>> But no luck. >>> >>> Is there some way to confirm my bl31.bin is handing off to any BL33 (normal world) test image ? >>> In other words, is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? >>>> >>> Thanks. >>> >>> >>>> On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:10 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Ravi, >>>> >>>> You can take a look at arm_bl31_early_platform_setup() in plat\arm\common\arm_bl31_setup.c: >>>> >>>> /* Populate entry point information for BL33 */ >>>> SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, >>>> PARAM_EP, >>>> VERSION_1, >>>> 0); >>>> /* >>>> * Tell BL31 where the non-trusted software image >>>> * is located and the entry state information >>>> */ >>>> bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); >>>> >>>> bl33_image_ep_info.spsr = arm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(); >>>> SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); >>>> >>>> Regards. >>>> Alexei >>>> >>>> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>> Sent: 21 October 2020 10:57 >>>> To: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> >>>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>> >>>> Hi Manish, >>>> >>>> The test image should not have any dependency on device tree (dtb?) >>>> for console init. >>>> I used the NXP provided imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb file which should match >>>> the MEK board. >>>> I have tested removing "--data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000" (below) >>>> as well but no luck. >>>> I don't believe PC is getting set to the 0x80020000 entry point. >>>> >>>> The test image has validated with u-boot using these tftpboot settings: >>>> setenv ipaddr x.x.x.x >>>> setenv serverip x.x.x.x >>>> tftpboot 0xf0000000 App.bin >>>> bootm 0xf0000000 >>>> >>>> I don't see any console output on the screen running it with bl31.bin as below. >>>> Is there any debug I can add somewhere to help troubleshoot? >>>> >>>> Can you please provide me instructions on where to patch this missing code : >>>> "SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0);" >>>> I can try it to see if any change in behavior. >>>> >>>> Thanks in advance. >>>> Regards >>>> Ravi >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 5:15 AM Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> wrote: >>>> > >>>> > Hi Ravi, >>>> > >>>> > Can you please confirm if control reached "test image" ? I guess, yes, as PC has right value. >>>> > Also, does your "test image" depends on device tree for console initialization? >>>> > >>>> > One thing i see missing in "plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c +352" is bl33 header initialization >>>> > SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); >>>> > >>>> > thanks >>>> > Manish >>>> > >>>> > ________________________________ >>>> > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>> > Sent: 21 October 2020 00:10 >>>> > To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >>>> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>> > >>>> > Hi Alexei, >>>> > >>>> > I built my TF-A (imx-atf) b31.bin image using the RESET_TO_BL31 build option for the i.MX8QM MEK dev kit. >>>> > >>>> > make DEBUG=1 RESET_TO_BL31=1 PLAT=imx8qm bl31 >>>> > >>>> > I used the imx-mkimage tool to generate a flash.bin (flash bootable image) with the following target to run on the MEK: >>>> > >>>> > flash_cortex_a53: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin MyA53Serial.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb >>>> > ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -c -p3 -ap MyA53Serial.bin a53 0x80020000 -p4 --data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin >>>> > >>>> > Here, I allocated bl31.bin to boot from 0x80000000 and a test image at BL33 (normal world) entry point 0x80020000 (both for Cortex-A53). >>>> > I can see DEBUG console output from the bl31.bin image but no serial output from my test image I am trying to boot from 0x80020000. >>>> > >>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 3 0x38000000 -- 0x3bffffff >>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 4 0x60000000 -- 0x6fffffff >>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 5 0x70000000 -- 0x7fffffff >>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 6 0x80000000 -- 0xffffffff >>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 7 0x400000000 -- 0x43fffffff >>>> > NOTICE: Memreg 8 0x880000000 -- 0x97fffffff >>>> > NOTICE: Non-secure Partitioning Succeeded >>>> > NOTICE: BL31: v2.2(debug):imx_5.4.24_er3-1-g06450210f-dirty >>>> > NOTICE: BL31: Built : 17:33:32, Oct 20 2020 >>>> > INFO: bl31_platform_setup is called >>>> > INFO: GICv3 with legacy support detected. ARM GICv3 driver initialized in EL3 >>>> > INFO: BL31: Initializing runtime services >>>> > INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: CPU workaround for 855873 was applied >>>> > INFO: BL31: Preparing for EL3 exit to normal world >>>> > INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 >>>> > INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 >>>> > INFO: BL31: DEBUG: image_type is: normal >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > Can anyone please suggest what could be the issue here that I don't see the test image console output ? >>>> > Note, the same test image works fine using u-boot. >>>> > >>>> > Regards >>>> > Ravi >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:43 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: >>>> > >>>> > Hi Alexei, >>>> > >>>> > Thanks for your reply. I have not verified the RESET_TO_BL1 for imx8qm yet. >>>> > I will try it out and confirm. And, thanks for this suggestion. >>>> > >>>> > Regards >>>> > Ravi >>>> > >>>> > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:12 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>>> > >>>> > Hi Ravi, >>>> > >>>> > Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? >>>> > >>>> > Regards. >>>> > Alexei >>>> > ________________________________ >>>> > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>> > Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 >>>> > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>>> > Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>>> > >>>> > Hi, >>>> > I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. >>>> > >>>> > I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. >>>> > I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can >>>> > specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. >>>> > This is without any security requirements or dependencies. >>>> > >>>> > Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch >>>> > a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point >>>> > 0x80020000 address ? >>>> > >>>> > Thanks in advance. >>>> > Ravi >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > -- >>>> > TF-A mailing list >>>> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>>> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > -- >>>> > TF-A mailing list >>>> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>>> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- >>>> TF-A mailing list >>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

2
2
0 0

Fwd: BL31 as bootloader

by rkohli2000 gmail

Hi Alexei, I captured the LOG_LEVEL=50 log (attached putty-ser0.log <https://www.dropbox.com/s/bi3hngmljksxl3a/putty-ser0.log?dl=0>) from TF-A bl31.bin. I see bl31 boots normally but never hands off to the BL33 normal world image (App.bin) The flash.bin image I am running is constructed using imx-mkimage <https://source.codeaurora.org/external/imx/imx-mkimage/tree/README?h=imx_4.…> tool with the following target: > flash_test_7: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin App.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb > ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c -flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -p3 -ap App.bin a53 0x80020000 -data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin I used UUU tool to flash eMMC with flash.bin on the imx8QM MEK board. I inspected RAM using a trace32 debugger SW after using a while (1) to halt the execution at the end of bl31.bin main function (bl31_main()). > diff --git a/bl31/bl31_main.c b/bl31/bl31_main.c > index 92a2027dd..51afb13ea 100644 > --- a/bl31/bl31_main.c > > +++ b/bl31/bl31_main.c > @@ -147,6 +147,11 @@ void bl31_main(void) > * from BL31 > */ > bl31_plat_runtime_setup(); > + > + INFO("BL31: leaving bl31_main\n"); > + INFO("entering while(1)\n"); > + > + while (1) {}; > } It appears that there's no data or image at 0x80020000 just before exiting bl31_main(). See the debugger RAM dump at address 0x80000000 (bl31.bin entry point) and 0x80020000 (BL33 or App.bin normal world app entry point). See the debugger output <https://www.dropbox.com/s/revv4qev2ky5djj/ksnip_20201022-153339.png?dl=0>. When should the flash image provided in flash.bin get copied to the RAM entry point 0x80020000 ? Should bl31.bin copy the image from flash to RAM ? Can you suggest what could be going on ? Regards Ravi > On Oct 22, 2020, at 6:15 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: > > Hi Ravi, > > TFTF image can be built from https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git <https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/tf-a-tests.git> > > You can also try to increase TF-A log level by setting LOG_LEVEL=50 and check if BL33 memory region is mapped correctly. > Before passing control to BL33 and could add code to dump initial memory at BL33 start address to see if the image was loaded with no issues. > > Regards. > Alexei > > From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> > Sent: 21 October 2020 19:59 > To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> > Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > > Alexei, > > I don't have a DS-5 debugger setup/licensed. I am hoping > on getting something shortly. > > Can you point me to the TFTF image that I can use to > test the BL33 handoff ? > > Sorry, I'm not familiar at this time. > > Regards > Ravi > > >> On Oct 21, 2020, at 12:35 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >> >> You can also use TFTF image as BL33. >> >> Alexei >> >> From: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> >> Sent: 21 October 2020 15:26 >> To: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>>; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> >> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >> >> The best way to figure out whether handing off to BL33 happened or not is by attaching a debugger(DS-5). >> >> is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? >> - You can use a linux image and device tree to test it >> Refer to plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c -> "brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup()" function >> For linux as BL33 payload please use coder under "ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33" >> >> >> From: rkohli2000 gmail <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >> Sent: 21 October 2020 12:12 >> To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> >> Cc: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >> >> Hi Alexei, Manish, >> >> I tried the following patch to plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c: >>> @@ -483,11 +486,15 @@ void bl31_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1, >>> bl32_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = BL32_FDT_OVERLAY_ADDR; >>> #endif >>> #endif >>> + // DEBUG ONLY - FIXME >>> + SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); >>> + >>> SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); >>> >>> /* init the first cluster's cci slave interface */ >>> cci_init(PLAT_CCI_BASE, imx8qm_cci_map, PLATFORM_CLUSTER_COUNT); >>> cci_enable_snoop_dvm_reqs(MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1())); >>> + >>> } >> But no luck. >> >> Is there some way to confirm my bl31.bin is handing off to any BL33 (normal world) test image ? >> In other words, is there any other A53 (or A72) test image (hello world like) I can validate with to further debug ? >>> >> Thanks. >> >> >>> On Oct 21, 2020, at 6:10 AM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Ravi, >>> >>> You can take a look at arm_bl31_early_platform_setup() in plat\arm\common\arm_bl31_setup.c: >>> >>> /* Populate entry point information for BL33 */ >>> SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, >>> PARAM_EP, >>> VERSION_1, >>> 0); >>> /* >>> * Tell BL31 where the non-trusted software image >>> * is located and the entry state information >>> */ >>> bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); >>> >>> bl33_image_ep_info.spsr = arm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(); >>> SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); >>> >>> Regards. >>> Alexei >>> >>> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>> Sent: 21 October 2020 10:57 >>> To: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> >>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>> >>> Hi Manish, >>> >>> The test image should not have any dependency on device tree (dtb?) >>> for console init. >>> I used the NXP provided imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb file which should match >>> the MEK board. >>> I have tested removing "--data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000" (below) >>> as well but no luck. >>> I don't believe PC is getting set to the 0x80020000 entry point. >>> >>> The test image has validated with u-boot using these tftpboot settings: >>> setenv ipaddr x.x.x.x >>> setenv serverip x.x.x.x >>> tftpboot 0xf0000000 App.bin >>> bootm 0xf0000000 >>> >>> I don't see any console output on the screen running it with bl31.bin as below. >>> Is there any debug I can add somewhere to help troubleshoot? >>> >>> Can you please provide me instructions on where to patch this missing code : >>> "SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0);" >>> I can try it to see if any change in behavior. >>> >>> Thanks in advance. >>> Regards >>> Ravi >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 5:15 AM Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com <mailto:Manish.Pandey2@arm.com>> wrote: >>> > >>> > Hi Ravi, >>> > >>> > Can you please confirm if control reached "test image" ? I guess, yes, as PC has right value. >>> > Also, does your "test image" depends on device tree for console initialization? >>> > >>> > One thing i see missing in "plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c +352" is bl33 header initialization >>> > SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); >>> > >>> > thanks >>> > Manish >>> > >>> > ________________________________ >>> > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>> > Sent: 21 October 2020 00:10 >>> > To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com <mailto:rkohli2000@gmail.com>> >>> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>> > >>> > Hi Alexei, >>> > >>> > I built my TF-A (imx-atf) b31.bin image using the RESET_TO_BL31 build option for the i.MX8QM MEK dev kit. >>> > >>> > make DEBUG=1 RESET_TO_BL31=1 PLAT=imx8qm bl31 >>> > >>> > I used the imx-mkimage tool to generate a flash.bin (flash bootable image) with the following target to run on the MEK: >>> > >>> > flash_cortex_a53: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin MyA53Serial.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb >>> > ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -c -p3 -ap MyA53Serial.bin a53 0x80020000 -p4 --data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin >>> > >>> > Here, I allocated bl31.bin to boot from 0x80000000 and a test image at BL33 (normal world) entry point 0x80020000 (both for Cortex-A53). >>> > I can see DEBUG console output from the bl31.bin image but no serial output from my test image I am trying to boot from 0x80020000. >>> > >>> > NOTICE: Memreg 3 0x38000000 -- 0x3bffffff >>> > NOTICE: Memreg 4 0x60000000 -- 0x6fffffff >>> > NOTICE: Memreg 5 0x70000000 -- 0x7fffffff >>> > NOTICE: Memreg 6 0x80000000 -- 0xffffffff >>> > NOTICE: Memreg 7 0x400000000 -- 0x43fffffff >>> > NOTICE: Memreg 8 0x880000000 -- 0x97fffffff >>> > NOTICE: Non-secure Partitioning Succeeded >>> > NOTICE: BL31: v2.2(debug):imx_5.4.24_er3-1-g06450210f-dirty >>> > NOTICE: BL31: Built : 17:33:32, Oct 20 2020 >>> > INFO: bl31_platform_setup is called >>> > INFO: GICv3 with legacy support detected. ARM GICv3 driver initialized in EL3 >>> > INFO: BL31: Initializing runtime services >>> > INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: CPU workaround for 855873 was applied >>> > INFO: BL31: Preparing for EL3 exit to normal world >>> > INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 >>> > INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 >>> > INFO: BL31: DEBUG: image_type is: normal >>> > >>> > >>> > Can anyone please suggest what could be the issue here that I don't see the test image console output ? >>> > Note, the same test image works fine using u-boot. >>> > >>> > Regards >>> > Ravi >>> > >>> > >>> > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:43 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: >>> > >>> > Hi Alexei, >>> > >>> > Thanks for your reply. I have not verified the RESET_TO_BL1 for imx8qm yet. >>> > I will try it out and confirm. And, thanks for this suggestion. >>> > >>> > Regards >>> > Ravi >>> > >>> > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:12 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >>> > >>> > Hi Ravi, >>> > >>> > Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? >>> > >>> > Regards. >>> > Alexei >>> > ________________________________ >>> > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>> > Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 >>> > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >>> > Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >>> > >>> > Hi, >>> > I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. >>> > >>> > I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. >>> > I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can >>> > specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. >>> > This is without any security requirements or dependencies. >>> > >>> > Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch >>> > a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point >>> > 0x80020000 address ? >>> > >>> > Thanks in advance. >>> > Ravi >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > -- >>> > TF-A mailing list >>> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> >>> > >>> > >>> > -- >>> > TF-A mailing list >>> > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>> > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> >>> > >>> > >>> -- >>> TF-A mailing list >>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a>

5 years, 11 months

1
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Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Ravi, You can take a look at arm_bl31_early_platform_setup() in plat\arm\common\arm_bl31_setup.c: /* Populate entry point information for BL33 */ SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); /* * Tell BL31 where the non-trusted software image * is located and the entry state information */ bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(); bl33_image_ep_info.spsr = arm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(); SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE); Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 21 October 2020 10:57 To: Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Hi Manish, The test image should not have any dependency on device tree (dtb?) for console init. I used the NXP provided imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb file which should match the MEK board. I have tested removing "--data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000" (below) as well but no luck. I don't believe PC is getting set to the 0x80020000 entry point. The test image has validated with u-boot using these tftpboot settings: setenv ipaddr x.x.x.x setenv serverip x.x.x.x tftpboot 0xf0000000 App.bin bootm 0xf0000000 I don't see any console output on the screen running it with bl31.bin as below. Is there any debug I can add somewhere to help troubleshoot? Can you please provide me instructions on where to patch this missing code : "SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0);" I can try it to see if any change in behavior. Thanks in advance. Regards Ravi On Wed, Oct 21, 2020 at 5:15 AM Manish Pandey2 <Manish.Pandey2(a)arm.com> wrote: > > Hi Ravi, > > Can you please confirm if control reached "test image" ? I guess, yes, as PC has right value. > Also, does your "test image" depends on device tree for console initialization? > > One thing i see missing in "plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c +352" is bl33 header initialization > SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); > > thanks > Manish > > ________________________________ > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Sent: 21 October 2020 00:10 > To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > > Hi Alexei, > > I built my TF-A (imx-atf) b31.bin image using the RESET_TO_BL31 build option for the i.MX8QM MEK dev kit. > > make DEBUG=1 RESET_TO_BL31=1 PLAT=imx8qm bl31 > > I used the imx-mkimage tool to generate a flash.bin (flash bootable image) with the following target to run on the MEK: > > flash_cortex_a53: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin MyA53Serial.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb > ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -c -p3 -ap MyA53Serial.bin a53 0x80020000 -p4 --data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin > > Here, I allocated bl31.bin to boot from 0x80000000 and a test image at BL33 (normal world) entry point 0x80020000 (both for Cortex-A53). > I can see DEBUG console output from the bl31.bin image but no serial output from my test image I am trying to boot from 0x80020000. > > NOTICE: Memreg 3 0x38000000 -- 0x3bffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 4 0x60000000 -- 0x6fffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 5 0x70000000 -- 0x7fffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 6 0x80000000 -- 0xffffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 7 0x400000000 -- 0x43fffffff > NOTICE: Memreg 8 0x880000000 -- 0x97fffffff > NOTICE: Non-secure Partitioning Succeeded > NOTICE: BL31: v2.2(debug):imx_5.4.24_er3-1-g06450210f-dirty > NOTICE: BL31: Built : 17:33:32, Oct 20 2020 > INFO: bl31_platform_setup is called > INFO: GICv3 with legacy support detected. ARM GICv3 driver initialized in EL3 > INFO: BL31: Initializing runtime services > INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: CPU workaround for 855873 was applied > INFO: BL31: Preparing for EL3 exit to normal world > INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 > INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 > INFO: BL31: DEBUG: image_type is: normal > > > Can anyone please suggest what could be the issue here that I don't see the test image console output ? > Note, the same test image works fine using u-boot. > > Regards > Ravi > > > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:43 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi Alexei, > > Thanks for your reply. I have not verified the RESET_TO_BL1 for imx8qm yet. > I will try it out and confirm. And, thanks for this suggestion. > > Regards > Ravi > > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:12 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com> wrote: > > Hi Ravi, > > Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? > > Regards. > Alexei > ________________________________ > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader > > Hi, > I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. > > I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. > I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can > specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. > This is without any security requirements or dependencies. > > Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch > a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point > 0x80020000 address ? > > Thanks in advance. > Ravi > > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

3
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Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader

by Manish Pandey2

Hi Ravi, Can you please confirm if control reached "test image" ? I guess, yes, as PC has right value. Also, does your "test image" depends on device tree for console initialization? One thing i see missing in "plat/imx/imx8qm/imx8qm_bl31_setup.c +352" is bl33 header initialization SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info, PARAM_EP, VERSION_1, 0); thanks Manish ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 21 October 2020 00:10 To: Ravi Kohli <rkohli2000(a)gmail.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Hi Alexei, I built my TF-A (imx-atf) b31.bin image using the RESET_TO_BL31 build option for the i.MX8QM MEK dev kit. make DEBUG=1 RESET_TO_BL31=1 PLAT=imx8qm bl31 I used the imx-mkimage tool to generate a flash.bin (flash bootable image) with the following target to run on the MEK: flash_cortex_a53: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin MyA53Serial.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -c -p3 -ap MyA53Serial.bin a53 0x80020000 -p4 --data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin Here, I allocated bl31.bin to boot from 0x80000000 and a test image at BL33 (normal world) entry point 0x80020000 (both for Cortex-A53). I can see DEBUG console output from the bl31.bin image but no serial output from my test image I am trying to boot from 0x80020000. NOTICE: Memreg 3 0x38000000 -- 0x3bffffff NOTICE: Memreg 4 0x60000000 -- 0x6fffffff NOTICE: Memreg 5 0x70000000 -- 0x7fffffff NOTICE: Memreg 6 0x80000000 -- 0xffffffff NOTICE: Memreg 7 0x400000000 -- 0x43fffffff NOTICE: Memreg 8 0x880000000 -- 0x97fffffff NOTICE: Non-secure Partitioning Succeeded NOTICE: BL31: v2.2(debug):imx_5.4.24_er3-1-g06450210f-dirty NOTICE: BL31: Built : 17:33:32, Oct 20 2020 INFO: bl31_platform_setup is called INFO: GICv3 with legacy support detected. ARM GICv3 driver initialized in EL3 INFO: BL31: Initializing runtime services INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: CPU workaround for 855873 was applied INFO: BL31: Preparing for EL3 exit to normal world INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 INFO: BL31: DEBUG: image_type is: normal Can anyone please suggest what could be the issue here that I don't see the test image console output ? Note, the same test image works fine using u-boot. Regards Ravi On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:43 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> wrote: Hi Alexei, Thanks for your reply. I have not verified the RESET_TO_BL1 for imx8qm yet. I will try it out and confirm. And, thanks for this suggestion. Regards Ravi On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:12 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: Hi Ravi, Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Hi, I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. This is without any security requirements or dependencies. Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point 0x80020000 address ? Thanks in advance. Ravi -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

2
1
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Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader

by rkohli2000 gmail

Hi Alexei, I built my TF-A (imx-atf) b31.bin image using the RESET_TO_BL31 build option for the i.MX8QM MEK dev kit. make DEBUG=1 RESET_TO_BL31=1 PLAT=imx8qm bl31 I used the imx-mkimage tool to generate a flash.bin (flash bootable image) with the following target to run on the MEK: flash_cortex_a53: $(MKIMG) mx8qm-ahab-container.img scfw_tcm.bin bl31.bin MyA53Serial.bin imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb ./$(MKIMG) -soc QM -rev B0 -append mx8qm-ahab-container.img -c flags 0x00200000 -scfw scfw_tcm.bin -ap bl31.bin a53 0x80000000 -c -p3 -ap MyA53Serial.bin a53 0x80020000 -p4 --data imx8qm-mek-ca53.dtb 0x83000000 -out flash.bin Here, I allocated bl31.bin to boot from 0x80000000 and a test image at BL33 (normal world) entry point 0x80020000 (both for Cortex-A53). I can see DEBUG console output from the bl31.bin image but no serial output from my test image I am trying to boot from 0x80020000. NOTICE: Memreg 3 0x38000000 -- 0x3bffffff NOTICE: Memreg 4 0x60000000 -- 0x6fffffff NOTICE: Memreg 5 0x70000000 -- 0x7fffffff NOTICE: Memreg 6 0x80000000 -- 0xffffffff NOTICE: Memreg 7 0x400000000 -- 0x43fffffff NOTICE: Memreg 8 0x880000000 -- 0x97fffffff NOTICE: Non-secure Partitioning Succeeded NOTICE: BL31: v2.2(debug):imx_5.4.24_er3-1-g06450210f-dirty NOTICE: BL31: Built : 17:33:32, Oct 20 2020 INFO: bl31_platform_setup is called INFO: GICv3 with legacy support detected. ARM GICv3 driver initialized in EL3 INFO: BL31: Initializing runtime services INFO: BL31: cortex_a53: CPU workaround for 855873 was applied INFO: BL31: Preparing for EL3 exit to normal world INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 INFO: BL31: DEBUG: image_type is: normal Can anyone please suggest what could be the issue here that I don't see the test image console output ? Note, the same test image works fine using u-boot. Regards Ravi > On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:43 PM, rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi Alexei, > > Thanks for your reply. I have not verified the RESET_TO_BL1 for imx8qm yet. > I will try it out and confirm. And, thanks for this suggestion. > > Regards > Ravi > >> On Oct 7, 2020, at 12:12 PM, Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> wrote: >> >> Hi Ravi, >> >> Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? >> >> Regards. >> Alexei >> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >> Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 >> To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> >> Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader >> >> Hi, >> I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. >> >> I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. >> I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can >> specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. >> This is without any security requirements or dependencies. >> >> Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch >> a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point >> 0x80020000 address ? >> >> Thanks in advance. >> Ravi >> >> >> >> -- >> TF-A mailing list >> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:TF-A@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a> > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

1
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TF-A Tech Forum Agenda @ Thr 22nd October 2020 16:00-1700 BST

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 22nd October 2020 16:00 – 17:00 (BST). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. Agenda: * Encrypted FIP Support * Presented by Sumit Garg * Summary * Overview of FIP encryption. * Common challenges with firmware encryption implementation and how we addressed those in TF-A. * FIP encryption implementation details. * Follow on Measured Boot Support in TF-A discussion from last meeting (if required) * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions If TF-A contributors have anything they wish to present at any future TF-A tech forum please contact me to have that scheduled. Previous sessions, both recording and presentation material can be found on the trustedfirmware.org TF-A Technical meeting webpage: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ A scheduling tracking page is also available to help track sessions suggested and being prepared: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a-tech-forum-scheduling/ Final decisions on what will be presented will be shared a few days before the next meeting and shared on the TF-A mailing list. Thanks Joanna

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Re: [TF-A] TF-A Tech Forum Agenda @ Thr 8th October 2020 16:00-1700 BST

by Ruchika Gupta

Hi Joanna, Can you please share the presentation of the session on Measured Boot. It is not currently available on the webpage - https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ Regards, Ruchika On Tue, 6 Oct 2020 at 22:58, Joanna Farley via TF-A < tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi All, > > > > The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 8th October 2020 16:00 – > 17:00 (BST). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the > subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me > know. > > > > Agenda: > > > > - Measured Boot Support in TF-A > - Presented by Alexei Fedorov and Javier Almansa Sobrino > - Update on the support for Measured Boot in TF-A along with an > overview of test cases for integration with a TPM service > - Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions > > > > If TF-A contributors have anything they wish to present at any future TF-A > tech forum please contact me to have that scheduled. > > > > Previous sessions, both recording and presentation material can be found > on the trustedfirmware.org TF-A Technical meeting webpage: > https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ > > > > A scheduling tracking page is also available to help track sessions > suggested and being prepared: > https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a-tech-forum-scheduling/ Final > decisions on what will be presented will be shared a few days before the > next meeting and shared on the TF-A mailing list. > > > > Thanks > > > > Joanna > > > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >

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Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop on Nov. 3rd

by Shebu Varghese Kuriakose

Hi All, Trustedfirmware.org community project would like to invite you to the Mbed TLS Virtual Workshop on November 3rd (Tuesday) from 2pm to 6pm GMT. The purpose of the workshop is to bring together the Mbed TLS community including maintainers, contributors and users to discuss * The future direction of the project and * Ways to improve community collaboration The workshop will be hosted in Zoom open to all. The invitation with the zoom link will be send in the Mbed TLS, PSA Crypto* mailing lists in the coming days. Here are some of the proposed agenda topics. Please reply if there is anything else you would like us or you to present during the workshop that will be interesting to the community * Constant-time code * How to be an effective Mbed TLS reviewer * Processes - how does work get scheduled? * Roadmap, Mbed TLS3.0 * PSA Crypto APIs * How Do I contribute my first review. Thanks, Shebu (TrustedFirmware.org Co-Chair, Mbed TLS Technology Manager) * https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/psa-crypto

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commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 ("libc: memset: improve performance by avoiding single byte writes") causing BL31 boot failure on Renesas RZ/G2 platforms.

by Biju Das

Hi All, I am porting Renesas RZ/G2M[1] platform to TF-A Master branch(commitid: eeb77da646844) . Initially faced a compilation error [2] which is fixed by using "#define" instead of "static const uint64_t". Then on target, found that BL31 is failed to boot[3], which is fixed by reverting the commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 ("libc: memset: improve performance by avoiding single byte writes"), see the logs [3]. Q1) Have you seen this issue? Please share your thoughts on this issues. [1] https://www.renesas.com/us/en/products/microcontrollers-microprocessors/rz/… [2] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/tf-a/2020-October/000763.html [3] Failure logs ------------ NOTICE: BL2: RZ/G Initial Program Loader(CA57) Rev.2.0.6 NOTICE: BL2: PRR is RZG G2M Ver.1.3 NOTICE: BL2: Board is HiHope RZ/G2M Rev.4.0 NOTICE: BL2: Boot device is QSPI Flash(40MHz) NOTICE: BL2: LCM state is unknown NOTICE: BL2: DDR3200(rev.0.40) NOTICE: BL2: [COLD_BOOT] NOTICE: BL2: DRAM Split is 2ch NOTICE: BL2: QoS is default setting(rev.0.19) NOTICE: BL2: DRAM refresh interval 1.95 usec NOTICE: BL2: Periodic Write DQ Training NOTICE: BL2: CH0: 400000000 - 47fffffff, 2 GiB NOTICE: BL2: CH2: 600000000 - 67fffffff, 2 GiB NOTICE: BL2: FDT at 0xe632a648 NOTICE: BL2: v2.3(release):v2.3-778-g4fd58b045 NOTICE: BL2: Built : 18:14:35, Oct 8 2020 NOTICE: BL2: Normal boot NOTICE: BL2: dst=0xe6328300 src=0x8180000 len=512(0x200) NOTICE: BL2: dst=0x43f00000 src=0x8180400 len=6144(0x1800) NOTICE: rcar_file_len: len: 0x0003e000 NOTICE: BL2: dst=0x44000000 src=0x81c0000 len=253952(0x3e000) NOTICE: rcar_file_len: len: 0x00100000 NOTICE: BL2: dst=0x50000000 src=0x8300000 len=1048576(0x100000) NOTICE: BL2: Booting BL31 [4]Working logs after reverting the commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 ("libc: memset: improve performance by avoiding single byte writes") -------------------------------------- NOTICE: BL2: RZ/G Initial Program Loader(CA57) Rev.2.0.6 NOTICE: BL2: PRR is RZG G2M Ver.1.3 NOTICE: BL2: Board is HiHope RZ/G2M Rev.4.0 NOTICE: BL2: Boot device is QSPI Flash(40MHz) NOTICE: BL2: LCM state is unknown NOTICE: BL2: DDR3200(rev.0.40) NOTICE: BL2: [COLD_BOOT] NOTICE: BL2: DRAM Split is 2ch NOTICE: BL2: QoS is default setting(rev.0.19) NOTICE: BL2: DRAM refresh interval 1.95 usec NOTICE: BL2: Periodic Write DQ Training NOTICE: BL2: CH0: 400000000 - 47fffffff, 2 GiB NOTICE: BL2: CH2: 600000000 - 67fffffff, 2 GiB NOTICE: BL2: FDT at 0xe632a648 NOTICE: BL2: v2.3(release):v2.3-779-geba02ef39 NOTICE: BL2: Built : 18:16:47, Oct 8 2020 NOTICE: BL2: Normal boot NOTICE: BL2: dst=0xe6328300 src=0x8180000 len=512(0x200) NOTICE: BL2: dst=0x43f00000 src=0x8180400 len=6144(0x1800) NOTICE: rcar_file_len: len: 0x0003e000 NOTICE: BL2: dst=0x44000000 src=0x81c0000 len=253952(0x3e000) NOTICE: rcar_file_len: len: 0x00100000 NOTICE: BL2: dst=0x50000000 src=0x8300000 len=1048576(0x100000) NOTICE: BL2: Booting BL31 U-Boot 2020.10-00535-gd0e9210a2f (Oct 08 2020 - 12:34:09 +0100) CPU: Renesas Electronics R8A774A1 rev 1.3 Model: HopeRun HiHope RZ/G2M with sub board DRAM: 3.9 GiB MMC: mmc@ee100000: 0, mmc@ee160000: 1 Loading Environment from MMC... OK In: serial@e6e88000 Out: serial@e6e88000 Err: serial@e6e88000 Net: eth0: ethernet@e6800000 Hit any key to stop autoboot: 0 Regards, Biju Renesas Electronics Europe GmbH, Geschaeftsfuehrer/President: Carsten Jauch, Sitz der Gesellschaft/Registered office: Duesseldorf, Arcadiastrasse 10, 40472 Duesseldorf, Germany, Handelsregister/Commercial Register: Duesseldorf, HRB 3708 USt-IDNr./Tax identification no.: DE 119353406 WEEE-Reg.-Nr./WEEE reg. no.: DE 14978647

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Re: [TF-A] commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 ("libc: memset: improve performance by avoiding single byte writes") causing BL31 boot failure on Renesas RZ/G2 platforms.

by Ash Wilding

Hi Biju, Andre, > sctlr_el3 = 0x0000000030c5183a The MMU is still disabled since we're so early in BL31, so nothing preventing us from making an actual access to physical address 0x0. As Andre already noted: > x30 = 0x0000000000000000 > elr_el3 = 0x0000000000000000 > far_el3 = 0x0000000000000000 It looks like we do have an errant null pointer dereference here. If I had to guess, the I-side successfully fetches a 32-bit word from physical address 0x0, but then fails to decode that bit pattern as a valid opcode. This is reported as "unknown reason", like you're seeing: <quote Arm ARM DDI 0487E.a pp D13-2963> This EC code is used for all exceptions that are not covered by any other EC value. This includes exceptions that are generated in the following situations: - ... - Instruction encodings that are unallocated. - ... </quote> Hope that helps, Ash.

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 ("libc: memset: improve performance by avoiding single byte writes") causing BL31 boot failure on Renesas RZ/G2 platforms.

by Ash Wilding

From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Ash Wilding via TF-A <TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Date: Sunday, 11 October 2020 at 18:53 <...> It looks like we do have an errant null pointer dereference here. <...> Just to clarify, when I say "null pointer dereference": - you may be trampling over your stack, causing you to pop 0x0 into LR and return there; - you may be trampling over your stack, causing you to pop 0x0 into a GPR that is then BLR'd to; - you may be trampling over some other region of memory containing a function pointer, causing you to load 0x0 into a GPR that is then BLR'd to; - etc. Cheers, Ash.

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Questions raised about Measured Boot + fTPM test case

by Javier Almansa Sobrino

Hello all, Following up the question raised yesterday during the TF-A Tech Forum with regards to any modification needed on the Linux Kernel to run the test case that I was presenting (Measured Boot + fTPM service), I double checked today and I ran some tests on system and I can confirm that the test case works with the mainline Linux Kernel, with no modification other than enabling the driver on the DTB. The modules involved on the interaction with the fTPM (for this particular example) are: * optee.ko: Allows communication between the REE (unsecure world), the Trusted OS (secure world) and the tee-supplicant (unsecure world). * tpm_ftpm_tee.ko: Module to communicate with a firmware TPM through a char device. This also includes the reference implementation used on the test case. In order to use the fTPM service, the test case makes use of IBM's TPM 2.0 TSS, a user space TSS for TPM 2.0 that uses services provided by the fTPM. I would also like to highlight the following points: A) The test case is only meant to test the ability of the Measured Boot Driver and a TPM 2.0 compliant device to interact with each other. As such, we are not providing an fTPM meant to be used on a production environment. Instead, we are using an existing reference implementation to which we added support for Measured Boot to fulfil our needs for the test and use it as a functional example. The implementation details on how to interact with a particular TPM device (either firmware or discrete) can differ from the ones used on the test case as those details can be platform dependent. For example, we use an OPTEE TA fTPM on this example, but other platforms might use a discrete TPM or an fTPM running on a different Trusted OS. B) As stated on the presentation, we are undergoing internal review of the contributions done for the fTPM service to make it compatible with Measured Boot. Once the review is completed and the changes merged into the TPM repo mainline, we will update the TF-A documentation with instructions on how to download and build all the components to run the tests manually. Please, let me know in case you have any more questions. Best regards, Javier

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 ("libc: memset: improve performance by avoiding single byte writes") causing BL31 boot failure on Renesas RZ/G2 platforms.

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Biju, As you work with Renesas platforms, have you also seen "Renesas rcar-gen3: cert_header_sa6 Compilation Issue" which I reported on the mailing list on 10/12/2018 and is still not fixed? tools\renesas\rcar_layout_create\sa6.c has #include <stdint.h> which causes compilation error on Yocto 3.13: | aarch64-poky-linux-gcc -DRCAR_SA0_SIZE=1 -DRCAR_SA6_TYPE=0 -I../../include/lib/stdlib -D=AARCH64 -c -o sa6.o sa6.c | In file included from sa6.c:7:0: | /home/alexei/Work/Yocto_3.13_20181205/build/tmp/work/h3ulcb-poky-linux/arm-tf/2.0+gitAUTOINC+19b56cf4a2_556d7d9e3b-r0/recipe-sysroot-native/usr/lib/aarch64-poky-linux/gcc/aarch64-poky-linux/7.3.0/include/stdint.h:9:16: fatal error: stdint.h: No such file or directory | # include_next <stdint.h> | ^~~~~~~~~~ | compilation terminated. | <builtin>: recipe for target 'sa6.o' failed | make[1]: *** [sa6.o] Error 1 | plat/renesas/rcar/platform.mk:403: recipe for target 'rcar_layout_tool' failed | make: *** [rcar_layout_tool] Error 2 | ERROR: oe_runmake failed There's no compilation error with gcc-arm-8.2-2018.08-i686-mingw32-aarch64-elf tool chain, because compiler searches for <stdint.h> in \gcc-arm-8.2-2018.08-i686-mingw32-aarch64-elf\lib\gcc\aarch64-elf\8.2.1\include finding "stdint.h" with # include_next <stdint.h> and then getting "stdint.h" from gcc-arm-8.2-2018.08-i686-mingw32-aarch64-elf\aarch64-elf\include folder. Trusted Firmware-A Porting Guide reads that "To avoid subtle toolchain behavioral dependencies, the header files provided by the compiler are not used. The software is built with the ``-nostdinc`` flag to ensure no headers are included from the toolchain inadvertently. ", tools\renesas\rcar_layout_create\makefile has flags defined as: CFLAGS += ${DEFINES} CFLAGS += -I../../include/lib/stdlib and adding "-nostdinc" flag will make gcc-arm-8.2-2018.08-i686-mingw32-aarch64-elf compilation fail because ../../include/lib/stdlib is a wrong path (taken from Renesas ARM-TF version 1.5 "tools\dummy_create\makefile") to include\lib\libc\stdint.h for version ARM-TF version 2.0. This issue can be fixed by changing CFLAGS to CFLAGS += -nostdinc \ -I../../../include/lib/libc \ -I../../../include/lib/libc/aarch64 Regards. Alexei. ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Biju Das via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 09 October 2020 08:12 To: Andre Przywara <Andre.Przywara(a)arm.com>; TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; Madhukar Pappireddy <Madhukar.Pappireddy(a)arm.com>; Joanna Farley <Joanna.Farley(a)arm.com> Cc: Marek Vasut <marek.vasut(a)gmail.com>; Chris Paterson <Chris.Paterson2(a)renesas.com>; Prabhakar Mahadev Lad <prabhakar.mahadev-lad.rj(a)bp.renesas.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 ("libc: memset: improve performance by avoiding single byte writes") causing BL31 boot failure on Renesas RZ/G2 platforms. Hi Andre, Thanks for the feedback. > Subject: Re: commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 ("libc: memset: improve > performance by avoiding single byte writes") causing BL31 boot failure on > Renesas RZ/G2 platforms. > > On 08/10/2020 20:05, Biju Das wrote: > > Hi, > > > I am porting Renesas RZ/G2M[1] platform to TF-A Master > > branch(commitid: eeb77da646844) . Initially faced a compilation error [2] > which is fixed by using "#define" instead of "static const uint64_t". > > What is your exact fix? That compilation error sounds like a more serious > issue, I am scratching my head how such a change would really fix things? Looks like this issue is related to toolchain, I was using aarch64-linux-gcc-7 on U-buntu 18.04 Host toolchain. The compilation is error is fixed by the below changes. #define BL31_RO_BASE BL_CODE_BASE #define BL31_RO_LIMIT BL_CODE_END #define BL31_COHERENT_RAM_BASE BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE #define BL31_COHERENT_RAM_LIMIT BL_COHERENT_RAM_END The warning fix should not lead to compilation error with the old toolchains. It should be backward compatible to the old toolchains right? Please share your views. > And do you see this with mainline? I tried: Yes > $ make bl31 PLAT=rcar LSI=M3 MBEDTLS_DIR=../mbedtls.git on origin/master > and it built just fine. Thanks for the hint, After using the toolchain[1], I got the same results as your's. it compiles successfully. So the issue is related to using older tool chains. [1] https://developer.arm.com/tools-and-software/open-source-software/developer… > > > Then on target, found that BL31 is failed to boot[3], which is fixed > > by reverting the commit 75fab6496e5fce9a11 > > ("libc: memset: improve performance by avoiding single byte writes"), see > the logs [3]. > > Mmmh, interesting. Can you build with "DEBUG=1" to get more output from > BL31? Sure Will do and provide feedback. > I see some calls to memset() from code in drivers/renesas/rcar. > Can you add some debug prints at the top of memset() to dump the > parameters on each call? To see what breaks it? OK. > Are you using memset on some I/O memory, by any chance? And that > doesn't support all access types, like 64-bit stores? Will check and let you know. Cheers, Biju Renesas Electronics Europe GmbH, Geschaeftsfuehrer/President: Carsten Jauch, Sitz der Gesellschaft/Registered office: Duesseldorf, Arcadiastrasse 10, 40472 Duesseldorf, Germany, Handelsregister/Commercial Register: Duesseldorf, HRB 3708 USt-IDNr./Tax identification no.: DE 119353406 WEEE-Reg.-Nr./WEEE reg. no.: DE 14978647 -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

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Forthcoming Trusted Firmware-A 2.4 release

by Manish Badarkhe

Hi, This is to notify that we are planning to target the Trusted Firmware-A 2.4 release during the second week of November 2020 as part of the regular 6 month cadence. The aim is to consolidate all TF-A work since the 2.3 release. As part of this, a release candidate tag will be created and release activities will commence from Friday 30th Oct 2020 (code freeze date). Essentially we will not merge any major enhancements from this date until the release is made. Please ensure any Pull Requests (PR’s) desired to make the 2.4 release are submitted in good time, to be completed by Tuesday 27th Oct 2020. Any major enhancement PR’s still open after that date will not be merged until after the release Please note, there is no guarantee that all patches under review will be merged before the code freeze date. Any patches that don’t make the code freeze date will complete their review and merge post the release date. Thanks Manish Badarkhe

5 years, 11 months

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Compilation error with commit "ca661a0092c8ead5ac7df57c55fffcc835d9c0b9"

by Biju Das

Hi All, I am getting compilation error with Mainline TFA on renesas platform for bl31 build. Build command: #make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- bl31 PLAT=rcar LSI=M3 MBEDTLS_DIR=../mbedtls Q1) Have any one see this issue? Please correct me, if I am doing something wrong. On further investigation, the below commit introduced the issue [1] [1] https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/plat/ren… It gives compilation error " error: initializer element is not constant" for BL_CODE_BASE [2] [2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/arm-trusted-firmware/latest/source/plat/renesas/… BL_CODE_BASE gets its value from linker in [3] [3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/arm-trusted-firmware/latest/source/include/commo… If you see [4], the initializer element is not constant [4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/arm-trusted-firmware/latest/source/include/lib/u… Error logs: biju@biju-VirtualBox:~/work/trusted-firmware-a$ CC plat/renesas/rcar/bl31_plat_setup.c plat/renesas/rcar/bl31_plat_setup.c:25:39: error: initializer element is not constant static const uint64_t BL31_RO_BASE = BL_CODE_BASE; ^~~~~~~~~~~~ plat/renesas/rcar/bl31_plat_setup.c:26:40: error: initializer element is not constant static const uint64_t BL31_RO_LIMIT = BL_CODE_END; ^~~~~~~~~~~ plat/renesas/rcar/bl31_plat_setup.c:29:48: error: initializer element is not constant static const uint64_t BL31_COHERENT_RAM_BASE = BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE; ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ plat/renesas/rcar/bl31_plat_setup.c:30:49: error: initializer element is not constant static const uint64_t BL31_COHERENT_RAM_LIMIT = BL_COHERENT_RAM_END; ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Makefile:1109: recipe for target '/home/biju/work/trusted-firmware-a/build/rcar/release/bl31/bl31_plat_setup.o' failed make: *** [/home/biju/work/trusted-firmware-a/build/rcar/release/bl31/bl31_plat_setup.o] Error 1 Regards, Biju Renesas Electronics Europe GmbH, Geschaeftsfuehrer/President: Carsten Jauch, Sitz der Gesellschaft/Registered office: Duesseldorf, Arcadiastrasse 10, 40472 Duesseldorf, Germany, Handelsregister/Commercial Register: Duesseldorf, HRB 3708 USt-IDNr./Tax identification no.: DE 119353406 WEEE-Reg.-Nr./WEEE reg. no.: DE 14978647

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF

by Achin Gupta

Hi Sandeep, A few comments inline from a SW architecture/FF-A perspective. > On 5 Oct 2020, at 12:28, Sandeep Tripathy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi Olivier, > Appreciate the details. I have a different perception of G0 > interrupts and their relevance to RAS/ critical events. > Comments in line. > Thanks > Sandeep > > On Fri, Oct 2, 2020 at 6:47 PM Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> wrote: >> >> Hi Sandeep, >> >> Here are a few more details. >> The reasoning differs when considering pre-Armv8.4 platforms (1) vs Armv8.4 platforms onwards with secure virtualization enabled (2). >> >> Case (1): >> >> EHF framework unifies EL3 exceptions delivered via different vectors and allows them to be handled in a common way. It is also allowing exception delegation handling to lower secure ELs. This framework although primarily used for RAS, is also used for SDEI and platform EL3 interrupts. EL3's role in this case is about trapping and routing the event to appropriate the component (when the interrupt/exception is not handled solely at EL3). >> >> The interoperability between EHF and a Trusted OS is not accurately defined apart from this guidance in EHF documentation: >> "In order for S-EL1 software to handle Non-secure interrupts while having EHF enabled, the dispatcher must adopt a model where Non-secure interrupts are received at EL3, but are then synchronously handled over to S-EL1." >> >> Until then for the specific RAS handling scenario, this was delegated to a StandaloneMM partition running at S-EL0 (through the SPM-MM implementation) and not necessarily delegated to a TOS. > > Reliability is provided by the feature of G0 interrupt that it can not > be masked by lower ELs. Such interrupt being handled at EL3 or being > delegated to other components does not impact the > reliable feature of G0 interrupt. Sure its handling must be offloaded > to other components to keep EL3 firmware light. But If it were just > about handling an interrupt then it could have been entirely handled > in each state without even requiring an EL3 interrupt type. Reliability in RAS is a different concept. RAS error interrupts do not provide reliability. They report unreliable operation. Routing RAS interrupts to EL3 is an implementation choice called Firmware First Handling (FFH). Indeed, the interrupts could be routed to a lower EL which is called Kernel first handling (KFH). For e.g. an implementation could decide to handle corrected errors Kernel first. Uncorrected errors could be routed to a platform controller instead of firmware or be routed to both. There is no single solution. With FFH, the main requirement is that an uncorrected error must be handled even if the Normal world is not in a position to do so. There are non-technical requirements too but lets not go there. So I don’t think there is a requirement that "no lower EL" should be able to mask the interrupt. EL3/S-EL1 and EL3/S-EL2 are at the same privilege level as far as access to the physical address space is concerned. G0 interrupts could be routed to EL3 but they can be disabled by S-EL1 or S-EL2 by programming the GIC distributor. The main point being that software in all privileged exception levels in the Secure world must be trusted to handle RAS errors in the Normal world. Routing G0 interrupts to EL3 is not a silver bullet. When support for FFH was added to TF-A, there was no use case to put software in S-EL1. This EL is owned by TF-A which deploys a simple shim layer. The EHF was developed with this assumption in mind. If your requirement is to put a Trusted OS in S-EL1 and continue doing RAS error handling, then the requirements of the Trusted OS w.r.t the interrupt routing model must be factored in. Hence, the question about what exactly are your requirements. I can understand the desire to reuse EHF but it cannot come at the cost of not meeting the TOS requirements. It needs a SW architecture discussion first. It might be possible to preempt S-EL1 and route RAS errors to EL3 in some cases. A cooperative model (2) between S-EL1 and EL3 (as Olivier described) is what most Trusted OSs implement today. It would be good to understand why that would not work for RAS. > >> >> In order to better help you, we would need more information on the scenario you intend to achieve, and the environment (Arm architecture version and extensions, GIC version). >> Or maybe your question was out of curiosity for the longer term approach (2) as described below? > > As per sbsa level III spec: sbsa non secure watchdog WS1 (reset) must > be targeted at EL3. The patch in review ref: > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5495 > And we would want a watchdog interrupt to preempt all execution > context. I would expect the same with any RAS or SDEI critical prio > events. Thanks for pointing this out! SBSA applies to the Server segment. It was reasonable to assume that Secure firmware almost entirely resides in EL3. Hence the guidance. We will look at rewording this in a future release. The intent is that since it is a Non-secure Watchdog, the WS1 signal must not be masked by the Normal world. The BSA applies to all segments. It leaves routing of WS1 implementation defined as long as the Normal world cannot mask it. It could be routed to S-EL1 or S-EL2 if that fulfils the requirement. > Another misc application of our platform is to be able to forcefully > turn off/ halt/ just ping any core at any execution context (S/NS). > These motivated me to leverage EHF. But the idea of dropping EHF in > future designs makes me think now ! > > Our current system is pre Armv8.4. We will stick to case (1). Case > (2) ie SPMD was just my quoricity. However, I felt PSA-FFA may > replace TOS specific SPDs someday. > Making SPMD relevant in this discussion even with pre 8.4 systems. > Because at least the TOS will have to follow one policy. The SPMD is indeed meant to replace TOS specific SPDs. It is meant to cater for the RAS use case as well. From an FF-A perspective, a cooperative approach is simpler. I would like to understand why this would not work for RAS error interrupts as well. Reuse of EHF is an implementation level discussion and I don’t think that is off the table even with (2). > >> >> Case (2): >> >> As a general rule, it is preferred that EL3 reduces its footprint and minimises platform specific handling code. > > Agreed. Applies to case(1) aswell and heavy lifting to be delegated > to lower ELs in either security states. My concern is on 'Taking' the > interrupt handling (mjust)can be delegated. It would certainly be desirable to reuse the EHF. However, it is not possible to delegate the heavy lifting to preempted software in S-EL1 or S-EL2 without significantly increasing their complexity. This is not the current direction of travel of FF-A. > >> EHF framework would most probably not be enabled at all. >> The priority logic provided by the GIC PMR register to mask NS interrupts cannot really work as before because all of trusted EL3/S-EL2 and untrusted S-EL1 SPs can manipulate this register. > > This is a limitation. This can be taken care of by cooperative > software design. ie. S_EL2/S_EL1 will not set PMR out of its range. > And the platform defines what's EL3 priority range. > GIC_LOWEST_EL3_PRI. This falls under the solution space. It would be good to understand what is it you want to run on S-EL1/S-EL2 first. > >> Any secure/non-secure interrupt triggered while running SEL1/SEL0 is trapped first by the S-EL2 firmware (or the so-called SPMC). This translates into SCR_EL3.FIQ/IRQ=0 in the secure world. >> Group1NS interrupts are redirected to SPMD for routing to NWd. >> >> A Group0 interrupt is possibly redirected to a platform driver into an S-EL1 secure partition (e.g. a RAS handling service). >> Hence it does no longer hold true that Group0 interrupts are necessarily qualified as "EL3 interrupts". >> It is still possible to redirect Group0 interrupts from S-EL2 to EL3 and be handled there, but as said, this is a less preferred approach. >> >> Either way when NWd runs (with SCR_EL3.FIQ=1/IRQ=0), a Group1S/Group0 secure interrupt is trapped at EL3 and routed to SPMD then SPMC. >> The SPMC can take the decision to resume the secure partition which registered the corresponding secure INTID. >> >> This design does mean that SDEI interrupt handling would need SPMC and BL31 collaboration and this is something we are working on. > > I understood this scheme. But it means RAS interrupts and other > critical events will always have blackout periods even with proper > software design. RAS interrupts will have blackout periods even if a SMC is handled entirely in EL3. How is routing them to S-EL1 or S-EL2 any different? Afaiu, the RAS architecture spec does not lay down any time limits on by when an error must be reported. All RAS errors are not critical errors. Even critical errors e.g. uncontainable errors report something that has already happened. With unrecoverable errors, ESBs ensure that the problem is contained to a particular EL or Security state. Could you elaborate on what timing requirements you have and why a cooperative model would cause problems? > Whereas with the other routing model scheme the reliability of EHF > handlers can be retained with the constraint of PMR ranges. There may > be something > I am missing. I don’t think “reliability” is an argument here. It is about reusing the EHF in EL3. It is not off the table but we cannot overlook other evolutions in the software and hardware architecture since the EHF was written. Let me know what you think. Cheers, Achin > >> >> Hope this helps. >> >> Regards, >> Olivier. >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Olivier Deprez via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> >> Sent: 28 September 2020 14:01 >> To: Sandeep Tripathy; Soby Mathew >> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd >> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF >> >> Hi Sandeep, >> >> Your question is very valid and we're discussing options internally. >> >> We will come back to you with a consolidated answer shortly. >> >> Regards, >> Olivier. >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: Sandeep Tripathy >> Sent: Monday, September 28, 2020 05:28 >> To: Soby Mathew >> Cc: Dan Handley; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd; Olivier Deprez >> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF >> >> >> Thanks Soby and Dan for confirmation on TSPD. I can see a few more gaps >> in the related area. >> >> "The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast >> SMC i.e. any execution context for that matter ". >> This should apply to all SPDs including SPMD. However I learned from >> @Oliver that SPMD/SPMC design traps FIQs to S_EL2. >> >> In that case a RAS interrupt can be masked by S_EL2 software (eg: >> Hafnium). Probably by design it will be ensured that S_EL2 will never >> mask the physical FIQ ? >> >> S_EL2 FIQ handler will exit to EL3/SPMD by SMC call. And depending on >> the pending interrupt type either it can exit to NWd OR invoke el3 fiq >> vector handler synchronously ? >> >> Are there limitations if we trap fiq to EL3 instead ? >> >> Thanks >> Sandeep >> On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:26 PM Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Sandeep >>> >>>> Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECUE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). >>>> But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. >>>> EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. >>>> This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. >>> >>> The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC. Hence the usage of GIC PMR to mask the NS interrupts. As Dan says, the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT predates the EHF design and it seems there is a problem as you describe. >>> >>>> EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. >>>> This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. >>> >>> You are right. Routing model manipulation is not required when EL3 interrupts are present as GIC PMR manipulation should take care of the required behaviour for yielding vs atomic SMC. You also need to ensure it works as expected when EL3 interrupts are not enabled and when EHF is disabled. >>> >>> Best Regards >>> Soby Mathew >>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep >>>> Tripathy via TF-A >>>> Sent: 17 September 2020 16:53 >>>> To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> >>>> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF >>>> >>>> Hi Dan, >>>> I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think >>>> EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs >>>> and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. >>>> If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. >>>> >>>> Thanks >>>> Sandeep >>>> >>>> On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf- >>>> a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> A correction... >>>>> >>>>>> -----Original Message----- >>>>>> From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan >>>>>> Handley via TF-A >>>>>> Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF >>>>>>>> depending on >>>>>>> what is the expected behavior. >>>>>>>> >>>>>> Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the >>>> TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 >>>>>> case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a >>>>>> yielding SMC in S- EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to >>>> follow? >>>>>> >>>>> Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are >>>> routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing >>>> over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to >>>> ehf_allow_ns_preemption. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts >>>> and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. >>>> But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is >>>> happening in TSPD. >>>> >>>>> Dan. >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> TF-A mailing list >>>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >>>> -- >>>> TF-A mailing list >>>> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >>>> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a >> >> >> -- >> TF-A mailing list >> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org >> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] Nailgun

by Joanna Farley

Hi Varun, The Arm security support pages provides official responses to questions related to security vulnerabilities. [https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates] Trustedfirmware.org provides Security Centre pages covering the security incident handling and vulnerability disclosure process for hosted projects. [https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/security_center/] You can find information regarding Nailgun on the following Arm security support FAQ page [https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processo…]. If you have further questions then please email arm-security(a)arm.com<mailto:arm-security@arm.com> as mentioned in the Arm security support pages. Joanna From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com> Date: Monday, 28 September 2020 at 21:53 To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Nailgun Hi, Recently, I learned about Nailgun [1] – leak information by snooping across privilege boundaries with the help of CoreSight. The proof of concept uses Raspberry Pi3 (uses Cortex A-53 CPUs) platform to demonstrate the exploit. Has anyone reviewed this attack and does it affect other Arm v8 CPUs too? Do we have support in TF-A to disable CoreSight to mitigate against such attacks? Are there any other mitigations against this attack? -Varun [1] https://github.com/ningzhenyu/nailgun

5 years, 11 months

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TF-A LTS wiki page

by Varun Wadekar

Hello team, After the recent discussion in the tech forums for the need of a LTS release, I have create a wiki page [1] on tf.org to discuss how we should move forward. The page is expected to be a "live" document and the intention is to allow the community to capture current problems and expectations from the LTS version. Request you to review the page and provide feedback. Thanks, -Varun [1] https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/lts_proposal/

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi Ravi, Have you tried to use RESET_TO_BL31 build option for your platform? Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of rkohli2000 gmail via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 07 October 2020 17:01 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] BL31 as bootloader Hi, I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. This is without any security requirements or dependencies. Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point 0x80020000 address ? Thanks in advance. Ravi -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

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BL31 as bootloader

by rkohli2000 gmail

Hi, I'm a new user and sorry for some basic TF-A questions. Any guidance is appreciated. I'm am able boot the TF-A bl31.bin image itself on my i.MX8QM MEK platform without using u-boot. I can use the imx-mkimage tool to create a flash or eMMC bootable image (flash.bin). Here, I can specify this container image with both bl31.bin and a separate custom app at a give flash address. This is without any security requirements or dependencies. Can I use the T-FA bl31.bin image to act as a first stage bootloader (without u-boot) and then launch a "custom" bare metal app for Cortex-A53 (for example) on the i.MX8QM at the given (BL33) entry point 0x80020000 address ? Thanks in advance. Ravi

5 years, 11 months

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TF-A Tech Forum Agenda @ Thr 8th October 2020 16:00-1700 BST

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 8th October 2020 16:00 – 17:00 (BST). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. Agenda: * Measured Boot Support in TF-A * Presented by Alexei Fedorov and Javier Almansa Sobrino * Update on the support for Measured Boot in TF-A along with an overview of test cases for integration with a TPM service * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions If TF-A contributors have anything they wish to present at any future TF-A tech forum please contact me to have that scheduled. Previous sessions, both recording and presentation material can be found on the trustedfirmware.org TF-A Technical meeting webpage: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ A scheduling tracking page is also available to help track sessions suggested and being prepared: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a-tech-forum-scheduling/ Final decisions on what will be presented will be shared a few days before the next meeting and shared on the TF-A mailing list. Thanks Joanna

5 years, 11 months

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TF-A image construction

by rkohli2000 gmail

Hi, Sorry for the wide distribution and if this isn't the appropriate board. I'm interested in TF-A image construction for the i.MX8QM SoC platform and basic image construction instructions. I'd like to understand how to deploy a user application for the Cortex-A53 core and flash image construction. For example, how to deploy BL31.bin and launch a user app for the platform and what does the following TF-A console log imply for user apps: INFO: Entry point address = 0x80020000 INFO: SPSR = 0x3c9 Any intro info is appreciated. Thanks again. Regards Ravi

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF

by Olivier Deprez

Hi Sandeep, Here are a few more details. The reasoning differs when considering pre-Armv8.4 platforms (1) vs Armv8.4 platforms onwards with secure virtualization enabled (2). Case (1): EHF framework unifies EL3 exceptions delivered via different vectors and allows them to be handled in a common way. It is also allowing exception delegation handling to lower secure ELs. This framework although primarily used for RAS, is also used for SDEI and platform EL3 interrupts. EL3's role in this case is about trapping and routing the event to appropriate the component (when the interrupt/exception is not handled solely at EL3). The interoperability between EHF and a Trusted OS is not accurately defined apart from this guidance in EHF documentation: "In order for S-EL1 software to handle Non-secure interrupts while having EHF enabled, the dispatcher must adopt a model where Non-secure interrupts are received at EL3, but are then synchronously handled over to S-EL1." Until then for the specific RAS handling scenario, this was delegated to a StandaloneMM partition running at S-EL0 (through the SPM-MM implementation) and not necessarily delegated to a TOS. In order to better help you, we would need more information on the scenario you intend to achieve, and the environment (Arm architecture version and extensions, GIC version). Or maybe your question was out of curiosity for the longer term approach (2) as described below? Case (2): As a general rule, it is preferred that EL3 reduces its footprint and minimises platform specific handling code. EHF framework would most probably not be enabled at all. The priority logic provided by the GIC PMR register to mask NS interrupts cannot really work as before because all of trusted EL3/S-EL2 and untrusted S-EL1 SPs can manipulate this register. Any secure/non-secure interrupt triggered while running SEL1/SEL0 is trapped first by the S-EL2 firmware (or the so-called SPMC). This translates into SCR_EL3.FIQ/IRQ=0 in the secure world. Group1NS interrupts are redirected to SPMD for routing to NWd. A Group0 interrupt is possibly redirected to a platform driver into an S-EL1 secure partition (e.g. a RAS handling service). Hence it does no longer hold true that Group0 interrupts are necessarily qualified as "EL3 interrupts". It is still possible to redirect Group0 interrupts from S-EL2 to EL3 and be handled there, but as said, this is a less preferred approach. Either way when NWd runs (with SCR_EL3.FIQ=1/IRQ=0), a Group1S/Group0 secure interrupt is trapped at EL3 and routed to SPMD then SPMC. The SPMC can take the decision to resume the secure partition which registered the corresponding secure INTID. This design does mean that SDEI interrupt handling would need SPMC and BL31 collaboration and this is something we are working on. Hope this helps. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Olivier Deprez via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 28 September 2020 14:01 To: Sandeep Tripathy; Soby Mathew Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF Hi Sandeep, Your question is very valid and we're discussing options internally. We will come back to you with a consolidated answer shortly. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: Sandeep Tripathy Sent: Monday, September 28, 2020 05:28 To: Soby Mathew Cc: Dan Handley; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd; Olivier Deprez Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF Thanks Soby and Dan for confirmation on TSPD. I can see a few more gaps in the related area. "The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC i.e. any execution context for that matter ". This should apply to all SPDs including SPMD. However I learned from @Oliver that SPMD/SPMC design traps FIQs to S_EL2. In that case a RAS interrupt can be masked by S_EL2 software (eg: Hafnium). Probably by design it will be ensured that S_EL2 will never mask the physical FIQ ? S_EL2 FIQ handler will exit to EL3/SPMD by SMC call. And depending on the pending interrupt type either it can exit to NWd OR invoke el3 fiq vector handler synchronously ? Are there limitations if we trap fiq to EL3 instead ? Thanks Sandeep On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:26 PM Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> wrote: > > Hi Sandeep > > > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECUE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). > > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC. Hence the usage of GIC PMR to mask the NS interrupts. As Dan says, the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT predates the EHF design and it seems there is a problem as you describe. > > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > You are right. Routing model manipulation is not required when EL3 interrupts are present as GIC PMR manipulation should take care of the required behaviour for yielding vs atomic SMC. You also need to ensure it works as expected when EL3 interrupts are not enabled and when EHF is disabled. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > > Tripathy via TF-A > > Sent: 17 September 2020 16:53 > > To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF > > > > Hi Dan, > > I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think > > EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs > > and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. > > If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf- > > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > > A correction... > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan > > > > Handley via TF-A > > > > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > > > > depending on > > > > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > > > > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the > > TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 > > > > case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a > > > > yielding SMC in S- EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to > > follow? > > > > > > > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are > > routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing > > over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to > > ehf_allow_ns_preemption. > > > > > > > Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts > > and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. > > But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is > > happening in TSPD. > > > > > Dan. > > > > > > -- > > > TF-A mailing list > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 3 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 defect(s), reported by Coverity Scan earlier, were marked fixed in the recent build analyzed by Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 3 of 3 defect(s) ** CID 362943: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 362943: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) /common/fdt_fixup.c: 437 in fdt_adjust_gic_redist() 431 432 /* 433 * The redistributor is described in the second "reg" entry. 434 * So we have to skip one address and one size cell, then another 435 * address cell to get to the second size cell. 436 */ >>> CID 362943: Insecure data handling (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted variable "sc * 4" to a tainted sink. 437 return fdt_setprop_inplace_namelen_partial(dtb, offset, "reg", 3, 438 (ac + sc + ac) * 4, 439 val, sc * 4); ** CID 362942: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /common/fdt_fixup.c: 428 in fdt_adjust_gic_redist() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 362942: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) /common/fdt_fixup.c: 428 in fdt_adjust_gic_redist() 422 } 423 424 if (sc == 1) { 425 redist_size_32 = cpu_to_fdt32(nr_cores * gicr_frame_size); 426 val = &redist_size_32; 427 } else { >>> CID 362942: Integer handling issues (OVERFLOW_BEFORE_WIDEN) >>> Potentially overflowing expression "nr_cores * gicr_frame_size" with type "unsigned int" (32 bits, unsigned) is evaluated using 32-bit arithmetic, and then used in a context that expects an expression of type "uint64_t" (64 bits, unsigned). 428 redist_size_64 = cpu_to_fdt64(nr_cores * gicr_frame_size); 429 val = &redist_size_64; 430 } 431 432 /* 433 * The redistributor is described in the second "reg" entry. ** CID 362941: Integer handling issues (BAD_SHIFT) /mbedtls/library/bignum.c: 1713 in mbedtls_int_div_int() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 362941: Integer handling issues (BAD_SHIFT) /mbedtls/library/bignum.c: 1713 in mbedtls_int_div_int() 1707 * Normalize the divisor, d, and dividend, u0, u1 1708 */ 1709 s = mbedtls_clz( d ); 1710 d = d << s; 1711 1712 u1 = u1 << s; >>> CID 362941: Integer handling issues (BAD_SHIFT) >>> In expression "u0 >> 64UL - s", right shifting by more than 63 bits has undefined behavior. The shift amount, "64UL - s", is 64. 1713 u1 |= ( u0 >> ( biL - s ) ) & ( -(mbedtls_mpi_sint)s >> ( biL - 1 ) ); 1714 u0 = u0 << s; 1715 1716 d1 = d >> biH; 1717 d0 = d & uint_halfword_mask; 1718 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

5 years, 11 months

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STM32MP1: Adding TF-A causes kernel errors

by Jan Kiszka

Hi Yann, not sure if TF-A is the one to blame, but it's the variable that triggers the following on the STM32MP15x eval board for me. I think I'm following tfa/docs/plat/stm32mp1.rst and u-boot/doc/board/st/stm32mp1.rst correctly. Working: - U-Boot 2020.07, stm32mp15_basic_defconfig - Linux 5.9-rc7 (or 5.4.x), defconfig [ 0.000000] Memory: 815540K/917500K available (13312K kernel code, 1800K rwdata, 5452K rodata, 2048K init, 407K bss, 36424K reserved, 65536K cma-reserved, 196604K highmem) Failing: - TF-A 2.3, PLAT=stm32mp1 ARCH=aarch32 ARM_ARCH_MAJOR=7 \ AARCH32_SP=sp_min STM32MP_SDMMC=1 STM32MP_EMMC=1 STM32MP_RAW_NAND=1 \ STM32MP_SPI_NAND=1 STM32MP_SPI_NOR=1 DTB_FILE_NAME=stm32mp157c-ev1.dtb - U-Boot 2020.07, stm32mp15_trusted_defconfig - Linux as above [ 0.000000] Memory: 881076K/917500K available (13312K kernel code, 1800K rwdata, 5452K rodata, 2048K init, 407K bss, 4294938184K reserved, 65536K cma-reserved, 262140K highmem) which causes issues like [ 0.047215] BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/0 pfn:fa000 [ 0.047236] page:(ptrval) refcount:0 mapcount:-128 mapping:00000000 index:0x1 pfn:0xfa000 [ 0.047249] flags: 0x80000000() CMA [ 0.047273] raw: 80000000 e7f29004 e7f49004 00000000 00000001 0000000b ffffff7f 00000000 [ 0.047281] page dumped because: nonzero mapcount [ 0.047287] Modules linked in: [ 0.047305] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.9.0-rc7 #1 [ 0.047314] Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) [ 0.047358] [<c0311708>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030b88c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [ 0.047384] [<c030b88c>] (show_stack) from [<c0718a40>] (dump_stack+0xc8/0xdc) [ 0.047408] [<c0718a40>] (dump_stack) from [<c047b3c8>] (bad_page+0xdc/0x10c) [ 0.047426] [<c047b3c8>] (bad_page) from [<c047c060>] (__free_pages_ok+0x2e8/0x36c) [ 0.047447] [<c047c060>] (__free_pages_ok) from [<c1623a80>] (init_cma_reserved_pageblock+0x58/0x68) [ 0.047469] [<c1623a80>] (init_cma_reserved_pageblock) from [<c16266c8>] (cma_init_reserved_areas+0x170/0x1c8) [ 0.047491] [<c16266c8>] (cma_init_reserved_areas) from [<c0301ef8>] (do_one_initcall+0x54/0x22c) [ 0.047513] [<c0301ef8>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c160102c>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x188/0x1ec) [ 0.047537] [<c160102c>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c0f4a340>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x118) [ 0.047559] [<c0f4a340>] (kernel_init) from [<c03001a8>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c) [ 0.047570] Exception stack(0xe68b7fb0 to 0xe68b7ff8) [ 0.047584] 7fa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.047600] 7fc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 0.047614] 7fe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 [ 0.047624] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint Still, the system boots, and I can login. That reserved value the kernel finds is obviously off. Does it come from TF-A, is U-Boot causing this in the presence of TF-A, or is the kernel itself getting it wrong? Or am I missing some switch that is not in the kernel defconfig? Thanks, Jan

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] Tests to verify BP_OPTION

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi, tf-a-tests\tftf\tests\extensions\pauth\test_pauth.c will test fvp-pauth-pac-ret-leaf-sdei,fvp-pauth-standard:fvp-tftf-fip.tftf-aemv8a.8_5-debug fvp-pauth-pac-ret-leaf-tsp-sdei,fvp-pauth-standard:fvp-tftf-fip.tftf-aemv8a.8_5-debug CI configurations. Alexei Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 23 September 2020 18:25 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Tests to verify BP_OPTION Hi, Is there any test to verify the BP_OPTION feature set to “pac-ret+leaf” ? When BRANCH_PROTECTION is set to “3”, BP_OPTION is set to “pac-ret+leaf”. Reference code - https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/Makefile Thanks, Kalyani

5 years, 11 months

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a80x0_mcbin doesn't build with recommended mv-ddr-marvell

by Jan Kiszka

Hi all, docs/plat/marvell/armada/build.rst says that you should use branch mv_ddr-armada-atf-mainline from [1]. But that no longer works with tf-a master. The mv-ddr-devel branch builds fine (didn't run the result, though). make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-linux-gnu- PLAT=a80x0_mcbin \ USE_COHERENT_MEM=0 MV_DDR_PATH=.../mv-ddr-marvell/ \ SCP_BL2=.../mrvl_scp_bl2.img Are there plans to update the tf-a doc or rather refresh that branch? Jan [1] https://github.com/MarvellEmbeddedProcessors/mv-ddr-marvell.git

5 years, 11 months

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Nailgun

by Varun Wadekar

Hi, Recently, I learned about Nailgun [1] - leak information by snooping across privilege boundaries with the help of CoreSight. The proof of concept uses Raspberry Pi3 (uses Cortex A-53 CPUs) platform to demonstrate the exploit. Has anyone reviewed this attack and does it affect other Arm v8 CPUs too? Do we have support in TF-A to disable CoreSight to mitigate against such attacks? Are there any other mitigations against this attack? -Varun [1] https://github.com/ningzhenyu/nailgun

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF

by Olivier Deprez

Hi Sandeep, Your question is very valid and we're discussing options internally. We will come back to you with a consolidated answer shortly. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: Sandeep Tripathy Sent: Monday, September 28, 2020 05:28 To: Soby Mathew Cc: Dan Handley; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; nd; Olivier Deprez Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF Thanks Soby and Dan for confirmation on TSPD. I can see a few more gaps in the related area. "The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC i.e. any execution context for that matter ". This should apply to all SPDs including SPMD. However I learned from @Oliver that SPMD/SPMC design traps FIQs to S_EL2. In that case a RAS interrupt can be masked by S_EL2 software (eg: Hafnium). Probably by design it will be ensured that S_EL2 will never mask the physical FIQ ? S_EL2 FIQ handler will exit to EL3/SPMD by SMC call. And depending on the pending interrupt type either it can exit to NWd OR invoke el3 fiq vector handler synchronously ? Are there limitations if we trap fiq to EL3 instead ? Thanks Sandeep On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:26 PM Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> wrote: > > Hi Sandeep > > > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECUE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). > > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC. Hence the usage of GIC PMR to mask the NS interrupts. As Dan says, the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT predates the EHF design and it seems there is a problem as you describe. > > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > You are right. Routing model manipulation is not required when EL3 interrupts are present as GIC PMR manipulation should take care of the required behaviour for yielding vs atomic SMC. You also need to ensure it works as expected when EL3 interrupts are not enabled and when EHF is disabled. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > > Tripathy via TF-A > > Sent: 17 September 2020 16:53 > > To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF > > > > Hi Dan, > > I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think > > EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs > > and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. > > If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf- > > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > > A correction... > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan > > > > Handley via TF-A > > > > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > > > > depending on > > > > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > > > > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the > > TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 > > > > case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a > > > > yielding SMC in S- EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to > > follow? > > > > > > > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are > > routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing > > over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to > > ehf_allow_ns_preemption. > > > > > > > Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts > > and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. > > But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is > > happening in TSPD. > > > > > Dan. > > > > > > -- > > > TF-A mailing list > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] Query SPD/SPMD behavior with EHF

by Sandeep Tripathy

Thanks Soby and Dan for confirmation on TSPD. I can see a few more gaps in the related area. "The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC i.e. any execution context for that matter ". This should apply to all SPDs including SPMD. However I learned from @Oliver that SPMD/SPMC design traps FIQs to S_EL2. In that case a RAS interrupt can be masked by S_EL2 software (eg: Hafnium). Probably by design it will be ensured that S_EL2 will never mask the physical FIQ ? S_EL2 FIQ handler will exit to EL3/SPMD by SMC call. And depending on the pending interrupt type either it can exit to NWd OR invoke el3 fiq vector handler synchronously ? Are there limitations if we trap fiq to EL3 instead ? Thanks Sandeep On Fri, Sep 18, 2020 at 6:26 PM Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> wrote: > > Hi Sandeep > > > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECUE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). > > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC. Hence the usage of GIC PMR to mask the NS interrupts. As Dan says, the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT predates the EHF design and it seems there is a problem as you describe. > > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > You are right. Routing model manipulation is not required when EL3 interrupts are present as GIC PMR manipulation should take care of the required behaviour for yielding vs atomic SMC. You also need to ensure it works as expected when EL3 interrupts are not enabled and when EHF is disabled. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > > Tripathy via TF-A > > Sent: 17 September 2020 16:53 > > To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF > > > > Hi Dan, > > I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think > > EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs > > and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. > > If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf- > > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > > > A correction... > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan > > > > Handley via TF-A > > > > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > > > > depending on > > > > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > > > > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the > > TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 > > > > case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a > > > > yielding SMC in S- EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to > > follow? > > > > > > > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are > > routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing > > over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to > > ehf_allow_ns_preemption. > > > > > > > Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts > > and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. > > But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is > > happening in TSPD. > > > > > Dan. > > > > > > -- > > > TF-A mailing list > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 11 months

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When to implement plat_sdei_validate_entry_point?

by Jan Kiszka

Hi, I'm adding basic SDEI support to the zynqmp platform (just private event 0 for now), and I'm wondering what to do with plat_sdei_validate_entry_point(). Looking around what other SDEI implementations did, neither tegra nor the recently added imx8mm implement this and rather rely on the empty stub from plat/common/aarch64/plat_common.c. As zynqmp also pulls in plat/arm/common/arm_common.c and doesn't find any arm_validate_ns_entrypoint, my search started. Is there anything that makes the check for tegra and imx8mm unneeded? Or are they both broken and should better use plat_sdei_validate_entry_point from plat/arm/common/arm_common.c? Thanks, Jan

5 years, 11 months

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Re: [TF-A] TF-A warm reboot question

by Soby Mathew

Hi Maxim, There could be some terminology mixup that needs to be clarified. These are the typical words related to boot in TF-A: 1. cold boot : This is the first boot after a power cycle. Typically a single CPU is powered up and executed the entire boot flow upto linux 2. Warm boot: The Cold boot has completed and transitioned into Linux kernel and then the kernel invokes PSCI_CPU_ON to power up the secondary CPUs. This is the CPU `hotplug` operation from linux side. The figure you referred to mentions these boot scenarios. Now reboot is system reset + cold boot. Ideally if QEMU has to support reboot, it needs to be able to reset the system (CPUs and peripherals) from software. The flow you suggest for QEMU could work but if the CPU and the peripherals are not reset properly, you could encounter errors later on because software could assume reset values for some registers and hence may not initialize it. Also there are registers that are 1 time write and cannot be written to again without proper reset cycle, and these could problems during execution. Best Regards Soby Mathew > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Maxim > Uvarov via TF-A > Sent: 24 September 2020 13:27 > To: Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Ilias Apalodimas > <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org>; Arnd Bergmann <arnd(a)linaro.org> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] TF-A warm reboot question > > sorry, wrong email thread. > > Another way around is to not support "hot reset" in ATF, but make qemu > reboot is implement some watchdog for qemu virt platform. That also works > for me with quick implementation with lhe link which I sent in the previous > email. > > Maxim. > > On Thu, 24 Sep 2020 at 15:16, Maxim Uvarov via TF-A <tf- > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > I.e. that implementation works for me: > > > https://github.com/muvarov/qemu/commit/f5e3fb83170613a9eed46b87358 > ab2e > > 37de260a2 > > > > On Mon, 21 Sep 2020 at 18:16, Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> > wrote: > > > > > > Hello, > > > > > > I'm trying to understand why "warm reboot" is not currently > > > implemented in TF-A for qemu targets. I.e. in case of qemu armv8 > > > boot > > > atf->optee->uboot->linux and then reboot, cpu jumps to BL31 > > > qemu_system_reset() function which just calls panic(). I'm wondering > > > why loading images from this stage is not happening? Something > > > similar to bl2_load_images()->load_image() to load uboot and optee > > > os again and run them with bl31_main()? > > > > > > If I understand "CPU reset" spec [1] correctly, warm boot from reset > > > vector in BL31 again to Non-Secure world has to work. > > > > > > [1] > > > https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted- > firmware/blob/master/doc > > > s/design/reset-design.rst > > > > > > Best regards, > > > Maxim. > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-A] TF-A warm reboot question

by Maxim Uvarov

sorry, wrong email thread. Another way around is to not support "hot reset" in ATF, but make qemu reboot is implement some watchdog for qemu virt platform. That also works for me with quick implementation with lhe link which I sent in the previous email. Maxim. On Thu, 24 Sep 2020 at 15:16, Maxim Uvarov via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > I.e. that implementation works for me: > https://github.com/muvarov/qemu/commit/f5e3fb83170613a9eed46b87358ab2e37de2… > > On Mon, 21 Sep 2020 at 18:16, Maxim Uvarov <maxim.uvarov(a)linaro.org> wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > > I'm trying to understand why "warm reboot" is not currently > > implemented in TF-A for qemu targets. I.e. in case of qemu armv8 boot > > atf->optee->uboot->linux and then reboot, cpu jumps to BL31 > > qemu_system_reset() function which just calls panic(). I'm wondering > > why loading images from this stage is not happening? Something > > similar to bl2_load_images()->load_image() to load uboot and optee os > > again and run them with bl31_main()? > > > > If I understand "CPU reset" spec [1] correctly, warm boot from reset > > vector in BL31 again to Non-Secure world has to work. > > > > [1] https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/docs/desig… > > > > Best regards, > > Maxim. > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

5 years, 12 months

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TF-A warm reboot question

by Maxim Uvarov

Hello, I'm trying to understand why "warm reboot" is not currently implemented in TF-A for qemu targets. I.e. in case of qemu armv8 boot atf->optee->uboot->linux and then reboot, cpu jumps to BL31 qemu_system_reset() function which just calls panic(). I'm wondering why loading images from this stage is not happening? Something similar to bl2_load_images()->load_image() to load uboot and optee os again and run them with bl31_main()? If I understand "CPU reset" spec [1] correctly, warm boot from reset vector in BL31 again to Non-Secure world has to work. [1] https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/docs/desig… Best regards, Maxim.

5 years, 12 months

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Cancelled event with note: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 24 Sep 2020 16:00 - 17:00 (BST) (tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Bill Fletcher

This event has been cancelled with this note: "Due to conflicts with Linaro Connect this week we are cancelling this week’s TF-A Techforum on Thursday, 24th September 2020 at 16:00 – 17:00 BST. The next meeting will now be Thursday, 8th October 2020 at 16:00 – 17:00 BST" Title: TF-A Tech Forum We run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Invites are via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h   When: Thu 24 Sep 2020 16:00 – 17:00 United Kingdom Time Calendar: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Bill Fletcher- creator * marek.bykowski(a)gmail.com * okash.khawaja(a)gmail.com * tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

5 years, 12 months

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Linaro Connect Sessions of Interest

by Don Harbin

Hi All, As Linaro Connect starts tomorrow, here are some pointers to sessions that will be of interest related to trustedfirmware.org. - *PSA Secure Partitions in OP-TEE* - Tuesday, September 22nd (1:25-1:50pm UTC) - Speaker: Miklos Balint - Slides available here <https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/lvc20/9a/LVC20-112_PSA_Secure_Partiti…> - *Trusted Firmware Project update* - Tuesday, Sept. 22nd (2:00-2:25pm UTC) - Spreaders: Matteo Carlini, Shebu Kuriakose - Slides available here <https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/lvc20/1e/LVC20-113-Trusted-Firmware-p…> - *Scalable Security Using Trusted Firmware-M Profiles* - Wednesday September 23rd (11.45am – 12.10pm UTC) - Speakers: Shebu Kuiakose, David Want - Slides available here <https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/lvc20/d0/ScalableSecurityUsingTrusted…> - *Enable UEFI Secure Boot using OP-TEE as Secure Partition* - Thursday September 24th (3.45-4.10pm UTC) - Speakers: Sahil Malhotra, Ilias Apalodimas - *Secure Partition Manager (SEL2 firmware) for Arm A-class devices* - Thursday September 24th (4.15-4.40pm UTC) - Speaker: Olivier Deprez - Slides are available here <https://static.sched.com/hosted_files/lvc20/09/LVC20-305-secure-partition-m…> Some general pointers to sessions of potential interest: - Security related topics can be viewed here - Boot architecture topics can be viewed here As a reminder, sign up for tomorrow's event is at Linaro Connect Registration <https://connect.linaro.org/> and is free, so feel free to forward this information on. :) The overall schedule is available at the same link as registration in case you may be interested in other sessions. Best regards, Don

5 years, 12 months

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TF-A TechForum 24th Sept Cancelled

by Joanna Farley

Due to conflicts this week I am cancelling this week’s TF-A Techforum on Thursday, 24th September 2020 at 16:00 – 17:00 BST. The next meeting will now be Thursday, 8th October 2020 at 16:00 – 17:00 BST Apologies all. Joanna

5 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-A] Tests to verify BP_OPTION

by Alexei Fedorov

Hi, Yes, there are fvp-pauth-pac-ret-leaf-sdei,fvp-pauth-standard:fvp-tftf-fip.tftf-aemv8a.8_5-debug fvp-pauth-pac-ret-leaf-tsp-sdei,fvp-pauth-standard:fvp-tftf-fip.tftf-aemv8a.8_5-debug configs in platform-ci/group/tftf-l2-fvp introduced by https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/ci/tf-a-ci-scripts/+/5393 Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 17 September 2020 19:18 To: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Tests to verify BP_OPTION <Bump to get this email through> From: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2020 11:54 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com> Subject: Tests to verify BP_OPTION Hi, Is there any test to verify the BP_OPTION feature set to “pac-ret+leaf” ? When BRANCH_PROTECTION is set to “3”, BP_OPTION is set to “pac-ret+leaf”. Reference code - https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/Makefile Thanks, Kalyani

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF

by Soby Mathew

Hi Sandeep > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECUE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. The EL3 interrupts (G0 interrupts) should be able to pre-empt Fast SMC. Hence the usage of GIC PMR to mask the NS interrupts. As Dan says, the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT predates the EHF design and it seems there is a problem as you describe. > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. You are right. Routing model manipulation is not required when EL3 interrupts are present as GIC PMR manipulation should take care of the required behaviour for yielding vs atomic SMC. You also need to ensure it works as expected when EL3 interrupts are not enabled and when EHF is disabled. Best Regards Soby Mathew > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > Tripathy via TF-A > Sent: 17 September 2020 16:53 > To: Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF > > Hi Dan, > I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think > EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs > and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. > If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. > > Thanks > Sandeep > > On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf- > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > > A correction... > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan > > > Handley via TF-A > > > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > > > depending on > > > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the > TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 > > > case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a > > > yielding SMC in S- EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to > follow? > > > > > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are > routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing > over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to > ehf_allow_ns_preemption. > > > > Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts > and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. > But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is > happening in TSPD. > > > Dan. > > > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Build failure in OpenCI

by Joanna Farley

FYI we are trying to get the OpenCI to use a different label (Validation-Bot-Review) which is not part our of day to day workflow for patch approvals but standard plugins being used don't seem to support non standard labels so they are working on an alternative approach. Hopefully it will be fixed soon so we don't have to manually remove the OpenCI bot setting on the CR label. Joanna On 18/09/2020, 09:30, "TF-A on behalf of Yann GAUTIER via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hi Olivier, Thanks for your answer. I was not particularly worried when I saw what the error was. And I understand it can take time to stabilize such infrastructure. It is nice that we can have access to it now. Regards, Yann -----Original Message----- From: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> Sent: vendredi 18 septembre 2020 10:22 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Yann GAUTIER <yann.gautier(a)st.com> Subject: Re: Build failure in OpenCI Hi Yann, The OpenCI is under enablement/works, and I think you can safely ignore those CR-1/Verified-1 from the bot. Current CI strategy is still about maintainers applying Allow-CI+1/2 (resulting in Verified+1 on success). Sorry for the trouble it causes presently. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Yann GAUTIER via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 18 September 2020 09:33 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Build failure in OpenCI Hi, I've pushed some series of patches this morning, but none of them passes the OpenCI builds and tests. For all of them, the error is the same, Lava cannot find a file: http://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder//ws/custom_lava_job_definiti…<http://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder/ws/custom_lava_job_definitio…> See for example: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/post-build-lava/3941/console Do you know what's wrong with this file? And if it will be corrected soon? Thanks, Yann -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Build failure in OpenCI

by Olivier Deprez

Hi Yann, The OpenCI is under enablement/works, and I think you can safely ignore those CR-1/Verified-1 from the bot. Current CI strategy is still about maintainers applying Allow-CI+1/2 (resulting in Verified+1 on success). Sorry for the trouble it causes presently. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Yann GAUTIER via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 18 September 2020 09:33 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Build failure in OpenCI Hi, I’ve pushed some series of patches this morning, but none of them passes the OpenCI builds and tests. For all of them, the error is the same, Lava cannot find a file: http://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder//ws/custom_lava_job_definiti…<http://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder/ws/custom_lava_job_definitio…> See for example: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/post-build-lava/3941/console Do you know what’s wrong with this file? And if it will be corrected soon? Thanks, Yann

6 years

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Build failure in OpenCI

by Yann GAUTIER

Hi, I've pushed some series of patches this morning, but none of them passes the OpenCI builds and tests. For all of them, the error is the same, Lava cannot find a file: http://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder//ws/custom_lava_job_definiti…<http://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/tf-a-builder/ws/custom_lava_job_definitio…> See for example: https://ci.trustedfirmware.org/job/post-build-lava/3941/console Do you know what's wrong with this file? And if it will be corrected soon? Thanks, Yann

6 years

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Tests to verify BP_OPTION

by Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan

Hi, Is there any test to verify the BP_OPTION feature set to "pac-ret+leaf" ? When BRANCH_PROTECTION is set to "3", BP_OPTION is set to "pac-ret+leaf". Reference code - https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/Makefile Thanks, Kalyani

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF

by Sandeep Tripathy

Hi Dan, I am not sure if this is mentioned anywhere in any documents but I think EHF handlers should be able to preempt all execution contexts at lower ELs and lower ELs should never be able to mask such interrupts. If the behavioral expectation is set the implementation can be fixed. Thanks Sandeep On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 7:57 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > A correction... > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan Handley > > via TF-A > > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > > depending on > > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 case, > > where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a yielding SMC in S- > > EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to follow? > > > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to ehf_allow_ns_preemption. > Right, that is the case for yielding SMC handling where both NS interrupts and EL3/G0 interrupts can preempt the S_EL1/S_EL2 context. But I would expect the same routing model even for 'Fast SMC' unlike what is happening in TSPD. > Dan. > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF

by Dan Handley

A correction... > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Dan Handley > via TF-A > Sent: 17 September 2020 15:14 > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF > > > depending on > > what is the expected behavior. > > > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 case, > where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a yielding SMC in S- > EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to follow? > Sorry, if EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING=1 then obviously NS interrupts are routed to EL3 first, but the TSPD re-enables NS interrupts before handing over to the TSP to handle yielding calls, via a call to ehf_allow_ns_preemption. Dan.

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF

by Dan Handley

Hi Sandeep > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > Tripathy via TF-A > > > > EHF activates the routing model for ‘INTR_TYPE_EL3’ CSS = 0 , TEL3 = 1 > ie FIQ trapped to EL3 and not visible and not mask-able to lower ELs. > > > > Which means G0 interrupts (all EHF interrupts) expected to preempt any > > execution context. And secure state cannot mask such interrupts > > > > eg: critical error interrupts. Sort of NMI behavior. > > > > However from TSPD code I see ‘TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT’ enforces a > slightly different behavior. G0 interrupt cannot preempt a fast smc handler > in SPD. > > > > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);’ > is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution > (Fast SMC). > > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 > interrupt are on FIQ. I haven't double checked but that sounds correct. > > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model > seems unnecessary in this case. > > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > The TSPD's TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT functionality predates the EHF, which probably explains why NS interrupts are disabled in 2 ways in this config (i.e. when both TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT and EL3_EXCEPTION_HANDLING equal 1). I guess it's possible that the call to disable the routing model can be safely removed in this config but it would require some thorough code review and testing. I'm not sure if this config is tested much at all. > > > > > > Do we think it is not aligned with G0 interrupt preemption rule. Or do we > treat Fast SMC at S_EL1/EL2 as non interruptible. > > I think G0 interrupts should be handled in this case but I'm not sure if this is easy to fix in the TSPD. > > > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF depending on > what is the expected behavior. > > Hmm, I thought OP-TEED was more like the TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT=0 case, where NS interrupts are routed to S-EL1 while processing a yielding SMC in S-EL1? Perhaps that's a better TSPD config for you to follow? Regards Dan.

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] Query TSPD behavior with EHF

by Sandeep Tripathy

Updated.. On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 10:51 AM Sandeep Tripathy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi, > > EHF activates the routing model for ‘INTR_TYPE_EL3’ CSS = 0 , TEL3 = 1 ie FIQ trapped to EL3 and not visible and not mask-able to lower ELs. > > Which means G0 interrupts (all EHF interrupts) expected to preempt any execution context. And secure state cannot mask such interrupts > > eg: critical error interrupts. Sort of NMI behavior. > > > > However from TSPD code I see ‘TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT’ enforces a slightly different behavior. G0 interrupt cannot preempt a fast smc handler in SPD. > > Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). > But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. > EHF already ensures this by GIC PMR adjustment. So disabling routing model seems unnecessary in this case. > This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. > > > > Do we think it is not aligned with G0 interrupt preemption rule. Or do we treat Fast SMC at S_EL1/EL2 as non interruptible. > > > > I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF depending on what is the expected behavior. > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years

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Query TSPD behavior with EHF

by Sandeep Tripathy

Hi, EHF activates the routing model for ‘INTR_TYPE_EL3’ CSS = 0 , TEL3 = 1 ie FIQ trapped to EL3 and not visible and not mask-able to lower ELs. Which means G0 interrupts (all EHF interrupts) expected to preempt any execution context. And secure state cannot mask such interrupts eg: critical error interrupts. Sort of NMI behavior. However from TSPD code I see ‘TSP_NS_INTR_ASYNC_PREEMPT’ enforces a slightly different behavior. G0 interrupt cannot preempt a fast smc handler in SPD. Except during yielding SMC ‘disable_intr_rm_local(INTR_TYPE_NS, SECURE);’ is in effect. Intention is to avoid NS interrupt preempt secure execution (Fast SMC). But I think that will also disable G0 interrupt as both NS interrupt and G0 interrupt are on FIQ. This is my understanding from the code please confirm if this is correct. Do we think it is not aligned with G0 interrupt preemption rule. Or do we treat Fast SMC at S_EL1/EL2 as non interruptible. I want to handle something similar in OP-TEED along with EHF depending on what is the expected behavior. Thanks Sandeep

6 years

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ATF currently does not use proper printf format specifiers for fixed width types

by Scott Branden

Hello, ATF currently uses non-portable printf format specifiers for fixed width types defined in stdint.h In addition, ATF redefines types defined in gcc for stdint.h with its own custom types causing additional issues. This causes compilation issues when porting code to/from ATF. AND, generates coverity parse errors as int64_t and uint64_t are incorrectly defined in ATF vs. gcc for aarch64. The printf format specifiers in inttypes.h are to be used for the proper format specifiers. And, uint64_t/int64_t should be defined the same as in gcc. I tried fixing up all the instances of int64 printf format specifiers by introducing inttypes.h and redefined the stdint types correctly here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5437 We have checked the change into our local tree so that everything compiles and runs in our system. Please accept change upstream. Regards, Scott

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] ATF LTS version

by François Ozog

On Thu, 11 Jun 2020 at 23:42, Varun Wadekar via TF-A < tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hello Matteo, > > Apologies for still using an outdated term. I have trained myself to get > used to "TF-A" - looks like I am still not there. > > >> The idea has also been just raised to the Trusted Firmware project > Board for initial consideration and we will be all very keen to understand > how much interest there is from the wider TF-A community of adopters and > external (non-Arm) maintainers > > That is good to hear. For the exact scope, I think we can assume the usual > expectations from any LTS software stack - stability, performance, > security, bug fixes along with maintenance support. We are open to > discussing the cadence and any other operational commitments. > > @Francois, from the description of Trusted Substrate looks like you also > expect the sub-projects to provide LTS versions for the project as a whole > to succeed (?) > > Yes. I assume relevant tf.org projects decide to branch LTSes so that we can extend the scope to selected OP-TEE TAs for the Trusted Substrate LTS and may be extend duration of support for the tf.org LTSes. (just to make sure: this is just early open thinking to understand what it would mean to build such a service on the Linaro side should there be tf.org LTSes). -Varun > > > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Matteo > Carlini via TF-A > Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2020 4:25 AM > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: Re: [TF-A] ATF LTS version > > External email: Use caution opening links or attachments > > > Hi Francois, > > > I'd be happy to know more about what you see as TFA LTS: exact scope, > number of versions, duration, operational commitments (zero-day...). > > Do you have other firmware LTS needs? > > Agree. That’s precisely what I was hinting to Varun, when mentioning > concrete requirements for the LTS scheme. > > > Trusted Substrate is the aggregation of { TFA, OP-TEE, some TEE apps > such as firmwareTPM, U-Boot }. > > Trusted Substrate effort is led by Linaro members and is going to be set > up as a more open project. > > First time I heard about it. Good to know, but I guess we'll need to > discuss the intersection and collaboration with the Trusted Firmware > project at some point. > Having a LTS versioning scheme for the Trusted Firmware hosted projects > should be theoretically either in the scope of the Project itself or, if > the Board agrees, appointed to some other project/entity. > > > Our end goal is to enable unified, transactional, robust (anti-bricking, > anti rollback) UEFI OTA on both U-Boot and EDK2. > > Fair, but IMHO this has little to do with Arm Secure world software LTS > releases (TF-A/Hafnium/OP-TEE/TAs, TF-M)...probably best to discuss aside, > this is not in scope of what Varun is raising. > > Thanks > Matteo > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > -- François-Frédéric Ozog | *Director Linaro Edge & Fog Computing Group* T: +33.67221.6485 francois.ozog(a)linaro.org | Skype: ffozog

6 years

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Test message please ignore

by Bill Fletcher

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6 years

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TF-A Tech Forum Agenda @ Thr 10th September 2020 16:00-1700 BST

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 10th September 2020 16:00 – 17:00 (BST). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. Agenda: * Proposal for a LTS (Long Term Support) Release Option for TF-A * Presented by Varun Wadekar * Long-term support is a lifecycle management policy in which a stable release is maintained for a period of time * Optional TF-A Mailing List Topic Discussions If TF-A contributors have anything they wish to present at any future TF-A tech forum please contact me to have that scheduled. Previous sessions, both recording and presentation material can be found on the trustedfirmware.org TF-A Technical meeting webpage: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ A scheduling tracking page is also available to help track sessions suggested and being prepared: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a-tech-forum-scheduling/ Final decisions on what will be presented will be shared a few days before the next meeting and shared on the TF-A mailing list. Thanks Joanna

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction

by Olivier Deprez

Hi again, After further check, it looks gcc 9.2 already supports the appropriate option. Maybe you missed ARM_ARCH_MINOR on the build command line depending on whether you need PAuth (Armv8.3) and/or BTI (Armv8.5). BRANCH_PROTECTION=2 or 3 => need ARM_ARCH_MINOR=3 (at least) BRANCH_PROTECTION=1 or 4 => need ARM_ARCH_MINOR=5 Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Olivier Deprez via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 03 September 2020 09:47 To: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Varun Wadekar Subject: Re: [TF-A] GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction Hi Kalyani, According to https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/build-op… you need a compiler supporting the -mbranch-protection option. This seems to be the case from gcc 9.3 onwards: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-9.3.0/gcc/AArch64-Options.html#AArch64-O… Notice a GCC10.2 cross-compiler release is planned by end of this year according to this page: https://community.arm.com/developer/tools-software/tools/b/tools-software-i… Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 03 September 2020 04:08 To: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction <Dummy response to get the email through to the mailing list> From: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:43 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com> Subject: GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction Hi, We are using gcc-arm-9.2 toolchain and see that this is not supporting the “xpaci” instruction. Is there any compiler flag that has to be included to support this? Reference code that uses “xpaci” when PAUTH is enabled - https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/bl31/aarch… Thanks, Kalyani -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction

by Olivier Deprez

Hi Kalyani, According to https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/build-op… you need a compiler supporting the -mbranch-protection option. This seems to be the case from gcc 9.3 onwards: https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc-9.3.0/gcc/AArch64-Options.html#AArch64-O… Notice a GCC10.2 cross-compiler release is planned by end of this year according to this page: https://community.arm.com/developer/tools-software/tools/b/tools-software-i… Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 03 September 2020 04:08 To: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction <Dummy response to get the email through to the mailing list> From: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:43 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com> Subject: GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction Hi, We are using gcc-arm-9.2 toolchain and see that this is not supporting the “xpaci” instruction. Is there any compiler flag that has to be included to support this? Reference code that uses “xpaci” when PAUTH is enabled - https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/bl31/aarch… Thanks, Kalyani

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction

by Varun Wadekar

<Dummy response to get the email through to the mailing list> From: Kalyani Chidambaram Vaidyanathan <kalyanic(a)nvidia.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:43 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com> Subject: GCC compiler option to support "xpaci" instruction Hi, We are using gcc-arm-9.2 toolchain and see that this is not supporting the "xpaci" instruction. Is there any compiler flag that has to be included to support this? Reference code that uses "xpaci" when PAUTH is enabled - https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/blob/master/bl31/aarch… Thanks, Kalyani

6 years

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List of issues with Cactus as SPMC on pre-8.4 CPUs

by Varun Wadekar

Hi @Olivier<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>, We have been trying to use Cactus as SPMC on Tegra194 (pre 8.4) platforms and have faced the following issues. 1. Cactus_main.c - During cold boot, Cactus checks if the ffa-id for the instance of Cactus == SPM_VM_ID_FIRST. It issues FFA_ID_GET SMC to TF-A which returns the spmc_id in return. But on pre-8.4 platforms the value does not match SPM_VM_ID_FIRST and so the system assumes that the device is running on a post-8.4 CPU. The problem is that TF-A returns the spmc_id for this SMC, which seems incorrect. I don't understand why Cactus needs to know its own VM_ID on pre-8.4 CPUs. Can we assume that only one SPMC can run on pre-8.4? 2. Cactus_ffa_tests.c - The ` ffa_partition_info_get_test` incorrectly queries the partition info for secondary and tertiary VMs on pre-8.4 CPUs. 3. In general the boot tests that execute within Cactus seem incorrect to me. Some tests expect the presence of a non-secure world payload, which is not available at this point in the boot. This leads to numerous crashes and asserts during boot. 4. Cactus incorrectly uses a hard-coded address 0x7300000 as the RX/TX memory base. It should be using a platform defined value instead. We do not support this memory address on Tegra194. 5. The debug UART in Cactus needs rework too. Right now, it only supports PL011 as the UART driver. 6. TF-A SPMD forwards some SMCs to the non-secure world without checking if a non-secure world payload exists. This causes crashes during cold boot. Please let me know if you have commits for any or all of these issues. We have some WIP commits that we can push to gerrit for review, if required. Thoughts? -Varun

6 years

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question about tf-a spec

by chen feng

Hello arm expects, While reading the tf-a spec about the section "3.5.1 Register state". It described that "The MMU must be disabled for a partition that does not run in S-EL0". Does this mean that the S-EL1 SP need to create their own page table and enable the MMU itself. I wonder in this way, it is not very friendly to a SP developer. Since the SP can be a verify simple binary, maybe a single driver which can benefited from the isolation from other partitions. So in the pointer of developing a single driver. I think it do not need to care about the MMU configuration. It will be more friendly to be as easy as developing a user-land binary. The SPMC(SEL2) can do this configure for the SEL1's page-tables and enable MMU for SEL1 before jump into the SP. So I want to discuss here to understand the meaning behind it. Cheers, Feng

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] [query] sbsa level 3 spec: non secure watchdog WS1 handling at EL3

by Sandeep Tripathy

Hi Dan, On Thu, Aug 27, 2020 at 8:31 PM Dan Handley via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi Sandeep > > > > Arm development platforms that have an SBSA secure watchdog like N1SDP do not register an interrupt handler for the WS0 signal. They simply wait for the WS1 signal, which is fed to a higher agent (in this case the System Control Processor), which resets the platform. > There is no explicit watchdog interrupt handling functionality in TF-A. > what happens to non secure sbsa WS1 ? That is the case for Secure sbsa WS1. NS WS0 ----> EL1 X (optional) but linux already implements it . NS WS1 ----> EL3 X TF-A Do not handle it. Hence the patch. Not handling it altogether is not an option I guess. S WS0 -------> EL3 X (optional) . Platform might want to log this condition. S WS1 ----------------------------------------> handled by a higher agent. > > > If your platform does not have a higher agent that handles WS1 then I guess you could add a handler in TF-A as you suggest in your code snippet, though I'm not sure if the maintainers would want this in generic SBSA code. Also, I don't see why you need both callback(s) and the explicit call to psci_systrem_reset2(), when presumably the callback(s) would do the latter. > Platform callback can optionally do more things like some logging. Ultimately 'system_reset2' seems to be the thing everyone would like to do as part of action. Then to reduce duplicate code we can have at one place. > > > > Q1- What happens if core is stuck and interrupts are not taken. > > It's rare for EL3 interrupts not to be taken when the core is stuck, unless an EL3 exception handler itself is stuck, in which case I'm not sure there's much you can do. That's why it's good to have a higher agent. > The rare lockup of core where it's not able to respond (not the software ones) requires some other agent to detect and reset/recover the system. Linux watchdog (ns sbsa WS1) will go unnoticed in such cases. ie. even if the watchdog hardware detected the lockup and indicated by WS0 then WS1 .. both were not acted upon. If it were the secure watchdog then no issues. > > > > Or it has to be registered as a RAS priority exception. > > I don't think that would help, unless the system was flooded with higher priority exceptions that prevented the watchdog handler from running. > > > > Regards > > > Dan. > > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep Tripathy via TF-A > Sent: 27 August 2020 12:14 > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-A] [query] sbsa level 3 spec: non secure watchdog WS1 handling at EL3 > > > > Hi, > > Based on sbsa spec for level-3 firmware specification watchdog signals NS WS1 and S WS0 to be handled at EL3 firmware. > > I have some query on how TF-A plans to implement this. > > > > Ref: Excerpt DEN0029D_SBSA_6.0 https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0029/d/?lang=en > > 3.2.3 Watchdogs The required behavior of watchdog signal 1 of the Non-secure watchdog is modified in level 3– firmware and is required to be routed as an SPI to the GIC. It is expected that this SPI be configured as an EL3 interrupt, directly targeting a single PE. A system compatible with level 3- firmware must implement a second watchdog, and is referred to as the Secure watchdog. It must have both its register frames mapped in the Secure memory address space and must not be aliased to the Non-secure address space. Watchdog Signal 0 of the Secure watchdog must be routed as an SPI to the GIC and it is expected this will be configured as an EL3 interrupt, directly targeting a single PE. > > > > Q1- What happens if core is stuck and interrupts are not taken. Non-secure watchdog will expire and ultimately results in a WS1 which is also not taken as the core is not responding. > > If WS1 were to another subsystem (eg: SCP) then it would take action. > > In current scheme is it the secure sbsa wdg expected to detect such hang ? > > > > Q2- How to handle sbsa watchdog interrupt at EL3. Please suggest if I should make a patch in following approach to start with. Or it has to be registered as a RAS priority exception. > > > > diff --git a/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c b/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c > > index 79c6f26..9683ef8 100644 > > --- a/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c > > +++ b/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c > > @@ -40,3 +40,26 @@ > > + > > +#define weak plat_sbsa_nt_wdog_ws1_handle > > +#define weak plat_sbsa_t_wdog_ws0_handle > > +void sbsa_wdog_handler(int id) > > +{ > > + if (id == SBSA_NT_WDG_WS1_INT) { > > + /* PUBLISH_EVENT */ > > + plat_sbsa_nt_wdog_ws1_handle(); > > + } else if (id == SBSA_T_WDG_WS0_INT) { > > + /* PUBLISH_EVENT */ > > + plat_sbsa_t_wdog_ws0_handle(); > > + } > > + /* EOI and reset , log what else */ > > + psci_systrem_reset2(); > > +} > > + > > +void sbsa_wdog_hander_init(void) > > +{ > > +#if EXCEPTION_HANDLING_FRAMEWORK > > + ehf_register_priority_handler(SBSA_WDG_PRI, sbsa_wdog_handler); > > +#endif > > +} > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a Thanks Sandeep

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] [query] sbsa level 3 spec: non secure watchdog WS1 handling at EL3

by Dan Handley

Hi Sandeep Arm development platforms that have an SBSA secure watchdog like N1SDP do not register an interrupt handler for the WS0 signal. They simply wait for the WS1 signal, which is fed to a higher agent (in this case the System Control Processor), which resets the platform. There is no explicit watchdog interrupt handling functionality in TF-A. If your platform does not have a higher agent that handles WS1 then I guess you could add a handler in TF-A as you suggest in your code snippet, though I'm not sure if the maintainers would want this in generic SBSA code. Also, I don't see why you need both callback(s) and the explicit call to psci_systrem_reset2(), when presumably the callback(s) would do the latter. > Q1- What happens if core is stuck and interrupts are not taken. It's rare for EL3 interrupts not to be taken when the core is stuck, unless an EL3 exception handler itself is stuck, in which case I'm not sure there's much you can do. That's why it's good to have a higher agent. > Or it has to be registered as a RAS priority exception. I don't think that would help, unless the system was flooded with higher priority exceptions that prevented the watchdog handler from running. Regards Dan. From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep Tripathy via TF-A Sent: 27 August 2020 12:14 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] [query] sbsa level 3 spec: non secure watchdog WS1 handling at EL3 Hi, Based on sbsa spec for level-3 firmware specification watchdog signals NS WS1 and S WS0 to be handled at EL3 firmware. I have some query on how TF-A plans to implement this. Ref: Excerpt DEN0029D_SBSA_6.0 https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0029/d/?lang=en 3.2.3 Watchdogs The required behavior of watchdog signal 1 of the Non-secure watchdog is modified in level 3– firmware and is required to be routed as an SPI to the GIC. It is expected that this SPI be configured as an EL3 interrupt, directly targeting a single PE. A system compatible with level 3- firmware must implement a second watchdog, and is referred to as the Secure watchdog. It must have both its register frames mapped in the Secure memory address space and must not be aliased to the Non-secure address space. Watchdog Signal 0 of the Secure watchdog must be routed as an SPI to the GIC and it is expected this will be configured as an EL3 interrupt, directly targeting a single PE. Q1- What happens if core is stuck and interrupts are not taken. Non-secure watchdog will expire and ultimately results in a WS1 which is also not taken as the core is not responding. If WS1 were to another subsystem (eg: SCP) then it would take action. In current scheme is it the secure sbsa wdg expected to detect such hang ? Q2- How to handle sbsa watchdog interrupt at EL3. Please suggest if I should make a patch in following approach to start with. Or it has to be registered as a RAS priority exception. diff --git a/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c b/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c index 79c6f26..9683ef8 100644 --- a/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c +++ b/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c @@ -40,3 +40,26 @@ + +#define weak plat_sbsa_nt_wdog_ws1_handle +#define weak plat_sbsa_t_wdog_ws0_handle +void sbsa_wdog_handler(int id) +{ + if (id == SBSA_NT_WDG_WS1_INT) { + /* PUBLISH_EVENT */ + plat_sbsa_nt_wdog_ws1_handle(); + } else if (id == SBSA_T_WDG_WS0_INT) { + /* PUBLISH_EVENT */ + plat_sbsa_t_wdog_ws0_handle(); + } + /* EOI and reset , log what else */ + psci_systrem_reset2(); +} + +void sbsa_wdog_hander_init(void) +{ +#if EXCEPTION_HANDLING_FRAMEWORK + ehf_register_priority_handler(SBSA_WDG_PRI, sbsa_wdog_handler); +#endif +} Thanks Sandeep

6 years

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[query] sbsa level 3 spec: non secure watchdog WS1 handling at EL3

by Sandeep Tripathy

Hi, Based on sbsa spec for level-3 firmware specification watchdog signals NS WS1 and S WS0 to be handled at EL3 firmware. I have some query on how TF-A plans to implement this. Ref: Excerpt DEN0029D_SBSA_6.0 https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0029/d/?lang=en 3.2.3 Watchdogs The required behavior of watchdog signal 1 of the Non-secure watchdog is modified in level 3– firmware and is required to be routed as an SPI to the GIC. It is expected that this SPI be configured as an EL3 interrupt, directly targeting a single PE. A system compatible with level 3- firmware must implement a second watchdog, and is referred to as the Secure watchdog. It must have both its register frames mapped in the Secure memory address space and must not be aliased to the Non-secure address space. Watchdog Signal 0 of the Secure watchdog must be routed as an SPI to the GIC and it is expected this will be configured as an EL3 interrupt, directly targeting a single PE. Q1- What happens if core is stuck and interrupts are not taken. Non-secure watchdog will expire and ultimately results in a WS1 which is also not taken as the core is not responding. If WS1 were to another subsystem (eg: SCP) then it would take action. In current scheme is it the secure sbsa wdg expected to detect such hang ? Q2- How to handle sbsa watchdog interrupt at EL3. Please suggest if I should make a patch in following approach to start with. Or it has to be registered as a RAS priority exception. diff --git a/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c b/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c index 79c6f26..9683ef8 100644 --- a/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c +++ b/drivers/arm/sbsa/sbsa.c @@ -40,3 +40,26 @@ + +#define weak plat_sbsa_nt_wdog_ws1_handle +#define weak plat_sbsa_t_wdog_ws0_handle +void sbsa_wdog_handler(int id) +{ + if (id == SBSA_NT_WDG_WS1_INT) { + /* PUBLISH_EVENT */ + plat_sbsa_nt_wdog_ws1_handle(); + } else if (id == SBSA_T_WDG_WS0_INT) { + /* PUBLISH_EVENT */ + plat_sbsa_t_wdog_ws0_handle(); + } + /* EOI and reset , log what else */ + psci_systrem_reset2(); +} + +void sbsa_wdog_hander_init(void) +{ +#if EXCEPTION_HANDLING_FRAMEWORK + ehf_register_priority_handler(SBSA_WDG_PRI, sbsa_wdog_handler); +#endif +} Thanks Sandeep

6 years

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 2 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 2 of 2 defect(s) ** CID 361485: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) /plat/qti/common/src/spmi_arb.c: 54 in wait_for_done() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 361485: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) /plat/qti/common/src/spmi_arb.c: 54 in wait_for_done() 48 49 static int wait_for_done(uint16_t apid) 50 { 51 unsigned int timeout = 100; 52 53 while (timeout-- != 0U) { >>> CID 361485: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) >>> Suspicious implicit sign extension: "apid" with type "uint16_t" (16 bits, unsigned) is promoted in "207618056 + 65536 * apid" to type "int" (32 bits, signed), then sign-extended to type "unsigned long" (64 bits, unsigned). If "207618056 + 65536 * apid" is greater than 0x7FFFFFFF, the upper bits of the result will all be 1. 54 uint32_t status = mmio_read_32(REG_ARB_STATUS(apid)); 55 if ((status & ARB_STATUS_DONE) != 0U) { 56 if ((status & ARB_STATUS_FAILURE) != 0U || 57 (status & ARB_STATUS_DENIED) != 0U || 58 (status & ARB_STATUS_DROPPED) != 0U) { 59 return status & 0xff; ** CID 361484: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) /plat/qti/common/src/spmi_arb.c: 72 in arb_command() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 361484: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) /plat/qti/common/src/spmi_arb.c: 72 in arb_command() 66 return ARB_FAKE_STATUS_TIMEOUT; 67 } 68 69 static void arb_command(uint16_t apid, uint8_t opcode, uint32_t addr, 70 uint8_t bytes) 71 { >>> CID 361484: Integer handling issues (SIGN_EXTENSION) >>> Suspicious implicit sign extension: "apid" with type "uint16_t" (16 bits, unsigned) is promoted in "207618048 + 65536 * apid" to type "int" (32 bits, signed), then sign-extended to type "unsigned long" (64 bits, unsigned). If "207618048 + 65536 * apid" is greater than 0x7FFFFFFF, the upper bits of the result will all be 1. 72 mmio_write_32(REG_ARB_CMD(apid), (uint32_t)opcode << 27 | 73 (addr & 0xff) << 4 | (bytes - 1)); 74 } 75 76 int spmi_arb_read8(uint32_t addr) 77 { ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] TF-A Gerrit access permissions currently broken.

by Joanna Farley

Things should be back to normal. Joanna From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Joanna Farley via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Reply to: Joanna Farley <Joanna.Farley(a)arm.com> Date: Wednesday, 26 August 2020 at 12:51 To: "tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org" <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] TF-A Gerrit access permissions currently broken. Just to inform project contributors that people may find their gerrit access rights may be broken at this time. I have raised a support request with the trustedfirmware.org support team. Joanna

6 years

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TF-A Gerrit access permissions currently broken.

by Joanna Farley

Just to inform project contributors that people may find their gerrit access rights may be broken at this time. I have raised a support request with the trustedfirmware.org support team. Joanna

6 years

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TF-A Tech Forum Agenda @ Thr 27th August 2020 16:00-1700 BST

by Joanna Farley

Hi All, The next TF-A Tech Forum is scheduled for Thu 27th August 2020 16:00 – 17:00 (BST). A reoccurring meeting invite has been sent out to the subscribers of this TF-A mailing list. If you don’t have this please let me know. Agenda: * TF-A Errata Process – Presented by Bipin Ravi * Bug Review Committee (BRC) & Categorization of Errata * Software Developers Errata Notice (SDEN) & Product Errata Notice (PEN) * What TF-A Implements * How TF-A Implements * Testing If TF-A contributors have anything they wish to present at any future TF-A tech forum please contact me to have that scheduled. Previous sessions, both recording and presentation material can be found on the trustedfirmware.org TF-A Technical meeting webpage: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/ A scheduling tracking page is also available to help track sessions suggested and being prepared: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a-tech-forum-scheduling/ Final decisions on what will be presented will be shared a few days before the next meeting and shared on the TF-A mailing list. Thanks Joanna

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] Api to power down all cores

by Varun Wadekar

<Cc alias> -----Original Message----- From: Sandeep Tripathy <sandeep.tripathy(a)broadcom.com> Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2020 8:59 AM To: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com>; Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: [TF-A] [RFC] Api to power down all cores Thanks, I will use callback as param to get rid of the 'plat*'. 'void psci_stop_other_cores(void (*stop_func)(uregister_t mpidr))' Platform can call like .. psci_stop_other_cores(ipi_send_stop); I will update the patch tomorrow. This api is not invoked by psci generic functions. So I think that should suffice your concern. Anyways I will take care any other suggestions. IPI implementation is under flag 'IPI_SUPPORT'. https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5323/ Thanks Sandeep > -----Original Message----- > From: Varun Wadekar [mailto:vwadekar@nvidia.com] > Sent: Tuesday, August 25, 2020 9:11 AM > To: Soby Mathew; Sandeep Tripathy > Subject: RE: [TF-A] [RFC] Api to power down all cores > > Hi, > > In addition to the suggestions already posted, we should provide a > build flag or dynamic knob to allow platforms to disable this feature. > > -Varun > > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Soby > Mathew via TF-A > Sent: Friday, August 21, 2020 3:57 AM > To: Sandeep Tripathy <sandeep.tripathy(a)broadcom.com> > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: Re: [TF-A] [RFC] Api to power down all cores > > External email: Use caution opening links or attachments > > > Hi Sandeep, > Thanks for the clarification. I too think this has general utility and > since you need access to internal PSCI data to perform the > functionality , exporting a utility function from PSCI for platforms > to invoke seems the right thing to do. > The small concern I have is using the `plat_*` namespace as this is a > utility function invoked by the platform and another porting layer > beneath it seems out of place. > > I would suggest to add a parameter to stop_other_cores(), this could > be either the IPI number or a callback function to trigger the IPI. > This allows to provide the platform specific details without `plat_*` > API. > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Sandeep Tripathy <sandeep.tripathy(a)broadcom.com> > > Sent: 21 August 2020 07:17 > > To: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > Subject: RE: [TF-A] [RFC] Api to power down all cores > > > > Hi Soby, > > I realize using term 'PSCI API' in rfc tag is misleading like Achin > > mentioned in gerrit. > > > > Here I wanted to have a generic API to 'stop_other_cores' in > > secure world. > > The usage is platform firmware specific. > > Implementation of 'stop_other_cores' depends on a generic 'IPI' > > support > (1). > > It leverages the existing EHF. So I feel it is not adding and > > complexity or overhead in normal execution path. > > > > 'stop_other_cores' API implementation depends on some psci private > > functions to traverse the pd nodes and extract MPIDRs for target pe > > list. That was the reason to put the function within psci lib. So > > there are > two things. > > 1- Does this idea of 'stop_other_core' api qualify to be generic > > 2- Does a generic IPI layer make sense > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Soby Mathew [mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com] > > > Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 8:54 PM > > > To: Sandeep Tripathy > > > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > Subject: RE: [TF-A] [RFC] psci: api to power down all cores > > > > > > Hi Sandeep, > > > Just to understand better, if there is a secure side > > > panic/watchdog interrupt, then the secure side is already able to > > > do such an intervention without the availability of a PSCI API to the NS side. > > > > > > In case the NS world has crashed, then PSCI_SYSTEM_RESET and > > > PSCI_SYSTEM_OFF APIs can be invoked which then does the > > > appropriate actions. From my reading, the PSCI specification > > > doesn't prevent firmware implementation of the reset and off API's > > > from doing the kind of implementation as per your proposal. > > > > I intend to do 'stop_other_cores' in platform extension of > > 'plat_system_resetx()', secure side watchdog expiry/ > > plat_panic_handler(). > > > > > > > > Best Regards > > > Soby Mathew > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > > > Sandeep > > > > Tripathy via TF-A > > > > Sent: 19 August 2020 16:42 > > > > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > > Subject: [TF-A] [RFC] psci: api to power down all cores > > > > > > > > Hi, > > > > I am proposing to have a generic api in psci lib which can be > > > > used to > > > force > > > > power down all other cores from any initiating core analogous to > > > > 'smp_cpu_stop' in linux. It is immune to interrupt lock by > > > > EL1/EL2 software. > > > > > > > > Platforms may use this api in case of secure side panic, secure > > > > watchdog interrupt handling or if required in certain types of > > > > warm resets. The usage > > > is > > > > platform dependent. > > > > > > > > This depends on a generic implementation of secure IPI (1) which > > > > uses EHF > > > to > > > > handle IPI at platform defined priority. We probably require > > > > more types of secure IPIs. > > > > > > > > Please review the series > > > > Ref: > > > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5 > > > > 32 > > > > 4 > > > > > > > > diff --git a/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c > > > > b/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c index > > > > 141d69e..011aaa6 100644 > > > > --- a/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c > > > > +++ b/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c > > > > @@ -10,10 +10,44 @@ > > > > #include <arch_helpers.h> > > > > #include <common/debug.h> > > > > #include <drivers/console.h> > > > > +#include <drivers/delay_timer.h> > > > > #include <plat/common/platform.h> > > > > > > > > #include "psci_private.h" > > > > > > > > +#ifndef PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS #define > > > > +PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 #endif > > > > + > > > > +#if IMAGE_BL31 > > > > +void psci_stop_other_cores(void) { #define > > > > +PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 #endif > > > > + > > > > +#if IMAGE_BL31 > > > > +void psci_stop_other_cores(void) { > > > > + int idx, this_cpu_idx, cnt; > > > > + > > > > + this_cpu_idx = plat_my_core_pos(); > > > > + > > > > + /* Raise G0 IPI cpustop to all cores but self */ > > > > + for (idx = 0; idx < psci_plat_core_count; idx++) { > > > > + if ((idx != this_cpu_idx) && > > > > + (psci_get_aff_info_state_by_idx(idx) == > > > > AFF_STATE_ON)) { > > > > + > > > > plat_ipi_send_cpu_stop(psci_cpu_pd_nodes[idx].mpidr); > > > > + } > > > > + } > > > > + > > > > + /* Wait for others cores to shutdown */ > > > > + for (cnt = 0; cnt < PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS; > > > > + cnt++) > > > { > > > > + if (psci_is_last_on_cpu()) > > > > + break; > > > > + mdelay(1); > > > > + } > > > > + > > > > + if (!psci_is_last_on_cpu()) { > > > > + WARN("Failed to stop all cores!\n"); > > > > + psci_print_power_domain_map(); > > > > + } > > > > +} > > > > +#endif > > > > + > > > > > > > > (1) > > > > RFC: ipi: add ipi feature > > > > Ref: > > > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware- > > > a/+/5323/1 > > > > > > > > Thanks > > > > Sandeep > > > > -- > > > > TF-A mailing list > > > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years

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[Request for review] Downstream patches from Tegra repos

by Varun Wadekar

Hello team, Requesting reviews for the latest patches [1] form our internal repos for Tegra platforms. I have updated the verification steps for each patch in the comments to help answer some questions. Thanks in advance. -Varun [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22tegra-downstream-08252020%22+…

6 years

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 1 of 1 defect(s) ** CID 361456: Memory - illegal accesses (NEGATIVE_RETURNS) /services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c: 49 in spmd_get_context_by_mpidr() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 361456: Memory - illegal accesses (NEGATIVE_RETURNS) /services/std_svc/spmd/spmd_main.c: 49 in spmd_get_context_by_mpidr() 43 44 /******************************************************************************* 45 * SPM Core context on CPU based on mpidr. 46 ******************************************************************************/ 47 spmd_spm_core_context_t *spmd_get_context_by_mpidr(uint64_t mpidr) 48 { >>> CID 361456: Memory - illegal accesses (NEGATIVE_RETURNS) >>> Using variable "plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr)" as an index to array "spm_core_context". 49 return &spm_core_context[plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr)]; 50 } 51 52 /******************************************************************************* 53 * SPM Core context on current CPU get helper. 54 ******************************************************************************/ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

6 years

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] Api to power down all cores

by Sandeep Tripathy

Hi Soby, I realize using term 'PSCI API' in rfc tag is misleading like Achin mentioned in gerrit. Here I wanted to have a generic API to 'stop_other_cores' in secure world. The usage is platform firmware specific. Implementation of 'stop_other_cores' depends on a generic 'IPI' support (1). It leverages the existing EHF. So I feel it is not adding and complexity or overhead in normal execution path. 'stop_other_cores' API implementation depends on some psci private functions to traverse the pd nodes and extract MPIDRs for target pe list. That was the reason to put the function within psci lib. So there are two things. 1- Does this idea of 'stop_other_core' api qualify to be generic 2- Does a generic IPI layer make sense Thanks Sandeep > -----Original Message----- > From: Soby Mathew [mailto:Soby.Mathew@arm.com] > Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2020 8:54 PM > To: Sandeep Tripathy > Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: RE: [TF-A] [RFC] psci: api to power down all cores > > Hi Sandeep, > Just to understand better, if there is a secure side panic/watchdog > interrupt, > then the secure side is already able to do such an intervention without > the > availability of a PSCI API to the NS side. > > In case the NS world has crashed, then PSCI_SYSTEM_RESET and > PSCI_SYSTEM_OFF APIs can be invoked which then does the appropriate > actions. From my reading, the PSCI specification doesn't prevent firmware > implementation of the reset and off API's from doing the kind of > implementation as per your proposal. I intend to do 'stop_other_cores' in platform extension of 'plat_system_resetx()', secure side watchdog expiry/ plat_panic_handler(). > > Best Regards > Soby Mathew > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > Sandeep > > Tripathy via TF-A > > Sent: 19 August 2020 16:42 > > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > Subject: [TF-A] [RFC] psci: api to power down all cores > > > > Hi, > > I am proposing to have a generic api in psci lib which can be used to > force > > power down all other cores from any initiating core analogous to > > 'smp_cpu_stop' in linux. It is immune to interrupt lock by EL1/EL2 > > software. > > > > Platforms may use this api in case of secure side panic, secure watchdog > > interrupt handling or if required in certain types of warm resets. The > > usage > is > > platform dependent. > > > > This depends on a generic implementation of secure IPI (1) which uses > > EHF > to > > handle IPI at platform defined priority. We probably require more types > > of > > secure IPIs. > > > > Please review the series > > Ref: > > https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5324 > > > > diff --git a/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c b/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c > > index > > 141d69e..011aaa6 100644 > > --- a/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c > > +++ b/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c > > @@ -10,10 +10,44 @@ > > #include <arch_helpers.h> > > #include <common/debug.h> > > #include <drivers/console.h> > > +#include <drivers/delay_timer.h> > > #include <plat/common/platform.h> > > > > #include "psci_private.h" > > > > +#ifndef PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS #define > > +PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 #endif > > + > > +#if IMAGE_BL31 > > +void psci_stop_other_cores(void) > > +{ > > +#define PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 #endif > > + > > +#if IMAGE_BL31 > > +void psci_stop_other_cores(void) > > +{ > > + int idx, this_cpu_idx, cnt; > > + > > + this_cpu_idx = plat_my_core_pos(); > > + > > + /* Raise G0 IPI cpustop to all cores but self */ > > + for (idx = 0; idx < psci_plat_core_count; idx++) { > > + if ((idx != this_cpu_idx) && > > + (psci_get_aff_info_state_by_idx(idx) == > > AFF_STATE_ON)) { > > + > > plat_ipi_send_cpu_stop(psci_cpu_pd_nodes[idx].mpidr); > > + } > > + } > > + > > + /* Wait for others cores to shutdown */ > > + for (cnt = 0; cnt < PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS; cnt++) > { > > + if (psci_is_last_on_cpu()) > > + break; > > + mdelay(1); > > + } > > + > > + if (!psci_is_last_on_cpu()) { > > + WARN("Failed to stop all cores!\n"); > > + psci_print_power_domain_map(); > > + } > > +} > > +#endif > > + > > > > (1) > > RFC: ipi: add ipi feature > > Ref: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware- > a/+/5323/1 > > > > Thanks > > Sandeep > > -- > > TF-A mailing list > > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [RFC] psci: api to power down all cores

by Soby Mathew

Hi Sandeep, Just to understand better, if there is a secure side panic/watchdog interrupt, then the secure side is already able to do such an intervention without the availability of a PSCI API to the NS side. In case the NS world has crashed, then PSCI_SYSTEM_RESET and PSCI_SYSTEM_OFF APIs can be invoked which then does the appropriate actions. From my reading, the PSCI specification doesn't prevent firmware implementation of the reset and off API's from doing the kind of implementation as per your proposal. Best Regards Soby Mathew > -----Original Message----- > From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Sandeep > Tripathy via TF-A > Sent: 19 August 2020 16:42 > To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-A] [RFC] psci: api to power down all cores > > Hi, > I am proposing to have a generic api in psci lib which can be used to force > power down all other cores from any initiating core analogous to > 'smp_cpu_stop' in linux. It is immune to interrupt lock by EL1/EL2 software. > > Platforms may use this api in case of secure side panic, secure watchdog > interrupt handling or if required in certain types of warm resets. The usage is > platform dependent. > > This depends on a generic implementation of secure IPI (1) which uses EHF to > handle IPI at platform defined priority. We probably require more types of > secure IPIs. > > Please review the series > Ref: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5324 > > diff --git a/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c b/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c index > 141d69e..011aaa6 100644 > --- a/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c > +++ b/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c > @@ -10,10 +10,44 @@ > #include <arch_helpers.h> > #include <common/debug.h> > #include <drivers/console.h> > +#include <drivers/delay_timer.h> > #include <plat/common/platform.h> > > #include "psci_private.h" > > +#ifndef PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS #define > +PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 #endif > + > +#if IMAGE_BL31 > +void psci_stop_other_cores(void) > +{ > +#define PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 #endif > + > +#if IMAGE_BL31 > +void psci_stop_other_cores(void) > +{ > + int idx, this_cpu_idx, cnt; > + > + this_cpu_idx = plat_my_core_pos(); > + > + /* Raise G0 IPI cpustop to all cores but self */ > + for (idx = 0; idx < psci_plat_core_count; idx++) { > + if ((idx != this_cpu_idx) && > + (psci_get_aff_info_state_by_idx(idx) == AFF_STATE_ON)) { > + plat_ipi_send_cpu_stop(psci_cpu_pd_nodes[idx].mpidr); > + } > + } > + > + /* Wait for others cores to shutdown */ > + for (cnt = 0; cnt < PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS; cnt++) { > + if (psci_is_last_on_cpu()) > + break; > + mdelay(1); > + } > + > + if (!psci_is_last_on_cpu()) { > + WARN("Failed to stop all cores!\n"); > + psci_print_power_domain_map(); > + } > +} > +#endif > + > > (1) > RFC: ipi: add ipi feature > Ref: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5323/1 > > Thanks > Sandeep > -- > TF-A mailing list > TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 1 month

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[RFC] psci: api to power down all cores

by Sandeep Tripathy

Hi, I am proposing to have a generic api in psci lib which can be used to force power down all other cores from any initiating core analogous to 'smp_cpu_stop' in linux. It is immune to interrupt lock by EL1/EL2 software. Platforms may use this api in case of secure side panic, secure watchdog interrupt handling or if required in certain types of warm resets. The usage is platform dependent. This depends on a generic implementation of secure IPI (1) which uses EHF to handle IPI at platform defined priority. We probably require more types of secure IPIs. Please review the series Ref: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5324 diff --git a/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c b/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c index 141d69e..011aaa6 100644 --- a/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c +++ b/lib/psci/psci_system_off.c @@ -10,10 +10,44 @@ #include <arch_helpers.h> #include <common/debug.h> #include <drivers/console.h> +#include <drivers/delay_timer.h> #include <plat/common/platform.h> #include "psci_private.h" +#ifndef PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS +#define PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 +#endif + +#if IMAGE_BL31 +void psci_stop_other_cores(void) +{ +#define PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS 1000 +#endif + +#if IMAGE_BL31 +void psci_stop_other_cores(void) +{ + int idx, this_cpu_idx, cnt; + + this_cpu_idx = plat_my_core_pos(); + + /* Raise G0 IPI cpustop to all cores but self */ + for (idx = 0; idx < psci_plat_core_count; idx++) { + if ((idx != this_cpu_idx) && + (psci_get_aff_info_state_by_idx(idx) == AFF_STATE_ON)) { + plat_ipi_send_cpu_stop(psci_cpu_pd_nodes[idx].mpidr); + } + } + + /* Wait for others cores to shutdown */ + for (cnt = 0; cnt < PLAT_CORES_PWRDWN_WAIT_TIMEOUT_MS; cnt++) { + if (psci_is_last_on_cpu()) + break; + mdelay(1); + } + + if (!psci_is_last_on_cpu()) { + WARN("Failed to stop all cores!\n"); + psci_print_power_domain_map(); + } +} +#endif + (1) RFC: ipi: add ipi feature Ref: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5323/1 Thanks Sandeep

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] [Hafnium] Fw: Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration

by Joao Alves

Hi Raghu, Thank you very much for your feedback! It seems like a good idea to automate it and the approach looks fine to me. Is my understanding correct that the generated *dtsi* files will need to be included in the *dts* files once and the hope is if there is a change, the dts files need not change since the dtsi files will be regenerated every time during build? Yes, your understanding is correct. The other way this could be done is that the tool can generate dts files which have nodes that change at build time, which can then be compiled and added as dtb files, added to the FIP. That way fvp_tb_fw_config.dts and fvp_spmc_manifest.dts will remain the same and not have any dependency on a changing dtsi file. I’d prefer that dts files that change frequently like in this case be autogenerated entirely and as separate files. That _seems_ cleaner but may not work out so in practice. I agree with you that the approach you described above would make the whole process a bit cleaner. One way this could be done is by passing the *.pre.dts files (generated after the initial processing from dtc) to the script that are part of the patch. Last time I worked on this, I added the possibility to generate the nodes structure to an already existing dts file. Thus, expanding the previous configuration with the values of the new nodes. However, this work needs further testing. Alternatively, the python package I am using in the script can parse and generate dtb instead of dts. I was thinking to add the option to the dts_gen.py script (maybe rename it as well) to operate over the dtb format. So, making sure that "in-place" changes are working , and adding the option to operate over dtb files should allow for the cleaner approach that you referred. As is and making the referred changes, most of the script's logic should be preserved, so I don't think there will be a lot of changes to the current implementation, which is good. Please let me know if I was not very clear, or if you have any other comments. Also thanks @Gyorgy Szing<mailto:Gyorgy.Szing@arm.com> for the feedback on the current state of the patch, I appreciate it. Let me know if anyone has questions, or any other comments to the scripts and/or current discussion. I will notify once the work progresses. Best regards, João Alves ________________________________ From: Hafnium <hafnium-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via Hafnium <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Friday, August 7, 2020 5:54 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [Hafnium] [TF-A] Fw: Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration Hi, It seems like a good idea to automate it and the approach looks fine to me. Is my understanding correct that the generated *dtsi* files will need to be included in the *dts* files once and the hope is if there is a change, the dts files need not change since the dtsi files will be regenerated every time during build? The other way this could be done is that the tool can generate dts files which have nodes that change at build time, which can then be compiled and added as dtb files, added to the FIP. That way fvp_tb_fw_config.dts and fvp_spmc_manifest.dts will remain the same and not have any dependency on a changing dtsi file. I’d prefer that dts files that change frequently like in this case be autogenerated entirely and as separate files. That _seems_ cleaner but may not work out so in practice. Thanks Raghu From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Joao Alves via TF-A Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 10:08 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Fw: Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration Hi all, Forwarding email below as the referred work may be useful/relevant for other parts of the TF-A project as well. Best regards, João Alves _____ From: Hafnium <hafnium-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:hafnium-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > on behalf of Joao Alves via Hafnium <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:hafnium@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 5:59 PM To: hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:hafnium@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:hafnium@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: [Hafnium] Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration Hello all, I have been trying to ease the process of adding a Secure Partition to a system using Secure Hafnium. There is no way to automatically generate SP's specific configuration into TF-A's code-base. Considering FVP as the target platform, we need to manually add partition's specific configuration to files "fvp_tb_fw_config.dts" and "fvp_spmc_manifest.dts" (files held in FVP platform specific folder of TF-A codebase). The following snippet shows the hypervisor node from "fvp_spmc_manifest.dts", for the simple case of having in the system two Cactus Secure Partitions: hypervisor { compatible = "hafnium,hafnium"; vm1 { is_ffa_partition; debug_name = "cactus-primary"; load_address = <0x7000000>; }; vm2 { is_ffa_partition; debug_name = "cactus-secondary"; load_address = <0x7100000>; vcpu_count = <2>; mem_size = <1048576>; }; }; Some of the above properties are available in the partition's manifest, for example "debug_name" and "load_address". If changing one of these values in the partition's manifest or adding another SP, we also need to update the referred files. In order to avoid the burden of having to manually update partition's specific configuration and to make whole system more scalable, I started to write a script that is able to generate a specific node structure and fetch any property value from a any dts file. Then, applied it to fetch/generate SPs specific configuration and include it in aforementioned configuration files. Although it is still a Work In Progress, the work can be found in the patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5150. The implementation is divided between two scripts: * "dts_gen.py" - This is a generic solution for the problem. It can fetch/generate/alter any configuration using dts files. * "sp_dts_gen.py" - Uses the previous command to solve the specific problem regarding SPs specific configuration. Although is still Work In Progress, I am looking to obtain feedback/reviews from anyone that could be interested in using this implementation. The above files contain a lot of comments on how to use them, and also describing the implementation. If the obtained feedback is good, I can work on integrating this in TF-A's build-system. Let me know if anyone has questions. Best regards, João Alves -- Hafnium mailing list Hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:Hafnium@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/hafnium -- Hafnium mailing list Hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/hafnium

6 years, 1 month

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Cancelled event with note: TF-A Tech Forum @ Thu 13 Aug 2020 16:00 - 17:00 (BST) (tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org)

by Bill Fletcher

This event has been cancelled with this note: " Next TF-A Tech Forum is now scheduled for 26th August" Title: TF-A Tech Forum We run an open technical forum call for anyone to participate and it is not restricted to Trusted Firmware project members. It will operate under the guidance of the TF TSC. Feel free to forward this invite to colleagues. Invites are via the TF-A mailing list and also published on the Trusted Firmware website. Details are here: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/tf-a-technical-forum/Tr… Firmware is inviting you to a scheduled Zoom meeting.Join Zoom Meetinghttps://zoom.us/j/9159704974Meeting ID: 915 970 4974One tap mobile+16465588656,,9159704974# US (New York)+16699009128,,9159704974# US (San Jose)Dial by your location        +1 646 558 8656 US (New York)        +1 669 900 9128 US (San Jose)        877 853 5247 US Toll-free        888 788 0099 US Toll-freeMeeting ID: 915 970 4974Find your local number: https://zoom.us/u/ad27hc6t7h   When: Thu 13 Aug 2020 16:00 – 17:00 United Kingdom Time Calendar: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Who: * Bill Fletcher- creator * marek.bykowski(a)gmail.com * okash.khawaja(a)gmail.com * tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Invitation from Google Calendar: https://www.google.com/calendar/ You are receiving this courtesy email at the account tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org because you are an attendee of this event. To stop receiving future updates for this event, decline this event. Alternatively, you can sign up for a Google Account at https://www.google.com/calendar/ and control your notification settings for your entire calendar. Forwarding this invitation could allow any recipient to send a response to the organiser and be added to the guest list, invite others regardless of their own invitation status or to modify your RSVP. Learn more at https://support.google.com/calendar/answer/37135#forwarding

6 years, 1 month

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TF-A Tech Forum CANCELLED @ Thr 13th August 2020 16:00-1700 BST

by Joanna Farley

Apologies everyone, I need to cancel this week’s TF-A Tech Forum as presenters for our next subjects are all on vacation or have yet to complete preparation of the necessary material. As a reminder we have a scheduling page https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/tf_a/tf-a-tech-forum-scheduling/ If anybody has subjects they are willing to present please reach out to me so we can find you an appropriate slot. Next TF-A Tech Forum is now scheduled for 26th August. Thanks Joanna

6 years, 1 month

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Missing properties from cactus dts

by Varun Wadekar

Hello Olivier, Hope you are doing well. As you already know, we are trying to test FF-A, using Cactus, on pre-8.4 Tegra platforms. While doing so, we saw that cactus.dts was missing the following properties 1. maj_ver 2. min_ver 3. spmc_id plat_spm_core_manifest_load() expects these values in the core manifest file. i.e. cactus.dts. What would be the right path forward? Do we add these fields to the dts file? Or modify plat_spmd_manifest.c file? -Varun

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Fw: Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration

by raghu.ncstate＠icloud.com

Hi, It seems like a good idea to automate it and the approach looks fine to me. Is my understanding correct that the generated *dtsi* files will need to be included in the *dts* files once and the hope is if there is a change, the dts files need not change since the dtsi files will be regenerated every time during build? The other way this could be done is that the tool can generate dts files which have nodes that change at build time, which can then be compiled and added as dtb files, added to the FIP. That way fvp_tb_fw_config.dts and fvp_spmc_manifest.dts will remain the same and not have any dependency on a changing dtsi file. I’d prefer that dts files that change frequently like in this case be autogenerated entirely and as separate files. That _seems_ cleaner but may not work out so in practice. Thanks Raghu From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Joao Alves via TF-A Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 10:08 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] Fw: Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration Hi all, Forwarding email below as the referred work may be useful/relevant for other parts of the TF-A project as well. Best regards, João Alves _____ From: Hafnium <hafnium-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:hafnium-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > on behalf of Joao Alves via Hafnium <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:hafnium@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 5:59 PM To: hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:hafnium@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:hafnium@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > Subject: [Hafnium] Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration Hello all, I have been trying to ease the process of adding a Secure Partition to a system using Secure Hafnium. There is no way to automatically generate SP's specific configuration into TF-A's code-base. Considering FVP as the target platform, we need to manually add partition's specific configuration to files "fvp_tb_fw_config.dts" and "fvp_spmc_manifest.dts" (files held in FVP platform specific folder of TF-A codebase). The following snippet shows the hypervisor node from "fvp_spmc_manifest.dts", for the simple case of having in the system two Cactus Secure Partitions: hypervisor { compatible = "hafnium,hafnium"; vm1 { is_ffa_partition; debug_name = "cactus-primary"; load_address = <0x7000000>; }; vm2 { is_ffa_partition; debug_name = "cactus-secondary"; load_address = <0x7100000>; vcpu_count = <2>; mem_size = <1048576>; }; }; Some of the above properties are available in the partition's manifest, for example "debug_name" and "load_address". If changing one of these values in the partition's manifest or adding another SP, we also need to update the referred files. In order to avoid the burden of having to manually update partition's specific configuration and to make whole system more scalable, I started to write a script that is able to generate a specific node structure and fetch any property value from a any dts file. Then, applied it to fetch/generate SPs specific configuration and include it in aforementioned configuration files. Although it is still a Work In Progress, the work can be found in the patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5150. The implementation is divided between two scripts: * "dts_gen.py" - This is a generic solution for the problem. It can fetch/generate/alter any configuration using dts files. * "sp_dts_gen.py" - Uses the previous command to solve the specific problem regarding SPs specific configuration. Although is still Work In Progress, I am looking to obtain feedback/reviews from anyone that could be interested in using this implementation. The above files contain a lot of comments on how to use them, and also describing the implementation. If the obtained feedback is good, I can work on integrating this in TF-A's build-system. Let me know if anyone has questions. Best regards, João Alves -- Hafnium mailing list Hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:Hafnium@lists.trustedfirmware.org> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/hafnium

6 years, 1 month

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[Request for review] Tegra platform changes

by Varun Wadekar

Hi Team, Can you please help review the changes [1] posted for Tegra platforms? These were pushed on 07/09 and I would like to make progress. Several other changes are blocked on this merge. Thanks, Varun [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22tegra-downstream-07092020%22+…

6 years, 1 month

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New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 1 defect(s), reported by Coverity Scan earlier, were marked fixed in the recent build analyzed by Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 1 of 1 defect(s) ** CID 361221: (TAINTED_SCALAR) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 361221: (TAINTED_SCALAR) /plat/arm/board/arm_fpga/fpga_bl31_setup.c: 196 in fpga_prepare_dtb() 190 if (err) { 191 ERROR("Could not set command line: %d\n", err); 192 } 193 } 194 } 195 >>> CID 361221: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted variable "fdt->size_dt_struct" to a tainted sink. 196 err = fdt_pack(fdt); 197 if (err < 0) { 198 ERROR("Failed to pack Device Tree at %p: error %d\n", fdt, err); 199 } 200 201 clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)fdt, fdt_blob_size(fdt)); /plat/arm/board/arm_fpga/fpga_bl31_setup.c: 196 in fpga_prepare_dtb() 190 if (err) { 191 ERROR("Could not set command line: %d\n", err); 192 } 193 } 194 } 195 >>> CID 361221: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted variable "fdt->size_dt_struct" to a tainted sink. 196 err = fdt_pack(fdt); 197 if (err < 0) { 198 ERROR("Failed to pack Device Tree at %p: error %d\n", fdt, err); 199 } 200 201 clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)fdt, fdt_blob_size(fdt)); /plat/arm/board/arm_fpga/fpga_bl31_setup.c: 196 in fpga_prepare_dtb() 190 if (err) { 191 ERROR("Could not set command line: %d\n", err); 192 } 193 } 194 } 195 >>> CID 361221: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted variable "fdt->size_dt_struct" to a tainted sink. 196 err = fdt_pack(fdt); 197 if (err < 0) { 198 ERROR("Failed to pack Device Tree at %p: error %d\n", fdt, err); 199 } 200 201 clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)fdt, fdt_blob_size(fdt)); /plat/arm/board/arm_fpga/fpga_bl31_setup.c: 196 in fpga_prepare_dtb() 190 if (err) { 191 ERROR("Could not set command line: %d\n", err); 192 } 193 } 194 } 195 >>> CID 361221: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted variable "fdt->size_dt_struct" to a tainted sink. 196 err = fdt_pack(fdt); 197 if (err < 0) { 198 ERROR("Failed to pack Device Tree at %p: error %d\n", fdt, err); 199 } 200 201 clean_dcache_range((uintptr_t)fdt, fdt_blob_size(fdt)); ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Erroneous speculative AT workaround

by Varun Wadekar

Hi, I guess I'm late for the party. But I have some questions. Looking at the initial email from Andrew, these two points stood out. --8<-- 1. Whilst looking at the speculative AT workaround in KVM, I compared it against the workaround in TF-A and noticed an inconsistency whereby TF-A **breaks** KVM's workaround. 2. TF-A will also have to be compatible with whatever workaround the EL2 software is using -->8-- Some questions about the unwanted dependency that this fix in TF-A creates. 1. Does KVM team always announce all the dependencies, along with their version numbers, that consumers should use? 2. With the fix in TF-A, are we forcing consumers to upgrade their TF-A blobs? Is this normal practice for consumers? 3. How do we plan to make the upgrade from TF-A side easier? Runtime detection of the feature (similar to the Spectre and Meltdown fixes) comes to mind. -Varun -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Manish Badarkhe via TF-A Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 10:48 PM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Cc: Will Deacon <willdeacon(a)google.com>; android-kvm(a)google.com; Marc Zyngier <mzyngier(a)google.com>; James Morse <James.Morse(a)arm.com>; Andrew Scull <ascull(a)google.com> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Erroneous speculative AT workaround External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hi All As per discussion over mailing list, we implemented workaround for AT speculative behaviour. If anybody interested they can look into the changes posted here: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/topic:%22at_errata_fix%22+(status:open… These changes are currently under review. Thanks Manish Badarkhe On 03/07/2020, 14:43, "TF-A on behalf of Soby Mathew via TF-A" <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > -----Original Message----- > From: Will Deacon <willdeacon(a)google.com> > Sent: 02 July 2020 15:47 > To: Soby Mathew <Soby.Mathew(a)arm.com> > Cc: Andrew Scull <ascull(a)google.com>; Raghu K > <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>; android-kvm(a)google.com; Marc Zyngier > <mzyngier(a)google.com>; James Morse <James.Morse(a)arm.com>; tf- > a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Erroneous speculative AT workaround > > On Thu, Jul 02, 2020 at 02:15:47PM +0000, Soby Mathew wrote: > > So the fix as we currently understand would involve the following > > sequence > > : > > > > a. On Entry to EL3, save the incoming SCTLR_EL1.M and TCR_EL1.EPDx > bits and set them (ensure TCR_EL1.EPDx =1 prior to SCTLR_EL1.M =1 using > isb()) > > b. Prior to Exit from EL3, after the target context is restored, restore > the SCTLR_EL1.M and TCR_EL1.EPDx bits. > > > > The above sequence now means that any use of AT instruction targeted > > at lower EL from EL3 that require PTW will fault. So prior to use of > > AT, ensure the PTW are re-enabled and disabled back again after the AT > > instructions. > > > > If the above sequence is agreed upon to resolve the errata, then we > > can work on a patch for the same. I suspect current el1 register save > > and restore sequence in TF-A is a bit unwieldy and we may need to > > analyze all the entry points to EL3 to ensure we cover everything. > > Looks good to me, but there's still one niggle that I don't know how to solve. > If EL2 has been audited not to have any executable AT instructions, it may > not have a software workaround. However, if a secure interrupt is taken > from EL2 to EL3 while EL2 is the middle of a world switch, then there is a > small window where an AT instruction present at EL3 cold be speculatively > executed before you've had a chance to mess with SCTLR_EL1. > > Fun! Maybe it's worth documenting this somewhere? Hi Will, Good point, this effectively means every EL2 software must implement the fix similar to KVM for this workaround to be effective (or else EL3 should also be audited to not to have any executable AT instruction). This needs to be communicated. Since this is crossing TF-A boundary and need wider communication, I can initiate some internal discussion on how to communicate this properly. Best Regards Soby Mathew > > Will -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 1 month

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Fw: Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration

by Joao Alves

Hi all, Forwarding email below as the referred work may be useful/relevant for other parts of the TF-A project as well. Best regards, João Alves ________________________________ From: Hafnium <hafnium-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Joao Alves via Hafnium <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Monday, August 3, 2020 5:59 PM To: hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [Hafnium] Automate generation of Partition's specific configuration Hello all, I have been trying to ease the process of adding a Secure Partition to a system using Secure Hafnium. There is no way to automatically generate SP's specific configuration into TF-A's code-base. Considering FVP as the target platform, we need to manually add partition's specific configuration to files "fvp_tb_fw_config.dts" and "fvp_spmc_manifest.dts" (files held in FVP platform specific folder of TF-A codebase). The following snippet shows the hypervisor node from "fvp_spmc_manifest.dts", for the simple case of having in the system two Cactus Secure Partitions: hypervisor { compatible = "hafnium,hafnium"; vm1 { is_ffa_partition; debug_name = "cactus-primary"; load_address = <0x7000000>; }; vm2 { is_ffa_partition; debug_name = "cactus-secondary"; load_address = <0x7100000>; vcpu_count = <2>; mem_size = <1048576>; }; }; Some of the above properties are available in the partition's manifest, for example "debug_name" and "load_address". If changing one of these values in the partition's manifest or adding another SP, we also need to update the referred files. In order to avoid the burden of having to manually update partition's specific configuration and to make whole system more scalable, I started to write a script that is able to generate a specific node structure and fetch any property value from a any dts file. Then, applied it to fetch/generate SPs specific configuration and include it in aforementioned configuration files. Although it is still a Work In Progress, the work can be found in the patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5150. The implementation is divided between two scripts: * "dts_gen.py" - This is a generic solution for the problem. It can fetch/generate/alter any configuration using dts files. * "sp_dts_gen.py" - Uses the previous command to solve the specific problem regarding SPs specific configuration. Although is still Work In Progress, I am looking to obtain feedback/reviews from anyone that could be interested in using this implementation. The above files contain a lot of comments on how to use them, and also describing the implementation. If the obtained feedback is good, I can work on integrating this in TF-A's build-system. Let me know if anyone has questions. Best regards, João Alves -- Hafnium mailing list Hafnium(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/hafnium

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] cactus and ivy on Tegra194

by Varun Wadekar

Hello Olivier, What are your thoughts on keeping Cactus alive for verifying FF-A tests on pre-8.4 Tegra platforms? -Varun -----Original Message----- From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Varun Wadekar via TF-A Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 2:27 PM To: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com>; Matteo Carlini <Matteo.Carlini(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] cactus and ivy on Tegra194 External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hi, >> [OD] The scenario we have in TF-A for pre-Armv8.4, is booting OP-TEE as the SPMC (or in other words a colocated SP+SPMC)., but that's a bare SPMD/SPMC boot case without exercising full fledged FF-A (only few direct message exchanges at the moment). [VW] I think it makes sense to keep cactus alive for pre-8.4 in tfa-tests repo. Using cactus would help us verify the initial boot expectations without having to port OP-TEE. I guess, successful handling of the FFA_VERSION call would be a good milestone for us. >> There is another OSS team you may interact with for the pre-Armv8.4 + FF-A story. @Matteo may provide pointers? [VW] Good to know. -Varun -----Original Message----- From: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2020 9:09 AM To: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com>; Matteo Carlini <Matteo.Carlini(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: cactus and ivy on Tegra194 External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hi Varun, See inline [OD] Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com> Sent: 27 July 2020 18:28 To: Olivier Deprez; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: RE: cactus and ivy on Tegra194 Hi Olivier, Thanks for your response. Looks like Ivy is still getting built in the tree and the fixes I have made are for the UART console driver - so can still be pushed upstream. [OD] It is built although it has no usage in any of TF-A CI test AFAIK. It is still using the former SPCI Alpha SPRT which is now deprecated. I should have mentioned earlier - Tegra194 is based off Arm v8.2. So, we cannot run Hafnium on that platform. The intent is to test the SPMD/SPMC and FF-A interface, before Hafnium comes along. So, the question is, can you please post instructions for pre-8.4 platforms? [OD] The scenario we have in TF-A for pre-Armv8.4, is booting OP-TEE as the SPMC (or in other words a colocated SP+SPMC)., but that's a bare SPMD/SPMC boot case without exercising full fledged FF-A (only few direct message exchanges at the moment). There is another OSS team you may interact with for the pre-Armv8.4 + FF-A story. @Matteo may provide pointers? The dual-cactus use case is interesting. Can we try that on pre-8.4 platforms too? [OD] Cactus was re-purposed only for being used as S-EL1 partitions on top of SPMC/Hafnium. So unfortunately no, you cannot immediately re-use this without S-EL2. There is no plan to let Cactus run at secure physical FF-A instance, although maybe that may work with some adaptation. The dual cactus case, is about instantiating two SPs (or VMs...) on top of Hafnium in the secure side. This is eventually the same binary payload run in two different sandboxes (differentiated by their FF-A id), to which direct message request can be emitted from TFTF to the corresponding FF-A id. -Varun -----Original Message----- From: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> Sent: Monday, July 27, 2020 1:36 AM To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Varun Wadekar <vwadekar(a)nvidia.com> Subject: Re: cactus and ivy on Tegra194 External email: Use caution opening links or attachments Hi Varun, Please consider Ivy (and Quark) payloads are remnant from older SPCI specs and must be considered deprecated. We did not clean this in deep to remove the related test code but AFAIK it's just not used anywhere in the test suites (although it may still be built). We may have a plan to upgrade this later when working on S-EL0 partitions on top of Hafnium, but that's not an immediate priority. Considering Cactus, that's the bare-metal S-EL1 payload you can use in place of a real TOS on top of Hafnium. The intent is to test FF-A ABIs unitarily at secure virtual FF-A instance. TFTF at EL2 exercises the ABI at non-secure physical FF-A instance to communicate with the secure endpoint. See below the build commands we use for FVP. Hopefully this should help porting to your platform. Notice it needs as well building the SPMC (aka Hafnium in the secure side), which only supports FVP at this moment (and Rpi, qemu...) It's not described here but I can guide you through this as well. I think you can just use a dummy BL32 payload for now, at least to test the build/integration. If TFTF and TF-A reside in the same top level dir: TFTF: this builds TFTF and cactus secure partitions make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- PLAT=fvp TESTS=spm -j8 TF-A: this uses TFTF, and assembles two cactus secure partitions within the FIP make \ CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- \ SPD=spmd \ CTX_INCLUDE_EL2_REGS=1 \ ARM_ARCH_MINOR=4 \ BL33=../tf-a-tests/build/fvp/debug/tftf.bin \ BL32=<path-to-secure-hafnium-bin>/hafnium.bin \ SP_LAYOUT_FILE=../tf-a-tests/build/fvp/debug/sp_layout.json \ PLAT=fvp \ all fip The tool last FIP tool entries are the two cactus instances: B4B5671E-4A90-4FE1-B81F-FB13DAE1DACB: offset=0x47DA3, size=0xC168, cmdline="--blob" D1582309-F023-47B9-827C-4464F5578FC8: offset=0x53F0B, size=0xC168, cmdline="--blob" Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Varun Wadekar via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 27 July 2020 06:46 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-A] cactus and ivy on Tegra194 Hello, In order to test the SPM dispatcher from TF-A, we plan to enable 'cactus' and 'ivy' on Tegra194 platforms. I was able to muscle my way through all the compilation issues, but the final payload generation part is not that clear. Can someone please help me with the steps to generate the final FIP package with all the payloads - TF-A, Cactus, Ivy? Thanks. -- TF-A mailing list TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE

by Alexei Fedorov

I've created https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/5153 which should fix the issue. Please review and test. Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Alexei Fedorov via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 31 July 2020 10:22 To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com>; Lauren Wehrmeister <Lauren.Wehrmeister(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Hi, Could you replace .word platform_normal_stacks with .quad platform_normal_stacks in plat\common\aarch64\platform_mp_stack.S and check if it fixes the issue? Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> Sent: 30 July 2020 23:55 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com>; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> Cc: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE +tf-a mailing list. Merging Lauren’s email. Hi Lauren, What command did you use to build TSP? I used the same command line from my original email and added SPD=tspd and I was able to get it to compile with Alexei’s fix. Thanks Raghu ________________________________ Hi, I also came across this issue as I'm trying to create test configurations for compiling BL31/TSP/BL2_AT_EL3 as PIEs, the fix suggested by Alexei worked for BL2_AT_EL3, but it did not work for TSP. I am getting the same error message as Raghu: "./build/fvp/debug/bl31/platform_mp_stack.o: relocation R_AARCH64_ABS32 against `a local symbol' can not be used when making a shared object". Any suggestions? Thanks, Lauren From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 9:15 AM To: 'Alexei Fedorov' <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com>; 'Olivier Deprez' <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Thanks I’ll try with GCC 11.0. What happens when you run a build without platform_normal_stacks? Does it even boot for you or does it crash in linux?? Trying to understand how you figured this was an issue and what prompted you to fix this by adding the adrp/.word. -Raghu From: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 9:02 AM To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com>; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Yes. I'm using ENABLE_PIE=1, but the same behaviour will be observed with ENABLE_PIE=0 (except that the linker error won't be reported). I'm isning GCC 11.0.0. Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com>> Sent: 30 July 2020 16:50 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>>; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>> Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Thanks. Are you using ENABLE_PIE=1? I’m using ENABLE_PIE=1 and I don’t see it in bl31.dump file with or without the “.word platform_normal_stacks” statement. However, when I do run FVP to linux without the statement, I see secondary a crash in EL3 with unhandled exception. So it is definitely required. Just trying to pin point what exactly is causing the crash. Thanks Raghu From: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 8:43 AM To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com>; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE With "platform_normal_stacks": bl31.dump 0000000004015280 l stacks 0000000000000000 platform_normal_stacks bl31.map: stacks 0x0000000004015280 0x4000 *(tzfw_normal_stacks) tzfw_normal_stacks 0x0000000004015280 0x4000 ./build/fvp/debug/bl31/platform_mp_stack.o 0x0000000004019280 __STACKS_END__ = . Without: platform_normal_stacks is missing from bl31.dump, bl31.map: stacks 0x0000000004015270 0x2d90 0x0000000004015270 __STACKS_START__ = . *(tzfw_normal_stacks) 0x0000000004018000 __STACKS_END__ = . Alexei ________________________________ From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com>> Sent: 30 July 2020 15:58 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>>; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>> Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Makes sense. Thanks. I just tried both debug and release builds, but I don’t see it being _removed_ by the linker. In either case I don’t see symbol information for platform_normal_stacks and only see symbol information for __STACK_START__. So what exactly are you referring to when the linker removes “declare_stack …” ? Also what build configuration? -Raghu From: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 7:43 AM To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com>; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Having platform_normal_stacks referenced prevents linker from removal of declare_stack platform_normal_stacks, tzfw_normal_stacks, \ PLATFORM_STACK_SIZE, PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT, \ CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com<mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com>> Sent: 30 July 2020 15:31 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>>; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>> Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Thanks Olivier, Alexei. >> Is it a copy/paste typo? [RK]Yes. >> Replace .word platform_normal_stacks with adrp x0, platform_normal_stacks [RK]Sure. I can do that. But why does “.word platform_normal_stacks” exist there in the first place? Not sure I understand that line’s purpose. What does replacing it with adrp x0, platform_normal_stacks do? The instruction is after a ret and looks like it will not be executed. I am using aarch64-non-elf- as the toolchain. Thanks Raghu From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> On Behalf Of Alexei Fedorov via TF-A Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 6:58 AM To: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>>; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Replace .word platform_normal_stacks with adrp x0, platform_normal_stacks Regards. Alexei. ________________________________ From: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com<mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com>> Sent: 30 July 2020 14:17 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>>; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com<mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com>> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Hi Raghu, On the toolchain question you would normally use CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- as recommended here: https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/initial-… However this does not seem to be the root cause of the problem you report. I reproduce the build issue, however it's not yet clear to me if this platform_normal_stacks variable should be rather placed in a specific section (.data?), rather than embedded in the code. Tbc. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Alexei Fedorov via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: 30 July 2020 14:53 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Is it a copy/paste typo? CTX_INCLUDE_EL2)REGS Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Sent: 30 July 2020 02:44 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org<mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org>> Subject: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE When I compile TF-A code on the integration branch with the ENABLE_PIE=1 option for FVP, I get a linker error “./build/fvp/debug/bl31/platform_mp_stack.o: relocation R_AARCH64_ABS32 against `a local symbol' can not be used when making a shared object". It appears to be related to line 62(.word platform_normal_stack) of plat/common/aarch64/platform_mp_stack.S that was introduced by https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/4301 . It looks like the linker is having trouble resolving this symbol for which I cant find a use for. If I remove line 62 or set ENABLE_PIE=0, the below command line to compile succeeds. What is the use of line 62 in the file? Seems like it may have some use in other configurations that are not obvious. Or is the issue due to the toolchain I’m using? See gcc version below. Command line I’m using: make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-linux-gnu- TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1 GENERATE_COT=1 DEBUG=1 LOG_LEVEL=40 MBEDTLS_DIR=../mbed-tls PLAT=fvp ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=regs CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1 CTX_INCLUDE_EL2)REGS=1 ARM_ARCH_MINOR=5 ENABLE_PIE=1 BRANCH_PROTECTION=1 FVP_HW_CONFIG_DTS=fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci-1t.dts BL33=<path_to_bl33> all fip Compiler version: aarch64-none-linux-gnu-gcc (GNU Toolchain for the A-profile Architecture 9.2-2019.12 (arm-9.10)) 9.2.1 20191025 Thanks Raghu IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

6 years, 1 month

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Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE

by raghu.ncstate＠icloud.com

+tf-a mailing list. Merging Lauren's email. Hi Lauren, What command did you use to build TSP? I used the same command line from my original email and added SPD=tspd and I was able to get it to compile with Alexei's fix. Thanks Raghu _____ Hi, I also came across this issue as I'm trying to create test configurations for compiling BL31/TSP/BL2_AT_EL3 as PIEs, the fix suggested by Alexei worked for BL2_AT_EL3, but it did not work for TSP. I am getting the same error message as Raghu: "./build/fvp/debug/bl31/platform_mp_stack.o: relocation R_AARCH64_ABS32 against `a local symbol' can not be used when making a shared object". Any suggestions? Thanks, Lauren From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com> Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 9:15 AM To: 'Alexei Fedorov' <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com>; 'Olivier Deprez' <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com> Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Thanks I'll try with GCC 11.0. What happens when you run a build without platform_normal_stacks? Does it even boot for you or does it crash in linux?? Trying to understand how you figured this was an issue and what prompted you to fix this by adding the adrp/.word. -Raghu From: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com> > Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 9:02 AM To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> ; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com <mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Yes. I'm using ENABLE_PIE=1, but the same behaviour will be observed with ENABLE_PIE=0 (except that the linker error won't be reported). I'm isning GCC 11.0.0. Regards. Alexei _____ From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> > Sent: 30 July 2020 16:50 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com> >; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com <mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com> > Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Thanks. Are you using ENABLE_PIE=1? I'm using ENABLE_PIE=1 and I don't see it in bl31.dump file with or without the ".word platform_normal_stacks" statement. However, when I do run FVP to linux without the statement, I see secondary a crash in EL3 with unhandled exception. So it is definitely required. Just trying to pin point what exactly is causing the crash. Thanks Raghu From: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com> > Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 8:43 AM To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> ; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com <mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE With "platform_normal_stacks": bl31.dump 0000000004015280 l stacks 0000000000000000 platform_normal_stacks bl31.map: stacks 0x0000000004015280 0x4000 *(tzfw_normal_stacks) tzfw_normal_stacks 0x0000000004015280 0x4000 ./build/fvp/debug/bl31/platform_mp_stack.o 0x0000000004019280 __STACKS_END__ = . Without: platform_normal_stacks is missing from bl31.dump, bl31.map: stacks 0x0000000004015270 0x2d90 0x0000000004015270 __STACKS_START__ = . *(tzfw_normal_stacks) 0x0000000004018000 __STACKS_END__ = . Alexei _____ From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> > Sent: 30 July 2020 15:58 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com> >; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com <mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com> > Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Makes sense. Thanks. I just tried both debug and release builds, but I don't see it being _removed_ by the linker. In either case I don't see symbol information for platform_normal_stacks and only see symbol information for __STACK_START__. So what exactly are you referring to when the linker removes "declare_stack ." ? Also what build configuration? -Raghu From: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com> > Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 7:43 AM To: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> ; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com <mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Having platform_normal_stacks referenced prevents linker from removal of declare_stack platform_normal_stacks, tzfw_normal_stacks, \ PLATFORM_STACK_SIZE, PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT, \ CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE Regards. Alexei _____ From: raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com <mailto:raghu.ncstate@icloud.com> > Sent: 30 July 2020 15:31 To: Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com> >; Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com <mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com> > Subject: RE: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Thanks Olivier, Alexei. >> Is it a copy/paste typo? [RK]Yes. >> Replace .word platform_normal_stacks with adrp x0, platform_normal_stacks [RK]Sure. I can do that. But why does ".word platform_normal_stacks" exist there in the first place? Not sure I understand that line's purpose. What does replacing it with adrp x0, platform_normal_stacks do? The instruction is after a ret and looks like it will not be executed. I am using aarch64-non-elf- as the toolchain. Thanks Raghu From: TF-A <tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org> > On Behalf Of Alexei Fedorov via TF-A Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2020 6:58 AM To: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com <mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com> >; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Replace .word platform_normal_stacks with adrp x0, platform_normal_stacks Regards. Alexei. _____ From: Olivier Deprez <Olivier.Deprez(a)arm.com <mailto:Olivier.Deprez@arm.com> > Sent: 30 July 2020 14:17 To: tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> >; Alexei Fedorov <Alexei.Fedorov(a)arm.com <mailto:Alexei.Fedorov@arm.com> > Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Hi Raghu, On the toolchain question you would normally use CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-elf- as recommended here: <https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/initial- build.html#performing-an-initial-build> https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/getting_started/initial-b uild.html#performing-an-initial-build However this does not seem to be the root cause of the problem you report. I reproduce the build issue, however it's not yet clear to me if this platform_normal_stacks variable should be rather placed in a specific section (.data?), rather than embedded in the code. Tbc. Regards, Olivier. ________________________________________ From: TF-A < <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Alexei Fedorov via TF-A < <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 30 July 2020 14:53 To: <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE Is it a copy/paste typo? CTX_INCLUDE_EL2)REGS Regards. Alexei ________________________________ From: TF-A < <mailto:tf-a-bounces@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-a-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Raghu Krishnamurthy via TF-A < <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: 30 July 2020 02:44 To: <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org < <mailto:tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org> tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [TF-A] Linker error on integration branch for FVP with ENABLE_PIE When I compile TF-A code on the integration branch with the ENABLE_PIE=1 option for FVP, I get a linker error "./build/fvp/debug/bl31/platform_mp_stack.o: relocation R_AARCH64_ABS32 against `a local symbol' can not be used when making a shared object". It appears to be related to line 62(.word platform_normal_stack) of plat/common/aarch64/platform_mp_stack.S that was introduced by <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/4301> https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/4301 . It looks like the linker is having trouble resolving this symbol for which I cant find a use for. If I remove line 62 or set ENABLE_PIE=0, the below command line to compile succeeds. What is the use of line 62 in the file? Seems like it may have some use in other configurations that are not obvious. Or is the issue due to the toolchain I'm using? See gcc version below. Command line I'm using: make CROSS_COMPILE=aarch64-none-linux-gnu- TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT=1 GENERATE_COT=1 DEBUG=1 LOG_LEVEL=40 MBEDTLS_DIR=../mbed-tls PLAT=fvp ARM_ROTPK_LOCATION=regs CTX_INCLUDE_PAUTH_REGS=1 CTX_INCLUDE_EL2)REGS=1 ARM_ARCH_MINOR=5 ENABLE_PIE=1 BRANCH_PROTECTION=1 FVP_HW_CONFIG_DTS=fdts/fvp-base-gicv3-psci-1t.dts BL33=<path_to_bl33> all fip Compiler version: aarch64-none-linux-gnu-gcc (GNU Toolchain for the A-profile Architecture 9.2-2019.12 (arm-9.10)) 9.2.1 20191025 Thanks Raghu IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

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