May 2022 - TF-A - lists.trustedfirmware.org

by Ming Huang

Hi James & TF-A guys, When hest acpi table configure Hardware Error Notification type as Software Delegated Exception(0x0B) for RAS event, kernel RAS interacts with TF-A by SDEI mechanism. On the firmware first system, kernel was notified by TF-A sdei call. The calling flow like as below when fatal RAS error happens: TF-A notify kernel flow: sdei_dispatch_event() ehf_activate_priority() call sdei callback // callback registered by kerenl ehf_deactivate_priority() Kernel sdei callback: sdei_asm_handler() __sdei_handler() _sdei_handler() sdei_event_handler() ghes_sdei_critical_callback() ghes_in_nmi_queue_one_entry() /* if RAS error is fatal */ __ghes_panic() panic() If fatal RAS error occured, panic was called in sdei_asm_handle() without ehf_deactivate_priority executed, which lead interrupt masked. If interrupt masked, system would be halted in kdump flow like this: arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 65536 entries for cmdq arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 32768 entries for evtq arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: allocated 65536 entries for priq arm-smmu-v3 arm-smmu-v3.3.auto: SMMU currently enabled! Resetting... So interrupt should be restored before panic otherwise kdump will hang. In the process of sdei, a SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE(or SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE_AND_RESUME) call should be called before panic for a completed run of ehf_deactivate_priority(). The ehf_deactivate_priority() function restore pmr_el1 to original value(>0x80). The SDEI dispatch flow was broken if SDEI_EVENT_COMPLETE was not be called. This will bring about two issue: 1 Kdump will hang for firmware reporting fatal RAS event by SDEI; (as explain above) 2 For NMI scene，TF-A enable a secure timer, the PPI 29 will trigger periodically. Kernel register a callback for hard lockup. The below code will not be called when panic in kernel callback: TF-A, services/std_svc/sdei/sdei_intr_mgmt.c sdei_intr_handler(): /* * We reach here when client completes the event. * * If the cause of dispatch originally interrupted the Secure world, * resume Secure. * * No need to save the Non-secure context ahead of a world switch: the * Non-secure context was fully saved before dispatch, and has been * returned to its pre-dispatch state. */ if (sec_state == SECURE) restore_and_resume_secure_context(); /* * The event was dispatched after receiving SDEI interrupt. With * the event handling completed, EOI the corresponding * interrupt. */ if ((map->ev_num != SDEI_EVENT_0) && !is_map_bound(map)) { ERROR("Invalid SDEI mapping: ev=%u\n", map->ev_num); panic(); } plat_ic_end_of_interrupt(intr_raw); How to fix above issues? I think the root cause is that kernel broken the SDEI dispatch flow, so kernel should modify to fix these issues. Thanks, Ming

1 year, 9 months

4
10
0 0

[PATCH TF-A] fix(plat/rcar3): Fix RPC-IF device node name

by Geert Uytterhoeven

According to the Generic Names Recommendation in the Devicetree Specification Release v0.3, and the DT Bindings for the Renesas Reduced Pin Count Interface, the node name for a Renesas RPC-IF device should be "spi". The node name matters, as the node is enabled by passing a DT fragment from TF-A to subsequent software. Fix this by renaming the device nodes from "rpc" to "spi". Fixes: 12c75c8886a0ee69 ("feat(plat/rcar3): emit RPC status to DT fragment if RPC unlocked") Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas(a)glider.be> --- Background: On Renesas R-Car Gen3 platforms, the SPI Multi I/O Bus Controllers (RPC-IF) provide access to HyperFlash or QSPI storage. On production systems, they are typically locked by the TF-A firmware, unless TF-A is built with RCAR_RPC_HYPERFLASH_LOCKED=0. When unlocked, TF-A communicates this to subsequent software by passing a DT fragment that sets the "status" property of the RPC-IF device node to "okay". Unfortunately there are several issues preventing this from working all the way to Linux: 1. TF-A (and U-Boot on the receiving side) uses a device node name that does not conform to the DT specification nor the DT bindings for RPC-IF, 2. While U-Boot receives the RPC-IF enablement from TF-A, it does not propagate it to Linux yet, 3. The DTS files that are part of Linux do not have RPC HyperFlash support yet. This patch takes care of the first issue in TF-A. The related patches for U-Boot are [1]. Patches to enable RPC-IF support in Linux are available at [2]. Thanks for your comments! [1] "[PATCH u-boot 0/3] renesas: Fix RPC-IF enablement" https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1648544792.git.geert+renesas@glider.be [2] "[PATCH 0/5] arm64: dts: renesas: rcar-gen3: Enable HyperFlash support" https://lore.kernel.org/r/cover.1648548339.git.geert+renesas@glider.be --- plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c b/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c index bbfa16927d6c2384..f85db8d650c6b1a5 100644 --- a/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c +++ b/plat/renesas/rcar/bl2_plat_setup.c @@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ static void bl2_add_rpc_node(void) goto err; } - node = ret = fdt_add_subnode(fdt, node, "rpc@ee200000"); + node = ret = fdt_add_subnode(fdt, node, "spi@ee200000"); if (ret < 0) { goto err; } -- 2.25.1

2 years, 2 months

3
7
1 0

TF-A TechForum 19th May Cancelled

by Bipin Ravi

All, This is to inform you all that the TF-A Techforum for Thursday, 19th May 2022 is cancelled as we didn't receive any topic for this week. The next meeting will now be Thursday, 2nd June 2022 at 16:00 - 17:00 BST. Thanks, Bipin Ravi

2 years, 4 months

1
1
0 0

Rebooting LTS discussion

by Okash Khawaja

Hi, There have been discussions about having long term support releases for TF-A, e.g. the email thread [1] and a tech forum [2]. For partners releasing TF-A in their production devices, LTS is very much needed. From the previous discussions, it seems like there is an agreement that LTS is a good idea but we need to build consensus on how to support it. Any thoughts on this? Thanks, Okash [1] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/search?mlist=tf-a%40lists.truste… [2] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/docs/TF-A-LTS.pdf

2 years, 5 months

4
11
0 0

Measured boot and external TPM modules

by Ramon Fried

Hi, I'm currently working on porting TFA to our upcoming SOC. We plan to support Measured boot using external I2C TPM module. I'm wondering about the implementation of that in BL1. Do you think that I need to write the measurements directly to the I2C module in BL1 ? I'm asking because I would like to have the least source of problems in BL1 which I can't upgrade. I thought of storing the measurements in secure RAM and perhaps copy later. Would love to hear your thoughts. PS. Actually I would love to have the option to choose to implement TPM also in SW (fTPM using optee - as was done in the POC). I think that if I store the measurement of BL2 in secure RAM I can later change the specific TPM while upgrading only BL2/BL31... Thanks, Ramon

2 years, 6 months

4
9
0 0

Floating point math

by Bartus, Dan

We are using an arm ARCH-64 (A55) and we need to do some floating point math in BL2. It seems this is not enabled. Is there a reason why I cannot do FP math (security issue?) and if I can, how do I enable it? I am seeing this error when I use floats "-mgeneral-regs-only" thanks

2 years, 6 months

4
9
0 0

arm-trustedfirmware whether has unit test

by 郭浙伟(本记)

hi, I has quality engineer from china. I would to start study the Arm profile-A trustedfirmware and try to test it. I has read trustedfirmware documetion , From the Processes & policies Chap about CI part. "https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/process/contributing.htm… " Find ATF has Coverity Scan and test image build. but I would to know, trustedfirmware-a whether has unit test part in the code level quality check. Brs Tony

2 years, 7 months

2
1
0 0

ChangeLog-v2.7

by Jayanth Dodderi Chidanand

Hello All, Kindly take a look at the Changelog section (rendered version) for your respective platforms, as we approach closer to TF-A release v2.7. Please share your comments at review.trustedfirmware.org as we can address them accordingly. External Patch: https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/15282 Rendered Version: https://ci-builds.trustedfirmware.org/static-files/La0ImPrSWDqkNWMSfH1vNhIR… Best regards, Jayanth

2 years, 7 months

2
1
0 0

Add neoverse-n1 support to QEMU SBSA

by Itaru Kitayama

Hi, I'd like to boot SBSA ref board with neoverse-n1 CPU, is anyone working on this? Itaru.

2 years, 7 months

2
8
1 0

New Defects reported by Coverity Scan for ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware

by scan-admin＠coverity.com

Hi, Please find the latest report on new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. 10 new defect(s) introduced to ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware found with Coverity Scan. New defect(s) Reported-by: Coverity Scan Showing 10 of 10 defect(s) ** CID 378520: (OVERRUN) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 441 in spmc_shm_convert_shmem_obj_from_v1_0() /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 441 in spmc_shm_convert_shmem_obj_from_v1_0() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378520: (OVERRUN) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 441 in spmc_shm_convert_shmem_obj_from_v1_0() 435 emad_array_in = mtd_orig->emad; 436 emad_array_out = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *) 437 ((uint8_t *) out + out->emad_offset); 438 439 /* Copy across the emad structs. */ 440 for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < out->emad_count; i++) { >>> CID 378520: (OVERRUN) >>> Overrunning array of 48 bytes at byte offset 48 by dereferencing pointer "&emad_array_out[i]". [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.] 441 memcpy(&emad_array_out[i], &emad_array_in[i], 442 sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)); 443 } 444 445 /* Place the mrd descriptors after the end of the emad descriptors.*/ 446 mrd_in_offset = emad_array_in->comp_mrd_offset; /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 441 in spmc_shm_convert_shmem_obj_from_v1_0() 435 emad_array_in = mtd_orig->emad; 436 emad_array_out = (struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *) 437 ((uint8_t *) out + out->emad_offset); 438 439 /* Copy across the emad structs. */ 440 for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < out->emad_count; i++) { >>> CID 378520: (OVERRUN) >>> Calling "memcpy" with "&emad_array_in[i]" and "16UL" is suspicious because "emad_array_in" points into a buffer of 16 bytes and the function call may access "(char *)&emad_array_in[i] + 15UL". [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.] 441 memcpy(&emad_array_out[i], &emad_array_in[i], 442 sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)); 443 } 444 445 /* Place the mrd descriptors after the end of the emad descriptors.*/ 446 mrd_in_offset = emad_array_in->comp_mrd_offset; ** CID 378519: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 525 in spmc_shm_convert_mtd_to_v1_0() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378519: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 525 in spmc_shm_convert_mtd_to_v1_0() 519 ((uint8_t *) mtd_orig + mtd_orig->emad_offset); 520 emad_array_out = out->emad; 521 522 /* Copy across the emad structs. */ 523 emad_in = emad_array_in; 524 for (unsigned int i = 0U; i < out->emad_count; i++) { >>> CID 378519: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) >>> Calling "memcpy" with "&emad_array_out[i]" and "16UL" is suspicious because "emad_array_out" points into a buffer of 16 bytes and the function call may access "(char *)&emad_array_out[i] + 15UL". [Note: The source code implementation of the function has been overridden by a builtin model.] 525 memcpy(&emad_array_out[i], emad_in, 526 sizeof(struct ffa_emad_v1_0)); 527 528 emad_in += mtd_orig->emad_size; 529 } 530 ** CID 378518: Program hangs (ORDER_REVERSAL) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1689 in spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378518: Program hangs (ORDER_REVERSAL) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1689 in spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish() 1683 if (req->endpoint_count == 0) { 1684 WARN("%s: endpoint count cannot be 0.\n", __func__); 1685 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1686 goto err_unlock_mailbox; 1687 } 1688 >>> CID 378518: Program hangs (ORDER_REVERSAL) >>> Calling "spin_lock" acquires lock "spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock" while holding lock "mailbox.lock" (count: 2 / 5). 1689 spin_lock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); 1690 1691 obj = spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, req->handle); 1692 if (obj == NULL) { 1693 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1694 goto err_unlock_all; ** CID 378517: Program hangs (ORDER_REVERSAL) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1338 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378517: Program hangs (ORDER_REVERSAL) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1338 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() 1332 WARN("%s: invalid length %u < %zu\n", __func__, total_length, 1333 min_desc_size); 1334 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1335 goto err_unlock_mailbox; 1336 } 1337 >>> CID 378517: Program hangs (ORDER_REVERSAL) >>> Calling "spin_lock" acquires lock "spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock" while holding lock "mailbox.lock" (count: 2 / 5). 1338 spin_lock(&spmc_shmem_obj_state.lock); 1339 1340 obj = spmc_shmem_obj_lookup(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, req->handle); 1341 if (obj == NULL) { 1342 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1343 goto err_unlock_all; ** CID 378516: Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1005 in spmc_ffa_fill_desc() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378516: Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1005 in spmc_ffa_fill_desc() 999 } 1000 1001 /* Get a new obj to store the v1.1 descriptor. */ 1002 v1_1_obj = 1003 spmc_shmem_obj_alloc(&spmc_shmem_obj_state, v1_1_desc_size); 1004 >>> CID 378516: Null pointer dereferences (REVERSE_INULL) >>> Null-checking "obj" suggests that it may be null, but it has already been dereferenced on all paths leading to the check. 1005 if (!obj) { 1006 ret = FFA_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; 1007 goto err_arg; 1008 } 1009 1010 /* Perform the conversion from v1.0 to v1.1. */ ** CID 378515: (TAINTED_SCALAR) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1446 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1407 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378515: (TAINTED_SCALAR) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1483 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() 1477 1478 /* 1479 * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy 1480 * directly. 1481 */ 1482 if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { >>> CID 378515: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->emad_count" to "spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor", which uses it as a loop boundary. 1483 ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(resp, obj, buf_size, 0, 1484 &copy_size, 1485 &out_desc_size); 1486 if (ret != 0U) { 1487 ERROR("%s: Failed to process descriptor.\n", __func__); 1488 goto err_unlock_all; /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1483 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() 1477 1478 /* 1479 * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy 1480 * directly. 1481 */ 1482 if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { >>> CID 378515: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->address_range_count" to "spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor", which uses it as an offset. 1483 ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(resp, obj, buf_size, 0, 1484 &copy_size, 1485 &out_desc_size); 1486 if (ret != 0U) { 1487 ERROR("%s: Failed to process descriptor.\n", __func__); 1488 goto err_unlock_all; /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1483 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() 1477 1478 /* 1479 * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy 1480 * directly. 1481 */ 1482 if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { >>> CID 378515: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->desc" to "spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor", which uses it as an offset. 1483 ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(resp, obj, buf_size, 0, 1484 &copy_size, 1485 &out_desc_size); 1486 if (ret != 0U) { 1487 ERROR("%s: Failed to process descriptor.\n", __func__); 1488 goto err_unlock_all; /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1483 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() 1477 1478 /* 1479 * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy 1480 * directly. 1481 */ 1482 if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { >>> CID 378515: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->emad_size" to "spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor", which uses it as an offset. 1483 ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(resp, obj, buf_size, 0, 1484 &copy_size, 1485 &out_desc_size); 1486 if (ret != 0U) { 1487 ERROR("%s: Failed to process descriptor.\n", __func__); 1488 goto err_unlock_all; /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1446 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() 1440 &emad_size); 1441 if (emad == NULL) { 1442 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1443 goto err_unlock_all; 1444 } 1445 >>> CID 378515: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Using tainted variable "obj->desc.emad_count" as a loop boundary. 1446 for (size_t j = 0; j < obj->desc.emad_count; j++) { 1447 other_emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad( 1448 &obj->desc, j, MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1), 1449 &emad_size); 1450 1451 if (other_emad == NULL) { /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1407 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() 1401 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1402 goto err_unlock_all; 1403 } 1404 } 1405 1406 /* Validate that the provided emad offset and structure is valid.*/ >>> CID 378515: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Using tainted variable "req->emad_count" as a loop boundary. 1407 for (size_t i = 0; i < req->emad_count; i++) { 1408 size_t emad_size; 1409 struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad; 1410 1411 emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(req, i, ffa_version, 1412 &emad_size); ** CID 378514: (TAINTED_SCALAR) ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378514: (TAINTED_SCALAR) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1604 in spmc_ffa_mem_frag_rx() 1598 * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy 1599 * directly. 1600 */ 1601 if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { 1602 size_t out_desc_size; 1603 >>> CID 378514: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->emad_count" to "spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor", which uses it as a loop boundary. 1604 ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(mbox->rx_buffer, obj, 1605 buf_size, 1606 fragment_offset, 1607 &copy_size, 1608 &out_desc_size); 1609 if (ret != 0U) { /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1604 in spmc_ffa_mem_frag_rx() 1598 * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy 1599 * directly. 1600 */ 1601 if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { 1602 size_t out_desc_size; 1603 >>> CID 378514: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->emad_size" to "spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor", which uses it as an offset. 1604 ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(mbox->rx_buffer, obj, 1605 buf_size, 1606 fragment_offset, 1607 &copy_size, 1608 &out_desc_size); 1609 if (ret != 0U) { /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1604 in spmc_ffa_mem_frag_rx() 1598 * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy 1599 * directly. 1600 */ 1601 if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { 1602 size_t out_desc_size; 1603 >>> CID 378514: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->address_range_count" to "spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor", which uses it as an offset. 1604 ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(mbox->rx_buffer, obj, 1605 buf_size, 1606 fragment_offset, 1607 &copy_size, 1608 &out_desc_size); 1609 if (ret != 0U) { /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1604 in spmc_ffa_mem_frag_rx() 1598 * If the caller is v1.0 convert the descriptor, otherwise copy 1599 * directly. 1600 */ 1601 if (ffa_version == MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 0)) { 1602 size_t out_desc_size; 1603 >>> CID 378514: (TAINTED_SCALAR) >>> Passing tainted expression "obj->desc" to "spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor", which uses it as an offset. 1604 ret = spmc_populate_ffa_v1_0_descriptor(mbox->rx_buffer, obj, 1605 buf_size, 1606 fragment_offset, 1607 &copy_size, 1608 &out_desc_size); 1609 if (ret != 0U) { ** CID 378513: Null pointer dereferences (FORWARD_NULL) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1320 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378513: Null pointer dereferences (FORWARD_NULL) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1320 in spmc_ffa_mem_retrieve_req() 1314 __func__); 1315 ret = FFA_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; 1316 goto err_unlock_mailbox; 1317 } 1318 1319 if (req->emad_count == 0U) { >>> CID 378513: Null pointer dereferences (FORWARD_NULL) >>> Dereferencing null pointer "obj". 1320 WARN("%s: unsupported attribute desc count %u.\n", 1321 __func__, obj->desc.emad_count); 1322 return -EINVAL; 1323 } 1324 1325 /* Determine the appropriate minimum descriptor size. */ ** CID 378512: Null pointer dereferences (NULL_RETURNS) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1714 in spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378512: Null pointer dereferences (NULL_RETURNS) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 1714 in spmc_ffa_mem_relinquish() 1708 struct ffa_emad_v1_0 *emad; 1709 1710 for (unsigned int j = 0; j < obj->desc.emad_count; j++) { 1711 emad = spmc_shmem_obj_get_emad(&obj->desc, j, 1712 MAKE_FFA_VERSION(1, 1), 1713 &emad_size); >>> CID 378512: Null pointer dereferences (NULL_RETURNS) >>> Dereferencing "emad", which is known to be "NULL". 1714 if (req->endpoint_array[i] == 1715 emad->mapd.endpoint_id) { 1716 found = true; 1717 break; 1718 } 1719 } ** CID 378511: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 681 in spmc_shmem_check_obj() ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ *** CID 378511: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) /services/std_svc/spm/el3_spmc/spmc_shared_mem.c: 681 in spmc_shmem_check_obj() 675 } 676 677 /* 678 * Validate the calculated emad address resides within the 679 * descriptor. 680 */ >>> CID 378511: Memory - corruptions (OVERRUN) >>> "(uint8_t *)&obj->desc + obj->desc_size" evaluates to an address that is at byte offset 64 of an array of 48 bytes. 681 if ((uintptr_t) emad >= 682 (uintptr_t)((uint8_t *) &obj->desc + obj->desc_size)) { 683 WARN("Invalid emad access.\n"); 684 return -EINVAL; 685 } 686 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ To view the defects in Coverity Scan visit, https://u15810271.ct.sendgrid.net/ls/click?upn=HRESupC-2F2Czv4BOaCWWCy7my0P…

2 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

TF-A May 2022