On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256 and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation.
I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective, this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace to extract the secret authentication key.
AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless the key is ephemeral.
AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case, and the API can't enforce that limit.
For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices. They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them at random for each encryption without any problems.
- XAES-256-GCM
- XChaCha20-Poly1305
- AEGIS-256
AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions.
The exitential problem here is that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN creates a circular relationship between the keyrings API and a specific key type.
At hardware level I did not see any support for TPM, which narrows down the potential user base.
The remaining potential user base is further reduced by those that use trusted keys; leaving out those who need to solve the assumed problem that only this patch set can presumebly sort out.
And we don't really know at this point that cut. This is pretty much the break down of what is wrong here.
If there is/was a problem to sort out, it should be so constrained that it should be as quick to describe as stepping over a nail really.
These are the main topics what I would focus on.
This whole patchset looks like a solution looking for a problem.
The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want. That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you have bigger problems.
Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance, time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is.