On 19/11/2026 05:35, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
On 11/18/26 7:43 PM, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
On 11/18/26 7:37 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 06:42:15PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless the key is ephemeral.
CBC is there for existing formats (craf writes files that openssl enc can read) and because the CAAM path is CBC only. I take your points on it.
AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case, and the API can't enforce that limit.
You are right that a construction of our own is the wrong choice: patch 9, the only GCM in the series, has no user yet and can go.
[snip]
The usual solution to something like this is a userspace service like ssh-agent. Then you can do whatever key management you want. That doesn't protect against root, but if someone can get root you have bigger problems.
The threat here is root, on devices where root eventually falls: a key root can copy decrypts that device's data offline and forever. A service that holds the key in its memory gives that away. keycrypt with the OP-TEE backend does not: the TA keeps the key and checks the purpose sealed with it at every use, so even a compromised kernel can only use it on that device, and only for that purpose.
Also, if you need keys stored in hardware for some reason (compliance, time-limited exfiltration), you can use a userspace library or daemon that abstracts over whatever the hardware-specific API is.
Yes, that is the case I mean, and a daemon over a TEE would not give the key away either. What it costs here is, for OP-TEE's PKCS#11 TA, secure storage before the root filesystem exists; for the CAAM, the only user-space path is AF_ALG cbc(paes), the one off-CPU exception left in an interface the kernel documents as deprecated, privileged by default, with a key format per driver and no purpose.
Ciao,
Rodolfo