On 11/18/26 9:04 AM, Rodolfo Giometti wrote:
This RFC proposes a key type, "keycrypt", whose material user space can use for symmetric operations but never read: AES-256-CBC, HMAC-SHA256 and an authenticated AES-256-GCM stream, through a file descriptor that KEYCTL_CRYPT_OPEN returns for one key and one operation.
I haven't looked at the API, but from a cryptographic perspective, this encourages very poor practices. AES-GCM even allows userspace to extract the secret authentication key.
AES-256-CBC isn't a suitable mode on its own, unless it's combined with a MAC in encrypt-then-MAC. Even then, it has a 2^64 birthday bound, so it should only be used 2^48 times with a single key unless the key is ephemeral.
AES-GCM is not a suitable algorithm either. If you allow encrypting with a key loaded from persistent storage, there is no way for the API to ensure it is only used with a unique nonce. Nonce reuse leaks the authentication key and allows forgeries. Using random nonces isn't good enough either: NIST only allows 2^32 encryptions in this case, and the API can't enforce that limit.
For long-term keys, all of the following are much safer choices. They have 192-bit nonces, which means that one can generate them at random for each encryption without any problems.
- XAES-256-GCM - XChaCha20-Poly1305 - AEGIS-256
AES-GCM-SIV is also okay, provided that you are fine with occasionally leaking if two plaintexts are equal. This happens whenever there is a nonce collision, so with probability 2^-32 after 2^32 encryptions.