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[PATCH v19 0/6] Introduction of a remoteproc tee to load signed firmware

by Arnaud Pouliquen

Main updates from version V18[2]: - rework documentation for the release_fw ops - rework function documentation in remoteproc_tee.c - replace spinlock by mutex and generalize usage in remoteproc_tee.c Main updates from version V17[1]: - Fix: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing More details are available in each patch commit message. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-remoteproc/20250613091650.2337411-1-arnaud.po… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-remoteproc/20250616075530.4106090-1-arnaud.po… Tested-on: commit 19272b37aa4f ("Linux 6.16-rc1") Description of the feature: -------------------------- This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context. 1) Principle: The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE). The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle: - authenticating and loading firmware images, - isolating and securing the remote processor memories, - supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33), - managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE. 2) Format of the signed image: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc… 3) OP-TEE trusted application API: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem… 4) OP-TEE signature script Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py Example of usage: sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem 5) Impact on User space Application No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image instead of the ELF image. For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here (note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation and the integration in OP-TEE). https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds Arnaud Pouliquen (6): remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper remoteproc: Add TEE support remoteproc: Introduce optional release_fw operation dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and release remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware .../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +- drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 52 ++ drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_internal.h | 6 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 708 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 139 +++- include/linux/remoteproc.h | 6 + include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 87 +++ 9 files changed, 1023 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h base-commit: 19272b37aa4f83ca52bdf9c16d5d81bdd1354494 -- 2.25.1

19 hours, 42 minutes

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[PATCH v10 0/9] TEE subsystem for protected dma-buf allocations

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, This patch set allocates the protected DMA-bufs from a DMA-heap instantiated from the TEE subsystem. The TEE subsystem handles the DMA-buf allocations since it is the TEE (OP-TEE, AMD-TEE, TS-TEE, or perhaps a future QTEE) which sets up the protection for the memory used for the DMA-bufs. The DMA-heap uses a protected memory pool provided by the backend TEE driver, allowing it to choose how to allocate the protected physical memory. The allocated DMA-bufs must be imported with a new TEE_IOC_SHM_REGISTER_FD before they can be passed as arguments when requesting services from the secure world. Three use-cases (Secure Video Playback, Trusted UI, and Secure Video Recording) have been identified so far to serve as examples of what can be expected. The use-cases have predefined DMA-heap names, "protected,secure-video", "protected,trusted-ui", and "protected,secure-video-record". The backend driver registers protected memory pools for the use-cases it supports. Each use-case has its own protected memory pool since different use-cases require isolation from different parts of the system. A protected memory pool can be based on a static carveout instantiated while probing the TEE backend driver, or dynamically allocated from CMA (dma_alloc_pages()) and made protected as needed by the TEE. This can be tested on a RockPi 4B+ with the following steps: repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m rockpi4.xml \ -b prototype/sdp-v10 repo sync -j8 cd build make toolchains -j$(nproc) make all -j$(nproc) # Copy ../out/rockpi4.img to an SD card and boot the RockPi from that # Connect a monitor to the RockPi # login and at the prompt: gst-launch-1.0 videotestsrc ! \ aesenc key=1f9423681beb9a79215820f6bda73d0f \ iv=e9aa8e834d8d70b7e0d254ff670dd718 serialize-iv=true ! \ aesdec key=1f9423681beb9a79215820f6bda73d0f ! \ kmssink The aesdec module has been hacked to use an OP-TEE TA to decrypt the stream into protected DMA-bufs which are consumed by the kmssink. The primitive QEMU tests from previous patch sets can be tested on RockPi in the same way using: xtest --sdp-basic The primitive tests are tested on QEMU with the following steps: repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m qemu_v8.xml \ -b prototype/sdp-v10 repo sync -j8 cd build make toolchains -j$(nproc) make SPMC_AT_EL=1 all -j$(nproc) make SPMC_AT_EL=1 run-only # login and at the prompt: xtest --sdp-basic The SPMC_AT_EL=1 parameter configures the build with FF-A and an SPMC at S-EL1 inside OP-TEE. The parameter can be changed to SPMC_AT_EL=n to test without FF-A using the original SMC ABI instead. Please remember to do %make arm-tf-clean for TF-A to be rebuilt properly using the new configuration. https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/prerequisites.html list dependencies required to build the above. The primitive tests are pretty basic, mostly checking that a Trusted Application in the secure world can access and manipulate the memory. There are also some negative tests for out of bounds buffers, etc. Thanks, Jens Changes since V9: * Adding Sumit's R-B to "optee: sync secure world ABI headers" * Update commit message as requested for "dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions". * In "tee: implement protected DMA-heap": - add the hidden config option TEE_DMABUF_HEAPS to tell if the TEE subsystem can support DMA heaps - add a pfn_valid() to check that the passed physical address can be used by __pfn_to_page() and friends - remove the memremap() call, the caller is should do that instead if needed * In "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_dma_mem()" guard the calls to dma_alloc_pages() and dma_free_pages() with TEE_DMABUF_HEAPS to avoid linking errors in some configurations * In "optee: support protected memory allocation": - add the hidden config option OPTEE_STATIC_PROTMEM_POOL to tell if the driver can support a static protected memory pool - optee_protmem_pool_init() is slightly refactored to make the patches that follow easier - Call devm_memremap() before calling tee_protmem_static_pool_alloc() Changes since V8: * Using dma_alloc_pages() instead of cma_alloc() so the direct dependency on CMA can be removed together with the patches "cma: export cma_alloc() and cma_release()" and "dma-contiguous: export dma_contiguous_default_area". The patch * Renaming the patch "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem()" to "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_dma_mem()" * Setting DMA mask for the OP-TEE TEE device based on input from the secure world instead of relying on the parent device so following patches are removed: "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" and "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc()". * Adding Sumit Garg's R-B to "tee: refactor params_from_user()" * In the patch "tee: implement protected DMA-heap", map the physical memory passed to tee_protmem_static_pool_alloc(). Changes since V7: * Adding "dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions", "cma: export cma_alloc() and cma_release()", and "dma-contiguous: export dma_contiguous_default_area" to export the symbols needed to keep the TEE subsystem as a load module. * Removing CONFIG_TEE_DMABUF_HEAP and CONFIG_TEE_CMA since they aren't needed any longer. * Addressing review comments in "optee: sync secure world ABI headers" * Better align protected memory pool initialization between the smc-abi and ffa-abi parts of the optee driver. * Removing the patch "optee: account for direction while converting parameters" Changes since V6: * Restricted memory is now known as protected memory since to use the same term as https://docs.vulkan.org/guide/latest/protected.html. Update all patches to consistently use protected memory. * In "tee: implement protected DMA-heap" add the hidden config option TEE_DMABUF_HEAP to tell if the DMABUF_HEAPS functions are available for the TEE subsystem * Adding "tee: refactor params_from_user()", broken out from the patch "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor" * For "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor": - Update commit message to mention protected memory - Remove and open code tee_shm_get_parent_shm() in param_from_user_memref() * In "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem" add the hidden config option TEE_CMA to tell if the CMA functions are available for the TEE subsystem * For "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" and "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc", added Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)kernel.org> Changes since V5: * Removing "tee: add restricted memory allocation" and "tee: add TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_FD_INFO" * Adding "tee: implement restricted DMA-heap", "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor", "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem()", "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc()", and "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" * The two TEE driver OPs "rstmem_alloc()" and "rstmem_free()" are replaced with a struct tee_rstmem_pool abstraction. * Replaced the the TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC user space API with the DMA-heap API Changes since V4: * Adding the patch "tee: add TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_FD_INFO" needed by the GStreamer demo * Removing the dummy CPU access and mmap functions from the dma_buf_ops * Fixing a compile error in "optee: FF-A: dynamic restricted memory allocation" reported by kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Changes since V3: * Make the use_case and flags field in struct tee_shm u32's instead of u16's * Add more description for TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC in the header file * Import namespace DMA_BUF in module tee, reported by lkp(a)intel.com * Added a note in the commit message for "optee: account for direction while converting parameters" why it's needed * Factor out dynamic restricted memory allocation from "optee: support restricted memory allocation" into two new commits "optee: FF-A: dynamic restricted memory allocation" and "optee: smc abi: dynamic restricted memory allocation" * Guard CMA usage with #ifdef CONFIG_CMA, effectively disabling dynamic restricted memory allocate if CMA isn't configured Changes since the V2 RFC: * Based on v6.12 * Replaced the flags for SVP and Trusted UID memory with a u32 field with unique id for each use case * Added dynamic allocation of restricted memory pools * Added OP-TEE ABI both with and without FF-A for dynamic restricted memory * Added support for FF-A with FFA_LEND Changes since the V1 RFC: * Based on v6.11 * Complete rewrite, replacing the restricted heap with TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC Changes since Olivier's post [2]: * Based on Yong Wu's post [1] where much of dma-buf handling is done in the generic restricted heap * Simplifications and cleanup * New commit message for "dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro restricted dmabuf heap support" * Replaced the word "secure" with "restricted" where applicable Etienne Carriere (1): tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor Jens Wiklander (8): optee: sync secure world ABI headers dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions tee: implement protected DMA-heap tee: refactor params_from_user() tee: add tee_shm_alloc_dma_mem() optee: support protected memory allocation optee: FF-A: dynamic protected memory allocation optee: smc abi: dynamic protected memory allocation drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c | 3 + drivers/tee/Kconfig | 5 + drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 5 + drivers/tee/optee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 10 + drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 147 +++++++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_ffa.h | 27 +- drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 84 +++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 15 +- drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 37 ++- drivers/tee/optee/protmem.c | 335 +++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 142 ++++++++- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 155 +++++++--- drivers/tee/tee_heap.c | 472 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 16 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 189 +++++++++++- include/linux/tee_core.h | 71 +++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 10 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 31 ++ 20 files changed, 1689 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/protmem.c create mode 100644 drivers/tee/tee_heap.c base-commit: 0ff41df1cb268fc69e703a08a57ee14ae967d0ca -- 2.43.0

1 day, 21 hours

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Linaro OP-TEE Contribution, LOC, monthly meeting June 24

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, Tomorrow, Tuesday, it's time for another LOC monthly meeting. For time and connection details, see the calendar at https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ - Jerome just announced that OP-TEE version 4.7.0 is scheduled for July 11. - Dynamic memory configuration in OP-TEE is nearing an end with https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/7426. I have a few more patches in store, but almost all the big and difficult things are done. - The Secure Data Path patchset [1] is at v10 Are there any other topics? [1] https://lore.kernel.org/op-tee/20250610131600.2972232-1-jens.wiklander@lina… Thanks, Jens

2 days, 21 hours

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[PATCH] treewide: Replace scnprintf with sysfs_emit in

by Abhinav Ananthu

Use sysfs_emit() to format sysfs output instead of scnprintf() as recommended by the kernel documentation. Signed-off-by: Abhinav Ananthu <abhinav.ogl(a)gmail.com> --- drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c index c75fddc83576..ce44e3498d37 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static ssize_t rpmb_routing_model_show(struct device *dev, else s = "user"; - return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%s\n", s); + return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", s); } static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(rpmb_routing_model); -- 2.34.1

3 days, 20 hours

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Preparing for OP-TEE 4.7.0

by Jerome Forissier

[BCC all OP-TEE maintainers] Hi OP-TEE maintainers & contributors, OP-TEE version 4.7.0 is scheduled to be released on 2025-07-11. So, now is a good time to start testing the master branch on the various platforms and report/fix any bugs. The GitHub pull request for collecting Tested-by tags or any other comments is https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/7439. We will create the release candidate tag 4.7.0-rc1 next Friday, allowing for a two week testing period before the planned release. You can find more information related to releases here: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/releases.html Thanks, -- Jerome

5 days, 17 hours

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[PATCH v2] tee: optee: prevent use-after-free when the client exits before the supplicant

by Amirreza Zarrabi

Commit 70b0d6b0a199 ("tee: optee: Fix supplicant wait loop") made the client wait as killable so it can be interrupted during shutdown or after a supplicant crash. This changes the original lifetime expectations: the client task can now terminate while the supplicant is still processing its request. If the client exits first it removes the request from its queue and kfree()s it, while the request ID remains in supp->idr. A subsequent lookup on the supplicant path then dereferences freed memory, leading to a use-after-free. Serialise access to the request with supp->mutex: * Hold supp->mutex in optee_supp_recv() and optee_supp_send() while looking up and touching the request. * Let optee_supp_thrd_req() notice that the client has terminated and signal optee_supp_send() accordingly. With these changes the request cannot be freed while the supplicant still has a reference, eliminating the race. Fixes: 70b0d6b0a199 ("tee: optee: Fix supplicant wait loop") Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <amirreza.zarrabi(a)oss.qualcomm.com> --- Changes in v2: - Replace the static variable with a sentinel value. - Fix the issue with returning the popped request to the supplicant. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250605-fix-use-after-free-v1-1-a70d23bff248@oss… --- drivers/tee/optee/supp.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/supp.c b/drivers/tee/optee/supp.c index d0f397c90242..fa39f5f226aa 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/supp.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/supp.c @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ struct optee_supp_req { struct list_head link; + int id; bool in_queue; u32 func; @@ -19,6 +20,9 @@ struct optee_supp_req { struct completion c; }; +/* It is temporary request used for invalid pending request in supp->idr. */ +#define INVALID_REQ_PTR ((struct optee_supp_req *)ERR_PTR(-ENOENT)) + void optee_supp_init(struct optee_supp *supp) { memset(supp, 0, sizeof(*supp)); @@ -102,6 +106,7 @@ u32 optee_supp_thrd_req(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 func, size_t num_params, mutex_lock(&supp->mutex); list_add_tail(&req->link, &supp->reqs); req->in_queue = true; + req->id = -1; mutex_unlock(&supp->mutex); /* Tell an eventual waiter there's a new request */ @@ -117,21 +122,40 @@ u32 optee_supp_thrd_req(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 func, size_t num_params, if (wait_for_completion_killable(&req->c)) { mutex_lock(&supp->mutex); if (req->in_queue) { + /* Supplicant has not seen this request yet. */ list_del(&req->link); req->in_queue = false; + + ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION; + } else if (req->id == -1) { + /* + * Supplicant has processed this request. Ignore the + * kill signal for now and submit the result. + */ + ret = req->ret; + } else { + /* + * Supplicant is in the middle of processing this + * request. Replace req with INVALID_REQ_PTR so that + * the ID remains busy, causing optee_supp_send() to + * fail on the next call to supp_pop_req() with this ID. + */ + idr_replace(&supp->idr, INVALID_REQ_PTR, req->id); + ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION; } + mutex_unlock(&supp->mutex); - req->ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION; + } else { + ret = req->ret; } - ret = req->ret; kfree(req); return ret; } static struct optee_supp_req *supp_pop_entry(struct optee_supp *supp, - int num_params, int *id) + int num_params) { struct optee_supp_req *req; @@ -153,8 +177,8 @@ static struct optee_supp_req *supp_pop_entry(struct optee_supp *supp, return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } - *id = idr_alloc(&supp->idr, req, 1, 0, GFP_KERNEL); - if (*id < 0) + req->id = idr_alloc(&supp->idr, req, 1, 0, GFP_KERNEL); + if (req->id < 0) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); list_del(&req->link); @@ -214,7 +238,6 @@ int optee_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 *func, u32 *num_params, struct optee *optee = tee_get_drvdata(teedev); struct optee_supp *supp = &optee->supp; struct optee_supp_req *req = NULL; - int id; size_t num_meta; int rc; @@ -223,16 +246,47 @@ int optee_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 *func, u32 *num_params, return rc; while (true) { - mutex_lock(&supp->mutex); - req = supp_pop_entry(supp, *num_params - num_meta, &id); - mutex_unlock(&supp->mutex); + scoped_guard(mutex, &supp->mutex) { + req = supp_pop_entry(supp, *num_params - num_meta); + if (!req) + goto wait_for_request; - if (req) { if (IS_ERR(req)) return PTR_ERR(req); - break; + + /* + * Process the request while holding the lock, + * so that optee_supp_thrd_req() doesn't pull the + * request out from under us. + */ + + if (num_meta) { + /* + * tee-supplicant support meta parameters -> + * requests can be processed asynchronously. + */ + param->attr = + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT | + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_META; + param->u.value.a = req->id; + param->u.value.b = 0; + param->u.value.c = 0; + } else { + supp->req_id = req->id; + } + + *func = req->func; + *num_params = req->num_params + num_meta; + memcpy(param + num_meta, req->param, + sizeof(struct tee_param) * req->num_params); + + return 0; } + /* Check for the next request in the queue. */ + continue; + +wait_for_request: /* * If we didn't get a request we'll block in * wait_for_completion() to avoid needless spinning. @@ -245,27 +299,6 @@ int optee_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 *func, u32 *num_params, return -ERESTARTSYS; } - if (num_meta) { - /* - * tee-supplicant support meta parameters -> requsts can be - * processed asynchronously. - */ - param->attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INOUT | - TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_META; - param->u.value.a = id; - param->u.value.b = 0; - param->u.value.c = 0; - } else { - mutex_lock(&supp->mutex); - supp->req_id = id; - mutex_unlock(&supp->mutex); - } - - *func = req->func; - *num_params = req->num_params + num_meta; - memcpy(param + num_meta, req->param, - sizeof(struct tee_param) * req->num_params); - return 0; } @@ -297,12 +330,19 @@ static struct optee_supp_req *supp_pop_req(struct optee_supp *supp, if (!req) return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + /* optee_supp_thrd_req() already returned to optee. */ + if (IS_ERR(req)) + goto failed_req; + if ((num_params - nm) != req->num_params) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); + req->id = -1; + *num_meta = nm; +failed_req: idr_remove(&supp->idr, id); supp->req_id = -1; - *num_meta = nm; + return req; } @@ -328,9 +368,8 @@ int optee_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 ret, u32 num_params, mutex_lock(&supp->mutex); req = supp_pop_req(supp, num_params, param, &num_meta); - mutex_unlock(&supp->mutex); - if (IS_ERR(req)) { + mutex_unlock(&supp->mutex); /* Something is wrong, let supplicant restart. */ return PTR_ERR(req); } @@ -358,6 +397,7 @@ int optee_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 ret, u32 num_params, /* Let the requesting thread continue */ complete(&req->c); + mutex_unlock(&supp->mutex); return 0; } --- base-commit: 3be1a7a31fbda82f3604b6c31e4f390110de1b46 change-id: 20250604-fix-use-after-free-8ff1b5d5d774 Best regards, -- Amirreza Zarrabi <amirreza.zarrabi(a)oss.qualcomm.com>

6 days, 15 hours

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[PATCH v18 0/6] Introduction of a remoteproc tee to load signed firmware

by Arnaud Pouliquen

Main updates from version V17[1]: - Fix: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing More details are available in each patch commit message. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-remoteproc/20250613091650.2337411-1-arnaud.po… Tested-on: commit 19272b37aa4f ("Linux 6.16-rc1") Description of the feature: -------------------------- This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context. 1) Principle: The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE). The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle: - authenticating and loading firmware images, - isolating and securing the remote processor memories, - supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33), - managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE. 2) Format of the signed image: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc… 3) OP-TEE trusted application API: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem… 4) OP-TEE signature script Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py Example of usage: sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem 5) Impact on User space Application No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image instead of the ELF image. For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here (note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation and the integration in OP-TEE). https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds Arnaud Pouliquen (6): remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper remoteproc: Add TEE support remoteproc: Introduce release_fw optional operation dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and release remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware .../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +- drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 52 ++ drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_internal.h | 6 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 620 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 139 +++- include/linux/remoteproc.h | 4 + include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 90 +++ 9 files changed, 936 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h base-commit: 19272b37aa4f83ca52bdf9c16d5d81bdd1354494 -- 2.25.1

1 week, 1 day

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[GIT PULL] OP-TEE fix for 6.16

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this patch for the optee driver. It relates to the FF-A driver PR https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250609105207.1185570-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com but it makes sense on its own and can be applied independently. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit 0ff41df1cb268fc69e703a08a57ee14ae967d0ca: Linux 6.15 (2025-05-25 16:09:23 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jenswi/linux-tee.git tags/optee-fix-for-v6.16 for you to fetch changes up to 312d02adb959ea199372f375ada06e0186f651e4: optee: ffa: fix sleep in atomic context (2025-06-12 12:04:57 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- A fix in the OP-TEE driver for v6.16 Fixing a sleep in atomic context in the FF-A notification callback by adding a work queue to process in a non-atomic context. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Jens Wiklander (1): optee: ffa: fix sleep in atomic context drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

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[PATCH v17 0/6] Introduction of a remoteproc tee to load signed firmware

by Arnaud Pouliquen

Main updates from version V16[1]: - rebase on Linux Kernel v6.16-rc1, - fix double space typos. More details are available in each patch commit message. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-remoteproc/CANLsYky=AAnQ3P6J9E9R1=ufVKpGniiVT… Tested-on: commit 19272b37aa4f ("Linux 6.16-rc1") Description of the feature: -------------------------- This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context. 1) Principle: The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE). The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle: - authenticating and loading firmware images, - isolating and securing the remote processor memories, - supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33), - managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE. 2) Format of the signed image: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc… 3) OP-TEE trusted application API: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem… 4) OP-TEE signature script Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py Example of usage: sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem 5) Impact on User space Application No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image instead of the ELF image. For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here (note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation and the integration in OP-TEE). https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds Arnaud Pouliquen (6): remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper remoteproc: Add TEE support remoteproc: Introduce release_fw optional operation dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and release remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware .../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +- drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 52 ++ drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_internal.h | 6 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 619 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 139 +++- include/linux/remoteproc.h | 4 + include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 90 +++ 9 files changed, 935 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h base-commit: 19272b37aa4f83ca52bdf9c16d5d81bdd1354494 -- 2.25.1

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Firmware Handoff for DT Overlay created by OP-TEE?

by Ahmad Fatoum

Hello Manish, In your recent talk[1] at LinaroConnect about the Firmware Handoff specification, you were asking about what other use cases it could address for OP-TEE. We ran into a possible use case that we would like to share: BL2 can pass a DT to OP-TEE, which it would use to discover memory and to fix up with memory reservations covering the memory it carves out for itself. OP-TEE also supports passing along the reservations as a device tree overlay. AFAICS, there is no way currently to have both: A DT for OP-TEE to probe hardware from and a way to pass the normal world a device tree overlay in return. I think this could be neatly addressed with Firmware Handoff and would be a motivation for us to implement support in barebox BL2/BL33 to take advantage of this. The current way is suboptimal as we would prefer the DT passed to OP-TEE to be read-only. This avoids either having to copy it or to pad it sufficiently in anticipation of it growing with the addition of the new nodes. [1]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxU798h8aiE Cheers, Ahmad -- Pengutronix e.K. | | Steuerwalder Str. 21 | http://www.pengutronix.de/ | 31137 Hildesheim, Germany | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0 | Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686 | Fax: +49-5121-206917-5555 |

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OP-TEE