- OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

[PATCH] hwrng: tpm: Do not enable by default

by Jan Kiszka

From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka(a)siemens.com> As seen with optee_ftpm, which uses ms-tpm-20-ref [1], a TPM may write the current time epoch to its NV storage every 4 seconds if there are commands sent to it. The 60 seconds periodic update of the entropy pool that the hwrng kthread does triggers this, causing about 4 writes per requests. Makes 2 millions per year for a 24/7 device, and that is a lot for its backing NV storage. It is therefore better to make the user intentionally enable this, providing a chance to read the warning. [1] https://github.com/Microsoft/ms-tpm-20-ref Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka(a)siemens.com> --- drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig index 8a8f692b6088..d64c929cacbe 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/Kconfig @@ -45,13 +45,17 @@ config TCG_TPM2_HMAC config HW_RANDOM_TPM bool "TPM HW Random Number Generator support" depends on TCG_TPM && HW_RANDOM && !(TCG_TPM=y && HW_RANDOM=m) - default y help This setting exposes the TPM's Random Number Generator as a hwrng device. This allows the kernel to collect randomness from the TPM at boot, and provides the TPM randomines in /dev/hwrng. - If unsure, say Y. + WARNING: Specifically firmware-based TPMs, possibly also hardware + variants, can wear-out from the frequent requests issued by the + Hardware Random Number Generator Core when filling the kernel's + entropy pool. These requests are sent once every minute by default, + and the TPM may write the current time to its NV storage for each of + them. config TCG_TIS_CORE tristate -- 2.51.0

1 week

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Linaro OP-TEE Contribution, LOC, monthly meeting October 28

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, Tomorrow, Tuesday, it's time for another LOC monthly meeting. For time and connection details, see the calendar at https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ - OP-TEE version 4.8.0 has been released - We have an op-tee channel at the Trusted Firmware Discord server [1]. Last week, there was a message about improving the order of all the config options we have in OP-TEE, the CFG_* variables. In the long term, we might still aim for Kconfig, but that's quite a large step. However, there are intermediate steps that we can take. I hope we'll see more of this. Are there any other topics? [1] https://www.trustedfirmware.org/faq/ Cheers, Jens

2 weeks, 6 days

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OP-TEE 4.8.0 has been released

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, I'm pleased to announce that OP-TEE version 4.6.0 is now available. The list of changes can be found in the changelog [1]. A big thank you to everyone who participated with contributions and helping out with testing the release [2]. [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/4.8.0/CHANGELOG.md [2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/86660925433a8d4d1b19cfa5fe940081d… Regards, Jens

3 weeks, 2 days

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[PATCH] core: Relax StMM dependency to TEE_STORAGE_PRIVATE

by Jan Kiszka

From: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka(a)siemens.com> This allows to run StMM without the userspace supplicant if the in-kernel RPMB service is available. Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka(a)siemens.com> --- core/pta/device.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/core/pta/device.c b/core/pta/device.c index 39ad3ddda..21c13bd94 100644 --- a/core/pta/device.c +++ b/core/pta/device.c @@ -67,8 +67,8 @@ static TEE_Result get_devices(uint32_t types, add_ta(ta->flags, &ta->uuid, buf, blen, &pos, rflags); if (stmm_get_uuid()) - add_ta(TA_FLAG_DEVICE_ENUM_SUPP, stmm_get_uuid(), buf, blen, - &pos, rflags); + add_ta(TA_FLAG_DEVICE_ENUM_TEE_STORAGE_PRIVATE, + stmm_get_uuid(), buf, blen, &pos, rflags); if (IS_ENABLED(CFG_EARLY_TA)) for_each_early_ta(eta) -- 2.51.0

3 weeks, 6 days

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Re: [PATCH 0/8] sd: Add RPMB emulation to eMMC model

by Jan Kiszka

FYI: QEMU model is working fine, upstreaming started, feedback welcome. Jan On 24.08.25 09:18, Jan Kiszka wrote: > This closes an old gap in system integration testing for the very > complex ARM firmware stacks by adding fairly advanced Replay Protected > Memory Block (RPMB) emulation to the eMMC device model. Key programming > and message authentication are working, so is the write counter. Known > users are happy with the result. What is missing, but not only for RPMB- > related registers, is state persistence across QEMU restarts. This is OK > at this stage for most test scenarios, though, and could still be added > later on. > > What can already be done with it is demonstrated in the WIP branch of > isar-cip-core at [1]: TF-A + OP-TEE + StandaloneMM TA + fTPM TA, used by > U-Boot and Linux for UEFI variable storage and TPM scenarios. If you > want to try: build qemu-arm64 target for trixie with 6.12-cip *head* > kernel, enable secure boot and disk encryption, then run > > $ QEMU_PATH=/path/to/qemu-build/ ./start-qemu.sh > > Deploy snakeoil keys into PK, KEK and db after first boot to enable > secure booting: > > root@demo:~# cert-to-efi-sig-list PkKek-1-snakeoil.pem PK.esl > root@demo:~# sign-efi-sig-list -k PkKek-1-snakeoil.key -c PkKek-1-snakeoil.pem PK PK.esl PK.auth > root@demo:~# efi-updatevar -f PK.auth db > root@demo:~# efi-updatevar -f PK.auth KEK > root@demo:~# efi-updatevar -f PK.auth PK > > Note that emulation is a bit slow in general, and specifically the > partition encryption on first boot is taking 20 min. - we should > probably reduce its size or understand if there is still something to > optimize. > > Jan > > [1] https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-core/isar-cip-core/-/commits/wip/qemu-rp… > > Cc: "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange(a)redhat.com> > > Jan Kiszka (8): > hw/sd/sdcard: Fix size check for backing block image > hw/sd/sdcard: Add validation for boot-partition-size > hw/sd/sdcard: Allow user-instantiated eMMC > hw/sd/sdcard: Refactor sd_bootpart_offset > hw/sd/sdcard: Add basic support for RPMB partition > crypto/hmac: Allow to build hmac over multiple > qcrypto_gnutls_hmac_bytes[v] calls > hw/sd/sdcard: Handle RPMB MAC field > scripts: Add helper script to generate eMMC block device images > > crypto/hmac-gcrypt.c | 4 +- > crypto/hmac-glib.c | 4 +- > crypto/hmac-gnutls.c | 4 +- > crypto/hmac-nettle.c | 4 +- > hw/sd/sd.c | 314 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > hw/sd/sdmmc-internal.h | 24 +++- > hw/sd/trace-events | 2 + > include/crypto/hmac.h | 12 ++ > scripts/mkemmc.sh | 185 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 9 files changed, 530 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) > create mode 100755 scripts/mkemmc.sh > -- Siemens AG, Foundational Technologies Linux Expert Center

4 weeks

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Preparing for OP-TEE 4.8.0

by Jens Wiklander

[BCC all OP-TEE maintainers] Hi OP-TEE maintainers & contributors, OP-TEE version 4.8.0 is now scheduled to be released on 2025-10-24. So, now is a good time to start testing the master branch on the various platforms and report/fix any bugs. The GitHub pull request for collecting Tested-by tags or any other comments is https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/7567. We will create the release candidate tag 4.8.0-rc1 this Friday, allowing for a one-week testing period before the planned release. You can find more information related to releases here: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/releases.html Thanks, Jens

1 month

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[PATCH v19 0/6] Introduction of a remoteproc tee to load signed firmware

by Arnaud Pouliquen

Main updates from version V18[2]: - rework documentation for the release_fw ops - rework function documentation in remoteproc_tee.c - replace spinlock by mutex and generalize usage in remoteproc_tee.c Main updates from version V17[1]: - Fix: warning: EXPORT_SYMBOL() is used, but #include <linux/export.h> is missing More details are available in each patch commit message. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-remoteproc/20250613091650.2337411-1-arnaud.po… [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-remoteproc/20250616075530.4106090-1-arnaud.po… Tested-on: commit 19272b37aa4f ("Linux 6.16-rc1") Description of the feature: -------------------------- This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context. 1) Principle: The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE). The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle: - authenticating and loading firmware images, - isolating and securing the remote processor memories, - supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33), - managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE. 2) Format of the signed image: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc… 3) OP-TEE trusted application API: Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem… 4) OP-TEE signature script Refer to: https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py Example of usage: sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem 5) Impact on User space Application No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image instead of the ELF image. For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here (note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation and the integration in OP-TEE). https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds Arnaud Pouliquen (6): remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper remoteproc: Add TEE support remoteproc: Introduce optional release_fw operation dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and release remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware .../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +- drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 52 ++ drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_internal.h | 6 + drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 708 ++++++++++++++++++ drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 139 +++- include/linux/remoteproc.h | 6 + include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 87 +++ 9 files changed, 1023 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h base-commit: 19272b37aa4f83ca52bdf9c16d5d81bdd1354494 -- 2.25.1

1 month

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.17-5.4] tee: allow a driver to allocate a tee_device without a pool

by Sasha Levin

From: Amirreza Zarrabi <amirreza.zarrabi(a)oss.qualcomm.com> [ Upstream commit 6dbcd5a9ab6cb6644e7d728521da1c9035ec7235 ] A TEE driver doesn't always need to provide a pool if it doesn't support memory sharing ioctls and can allocate memory for TEE messages in another way. Although this is mentioned in the documentation for tee_device_alloc(), it is not handled correctly. Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)oss.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <amirreza.zarrabi(a)oss.qualcomm.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- LLM Generated explanations, may be completely bogus: YES - The change simply drops the `|| !pool` guard in `tee_device_alloc()` (`drivers/tee/tee_core.c:892`), which currently rejects drivers that intentionally omit a shared-memory pool even though the API contract and docs (`include/linux/tee_core.h:123`) have long advertised `pool` as optional. Today that mismatch means such drivers cannot register at all, so user-visible functionality is blocked. - Other subsystem code already treats a missing pool as a valid state and bails out safely: shared-memory allocators check `if (!teedev->pool)` before dereferencing it and return an error to user space (`drivers/tee/tee_shm.c:78`), so allowing allocation without a pool doesn’t create new NULL dereferences or change behaviour for drivers that do use shared memory. - Existing in-tree TEE implementations still guard their pool setup with `IS_ERR()` checks (e.g. OP-TEE in `drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c:1651`), so a genuine failure still propagates an error instead of slipping through; we only unblock the documented “no pool” case. - The patch is tiny, self-contained, and doesn’t alter ioctls or data structures, making the regression risk very low while fixing a long- standing real bug that prevents compliant drivers from loading. Backporting keeps the stable tree consistent with the exported TEE API and supports downstream drivers that rely on the documented behaviour. drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index acc7998758ad8..133447f250657 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ struct tee_device *tee_device_alloc(const struct tee_desc *teedesc, if (!teedesc || !teedesc->name || !teedesc->ops || !teedesc->ops->get_version || !teedesc->ops->open || - !teedesc->ops->release || !pool) + !teedesc->ops->release) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); teedev = kzalloc(sizeof(*teedev), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.51.0

1 month, 1 week

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[PATCH v12 0/9] TEE subsystem for protected dma-buf allocations

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, This patch set allocates the protected DMA-bufs from a DMA-heap instantiated from the TEE subsystem. The TEE subsystem handles the DMA-buf allocations since it is the TEE (OP-TEE, AMD-TEE, TS-TEE, or perhaps a future QTEE) which sets up the protection for the memory used for the DMA-bufs. The DMA-heap uses a protected memory pool provided by the backend TEE driver, allowing it to choose how to allocate the protected physical memory. The allocated DMA-bufs must be imported with a new TEE_IOC_SHM_REGISTER_FD before they can be passed as arguments when requesting services from the secure world. Three use-cases (Secure Video Playback, Trusted UI, and Secure Video Recording) have been identified so far to serve as examples of what can be expected. The use-cases have predefined DMA-heap names, "protected,secure-video", "protected,trusted-ui", and "protected,secure-video-record". The backend driver registers protected memory pools for the use-cases it supports. Each use-case has its own protected memory pool since different use-cases require isolation from different parts of the system. A protected memory pool can be based on a static carveout instantiated while probing the TEE backend driver, or dynamically allocated from CMA (dma_alloc_pages()) and made protected as needed by the TEE. This can be tested on a RockPi 4B+ with the following steps: repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m rockpi4.xml \ -b prototype/sdp-v12 repo sync -j8 cd build make toolchains -j$(nproc) make all -j$(nproc) # Copy ../out/rockpi4.img to an SD card and boot the RockPi from that # Connect a monitor to the RockPi # login and at the prompt: gst-launch-1.0 videotestsrc ! \ aesenc key=1f9423681beb9a79215820f6bda73d0f \ iv=e9aa8e834d8d70b7e0d254ff670dd718 serialize-iv=true ! \ aesdec key=1f9423681beb9a79215820f6bda73d0f ! \ kmssink The aesdec module has been hacked to use an OP-TEE TA to decrypt the stream into protected DMA-bufs which are consumed by the kmssink. The primitive QEMU tests from previous patch sets can be tested on RockPi in the same way using: xtest --sdp-basic The primitive tests are tested on QEMU with the following steps: repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m qemu_v8.xml \ -b prototype/sdp-v12 repo sync -j8 cd build make toolchains -j$(nproc) make SPMC_AT_EL=1 all -j$(nproc) make SPMC_AT_EL=1 run-only # login and at the prompt: xtest --sdp-basic The SPMC_AT_EL=1 parameter configures the build with FF-A and an SPMC at S-EL1 inside OP-TEE. The parameter can be changed to SPMC_AT_EL=n to test without FF-A using the original SMC ABI instead. Please remember to do %make arm-tf-clean for TF-A to be rebuilt properly using the new configuration. https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/prerequisites.html list dependencies required to build the above. The primitive tests are pretty basic, mostly checking that a Trusted Application in the secure world can access and manipulate the memory. There are also some negative tests for out of bounds buffers, etc. Thanks, Jens Changes since V11: * In "dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions": - use EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS_GPL() - Added TJ's R-B and Sumit's Ack * In "tee: implement protected DMA-heap", import the namespaces "DMA_BUF" and "DMA_BUF_HEAP" as needed. Changes since V10: * Changed the new ABI OPTEE_MSG_CMD_GET_PROTMEM_CONFIG to report a list of u32 memory attributes instead of u16 endpoints to make room for both endpoint and access permissions in each entry. * In "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor", remove the unused path for DMA-bufs allocated by other means than the on in the TEE SS. * In "tee: implement protected DMA-heap", handle unloading of the backend driver module implementing the heap. The heap is reference counted and also calls tee_device_get() to guarantee that the module remains available while the heap is instantiated. * In "optee: support protected memory allocation", use dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent() instead of open-coding the function. * Added Sumit's R-B to - "optee: smc abi: dynamic protected memory allocation" - "optee: FF-A: dynamic protected memory allocation" - "optee: support protected memory allocation" - "tee: implement protected DMA-heap" - "dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions" Changes since V9: * Adding Sumit's R-B to "optee: sync secure world ABI headers" * Update commit message as requested for "dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions". * In "tee: implement protected DMA-heap": - add the hidden config option TEE_DMABUF_HEAPS to tell if the TEE subsystem can support DMA heaps - add a pfn_valid() to check that the passed physical address can be used by __pfn_to_page() and friends - remove the memremap() call, the caller is should do that instead if needed * In "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_dma_mem()" guard the calls to dma_alloc_pages() and dma_free_pages() with TEE_DMABUF_HEAPS to avoid linking errors in some configurations * In "optee: support protected memory allocation": - add the hidden config option OPTEE_STATIC_PROTMEM_POOL to tell if the driver can support a static protected memory pool - optee_protmem_pool_init() is slightly refactored to make the patches that follow easier - Call devm_memremap() before calling tee_protmem_static_pool_alloc() Changes since V8: * Using dma_alloc_pages() instead of cma_alloc() so the direct dependency on CMA can be removed together with the patches "cma: export cma_alloc() and cma_release()" and "dma-contiguous: export dma_contiguous_default_area". The patch * Renaming the patch "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem()" to "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_dma_mem()" * Setting DMA mask for the OP-TEE TEE device based on input from the secure world instead of relying on the parent device so following patches are removed: "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" and "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc()". * Adding Sumit Garg's R-B to "tee: refactor params_from_user()" * In the patch "tee: implement protected DMA-heap", map the physical memory passed to tee_protmem_static_pool_alloc(). Changes since V7: * Adding "dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions", "cma: export cma_alloc() and cma_release()", and "dma-contiguous: export dma_contiguous_default_area" to export the symbols needed to keep the TEE subsystem as a load module. * Removing CONFIG_TEE_DMABUF_HEAP and CONFIG_TEE_CMA since they aren't needed any longer. * Addressing review comments in "optee: sync secure world ABI headers" * Better align protected memory pool initialization between the smc-abi and ffa-abi parts of the optee driver. * Removing the patch "optee: account for direction while converting parameters" Changes since V6: * Restricted memory is now known as protected memory since to use the same term as https://docs.vulkan.org/guide/latest/protected.html. Update all patches to consistently use protected memory. * In "tee: implement protected DMA-heap" add the hidden config option TEE_DMABUF_HEAP to tell if the DMABUF_HEAPS functions are available for the TEE subsystem * Adding "tee: refactor params_from_user()", broken out from the patch "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor" * For "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor": - Update commit message to mention protected memory - Remove and open code tee_shm_get_parent_shm() in param_from_user_memref() * In "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem" add the hidden config option TEE_CMA to tell if the CMA functions are available for the TEE subsystem * For "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" and "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc", added Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)kernel.org> Changes since V5: * Removing "tee: add restricted memory allocation" and "tee: add TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_FD_INFO" * Adding "tee: implement restricted DMA-heap", "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor", "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem()", "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc()", and "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" * The two TEE driver OPs "rstmem_alloc()" and "rstmem_free()" are replaced with a struct tee_rstmem_pool abstraction. * Replaced the the TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC user space API with the DMA-heap API Changes since V4: * Adding the patch "tee: add TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_FD_INFO" needed by the GStreamer demo * Removing the dummy CPU access and mmap functions from the dma_buf_ops * Fixing a compile error in "optee: FF-A: dynamic restricted memory allocation" reported by kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Changes since V3: * Make the use_case and flags field in struct tee_shm u32's instead of u16's * Add more description for TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC in the header file * Import namespace DMA_BUF in module tee, reported by lkp(a)intel.com * Added a note in the commit message for "optee: account for direction while converting parameters" why it's needed * Factor out dynamic restricted memory allocation from "optee: support restricted memory allocation" into two new commits "optee: FF-A: dynamic restricted memory allocation" and "optee: smc abi: dynamic restricted memory allocation" * Guard CMA usage with #ifdef CONFIG_CMA, effectively disabling dynamic restricted memory allocate if CMA isn't configured Changes since the V2 RFC: * Based on v6.12 * Replaced the flags for SVP and Trusted UID memory with a u32 field with unique id for each use case * Added dynamic allocation of restricted memory pools * Added OP-TEE ABI both with and without FF-A for dynamic restricted memory * Added support for FF-A with FFA_LEND Changes since the V1 RFC: * Based on v6.11 * Complete rewrite, replacing the restricted heap with TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC Changes since Olivier's post [2]: * Based on Yong Wu's post [1] where much of dma-buf handling is done in the generic restricted heap * Simplifications and cleanup * New commit message for "dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro restricted dmabuf heap support" * Replaced the word "secure" with "restricted" where applicable Etienne Carriere (1): tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor Jens Wiklander (8): optee: sync secure world ABI headers dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions tee: implement protected DMA-heap tee: refactor params_from_user() tee: add tee_shm_alloc_dma_mem() optee: support protected memory allocation optee: FF-A: dynamic protected memory allocation optee: smc abi: dynamic protected memory allocation drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c | 4 + drivers/tee/Kconfig | 5 + drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 5 + drivers/tee/optee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 7 + drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 146 ++++++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_ffa.h | 27 +- drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 84 ++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 15 +- drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 37 ++- drivers/tee/optee/protmem.c | 335 ++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 141 ++++++++- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 158 +++++++--- drivers/tee/tee_heap.c | 500 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 14 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 157 +++++++++- include/linux/tee_core.h | 59 ++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 10 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 31 ++ 20 files changed, 1670 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/protmem.c create mode 100644 drivers/tee/tee_heap.c base-commit: c17b750b3ad9f45f2b6f7e6f7f4679844244f0b9 -- 2.43.0

1 month, 2 weeks

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[GIT PULL] TEE QTEE fixes for v6.18

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull these small fixes for the TEE QTEE driver introduced in v6.18 merge window. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit dcc7a571a3665a16581b5b18ca6b113f60a9a41a: Documentation: tee: Add Qualcomm TEE driver (2025-09-15 17:34:06 +0200) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jenswi/linux-tee.git tags/tee-qcomtee-fixes-for-v6.18 for you to fetch changes up to 3b63efa21bc6acc1a0fadd1dd0f0e1988a4c0177: tee: QCOMTEE should depend on ARCH_QCOM (2025-10-02 08:31:10 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- TEE QTEE fixes for v6.18 - Adds ARCH_QCOM dependency for the QTEE driver - Fixing return values for copy_from_user() failures - Guarding against potential off by one read ---------------------------------------------------------------- Dan Carpenter (2): tee: qcom: prevent potential off by one read tee: qcom: return -EFAULT instead of -EINVAL if copy_from_user() fails Geert Uytterhoeven (1): tee: QCOMTEE should depend on ARCH_QCOM drivers/tee/qcomtee/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/tee/qcomtee/call.c | 2 +- drivers/tee/qcomtee/core.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

1 month, 2 weeks

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OP-TEE