- OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.6 5/6] tee: Prevent size calculation wraparound on 32-bit kernels

by Sasha Levin

From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 39bb67edcc582b3b386a9ec983da67fa8a10ec03 ] The current code around TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE() is a bit wrong on 32-bit kernels: Multiplying a user-provided 32-bit value with the size of a structure can wrap around on such platforms. Fix it by using saturating arithmetic for the size calculation. This has no security consequences because, in all users of TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(), the subsequent kcalloc() implicitly checks for wrapping. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Rouven Czerwinski <rouven.czerwinski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Vulnerability Analysis The commit fixes a real integer overflow vulnerability in the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) subsystem on 32-bit kernels. The issue occurs in the `TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE()` macro defined as: ```c #define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) ``` Where `struct tee_ioctl_param` is 32 bytes (4 × 8-byte fields). On 32-bit systems, when a user provides a large `num_params` value, the multiplication `32 * num_params` can wrap around, potentially bypassing buffer length validation checks. ## Specific Vulnerable Code Locations The vulnerable pattern appears in 4 locations in `drivers/tee/tee_core.c`: 1. **Line 490**: `tee_ioctl_open_session()` - `sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len` 2. **Line 568**: `tee_ioctl_invoke()` - `sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len` 3. **Line 702**: `tee_ioctl_supp_recv()` - `sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) != buf.buf_len` 4. **Line 801**: `tee_ioctl_supp_send()` - `sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) > buf.buf_len` ## Attack Scenario On 32-bit systems, if `num_params = 0x08000000` (134,217,728), then: - `TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(0x08000000) = 32 * 0x08000000 = 0x100000000` - This wraps to `0x00000000` on 32-bit systems - The size validation `sizeof(arg) + 0 != buf.buf_len` could be bypassed - Subsequent `kcalloc()` would allocate a huge buffer, but the size calculations would be wrong ## Why This Should Be Backported **Matches "YES" backport criteria from similar commits:** 1. **Security Fix**: Like Similar Commit #2 (rtl8188eu security hole) and #4 (gup_benchmark integer overflow), this prevents user-controlled integer overflow that could lead to memory corruption. 2. **Small, Contained Change**: The fix uses the kernel's standard `size_add()` and `size_mul()` helpers from `linux/overflow.h` - exactly like Similar Commit #3 which was noted as using `size_add()` for similar protection. 3. **Critical Subsystem**: TEE handles sensitive cryptographic operations and trusted applications, making security fixes here particularly important. 4. **Low Regression Risk**: The fix only adds overflow protection without changing functionality. The `size_mul()` and `size_add()` functions are well- tested kernel overflow helpers. 5. **User-Controllable Input**: The `num_params` value comes directly from user space through ioctl calls, making this a user-triggerable condition. 6. **Clear Security Impact**: While the commit states "no security consequences because kcalloc() implicitly checks for wrapping," this is defense-in-depth - the size validation should not rely on downstream allocation checks. The fix pattern exactly matches Similar Commit #4 (mm/gup_benchmark.c) which was backported for preventing integer overflow in size calculations with user-provided values. This commit follows the same security principle and uses the same overflow-safe arithmetic helpers that the kernel has standardized on for these scenarios. drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index 0eb342de0b001..d7ad16f262b2e 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tee_drv.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ #define TEE_NUM_DEVICES 32 -#define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) +#define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (size_mul(sizeof(struct tee_param), (x))) #define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE 128 @@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(arg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (arg.num_params) { @@ -565,7 +566,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_invoke(struct tee_context *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(arg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (arg.num_params) { @@ -699,7 +700,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, if (get_user(num_params, &uarg->num_params)) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(*uarg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; params = kcalloc(num_params, sizeof(struct tee_param), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -798,7 +799,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, get_user(num_params, &uarg->num_params)) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) > buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(*uarg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params)) > buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; params = kcalloc(num_params, sizeof(struct tee_param), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.39.5

1 month

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.12 5/6] tee: Prevent size calculation wraparound on 32-bit kernels

by Sasha Levin

From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 39bb67edcc582b3b386a9ec983da67fa8a10ec03 ] The current code around TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE() is a bit wrong on 32-bit kernels: Multiplying a user-provided 32-bit value with the size of a structure can wrap around on such platforms. Fix it by using saturating arithmetic for the size calculation. This has no security consequences because, in all users of TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(), the subsequent kcalloc() implicitly checks for wrapping. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Rouven Czerwinski <rouven.czerwinski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Vulnerability Analysis The commit fixes a real integer overflow vulnerability in the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) subsystem on 32-bit kernels. The issue occurs in the `TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE()` macro defined as: ```c #define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) ``` Where `struct tee_ioctl_param` is 32 bytes (4 × 8-byte fields). On 32-bit systems, when a user provides a large `num_params` value, the multiplication `32 * num_params` can wrap around, potentially bypassing buffer length validation checks. ## Specific Vulnerable Code Locations The vulnerable pattern appears in 4 locations in `drivers/tee/tee_core.c`: 1. **Line 490**: `tee_ioctl_open_session()` - `sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len` 2. **Line 568**: `tee_ioctl_invoke()` - `sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len` 3. **Line 702**: `tee_ioctl_supp_recv()` - `sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) != buf.buf_len` 4. **Line 801**: `tee_ioctl_supp_send()` - `sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) > buf.buf_len` ## Attack Scenario On 32-bit systems, if `num_params = 0x08000000` (134,217,728), then: - `TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(0x08000000) = 32 * 0x08000000 = 0x100000000` - This wraps to `0x00000000` on 32-bit systems - The size validation `sizeof(arg) + 0 != buf.buf_len` could be bypassed - Subsequent `kcalloc()` would allocate a huge buffer, but the size calculations would be wrong ## Why This Should Be Backported **Matches "YES" backport criteria from similar commits:** 1. **Security Fix**: Like Similar Commit #2 (rtl8188eu security hole) and #4 (gup_benchmark integer overflow), this prevents user-controlled integer overflow that could lead to memory corruption. 2. **Small, Contained Change**: The fix uses the kernel's standard `size_add()` and `size_mul()` helpers from `linux/overflow.h` - exactly like Similar Commit #3 which was noted as using `size_add()` for similar protection. 3. **Critical Subsystem**: TEE handles sensitive cryptographic operations and trusted applications, making security fixes here particularly important. 4. **Low Regression Risk**: The fix only adds overflow protection without changing functionality. The `size_mul()` and `size_add()` functions are well- tested kernel overflow helpers. 5. **User-Controllable Input**: The `num_params` value comes directly from user space through ioctl calls, making this a user-triggerable condition. 6. **Clear Security Impact**: While the commit states "no security consequences because kcalloc() implicitly checks for wrapping," this is defense-in-depth - the size validation should not rely on downstream allocation checks. The fix pattern exactly matches Similar Commit #4 (mm/gup_benchmark.c) which was backported for preventing integer overflow in size calculations with user-provided values. This commit follows the same security principle and uses the same overflow-safe arithmetic helpers that the kernel has standardized on for these scenarios. drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index d113679b1e2d7..acc7998758ad8 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tee_core.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ #define TEE_NUM_DEVICES 32 -#define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) +#define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (size_mul(sizeof(struct tee_param), (x))) #define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE 128 @@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(arg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (arg.num_params) { @@ -565,7 +566,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_invoke(struct tee_context *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(arg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (arg.num_params) { @@ -699,7 +700,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, if (get_user(num_params, &uarg->num_params)) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(*uarg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; params = kcalloc(num_params, sizeof(struct tee_param), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -798,7 +799,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, get_user(num_params, &uarg->num_params)) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) > buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(*uarg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params)) > buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; params = kcalloc(num_params, sizeof(struct tee_param), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.39.5

1 month

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.14 7/8] tee: Prevent size calculation wraparound on 32-bit kernels

by Sasha Levin

From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 39bb67edcc582b3b386a9ec983da67fa8a10ec03 ] The current code around TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE() is a bit wrong on 32-bit kernels: Multiplying a user-provided 32-bit value with the size of a structure can wrap around on such platforms. Fix it by using saturating arithmetic for the size calculation. This has no security consequences because, in all users of TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(), the subsequent kcalloc() implicitly checks for wrapping. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Rouven Czerwinski <rouven.czerwinski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Vulnerability Analysis The commit fixes a real integer overflow vulnerability in the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) subsystem on 32-bit kernels. The issue occurs in the `TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE()` macro defined as: ```c #define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) ``` Where `struct tee_ioctl_param` is 32 bytes (4 × 8-byte fields). On 32-bit systems, when a user provides a large `num_params` value, the multiplication `32 * num_params` can wrap around, potentially bypassing buffer length validation checks. ## Specific Vulnerable Code Locations The vulnerable pattern appears in 4 locations in `drivers/tee/tee_core.c`: 1. **Line 490**: `tee_ioctl_open_session()` - `sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len` 2. **Line 568**: `tee_ioctl_invoke()` - `sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len` 3. **Line 702**: `tee_ioctl_supp_recv()` - `sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) != buf.buf_len` 4. **Line 801**: `tee_ioctl_supp_send()` - `sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) > buf.buf_len` ## Attack Scenario On 32-bit systems, if `num_params = 0x08000000` (134,217,728), then: - `TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(0x08000000) = 32 * 0x08000000 = 0x100000000` - This wraps to `0x00000000` on 32-bit systems - The size validation `sizeof(arg) + 0 != buf.buf_len` could be bypassed - Subsequent `kcalloc()` would allocate a huge buffer, but the size calculations would be wrong ## Why This Should Be Backported **Matches "YES" backport criteria from similar commits:** 1. **Security Fix**: Like Similar Commit #2 (rtl8188eu security hole) and #4 (gup_benchmark integer overflow), this prevents user-controlled integer overflow that could lead to memory corruption. 2. **Small, Contained Change**: The fix uses the kernel's standard `size_add()` and `size_mul()` helpers from `linux/overflow.h` - exactly like Similar Commit #3 which was noted as using `size_add()` for similar protection. 3. **Critical Subsystem**: TEE handles sensitive cryptographic operations and trusted applications, making security fixes here particularly important. 4. **Low Regression Risk**: The fix only adds overflow protection without changing functionality. The `size_mul()` and `size_add()` functions are well- tested kernel overflow helpers. 5. **User-Controllable Input**: The `num_params` value comes directly from user space through ioctl calls, making this a user-triggerable condition. 6. **Clear Security Impact**: While the commit states "no security consequences because kcalloc() implicitly checks for wrapping," this is defense-in-depth - the size validation should not rely on downstream allocation checks. The fix pattern exactly matches Similar Commit #4 (mm/gup_benchmark.c) which was backported for preventing integer overflow in size calculations with user-provided values. This commit follows the same security principle and uses the same overflow-safe arithmetic helpers that the kernel has standardized on for these scenarios. drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index d113679b1e2d7..acc7998758ad8 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tee_core.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ #define TEE_NUM_DEVICES 32 -#define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) +#define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (size_mul(sizeof(struct tee_param), (x))) #define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE 128 @@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(arg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (arg.num_params) { @@ -565,7 +566,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_invoke(struct tee_context *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(arg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (arg.num_params) { @@ -699,7 +700,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, if (get_user(num_params, &uarg->num_params)) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(*uarg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; params = kcalloc(num_params, sizeof(struct tee_param), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -798,7 +799,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, get_user(num_params, &uarg->num_params)) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) > buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(*uarg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params)) > buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; params = kcalloc(num_params, sizeof(struct tee_param), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.39.5

1 month

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[PATCH AUTOSEL 6.15 8/9] tee: Prevent size calculation wraparound on 32-bit kernels

by Sasha Levin

From: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> [ Upstream commit 39bb67edcc582b3b386a9ec983da67fa8a10ec03 ] The current code around TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE() is a bit wrong on 32-bit kernels: Multiplying a user-provided 32-bit value with the size of a structure can wrap around on such platforms. Fix it by using saturating arithmetic for the size calculation. This has no security consequences because, in all users of TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(), the subsequent kcalloc() implicitly checks for wrapping. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh(a)google.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> Tested-by: Rouven Czerwinski <rouven.czerwinski(a)linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org> --- **YES** This commit should be backported to stable kernel trees. Here's my extensive analysis: ## Vulnerability Analysis The commit fixes a real integer overflow vulnerability in the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) subsystem on 32-bit kernels. The issue occurs in the `TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE()` macro defined as: ```c #define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) ``` Where `struct tee_ioctl_param` is 32 bytes (4 × 8-byte fields). On 32-bit systems, when a user provides a large `num_params` value, the multiplication `32 * num_params` can wrap around, potentially bypassing buffer length validation checks. ## Specific Vulnerable Code Locations The vulnerable pattern appears in 4 locations in `drivers/tee/tee_core.c`: 1. **Line 490**: `tee_ioctl_open_session()` - `sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len` 2. **Line 568**: `tee_ioctl_invoke()` - `sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len` 3. **Line 702**: `tee_ioctl_supp_recv()` - `sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) != buf.buf_len` 4. **Line 801**: `tee_ioctl_supp_send()` - `sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) > buf.buf_len` ## Attack Scenario On 32-bit systems, if `num_params = 0x08000000` (134,217,728), then: - `TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(0x08000000) = 32 * 0x08000000 = 0x100000000` - This wraps to `0x00000000` on 32-bit systems - The size validation `sizeof(arg) + 0 != buf.buf_len` could be bypassed - Subsequent `kcalloc()` would allocate a huge buffer, but the size calculations would be wrong ## Why This Should Be Backported **Matches "YES" backport criteria from similar commits:** 1. **Security Fix**: Like Similar Commit #2 (rtl8188eu security hole) and #4 (gup_benchmark integer overflow), this prevents user-controlled integer overflow that could lead to memory corruption. 2. **Small, Contained Change**: The fix uses the kernel's standard `size_add()` and `size_mul()` helpers from `linux/overflow.h` - exactly like Similar Commit #3 which was noted as using `size_add()` for similar protection. 3. **Critical Subsystem**: TEE handles sensitive cryptographic operations and trusted applications, making security fixes here particularly important. 4. **Low Regression Risk**: The fix only adds overflow protection without changing functionality. The `size_mul()` and `size_add()` functions are well- tested kernel overflow helpers. 5. **User-Controllable Input**: The `num_params` value comes directly from user space through ioctl calls, making this a user-triggerable condition. 6. **Clear Security Impact**: While the commit states "no security consequences because kcalloc() implicitly checks for wrapping," this is defense-in-depth - the size validation should not rely on downstream allocation checks. The fix pattern exactly matches Similar Commit #4 (mm/gup_benchmark.c) which was backported for preventing integer overflow in size calculations with user-provided values. This commit follows the same security principle and uses the same overflow-safe arithmetic helpers that the kernel has standardized on for these scenarios. drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index d113679b1e2d7..acc7998758ad8 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/idr.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/overflow.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tee_core.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ #define TEE_NUM_DEVICES 32 -#define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) +#define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (size_mul(sizeof(struct tee_param), (x))) #define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE 128 @@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(arg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (arg.num_params) { @@ -565,7 +566,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_invoke(struct tee_context *ctx, if (copy_from_user(&arg, uarg, sizeof(arg))) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(arg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(arg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(arg.num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; if (arg.num_params) { @@ -699,7 +700,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_supp_recv(struct tee_context *ctx, if (get_user(num_params, &uarg->num_params)) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) != buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(*uarg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params)) != buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; params = kcalloc(num_params, sizeof(struct tee_param), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -798,7 +799,7 @@ static int tee_ioctl_supp_send(struct tee_context *ctx, get_user(num_params, &uarg->num_params)) return -EFAULT; - if (sizeof(*uarg) + TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params) > buf.buf_len) + if (size_add(sizeof(*uarg), TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(num_params)) > buf.buf_len) return -EINVAL; params = kcalloc(num_params, sizeof(struct tee_param), GFP_KERNEL); -- 2.39.5

1 month

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[PATCH v9 0/9] TEE subsystem for protected dma-buf allocations

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, This patch set allocates the protected DMA-bufs from a DMA-heap instantiated from the TEE subsystem. The TEE subsystem handles the DMA-buf allocations since it is the TEE (OP-TEE, AMD-TEE, TS-TEE, or perhaps a future QTEE) which sets up the protection for the memory used for the DMA-bufs. The DMA-heap uses a protected memory pool provided by the backend TEE driver, allowing it to choose how to allocate the protected physical memory. The allocated DMA-bufs must be imported with a new TEE_IOC_SHM_REGISTER_FD before they can be passed as arguments when requesting services from the secure world. Three use-cases (Secure Video Playback, Trusted UI, and Secure Video Recording) have been identified so far to serve as examples of what can be expected. The use-cases have predefined DMA-heap names, "protected,secure-video", "protected,trusted-ui", and "protected,secure-video-record". The backend driver registers protected memory pools for the use-cases it supports. Each use-case has its own protected memory pool since different use-cases require isolation from different parts of the system. A protected memory pool can be based on a static carveout instantiated while probing the TEE backend driver, or dynamically allocated from CMA (dma_alloc_pages()) and made protected as needed by the TEE. This can be tested on a RockPi 4B+ with the following steps: repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m rockpi4.xml \ -b prototype/sdp-v9 repo sync -j8 cd build make toolchains -j$(nproc) make all -j$(nproc) # Copy ../out/rockpi4.img to an SD card and boot the RockPi from that # Connect a monitor to the RockPi # login and at the prompt: gst-launch-1.0 videotestsrc ! \ aesenc key=1f9423681beb9a79215820f6bda73d0f \ iv=e9aa8e834d8d70b7e0d254ff670dd718 serialize-iv=true ! \ aesdec key=1f9423681beb9a79215820f6bda73d0f ! \ kmssink The aesdec module has been hacked to use an OP-TEE TA to decrypt the stream into protected DMA-bufs which are consumed by the kmssink. The primitive QEMU tests from previous patch sets can be tested on RockPi in the same way using: xtest --sdp-basic The primitive tests are tested on QEMU with the following steps: repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m qemu_v8.xml \ -b prototype/sdp-v9 repo sync -j8 cd build make toolchains -j$(nproc) make SPMC_AT_EL=1 all -j$(nproc) make SPMC_AT_EL=1 run-only # login and at the prompt: xtest --sdp-basic The SPMC_AT_EL=1 parameter configures the build with FF-A and an SPMC at S-EL1 inside OP-TEE. The parameter can be changed to SPMC_AT_EL=n to test without FF-A using the original SMC ABI instead. Please remember to do %make arm-tf-clean for TF-A to be rebuilt properly using the new configuration. https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/prerequisites.html list dependencies required to build the above. The primitive tests are pretty basic, mostly checking that a Trusted Application in the secure world can access and manipulate the memory. There are also some negative tests for out of bounds buffers, etc. Thanks, Jens Changes since V8: * Using dma_alloc_pages() instead of cma_alloc() so the direct dependency on CMA can be removed together with the patches "cma: export cma_alloc() and cma_release()" and "dma-contiguous: export dma_contiguous_default_area". The patch * Renaming the patch "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem()" to "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_dma_mem()" * Setting DMA mask for the OP-TEE TEE device based on input from the secure world instead of relying on the parent device so following patches are removed: "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" and "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc()". * Adding Sumit Garg's R-B to "tee: refactor params_from_user()" * In the patch "tee: implement protected DMA-heap", map the physical memory passed to tee_protmem_static_pool_alloc(). Changes since V7: * Adding "dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions", "cma: export cma_alloc() and cma_release()", and "dma-contiguous: export dma_contiguous_default_area" to export the symbols needed to keep the TEE subsystem as a load module. * Removing CONFIG_TEE_DMABUF_HEAP and CONFIG_TEE_CMA since they aren't needed any longer. * Addressing review comments in "optee: sync secure world ABI headers" * Better align protected memory pool initialization between the smc-abi and ffa-abi parts of the optee driver. * Removing the patch "optee: account for direction while converting parameters" Changes since V6: * Restricted memory is now known as protected memory since to use the same term as https://docs.vulkan.org/guide/latest/protected.html. Update all patches to consistently use protected memory. * In "tee: implement protected DMA-heap" add the hidden config option TEE_DMABUF_HEAP to tell if the DMABUF_HEAPS functions are available for the TEE subsystem * Adding "tee: refactor params_from_user()", broken out from the patch "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor" * For "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor": - Update commit message to mention protected memory - Remove and open code tee_shm_get_parent_shm() in param_from_user_memref() * In "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem" add the hidden config option TEE_CMA to tell if the CMA functions are available for the TEE subsystem * For "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" and "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc", added Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)kernel.org> Changes since V5: * Removing "tee: add restricted memory allocation" and "tee: add TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_FD_INFO" * Adding "tee: implement restricted DMA-heap", "tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor", "tee: add tee_shm_alloc_cma_phys_mem()", "optee: pass parent device to tee_device_alloc()", and "tee: tee_device_alloc(): copy dma_mask from parent device" * The two TEE driver OPs "rstmem_alloc()" and "rstmem_free()" are replaced with a struct tee_rstmem_pool abstraction. * Replaced the the TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC user space API with the DMA-heap API Changes since V4: * Adding the patch "tee: add TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_FD_INFO" needed by the GStreamer demo * Removing the dummy CPU access and mmap functions from the dma_buf_ops * Fixing a compile error in "optee: FF-A: dynamic restricted memory allocation" reported by kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com> Changes since V3: * Make the use_case and flags field in struct tee_shm u32's instead of u16's * Add more description for TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC in the header file * Import namespace DMA_BUF in module tee, reported by lkp(a)intel.com * Added a note in the commit message for "optee: account for direction while converting parameters" why it's needed * Factor out dynamic restricted memory allocation from "optee: support restricted memory allocation" into two new commits "optee: FF-A: dynamic restricted memory allocation" and "optee: smc abi: dynamic restricted memory allocation" * Guard CMA usage with #ifdef CONFIG_CMA, effectively disabling dynamic restricted memory allocate if CMA isn't configured Changes since the V2 RFC: * Based on v6.12 * Replaced the flags for SVP and Trusted UID memory with a u32 field with unique id for each use case * Added dynamic allocation of restricted memory pools * Added OP-TEE ABI both with and without FF-A for dynamic restricted memory * Added support for FF-A with FFA_LEND Changes since the V1 RFC: * Based on v6.11 * Complete rewrite, replacing the restricted heap with TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC Changes since Olivier's post [2]: * Based on Yong Wu's post [1] where much of dma-buf handling is done in the generic restricted heap * Simplifications and cleanup * New commit message for "dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro restricted dmabuf heap support" * Replaced the word "secure" with "restricted" where applicable Etienne Carriere (1): tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor Jens Wiklander (8): optee: sync secure world ABI headers dma-buf: dma-heap: export declared functions tee: implement protected DMA-heap tee: refactor params_from_user() tee: add tee_shm_alloc_dma_mem() optee: support protected memory allocation optee: FF-A: dynamic protected memory allocation optee: smc abi: dynamic protected memory allocation drivers/dma-buf/dma-heap.c | 3 + drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 10 + drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 147 ++++++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_ffa.h | 27 +- drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 84 +++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 15 +- drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 37 ++- drivers/tee/optee/protmem.c | 332 ++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 113 ++++++- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 155 +++++++--- drivers/tee/tee_heap.c | 487 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 16 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 183 ++++++++++- include/linux/tee_core.h | 71 +++++ include/linux/tee_drv.h | 10 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 31 ++ 18 files changed, 1655 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/protmem.c create mode 100644 drivers/tee/tee_heap.c base-commit: b4432656b36e5cc1d50a1f2dc15357543add530e -- 2.43.0

1 month

5
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[PATCH v4 00/11] Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver for Qualcomm TEE (QTEE)

by Amirreza Zarrabi

This patch series introduces a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver for Qualcomm TEE (QTEE). QTEE enables Trusted Applications (TAs) and services to run securely. It uses an object-based interface, where each service is an object with sets of operations. Clients can invoke these operations on objects, which can generate results, including other objects. For example, an object can load a TA and return another object that represents the loaded TA, allowing access to its services. Kernel and userspace services are also available to QTEE through a similar approach. QTEE makes callback requests that are converted into object invocations. These objects can represent services within the kernel or userspace process. Note: This patch series focuses on QTEE objects and userspace services. Linux already provides a TEE subsystem, which is described in [1]. The tee subsystem provides a generic ioctl interface, TEE_IOC_INVOKE, which can be used by userspace to talk to a TEE backend driver. We extend the Linux TEE subsystem to understand object parameters and an ioctl call so client can invoke objects in QTEE: - TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_OBJREF_* - TEE_IOC_OBJECT_INVOKE The existing ioctl calls TEE_IOC_SUPPL_RECV and TEE_IOC_SUPPL_SEND are used for invoking services in the userspace process by QTEE. The TEE backend driver uses the QTEE Transport Message to communicate with QTEE. Interactions through the object INVOKE interface are translated into QTEE messages. Likewise, object invocations from QTEE for userspace objects are converted into SEND/RECV ioctl calls to supplicants. The details of QTEE Transport Message to communicate with QTEE is available in [PATCH 11/11] Documentation: tee: Add Qualcomm TEE driver. You can run basic tests with following steps: git clone https://github.com/quic/quic-teec.git cd quic-teec mkdir build cmake .. -DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=CMakeToolchain.txt -DBUILD_UNITTEST=ON https://github.com/quic/quic-teec/blob/main/README.md lists dependencies needed to build the above. This series has been tested for basic QTEE object invocations and callback requests, including loading a TA and requesting services form the TA. Tested platforms: sm8650-mtp [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/tee.txt Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <amirreza.zarrabi(a)oss.qualcomm.com> Changes in v4: - Move teedev_ctx_get/put and tee_device_get/put to tee_core.h. - Rename object to id in struct tee_ioctl_object_invoke_arg. - Replace spinlock with mutex for qtee_objects_idr. - Move qcomtee_object_get to qcomtee_user/memobj_param_to_object. - More code cleanup following the comments. - Cleanup documentations. - Update MAINTAINERS file. - Link to v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250327-qcom-tee-using-tee-ss-without-mem-obj-v3… Changes in v3: - Export shm_bridge create/delete APIs. - Enable support for QTEE memory objects. - Update the memory management code to use the TEE subsystem for all allocations using the pool. - Move all driver states into the driver's main service struct. - Add more documentations. - Link to v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250202-qcom-tee-using-tee-ss-without-mem-obj-v2… Changes in v2: - Clean up commit messages and comments. - Use better names such as ubuf instead of membuf or QCOMTEE prefix instead of QCOM_TEE, or names that are more consistent with other TEE-backend drivers such as qcomtee_context_data instead of qcom_tee_context. - Drop the DTS patch and instantiate the device from the scm driver. - Use a single structure for all driver's internal states. - Drop srcu primitives and use the existing mutex for synchronization between the supplicant and QTEE. - Directly use tee_context to track the lifetime of qcomtee_context_data. - Add close_context() to be called when the user closes the tee_context. - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241202-qcom-tee-using-tee-ss-without-mem-obj-v1… Changes in v1: - It is a complete rewrite to utilize the TEE subsystem. - Link to RFC: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240702-qcom-tee-object-and-ioctls-v1-0-633c3d… --- Amirreza Zarrabi (11): tee: allow a driver to allocate a tee_device without a pool tee: add close_context to TEE driver operation tee: add TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_UBUF tee: add TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_OBJREF firmware: qcom: scm: add support for object invocation firmware: qcom: scm: remove unused arguments to the shm_brige firmware: qcom: tzmem: export shm_bridge create/delete tee: add Qualcomm TEE driver qcomtee: add primordial object qcomtee: enable TEE_IOC_SHM_ALLOC ioctl Documentation: tee: Add Qualcomm TEE driver Documentation/tee/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/tee/qtee.rst | 150 ++++++ MAINTAINERS | 8 + drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_scm.c | 132 ++++- drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_scm.h | 7 + drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_tzmem.c | 57 ++- drivers/tee/Kconfig | 1 + drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 + drivers/tee/qcomtee/Kconfig | 10 + drivers/tee/qcomtee/Makefile | 11 + drivers/tee/qcomtee/async.c | 160 ++++++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/call.c | 770 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/core.c | 815 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/mem_obj.c | 172 +++++++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/primordial_obj.c | 115 +++++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/qcom_scm.c | 38 ++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/qcomtee_msg.h | 239 +++++++++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/qcomtee_private.h | 264 ++++++++++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/release.c | 48 ++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/shm.c | 146 ++++++ drivers/tee/qcomtee/user_obj.c | 713 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 127 ++++- drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 6 - include/linux/firmware/qcom/qcom_scm.h | 31 +- include/linux/firmware/qcom/qcom_tee.h | 302 ++++++++++++ include/linux/firmware/qcom/qcom_tzmem.h | 15 + include/linux/tee_core.h | 54 +- include/linux/tee_drv.h | 12 + include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 54 +- 29 files changed, 4427 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-) --- base-commit: 33035b665157558254b3c21c3f049fd728e72368 change-id: 20241202-qcom-tee-using-tee-ss-without-mem-obj-362c66340527 Best regards, -- Amirreza Zarrabi <amirreza.zarrabi(a)oss.qualcomm.com>

1 month, 1 week

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Linaro OP-TEE Contribution, LOC, monthly meeting May 27

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, Tomorrow, Tuesday, it's time for another LOC monthly meeting. For time and connection details, see the calendar at https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ OP-TEE version 4.6.0 was released on April 25. Amir posted a v4 [1] of the QTEE driver. Sumit and I have spent quite a bit of time reviewing this, but it would be welcome with comments from others, too. For instance, for "tee: add TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_UBUF" which adds yet another type of memory reference. optee_ftpm Issue "Warning in _plat__GetUnique()" [2], digging in this reveals further issues. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250428-qcom-tee-using-tee-ss-without-mem-obj… [2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_ftpm/issues/15 Are there any other topics? Thanks, Jens

1 month, 2 weeks

2
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pkcs11 engine basic expectation clarification

by murali selvaraj

Hi Sir/Madam, I've been loading the private key from the PKCS11 token into my application using the code below. I'm attempting to use an API, such as get_key(privkey), to pass this private key to another library called (foo); Would it then be feasible for me to use the privkey from this function to perform a sign operation from the foo library? Or is there a rule in the PKCS11 engine that requires the key to be loaded each time it is needed? Then, my application and the foo library must call the code below separately ? ENGINE *e = NULL; #define PKCS11_MODULE_PATH "/usr/lib/libckteec.so" #define PRIV_URI "pkcs11:id=%12;type=private;pin-value=5432" e = ENGINE_by_id("pkcs11"); if (!e) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading dynamic engine\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ENGINE_free(e); } // Set the PKCS#11 module path if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "MODULE_PATH", PKCS11_MODULE_PATH, 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting PKCS#11 module path\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ENGINE_free(e); } // Initialize the engine if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error initializing the engine\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); ENGINE_free(e); } privkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, PRIV_URI, NULL, NULL); if (!privkey) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading private key\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); } ENGINE_free(e);

1 month, 2 weeks

1
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[GIT PULL] TEE updates for 6.16

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull two small small patches for the TEE subsystem and OP-TEE driver. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit 8ffd015db85fea3e15a77027fda6c02ced4d2444: Linux 6.15-rc2 (2025-04-13 11:54:49 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jenswi/linux-tee.git tags/tee-for-v6.16 for you to fetch changes up to 39bb67edcc582b3b386a9ec983da67fa8a10ec03: tee: Prevent size calculation wraparound on 32-bit kernels (2025-04-30 14:57:03 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Small TEE updates for v6.16 - Remove an unnecessary NULL check before release_firmware() in the OP-TEE driver - Prevent a size wrap in the TEE subsystem. The wrap would have been caught later in the code so no security consequences. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Chen Ni (1): tee: optee: smc: remove unnecessary NULL check before release_firmware() Jann Horn (1): tee: Prevent size calculation wraparound on 32-bit kernels drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 3 +-- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 11 ++++++----- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

2 months

3
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[GIT PULL] AMD-TEE updates for 6.16

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull these two small patches for the AMD-TEE driver. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit 8ffd015db85fea3e15a77027fda6c02ced4d2444: Linux 6.15-rc2 (2025-04-13 11:54:49 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jenswi/linux-tee.git tags/amd-tee-for-v6.16 for you to fetch changes up to 136deca59b1613c22aebfb0c8508dd02363c7142: amdtee: Sort header includes (2025-04-29 10:57:57 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- AMD-TEE driver updates for v6.16 - Sort header includes - Use pr_fmt ---------------------------------------------------------------- Mario Limonciello (2): amdtee: Use pr_fmt for messages amdtee: Sort header includes drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 16 +++++++++------- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

2 months

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OP-TEE