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Re: [TF-TSC] TSC Agenda 5th April 2019

by Bill Fletcher

LAVA Remote Labs slides Best regards Bill On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 08:42, Bill Fletcher via TSC < tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > As part of the action on CI infrastructure I have the action to describing > a proposal for a distributed CI instance called Remote Labs. > > Regards > > Bill > > On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 08:05, Abhishek Pandit via TSC < > tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > > Hi All, > > > > Any agenda items for this week's TSC meeting? > > > > Currently this is what I have for the agenda: > > > > > > * Pending action items > > * Major roadmap items for the next quarter > > * Next meeting > > > > Thanks > > Abhishek > > > > -- > > TSC mailing list > > TSC(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tsc > > > > > -- > > > EMEA Field Engineering > Linaro Ltd > Harston Mill CB22 7GG > Cambridge UK > +44 7833 498336 <+44%207833%20498336> > -- > TSC mailing list > TSC(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tsc > -- EMEA Field Engineering Linaro Ltd Harston Mill CB22 7GG Cambridge UK +44 7833 498336 <+44%207833%20498336>

5 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-TSC] tf.org security incident handling process

by David Brown

On Thu, Apr 04, 2019 at 02:44:35PM +0000, Dan Handley via TSC wrote: >If you think you have found a security vulnerability, then please send an email >to the Trusted Firmware security team at <[1]security(a)trusted-firmware.org>. >This is a private team of security officers who will help verify the security >vulnerability, develop and release a fix, and disclose the vulnerability >details responsibly. Please give us time to implement the disclosure plan >described in the next section before going public. We do our best to respond >and fix any issues quickly. I realize that the Linux docs don't mention encryption here, but there will probably be some reporters that will want to send encrypted email. It might be a good idea to have a few people on this list that have well-known PGP keys, and can respond to those people with what key to send a sensitive report to. David

5 years, 12 months

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tf.org security incident handling process

by Dan Handley

Hi TF TSC This is write up of the proposed tf.org security incident handling process, which is one of my actions from the last TSC. I wanted to circulate this before Friday's TSC meeting. I know there's not much time for you to review before then but perhaps you can have some initial discussion (without me) and we can go into more detail at the next TSC? I've included some comment/rationale in square brackets to aid discussion. All comments welcome. Regards Dan. ---- This security incident handling process proposal is broadly based on the kernel process [1], with influence from the existing TF-A [2] and OP-TEE [3] processes. Reporting ========= If you think you have found a security vulnerability, then please send an email to the Trusted Firmware security team at <security(a)trusted-firmware.org<mailto:security@trusted-firmware.org>>. This is a private team of security officers who will help verify the security vulnerability, develop and release a fix, and disclose the vulnerability details responsibly. Please give us time to implement the disclosure plan described in the next section before going public. We do our best to respond and fix any issues quickly. [DH: Note security(a)kernel.org<mailto:security@kernel.org> is exclusively about fixing the vulnerability; disclosure is delegated to linux-distros(a)vs.openwall.org<mailto:linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> [4]. This proposal combines these activities.] As with any bug, the more information you provide, the easier it is to diagnose and fix. If you already have a fix, please include it with your report, as that can speed up the process considerably. Any exploit code is very helpful. The security team may bring in extra help from area maintainers to understand and fix the vulnerability. The security team may share any information you provide with trusted third parties and eventually the public unless you request otherwise. [DH: Note, security(a)kernel.org<mailto:security@kernel.org> provides stronger confidentiality guarantees because it is only interested in fixes, not disclosure. In practice, I'd expect members of the security team to be sensitive with confidential information as with any other open source interactions, and to get explicit approval from the reporter for disclosure of sensitive information, e.g. identity, organization, product information,...] If the security team consider the bug not to be a security vulnerability, you will be informed and the bug directed to the standard bug fixing process. [DH: Do we need to indicate target reporter response times? TF-A has an internal target of 1 day for an initial response and 1 week for a considered response. Other processes (including TF-A) do not specify a target here. Perhaps one can assume it will always be ASAP?] Disclosure ========== The general security vulnerability disclosure plan is as follows: 1. For confirmed security vulnerabilities, develop a robust fix as soon as possible. During this time, information is only shared with the reporter, those needed to develop the fix and Especially Sensitive Stakeholders (ESSes), in particular organizations with large scale deployments of Trusted Firmware providing bare-metal access on multi-tenancy systems. 2. After a robust fix becomes available, our preference is to publicly release it as soon as possible. This will automatically happen if the vulnerability is already publicly known. However, release may be deferred if the reporter or an ESS requests it within 1 calendar day of the fix becoming available, and the security team agree the criticality of the vulnerability requires more time. The requested deferral period should be as short as possible and no more than 14 calendar days after the fix becomes available. The only valid reason for this release deferral is to accommodate deployment of the fix by ESSs. If it is immediately clear that ESSes are unaffected by the vulnerability then this stage is skipped. This 0-14 day deferral is the primary embargo period. [DH: Note, this stage is only relevant for TF-A currently.] [DH: I removed the nuance between 7 and 14 days used in the kernel process. I don't think it essentially changes the process.] [DH: Note, this assumes that ESS security teams operate 7 days a week.] 3. After the primary embargo period, the fix and relevant vulnerability information are shared with registered Trusted Stakeholders (see below section). Fix release may be deferred further if a Trusted Stakeholder requests it within 1 working day (Monday to Friday) of being notified, and the security team agree the criticality of the vulnerability requires more time. The requested deferral period should be as short as possible and no more than 14 calendar days after the Trusted Stakeholder receives it. The only valid reason for this further release deferral is to accommodate deployment of the fix by a Trusted Stakeholder. This further 1-14 day deferral is the secondary embargo period. Note, security fixes contain the minimum information required to fix the bug. The accompanying vulnerability details are disclosed later. [DH: Note, I've slightly relaxed the Trusted Stakeholder required response time to 1 working day, as oppose to 1 calendar day. Is this reasonable?] [DH: Note, this aggressive release of security fixes is aligned with the kernel process. The existing TF-A process allows for early release of fixes, which we generally do in practice, but that process doesn't really specify a fix embargo period. However it does specify a 4 week embargo on the subsequent security advisory. Also note that OP-TEE's fix embargo period is 90 days, which is aligned with Google's policy.] 4. After the fix is released, details of the security vulnerability are consolidated into a security advisory. This includes a CVE number and the security team will request one if not already done by the reporter. It also includes credit to the reporter unless they indicate otherwise. Drafts of the security advisory are circulated with the reporter, ESSes and Trusted Stakeholders as they become available. [DH: Note, the existing TF-A process only shares information with Trusted Stakeholders in the form of security advisories. This proposal is more aligned with the kernel process and means we can focus on fix development by sharing raw vulnerability information in the early stages.] 5. 90 days after the vulnerability was reported, the security advisory is made public on https://www.trustedfirmware.org/. This 90 day window is the public embargo period. [DH: This public embargo period aligns with Google and OP-TEE processes, although this proposal releases fixes earlier.] In exceptional cases, the above disclosure plan may be extended in consultation with the reporter, ESSes and Trusted Stakeholders, for example if it is very difficult to develop or deploy a fix, or wider industry consultation is needed. [DH: I'm accommodating for the Spectre/Meltdown case here, but does this encourage Trusted Stakeholders to invoke "exceptional cases" casually?] Handling embargoed information ============================== On receipt of embargoed information, you must not disclose any of the provided information beyond the group of people in your organization that need to know about it. During the primary and secondary embargo periods, that group of people should be limited to those entrusted to assess the impact of the vulnerability on your organization and deploy fixes to your products. After the secondary embargo period but during the public embargo period, that group of people may be expanded in order to prepare your organization's public response. The embargoed information must not be shared outside your organization during the public embargo period under any circumstances. If you think another individual/organization requires access to the embargoed information, then please ask them to register as a Trusted Stakeholder (see next section). If you believe there has been a leak of embargoed information then please notify the security team immediately. [DH: This section is stronger than the existing TF-A and OP-TEE processes, but not as strong as the linux distros policy [4]. I hope I've struck the right balance here.] The security team welcomes feedback on embargoed information at any time. Trusted Stakeholder registration ================================ [DH: This is broadly based on the OP-TEE policy.] The security team maintains a vetted list of organizations and individuals who are considered Trusted Stakeholders of Trusted Firmware security vulnerabilities. Contact <security(a)trusted-firmware.org<mailto:security@trusted-firmware.org>> if you wish to be added to the list, providing the following information: 1. A justification of why you need to know about security vulnerabilities and have access to security fixes before they are made public. A valid reason for example, is that you use Trusted Firmware in a deployed product. 2. An organization email address (not gmail, yahoo or similar addresses). It is preferable for each organization to provide an email alias that you can manage yourselves rather than providing a long list of individual addresses. 3. Confirmation that your Trusted Stakeholders will handle embargoed information responsibly as described in the previous section. Note, the security team reserves the right to deny registration or revoke membership to the Trusted Stakeholders list, for example if it has concerns about the confidentiality of embargoed information. [DH: Note, becoming a Trusted Stakeholder in the current TF-A process requires having a valid NDA with Arm and requesting to be added via Arm account management. Should Arm automatically add existing stakeholders to the new process or invite them to be part of it?] [DH: Note, I expect each TF project to have its own Trusted Stakeholder list.] [DH: Note, I've not included severity scoring in this proposal, as I think the only value of a score is helping to determine whether a bug is a security vulnerability or not, which in the end has a subjective element. I'm open to the idea of adding this to the process but I'd prefer it to be optional and aligned with CVSSv3 as used by CVE.] [DH: Note, I haven't specified use of PGP/GPG in this proposal. It makes the process much more difficult to administer in practice for questionable additional security IMO. If we did allow reporters to use PGP, then it implies all recipients of embargoed information should provide a PGP key, and that embargoed information should be decrypted and re-encrypted with recipient keys as it is passed around. I think this is too much effort but if we don't have it, will it put off reporters? The current TF-A process allows optional use of PGP but relies on GitHub security for access to embargoed information. security(a)kernel.org<mailto:security@kernel.org> does not support PGP, though linux-distros(a)vs.openwall.org<mailto:linux-distros@vs.openwall.org> does. OP-TEE does not support it.] [DH: Note, this proposal assumes a single security email alias for all tf.org projects, which was agreed at a previous board/TSC meeting to make things simpler from a reporter's perspective. However, I'm having 2nd thoughts about that. The additional triage stage could unnecessarily delay handling and there will need to be project specific security aliases anyway, whether they're publicly visible or not.] [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html [2] https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/wiki/ARM-Trusted-Firmw… [3] https://optee.readthedocs.io/general/disclosure.html [4] https://oss-security.openwall.org/wiki/mailing-lists/distros#how-to-use-the… IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.

5 years, 12 months

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Re: [TF-TSC] TSC Agenda 5th April 2019

by Bill Fletcher

As part of the action on CI infrastructure I have the action to describing a proposal for a distributed CI instance called Remote Labs. Regards Bill On Wed, 3 Apr 2019 at 08:05, Abhishek Pandit via TSC < tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi All, > > Any agenda items for this week's TSC meeting? > > Currently this is what I have for the agenda: > > > * Pending action items > * Major roadmap items for the next quarter > * Next meeting > > Thanks > Abhishek > > -- > TSC mailing list > TSC(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tsc > -- EMEA Field Engineering Linaro Ltd Harston Mill CB22 7GG Cambridge UK +44 7833 498336 <+44%207833%20498336>

6 years

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TSC Agenda 5th April 2019

by Abhishek Pandit

Hi All, Any agenda items for this week's TSC meeting? Currently this is what I have for the agenda: * Pending action items * Major roadmap items for the next quarter * Next meeting Thanks Abhishek

6 years

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Trusted Firmware TSC meeting minutes - 14th March

by Bill Fletcher

Attendees David Brown - Linaro Bill Fletcher - Linaro Joakim Bech - Linaro Bill Mills - TI Matteo Carlini - Arm Eric Finco - ST Mark Groesen - TI Shebu Kirakose - Arm Abhishek Pandit - Arm Julius Werner - Google Christian Daudt - Cypress Andrew Davis - TI Dean Arnold - Arm Actions noted Binary repository implementation proposal (name, path, mechanism) - Dan Propose slot for TSC call co-timed with Connect - Abhishek Proposal on incident handling list - Dan Reconcile mailing lists with attendees - Bill Attestation script home - Abhishek to talk with David Dean to send test cases running on MPS2 to Christian Agenda 1. CI system discussion. 2. Security Incident Process. 3. Binary Contribution Policy. Draft has already been circulated. 4. Attestation Token Validation script Arm team has created a validation script for checking the initial attestation token (CBOR/COSE). We would like to open source this script as it helps TF-M users. Would it make sense to have this in tf.org? 5. TF-M Documentation Proposal We have been working on a better documentation proposal for TF-M. I can briefly introduce this to TSC then it can be followed by mailing list discussion. 6. Next meeting – BKK19 F2F? 7. Mailing list subscription status. 8. If time permits we can discus major work items for the next quarter. 9. AOB Minutes Binary Contribution Policy JW: Circulated via Board. Already have some instances. Will have separate repository for TF Binaries. Policy describes rules that need to be followed to upload to the repository. We review case-by-case. Policy describes the process where they discuss with the TSC. How to technically implement this - propose it should be a git submodule. Board has already approved the policy. AP: Expect to send some questions by email. Any other questions? JW: Can we start implementing - creating the repository? DH: All we need is a location and a name for the repo. Do we have a generic (non TF-A, TF-M) namespace? Unified repo. JW: Need someone from Arm to create the submodule repo. Action: Dan to suggest path/name Incident Handling DH: TF-A has an incident handling process. So does OP-TEE (different). TF-M doesn’t have one. Need to have (need from hyperscalers) a very restricted list for who can contribute to the fix before publicizing it. Similar to kernel. MC: In the kernel - restricted to non-disclosed list of security experts. Second list of people for controlled disclosure that are under a linux distro mailing alias. CD: Not quite clear on the distinction. Board discussion was a single entry point. Think the grand goal was to make it simpler reporting. Don’t create artificial separation. Should be obvious to submitter. If could have 2-3 triagers forwarding to TF-A and TF-M. Who are those 2-3 people? DH: Arm looking for them to be Arm people. MC: Distinction is based on individual merit rather than specific companies. Core developers for A & M are currently Arm. Disclosure comes afterwards. CD: 3rd level - an inform list? DH: Yes. Currently would be people with an NDA with Arm. CD: If there’s an embargo don’t want it going to even a semi-open list. Action: Dan to come up with a proposal MC: cf Linux kernel policy. Aim is to push the fix as soon as possible but acknowledge the needs of hyperscalers JB: For OPTEE initial proposal was seen as too tight. Google has 90 days. Difference is if the problem is out in the wild and then fix as quickly as possible. DH: Feedback from hyperscaler vendors that they only need 2 weeks. Even Linux distros only ask for another 2 weeks on top. For TF-A, 4 weeks after initial disclosure it goes public. In kernel process don’t get involved in CVE and severity scoring. Leave that to reports. Anyone have any initial thoughts JB: Not saying TF should use same policy as OPTEE but if there are no other ideas. DH: Reason OPTEE doesn’t use CVSS? JB: Not really. Needed to tweak it with OPTEE wording. JW: Propose to follow Linux policy of releasing the patch as soon as possible. Some project, patching is public Mailing list subscription service AP: Please can everyone check their subscription status. BF: If any issues with lists.trustedfirmware.org then mail BillF Action: Bill to reconcile the mailing lists vs attendees CD: Should maybe consider TSC to be TSC “announce”. BF: TSC was aimed to be as open/transparent as possible Attestation token: AP: Team in Arm has been working on a script. Team have asked if it can be upstreamed somewhere. TF-M generates this token. Does it make sense to create a repo to host this script. Would be someone assigned as maintainer from Arm side. CD: Already a tools directory in TF-M with some Python scripts. Why not there? AP: Might apply to other projects SK: It’s an ITF standard. Just happens that TF-M uses that format DB: Suggest to put it in the repo CD: What open source project do you want it to live under, or does it need it’s own project? Don’t see why it would be in TF. Can import it into TF for use. DB: Cbor implementations tend to be for specific uses. Not sure it’s the trend we want to follow. CD: But if not, someone needs to make sure it’s generic enough. Level of ownership needed. Otherwise throw it in TF-M. DB: Question - who is going to work on generalising it. Will only be when someone has the resources AP: Propose to take input from David [action] CI DA: Have a set up of Jenkins/Build Slaves and LAVA. Will meet with Linaro next week to see how to move that onto their infrastructure. CD: Test cycle is via a LAVA instance testing DA: Yes via MPS2 CD: Is just boot? DA: Have a couple of test cases. Can find out. [action] CD: Is the plan to move this to the LAVA lab? BF: There are a few options, as well as physical location in the lab we have a federated/distributed lab instance concept. Builds and results are central but board farm has instances at vendor sites. Helps avoid lab bottlenecks and shipping boards. CD: Like kernel CI? BF: Yes. Will look at putting together a deck with some more information MG: Does the CI use simulation? i.e. qemu or fast model? DA: TF-A use fast models. Qemu - not done anything at the moment. BF: Does TF-A Test support qemu? DH: Can check MG: Recently has been some more support pushed. CD: LAVA supports qemu. EF: Distributed instance supports TF-A and TF-M? BF: For LAVA infrastructure - yes AP: Next meeting. Board is meeting at Linaro Connect. Any interest in a TSC meeting? (confirmed several TSC members will be there) EF: Yes. Welcome opportunity to discuss work items for the next quarter AP: Documentation - brief overview. Slides to be circulated by email. JB: Done same activity for OPTEE and done same activity. Nice think with Sphinx - interlinking within the documentation is very easy. Like this idea. CD: If RFC discussed in gerrit code review then that could get lost. AP: Should still say in draft folder in the doc. CD: Basically the history of thingks that were discussed by not accepted. AP: review happens on the mailing list CD: So there is history in git if something is turned down AP: And mailing list has the discussion. DB: Reference: https://github.com/rust-lang/rfcs -- EMEA Field Engineering Linaro Ltd Harston Mill CB22 7GG Cambridge UK +44 7833 498336 <+44%207833%20498336>

6 years

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Re: [TF-TSC] Trusted Firmware TSC - meeting proposal - Friday 5th April 01:00 UTC

by Joakim Bech

Den mån 18 mars 2019 17:38Abhishek Pandit via TSC < tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> skrev: > 8 am Friday should be okay for me. > Thanks, Abhishek > +1 // Joakim > -----Original Message----- > From: TSC <tsc-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Bill > Fletcher via TSC > Sent: 15 March 2019 16:14 > To: tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: [TF-TSC] Trusted Firmware TSC - meeting proposal - Friday 5th > April 01:00 UTC > > Hi all, > > There was a discussion about scheduling a F2F TSC session (with remote > access) during the week of Linaro Connect BKK19 1st-5th April. The agenda > topic is work items for the next quarter. > > We could do 08:00 Bangkok time on Fri 5th April. This equates to 18:00 > Pacific time on 4th April. Dial in from Europe is unfortunately difficult > (UTC 01:00). > > Please let me know if you'd like me to set it up. > > Full details: > > - Bangkok (Thailand) Friday, 5 April 2019, 08:00:00 ICT UTC+7 hours > - San Francisco (USA - California) Thursday, 4 April 2019, 18:00:00 PDT > UTC-7 > hours > - London (United Kingdom - England) Friday, 5 April 2019, 02:00:00 BST > UTC+1 > hour > - Corresponding UTC (GMT) Friday, 5 April 2019, 01:00:00 > > Regards > > Bill > > -- > > > EMEA Field Engineering > Linaro Ltd > Harston Mill CB22 7GG > Cambridge UK > +44 7833 498336 <+44%207833%20498336> > -- > TSC mailing list > TSC(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tsc > -- > TSC mailing list > TSC(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tsc >

6 years

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Re: [TF-TSC] Trusted Firmware TSC - meeting proposal - Friday 5th April 01:00 UTC

by Abhishek Pandit

8 am Friday should be okay for me. Thanks, Abhishek -----Original Message----- From: TSC <tsc-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of Bill Fletcher via TSC Sent: 15 March 2019 16:14 To: tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: [TF-TSC] Trusted Firmware TSC - meeting proposal - Friday 5th April 01:00 UTC Hi all, There was a discussion about scheduling a F2F TSC session (with remote access) during the week of Linaro Connect BKK19 1st-5th April. The agenda topic is work items for the next quarter. We could do 08:00 Bangkok time on Fri 5th April. This equates to 18:00 Pacific time on 4th April. Dial in from Europe is unfortunately difficult (UTC 01:00). Please let me know if you'd like me to set it up. Full details: - Bangkok (Thailand) Friday, 5 April 2019, 08:00:00 ICT UTC+7 hours - San Francisco (USA - California) Thursday, 4 April 2019, 18:00:00 PDT UTC-7 hours - London (United Kingdom - England) Friday, 5 April 2019, 02:00:00 BST UTC+1 hour - Corresponding UTC (GMT) Friday, 5 April 2019, 01:00:00 Regards Bill -- EMEA Field Engineering Linaro Ltd Harston Mill CB22 7GG Cambridge UK +44 7833 498336 <+44%207833%20498336> -- TSC mailing list TSC(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tsc

6 years

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Re: [TF-TSC] Trusted Firmware TSC - meeting proposal - Friday 5th April 01:00 UTC

by Christian Daudt

That timeslot works for me. Thanks Christian. ________________________________ From: TSC <tsc-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Julius Werner via TSC <tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Friday, March 15, 2019 10:55 AM To: Bill Fletcher Cc: tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [TF-TSC] Trusted Firmware TSC - meeting proposal - Friday 5th April 01:00 UTC CAUTION: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. That would work for me in PDT. On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 9:13 AM Bill Fletcher via TSC <tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi all, > > There was a discussion about scheduling a F2F TSC session (with remote > access) during the week of Linaro Connect BKK19 1st-5th April. The agenda > topic is work items for the next quarter. > > We could do 08:00 Bangkok time on Fri 5th April. This equates to 18:00 > Pacific time on 4th April. Dial in from Europe is unfortunately difficult > (UTC 01:00). > > Please let me know if you'd like me to set it up. > > Full details: > > - Bangkok (Thailand) Friday, 5 April 2019, 08:00:00 ICT UTC+7 hours > - San Francisco (USA - California) Thursday, 4 April 2019, 18:00:00 > PDT UTC-7 > hours > - London (United Kingdom - England) Friday, 5 April 2019, 02:00:00 BST UTC+1 > hour > - Corresponding UTC (GMT) Friday, 5 April 2019, 01:00:00 > > Regards > > Bill > > -- > > > EMEA Field Engineering > Linaro Ltd > Harston Mill CB22 7GG > Cambridge UK > +44 7833 498336 <+44%207833%20498336> > -- > TSC mailing list > TSC(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tsc This message and any attachments may contain confidential information from Cypress or its subsidiaries. If it has been received in error, please advise the sender and immediately delete this message.

6 years

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Re: [TF-TSC] Trusted Firmware TSC - meeting proposal - Friday 5th April 01:00 UTC

by Julius Werner

That would work for me in PDT. On Fri, Mar 15, 2019 at 9:13 AM Bill Fletcher via TSC <tsc(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > > Hi all, > > There was a discussion about scheduling a F2F TSC session (with remote > access) during the week of Linaro Connect BKK19 1st-5th April. The agenda > topic is work items for the next quarter. > > We could do 08:00 Bangkok time on Fri 5th April. This equates to 18:00 > Pacific time on 4th April. Dial in from Europe is unfortunately difficult > (UTC 01:00). > > Please let me know if you'd like me to set it up. > > Full details: > > - Bangkok (Thailand) Friday, 5 April 2019, 08:00:00 ICT UTC+7 hours > - San Francisco (USA - California) Thursday, 4 April 2019, 18:00:00 > PDT UTC-7 > hours > - London (United Kingdom - England) Friday, 5 April 2019, 02:00:00 BST UTC+1 > hour > - Corresponding UTC (GMT) Friday, 5 April 2019, 01:00:00 > > Regards > > Bill > > -- > > > EMEA Field Engineering > Linaro Ltd > Harston Mill CB22 7GG > Cambridge UK > +44 7833 498336 <+44%207833%20498336> > -- > TSC mailing list > TSC(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tsc

6 years

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