There are two patches that previously was mailed separatedly. Both patches fix issues found during testing the OP-TEE 3.9 release.
Julien and Stefano suggested to include this patches in Xen 4.14 release, because optee support still in the preview state and those patches provide no new functionality, bugfixes only.
Volodymyr Babchuk (2): optee: immediately free buffers that are released by OP-TEE optee: allow plain TMEM buffers with NULL address
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Normal World can share buffer with OP-TEE for two reasons: 1. Some client application wants to exchange data with TA 2. OP-TEE asks for shared buffer for internal needs
The second case was handle more strictly than necessary:
1. In RPC request OP-TEE asks for buffer 2. NW allocates buffer and provides it via RPC response 3. Xen pins pages and translates data 4. Xen provides buffer to OP-TEE 5. OP-TEE uses it 6. OP-TEE sends request to free the buffer 7. NW frees the buffer and sends the RPC response 8. Xen unpins pages and forgets about the buffer
The problem is that Xen should forget about buffer in between stages 6 and 7. I.e. the right flow should be like this:
6. OP-TEE sends request to free the buffer 7. Xen unpins pages and forgets about the buffer 8. NW frees the buffer and sends the RPC response
This is because OP-TEE internally frees the buffer before sending the "free SHM buffer" request. So we have no reason to hold reference for this buffer anymore. Moreover, in multiprocessor systems NW have time to reuse buffer cookie for another buffer. Xen complained about this and denied the new buffer registration. I have seen this issue while running tests on iMX SoC.
So, this patch basically corrects that behavior by freeing the buffer earlier, when handling RPC return from OP-TEE.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com ---
Changes from v1: - reworded the comments - added WARN() for a case when OP-TEE wants to release not the buffer it requeset to allocate durint this call
--- xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6a035355db..6963238056 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -1099,6 +1099,34 @@ static int handle_rpc_return(struct optee_domain *ctx, if ( shm_rpc->xen_arg->cmd == OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_ALLOC ) call->rpc_buffer_type = shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.a;
+ /* + * OP-TEE is signalling that it has freed the buffer that it + * requested before. This is the right time for us to do the + * same. + */ + if ( shm_rpc->xen_arg->cmd == OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE ) + { + uint64_t cookie = shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b; + + free_optee_shm_buf(ctx, cookie); + + /* + * OP-TEE asks to free buffer, but this is not the same + * buffer we previously allocated for it. While nothing + * prevents OP-TEE from asking this, it is the strange + * situation. This may or may not be caused by a bug in + * OP-TEE or mediator. But is better to print warning. + */ + if ( call->rpc_data_cookie && call->rpc_data_cookie != cookie ) + { + gprintk(XENLOG_ERR, + "Saved RPC cookie does not corresponds to OP-TEE's (%"PRIx64" != %"PRIx64")\n", + call->rpc_data_cookie, cookie); + + WARN(); + } + call->rpc_data_cookie = 0; + } unmap_domain_page(shm_rpc->xen_arg); }
@@ -1464,10 +1492,6 @@ static void handle_rpc_cmd(struct optee_domain *ctx, struct cpu_user_regs *regs, } break; case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE: - free_optee_shm_buf(ctx, shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b); - if ( call->rpc_data_cookie == - shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b ) - call->rpc_data_cookie = 0; break; default: break;
On Fri, 19 Jun 2020, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Normal World can share buffer with OP-TEE for two reasons:
- Some client application wants to exchange data with TA
- OP-TEE asks for shared buffer for internal needs
The second case was handle more strictly than necessary:
- In RPC request OP-TEE asks for buffer
- NW allocates buffer and provides it via RPC response
- Xen pins pages and translates data
- Xen provides buffer to OP-TEE
- OP-TEE uses it
- OP-TEE sends request to free the buffer
- NW frees the buffer and sends the RPC response
- Xen unpins pages and forgets about the buffer
The problem is that Xen should forget about buffer in between stages 6 and 7. I.e. the right flow should be like this:
- OP-TEE sends request to free the buffer
- Xen unpins pages and forgets about the buffer
- NW frees the buffer and sends the RPC response
This is because OP-TEE internally frees the buffer before sending the "free SHM buffer" request. So we have no reason to hold reference for this buffer anymore. Moreover, in multiprocessor systems NW have time to reuse buffer cookie for another buffer. Xen complained about this and denied the new buffer registration. I have seen this issue while running tests on iMX SoC.
So, this patch basically corrects that behavior by freeing the buffer earlier, when handling RPC return from OP-TEE.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com
There are a couple of grammar issues in the comments, but we can fix them on commit.
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini sstabellini@kernel.org
Changes from v1:
- reworded the comments
- added WARN() for a case when OP-TEE wants to release not the buffer it requeset to allocate durint this call
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6a035355db..6963238056 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -1099,6 +1099,34 @@ static int handle_rpc_return(struct optee_domain *ctx, if ( shm_rpc->xen_arg->cmd == OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_ALLOC ) call->rpc_buffer_type = shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.a;
/** OP-TEE is signalling that it has freed the buffer that it* requested before. This is the right time for us to do the* same.*/if ( shm_rpc->xen_arg->cmd == OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE ){uint64_t cookie = shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b;free_optee_shm_buf(ctx, cookie);/** OP-TEE asks to free buffer, but this is not the same* buffer we previously allocated for it. While nothing* prevents OP-TEE from asking this, it is the strange
^ a
* situation. This may or may not be caused by a bug in* OP-TEE or mediator. But is better to print warning.
^ it is
*/if ( call->rpc_data_cookie && call->rpc_data_cookie != cookie ){gprintk(XENLOG_ERR,"Saved RPC cookie does not corresponds to OP-TEE's (%"PRIx64" != %"PRIx64")\n",
^ correspond
call->rpc_data_cookie, cookie);WARN();}call->rpc_data_cookie = 0;} unmap_domain_page(shm_rpc->xen_arg);@@ -1464,10 +1492,6 @@ static void handle_rpc_cmd(struct optee_domain *ctx, struct cpu_user_regs *regs, } break; case OPTEE_RPC_CMD_SHM_FREE:
free_optee_shm_buf(ctx, shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b);if ( call->rpc_data_cookie ==shm_rpc->xen_arg->params[0].u.value.b )call->rpc_data_cookie = 0; break; default: break;-- 2.26.2
Trusted Applications use popular approach to determine required size of buffer: client provides a memory reference with the NULL pointer to a buffer. This is so called "Null memory reference". TA updates the reference with the required size and returns it back to the client. Then client allocates buffer of needed size and repeats the operation.
This behavior is described in TEE Client API Specification, paragraph 3.2.5. Memory References.
OP-TEE represents this null memory reference as a TMEM parameter with buf_ptr = 0x0. This is the only case when we should allow TMEM buffer without the OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. This also the special case for a buffer with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag.
This could lead to a potential issue, because IPA 0x0 is a valid address, but OP-TEE will treat it as a special case. So, care should be taken when construction OP-TEE enabled guest to make sure that such guest have no memory at IPA 0x0 and none of its memory is mapped at PA 0x0.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com ---
Changes from v1: - Added comment with TODO about possible PA/IPA 0x0 issue - The same is described in the commit message - Added check in translate_noncontig() for the NULL ptr buffer
--- xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6963238056..70bfef7e5f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ static bool optee_probe(void) return true; }
+/* + * TODO: There is a potential issue with guests that either have RAM + * at IPA of 0x0 or some of theirs memory is mapped at PA 0x0. This is + * because PA of 0x0 is considered as NULL pointer by OP-TEE. It will + * not be able to map buffer with such pointer to TA address space, or + * use such buffer for communication with the guest. We either need to + * check that guest have no such mappings or ensure that OP-TEE + * enabled guest will not be created with such mappings. + */ static int optee_domain_init(struct domain *d) { struct arm_smccc_res resp; @@ -725,6 +734,15 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain *ctx, uint64_t next_page_data; } *guest_data, *xen_data;
+ /* + * Special case: buffer with buf_ptr == 0x0 is considered as NULL + * pointer by OP-TEE. No translation is needed. This can lead to + * an issue as IPA 0x0 is a valid address for Xen. See the comment + * near optee_domain_init() + */ + if ( !param->u.tmem.buf_ptr ) + return 0; + /* Offset of user buffer withing OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE-sized page */ offset = param->u.tmem.buf_ptr & (OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE - 1);
@@ -865,9 +883,12 @@ static int translate_params(struct optee_domain *ctx, } else { - gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest tries to use old tmem arg\n"); - ret = -EINVAL; - goto out; + if ( call->xen_arg->params[i].u.tmem.buf_ptr ) + { + gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest tries to use old tmem arg\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } } break; case OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_NONE:
On Fri, 19 Jun 2020, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Trusted Applications use popular approach to determine required size of buffer: client provides a memory reference with the NULL pointer to a buffer. This is so called "Null memory reference". TA updates the reference with the required size and returns it back to the client. Then client allocates buffer of needed size and repeats the operation.
This behavior is described in TEE Client API Specification, paragraph 3.2.5. Memory References.
OP-TEE represents this null memory reference as a TMEM parameter with buf_ptr = 0x0. This is the only case when we should allow TMEM buffer without the OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. This also the special case for a buffer with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag.
This could lead to a potential issue, because IPA 0x0 is a valid address, but OP-TEE will treat it as a special case. So, care should be taken when construction OP-TEE enabled guest to make sure that such guest have no memory at IPA 0x0 and none of its memory is mapped at PA 0x0.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com
Changes from v1:
- Added comment with TODO about possible PA/IPA 0x0 issue
- The same is described in the commit message
- Added check in translate_noncontig() for the NULL ptr buffer
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6963238056..70bfef7e5f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ static bool optee_probe(void) return true; } +/*
- TODO: There is a potential issue with guests that either have RAM
- at IPA of 0x0 or some of theirs memory is mapped at PA 0x0. This is
^ their
- because PA of 0x0 is considered as NULL pointer by OP-TEE. It will
- not be able to map buffer with such pointer to TA address space, or
- use such buffer for communication with the guest. We either need to
- check that guest have no such mappings or ensure that OP-TEE
- enabled guest will not be created with such mappings.
- */
static int optee_domain_init(struct domain *d) { struct arm_smccc_res resp; @@ -725,6 +734,15 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain *ctx, uint64_t next_page_data; } *guest_data, *xen_data;
- /*
* Special case: buffer with buf_ptr == 0x0 is considered as NULL* pointer by OP-TEE. No translation is needed. This can lead to* an issue as IPA 0x0 is a valid address for Xen. See the comment* near optee_domain_init()*/- if ( !param->u.tmem.buf_ptr )
return 0;
Given that today it is not possible for this to happen, it could even be an ASSERT. But I think I would just return an error, maybe -EINVAL?
Aside from this, and the small grammar issue, everything else looks fine to me.
Let's wait for Julien's reply, but if this is the only thing I could fix on commit.
/* Offset of user buffer withing OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE-sized page */ offset = param->u.tmem.buf_ptr & (OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE - 1);@@ -865,9 +883,12 @@ static int translate_params(struct optee_domain *ctx, } else {
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest tries to use old tmem arg\n");ret = -EINVAL;goto out;
if ( call->xen_arg->params[i].u.tmem.buf_ptr ){gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest tries to use old tmem arg\n");ret = -EINVAL;goto out;} } break; case OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_NONE:-- 2.26.2
Hi Stefano,
Stefano Stabellini writes:
On Fri, 19 Jun 2020, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Trusted Applications use popular approach to determine required size of buffer: client provides a memory reference with the NULL pointer to a buffer. This is so called "Null memory reference". TA updates the reference with the required size and returns it back to the client. Then client allocates buffer of needed size and repeats the operation.
This behavior is described in TEE Client API Specification, paragraph 3.2.5. Memory References.
OP-TEE represents this null memory reference as a TMEM parameter with buf_ptr = 0x0. This is the only case when we should allow TMEM buffer without the OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. This also the special case for a buffer with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag.
This could lead to a potential issue, because IPA 0x0 is a valid address, but OP-TEE will treat it as a special case. So, care should be taken when construction OP-TEE enabled guest to make sure that such guest have no memory at IPA 0x0 and none of its memory is mapped at PA 0x0.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com
Changes from v1:
- Added comment with TODO about possible PA/IPA 0x0 issue
- The same is described in the commit message
- Added check in translate_noncontig() for the NULL ptr buffer
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6963238056..70bfef7e5f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ static bool optee_probe(void) return true; } +/*
- TODO: There is a potential issue with guests that either have RAM
- at IPA of 0x0 or some of theirs memory is mapped at PA 0x0. This is
^ their
- because PA of 0x0 is considered as NULL pointer by OP-TEE. It will
- not be able to map buffer with such pointer to TA address space, or
- use such buffer for communication with the guest. We either need to
- check that guest have no such mappings or ensure that OP-TEE
- enabled guest will not be created with such mappings.
- */
static int optee_domain_init(struct domain *d) { struct arm_smccc_res resp; @@ -725,6 +734,15 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain *ctx, uint64_t next_page_data; } *guest_data, *xen_data;
- /*
* Special case: buffer with buf_ptr == 0x0 is considered as NULL* pointer by OP-TEE. No translation is needed. This can lead to* an issue as IPA 0x0 is a valid address for Xen. See the comment* near optee_domain_init()*/- if ( !param->u.tmem.buf_ptr )
return 0;Given that today it is not possible for this to happen, it could even be an ASSERT. But I think I would just return an error, maybe -EINVAL?
Hmm, looks like my comment is somewhat misleading :(
What I mean, is that param->u.tmem.buf_ptr == 0 is the normal situation. This is the special case, when OP-TEE treats this buffer as a NULL. So we are doing nothing there. Thus, "return 0".
But, as Julien pointed out, we can have machine where 0x0 is the valid memory address and there is a chance, that some guest will use it as a pointer to buffer.
Aside from this, and the small grammar issue, everything else looks fine to me.
Let's wait for Julien's reply, but if this is the only thing I could fix on commit.
/* Offset of user buffer withing OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE-sized page */ offset = param->u.tmem.buf_ptr & (OPTEE_MSG_NONCONTIG_PAGE_SIZE - 1);@@ -865,9 +883,12 @@ static int translate_params(struct optee_domain *ctx, } else {
gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest tries to use old tmem arg\n");ret = -EINVAL;goto out;
if ( call->xen_arg->params[i].u.tmem.buf_ptr ){gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Guest tries to use old tmem arg\n");ret = -EINVAL;goto out;} } break; case OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_NONE:-- 2.26.2
On 23/06/2020 03:49, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Hi Stefano,
Stefano Stabellini writes:
On Fri, 19 Jun 2020, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Trusted Applications use popular approach to determine required size of buffer: client provides a memory reference with the NULL pointer to a buffer. This is so called "Null memory reference". TA updates the reference with the required size and returns it back to the client. Then client allocates buffer of needed size and repeats the operation.
This behavior is described in TEE Client API Specification, paragraph 3.2.5. Memory References.
OP-TEE represents this null memory reference as a TMEM parameter with buf_ptr = 0x0. This is the only case when we should allow TMEM buffer without the OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. This also the special case for a buffer with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag.
This could lead to a potential issue, because IPA 0x0 is a valid address, but OP-TEE will treat it as a special case. So, care should be taken when construction OP-TEE enabled guest to make sure that such guest have no memory at IPA 0x0 and none of its memory is mapped at PA 0x0.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com
Changes from v1:
- Added comment with TODO about possible PA/IPA 0x0 issue
- The same is described in the commit message
- Added check in translate_noncontig() for the NULL ptr buffer
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6963238056..70bfef7e5f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ static bool optee_probe(void) return true; } +/*
- TODO: There is a potential issue with guests that either have RAM
- at IPA of 0x0 or some of theirs memory is mapped at PA 0x0. This is
^ their
- because PA of 0x0 is considered as NULL pointer by OP-TEE. It will
- not be able to map buffer with such pointer to TA address space, or
- use such buffer for communication with the guest. We either need to
- check that guest have no such mappings or ensure that OP-TEE
- enabled guest will not be created with such mappings.
- */ static int optee_domain_init(struct domain *d) { struct arm_smccc_res resp;
@@ -725,6 +734,15 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain *ctx, uint64_t next_page_data; } *guest_data, *xen_data;
- /*
* Special case: buffer with buf_ptr == 0x0 is considered as NULL* pointer by OP-TEE. No translation is needed. This can lead to* an issue as IPA 0x0 is a valid address for Xen. See the comment* near optee_domain_init()*/- if ( !param->u.tmem.buf_ptr )
return 0;Given that today it is not possible for this to happen, it could even be an ASSERT. But I think I would just return an error, maybe -EINVAL?
Hmm, looks like my comment is somewhat misleading :(
How about the following comment:
We don't want to translate NULL (0) as it can be used by the guest to fetch the size of the buffer to allocate. This behavior depends on TA, but there is a guarantee that OP-TEE will not try to map it (see more details on top of optee_domain_init()).
What I mean, is that param->u.tmem.buf_ptr == 0 is the normal situation. This is the special case, when OP-TEE treats this buffer as a NULL. So we are doing nothing there. Thus, "return 0".
But, as Julien pointed out, we can have machine where 0x0 is the valid memory address and there is a chance, that some guest will use it as a pointer to buffer.
Aside from this, and the small grammar issue, everything else looks fine to me.
Let's wait for Julien's reply, but if this is the only thing I could fix on commit.
I agree with Volodymyr, this is the normal case here. There are more work to prevent MFN 0 to be mapped in the guest but this shouldn't be an issue today.
Cheers,
On Tue, 23 Jun 2020, Julien Grall wrote:
On 23/06/2020 03:49, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Hi Stefano,
Stefano Stabellini writes:
On Fri, 19 Jun 2020, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Trusted Applications use popular approach to determine required size of buffer: client provides a memory reference with the NULL pointer to a buffer. This is so called "Null memory reference". TA updates the reference with the required size and returns it back to the client. Then client allocates buffer of needed size and repeats the operation.
This behavior is described in TEE Client API Specification, paragraph 3.2.5. Memory References.
OP-TEE represents this null memory reference as a TMEM parameter with buf_ptr = 0x0. This is the only case when we should allow TMEM buffer without the OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. This also the special case for a buffer with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag.
This could lead to a potential issue, because IPA 0x0 is a valid address, but OP-TEE will treat it as a special case. So, care should be taken when construction OP-TEE enabled guest to make sure that such guest have no memory at IPA 0x0 and none of its memory is mapped at PA 0x0.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com
Changes from v1:
- Added comment with TODO about possible PA/IPA 0x0 issue
- The same is described in the commit message
- Added check in translate_noncontig() for the NULL ptr buffer
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6963238056..70bfef7e5f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ static bool optee_probe(void) return true; } +/*
- TODO: There is a potential issue with guests that either have RAM
- at IPA of 0x0 or some of theirs memory is mapped at PA 0x0. This is
^ their
- because PA of 0x0 is considered as NULL pointer by OP-TEE. It will
- not be able to map buffer with such pointer to TA address space, or
- use such buffer for communication with the guest. We either need to
- check that guest have no such mappings or ensure that OP-TEE
- enabled guest will not be created with such mappings.
- */ static int optee_domain_init(struct domain *d) { struct arm_smccc_res resp;
@@ -725,6 +734,15 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain *ctx, uint64_t next_page_data; } *guest_data, *xen_data;
- /*
* Special case: buffer with buf_ptr == 0x0 is considered as NULL* pointer by OP-TEE. No translation is needed. This can lead to* an issue as IPA 0x0 is a valid address for Xen. See the comment* near optee_domain_init()*/- if ( !param->u.tmem.buf_ptr )
return 0;Given that today it is not possible for this to happen, it could even be an ASSERT. But I think I would just return an error, maybe -EINVAL?
Hmm, looks like my comment is somewhat misleading :(
How about the following comment:
We don't want to translate NULL (0) as it can be used by the guest to fetch the size of the buffer to allocate. This behavior depends on TA, but there is a guarantee that OP-TEE will not try to map it (see more details on top of optee_domain_init()).
What I mean, is that param->u.tmem.buf_ptr == 0 is the normal situation. This is the special case, when OP-TEE treats this buffer as a NULL. So we are doing nothing there. Thus, "return 0".
But, as Julien pointed out, we can have machine where 0x0 is the valid memory address and there is a chance, that some guest will use it as a pointer to buffer.
Aside from this, and the small grammar issue, everything else looks fine to me.
Let's wait for Julien's reply, but if this is the only thing I could fix on commit.
I agree with Volodymyr, this is the normal case here. There are more work to prevent MFN 0 to be mapped in the guest but this shouldn't be an issue today.
Let's put the MFN 0 issue aside for a moment.
From the commit message I thought that if the guest wanted to pass a
NULL buffer ("Null memory reference") then it would also *not* set OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG, which would be handled by the "else" statement also modified by this patch. Thus, I thought that reaching translate_noncontig with buf_ptr == NULL would always be an error.
But re-reading the commit message and from both your answers it is not the case: a "Null memory reference" is allowed with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG set too.
Thus, I have no further comments and the improvements on the in-code comment could be done on commit.
(using paul xen.org's email)
Hi,
Apologies for the late answer.
On 23/06/2020 22:09, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
On Tue, 23 Jun 2020, Julien Grall wrote:
On 23/06/2020 03:49, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Hi Stefano,
Stefano Stabellini writes:
On Fri, 19 Jun 2020, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Trusted Applications use popular approach to determine required size of buffer: client provides a memory reference with the NULL pointer to a buffer. This is so called "Null memory reference". TA updates the reference with the required size and returns it back to the client. Then client allocates buffer of needed size and repeats the operation.
This behavior is described in TEE Client API Specification, paragraph 3.2.5. Memory References.
OP-TEE represents this null memory reference as a TMEM parameter with buf_ptr = 0x0. This is the only case when we should allow TMEM buffer without the OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. This also the special case for a buffer with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag.
This could lead to a potential issue, because IPA 0x0 is a valid address, but OP-TEE will treat it as a special case. So, care should be taken when construction OP-TEE enabled guest to make sure that such guest have no memory at IPA 0x0 and none of its memory is mapped at PA 0x0.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com
Changes from v1:
- Added comment with TODO about possible PA/IPA 0x0 issue
- The same is described in the commit message
- Added check in translate_noncontig() for the NULL ptr buffer
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6963238056..70bfef7e5f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ static bool optee_probe(void) return true; } +/*
- TODO: There is a potential issue with guests that either have RAM
- at IPA of 0x0 or some of theirs memory is mapped at PA 0x0. This is
^ their
- because PA of 0x0 is considered as NULL pointer by OP-TEE. It will
- not be able to map buffer with such pointer to TA address space, or
- use such buffer for communication with the guest. We either need to
- check that guest have no such mappings or ensure that OP-TEE
- enabled guest will not be created with such mappings.
- */ static int optee_domain_init(struct domain *d) { struct arm_smccc_res resp;
@@ -725,6 +734,15 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain *ctx, uint64_t next_page_data; } *guest_data, *xen_data;
- /*
* Special case: buffer with buf_ptr == 0x0 is considered as NULL* pointer by OP-TEE. No translation is needed. This can lead to* an issue as IPA 0x0 is a valid address for Xen. See the comment* near optee_domain_init()*/- if ( !param->u.tmem.buf_ptr )
return 0;Given that today it is not possible for this to happen, it could even be an ASSERT. But I think I would just return an error, maybe -EINVAL?
Hmm, looks like my comment is somewhat misleading :(
How about the following comment:
We don't want to translate NULL (0) as it can be used by the guest to fetch the size of the buffer to allocate. This behavior depends on TA, but there is a guarantee that OP-TEE will not try to map it (see more details on top of optee_domain_init()).
What I mean, is that param->u.tmem.buf_ptr == 0 is the normal situation. This is the special case, when OP-TEE treats this buffer as a NULL. So we are doing nothing there. Thus, "return 0".
But, as Julien pointed out, we can have machine where 0x0 is the valid memory address and there is a chance, that some guest will use it as a pointer to buffer.
Aside from this, and the small grammar issue, everything else looks fine to me.
Let's wait for Julien's reply, but if this is the only thing I could fix on commit.
I agree with Volodymyr, this is the normal case here. There are more work to prevent MFN 0 to be mapped in the guest but this shouldn't be an issue today.
Let's put the MFN 0 issue aside for a moment.
From the commit message I thought that if the guest wanted to pass a NULL buffer ("Null memory reference") then it would also *not* set OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG, which would be handled by the "else" statement also modified by this patch. Thus, I thought that reaching translate_noncontig with buf_ptr == NULL would always be an error.
But re-reading the commit message and from both your answers it is not the case: a "Null memory reference" is allowed with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG set too.
Thus, I have no further comments and the improvements on the in-code comment could be done on commit.
Good :). IIRC Paul gave a provisional RaB for this series. @Paul, now that we are settled, could we get a formal one?
Cheers,
-----Original Message----- From: Julien Grall julien@xen.org Sent: 26 June 2020 18:54 To: Stefano Stabellini sstabellini@kernel.org; paul@xen.org Cc: Volodymyr Babchuk Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; op- tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] optee: allow plain TMEM buffers with NULL address
(using paul xen.org's email)
Thanks. Avoids annoying warning banners :-)
Hi,
Apologies for the late answer.
On 23/06/2020 22:09, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
On Tue, 23 Jun 2020, Julien Grall wrote:
On 23/06/2020 03:49, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Hi Stefano,
Stefano Stabellini writes:
On Fri, 19 Jun 2020, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Trusted Applications use popular approach to determine required size of buffer: client provides a memory reference with the NULL pointer to a buffer. This is so called "Null memory reference". TA updates the reference with the required size and returns it back to the client. Then client allocates buffer of needed size and repeats the operation.
This behavior is described in TEE Client API Specification, paragraph 3.2.5. Memory References.
OP-TEE represents this null memory reference as a TMEM parameter with buf_ptr = 0x0. This is the only case when we should allow TMEM buffer without the OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. This also the special case for a buffer with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag.
This could lead to a potential issue, because IPA 0x0 is a valid address, but OP-TEE will treat it as a special case. So, care should be taken when construction OP-TEE enabled guest to make sure that such guest have no memory at IPA 0x0 and none of its memory is mapped at PA 0x0.
Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com
Changes from v1:
- Added comment with TODO about possible PA/IPA 0x0 issue
- The same is described in the commit message
- Added check in translate_noncontig() for the NULL ptr buffer
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c index 6963238056..70bfef7e5f 100644 --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c @@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ static bool optee_probe(void) return true; } +/*
- TODO: There is a potential issue with guests that either have RAM
- at IPA of 0x0 or some of theirs memory is mapped at PA 0x0. This is
^ their
- because PA of 0x0 is considered as NULL pointer by OP-TEE. It will
- not be able to map buffer with such pointer to TA address space, or
- use such buffer for communication with the guest. We either need to
- check that guest have no such mappings or ensure that OP-TEE
- enabled guest will not be created with such mappings.
- */ static int optee_domain_init(struct domain *d) { struct arm_smccc_res resp;
@@ -725,6 +734,15 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain *ctx, uint64_t next_page_data; } *guest_data, *xen_data;
- /*
* Special case: buffer with buf_ptr == 0x0 is considered as NULL* pointer by OP-TEE. No translation is needed. This can lead to* an issue as IPA 0x0 is a valid address for Xen. See the comment* near optee_domain_init()*/- if ( !param->u.tmem.buf_ptr )
return 0;Given that today it is not possible for this to happen, it could even be an ASSERT. But I think I would just return an error, maybe -EINVAL?
Hmm, looks like my comment is somewhat misleading :(
How about the following comment:
We don't want to translate NULL (0) as it can be used by the guest to fetch the size of the buffer to allocate. This behavior depends on TA, but there is a guarantee that OP-TEE will not try to map it (see more details on top of optee_domain_init()).
What I mean, is that param->u.tmem.buf_ptr == 0 is the normal situation. This is the special case, when OP-TEE treats this buffer as a NULL. So we are doing nothing there. Thus, "return 0".
But, as Julien pointed out, we can have machine where 0x0 is the valid memory address and there is a chance, that some guest will use it as a pointer to buffer.
Aside from this, and the small grammar issue, everything else looks fine to me.
Let's wait for Julien's reply, but if this is the only thing I could fix on commit.
I agree with Volodymyr, this is the normal case here. There are more work to prevent MFN 0 to be mapped in the guest but this shouldn't be an issue today.
Let's put the MFN 0 issue aside for a moment.
From the commit message I thought that if the guest wanted to pass a NULL buffer ("Null memory reference") then it would also *not* set OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG, which would be handled by the "else" statement also modified by this patch. Thus, I thought that reaching translate_noncontig with buf_ptr == NULL would always be an error.
But re-reading the commit message and from both your answers it is not the case: a "Null memory reference" is allowed with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG set too.
Thus, I have no further comments and the improvements on the in-code comment could be done on commit.
Good :). IIRC Paul gave a provisional RaB for this series. @Paul, now that we are settled, could we get a formal one?
Sure.
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant paul@xen.org
Cheers,
-- Julien Grall
On 29/06/2020 08:42, Paul Durrant wrote:
-----Original Message----- From: Julien Grall julien@xen.org Sent: 26 June 2020 18:54 To: Stefano Stabellini sstabellini@kernel.org; paul@xen.org Cc: Volodymyr Babchuk Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com; xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; op- tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] optee: allow plain TMEM buffers with NULL address
(using paul xen.org's email)
Thanks. Avoids annoying warning banners :-)
Hi,
Apologies for the late answer.
On 23/06/2020 22:09, Stefano Stabellini wrote:
On Tue, 23 Jun 2020, Julien Grall wrote:
On 23/06/2020 03:49, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote:
Hi Stefano,
Stefano Stabellini writes:
On Fri, 19 Jun 2020, Volodymyr Babchuk wrote: > Trusted Applications use popular approach to determine required size > of buffer: client provides a memory reference with the NULL pointer to > a buffer. This is so called "Null memory reference". TA updates the > reference with the required size and returns it back to the > client. Then client allocates buffer of needed size and repeats the > operation. > > This behavior is described in TEE Client API Specification, paragraph > 3.2.5. Memory References. > > OP-TEE represents this null memory reference as a TMEM parameter with > buf_ptr = 0x0. This is the only case when we should allow TMEM > buffer without the OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. This also the > special case for a buffer with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG flag. > > This could lead to a potential issue, because IPA 0x0 is a valid > address, but OP-TEE will treat it as a special case. So, care should > be taken when construction OP-TEE enabled guest to make sure that such > guest have no memory at IPA 0x0 and none of its memory is mapped at PA > 0x0. > > Signed-off-by: Volodymyr Babchuk volodymyr_babchuk@epam.com > --- > > Changes from v1: > - Added comment with TODO about possible PA/IPA 0x0 issue > - The same is described in the commit message > - Added check in translate_noncontig() for the NULL ptr buffer > > --- > xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c > index 6963238056..70bfef7e5f 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c > @@ -215,6 +215,15 @@ static bool optee_probe(void) > return true; > } > +/* > + * TODO: There is a potential issue with guests that either have RAM > + * at IPA of 0x0 or some of theirs memory is mapped at PA 0x0. This is ^ their
> + * because PA of 0x0 is considered as NULL pointer by OP-TEE. It will > + * not be able to map buffer with such pointer to TA address space, or > + * use such buffer for communication with the guest. We either need to > + * check that guest have no such mappings or ensure that OP-TEE > + * enabled guest will not be created with such mappings. > + */ > static int optee_domain_init(struct domain *d) > { > struct arm_smccc_res resp; > @@ -725,6 +734,15 @@ static int translate_noncontig(struct optee_domain > *ctx, > uint64_t next_page_data; > } *guest_data, *xen_data; > + /* > + * Special case: buffer with buf_ptr == 0x0 is considered as NULL > + * pointer by OP-TEE. No translation is needed. This can lead to > + * an issue as IPA 0x0 is a valid address for Xen. See the comment > + * near optee_domain_init() > + */ > + if ( !param->u.tmem.buf_ptr ) > + return 0;
Given that today it is not possible for this to happen, it could even be an ASSERT. But I think I would just return an error, maybe -EINVAL?
Hmm, looks like my comment is somewhat misleading :(
How about the following comment:
We don't want to translate NULL (0) as it can be used by the guest to fetch the size of the buffer to allocate. This behavior depends on TA, but there is a guarantee that OP-TEE will not try to map it (see more details on top of optee_domain_init()).
What I mean, is that param->u.tmem.buf_ptr == 0 is the normal situation. This is the special case, when OP-TEE treats this buffer as a NULL. So we are doing nothing there. Thus, "return 0".
But, as Julien pointed out, we can have machine where 0x0 is the valid memory address and there is a chance, that some guest will use it as a pointer to buffer.
Aside from this, and the small grammar issue, everything else looks fine to me.
Let's wait for Julien's reply, but if this is the only thing I could fix on commit.
I agree with Volodymyr, this is the normal case here. There are more work to prevent MFN 0 to be mapped in the guest but this shouldn't be an issue today.
Let's put the MFN 0 issue aside for a moment.
From the commit message I thought that if the guest wanted to pass a NULL buffer ("Null memory reference") then it would also *not* set OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG, which would be handled by the "else" statement also modified by this patch. Thus, I thought that reaching translate_noncontig with buf_ptr == NULL would always be an error.
But re-reading the commit message and from both your answers it is not the case: a "Null memory reference" is allowed with OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_NONCONTIG set too.
Thus, I have no further comments and the improvements on the in-code comment could be done on commit.
Good :). IIRC Paul gave a provisional RaB for this series. @Paul, now that we are settled, could we get a formal one?
Sure.
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant paul@xen.org
Thanks!
It is not clear to me what Stefano had in mind for the "in-code comment". So I will leave him committing the series.
Cheers,
op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org
-
Julien Grall -
Paul Durrant -
Stefano Stabellini -
Volodymyr Babchuk