October 2020 - OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

[PATCH] tee: fix some comment typos in header files

by Elvira Khabirova

struct tee_param: revc -> recv. TEE_IOC_SUPPL_SEND: typo introduced by copy-pasting, replace invalid description with description from the according argument struct. Signed-off-by: Elvira Khabirova <e.khabirova(a)omprussia.ru> --- include/linux/tee_drv.h | 2 +- include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/tee_drv.h b/include/linux/tee_drv.h index d074302989dd..61557bc0e29f 100644 --- a/include/linux/tee_drv.h +++ b/include/linux/tee_drv.h @@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ struct tee_param { * @close_session: close a session * @invoke_func: invoke a trusted function * @cancel_req: request cancel of an ongoing invoke or open - * @supp_revc: called for supplicant to get a command + * @supp_recv: called for supplicant to get a command * @supp_send: called for supplicant to send a response * @shm_register: register shared memory buffer in TEE * @shm_unregister: unregister shared memory buffer in TEE diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h index b619f37ee03e..7546be5ed4f8 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tee.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tee.h @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ struct tee_iocl_supp_send_arg { }; /** - * TEE_IOC_SUPPL_SEND - Receive a request for a supplicant function + * TEE_IOC_SUPPL_SEND - Send a response to a received request * * Takes a struct tee_ioctl_buf_data which contains a struct * tee_iocl_supp_send_arg followed by any array of struct tee_param -- 2.28.0

3 years, 10 months

3
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[PATCH v4] tee: add support for application-based session login methods

by Elvira Khabirova

GP TEE Client API in addition to login methods already supported in the kernel also defines several application-based methods: TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION, TEEC_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION, and TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION. It specifies credentials generated for TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION as only depending on the identity of the program, being persistent within one implementation, across multiple invocations of the application and across power cycles, enabling them to be used to disambiguate persistent storage. The exact nature is REE-specific. As the exact method of generating application identifier strings may vary between vendors, setups and installations, add two suggested methods and an exact framework for vendors to extend upon. Signed-off-by: Elvira Khabirova <e.khabirova(a)omprussia.ru> --- Changes in v4: - Fix potential exe_file leaks. Changes in v3: - Remove free_app_id() and replace it with calls to kfree(). Changes in v2: - Rename some functions and variables to make them shorter. - Include linux/security.h unconditionally. - Restructure error handling in tee_session_calc_client_uuid(). --- drivers/tee/Kconfig | 29 ++++++++++ drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 126 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/Kconfig index e99d840c2511..4cd6e0d2aad5 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/tee/Kconfig @@ -11,6 +11,35 @@ config TEE This implements a generic interface towards a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). +choice + prompt "Application ID for client UUID" + depends on TEE + default TEE_APPID_PATH + help + This option allows to choose which method will be used to generate + application identifiers for client UUID generation when login methods + TEE_LOGIN_APPLICATION, TEE_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION + and TEE_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION are used. + Please be mindful of the security of each method in your particular + installation. + + config TEE_APPID_PATH + bool "Path-based application ID" + help + Use the executable's path as an application ID. + + config TEE_APPID_SECURITY + bool "Security extended attribute based application ID" + help + Use the executable's security extended attribute as an application ID. +endchoice + +config TEE_APPID_SECURITY_XATTR + string "Security extended attribute to use for application ID" + depends on TEE_APPID_SECURITY + help + Attribute to be used as an application ID (with the security prefix removed). + if TEE menu "TEE drivers" diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index 64637e09a095..a72b8c19253a 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -7,9 +7,12 @@ #include <linux/cdev.h> #include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/idr.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tee_drv.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> @@ -21,7 +24,7 @@ #define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) -#define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE 128 +#define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE PATH_MAX /* * TEE Client UUID name space identifier (UUIDv4) @@ -125,6 +128,65 @@ static int tee_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) return 0; } +#ifdef CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY +static const char *get_app_id(void **data) +{ + struct file *exe_file; + const char *name = CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY_XATTR; + int len; + + exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm); + if (!exe_file) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + + if (!exe_file->f_inode) { + fput(exe_file); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + } + + /* + * An identifier string for the binary. Depends on the implementation. + * Could be, for example, a string containing the application vendor ID, + * or the binary's signature, or its hash and a timestamp. + */ + len = security_inode_getsecurity(exe_file->f_inode, name, data, true); + fput(exe_file); + + if (len < 0) + return ERR_PTR(len); + + return *data; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH +static const char *get_app_id(void **data) +{ + struct file *exe_file; + char *path; + + *data = kzalloc(TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!*data) + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + + exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm); + if (!exe_file) { + kfree(*data); + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); + } + + path = file_path(exe_file, *data, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE); + fput(exe_file); + + if (IS_ERR(path)) { + kfree(*data); + return path; + } + + return path; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH */ + /** * uuid_v5() - Calculate UUIDv5 * @uuid: Resulting UUID @@ -197,6 +259,8 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, gid_t ns_grp = (gid_t)-1; kgid_t grp = INVALID_GID; char *name = NULL; + void *app_id_data = NULL; + const char *app_id = NULL; int name_len; int rc; @@ -217,6 +281,14 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, * For TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP: * gid=<gid> * + * For TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION: + * app=<application id> + * + * For TEEC_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION: + * uid=<uid>:app=<application id> + * + * For TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION: + * gid=<gid>:app=<application id> */ name = kzalloc(TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -227,10 +299,6 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER: name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "uid=%x", current_euid().val); - if (name_len >= TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) { - rc = -E2BIG; - goto out_free_name; - } break; case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP: @@ -243,10 +311,49 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "gid=%x", grp.val); - if (name_len >= TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) { - rc = -E2BIG; + break; + + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_APPLICATION: + app_id = get_app_id(&app_id_data); + if (IS_ERR(app_id)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(app_id); + goto out_free_name; + } + + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "app=%s", + app_id); + kfree(app_id_data); + break; + + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION: + app_id = get_app_id(&app_id_data); + if (IS_ERR(app_id)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(app_id); goto out_free_name; } + + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "uid=%x:app=%s", + current_euid().val, app_id); + kfree(app_id_data); + break; + + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION: + memcpy(&ns_grp, connection_data, sizeof(gid_t)); + grp = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), ns_grp); + if (!gid_valid(grp) || !in_egroup_p(grp)) { + rc = -EPERM; + goto out_free_name; + } + + app_id = get_app_id(&app_id_data); + if (IS_ERR(app_id)) { + rc = PTR_ERR(app_id); + goto out_free_name; + } + + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "gid=%x:app=%s", + grp.val, app_id); + kfree(app_id_data); break; default: @@ -254,7 +361,10 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, goto out_free_name; } - rc = uuid_v5(uuid, &tee_client_uuid_ns, name, name_len); + if (name_len < TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) + rc = uuid_v5(uuid, &tee_client_uuid_ns, name, name_len); + else + rc = -E2BIG; out_free_name: kfree(name); -- 2.28.0

4 years

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[PATCH] tee: client UUID: Skip REE kernel login method as well

by Sumit Garg

Since the addition of session's client UUID generation via commit [1], login via REE kernel method was disallowed. So fix that via passing nill UUID in case of TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL method as well. Fixes: e33bcbab16d1 ("tee: add support for session's client UUID generation") [1] Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> --- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index 64637e0..2f6199e 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, int name_len; int rc; - if (connection_method == TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_PUBLIC) { + if (connection_method == TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_PUBLIC || + connection_method == TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_REE_KERNEL) { /* Nil UUID to be passed to TEE environment */ uuid_copy(uuid, &uuid_null); return 0; -- 2.7.4

4 years

3
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Linaro OP-TEE Contributions meeting October 2020

by Joakim Bech

Hi, LOC monthly meeting is planned to take place October 28th @ 16.00 (UTC+1). Connection details can be found in the meeting notes document (link below). Ilias and Jens will give an introduction to the secure partitions and StandaloneMM parts in OP-TEE. Other than that feel free to suggest topics you'd like to discuss (by replying to this email or write it directly in the meeting notes). Note that it's UTC+1 since we're moving to winter time in Sweden in a couple of days from now (previous LOC meetings have been UTC+2). Meeting details: --------------- Date/time: Wednesday October 28th(a)16.00 (UTC+1) https://everytimezone.com/s/9bfdb976 Invitation/connection details: In the meeting notes Meeting notes: http://bit.ly/loc-notes Project page: https://www.linaro.org/projects/#LOC Regards, Joakim on behalf of the Linaro OP-TEE team

4 years

1
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[GIT PULL] OP-TEE use UUID API for v5.10

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this small patch which allows to hide uuit_t internals from the OP-TEE driver. I know it's a bit late for v5.10, if it's too late please queue it for v5.11 instead. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit 9123e3a74ec7b934a4a099e98af6a61c2f80bbf5: Linux 5.9-rc1 (2020-08-16 13:04:57 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.linaro.org:/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/optee-use-uuid-api-for-v5.10 for you to fetch changes up to 57222a1be27e06ecb81cc2f945e897814d5f461c: tee: optee: Use UUID API for exporting the UUID (2020-10-13 08:03:18 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Use UUID API to export the UUID Uses export_uuid() to export and uuid_t to an u8 array instead of depending on the internals of uuid_t. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Andy Shevchenko (1): tee: optee: Use UUID API for exporting the UUID drivers/tee/optee/device.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

4 years, 1 month

2
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[PATCH] tee: optee: Set a flag to avoid memory leaks

by Wang, Xiaolei

When an rpc message to release memory is not received, a memory leak will occur, which should be released unreferenced object 0xffff00006871b580 (size 128): comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294892673 (age 428.192s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 80 b3 71 68 00 00 ff ff 00 e0 71 a8 00 00 00 00 ..qh......q..... 00 e0 71 68 00 00 ff ff 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..qh............ backtrace: [<00000000f0425299>] slab_post_alloc_hook+0x6c/0x338 [<000000004705f905>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1d4/0x328 [<00000000773c66a0>] tee_shm_alloc+0x84/0x268 [<00000000ca052f98>] optee_handle_rpc+0x144/0x5a0 [<0000000015a8eebe>] optee_do_call_with_arg+0x14c/0x168 [<00000000d51ef0fd>] optee_open_session+0x12c/0x200 [<000000007146f51d>] tee_client_open_session+0x24/0x38 [<00000000ea2b35e7>] optee_enumerate_devices+0xa0/0x2c0 [<0000000068088775>] optee_probe+0x560/0x690 [<00000000ad1d997a>] platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xa8 [<00000000e11592d4>] really_probe+0x118/0x3e0 [<00000000dacd3142>] driver_probe_device+0x5c/0xc0 [<0000000077c13842>] device_driver_attach+0x74/0x80 [<00000000106ccc62>] __driver_attach+0x8c/0xd8 [<00000000e120c345>] bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xd8 [<00000000b79335f5>] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <xiaolei.wang(a)windriver.com<mailto:xiaolei.wang@windriver.com>> --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 7 ++++++- drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 2 +- drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index 20b6fd7383c5..522c133b9d95 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ u32 optee_do_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, phys_addr_t parg) struct optee_rpc_param param = { }; struct optee_call_ctx call_ctx = { }; u32 ret; + unsigned int flags = 0; param.a0 = OPTEE_SMC_CALL_WITH_ARG; reg_pair_from_64(&param.a1, &param.a2, parg); @@ -153,9 +154,13 @@ u32 optee_do_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, phys_addr_t parg) param.a1 = res.a1; param.a2 = res.a2; param.a3 = res.a3; - optee_handle_rpc(ctx, &param, &call_ctx); + optee_handle_rpc(ctx, &param, &call_ctx, &flags); } else { ret = res.a0; + if (flags != 0x0) { + param.a0 = 2; + optee_handle_rpc(ctx, &param, &call_ctx, &flags); + } break; } } diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h index 8b71839a357e..1c1d62e21141 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ struct optee_call_ctx { }; void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_rpc_param *param, - struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx); + struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx, unsigned int *flags); void optee_rpc_finalize_call(struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx); void optee_wait_queue_init(struct optee_wait_queue *wq); diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c b/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c index b4ade54d1f28..4e76c87b61f4 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c @@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ static void handle_rpc_func_cmd(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee *optee, * Result of RPC is written back into @param. */ void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_rpc_param *param, - struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx) + struct optee_call_ctx *call_ctx, unsigned int *flags) { struct tee_device *teedev = ctx->teedev; struct optee *optee = tee_get_drvdata(teedev); @@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_rpc_param *param, reg_pair_from_64(&param->a1, &param->a2, pa); reg_pair_from_64(&param->a4, &param->a5, (unsigned long)shm); + *flags = 0x1; } else { param->a1 = 0; param->a2 = 0; @@ -420,6 +421,7 @@ void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_rpc_param *param, case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_FREE: shm = reg_pair_to_ptr(param->a1, param->a2); tee_shm_free(shm); + *flags = 0x0; break; case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_FOREIGN_INTR: /* -- 2.25.1

4 years, 1 month

2
1
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[PATCH v7 0/4] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support

by Sumit Garg

Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device. This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based early TA which is already merged in upstream [1]. [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/f86ab8e7e0de869dfa25ca05a37ee070d… Changes in v7: 1. Added a trusted.source module parameter in order to enforce user's choice in case a particular platform posses both TPM and TEE. 2. Refine commit description for patch #1. Changes in v6: 1. Revert back to dynamic detection of trust source. 2. Drop author mention from trusted_core.c and trusted_tpm1.c files. 3. Rebased to latest tpmdd/master. Changes in v5: 1. Drop dynamic detection of trust source and use compile time flags instead. 2. Rename trusted_common.c -> trusted_core.c. 3. Rename callback: cleanup() -> exit(). 4. Drop "tk" acronym. 5. Other misc. comments. 6. Added review tags for patch #3 and #4. Changes in v4: 1. Pushed independent TEE features separately: - Part of recent TEE PR: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/4/1062 2. Updated trusted-encrypted doc with TEE as a new trust source. 3. Rebased onto latest tpmdd/master. Changes in v3: 1. Update patch #2 to support registration of multiple kernel pages. 2. Incoporate dependency patch #4 in this patch-set: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11091435/ Changes in v2: 1. Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2. 2. Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3. 3. Switch to use generic trusted keys framework. Sumit Garg (4): KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 203 ++++++++++--- MAINTAINERS | 8 + include/keys/trusted-type.h | 47 +++ include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 55 ++++ include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 17 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 334 +++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 278 ++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 336 ++++------------------ 9 files changed, 953 insertions(+), 327 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c -- 2.7.4

4 years, 2 months

4
18
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OP-TEE 3.11.0 has been released

by Jerome Forissier

[BCC all OP-TEE maintainers] Hi, FYI, I have just finalized the OP-TEE 3.11.0 release (changelog [1]). Once again, many thanks to all of you who contributed to this release by submitting or reviewing code, or taking part in release testing [2]. [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/3.11.0/CHANGELOG.md [2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/c4def2a8262a Regards, -- Jerome

4 years, 2 months

1
0
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[GIT PULL] TEE fix for v5.10

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this small fix which reenables the kernel login method in the kernel internal TEE client API. This fixes a problem introduced in v5.8. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit 9123e3a74ec7b934a4a099e98af6a61c2f80bbf5: Linux 5.9-rc1 (2020-08-16 13:04:57 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.linaro.org:/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/tee-fix-for-v5.10 for you to fetch changes up to 722939528a37aa0cb22d441e2045c0cf53e78fb0: tee: client UUID: Skip REE kernel login method as well (2020-10-13 08:42:11 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Reenable kernel login method for kernel TEE client API The kernel TEE login method was accidentally disabled previously when enabling a few other login methods, so fix that here. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Sumit Garg (1): tee: client UUID: Skip REE kernel login method as well drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

4 years, 2 months

1
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Re: [PATCH v1] firmware: tee_bnxt: Use UUID API for exporting the UUID

by Andy Shevchenko

On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 01:56:48PM +0300, Andy Shevchenko wrote: > On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 04:00:21PM +0300, Andy Shevchenko wrote: > > There is export_uuid() function which exports uuid_t to the u8 array. > > Use it instead of open coding variant. > > > > This allows to hide the uuid_t internals. > > Any comment on this? Guys, who is going to pick this up? > > Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> > > --- > > drivers/firmware/broadcom/tee_bnxt_fw.c | 2 +- > > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > > > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/broadcom/tee_bnxt_fw.c b/drivers/firmware/broadcom/tee_bnxt_fw.c > > index ed10da5313e86..4cf0c2576037d 100644 > > --- a/drivers/firmware/broadcom/tee_bnxt_fw.c > > +++ b/drivers/firmware/broadcom/tee_bnxt_fw.c > > @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ static int tee_bnxt_fw_probe(struct device *dev) > > return -ENODEV; > > > > /* Open session with Bnxt load Trusted App */ > > - memcpy(sess_arg.uuid, bnxt_device->id.uuid.b, TEE_IOCTL_UUID_LEN); > > + export_uuid(sess_arg.uuid, &bnxt_device->id.uuid); > > sess_arg.clnt_login = TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_PUBLIC; > > sess_arg.num_params = 0; > > -- With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko

4 years, 2 months

1
0
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OP-TEE October 2020