My take on this is a question I ask myself. Is this a generic supportable option for the SPD or if it is more of a Chromebook specific architecture change?

If this is something specific to the Chromebook architecture that should be called out more. One reaction is to say these should be kept downstream but I do understand the desire to have this upstream and in the SPD code to aid in maintainability so lets see what we can do to facilitate that. However, I would not want to promote and set a precedence that its ok to scatter platform specific changes in common generic code behind lots of build flags. I do though see that this change is not so much a specific platform architecture behaviour but a Chromebook architecture behaviour which supports multiple platforms. I can also see trying to split the changes out into a Plat directory in the SPD could be really ugly.

If this is meant to be for a more generic supportable option which is how the patches are written it does undermine the trustzone security model which is the more commonly deployed security model in the TF-A reference implementation as you say Julius. I take the point there are some warning comments in the code that this change weakens trustzone which rules out any compliance if sought but I think if we keep the patches as is I would like to see these warnings more prominent so that non-Chromebook platforms are more fully aware and so understand the implications of enabling them.

Two things I can suggest are:

* First is can this warning be repeated during build time so that people building with this option turned on get a message in their build log. We have precedence for this type of build time warning for features marked as experimental. I realise this is not experimental but it is a more limited type of deployment security model and not the default operated by most platforms fully supporting trustzone. * Second is to update the documentation on the Optee SPD. Looking at what we have today * Rendered https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/components/spd/optee-disp... * Source https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/tree/docs/compon...

We don’t really have much about the Optee SPD but if we have these changes it would be good to document the two build variants now and the nature/limitations/use-cases of each I think.

Finally as Jens is the Code Owner of the Optee SPD I would like him to be comfortable with the changes, he asked for maintainers view and the above is mine, others may differ.

Joanna

From: Julius Werner via TF-A tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org Date: Monday, 9 January 2023 at 17:05 To: Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org Cc: tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org, OP-TEE TrustedFirmware op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware.org, Dan Handley Dan.Handley@arm.com, Jeffrey Kardatzke jkardatzke@google.com, Ilias Apalodimas ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org Subject: [TF-A] Re: Post-boot loading of OP-TEE Hi Jens,

As I already argued in that older thread, I think the whole TrustZone / secure world mechanism is fundamentally just a sort of security toolkit that allows the platform implementer to enforce certain security guarantees and isolate certain execution contexts from another. What you actually want to do with that, what threats you're trying to protect against, what secrets or resources you're actually trying to protect from whom, are all questions that only make sense to ask for the platform as a whole, not for EL3 in isolation, and thus can only be answered by the platform implementer. As such, I don't think you can really say things like this seems very "risky" or gives up a "critical level of defense" without actually looking at the platform in question.

Of course I know that the majority of TF-A users have security models that are incompatible with this sort of post-boot loading, because they do not secure their operating system with the same level of trust as EL3 firmware. But our system is different -- we have firmware, kernel and userland all owned by the same entity and secured with a single chain of trust from the first boot firmware components down to the OS root file system. We have tight control over our early userland initialization and can actually ensure that the OS doesn't open any external attack vectors before it loads OP-TEE from the verified file system and sends it to EL3. I understand that this is not a common situation but it is the case for us, and all we're asking is that we can contribute this as an optional, default-off compile time setting so that we aren't forced to either implement a (for us) vastly inferior solution or fork the whole project, just because we have a less common case. (I also don't think it is fair to say this code would set a "bad example", because there's nothing actually bad about it for our use case. Security models always take the whole platform into account, and TF-A was not designed with a single "default security model" that needs to be forced upon every platform running it. We are happy to work with you on ways to ensure the implications and limitations of this compile-time option are clearly labeled so that nobody would turn it on without knowing what they're doing and create an insecure situation by accident.)

As for the alternative proposals, they're all implying large drawbacks for our use case which is why we decided on this kind of solution in the first place. Of course there are a dozen different ways to get a system that somehow "works", but there are more constraints here that we need to be aware of since we're trying to ship an efficient and maintainable production system. Our BL2 (which is not part of TF-A) is not designed to stay resident, and any runtime verification in firmware (whether in BL2 or a stub OP-TEE) would require us to create and maintain a whole separate key infrastructure just to verify that one component (and add the code bloat of all those crypto routines to firmware components which would otherwise not need them, and the boot time cost of verifying them, and add new headaches about key revocation for this separate verification system, and...). Why would we do all of that if we already have a key infrastructure in place that verifies our root file system to begin with, and we know that our system encounters no additional attack vectors between initial BL31 loading time and the time when the kernel would load the OP-TEE binary from that verified file system? It just doesn't make any sense for our case.

I do hope that we can continue the exiting TF-A design pattern of offering platforms different options for different use cases here, rather than trying to force everyone on a single model which just isn't going to work out well for a project that gets embedded into so many different systems with different constraints. -- TF-A mailing list -- tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.org To unsubscribe send an email to tf-a-leave@lists.trustedfirmware.org