On Mon, 21 Aug 2023 at 14:01, Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
On Mon, 21 Aug 2023 at 13:15, Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org wrote:
Hi,
On Tue, Aug 8, 2023 at 11:07 AM Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org wrote:
Hi Sumit,
On Mon, Aug 7, 2023 at 9:58 AM Sumit Garg sumit.garg@linaro.org wrote:
Hi Jens,
On Thu, 3 Aug 2023 at 18:05, Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org wrote:
Prior to this patch was trusted_tee_seal() and trusted_tee_get_random() relying on tee_shm_register_kernel_buf() to share memory with the TEE. Depending on the memory allocation pattern the pages holding the registered buffers overlap with other buffers also shared with the TEE.
The overlap here is due to the fact that we are registering two array members of the same struct. This overlap can be removed by registering the overall structure at once. But that sounds unnecessary data structure type sharing with trusted keys TA.
The OP-TEE driver using the old SMC based ABI permits overlapping shared buffers, but with the new FF-A based ABI each physical page may only be registered once.
Would it be possible for OP-TEE FF-A ABI to check if a page is already registered?
No, there's no such ABI in the FF-A specification.
If it is then just return success with appropriate page offset.
It's more complicated than that. What if only there's a partial registration?
As otherwise this sounds like an unnecessary restriction for users. I don't think the problem is only particular to the trusted keys driver but can be reproduced for user-space clients as well.
Indeed, we're dealing with it by using a temporary buffer in the client lib.
Fix this problem by allocating a temporary page aligned shared memory buffer to be used as a bounce buffer for the needed data buffers.
Since TEE trusted keys doesn't depend on registered shared memory support any longer remove that explicit dependency when opening a context to the TEE.
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander jens.wiklander@linaro.org
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 68 +++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c index ac3e270ade69..3085343c489a 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/key-type.h> +#include <linux/minmax.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/string.h> @@ -65,38 +66,37 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) int ret; struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; struct tee_param param[4];
struct tee_shm *reg_shm_in = NULL, *reg_shm_out = NULL;
struct tee_shm *shm;uint8_t *buf; memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
reg_shm_in = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->key,p->key_len);if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_in)) {dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");return PTR_ERR(reg_shm_in);
shm = tee_shm_alloc_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx,p->key_len + sizeof(p->blob));if (IS_ERR(shm)) {dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm alloc failed\n");return PTR_ERR(shm); }
reg_shm_out = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, p->blob,sizeof(p->blob));if (IS_ERR(reg_shm_out)) {dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "blob shm register failed\n");ret = PTR_ERR(reg_shm_out);
buf = tee_shm_get_va(shm, 0);if (IS_ERR(buf)) {ret = PTR_ERR(buf); goto out; }memcpy(buf, p->key, p->key_len);These memcpy()'s here and below are undue overheads if we change to tee_shm_alloc_kernel_buf().
There's a bit of overhead when entering and exiting the secure world too, just to save and restore registers. Anyway, trusted_tee_seal() doesn't together with FF-A without this patch.
By the way, without this patch the kernel fails with: [ 12.642071] trusted-key-tee optee-ta-f04a0fe7-1f5d-4b9b-abf7-619b85b4ce8c: blob shm register failed [ 12.642576] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffffffffffff3 [ 12.642668] Mem abort info: [ 12.642701] ESR = 0x0000000096000004 [ 12.642764] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 12.642821] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 12.642864] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 12.642910] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault [ 12.642960] Data abort info: [ 12.643006] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004 [ 12.643049] CM = 0, WnR = 0 [ 12.643104] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000043bfb000 [ 12.643197] [fffffffffffffff3] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000 [ 12.643654] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 12.643821] Modules linked in: [ 12.647781] CPU: 0 PID: 134 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 6.4.0 #1 [ 12.647990] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 12.648146] pstate: 63400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 12.648280] pc : tee_shm_put+0x1c/0x180 [ 12.648715] lr : tee_shm_free+0x10/0x1c [ 12.648773] sp : ffff80000aa33aa0 [ 12.648822] x29: ffff80000aa33aa0 x28: ffff0000002b7900 x27: ffff80000a2f7750 [ 12.648980] x26: ffff80000aa33cf8 x25: ffff80000a2f76f0 x24: 0000000000000020 [ 12.649088] x23: ffff80000a6b2000 x22: 00000000fffffff3 x21: fffffffffffffff3 [ 12.649199] x20: fffffffffffffff3 x19: fffffffffffffff3 x18: ffffffffffffffff [ 12.649307] x17: 62203a6338656334 x16: 623538623931362d x15: 376662612d623962 [ 12.649414] x14: 342d643566312d37 x13: ffff80000a271ac8 x12: 0000000000000363 [ 12.649523] x11: 0000000000000121 x10: ffff80000a2c9ac8 x9 : ffff80000a271ac8 [ 12.649667] x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffff80000a2c9ac8 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 12.649797] x5 : ffff000041ea0c48 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 12.649912] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : fffffffffffffff3 [ 12.650074] Call trace: [ 12.650212] tee_shm_put+0x1c/0x180 [ 12.650361] tee_shm_free+0x10/0x1c [ 12.650437] trusted_tee_seal+0xf4/0x17c [ 12.650503] trusted_instantiate+0x16c/0x1fc [ 12.650564] __key_instantiate_and_link+0x60/0x1f8 [ 12.650629] __key_create_or_update+0x2a4/0x460 [ 12.650691] key_create_or_update+0x14/0x20 [ 12.650757] __arm64_sys_add_key+0xe4/0x244 [ 12.650822] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 12.650886] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xf4 [ 12.650958] do_el0_svc+0x3c/0xa8 [ 12.651015] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84 [ 12.651074] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x138 [ 12.651144] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 12.651341] Code: a90153f3 aa0003f4 aa0003f3 a9025bf5 (f8438680) [ 12.651654] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Segmentation fault
So clearly something needs to be done since there's a bug in the error path.
I'm not overly concerned about the overhead with memcpy(), since we're using relatively small buffers. Kernel clients using large buffers will need a different approach, for example by using page-aligned buffers.
With that too, it is very much possible for kernel clients to share the same page for two sub page buffers, correct? IMO, it should be handled as part of tee_shm_register_kernel_buf() as you did for user-space clients as a short term workaround until we find a real fix.
Actually thinking about it more, let's rework tee_shm_register_kernel_buf() to be tee_shm_register_kernel_pages() to get aligned as we agreed here [1]. This would then shift the responsibility to check for duplicate pages to kernel clients rather than the TEE driver (don't need to bother about sub page buffers).
[1] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/op-tee@lists.trustedfirmware...
-Sumit
Thanks, Jens
Thanks, Jens
-Sumit
inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_SEAL; inv_arg.session = pvt_data.session_id; inv_arg.num_params = 4; param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_INPUT;
param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_in;
param[0].u.memref.shm = shm; param[0].u.memref.size = p->key_len; param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0; param[1].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
param[1].u.memref.shm = reg_shm_out;
param[1].u.memref.shm = shm; param[1].u.memref.size = sizeof(p->blob);
param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;
param[1].u.memref.shm_offs = p->key_len; ret = tee_client_invoke_func(pvt_data.ctx, &inv_arg, param); if ((ret < 0) || (inv_arg.ret != 0)) {@@ -104,14 +104,13 @@ static int trusted_tee_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) inv_arg.ret); ret = -EFAULT; } else {
memcpy(p->blob, buf + p->key_len,min(param[1].u.memref.size, sizeof(p->blob))); p->blob_len = param[1].u.memref.size; }out:
if (reg_shm_out)tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out);if (reg_shm_in)tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in);
tee_shm_free(shm); return ret;} @@ -166,11 +165,9 @@ static int trusted_tee_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) p->key_len = param[1].u.memref.size; }
tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out);out:
if (reg_shm_out)tee_shm_free(reg_shm_out);if (reg_shm_in)tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in);
tee_shm_free(reg_shm_in); return ret;} @@ -183,15 +180,21 @@ static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) int ret; struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg inv_arg; struct tee_param param[4];
struct tee_shm *reg_shm = NULL;
struct tee_shm *shm;void *buf; memset(&inv_arg, 0, sizeof(inv_arg)); memset(¶m, 0, sizeof(param));
reg_shm = tee_shm_register_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, key, key_len);if (IS_ERR(reg_shm)) {dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm register failed\n");return PTR_ERR(reg_shm);
shm = tee_shm_alloc_kernel_buf(pvt_data.ctx, key_len);if (IS_ERR(shm)) {dev_err(pvt_data.dev, "key shm alloc failed\n");return PTR_ERR(shm);}buf = tee_shm_get_va(shm, 0);if (IS_ERR(buf)) {ret = PTR_ERR(buf);goto out; } inv_arg.func = TA_CMD_GET_RANDOM;@@ -199,7 +202,7 @@ static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) inv_arg.num_params = 4;
param[0].attr = TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMREF_OUTPUT;
param[0].u.memref.shm = reg_shm;
param[0].u.memref.shm = shm; param[0].u.memref.size = key_len; param[0].u.memref.shm_offs = 0;@@ -209,18 +212,19 @@ static int trusted_tee_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) inv_arg.ret); ret = -EFAULT; } else {
memcpy(key, buf, min(param[0].u.memref.size, key_len)); ret = param[0].u.memref.size; }
tee_shm_free(reg_shm);+out:
tee_shm_free(shm); return ret;}
static int optee_ctx_match(struct tee_ioctl_version_data *ver, const void *data) {
if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE &&ver->gen_caps & TEE_GEN_CAP_REG_MEM)
if (ver->impl_id == TEE_IMPL_ID_OPTEE) return 1; else return 0;-- 2.34.1