Hi Jeffrey,
Thank you for the patch! Perhaps something to improve:
[auto build test WARNING on linus/master] [also build test WARNING on v6.3-rc2 next-20230315] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Jeffrey-Kardatzke/tee-optee-A... patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230314135704.v9.1.I8e7f9b01d9ac940507d78e15368e2... patch subject: [PATCH v9] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image reproduce: # https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commit/cab42c7807bc48ef664573253d3f37... git remote add linux-review https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux git fetch --no-tags linux-review Jeffrey-Kardatzke/tee-optee-Add-SMC-for-loading-OP-TEE-image/20230315-045847 git checkout cab42c7807bc48ef664573253d3f37c6bf7c1d08 make menuconfig # enable CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST, CONFIG_WARN_MISSING_DOCUMENTS, CONFIG_WARN_ABI_ERRORS make htmldocs
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag where applicable | Reported-by: kernel test robot lkp@intel.com | Link: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202303160226.q1JZZFAw-lkp@intel.com/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
Documentation/staging/tee.rst:233: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/staging/tee.rst:234: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/staging/tee.rst:237: WARNING: Enumerated list ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.
vim +233 Documentation/staging/tee.rst
230 231 1. Boot chain security. 232 Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of
233 the system. 234 Migitation: There must be boot chain security that verifies the kernel and
235 rootfs, otherwise an attacker can modify the loaded OP-TEE 236 binary by modifying it in the rootfs.
237 3. Alternate boot modes.
238 Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the OP-TEE 239 driver isn't loaded, leaving the SMC hole open. 240 Mitigation: If there are alternate methods of booting the device, such as a 241 recovery mode, it should be ensured that the same mitigations are 242 applied in that mode. 243 3. Attacks prior to SMC invocation. 244 Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load 245 OP-TEE can be exploited to then load an alternate OS image. 246 Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack 247 vectors are opened up. This should include mounting of any 248 modifiable filesystems, opening of network ports or communicating 249 with external devices (e.g. USB). 250 4. Blocking SMC call to load OP-TEE. 251 Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to load 252 OP-TEE isn't executed when desired, leaving it open to being 253 executed later and loading a modified OS. 254 Mitigation: It is recommended to build the OP-TEE driver as an included 255 driver rather than a module to prevent exploits that may cause 256 the module to not be loaded. 257