- OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

[PATCH] optee: add error checks in optee_ffa_do_call_with_arg()

by Jens Wiklander

Adds error checking in optee_ffa_do_call_with_arg() for correctness. Fixes: 4615e5a34b95 ("optee: add FF-A support") Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> --- drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 15 ++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c index d8c8683863aa..d88bd2e41572 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c @@ -619,9 +619,18 @@ static int optee_ffa_do_call_with_arg(struct tee_context *ctx, .data2 = (u32)(shm->sec_world_id >> 32), .data3 = shm->offset, }; - struct optee_msg_arg *arg = tee_shm_get_va(shm, 0); - unsigned int rpc_arg_offs = OPTEE_MSG_GET_ARG_SIZE(arg->num_params); - struct optee_msg_arg *rpc_arg = tee_shm_get_va(shm, rpc_arg_offs); + struct optee_msg_arg *arg; + unsigned int rpc_arg_offs; + struct optee_msg_arg *rpc_arg; + + arg = tee_shm_get_va(shm, 0); + if (IS_ERR(arg)) + return PTR_ERR(arg); + + rpc_arg_offs = OPTEE_MSG_GET_ARG_SIZE(arg->num_params); + rpc_arg = tee_shm_get_va(shm, rpc_arg_offs); + if (IS_ERR(arg)) + return PTR_ERR(arg); return optee_ffa_yielding_call(ctx, &data, rpc_arg); } -- 2.31.1

4 years, 7 months

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[PATCH] tee: optee: do not check memref size on return from Secure World

by Jerome Forissier

Commit c650b8dc7a79 ("tee: optee: do not check memref size on return from Secure World") was mistakenly lost in commit 4602c5842f64 ("optee: refactor driver with internal callbacks"). Remove the unwanted code again. Fixes: 4602c5842f64 ("optee: refactor driver with internal callbacks") Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome(a)forissier.org> --- drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index cf2e3293567d..09e7ec673bb6 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -71,16 +71,6 @@ static int from_msg_param_tmp_mem(struct tee_param *p, u32 attr, p->u.memref.shm_offs = mp->u.tmem.buf_ptr - pa; p->u.memref.shm = shm; - /* Check that the memref is covered by the shm object */ - if (p->u.memref.size) { - size_t o = p->u.memref.shm_offs + - p->u.memref.size - 1; - - rc = tee_shm_get_pa(shm, o, NULL); - if (rc) - return rc; - } - return 0; } -- 2.32.0

4 years, 7 months

3
3
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[PATCH] docs: staging/tee.rst: fix two typos found while reading

by Wang Cheng

Signed-off-by: Wang Cheng <wanngchenng(a)gmail.com> --- Documentation/staging/tee.rst | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst index 3c63d8dcd61e..498343c7ab08 100644 --- a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst +++ b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst @@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ The following picture shows a high level overview of AMD-TEE:: +--------------------------+ +---------+--------------------+ At the lowest level (in x86), the AMD Secure Processor (ASP) driver uses the -CPU to PSP mailbox regsister to submit commands to the PSP. The format of the +CPU to PSP mailbox register to submit commands to the PSP. The format of the command buffer is opaque to the ASP driver. It's role is to submit commands to the secure processor and return results to AMD-TEE driver. The interface between AMD-TEE driver and AMD Secure Processor driver can be found in [6]. @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ cancel_req driver callback is not supported by AMD-TEE. The GlobalPlatform TEE Client API [5] can be used by the user space (client) to talk to AMD's TEE. AMD's TEE provides a secure environment for loading, opening -a session, invoking commands and clossing session with TA. +a session, invoking commands and closing session with TA. References ========== -- 2.33.1

4 years, 7 months

4
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no TEE TA log (D/TA:) issue (github issue #5112)

by 起飞的老杨

Hello, I got problems here: I built the whole system with yotcto 3.3.3, linux kernel 5.10, optee-os 3.14, platform for rk3399 ( was working for qemu platform ). Console Configuration: U-Boot / TrustFirmware-A / optee-os: all pointed console to uart2 linux dts: chosen and secure-chosen all pointed to uart2. uart2's status and secure-status are both set to "okay" Build Configuration: optee-os: DEBUG=1 \ CFG_TEE_CORE_LOG_LEVEL=4 \ CFG_TEE_CORE_DEBUG=y \ CFG_TEE_TA_LOG_LEVEL=4 \ ... both optee-examples and my TA: DEBUG=1 \ CFG_TEE_TA_LOG_LEVEL=4 \ ... During boot I can see D/TC: logs, but no any D/TA: log is output. Some D/TC log like this: D/TC:? 0 tee_ta_init_session_with_context:607 Re-open TA xxxxx D/TC:? 0 tee_ta_close_session:512 csess 0xDDDDDD id 1 D/TC:? 0 tee_ta_close_session:531 Destroy session My TA has correct output, no crashes,or other errors Thanks.

4 years, 7 months

1
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[PATCH] tee: combine "config" and "menu" for TEE's menuconfig

by Jan Engelhardt

Don't let TEE occupy two lines in menuconfig when practically no other (sub)menu does either. Signed-off-by: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh(a)inai.de> --- drivers/tee/Kconfig | 5 +---- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git drivers/tee/Kconfig drivers/tee/Kconfig index e99d840c2511..73a147202e88 100644 --- drivers/tee/Kconfig +++ drivers/tee/Kconfig @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only # Generic Trusted Execution Environment Configuration -config TEE +menuconfig TEE tristate "Trusted Execution Environment support" depends on HAVE_ARM_SMCCC || COMPILE_TEST || CPU_SUP_AMD select CRYPTO @@ -13,10 +13,7 @@ config TEE if TEE -menu "TEE drivers" - source "drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig" source "drivers/tee/amdtee/Kconfig" -endmenu endif -- 2.34.1

4 years, 7 months

3
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[PATCH] optee: Use bitmap_free() to free bitmap

by Christophe JAILLET

kfree() and bitmap_free() are the same. But using the latter is more consistent when freeing memory allocated with bitmap_zalloc(). Signed-off-by: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet(a)wanadoo.fr> --- drivers/tee/optee/notif.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/notif.c b/drivers/tee/optee/notif.c index a28fa03dcd0e..05212842b0a5 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/notif.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/notif.c @@ -121,5 +121,5 @@ int optee_notif_init(struct optee *optee, u_int max_key) void optee_notif_uninit(struct optee *optee) { - kfree(optee->notif.bitmap); + bitmap_free(optee->notif.bitmap); } -- 2.32.0

4 years, 7 months

3
2
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[PATCH v3 0/2] CAAM Driver: re-factor and set proper JR status

by Andrey Zhizhikin

This V3 series covers points uncovered during the review of the previous series, one major point being that register readout should not be used for dynamic JR availability check due to its unreliability. Instead, JR should have a proper status set in FDT which indicates the availability of the ring in NS-World. This status is aligned with what BootROM code configures, and can be modified by all actors in the boot chain. Therefore, patch in V2 series that was handling the dynamic JR availability check is dropped in this series and replaced by the patch which sets proper DT status for JR nodes. Andrey Zhizhikin (2): crypto: caam - convert to use capabilities arm64: dts: imx8m: define proper status for caam jr arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mm.dtsi | 4 + arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mn.dtsi | 4 + arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mp.dtsi | 4 + arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8mq.dtsi | 4 + drivers/crypto/caam/caamalg_qi.c | 2 +- drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c | 115 ++++++++++++++-------- drivers/crypto/caam/intern.h | 20 ++-- drivers/crypto/caam/jr.c | 19 +++- drivers/crypto/caam/regs.h | 2 - 9 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) base-commit: 04fe99a8d936d46a310ca61b8b63dc270962bf01 -- 2.25.1

4 years, 7 months

6
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[GIT PULL] TEE and OP-TEE fixes for v5.16

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull these TEE subsystem and OP-TEE driver fixes which by coincident all are concerning memory shared with secure world. There's one in particular nasty race fixed when a tee_shm is about to be teared down. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit d58071a8a76d779eedab38033ae4c821c30295a5: Linux 5.16-rc3 (2021-11-28 14:09:19 -0800) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/fixes-for-v5.16 for you to fetch changes up to 6add87fdae9bcb1d20b4503df5bd02ce5246cc8b: optee: Suppress false positive kmemleak report in optee_handle_rpc() (2021-12-16 15:32:48 +0100) ---------------------------------------------------------------- TEE and OP-TEE fixes for v5.16 - Fixes a race when a tee_shm reaches reference count 0 and is about to be teared down - Fixes an incorrect page free bug in an error path of the OP-TEE shared memory pool handling - Suppresses a false positive kmemleak report when allocating driver private shared memory buffers for OP-TEE ---------------------------------------------------------------- Jens Wiklander (1): tee: handle lookup of shm with reference count 0 Sumit Garg (1): tee: optee: Fix incorrect page free bug Xiaolei Wang (1): optee: Suppress false positive kmemleak report in optee_handle_rpc() drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 6 +- drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 2 + drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 174 +++++++++++++++++--------------------------- include/linux/tee_drv.h | 4 +- 4 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)

4 years, 8 months

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[PATCH v2] tee: handle lookup of shm with reference count 0

by Jens Wiklander

Since the tee subsystem does not keep a strong reference to its idle shared memory buffers, it races with other threads that try to destroy a shared memory through a close of its dma-buf fd or by unmapping the memory. In tee_shm_get_from_id() when a lookup in teedev->idr has been successful, it is possible that the tee_shm is in the dma-buf teardown path, but that path is blocked by the teedev mutex. Since we don't have an API to tell if the tee_shm is in the dma-buf teardown path or not we must find another way of detecting this condition. Fix this by doing the reference counting directly on the tee_shm using a new refcount_t refcount field. dma-buf is replaced by using anon_inode_getfd() instead, this separates the life-cycle of the underlying file from the tee_shm. tee_shm_put() is updated to hold the mutex when decreasing the refcount to 0 and then remove the tee_shm from teedev->idr before releasing the mutex. This means that the tee_shm can never be found unless it has a refcount larger than 0. Fixes: 967c9cca2cc5 ("tee: generic TEE subsystem") Cc: stable(a)vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Lars Persson <larper(a)axis.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org> Reported-by: Patrik Lantz <patrik.lantz(a)axis.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> --- v1->v2 * fix copyright years in drivers/tee/tee_shm.c * update kerneldoc comment for struct tee_shm with the reference counter drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 174 +++++++++++++++------------------------- include/linux/tee_drv.h | 4 +- 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c index 8a8deb95e918..499fccba3d74 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_shm.c @@ -1,20 +1,17 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* - * Copyright (c) 2015-2016, Linaro Limited + * Copyright (c) 2015-2017, 2019-2021 Linaro Limited */ +#include <linux/anon_inodes.h> #include <linux/device.h> -#include <linux/dma-buf.h> -#include <linux/fdtable.h> #include <linux/idr.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/tee_drv.h> #include <linux/uio.h> -#include <linux/module.h> #include "tee_private.h" -MODULE_IMPORT_NS(DMA_BUF); - static void release_registered_pages(struct tee_shm *shm) { if (shm->pages) { @@ -31,16 +28,8 @@ static void release_registered_pages(struct tee_shm *shm) } } -static void tee_shm_release(struct tee_shm *shm) +static void tee_shm_release(struct tee_device *teedev, struct tee_shm *shm) { - struct tee_device *teedev = shm->ctx->teedev; - - if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) { - mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex); - idr_remove(&teedev->idr, shm->id); - mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex); - } - if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_POOL) { struct tee_shm_pool_mgr *poolm; @@ -67,45 +56,6 @@ static void tee_shm_release(struct tee_shm *shm) tee_device_put(teedev); } -static struct sg_table *tee_shm_op_map_dma_buf(struct dma_buf_attachment - *attach, enum dma_data_direction dir) -{ - return NULL; -} - -static void tee_shm_op_unmap_dma_buf(struct dma_buf_attachment *attach, - struct sg_table *table, - enum dma_data_direction dir) -{ -} - -static void tee_shm_op_release(struct dma_buf *dmabuf) -{ - struct tee_shm *shm = dmabuf->priv; - - tee_shm_release(shm); -} - -static int tee_shm_op_mmap(struct dma_buf *dmabuf, struct vm_area_struct *vma) -{ - struct tee_shm *shm = dmabuf->priv; - size_t size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; - - /* Refuse sharing shared memory provided by application */ - if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) - return -EINVAL; - - return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, shm->paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, - size, vma->vm_page_prot); -} - -static const struct dma_buf_ops tee_shm_dma_buf_ops = { - .map_dma_buf = tee_shm_op_map_dma_buf, - .unmap_dma_buf = tee_shm_op_unmap_dma_buf, - .release = tee_shm_op_release, - .mmap = tee_shm_op_mmap, -}; - struct tee_shm *tee_shm_alloc(struct tee_context *ctx, size_t size, u32 flags) { struct tee_device *teedev = ctx->teedev; @@ -140,6 +90,7 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_alloc(struct tee_context *ctx, size_t size, u32 flags) goto err_dev_put; } + refcount_set(&shm->refcount, 1); shm->flags = flags | TEE_SHM_POOL; shm->ctx = ctx; if (flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) @@ -153,10 +104,7 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_alloc(struct tee_context *ctx, size_t size, u32 flags) goto err_kfree; } - if (flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) { - DEFINE_DMA_BUF_EXPORT_INFO(exp_info); - mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex); shm->id = idr_alloc(&teedev->idr, shm, 1, 0, GFP_KERNEL); mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex); @@ -164,28 +112,11 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_alloc(struct tee_context *ctx, size_t size, u32 flags) ret = ERR_PTR(shm->id); goto err_pool_free; } - - exp_info.ops = &tee_shm_dma_buf_ops; - exp_info.size = shm->size; - exp_info.flags = O_RDWR; - exp_info.priv = shm; - - shm->dmabuf = dma_buf_export(&exp_info); - if (IS_ERR(shm->dmabuf)) { - ret = ERR_CAST(shm->dmabuf); - goto err_rem; - } } teedev_ctx_get(ctx); return shm; -err_rem: - if (flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) { - mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex); - idr_remove(&teedev->idr, shm->id); - mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex); - } err_pool_free: poolm->ops->free(poolm, shm); err_kfree: @@ -246,6 +177,7 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, goto err; } + refcount_set(&shm->refcount, 1); shm->flags = flags | TEE_SHM_REGISTER; shm->ctx = ctx; shm->id = -1; @@ -306,22 +238,6 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, goto err; } - if (flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) { - DEFINE_DMA_BUF_EXPORT_INFO(exp_info); - - exp_info.ops = &tee_shm_dma_buf_ops; - exp_info.size = shm->size; - exp_info.flags = O_RDWR; - exp_info.priv = shm; - - shm->dmabuf = dma_buf_export(&exp_info); - if (IS_ERR(shm->dmabuf)) { - ret = ERR_CAST(shm->dmabuf); - teedev->desc->ops->shm_unregister(ctx, shm); - goto err; - } - } - return shm; err: if (shm) { @@ -339,6 +255,35 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_register(struct tee_context *ctx, unsigned long addr, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_shm_register); +static int tee_shm_fop_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) +{ + tee_shm_put(filp->private_data); + return 0; +} + +static int tee_shm_fop_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + struct tee_shm *shm = filp->private_data; + size_t size = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start; + + /* Refuse sharing shared memory provided by application */ + if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_USER_MAPPED) + return -EINVAL; + + /* check for overflowing the buffer's size */ + if (vma->vm_pgoff + vma_pages(vma) > shm->size >> PAGE_SHIFT) + return -EINVAL; + + return remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, shm->paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, + size, vma->vm_page_prot); +} + +static const struct file_operations tee_shm_fops = { + .owner = THIS_MODULE, + .release = tee_shm_fop_release, + .mmap = tee_shm_fop_mmap, +}; + /** * tee_shm_get_fd() - Increase reference count and return file descriptor * @shm: Shared memory handle @@ -351,10 +296,11 @@ int tee_shm_get_fd(struct tee_shm *shm) if (!(shm->flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF)) return -EINVAL; - get_dma_buf(shm->dmabuf); - fd = dma_buf_fd(shm->dmabuf, O_CLOEXEC); + /* matched by tee_shm_put() in tee_shm_op_release() */ + refcount_inc(&shm->refcount); + fd = anon_inode_getfd("tee_shm", &tee_shm_fops, shm, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) - dma_buf_put(shm->dmabuf); + tee_shm_put(shm); return fd; } @@ -364,17 +310,7 @@ int tee_shm_get_fd(struct tee_shm *shm) */ void tee_shm_free(struct tee_shm *shm) { - /* - * dma_buf_put() decreases the dmabuf reference counter and will - * call tee_shm_release() when the last reference is gone. - * - * In the case of driver private memory we call tee_shm_release - * directly instead as it doesn't have a reference counter. - */ - if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) - dma_buf_put(shm->dmabuf); - else - tee_shm_release(shm); + tee_shm_put(shm); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_shm_free); @@ -481,10 +417,15 @@ struct tee_shm *tee_shm_get_from_id(struct tee_context *ctx, int id) teedev = ctx->teedev; mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex); shm = idr_find(&teedev->idr, id); + /* + * If the tee_shm was found in the IDR it must have a refcount + * larger than 0 due to the guarantee in tee_shm_put() below. So + * it's safe to use refcount_inc(). + */ if (!shm || shm->ctx != ctx) shm = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); - else if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) - get_dma_buf(shm->dmabuf); + else + refcount_inc(&shm->refcount); mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex); return shm; } @@ -496,7 +437,24 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_shm_get_from_id); */ void tee_shm_put(struct tee_shm *shm) { - if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) - dma_buf_put(shm->dmabuf); + struct tee_device *teedev = shm->ctx->teedev; + bool do_release = false; + + mutex_lock(&teedev->mutex); + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&shm->refcount)) { + /* + * refcount has reached 0, we must now remove it from the + * IDR before releasing the mutex. This will guarantee that + * the refcount_inc() in tee_shm_get_from_id() never starts + * from 0. + */ + if (shm->flags & TEE_SHM_DMA_BUF) + idr_remove(&teedev->idr, shm->id); + do_release = true; + } + mutex_unlock(&teedev->mutex); + + if (do_release) + tee_shm_release(teedev, shm); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_shm_put); diff --git a/include/linux/tee_drv.h b/include/linux/tee_drv.h index a1f03461369b..cf5999626e28 100644 --- a/include/linux/tee_drv.h +++ b/include/linux/tee_drv.h @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, * @offset: offset of buffer in user space * @pages: locked pages from userspace * @num_pages: number of locked pages - * @dmabuf: dmabuf used to for exporting to user space + * @refcount: reference counter * @flags: defined by TEE_SHM_* in tee_drv.h * @id: unique id of a shared memory object on this device, shared * with user space @@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ struct tee_shm { unsigned int offset; struct page **pages; size_t num_pages; - struct dma_buf *dmabuf; + refcount_t refcount; u32 flags; int id; u64 sec_world_id; -- 2.31.1

4 years, 8 months

2
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[PATCH] optee: Suppress false positive kmemleak report in optee_handle_rpc()

by Xiaolei Wang

We observed the following kmemleak report: unreferenced object 0xffff000007904500 (size 128): comm "swapper/0", pid 1, jiffies 4294892671 (age 44.036s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 47 90 07 00 00 ff ff 60 00 c0 ff 00 00 00 00 .G......`....... 60 00 80 13 00 80 ff ff a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 `............... backtrace: [<000000004c12b1c7>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1ac/0x2f4 [<000000005d23eb4f>] tee_shm_alloc+0x78/0x230 [<00000000794dd22c>] optee_handle_rpc+0x60/0x6f0 [<00000000d9f7c52d>] optee_do_call_with_arg+0x17c/0x1dc [<00000000c35884da>] optee_open_session+0x128/0x1ec [<000000001748f2ff>] tee_client_open_session+0x28/0x40 [<00000000aecb5389>] optee_enumerate_devices+0x84/0x2a0 [<000000003df18bf1>] optee_probe+0x674/0x6cc [<000000003a4a534a>] platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xb0 [<000000000c51ce7d>] really_probe+0xe4/0x4d0 [<000000002f04c865>] driver_probe_device+0x58/0xc0 [<00000000b485397d>] device_driver_attach+0xc0/0xd0 [<00000000c835f0df>] __driver_attach+0x84/0x124 [<000000008e5a429c>] bus_for_each_dev+0x70/0xc0 [<000000001735e8a8>] driver_attach+0x24/0x30 [<000000006d94b04f>] bus_add_driver+0x104/0x1ec This is not a memory leak because we pass the share memory pointer to secure world and would get it from secure world before releasing it. Signed-off-by: Xiaolei Wang <xiaolei.wang(a)windriver.com> --- drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index 6196d7c3888f..cf2e3293567d 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #include "optee_private.h" #include "optee_smc.h" #include "optee_rpc_cmd.h" +#include <linux/kmemleak.h> #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS #include "optee_trace.h" @@ -783,6 +784,7 @@ static void optee_handle_rpc(struct tee_context *ctx, param->a4 = 0; param->a5 = 0; } + kmemleak_not_leak(shm); break; case OPTEE_SMC_RPC_FUNC_FREE: shm = reg_pair_to_ptr(param->a1, param->a2); -- 2.25.1

4 years, 8 months

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