- OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: Linaro OP-TEE Contributions meeting April 2021

by Elvira Khabirova

On Mon, 19 Apr 2021 12:30:51 +0000 Joakim Bech via OP-TEE <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi, > > LOC monthly meeting is planned to take place Thursday April 29th(a)17.00 > (UTC+2). > > First, note that we have pushed the meeting forward one hour. If you > subscribe to the meeting via the TrustedFirmware calendar, then your invite > hopefully should've been updated (it could be worth cross checking). > > This month we will have Achin Gupta from Arm giving us an update regarding > the evolution of FF-A and how that could work together with virtualization. > > Usually there is some time left over for other discussions. So if you > have anything you'd like to talk about, then please let me know by replying > to this email thread. We at OMP would like to discuss GLOBEX - the REE/TEE synchronization mechanism that we've proposed at https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/4539 . It allows for sharing access to HW resources - something that came up on the last contributors meeting. We would like to present the design and hear your thoughts about it. > Related to that, Linaro arranged an "OP-TEE readiness > for safety" workshop last week. We're looking at all kinds of things > related to that right now. But this is also something that we could touch > in the LOC meeting. How would that affect upstream work? What code changes > could we expect etc? Any expertise out there who would be interested in > collaborating? > > OP-TEE 3.13.0 is planned to be released 2012-04-30, so in case you have any > questions related to that, then the LOC meeting would be a good opportunity > to ask. > > Meeting details: > --------------- > Date/time: Thursday April 29th(a)17.00 (UTC+2) > https://everytimezone.com/s/c32cdcc3 > Connection details: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ > Meeting notes: http://bit.ly/loc-notes > Project page: https://www.linaro.org/projects#trusted-substrate_TS > > Regards, > Joakim on behalf of the Linaro OP-TEE team

3 years, 7 months

2
1
0 0

Preparing for OP-TEE 3.13.0

by Ruchika Gupta

[BCC all OP-TEE maintainers] Hi OP-TEE maintainers & contributors, OP-TEE v3.13.0 is scheduled to be released at 2021-04-30. So, now is a good time to start testing the master branch on the various platforms and report/fix any bugs. The GitHub pull request for collecting Tested-by tags or any other comments is https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/4552. As usual, we will create a release candidate tag one week before the release date for final testing. In addition to that you can find some additional information related to releases here: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/releases.html Regards, Ruchika

3 years, 7 months

1
1
0 0

[PATCH v9 0/4] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support

by Sumit Garg

Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device. This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based early TA which is already merged in upstream [1]. [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/f86ab8e7e0de869dfa25ca05a37ee070d… Changes in v9: 1. Rebased to latest tpmdd/master. 2. Defined pr_fmt() and removed redundant tags. 3. Patch #2: incorporated misc. comments. 4. Patch #3: incorporated doc changes from Elaine and misc. comments from Randy. 5. Patch #4: reverted to separate maintainer entry as per request from Jarkko. 6. Added Jarkko's Tested-by: tag on patch #2. Changes in v8: 1. Added static calls support instead of indirect calls. 2. Documented trusted keys source module parameter. 3. Refined patch #1 commit message discription. 4. Addressed misc. comments on patch #2. 5. Added myself as Trusted Keys co-maintainer instead. 6. Rebased to latest tpmdd master. Changes in v7: 1. Added a trusted.source module parameter in order to enforce user's choice in case a particular platform posses both TPM and TEE. 2. Refine commit description for patch #1. Changes in v6: 1. Revert back to dynamic detection of trust source. 2. Drop author mention from trusted_core.c and trusted_tpm1.c files. 3. Rebased to latest tpmdd/master. Changes in v5: 1. Drop dynamic detection of trust source and use compile time flags instead. 2. Rename trusted_common.c -> trusted_core.c. 3. Rename callback: cleanup() -> exit(). 4. Drop "tk" acronym. 5. Other misc. comments. 6. Added review tags for patch #3 and #4. Changes in v4: 1. Pushed independent TEE features separately: - Part of recent TEE PR: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/4/1062 2. Updated trusted-encrypted doc with TEE as a new trust source. 3. Rebased onto latest tpmdd/master. Changes in v3: 1. Update patch #2 to support registration of multiple kernel pages. 2. Incoporate dependency patch #4 in this patch-set: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11091435/ Changes in v2: 1. Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2. 2. Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3. 3. Switch to use generic trusted keys framework. Sumit Garg (4): KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 + .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 171 ++++++-- MAINTAINERS | 8 + include/keys/trusted-type.h | 53 +++ include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 16 + include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 29 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 358 +++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 317 +++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 366 ++++-------------- 10 files changed, 981 insertions(+), 351 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c -- 2.25.1

3 years, 7 months

3
20
0 0

[PATCH] optee: use export_uuid() to copy client UUID

by Jens Wiklander

Prior to this patch optee_open_session() was making assumptions about the internal format of uuid_t by casting a memory location in a parameter struct to uuid_t *. Fix this using export_uuid() to get a well defined binary representation and also add an octets field in struct optee_msg_param in order to avoid casting. Fixes: c5b4312bea5d ("tee: optee: Add support for session login client UUID generation") Suggested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 6 ++++-- drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 6 ++++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index 7a77e375b503..6b52f0c526ba 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -216,6 +216,7 @@ int optee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, struct optee_msg_arg *msg_arg; phys_addr_t msg_parg; struct optee_session *sess = NULL; + uuid_t client_uuid; /* +2 for the meta parameters added below */ shm = get_msg_arg(ctx, arg->num_params + 2, &msg_arg, &msg_parg); @@ -236,10 +237,11 @@ int optee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, memcpy(&msg_arg->params[0].u.value, arg->uuid, sizeof(arg->uuid)); msg_arg->params[1].u.value.c = arg->clnt_login; - rc = tee_session_calc_client_uuid((uuid_t *)&msg_arg->params[1].u.value, - arg->clnt_login, arg->clnt_uuid); + rc = tee_session_calc_client_uuid(&client_uuid, arg->clnt_login, + arg->clnt_uuid); if (rc) goto out; + export_uuid(msg_arg->params[1].u.octets, &client_uuid); rc = optee_to_msg_param(msg_arg->params + 2, arg->num_params, param); if (rc) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h index 81ff593ac4ec..e3d72d09c484 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ #include <linux/types.h> /* - * This file defines the OP-TEE message protocol used to communicate + * This file defines the OP-TEE message protocol (ABI) used to communicate * with an instance of OP-TEE running in secure world. * * This file is divided into two sections. @@ -144,9 +144,10 @@ struct optee_msg_param_value { * @tmem: parameter by temporary memory reference * @rmem: parameter by registered memory reference * @value: parameter by opaque value + * @octets: parameter by octet string * * @attr & OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_MASK indicates if tmem, rmem or value is used in - * the union. OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_* indicates value, + * the union. OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_* indicates value or octets, * OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_TMEM_* indicates @tmem and * OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_RMEM_* indicates @rmem, * OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_NONE indicates that none of the members are used. @@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct optee_msg_param { struct optee_msg_param_tmem tmem; struct optee_msg_param_rmem rmem; struct optee_msg_param_value value; + u8 octets[24]; } u; }; -- 2.25.1

3 years, 7 months

2
1
0 0

[PATCH v1 1/1] tee: optee: Provide special parameter field for UUID values

by Andy Shevchenko

Dereferencing something to uuid_t value is not good idea strictly speaking. Provide a special parameter field for UUID values and drop ugly casting. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko(a)linux.intel.com> --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 2 +- drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index 1f0a68381656..d50cff7a9406 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ int optee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, memcpy(&msg_arg->params[0].u.value, arg->uuid, sizeof(arg->uuid)); msg_arg->params[1].u.value.c = arg->clnt_login; - rc = tee_session_calc_client_uuid((uuid_t *)&msg_arg->params[1].u.value, + rc = tee_session_calc_client_uuid(&msg_arg->params[1].u.uuid, arg->clnt_login, arg->clnt_uuid); if (rc) goto out; diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h index 81ff593ac4ec..df095a974f3f 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ struct optee_msg_param_value { * @tmem: parameter by temporary memory reference * @rmem: parameter by registered memory reference * @value: parameter by opaque value + * @uuid: parameter by UUID * * @attr & OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_MASK indicates if tmem, rmem or value is used in * the union. OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_* indicates value, @@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct optee_msg_param { struct optee_msg_param_tmem tmem; struct optee_msg_param_rmem rmem; struct optee_msg_param_value value; + uuid_t uuid; } u; }; -- 2.30.2

3 years, 7 months

3
6
0 0

Linaro OP-TEE Contributions meeting April 2021

by Joakim Bech

Hi, LOC monthly meeting is planned to take place Thursday April 29th(a)17.00 (UTC+2). First, note that we have pushed the meeting forward one hour. If you subscribe to the meeting via the TrustedFirmware calendar, then your invite hopefully should've been updated (it could be worth cross checking). This month we will have Achin Gupta from Arm giving us an update regarding the evolution of FF-A and how that could work together with virtualization. Usually there is some time left over for other discussions. So if you have anything you'd like to talk about, then please let me know by replying to this email thread. Related to that, Linaro arranged an "OP-TEE readiness for safety" workshop last week. We're looking at all kinds of things related to that right now. But this is also something that we could touch in the LOC meeting. How would that affect upstream work? What code changes could we expect etc? Any expertise out there who would be interested in collaborating? OP-TEE 3.13.0 is planned to be released 2012-04-30, so in case you have any questions related to that, then the LOC meeting would be a good opportunity to ask. Meeting details: --------------- Date/time: Thursday April 29th(a)17.00 (UTC+2) https://everytimezone.com/s/c32cdcc3 Connection details: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/ Meeting notes: http://bit.ly/loc-notes Project page: https://www.linaro.org/projects#trusted-substrate_TS Regards, Joakim on behalf of the Linaro OP-TEE team

3 years, 7 months

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v2] tee: amdtee: unload TA only when its refcount becomes 0

by Rijo Thomas

Same Trusted Application (TA) can be loaded in multiple TEE contexts. If it is a single instance TA, the TA should not get unloaded from AMD Secure Processor, while it is still in use in another TEE context. Therefore reference count TA and unload it when the count becomes zero. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Reviewed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> --- v2: * Unload TA if get_ta_refcount() fails drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h | 13 ++++ drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c | 94 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 15 +++-- 3 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h b/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h index 337c8d82f74e..6d0f7062bb87 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #define TEEC_SUCCESS 0x00000000 #define TEEC_ERROR_GENERIC 0xFFFF0000 #define TEEC_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS 0xFFFF0006 +#define TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY 0xFFFF000C #define TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION 0xFFFF000E #define TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS 0x00000002 @@ -93,6 +94,18 @@ struct amdtee_shm_data { u32 buf_id; }; +/** + * struct amdtee_ta_data - Keeps track of all TAs loaded in AMD Secure + * Processor + * @ta_handle: Handle to TA loaded in TEE + * @refcount: Reference count for the loaded TA + */ +struct amdtee_ta_data { + struct list_head list_node; + u32 ta_handle; + u32 refcount; +}; + #define LOWER_TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x0000FFFF /** diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c index 096dd4d92d39..06abaa518921 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c @@ -121,15 +121,69 @@ static int amd_params_to_tee_params(struct tee_param *tee, u32 count, return ret; } +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ta_refcount_mutex); +static struct list_head ta_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ta_list); + +static u32 get_ta_refcount(u32 ta_handle) +{ + struct amdtee_ta_data *ta_data; + u32 count = 0; + + /* Caller must hold a mutex */ + list_for_each_entry(ta_data, &ta_list, list_node) + if (ta_data->ta_handle == ta_handle) + return ++ta_data->refcount; + + ta_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*ta_data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (ta_data) { + ta_data->ta_handle = ta_handle; + ta_data->refcount = 1; + count = ta_data->refcount; + list_add(&ta_data->list_node, &ta_list); + } + + return count; +} + +static u32 put_ta_refcount(u32 ta_handle) +{ + struct amdtee_ta_data *ta_data; + u32 count = 0; + + /* Caller must hold a mutex */ + list_for_each_entry(ta_data, &ta_list, list_node) + if (ta_data->ta_handle == ta_handle) { + count = --ta_data->refcount; + if (count == 0) { + list_del(&ta_data->list_node); + kfree(ta_data); + break; + } + } + + return count; +} + int handle_unload_ta(u32 ta_handle) { struct tee_cmd_unload_ta cmd = {0}; - u32 status; + u32 status, count; int ret; if (!ta_handle) return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&ta_refcount_mutex); + + count = put_ta_refcount(ta_handle); + + if (count) { + pr_debug("unload ta: not unloading %u count %u\n", + ta_handle, count); + ret = -EBUSY; + goto unlock; + } + cmd.ta_handle = ta_handle; ret = psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA, (void *)&cmd, @@ -137,8 +191,12 @@ int handle_unload_ta(u32 ta_handle) if (!ret && status != 0) { pr_err("unload ta: status = 0x%x\n", status); ret = -EBUSY; + } else { + pr_debug("unloaded ta handle %u\n", ta_handle); } +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&ta_refcount_mutex); return ret; } @@ -340,7 +398,8 @@ int handle_open_session(struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg *arg, u32 *info, int handle_load_ta(void *data, u32 size, struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg *arg) { - struct tee_cmd_load_ta cmd = {0}; + struct tee_cmd_unload_ta unload_cmd = {0}; + struct tee_cmd_load_ta load_cmd = {0}; phys_addr_t blob; int ret; @@ -353,21 +412,36 @@ int handle_load_ta(void *data, u32 size, struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg *arg) return -EINVAL; } - cmd.hi_addr = upper_32_bits(blob); - cmd.low_addr = lower_32_bits(blob); - cmd.size = size; + load_cmd.hi_addr = upper_32_bits(blob); + load_cmd.low_addr = lower_32_bits(blob); + load_cmd.size = size; - ret = psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA, (void *)&cmd, - sizeof(cmd), &arg->ret); + mutex_lock(&ta_refcount_mutex); + + ret = psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA, (void *)&load_cmd, + sizeof(load_cmd), &arg->ret); if (ret) { arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION; - } else { - set_session_id(cmd.ta_handle, 0, &arg->session); + } else if (arg->ret == TEEC_SUCCESS) { + ret = get_ta_refcount(load_cmd.ta_handle); + if (!ret) { + arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; + arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + + /* Unload the TA on error */ + unload_cmd.ta_handle = load_cmd.ta_handle; + psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA, + (void *)&unload_cmd, + sizeof(unload_cmd), &ret); + } else { + set_session_id(load_cmd.ta_handle, 0, &arg->session); + } } + mutex_unlock(&ta_refcount_mutex); pr_debug("load TA: TA handle = 0x%x, RO = 0x%x, ret = 0x%x\n", - cmd.ta_handle, arg->ret_origin, arg->ret); + load_cmd.ta_handle, arg->ret_origin, arg->ret); return 0; } diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 8a6a8f30bb42..da6b88e80dc0 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -59,10 +59,9 @@ static void release_session(struct amdtee_session *sess) continue; handle_close_session(sess->ta_handle, sess->session_info[i]); + handle_unload_ta(sess->ta_handle); } - /* Unload Trusted Application once all sessions are closed */ - handle_unload_ta(sess->ta_handle); kfree(sess); } @@ -224,8 +223,6 @@ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - /* Unload the TA from TEE */ - handle_unload_ta(sess->ta_handle); mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); @@ -238,7 +235,7 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, { struct amdtee_context_data *ctxdata = ctx->data; struct amdtee_session *sess = NULL; - u32 session_info; + u32 session_info, ta_handle; size_t ta_size; int rc, i; void *ta; @@ -259,11 +256,14 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) goto out; + ta_handle = get_ta_handle(arg->session); + mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); sess = alloc_session(ctxdata, arg->session); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); if (!sess) { + handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (i >= TEE_NUM_SESSIONS) { pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); + handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -289,12 +290,13 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, spin_lock(&sess->lock); clear_bit(i, sess->sess_mask); spin_unlock(&sess->lock); + handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); goto out; } sess->session_info[i] = session_info; - set_session_id(sess->ta_handle, i, &arg->session); + set_session_id(ta_handle, i, &arg->session); out: free_pages((u64)ta, get_order(ta_size)); return rc; @@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) /* Close the session */ handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); + handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); -- 2.17.1

3 years, 7 months

3
6
0 0

[PATCH] tee: optee: fix build error caused by recent optee tracepoints feature

by Jisheng Zhang

If build kernel without "O=dir", below error will be seen: In file included from drivers/tee/optee/optee_trace.h:67, from drivers/tee/optee/call.c:18: ./include/trace/define_trace.h:95:42: fatal error: ./optee_trace.h: No such file or directory 95 | #include TRACE_INCLUDE(TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE) | ^ compilation terminated. Fix it by adding below line to Makefile: CFLAGS_call.o := -I$(src) Tested with and without "O=dir", both can build successfully. Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux(a)roeck-us.net> Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt(a)goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Jisheng Zhang <Jisheng.Zhang(a)synaptics.com> --- drivers/tee/optee/Makefile | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Makefile b/drivers/tee/optee/Makefile index 56263ae3b1d7..3aa33ea9e6a6 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Makefile +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Makefile @@ -6,3 +6,6 @@ optee-objs += rpc.o optee-objs += supp.o optee-objs += shm_pool.o optee-objs += device.o + +# for tracing framework to find optee_trace.h +CFLAGS_call.o := -I$(src) -- 2.31.0

3 years, 7 months

3
5
0 0

[PATCH] tee: amdtee: unload TA only when its refcount becomes 0

by Rijo Thomas

Same Trusted Application (TA) can be loaded in multiple TEE contexts. If it is a single instance TA, the TA should not get unloaded from AMD Secure Processor, while it is still in use in another TEE context. Therefore reference count TA and unload it when the count becomes zero. Fixes: 757cc3e9ff1d ("tee: add AMD-TEE driver") Reviewed-by: Devaraj Rangasamy <Devaraj.Rangasamy(a)amd.com> Signed-off-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas(a)amd.com> --- drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h | 13 +++++ drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c | 15 +++--- 3 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h b/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h index 337c8d82f74e..6d0f7062bb87 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/amdtee_private.h @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #define TEEC_SUCCESS 0x00000000 #define TEEC_ERROR_GENERIC 0xFFFF0000 #define TEEC_ERROR_BAD_PARAMETERS 0xFFFF0006 +#define TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY 0xFFFF000C #define TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION 0xFFFF000E #define TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS 0x00000002 @@ -93,6 +94,18 @@ struct amdtee_shm_data { u32 buf_id; }; +/** + * struct amdtee_ta_data - Keeps track of all TAs loaded in AMD Secure + * Processor + * @ta_handle: Handle to TA loaded in TEE + * @refcount: Reference count for the loaded TA + */ +struct amdtee_ta_data { + struct list_head list_node; + u32 ta_handle; + u32 refcount; +}; + #define LOWER_TWO_BYTE_MASK 0x0000FFFF /** diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c index 096dd4d92d39..e10601417ea3 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/call.c @@ -121,15 +121,69 @@ static int amd_params_to_tee_params(struct tee_param *tee, u32 count, return ret; } +static DEFINE_MUTEX(ta_refcount_mutex); +static struct list_head ta_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(ta_list); + +static u32 get_ta_refcount(u32 ta_handle) +{ + struct amdtee_ta_data *ta_data; + u32 count = 0; + + /* Caller must hold a mutex */ + list_for_each_entry(ta_data, &ta_list, list_node) + if (ta_data->ta_handle == ta_handle) + return ++ta_data->refcount; + + ta_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*ta_data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (ta_data) { + ta_data->ta_handle = ta_handle; + ta_data->refcount = 1; + count = ta_data->refcount; + list_add(&ta_data->list_node, &ta_list); + } + + return count; +} + +static u32 put_ta_refcount(u32 ta_handle) +{ + struct amdtee_ta_data *ta_data; + u32 count = 0; + + /* Caller must hold a mutex */ + list_for_each_entry(ta_data, &ta_list, list_node) + if (ta_data->ta_handle == ta_handle) { + count = --ta_data->refcount; + if (count == 0) { + list_del(&ta_data->list_node); + kfree(ta_data); + break; + } + } + + return count; +} + int handle_unload_ta(u32 ta_handle) { struct tee_cmd_unload_ta cmd = {0}; - u32 status; + u32 status, count; int ret; if (!ta_handle) return -EINVAL; + mutex_lock(&ta_refcount_mutex); + + count = put_ta_refcount(ta_handle); + + if (count) { + pr_debug("unload ta: not unloading %u count %u\n", + ta_handle, count); + ret = -EBUSY; + goto unlock; + } + cmd.ta_handle = ta_handle; ret = psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_UNLOAD_TA, (void *)&cmd, @@ -137,8 +191,12 @@ int handle_unload_ta(u32 ta_handle) if (!ret && status != 0) { pr_err("unload ta: status = 0x%x\n", status); ret = -EBUSY; + } else { + pr_debug("unloaded ta handle %u\n", ta_handle); } +unlock: + mutex_unlock(&ta_refcount_mutex); return ret; } @@ -357,14 +415,23 @@ int handle_load_ta(void *data, u32 size, struct tee_ioctl_open_session_arg *arg) cmd.low_addr = lower_32_bits(blob); cmd.size = size; + mutex_lock(&ta_refcount_mutex); + ret = psp_tee_process_cmd(TEE_CMD_ID_LOAD_TA, (void *)&cmd, sizeof(cmd), &arg->ret); if (ret) { arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_COMMUNICATION; - } else { - set_session_id(cmd.ta_handle, 0, &arg->session); + } else if (arg->ret == TEEC_SUCCESS) { + ret = get_ta_refcount(cmd.ta_handle); + if (!ret) { + arg->ret_origin = TEEC_ORIGIN_COMMS; + arg->ret = TEEC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; + } else { + set_session_id(cmd.ta_handle, 0, &arg->session); + } } + mutex_unlock(&ta_refcount_mutex); pr_debug("load TA: TA handle = 0x%x, RO = 0x%x, ret = 0x%x\n", cmd.ta_handle, arg->ret_origin, arg->ret); diff --git a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c index 8a6a8f30bb42..da6b88e80dc0 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/amdtee/core.c @@ -59,10 +59,9 @@ static void release_session(struct amdtee_session *sess) continue; handle_close_session(sess->ta_handle, sess->session_info[i]); + handle_unload_ta(sess->ta_handle); } - /* Unload Trusted Application once all sessions are closed */ - handle_unload_ta(sess->ta_handle); kfree(sess); } @@ -224,8 +223,6 @@ static void destroy_session(struct kref *ref) struct amdtee_session *sess = container_of(ref, struct amdtee_session, refcount); - /* Unload the TA from TEE */ - handle_unload_ta(sess->ta_handle); mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); list_del(&sess->list_node); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); @@ -238,7 +235,7 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, { struct amdtee_context_data *ctxdata = ctx->data; struct amdtee_session *sess = NULL; - u32 session_info; + u32 session_info, ta_handle; size_t ta_size; int rc, i; void *ta; @@ -259,11 +256,14 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (arg->ret != TEEC_SUCCESS) goto out; + ta_handle = get_ta_handle(arg->session); + mutex_lock(&session_list_mutex); sess = alloc_session(ctxdata, arg->session); mutex_unlock(&session_list_mutex); if (!sess) { + handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, if (i >= TEE_NUM_SESSIONS) { pr_err("reached maximum session count %d\n", TEE_NUM_SESSIONS); + handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; @@ -289,12 +290,13 @@ int amdtee_open_session(struct tee_context *ctx, spin_lock(&sess->lock); clear_bit(i, sess->sess_mask); spin_unlock(&sess->lock); + handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); goto out; } sess->session_info[i] = session_info; - set_session_id(sess->ta_handle, i, &arg->session); + set_session_id(ta_handle, i, &arg->session); out: free_pages((u64)ta, get_order(ta_size)); return rc; @@ -329,6 +331,7 @@ int amdtee_close_session(struct tee_context *ctx, u32 session) /* Close the session */ handle_close_session(ta_handle, session_info); + handle_unload_ta(ta_handle); kref_put(&sess->refcount, destroy_session); -- 2.17.1

3 years, 7 months

2
2
0 0

[GIT PULL] OP-TEE memref size check for v5.13

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this small patch for the OP-TEE driver to remove the invalid size check of outgoing memref parameters. This code path is only activated for a certain configuration of OP-TEE in secure world (CFG_CORE_DYN_SHM=n) so this problem isn't always visible. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15: Linux 5.12-rc2 (2021-03-05 17:33:41 -0800) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git/ tags/optee-memref-size-for-v5.13 for you to fetch changes up to c650b8dc7a7910eb25af0aac1720f778b29e679d: tee: optee: do not check memref size on return from Secure World (2021-03-30 10:44:50 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- OP-TEE skip check of returned memref size ---------------------------------------------------------------- Jerome Forissier (1): tee: optee: do not check memref size on return from Secure World drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 10 ---------- 1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)

3 years, 7 months

2
1
0 0

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

OP-TEE