Hi,
I'm pleased to announce that I've just completed the release work and made
OP-TEE version 4.5.0 available. The list of changes can be found in the
changelog [1]. A summary of this release will be published shortly. The
stable branch is available here [2] and the tested platforms for this
release are listed here [3].
Many thanks to everyone who has contributed in any form to this release.
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md
[2] https://github.com/OP-TEE/manifest/tree/4.5.0
[3]
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/0919de0f7c79ad35ad3c8ace5f823ad13…
--
Regards,
Joakim Bech
| Distinguished Engineer | Linaro |
| Mobile: +46 73 697 37 14 | Address: Scheelevägen 17, 223 63 Lund, Sweden |
[BCC all OP-TEE maintainers]
Hi OP-TEE maintainers & contributors,
OP-TEE v4.5.0 is scheduled to be released on 2025-01-17. So, now is
a good time to start testing the master branch on the various platforms
and report/fix any bugs.
The GitHub pull request for collecting Tested-by tags or any other
comments is https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/7211.
As usual, we will create a release candidate tag one week before the
release date for final testing (Friday this week, i.e., tomorrow).
In addition to that you can find some additional information related to
releases here: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/releases.html
--
Regards,
Joakim Bech
| Distinguished Engineer | Linaro |
| Mobile: +46 73 697 37 14 | Address: Scheelevägen 17, 223 63 Lund, Sweden |
Hello arm-soc maintainers,
Please pull this small patch fixing a version print in the optee driver.
Thanks,
Jens
The following changes since commit fac04efc5c793dccbd07e2d59af9f90b7fc0dca4:
Linux 6.13-rc2 (2024-12-08 14:03:39 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git/ tags/optee-for-v6.14
for you to fetch changes up to 1ff7d092dce0b2273dce4b8d33fa5856679dd25b:
optee: fix format string for printing optee build_id (2024-12-17 11:22:46 +0100)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fix format string for printing optee build_id
----------------------------------------------------------------
Sahil Malhotra (1):
optee: fix format string for printing optee build_id
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
This patch series introduces a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
driver for Qualcomm TEE (QTEE). QTEE enables Trusted Applications (TAs)
and services to run securely. It uses an object-based interface, where
each service is an object with sets of operations. Clients can invoke
these operations on objects, which can generate results, including other
objects. For example, an object can load a TA and return another object
that represents the loaded TA, allowing access to its services.
Kernel and userspace services are also available to QTEE through a
similar approach. QTEE makes callback requests that are converted into
object invocations. These objects can represent services within the
kernel or userspace process.
Note: This patch series focuses on QTEE objects and userspace services.
Linux already provides a TEE subsystem, which is described in [1]. The
tee subsystem provides a generic ioctl interface, TEE_IOC_INVOKE, which
can be used by userspace to talk to a TEE backend driver. We extend the
Linux TEE subsystem to understand object parameters and an ioctl call so
client can invoke objects in QTEE:
- TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_OBJREF_*
- TEE_IOC_OBJECT_INVOKE
The existing ioctl calls TEE_IOC_SUPPL_RECV and TEE_IOC_SUPPL_SEND are
used for invoking services in the userspace process by QTEE.
The TEE backend driver uses the QTEE Transport Message to communicate
with QTEE. Interactions through the object INVOKE interface are
translated into QTEE messages. Likewise, object invocations from QTEE
for userspace objects are converted into SEND/RECV ioctl calls to
supplicants.
The details of QTEE Transport Message to communicate with QTEE is
available in [PATCH 10/10] Documentation: tee: Add Qualcomm TEE driver.
This patch series has been tested for basic QTEE object invocations and
callback requests, including loading a TA and requesting services form
the TA. However, the test platform is currently being prepared for
upstream availability and will soon be accessible to the community for
further validation. I will share updates as the platform become
available.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/tee.txt
Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com>
---
Amirreza Zarrabi (10):
tee: allow a driver to allocate a tee_device without a pool
tee: add TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_MEMBUF
tee: add TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_OBJREF
firmware: qcom: scm: add support for object invocation
qcomtee: implement object invoke support
qcomtee: add primordial object
dt-bindings: arm: qcomtee: add QTEE driver devicetree binding for TEE subsystem
tee: add Qualcomm TEE driver
arm64: dts: qcom: sm8650: add support for QTEE
Documentation: tee: Add Qualcomm TEE driver
.../devicetree/bindings/arm/firmware/qcom,tee.yaml | 34 +
Documentation/tee/index.rst | 1 +
Documentation/tee/qtee.rst | 143 ++++
arch/arm64/boot/dts/qcom/sm8650.dtsi | 4 +
drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_scm.c | 60 ++
drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_scm.h | 7 +
drivers/tee/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/tee/qcomtee/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/tee/qcomtee/Makefile | 9 +
drivers/tee/qcomtee/async.c | 153 ++++
drivers/tee/qcomtee/call.c | 707 ++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/qcomtee/core.c | 942 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/qcomtee/primordial_obj.c | 63 ++
drivers/tee/qcomtee/qcom_scm.c | 36 +
drivers/tee/qcomtee/qcomtee_msg.h | 217 +++++
drivers/tee/qcomtee/qcomtee_private.h | 218 +++++
drivers/tee/qcomtee/release.c | 66 ++
drivers/tee/qcomtee/user_obj.c | 625 ++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 113 ++-
include/linux/firmware/qcom/qcom_scm.h | 9 +
include/linux/firmware/qcom/qcom_tee.h | 284 +++++++
include/linux/tee_core.h | 4 +
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 12 +
include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 54 +-
25 files changed, 3765 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: f486c8aa16b8172f63bddc70116a0c897a7f3f02
change-id: 20241202-qcom-tee-using-tee-ss-without-mem-obj-362c66340527
Best regards,
--
Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com>
There has been a recent change in OP-TEE to print 8 and 16 character
commit id for 32bit and 64bit architecture respectively.
In case if commit id is starting with 0 like 04d1c612ec7beaede073b8c
it is printing revision as below removing leading 0
"optee: revision 4.4 (4d1c612ec7beaed)"
Signed-off-by: Sahil Malhotra <sahil.malhotra(a)nxp.com>
---
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
index e9456e3e74cc..eb51dc18f32d 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c
@@ -1272,8 +1272,9 @@ static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn)
&res.smccc);
if (res.result.build_id)
- pr_info("revision %lu.%lu (%08lx)", res.result.major,
- res.result.minor, res.result.build_id);
+ pr_info("revision %lu.%lu (%0*lx)", res.result.major,
+ res.result.minor, (int)sizeof(res.result.build_id) * 2,
+ res.result.build_id);
else
pr_info("revision %lu.%lu", res.result.major, res.result.minor);
}
--
2.34.1
Hi, not sure if this is a good place to ask, however I see that OPTEE
developers are highly involved in this topic so I decided to ask.
Short background - we've been working on an embedded system based on
Layerscape 1028A SoC. On this platform we've been using TFA (bl2, el3
runtime services), OPTEE as BL32 and u-boot as BL33. In the previous,
older platforms we usually stored u-boot's environment in let's say
"traditional way", we just stored the env on some offset of the eMMC
device, however I see that on this particular, new platform there are
some better possibilities, like combining OPTEE, EDKII StandaloneMM
and u-boot efivars implementation to store EFI variables in RPMB on
eMMC which seems to be more secure, UEFI compliant way. The aspect I'm
unsure of is - does it make sense to utilize these capabilities if we
want to only use it to store some u-boot's writable env variables and
not utilize features like UEFI SecureBoot (at least for now, it may
change it in the future)?
I would be grateful for some advice.
Best regards
Patryk
Hi All,
We are currently working on standard PKCS#11 TA and I'm new to this topic
(PKCS11, OP-TEE,TA).
Please go through and share your inputs on the following queries.
-> slot
How do we know how many slots are supported in my device?
Is it based on the physical interface of the device or how do we
find the list of available slots without pkcs11-tool?
Please share the details with an example.
-> token
Is token is a kind of virtual to hold different objects(keys, cert
and so on).
Can one token have private, public, leaf cert, intermediate ca
cert, root ca cart and so on or any limitations on the number of objects in
a token?
Can we have each token be specific to the object ( for example ,
token1 will have cert, token 2 will have key, token 3 will have seed/client
cert )?
How many tokens maximum support on each slot?
-> As part of pkcs11-tool, we have been using SO-PIN, user PIN,
token/label name which are more specific to security.
If the normal world/REE is compromised, any sensitive data it holds,
including PINs and tokens, could be exposed.
Do we have any access control mechanism to avoid this security issue
( in PKCS11 TA, OP-TEE context).
Thanks,
Murali.S
Hi,
This patch set allocates the restricted DMA-bufs via the TEE subsystem.
This a big update compared to the previous patch set [1].
The TEE subsystem handles the DMA-buf allocations since it is the TEE
(OP-TEE, AMD-TEE, TS-TEE, or perhaps a future QTEE) which sets up the
restrictions for the memory used for the DMA-bufs.
I've added a new IOCTL, TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC, to allocate the restricted
DMA-bufs. This IOCTL reaches the backend TEE driver, allowing it to choose
how to allocate the restricted physical memory.
TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC takes in addition to a size and flags parameters also
a use-case parameter. This is used by the backend TEE driver to decide on
allocation policy and which devices should be able to access the memory.
Three use-cases (Secure Video Playback, Trusted UI, and Secure Video
Recording) has been identified so far to serve as examples of what can be
expected. More use-cases can be added in userspace ABI, but it's up to the
backend TEE drivers to provide the implementation.
Each use-case has it's own restricted memory pool since different use-cases
requires isolation from different parts of the system. A restricted memory
pool can be based on a static carveout instantiated while probing the TEE
backend driver, or dynamically allocated from CMA and made restricted as
needed by the TEE.
This can be tested on QEMU with the following steps:
repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m qemu_v8.xml \
-b prototype/sdp-v3
repo sync -j8
cd build
make toolchains -j$(nproc)
make SPMC_AT_EL=1 all -j$(nproc)
make SPMC_AT_EL=1 run-only
# login and at the prompt:
xtest --sdp-basic
The SPMC_AT_EL=1 parameter configures the build with FF-A and an SPMC at
S-EL1 inside OP-TEE. The parameter can be changed into SPMC_AT_EL=n to test
without FF-A using the original SMC ABI instead. Please remember to do
%rm -rf ../trusted-firmware-a/build/qemu
for TF-A to be rebuilt properly using the new configuration.
https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/prerequisites.html
list dependencies needed to build the above.
The tests are pretty basic, mostly checking that a Trusted Application in
the secure world can access and manipulate the memory. There are also some
negative tests for out of bounds buffers etc.
Thanks,
Jens
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241015101716.740829-1-jens.wiklander@linaro.…
Changes since the V2 RFC:
* Based on v6.12
* Replaced the flags for SVP and Trusted UID memory with a u32 field with
unique id for each use case
* Added dynamic allocation of restricted memory pools
* Added OP-TEE ABI both with and without FF-A for dynamic restricted memory
* Added support for FF-A with FFA_LEND
Changes since the V1 RFC:
* Based on v6.11
* Complete rewrite, replacing the restricted heap with TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC
Changes since Olivier's post [2]:
* Based on Yong Wu's post [1] where much of dma-buf handling is done in
the generic restricted heap
* Simplifications and cleanup
* New commit message for "dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro restricted dmabuf heap
support"
* Replaced the word "secure" with "restricted" where applicable
Jens Wiklander (4):
tee: add restricted memory allocation
optee: account for direction while converting parameters
optee: sync secure world ABI headers
optee: support restricted memory allocation
drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/tee/optee/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 10 +-
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 1 +
drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 178 +++++++++++++-
drivers/tee/optee/optee_ffa.h | 27 ++-
drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 65 ++++-
drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 75 ++++--
drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 71 +++++-
drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 31 ++-
drivers/tee/optee/rstmem.c | 380 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 214 +++++++++++++++--
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 37 ++-
drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 2 +
drivers/tee/tee_rstmem.c | 201 ++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 2 +
drivers/tee/tee_shm_pool.c | 69 +++++-
include/linux/tee_core.h | 15 ++
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 4 +-
include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 37 ++-
20 files changed, 1344 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/rstmem.c
create mode 100644 drivers/tee/tee_rstmem.c
--
2.43.0
The TEE subsystem manages three main structures: tee_device, the device
that represents the TEE; tee_context, the context that represents the
TEE client; and tee_shm, which represents the shared memory with the
TEE. When a tee_device is opened, it creates a tee_context instance. The
tee_shm is created for the tee_device when allocating shared memory with
the TEE but is linked to a context. The lifespan of the device is
determined by the presence of context and shared memory, while the
lifespan of a context depends on the client closing the device.
This behavior has been modified, making the lifespan of context
dependent on shared memory. If a client closes the device but doesn’t
release the shared memory, the linked context will remain active,
preventing the release callback from freeing resources in the TEE. This
could lead to a deadlock if the TEE holds a reference to the shared
memory and relies on the release callback to remove the reference.
In this pachset we introduce orphan tee_shm and default tee_context.
When a shared memory becomes orphan because its associated context is
released, it no longer has a tee_context. One method to differentiate
between orphaned and regular shared memory is to use NULL as the linked
context. However, this can cause issues if releasing the shared memory
triggers additional calls, like those to the supplicant, which require a
valid context. Instead of using NULL, an internal tee_context for the
driver can be used.
The driver relies on tee_device_unregister which is a blocking calls
waiting for all context to be released and all shared memory to be freed
before unloading the driver. This means that all contexts, including
internal context, should be closed before tee_device_unregister can
proceed. This can introduce a short window where there is no valid
context to use when releasing the shared memory. The default tee_context
has lifespan similar to the device.
For an orphan tee_shm, default context is used.
This has not been tested. Looking for feedback if this is a reasonable
change.
Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com>
---
Amirreza Zarrabi (3):
tee: revert removal of redundant teedev in struct tee_shm
tee: revert removal of linked list of struct tee_shm
tee: introduce orphan tee_shm and default context
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 2 +-
drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 2 +-
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 2 +-
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 3 --
drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 41 ++++++++++++----------
include/linux/tee_core.h | 15 ++++++++
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 13 ++++---
8 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: ae58226b89ac0cffa05ba7357733776542e40216
change-id: 20241120-fix-tee_shm-refcount-upstream-c671b89fbe67
Best regards,
--
Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com>
Main updates from version V12[1]:
Fix warning build by fixing the inline declaration in
remoteproc_tee.h (when CONFIG_REMOTEPROC_TEE is not set).
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202410262040.PWNrKv2Q-lkp@intel.com/
Main updates from version V11[2]:
- rename structures, functions, and variables from "tee_rproc_xxx" to
"rproc_tee_xxx",
- update rproc_tee_register to return an error instead of
"struct rproc_tee *" pointer
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20241025205924.2087768-1-arnaud.pouliquen@foss…
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZxZ4cBilIlpf3IPw@p14s/T/
Tested-on: commit 42f7652d3eb5 ("Linux 6.12-rc4")
Description of the feature:
--------------------------
This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to
communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating
and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context.
1) Principle:
The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE
trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE).
The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle:
- authenticating and loading firmware images,
- isolating and securing the remote processor memories,
- supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33),
- managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE.
2) Format of the signed image:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc…
3) OP-TEE trusted application API:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem…
4) OP-TEE signature script
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py
Example of usage:
sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem
5) Impact on User space Application
No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image
instead of the ELF image.
For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here
(note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation
and the integration in OP-TEE).
https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds
Arnaud Pouliquen (7):
remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper
remoteproc: Add TEE support
remoteproc: core: Refactor resource table cleanup into
rproc_release_fw
remoteproc: Introduce release_fw optional operation
dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support
remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and
release
remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware
.../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +-
drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 72 ++-
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 510 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 139 +++--
include/linux/remoteproc.h | 8 +
include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 105 ++++
8 files changed, 848 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h
base-commit: 42f7652d3eb527d03665b09edac47f85fb600924
--
2.25.1
Hello,
I've been currently looking at the possibility of storing u-boot
environment variables in RPMB and I've stumbled upon this article:
https://www.linaro.org/blog/protected-uefi-variables-with-u-boot/
which briefly describes what needs to be done in order to achieve
this.
Unfortunately there is no comment section in this article so I cannot
ask the author so I decided to try here.
The article mentions that for that purpose, my board should support
dynamic shared memory, therefore the OP-TEE port for my board should
register that memory in platform main using the "register_ddr"
function. For my platform (ls1028ardb) I do not see anything like
this, thus I assume it's not supported. However, I'm wondering - is it
my platform's hardware limitation or missing software implementation?
Making this question more generic - does dynamic shared memory depend
on hardware, meaning that there is no way to register dynamic shared
memory if hardware does not support some particular features?
I would be grateful for some hints.
Best regards
Patryk
Hi,
I have a doubt about the correct priority that tee-supplicant should have
in the system.
In detail, we have 2 user-space applications (user-pkcs11-0, user-pkcs11-1)
that use the same PKCS11 services from OPTEE-OS (access to RPDB partition
for private key).
For project reason we use the following nice priority values:
user-pkcs11-0, nice=-5
user-pkcs11-1, nice=-10
....
tee-supplcant, nice=0
...
a lot of other services with nice=0
...
Unfortunately, in some strange case when CPU is overload (booting)....
appear a strange problem in user-pkcs11-1: occasionally the time for the
certificate's signature check explode to 400ms.
Due to the problem to replicate this defect, I have try to investigate in
theory if could be verify a starvation/race-condition between
tee-supplicant and user-pkcs11-1 or other-services.
In this scenario, what is the correct priority value that tee-supplicant
should have?
I suspect that we should change the priority of tee-supplcant =
user-pkcs11-1 = -10
Is it make sense for you, or maybe better to search the problem from an
other side :-) ?
Thanks in advance for your attention
BR
Matteo Facchinetti
Hi all,
I'm looking for any advice/clue to help me to progress on enabling
TEE-base EFI Runtime Variable Service on TI a j784s4 platforms.
I basically followed the steps described in u-boot documentation [1],
I enabled some debugging messages but I think I'm at the point that
the problem might be in the StandaloneMM application, and I'm not sure
how to debug it.
What I see is that when I run the tee-supplicant daemon, it looks like
the tee_client_open_session() call loops forever and the tee_stmm_efi
driver never ends to probe.
With debug enabled I got the following messages.
# tee-supplicant
D/TC:? 0 tee_ta_init_session_with_context:557 Re-open trusted service
7011a688-ddde-4053-a5a9-7b3c4ddf13b8
D/TC:? 0 load_stmm:297 stmm load address 0x40004000
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:859 Received FFA version
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
D/TC:? 0 spm_handle_scall:867 Received FFA direct request
And tracing the function calls gives me that:
tee_stmm_efi_probe() {
tee_client_open_context() {
optee_get_version() {
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
} (ret=0xd)
tee_ctx_match(); (ret=0x1)
optee_smc_open() {
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
optee_open() {
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
} (ret=0x0)
} (ret=0x0)
} (ret=0xffff000004e71c80)
tee_client_open_session() {
optee_open_session() {
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
optee_get_msg_arg() {
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
tee_shm_get_va(); (ret=0xffff000002909000)
} (ret=0xffff000002909000)
tee_session_calc_client_uuid(); (ret=0x0)
optee_to_msg_param(); (ret=0x0)
optee_smc_do_call_with_arg() {
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
tee_shm_get_va(); (ret=0xffff000002909000)
tee_shm_get_va(); (ret=0xffff000002909060)
optee_cq_wait_init(); (ret=0xffff000002e55910)
optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004)
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004)
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004)
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004)
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
optee_smccc_smc(); (ret=0xffff0004)
... continues sending this forever ...
... Hit ^C to stop recording ...
tee_get_drvdata(); (ret=0xffff000002e55800)
optee_smccc_smc() {
[1] https://docs.u-boot.org/en/latest/develop/uefi/uefi.html#using-op-tee-for-e…
Thanks in advance,
Enric
Hello,
I am Jork Loeser from Microsoft, and we are looking into providing the OP-TEE internal core API from Linux user-level, as well as hosting a derivative of OP-TEE OS in Linux user-level. Can you say is something like this has been attempted in the past, and perhaps provide pointers?
How interesting would it be for OP-TEE to have such an implementation - e.g., for early/rapid-development purposes?
Best,
Jork
Main updates from version V11[1]:
- rename structures, functions, and variables from "tee_rproc_xxx" to
"rproc_tee_xxx",
- update rproc_tee_register to return an error instead of
"struct rproc_tee *" pointer
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/ZxZ4cBilIlpf3IPw@p14s/T/
Tested-on: 42f7652d3eb5 ("Linux 6.12-rc4")
Description of the feature:
--------------------------
This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to
communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating
and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context.
1) Principle:
The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE
trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE).
The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle:
- authenticating and loading firmware images,
- isolating and securing the remote processor memories,
- supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33),
- managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE.
2) Format of the signed image:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc…
3) OP-TEE trusted application API:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem…
4) OP-TEE signature script
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py
Example of usage:
sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem
5) Impact on User space Application
No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image
instead of the ELF image.
For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here
(note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation
and the integration in OP-TEE).
https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds
Arnaud Pouliquen (7):
remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper
remoteproc: Add TEE support
remoteproc: core: Refactor resource table cleanup into
rproc_release_fw
remoteproc: Introduce release_fw optional operation
dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support
remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and
release
remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware
.../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +-
drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 72 ++-
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 510 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 139 +++--
include/linux/remoteproc.h | 8 +
include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 106 ++++
8 files changed, 849 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h
base-commit: 42f7652d3eb527d03665b09edac47f85fb600924
--
2.25.1
Main updates from version V10[1]:
- remove "select REMOTEPROC_TEE" in STM32_RPROC config to fix kernel robot
To keep history of the updates I have kept in each patches the description
of the updates versus the V9[2] revision.
Main updates from version V9[2]:
- Introduce release_fw remoteproc ops to avoid direct call of
tee_rproc_release_fw() in remoteproc_core.c:
- allow to remove link between remoteproc and remoteproc_tee
- allow to build the remoteproc_tee as a module
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/ZwVATlRbo0OdRLbj@p14s/T/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/ZuMIEp4cVrp1hWa7@p14s/T/
Tested-on: commit 9852d85ec9d4 ("Linux 6.12-rc1")
Description of the feature:
--------------------------
This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to
communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating
and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context.
1) Principle:
The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE
trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE).
The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle:
- authenticating and loading firmware images,
- isolating and securing the remote processor memories,
- supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33),
- managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE.
2) Format of the signed image:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc…
3) OP-TEE trusted application API:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem…
4) OP-TEE signature script
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py
Example of usage:
sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem
5) Impact on User space Application
No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image
instead of the ELF image.
For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here
(note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation
and the integration in OP-TEE).
https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds
Arnaud Pouliquen (7):
remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper
remoteproc: Add TEE support
remoteproc: core: Refactor resource table cleanup into
rproc_release_fw
remoteproc: Introduce release_fw optional operation
dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support
remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and
release
remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware
.../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +-
drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 72 ++-
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 506 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 145 +++--
include/linux/remoteproc.h | 8 +
include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 107 ++++
8 files changed, 852 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h
base-commit: 9852d85ec9d492ebef56dc5f229416c925758edc
--
2.25.1
Hi,
Tomorrow, Tuesday, it's time for another LOC monthly meeting. For time
and connection details see the calendar at
https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/
I've started the Pull Request
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/7054 to import the TA-specific
part of fTPM into the OP-TEE git.
It appears that MS has filed for patents on fTPM. How does that affect
downstream usage? Would it be safer or more convenient for downstream
if the fTPM TA was in a separate git instead of the optee_os git?
Are there any other topics?
Thanks,
Jens
Hi,
This patch set allocates the restricted DMA-bufs via the TEE subsystem.
This a complete rewrite compared to the previous patch set [1], and other
earlier proposals [2] and [3] with a separate restricted heap.
The TEE subsystem handles the DMA-buf allocations since it is the TEE
(OP-TEE, AMD-TEE, TS-TEE, or a future QTEE) which sets up the restrictions
for the memory used for the DMA-bufs.
I've added a new IOCTL, TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC, to allocate the restricted
DMA-bufs. This new IOCTL reaches the backend TEE driver, allowing it to
choose how to allocate the restricted physical memory.
TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC is quite similar to TEE_IOC_SHM_ALLOC so it's tempting
to extend TEE_IOC_SHM_ALLOC with two new flags
TEE_IOC_SHM_FLAG_SECURE_VIDEO and TEE_IOC_SHM_FLAG_SECURE_TRUSTED_UI for
the same feature. However, it might be a bit confusing since
TEE_IOC_SHM_ALLOC only returns an anonymous file descriptor, but
TEE_IOC_SHM_FLAG_SECURE_VIDEO and TEE_IOC_SHM_FLAG_SECURE_TRUSTED_UI would
return a DMA-buf file descriptor instead. What do others think?
This can be tested on QEMU with the following steps:
repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m qemu_v8.xml \
-b prototype/sdp-v2
repo sync -j8
cd build
make toolchains -j4
make all -j$(nproc)
make run-only
# login and at the prompt:
xtest --sdp-basic
https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/prerequisites.html
list dependencies needed to build the above.
The tests are pretty basic, mostly checking that a Trusted Application in
the secure world can access and manipulate the memory. There are also some
negative tests for out of bounds buffers etc.
Thanks,
Jens
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240830070351.2855919-1-jens.wiklander@linaro…
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20240515112308.10171-1-yong.wu@mediatek.c…
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220805135330.970-1-olivier.masse@nxp.com/
Changes since the V1 RFC:
* Based on v6.11
* Complete rewrite, replacing the restricted heap with TEE_IOC_RSTMEM_ALLOC
Changes since Olivier's post [2]:
* Based on Yong Wu's post [1] where much of dma-buf handling is done in
the generic restricted heap
* Simplifications and cleanup
* New commit message for "dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro restricted dmabuf heap
support"
* Replaced the word "secure" with "restricted" where applicable
Jens Wiklander (2):
tee: add restricted memory allocation
optee: support restricted memory allocation
drivers/tee/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 21 ++++
drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 6 +
drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 35 ++++++
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 45 ++++++-
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 33 ++++-
drivers/tee/tee_private.h | 2 +
drivers/tee/tee_rstmem.c | 200 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 2 +
drivers/tee/tee_shm_pool.c | 69 ++++++++++-
include/linux/tee_core.h | 6 +
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 9 ++
include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 33 ++++-
13 files changed, 455 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/tee/tee_rstmem.c
--
2.43.0
Dear Op-Tee support team,
Required some expert opinion - Could you please confirm whether AES block cyphers (ECB and CBC mode) support non-block aligned input for cryption ?
My Use case as below App (say input buffer as 17 bytes) -> OpTee (CA + TA) -> HSM.
In the above mentioned case, Does Op-Tee can take care the input buffer with any size or does it expect block-size aligned input buffer ? In which layer does the padding recommended ? Could you please provide any suggestions / links ?
Thanks & Regards,
Hareesh
[BCC all OP-TEE maintainers]
Hi OP-TEE maintainers & contributors,
OP-TEE v4.4.0 is scheduled to be released on 2024-10-18. So, now is
a good time to start testing the master branch on the various platforms
and report/fix any bugs.
The GitHub pull request for collecting Tested-by tags or any other
comments is https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/7058.
As usual, we will create a release candidate tag one week before the
release date for final testing.
In addition to that you can find some additional information related to
releases here: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/releases.html
Thanks,
--
Jerome
Main updates from version V9[1]:
- Introduce release_fw remoteproc ops to avoid direct call of
tee_rproc_release_fw() in remoteproc_core.c:
- allow to remove link between remoteproc and remoteproc_tee
- allow to build the remoteproc_tee as a module
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/ZuMIEp4cVrp1hWa7@p14s/T/
Tested-on: commit 9852d85ec9d4 ("Linux 6.12-rc1")
Description of the feature:
--------------------------
This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to
communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating
and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context.
1) Principle:
The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE
trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE).
The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle:
- authenticating and loading firmware images,
- isolating and securing the remote processor memories,
- supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33),
- managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE.
2) Format of the signed image:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc…
3) OP-TEE trusted application API:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem…
4) OP-TEE signature script
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py
Example of usage:
sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem
5) Impact on User space Application
No sysfs impact. The user only needs to provide the signed firmware image
instead of the ELF image.
For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here
(note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation
and the integration in OP-TEE).
https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds
Arnaud Pouliquen (7):
remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper
remoteproc: Add TEE support
remoteproc: core: Refactor resource table cleanup into
rproc_release_fw
remoteproc: Introduce release_fw optional operation
dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support
remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and
release
remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware
.../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 +-
drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 11 +
drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 72 ++-
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 506 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 145 +++--
include/linux/remoteproc.h | 8 +
include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 107 ++++
8 files changed, 853 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h
base-commit: 9852d85ec9d492ebef56dc5f229416c925758edc
--
2.25.1
Hi,
This patch set is based on top of Yong Wu's restricted heap patch set [1].
It's also a continuation on Olivier's Add dma-buf secure-heap patch set [2].
The Linaro restricted heap uses genalloc in the kernel to manage the heap
carvout. This is a difference from the Mediatek restricted heap which
relies on the secure world to manage the carveout.
I've tried to adress the comments on [2], but [1] introduces changes so I'm
afraid I've had to skip some comments.
This can be tested on QEMU with the following steps:
repo init -u https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/manifest.git -m qemu_v8.xml \
-b prototype/sdp-v1
repo sync -j8
cd build
make toolchains -j4
make all -j$(nproc)
make run-only
# login and at the prompt:
xtest --sdp-basic
https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/prerequisites.html
list dependencies needed to build the above.
The tests are pretty basic, mostly checking that a Trusted Application in
the secure world can access and manipulate the memory.
Cheers,
Jens
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20240515112308.10171-1-yong.wu@mediatek.c…
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220805135330.970-1-olivier.masse@nxp.com/
Changes since Olivier's post [2]:
* Based on Yong Wu's post [1] where much of dma-buf handling is done in
the generic restricted heap
* Simplifications and cleanup
* New commit message for "dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro restricted dmabuf heap
support"
* Replaced the word "secure" with "restricted" where applicable
Etienne Carriere (1):
tee: new ioctl to a register tee_shm from a dmabuf file descriptor
Jens Wiklander (2):
dma-buf: heaps: restricted_heap: add no_map attribute
dma-buf: heaps: add Linaro restricted dmabuf heap support
Olivier Masse (1):
dt-bindings: reserved-memory: add linaro,restricted-heap
.../linaro,restricted-heap.yaml | 56 ++++++
drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Kconfig | 10 ++
drivers/dma-buf/heaps/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/dma-buf/heaps/restricted_heap.c | 17 +-
drivers/dma-buf/heaps/restricted_heap.h | 2 +
.../dma-buf/heaps/restricted_heap_linaro.c | 165 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 38 ++++
drivers/tee/tee_shm.c | 104 ++++++++++-
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 11 ++
include/uapi/linux/tee.h | 29 +++
10 files changed, 426 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/reserved-memory/linaro,restricted-heap.yaml
create mode 100644 drivers/dma-buf/heaps/restricted_heap_linaro.c
--
2.34.1
Main updates from version V8[1]:
Add support for tee_rproc_release_fw(), which allows releasing firmware
that has been loaded. This service is used if an error occurs between
the loading of the firmware image and the start of the remote processor.
It is also called on remote processor shutdown.
Associated with this series, an update has been sent to OP-TEE for the
support of the TA_RPROC_CMD_RELEASE_FW TEE command [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20240621143759.547793-4-arnaud.pou…
[2]https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/7019
Tested-on: commit 5be63fc19fca ("Linux 6.11-rc5")
Description of the feature:
--------------------------
This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to
communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating
and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context.
1) Principle:
The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE
trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE).
The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle:
- authenticating and loading firmware images,
- isolating and securing the remote processor memories,
- supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33),
- managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE.
2) Format of the signed image:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc…
3) OP-TEE trusted application API:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem…
4) OP-TEE signature script
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py
Example of usage:
sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem
5) Impact on User space Application
No sysfs impact.the user only needs to provide the signed firmware image
instead of the ELF image.
For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here
(note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation
and the integration in OP-TEE).
https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds
Arnaud Pouliquen (7):
remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper
remoteproc: Add TEE support
remoteproc: core: Refactor resource table cleanup into
rproc_release_fw
remoteproc: core: Add TEE interface support for firmware release
dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support
remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and
release
remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware
.../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 ++-
drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 77 ++-
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 486 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 147 ++++--
include/linux/remoteproc.h | 5 +
include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 109 ++++
8 files changed, 836 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h
base-commit: 5be63fc19fcaa4c236b307420483578a56986a37
--
2.25.1
Hi,
Tomorrow, Tuesday, it's time for another LOC monthly meeting. For time
and connection details see the calendar at
https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/
I've started to work on importing the TA specific part of fTPM into
the OP-TEE git, based on the patches published at
https://github.com/zeschg/ms-tpm-20-ref/tree/feat_add_tee_crypto
replacing the third-party crypto library with TEE Internal core API.
I'd appreciate help reviewing this when I publish the work.
We'll need a way to test that the imported fTPM implementation works
as expected, preferably something we can have in our CI loop.
Are there any other topics?
Cheers,
Jens
Prevent build error when CONFIG_RPMB=m and CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK=y by adding
a dependency to CONFIG_RPMB for CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK block so the RPMB
subsystem always is reachable if configured. This means that
CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK automatically becomes compiled as a module if
CONFIG_RPMB is compiled as a module. If CONFIG_RPMB isn't configured or
is configured as built-in, CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK will remain unchanged.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202409021448.RSvcBPzt-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: 7852028a35f0 ("mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org>
---
Replacing "rpmb: use IS_REACHABLE instead of IS_ENABLED"
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20240902080727.2665235-1-jens.wiklander@linaro…
---
drivers/mmc/core/Kconfig | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/mmc/core/Kconfig b/drivers/mmc/core/Kconfig
index bf4e29ef023c..14d2ecbb04d3 100644
--- a/drivers/mmc/core/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/mmc/core/Kconfig
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ config PWRSEQ_SIMPLE
config MMC_BLOCK
tristate "MMC block device driver"
depends on BLOCK
+ depends on RPMB || !RPMB
imply IOSCHED_BFQ
default y
help
--
2.34.1
This series add basic support for FF-A v1.2.
It mainly includes support for newly added:
1. FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP}2
2. FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS
3. FFA_YIELD support in direct messaging
Apart from these, the changes include support to fetch the Rx/Tx buffer
size using FFA_FEATURES, addition of the FF-A FIDs for v1.2 and some
coding style cleanups.
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Fixed allmodconfig build. The issue is with memcpy when FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled.
- Fixed the return value copied back when the response is FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_RESP2
- Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240814-ffa_v1-2-v1-0-9e9abef69b21@arm.com
---
Sudeep Holla (7):
firmware: arm_ffa: Some coding style fixes
firmware: arm_ffa: Update the FF-A command list with v1.2 additions
firmware: arm_ffa: Move the function ffa_features() earlier
firmware: arm_ffa: Add support for FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS
firmware: arm_ffa: Add support for FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP}2
firmware: arm_ffa: Add support for FFA_YIELD in direct messaging
firmware: arm_ffa: Fetch the Rx/Tx buffer size using ffa_features()
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c | 240 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
include/linux/arm_ffa.h | 12 ++
2 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 47ac09b91befbb6a235ab620c32af719f8208399
change-id: 20240814-ffa_v1-2-6c33798743f3
Best regards,
--
Regards,
Sudeep
Hi,
This patch set is getting ready to be queued for the next merge window. The
issues reported by Mikka in the v7 patch set has been resolved, the issues
turned out to be outside of the v7 patch set relating to configuration in
the secure world. I'm planning a pull request to arm-soc, but before that
I'd rather have acks or at least an OK for:
- "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem" by Greg
- "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem" by Ulf
Arnd, please let me know if anything else is missing.
This patch set introduces a new RPMB subsystem, based on patches from [1],
[2], and [3]. The RPMB subsystem aims at providing access to RPMB
partitions to other kernel drivers, in particular the OP-TEE driver. A new
user space ABI isn't needed, we can instead continue using the already
present ABI when writing the RPMB key during production.
I've added and removed things to keep only what is needed by the OP-TEE
driver. Since the posting of [3], there has been major changes in the MMC
subsystem so "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
is in practice completely rewritten.
With this OP-TEE can access RPMB during early boot instead of having to
wait for user space to become available as in the current design [4].
This will benefit the efi variables [5] since we won't rely on userspace as
well as some TPM issues [6] that were solved.
The OP-TEE driver finds the correct RPMB device to interact with by
iterating over available devices until one is found with a programmed
authentication matching the one OP-TEE is using. This enables coexisting
users of other RPMBs since the owner can be determined by who knows the
authentication key.
The corresponding secure world OP-TEE patches are available at [7].
I've put myself as a maintainer for the RPMB subsystem as I have an
interest in the OP-TEE driver to keep this in good shape. However, if you'd
rather see someone else taking the maintainership that's fine too. I'll
help keep the subsystem updated regardless.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230722014037.42647-1-shyamsaini@linux.micros…
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220405093759.1126835-2-alex.bennee@linaro.or…
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mmc/1478548394-8184-2-git-send-email-tomas.wi…
[4] https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/architecture/secure_storage.html#rpm…
[5] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
[6] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
[7] https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/optee_os/tree/rpmb_probe_v8
Thanks,
Jens
Changes since v8:
* Moved changes to drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c and include/linux/rpmb.h from
"tee: add tee_device_set_dev_groups()" to
"rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- reverted license change of include/linux/rpmb.h introduced in [2] back
to GLP-2.0 as in [3]
- Small documentation fixes reported by kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Small documentation fixes reported by kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
- Silencing a "sparse: cast to restricted __be32" warning reported by
kernel test robot <lkp(a)intel.com>
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- replaced IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RPMB) with IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_RPMB)
- Added Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org>
Changes since v7:
* Rebased on v6.11-rc1
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Adding Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org>
* "tee: add tee_device_set_dev_groups()"
- Declaring tee_device_set_dev_groups() in the recently introduced
include/linux/tee_core.h
Changes since v6:
* Add Tested-by: Manuel Traut <manut(a)mecka.net> provided for the v6
* Add a new patch "tee: add tee_device_set_dev_groups()" needed later in
the patch set
* Reintroduce the rpmb_class as requested by Greg, this affects the patches
"rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem" and
"optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem":
- rpmb_interface_{,un}register() are now based on
class_interface_{,un}register()
- Embed a separate device in struct rpmb_dev for life cycle
management etc
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Add an internal blocking_notifier to deal with the struct
class_interface callback
- Add a rpmb_routing_model variable in sysfs to help integration with
systemd, requested by Mikko Rapeli
- Add an RPMB probe capability flag in the ABI shared with the secure
world, both SMC and FF-A ABI, needed to support the rpmb_routing_model
variable
- optee_rpc_cmd() is strict whether an RPMB RPC request should be
forwarded to tee-supplicant or routed via the RPMB subsystem, depending
on the reported RPMB routing model
Changes since v5:
Manuel Traut reported and investigated an error on an i.MX8MM, the root
cause was identified as insufficient alignment on frames sent to the RPMB
device. Fixed in the OP-TEE driver as described below.
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- Adding a missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Replacing the old OPTEE_RPC_CMD_RPMB ABI with OPTEE_RPC_CMD_RPMB_FRAMES
to get rid of the small header struct rpmb_req (now removed) causing
the problem.
- Matching changes on the secure side + support for re-initializing
RPMB in case a boot stage has used RPMB, the latter also reported by
Manuel Traut.
Changes since v4:
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- Describing struct rpmb_descr as RPMB description instead of descriptor
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Addressing review comments
- Adding more comments for struct rpmb_frame
- Fixing assignment of reliable_wr_count and capacity in mmc_blk_rpmb_add()
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Updating struct rpmb_dev_info to match changes in "rpmb: add Replay
Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
Changes since v3:
* Move struct rpmb_frame into the MMC driver since the format of the RPMB
frames depend on the implementation, one format for eMMC, another for
UFS, and so on
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- Adding Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org>
- Adding more description of the API functions
- Removing the set_dev_info() op from struct rpmb_ops, the needed information
is supplied in the arguments to rpmb_dev_register() instead.
- Getting rid of struct rpmb_ops since only the route_frames() op was
remaining, store that op directly in struct rpmb_dev
- Changed rpmb_interface_register() and rpmb_interface_unregister() to use
notifier_block instead of implementing the same thing ourselves
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Moving the call to rpmb_dev_register() to be done at the end of
mmc_blk_probe() when the device is fully available
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Use IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_RPMB) to determine if the RPMB subsystem is
available
- Translate TEE_ERROR_STORAGE_NOT_AVAILABLE if encountered in get_devices()
to recognize the error in optee_rpmb_scan()
- Simplified optee_rpmb_scan() and optee_rpmb_intf_rdev()
Changes since v2:
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- Fixing documentation issues
- Adding a "depends on MMC" in the Kconfig
- Removed the class-device and the embedded device, struct rpmb_dev now
relies on the parent device for reference counting as requested
- Removed the now unneeded rpmb_ops get_resources() and put_resources()
since references are already taken in mmc_blk_alloc_rpmb_part() before
rpmb_dev_register() is called
- Added rpmb_interface_{,un}register() now that
class_interface_{,un}register() can't be used ay longer
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Adding the missing error cleanup in alloc_idata()
- Taking the needed reference to md->disk in mmc_blk_alloc_rpmb_part()
instead of in mmc_rpmb_chrdev_open() and rpmb_op_mmc_get_resources()
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Registering to get a notification when an RPMB device comes online
- Probes for RPMB devices each time an RPMB device comes online, until
a usable device is found
- When a usable RPMB device is found, call
optee_enumerate_devices(PTA_CMD_GET_DEVICES_RPMB)
- Pass type of rpmb in return value from OPTEE_RPC_CMD_RPMB_PROBE_NEXT
Changes since Shyam's RFC:
* Removed the remaining leftover rpmb_cdev_*() function calls
* Refactored the struct rpmb_ops with all the previous ops replaced, in
some sense closer to [3] with the route_frames() op
* Added rpmb_route_frames()
* Added struct rpmb_frame, enum rpmb_op_result, and enum rpmb_type from [3]
* Removed all functions not needed in the OP-TEE use case
* Added "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem", based
on the commit with the same name in [3]
* Added "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem" for integration
with OP-TEE
* Moved the RPMB driver into drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c
* Added my name to MODULE_AUTHOR() in rpmb-core.c
* Added an rpmb_mutex to serialize access to the IDA
* Removed the target parameter from all rpmb_*() functions since it's
currently unused
Jens Wiklander (4):
rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem
mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem
tee: add tee_device_set_dev_groups()
optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-tee | 15 ++
MAINTAINERS | 8 +
drivers/misc/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/misc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/mmc/core/block.c | 242 +++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 96 ++++++++-
drivers/tee/optee/device.c | 7 +
drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 14 ++
drivers/tee/optee/optee_ffa.h | 2 +
drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 26 ++-
drivers/tee/optee/optee_rpc_cmd.h | 35 ++++
drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 2 +
drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 14 ++
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 19 +-
include/linux/rpmb.h | 123 +++++++++++
include/linux/tee_core.h | 12 ++
18 files changed, 1026 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-tee
create mode 100644 drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/rpmb.h
--
2.34.1
This series add basic support for FF-A v1.2.
It mainly includes support for newly added:
1. FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP}2
2. FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS
3. FFA_YIELD support in direct messaging
Apart from these, the changes include support to fetch the Rx/Tx buffer
size using FFA_FEATURES, addition of the FF-A FIDs for v1.2 and some
coding style cleanups.
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com>
---
Sudeep Holla (7):
firmware: arm_ffa: Some coding style fixes
firmware: arm_ffa: Update the FF-A command list with v1.2 additions
firmware: arm_ffa: Move the function ffa_features() earlier
firmware: arm_ffa: Add support for FFA_PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS
firmware: arm_ffa: Add support for FFA_MSG_SEND_DIRECT_{REQ,RESP}2
firmware: arm_ffa: Add support for FFA_YIELD in direct messaging
firmware: arm_ffa: Fetch the Rx/Tx buffer size using ffa_features()
drivers/firmware/arm_ffa/driver.c | 240 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
include/linux/arm_ffa.h | 12 ++
2 files changed, 195 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 7c626ce4bae1ac14f60076d00eafe71af30450ba
change-id: 20240814-ffa_v1-2-6c33798743f3
Best regards,
--
Regards,
Sudeep
Hi,
This patch set is getting ready to be queued for the next merge window. The
issues reported by Mikka in the previous patch set has been resolved, the
issues turned out to be outside of this patch set relating to configuration
in the secure world. I'm planning a pull request to arm-soc, but before
that I'd rather have acks or at least an OK for:
- "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem" by Greg
- "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem" by Ulf
Arnd, please let me know if anything else is missing.
This patch set introduces a new RPMB subsystem, based on patches from [1],
[2], and [3]. The RPMB subsystem aims at providing access to RPMB
partitions to other kernel drivers, in particular the OP-TEE driver. A new
user space ABI isn't needed, we can instead continue using the already
present ABI when writing the RPMB key during production.
I've added and removed things to keep only what is needed by the OP-TEE
driver. Since the posting of [3], there has been major changes in the MMC
subsystem so "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
is in practice completely rewritten.
With this OP-TEE can access RPMB during early boot instead of having to
wait for user space to become available as in the current design [4].
This will benefit the efi variables [5] since we won't rely on userspace as
well as some TPM issues [6] that were solved.
The OP-TEE driver finds the correct RPMB device to interact with by
iterating over available devices until one is found with a programmed
authentication matching the one OP-TEE is using. This enables coexisting
users of other RPMBs since the owner can be determined by who knows the
authentication key.
The corresponding secure world OP-TEE patches are available at [7].
I've put myself as a maintainer for the RPMB subsystem as I have an
interest in the OP-TEE driver to keep this in good shape. However, if you'd
rather see someone else taking the maintainership that's fine too. I'll
help keep the subsystem updated regardless.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230722014037.42647-1-shyamsaini@linux.micros…
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220405093759.1126835-2-alex.bennee@linaro.or…
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mmc/1478548394-8184-2-git-send-email-tomas.wi…
[4] https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/architecture/secure_storage.html#rpm…
[5] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
[6] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
[7] https://github.com/jenswi-linaro/optee_os/tree/rpmb_probe_v8
Thanks,
Jens
Changes since v7:
* Rebased on v6.11-rc1
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Adding Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org>
* "tee: add tee_device_set_dev_groups()"
- Declaring tee_device_set_dev_groups() in the recently introduced
include/linux/tee_core.h
Changes since v6:
* Add Tested-by: Manuel Traut <manut(a)mecka.net> provided for the v6
* Add a new patch "tee: add tee_device_set_dev_groups()" needed later in
the patch set
* Reintroduce the rpmb_class as requested by Greg, this affects the patches
"rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem" and
"optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem":
- rpmb_interface_{,un}register() are now based on
class_interface_{,un}register()
- Embed a separate device in struct rpmb_dev for life cycle
management etc
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Add an internal blocking_notifier to deal with the struct
class_interface callback
- Add a rpmb_routing_model variable in sysfs to help integration with
systemd, requested by Mikko Rapeli
- Add an RPMB probe capability flag in the ABI shared with the secure
world, both SMC and FF-A ABI, needed to support the rpmb_routing_model
variable
- optee_rpc_cmd() is strict whether an RPMB RPC request should be
forwarded to tee-supplicant or routed via the RPMB subsystem, depending
on the reported RPMB routing model
Changes since v5:
Manuel Traut reported and investigated an error on an i.MX8MM, the root
cause was identified as insufficient alignment on frames sent to the RPMB
device. Fixed in the OP-TEE driver as described below.
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- Adding a missing EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL()
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Replacing the old OPTEE_RPC_CMD_RPMB ABI with OPTEE_RPC_CMD_RPMB_FRAMES
to get rid of the small header struct rpmb_req (now removed) causing
the problem.
- Matching changes on the secure side + support for re-initializing
RPMB in case a boot stage has used RPMB, the latter also reported by
Manuel Traut.
Changes since v4:
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- Describing struct rpmb_descr as RPMB description instead of descriptor
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Addressing review comments
- Adding more comments for struct rpmb_frame
- Fixing assignment of reliable_wr_count and capacity in mmc_blk_rpmb_add()
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Updating struct rpmb_dev_info to match changes in "rpmb: add Replay
Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
Changes since v3:
* Move struct rpmb_frame into the MMC driver since the format of the RPMB
frames depend on the implementation, one format for eMMC, another for
UFS, and so on
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- Adding Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij(a)linaro.org>
- Adding more description of the API functions
- Removing the set_dev_info() op from struct rpmb_ops, the needed information
is supplied in the arguments to rpmb_dev_register() instead.
- Getting rid of struct rpmb_ops since only the route_frames() op was
remaining, store that op directly in struct rpmb_dev
- Changed rpmb_interface_register() and rpmb_interface_unregister() to use
notifier_block instead of implementing the same thing ourselves
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Moving the call to rpmb_dev_register() to be done at the end of
mmc_blk_probe() when the device is fully available
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Use IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_RPMB) to determine if the RPMB subsystem is
available
- Translate TEE_ERROR_STORAGE_NOT_AVAILABLE if encountered in get_devices()
to recognize the error in optee_rpmb_scan()
- Simplified optee_rpmb_scan() and optee_rpmb_intf_rdev()
Changes since v2:
* "rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem"
- Fixing documentation issues
- Adding a "depends on MMC" in the Kconfig
- Removed the class-device and the embedded device, struct rpmb_dev now
relies on the parent device for reference counting as requested
- Removed the now unneeded rpmb_ops get_resources() and put_resources()
since references are already taken in mmc_blk_alloc_rpmb_part() before
rpmb_dev_register() is called
- Added rpmb_interface_{,un}register() now that
class_interface_{,un}register() can't be used ay longer
* "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem"
- Adding the missing error cleanup in alloc_idata()
- Taking the needed reference to md->disk in mmc_blk_alloc_rpmb_part()
instead of in mmc_rpmb_chrdev_open() and rpmb_op_mmc_get_resources()
* "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem"
- Registering to get a notification when an RPMB device comes online
- Probes for RPMB devices each time an RPMB device comes online, until
a usable device is found
- When a usable RPMB device is found, call
optee_enumerate_devices(PTA_CMD_GET_DEVICES_RPMB)
- Pass type of rpmb in return value from OPTEE_RPC_CMD_RPMB_PROBE_NEXT
Changes since Shyam's RFC:
* Removed the remaining leftover rpmb_cdev_*() function calls
* Refactored the struct rpmb_ops with all the previous ops replaced, in
some sense closer to [3] with the route_frames() op
* Added rpmb_route_frames()
* Added struct rpmb_frame, enum rpmb_op_result, and enum rpmb_type from [3]
* Removed all functions not needed in the OP-TEE use case
* Added "mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem", based
on the commit with the same name in [3]
* Added "optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem" for integration
with OP-TEE
* Moved the RPMB driver into drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c
* Added my name to MODULE_AUTHOR() in rpmb-core.c
* Added an rpmb_mutex to serialize access to the IDA
* Removed the target parameter from all rpmb_*() functions since it's
currently unused
Jens Wiklander (4):
rpmb: add Replay Protected Memory Block (RPMB) subsystem
mmc: block: register RPMB partition with the RPMB subsystem
tee: add tee_device_set_dev_groups()
optee: probe RPMB device using RPMB subsystem
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-tee | 15 ++
MAINTAINERS | 8 +
drivers/misc/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/misc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c | 232 +++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/mmc/core/block.c | 241 +++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 96 ++++++++-
drivers/tee/optee/device.c | 7 +
drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 14 ++
drivers/tee/optee/optee_ffa.h | 2 +
drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 26 ++-
drivers/tee/optee/optee_rpc_cmd.h | 35 ++++
drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 2 +
drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++
drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 14 ++
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 19 +-
include/linux/rpmb.h | 123 +++++++++++
include/linux/tee_core.h | 12 ++
18 files changed, 1024 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-class-tee
create mode 100644 drivers/misc/rpmb-core.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/rpmb.h
--
2.34.1
Hello all,
We (Eden and I) have been assigned a summer project exploring the possibility of verified boot for Linux with a view to experiment with a TEE, and would like to share our outcomes from the project so far.
We've been working on condensing all the information and documentation on TF-A, OP-TEE, and U-Boot verified boot into a trivially workable form, a Makefile, for the Raspberry Pi 3B+. Our aim is a proof of concept pilot project to see what parts of the technology outlined in the NIST standards for secure boot on IoT is currently available, and thus what needs to be developed. This also leads us to an interest in full crypto algorithm agility to ensure quick adoption of the quantum safe algorithms as they come out.
I should note that our boot order here is TF-A to OP-TEE, then TF-A to U-Boot to Linux.
This has raised a few areas of note and a couple of issues on our end:
# Areas of note
- U-Boot and Linux DTB's being incompatible has minimal documentation
Newer versions of U-Boot do have `CONFIG_OF_UPSTREAM`, but I can't see that as a recommended solution. Perhaps a note in the Kconfig entry for `CONFIG_OF_CONTROL` would be sufficient
- U-Boot can fail silently if the DTB used is incompatible
No idea what the solution here could be; an invalid DTB inevitably means that the firmware cannot access any of the hardware correctly.
- U-Boot unable to find `CONFIG_OF_SEPARATE` DTB's when loaded by TF-A; this is a TF-A problem, but maybe check other possible places for a DTB on the U-Boot end?
- U-Boot itself appears to have good crypto agility (or will in the near future), with a macro and existing algorithms as examples for the addition of new algorithms
- `mkimage` appears to be lacking these same features for crypto agility, which would otherwise set U-Boot up to be ready for the new quantum safe algorithms' release
A similar macro system for `mkimage`, or some other schema for defining how to add algorithm keys to the FDT, would provide some amazing flexibility, already being able to define more than one signature as required. Adding keys to the FDT would need to be standardised in someway for this, I would imagine.
I am very aware that some of the below issues are not relevant to all projects, but thought it best to maintain a single list to ensure that the correct place to make a fix for each issue is not locked project wise too early.
# Issues
- buildroot build fails when the directory length is greater than ~80 characters
- TF-A does not pass on the DTB address unless `RPI3_DIRECT_LINUX_BOOT` is set, which also implies a define U-Boot doesn't need
- TF-A `LOG_LEVEL=50` flag has compatibility issue in xlat tables v2 when compiled for 64bit
- `mkimage` ECDSA key adding to FDT fails if there is no signature node pre-added and doesn't set `required` node when `-r` is used
- `fit_check_sig`fails to check an ECDSA signed FIT file with corresponding FDT due to `<null>` hash node
- `mkimage` expects ECDSA private key only in a `.pem` and not `.der`, which would be standard for a single private key
We intend to release the Makefile and accompanying scripts for this on Monday 12th August, likely ~5pm BST to give us time to finalise what we have currently; this will consist of two Makefiles: one for verified boot using `CONFIG_OF_EMBED`, and another using `CONFIG_OF_SEPARATE` on U-Boot v2024.07. We are currently planning on releasing this on GitHub under the same license as the involved projects, but what would be the most helpful way for us to release this to you?
We have, beside the points raised in the Issues section above, no specific changes for the exiting repos, focusing instead on Makefiles which pull together parts of the existing releases to produce a working PoC as quickly as possible. We intend to also release this to the Raspberry Pi community as a TEE solution they can experiment with today.
This email has been sent to:
- u-boot(a)lists.denx.de
- op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
and the Makefiles will be sent to Raspberry Pi Foundation and community some point next week
Thomas Gymer (thomas.gymer(a)bt.com) & Eden Hamilton (eden.hamilton(a)bt.com)
Adding TEE mailing list and maintainers to the CC list.
Amirreza, please include them in future even if you are not going to use
the framework.
On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 09:16:48AM GMT, Amirreza Zarrabi wrote:
>
>
> On 7/3/2024 9:36 PM, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 02, 2024 at 10:57:35PM GMT, Amirreza Zarrabi wrote:
> >> Qualcomm TEE hosts Trusted Applications (TAs) and services that run in
> >> the secure world. Access to these resources is provided using MinkIPC.
> >> MinkIPC is a capability-based synchronous message passing facility. It
> >> allows code executing in one domain to invoke objects running in other
> >> domains. When a process holds a reference to an object that lives in
> >> another domain, that object reference is a capability. Capabilities
> >> allow us to separate implementation of policies from implementation of
> >> the transport.
> >>
> >> As part of the upstreaming of the object invoke driver (called SMC-Invoke
> >> driver), we need to provide a reasonable kernel API and UAPI. The clear
> >> option is to use TEE subsystem and write a back-end driver, however the
> >> TEE subsystem doesn't fit with the design of Qualcomm TEE.
> >>
>
> To answer your "general comment", maybe a bit of background :).
>
> Traditionally, policy enforcement is based on access-control models,
> either (1) access-control list or (2) capability [0]. A capability is an
> opaque ("non-forge-able") object reference that grants the holder the
> right to perform certain operations on the object (e.g. Read, Write,
> Execute, or Grant). Capabilities are preferred mechanism for representing
> a policy, due to their fine-grained representation of access right, inline
> with
> (P1) the principle of least privilege [1], and
> (P2) the ability to avoid the confused deputy problem [2].
>
> [0] Jack B. Dennis and Earl C. Van Horn. 1966. Programming Semantics for
> Multiprogrammed Computations. Commun. ACM 9 (1966), 143–155.
>
> [1] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. 1975. The Protection of
> Information in Computer Systems. Proc. IEEE 63 (1975), 1278–1308.
>
> [2] Norm Hardy. 1988. The Confused Deputy (or Why Capabilities Might Have
> Been Invented). ACM Operating Systems Review 22, 4 (1988), 36–38.
>
> For MinkIPC, an object represents a TEE or TA service. The reference to
> the object is the "handle" that is returned from TEE (let's call it
> TEE-Handle). The supported operations are "service invocation" (similar
> to Execute), and "sharing access to a service" (similar to Grant).
> Anyone with access to the TEE-Handle can invoke the service or pass the
> TEE-Handle to someone else to access the same service.
>
> The responsibility of the MinkIPC framework is to hide the TEE-Handle,
> so that the client can not forge it, and allow the owner of the handle
> to transfer it to other clients as it wishes. Using a file descriptor
> table we can achieve that. We wrap the TEE-Handle as a FD and let the
> client invoke FD (e.g. using IOCTL), or transfer the FD (e.g. using
> UNIX socket).
>
> As a side note, for the sake of completeness, capabilities are fundamentally
> a "discretionary mechanism", as the holder of the object reference has the
> ability to share it with others. A secure system requires "mandatory
> enforcement" (i.e. ability to revoke authority and ability to control
> the authority propagation). This is out of scope for the MinkIPC.
> MinkIPC is only interested in P1 and P2 (mention above).
>
>
> >> Does TEE subsystem fit requirements of a capability based system?
> >> -----------------------------------------------------------------
> >> In TEE subsystem, to invoke a function:
> >> - client should open a device file "/dev/teeX",
> >> - create a session with a TA, and
> >> - invoke the functions in that session.
> >>
> >> 1. The privilege to invoke a function is determined by a session. If a
> >> client has a session, it cannot share it with other clients. Even if
> >> it does, it is not fine-grained enough, i.e. either all accessible
> >> functions/resources in a session or none. Assume a scenario when a client
> >> wants to grant a permission to invoke just a function that it has the rights,
> >> to another client.
> >>
> >> The "all or nothing" for sharing sessions is not in line with our
> >> capability system: "if you own a capability, you should be able to grant
> >> or share it".
> >
> > Can you please be more specific here? What kind of sharing is expected
> > on the user side of it?
>
> In MinkIPC, after authenticating a client credential, a TA (or TEE) may
> return multiple TEE-Handles, each representing a service that the client
> has privilege to access. The client should be able to "individually"
> reference each TEE-Handle, e.g. to invoke and share it (as per capability-
> based system requirements).
>
> If we use TEE subsystem, which has a session based design, all TEE-Handles
> are meaningful with respect to the session in which they are allocated,
> hence the use of "__u32 session" in "struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg".
>
> Here, we have a contradiction with MinkIPC. We may ignore the session
> and say "even though a TEE-Handle is allocated in a session but it is also
> valid outside a session", i.e. the session-id in TEE uapi becomes redundant
> (a case of divergence from definition).
>
> >
> >> 2. In TEE subsystem, resources are managed in a context. Every time a
> >> client opens "/dev/teeX", a new context is created to keep track of
> >> the allocated resources, including opened sessions and remote objects. Any
> >> effort for sharing resources between two independent clients requires
> >> involvement of context manager, i.e. the back-end driver. This requires
> >> implementing some form of policy in the back-end driver.
> >
> > What kind of resource sharing?
>
> TEE subsystem "rightfully" allocates a context each time a client opens
> a device file. This context pass around to the backend driver to identify
> independent clients that opened the device file.
>
> The context is used by backend driver to keep track of the resources. Type
> of resources are TEE driver dependent. As an example of resource in TEE
> subsystem, you can look into 'shm' register and unregister (specially,
> see comment in function 'shm_alloc_helper').
>
> For MinkIPC, all clients are treated the same and the TEE-Handles are
> representative of the resources, accessible "globally" if a client has the
> capability for them. In kernel, clients access an object if they have
> access to "qcom_tee_object", in userspace, clients access an object if
> they have the FD wrapper for the TEE-Handle.
>
> If we use context, instead of the file descriptor table, any form of object
> transfer requires involvement of the backend driver. If we use the file
> descriptor table, contexts are becoming useless for MinkIPC (i.e.
> 'ctx->data' will "always" be null).
>
> >
> >> 3. The TEE subsystem supports two type of memory sharing:
> >> - per-device memory pools, and
> >> - user defined memory references.
> >> User defined memory references are private to the application and cannot
> >> be shared. Memory allocated from per-device "shared" pools are accessible
> >> using a file descriptor. It can be mapped by any process if it has
> >> access to it. This means, we cannot provide the resource isolation
> >> between two clients. Assume a scenario when a client wants to allocate a
> >> memory (which is shared with TEE) from an "isolated" pool and share it
> >> with another client, without the right to access the contents of memory.
> >
> > This doesn't explain, why would it want to share such memory with
> > another client.
>
> Ok, I believe there is a misunderstanding here. I did not try to justify
> specific usecase. We want to separate the memory allocation from the
> framework. This way, how the memory is obtained, e.g. it is allocated
> (1) from an isolated pool, (2) a shared pool, (3) a secure heap,
> (4) a system dma-heap, (5) process address space, or (6) other memory
> with "different constraints", becomes independent.
>
> We introduced "memory object" type. User implements a kernel service
> using "qcom_tee_object" to represent the memory object. We have an
> implementation of memory objects based on dma-buf.
>
> >
> >> 4. The kernel API provided by TEE subsystem does not support a kernel
> >> supplicant. Adding support requires an execution context (e.g. a
> >> kernel thread) due to the TEE subsystem design. tee_driver_ops supports
> >> only "send" and "receive" callbacks and to deliver a request, someone
> >> should wait on "receive".
> >
> > There is nothing wrong here, but maybe I'm misunderstanding something.
>
> I agree. But, I am trying to re-emphasize how useful TEE subsystem is
> for MinkIPC. For kernel services, we solely rely on the backend driver.
> For instance, to expose RPMB service we will use "qcom_tee_object".
> So there is nothing provided by the framework to simplify the service
> development.
>
> >
> >> We need a callback to "dispatch" or "handle" a request in the context of
> >> the client thread. It should redirect a request to a kernel service or
> >> a user supplicant. In TEE subsystem such requirement should be implemented
> >> in TEE back-end driver, independent from the TEE subsystem.
> >>
> >> 5. The UAPI provided by TEE subsystem is similar to the GPTEE Client
> >> interface. This interface is not suitable for a capability system.
> >> For instance, there is no session in a capability system which means
> >> either its should not be used, or we should overload its definition.
> >
> > General comment: maybe adding more detailed explanation of how the
> > capabilities are aquired and how they can be used might make sense.
> >
> > BTW. It might be my imperfect English, but each time I see the word
> > 'capability' I'm thinking that some is capable of doing something. I
> > find it hard to use 'capability' for the reference to another object.
> >
>
> Explained at the top :).
>
> >>
> >> Can we use TEE subsystem?
> >> -------------------------
> >> There are workarounds for some of the issues above. The question is if we
> >> should define our own UAPI or try to use a hack-y way of fitting into
> >> the TEE subsystem. I am using word hack-y, as most of the workaround
> >> involves:
> >>
> >> - "diverging from the definition". For instance, ignoring the session
> >> open and close ioctl calls or use file descriptors for all remote
> >> resources (as, fd is the closet to capability) which undermines the
> >> isolation provided by the contexts,
> >>
> >> - "overloading the variables". For instance, passing object ID as file
> >> descriptors in a place of session ID, or
> >>
> >> - "bypass TEE subsystem". For instance, extensively rely on meta
> >> parameters or push everything (e.g. kernel services) to the back-end
> >> driver, which means leaving almost all TEE subsystem unused.
> >>
> >> We cannot take the full benefits of TEE subsystem and may need to
> >> implement most of the requirements in the back-end driver. Also, as
> >> discussed above, the UAPI is not suitable for capability-based use cases.
> >> We proposed a new set of ioctl calls for SMC-Invoke driver.
> >>
> >> In this series we posted three patches. We implemented a transport
> >> driver that provides qcom_tee_object. Any object on secure side is
> >> represented with an instance of qcom_tee_object and any struct exposed
> >> to TEE should embed an instance of qcom_tee_object. Any, support for new
> >> services, e.g. memory object, RPMB, userspace clients or supplicants are
> >> implemented independently from the driver.
> >>
> >> We have a simple memory object and a user driver that uses
> >> qcom_tee_object.
> >
> > Could you please point out any user for the uAPI? I'd like to understand
> > how does it from from the userspace point of view.
>
> Sure :), I'll write up a test patch and send it in next series.
>
> Summary.
>
> TEE framework provides some nice facilities, including:
> - uapi and ioctl interface,
> - marshaling parameters and context management,
> - memory mapping and sharing, and
> - TEE bus and TA drivers.
>
> For, MinkIPC, we will not use any of them. The only usable piece, is uapi
> interface which is not suitable for MinkIPC, as discussed above.
>
> >
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com>
> >> ---
> >> Amirreza Zarrabi (3):
> >> firmware: qcom: implement object invoke support
> >> firmware: qcom: implement memory object support for TEE
> >> firmware: qcom: implement ioctl for TEE object invocation
> >>
> >> drivers/firmware/qcom/Kconfig | 36 +
> >> drivers/firmware/qcom/Makefile | 2 +
> >> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/Makefile | 12 +
> >> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/async.c | 142 +++
> >> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/core.c | 1139 ++++++++++++++++++
> >> drivers/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/core.h | 186 +++
> >> .../qcom/qcom_object_invoke/qcom_scm_invoke.c | 22 +
> >> .../firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke/release_wq.c | 90 ++
> >> .../qcom/qcom_object_invoke/xts/mem_object.c | 406 +++++++
> >> .../qcom_object_invoke/xts/object_invoke_uapi.c | 1231 ++++++++++++++++++++
> >> include/linux/firmware/qcom/qcom_object_invoke.h | 233 ++++
> >> include/uapi/misc/qcom_tee.h | 117 ++
> >> 12 files changed, 3616 insertions(+)
> >> ---
> >> base-commit: 74564adfd3521d9e322cfc345fdc132df80f3c79
> >> change-id: 20240702-qcom-tee-object-and-ioctls-6f52fde03485
> >>
> >> Best regards,
> >> --
> >> Amirreza Zarrabi <quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com>
> >>
> >
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
Hi,
On Wed, Jul 10, 2024 at 1:17 AM Amirreza Zarrabi
<quic_azarrabi(a)quicinc.com> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 7/3/2024 9:36 PM, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote:
> > On Tue, Jul 02, 2024 at 10:57:35PM GMT, Amirreza Zarrabi wrote:
> >> Qualcomm TEE hosts Trusted Applications (TAs) and services that run in
> >> the secure world. Access to these resources is provided using MinkIPC.
> >> MinkIPC is a capability-based synchronous message passing facility. It
> >> allows code executing in one domain to invoke objects running in other
> >> domains. When a process holds a reference to an object that lives in
> >> another domain, that object reference is a capability. Capabilities
> >> allow us to separate implementation of policies from implementation of
> >> the transport.
> >>
> >> As part of the upstreaming of the object invoke driver (called SMC-Invoke
> >> driver), we need to provide a reasonable kernel API and UAPI. The clear
> >> option is to use TEE subsystem and write a back-end driver, however the
> >> TEE subsystem doesn't fit with the design of Qualcomm TEE.
> >>
>
> To answer your "general comment", maybe a bit of background :).
>
> Traditionally, policy enforcement is based on access-control models,
> either (1) access-control list or (2) capability [0]. A capability is an
> opaque ("non-forge-able") object reference that grants the holder the
> right to perform certain operations on the object (e.g. Read, Write,
> Execute, or Grant). Capabilities are preferred mechanism for representing
> a policy, due to their fine-grained representation of access right, inline
> with
> (P1) the principle of least privilege [1], and
> (P2) the ability to avoid the confused deputy problem [2].
>
> [0] Jack B. Dennis and Earl C. Van Horn. 1966. Programming Semantics for
> Multiprogrammed Computations. Commun. ACM 9 (1966), 143–155.
>
> [1] Jerome H. Saltzer and Michael D. Schroeder. 1975. The Protection of
> Information in Computer Systems. Proc. IEEE 63 (1975), 1278–1308.
>
> [2] Norm Hardy. 1988. The Confused Deputy (or Why Capabilities Might Have
> Been Invented). ACM Operating Systems Review 22, 4 (1988), 36–38.
>
> For MinkIPC, an object represents a TEE or TA service. The reference to
> the object is the "handle" that is returned from TEE (let's call it
> TEE-Handle). The supported operations are "service invocation" (similar
> to Execute), and "sharing access to a service" (similar to Grant).
> Anyone with access to the TEE-Handle can invoke the service or pass the
> TEE-Handle to someone else to access the same service.
>
> The responsibility of the MinkIPC framework is to hide the TEE-Handle,
> so that the client can not forge it, and allow the owner of the handle
> to transfer it to other clients as it wishes. Using a file descriptor
> table we can achieve that. We wrap the TEE-Handle as a FD and let the
> client invoke FD (e.g. using IOCTL), or transfer the FD (e.g. using
> UNIX socket).
>
> As a side note, for the sake of completeness, capabilities are fundamentally
> a "discretionary mechanism", as the holder of the object reference has the
> ability to share it with others. A secure system requires "mandatory
> enforcement" (i.e. ability to revoke authority and ability to control
> the authority propagation). This is out of scope for the MinkIPC.
> MinkIPC is only interested in P1 and P2 (mention above).
This is still quite abstract. We have tried to avoid inventing yet
another IPC mechanism in the TEE subsystem. But that's not written in
stone if it turns out there's a use case that needs it.
>
>
> >> Does TEE subsystem fit requirements of a capability based system?
> >> -----------------------------------------------------------------
> >> In TEE subsystem, to invoke a function:
> >> - client should open a device file "/dev/teeX",
> >> - create a session with a TA, and
> >> - invoke the functions in that session.
> >>
> >> 1. The privilege to invoke a function is determined by a session. If a
> >> client has a session, it cannot share it with other clients. Even if
> >> it does, it is not fine-grained enough, i.e. either all accessible
> >> functions/resources in a session or none. Assume a scenario when a client
> >> wants to grant a permission to invoke just a function that it has the rights,
> >> to another client.
> >>
> >> The "all or nothing" for sharing sessions is not in line with our
> >> capability system: "if you own a capability, you should be able to grant
> >> or share it".
> >
> > Can you please be more specific here? What kind of sharing is expected
> > on the user side of it?
>
> In MinkIPC, after authenticating a client credential, a TA (or TEE) may
> return multiple TEE-Handles, each representing a service that the client
> has privilege to access. The client should be able to "individually"
> reference each TEE-Handle, e.g. to invoke and share it (as per capability-
> based system requirements).
>
> If we use TEE subsystem, which has a session based design, all TEE-Handles
> are meaningful with respect to the session in which they are allocated,
> hence the use of "__u32 session" in "struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg".
>
> Here, we have a contradiction with MinkIPC. We may ignore the session
> and say "even though a TEE-Handle is allocated in a session but it is also
> valid outside a session", i.e. the session-id in TEE uapi becomes redundant
> (a case of divergence from definition).
Only the backend drivers put a meaning to a session, the TEE subsystem
doesn't enforce anything. All fields but num_params and params in
struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg are only interpreted by the backend driver
if I recall correctly. Using the fields for something completely
different would be confusing so if struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg isn't
matching well enough we might need a new IOCTL for whatever you have
in mind.
>
> >
> >> 2. In TEE subsystem, resources are managed in a context. Every time a
> >> client opens "/dev/teeX", a new context is created to keep track of
> >> the allocated resources, including opened sessions and remote objects. Any
> >> effort for sharing resources between two independent clients requires
> >> involvement of context manager, i.e. the back-end driver. This requires
> >> implementing some form of policy in the back-end driver.
> >
> > What kind of resource sharing?
>
> TEE subsystem "rightfully" allocates a context each time a client opens
> a device file. This context pass around to the backend driver to identify
> independent clients that opened the device file.
>
> The context is used by backend driver to keep track of the resources. Type
> of resources are TEE driver dependent. As an example of resource in TEE
> subsystem, you can look into 'shm' register and unregister (specially,
> see comment in function 'shm_alloc_helper').
>
> For MinkIPC, all clients are treated the same and the TEE-Handles are
> representative of the resources, accessible "globally" if a client has the
> capability for them. In kernel, clients access an object if they have
> access to "qcom_tee_object", in userspace, clients access an object if
> they have the FD wrapper for the TEE-Handle.
So if a client has a file descriptor representing a TEE-Handle, then
it has the capability to access a TEE-object? Is the kernel
controlling anything more about these capabilities?
>
> If we use context, instead of the file descriptor table, any form of object
> transfer requires involvement of the backend driver. If we use the file
> descriptor table, contexts are becoming useless for MinkIPC (i.e.
> 'ctx->data' will "always" be null).
You still need to open a device to be able to create TEE-handles.
>
> >
> >> 3. The TEE subsystem supports two type of memory sharing:
> >> - per-device memory pools, and
> >> - user defined memory references.
> >> User defined memory references are private to the application and cannot
> >> be shared. Memory allocated from per-device "shared" pools are accessible
> >> using a file descriptor. It can be mapped by any process if it has
> >> access to it. This means, we cannot provide the resource isolation
> >> between two clients. Assume a scenario when a client wants to allocate a
> >> memory (which is shared with TEE) from an "isolated" pool and share it
> >> with another client, without the right to access the contents of memory.
> >
> > This doesn't explain, why would it want to share such memory with
> > another client.
>
> Ok, I believe there is a misunderstanding here. I did not try to justify
> specific usecase. We want to separate the memory allocation from the
> framework. This way, how the memory is obtained, e.g. it is allocated
> (1) from an isolated pool, (2) a shared pool, (3) a secure heap,
> (4) a system dma-heap, (5) process address space, or (6) other memory
> with "different constraints", becomes independent.
Especially points 3 and 4 are of great interest for the TEE Subsystem.
>
> We introduced "memory object" type. User implements a kernel service
> using "qcom_tee_object" to represent the memory object. We have an
> implementation of memory objects based on dma-buf.
Do you have an idea of what it would take to extend to TEE subsystem
to cover this?
>
> >
> >> 4. The kernel API provided by TEE subsystem does not support a kernel
> >> supplicant. Adding support requires an execution context (e.g. a
> >> kernel thread) due to the TEE subsystem design. tee_driver_ops supports
> >> only "send" and "receive" callbacks and to deliver a request, someone
> >> should wait on "receive".
So far we haven't needed a kernel thread, but if you need one feel
free to propose something.
> >
> > There is nothing wrong here, but maybe I'm misunderstanding something.
>
> I agree. But, I am trying to re-emphasize how useful TEE subsystem is
> for MinkIPC. For kernel services, we solely rely on the backend driver.
> For instance, to expose RPMB service we will use "qcom_tee_object".
> So there is nothing provided by the framework to simplify the service
> development.
The same is true for all backend drivers.
>
> >
> >> We need a callback to "dispatch" or "handle" a request in the context of
> >> the client thread. It should redirect a request to a kernel service or
> >> a user supplicant. In TEE subsystem such requirement should be implemented
> >> in TEE back-end driver, independent from the TEE subsystem.
> >>
> >> 5. The UAPI provided by TEE subsystem is similar to the GPTEE Client
> >> interface. This interface is not suitable for a capability system.
> >> For instance, there is no session in a capability system which means
> >> either its should not be used, or we should overload its definition.
Not using the session field doesn't seem like such a big obstacle.
Overloading it for something different might be messy. We can add a
new IOCTL if needed as I mentioned above.
> >
> > General comment: maybe adding more detailed explanation of how the
> > capabilities are aquired and how they can be used might make sense.
> >
> > BTW. It might be my imperfect English, but each time I see the word
> > 'capability' I'm thinking that some is capable of doing something. I
> > find it hard to use 'capability' for the reference to another object.
> >
>
> Explained at the top :).
>
> >>
> >> Can we use TEE subsystem?
> >> -------------------------
> >> There are workarounds for some of the issues above. The question is if we
> >> should define our own UAPI or try to use a hack-y way of fitting into
> >> the TEE subsystem. I am using word hack-y, as most of the workaround
> >> involves:
Instead of hack-y workarounds, we should consider extending the TEE
subsystem as needed.
> >>
> >> - "diverging from the definition". For instance, ignoring the session
> >> open and close ioctl calls or use file descriptors for all remote
> >> resources (as, fd is the closet to capability) which undermines the
> >> isolation provided by the contexts,
> >>
> >> - "overloading the variables". For instance, passing object ID as file
> >> descriptors in a place of session ID, or
struct qcom_tee_object_invoke_arg and struct tee_ioctl_invoke_arg are
quite similar, there are only a few more fields in the latter and we
are missing a TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_OBJECT. Does it make sense to
have a direction on objects?
> >>
> >> - "bypass TEE subsystem". For instance, extensively rely on meta
> >> parameters or push everything (e.g. kernel services) to the back-end
> >> driver, which means leaving almost all TEE subsystem unused.
The TEE subsystem is largely "bypassed" by all backend drivers, with
the exception of some SHM handling.
I'm sure the TEE subsystem can be extended to handle the "common" part
of SHM handling needed by QTEE.
> >>
> >> We cannot take the full benefits of TEE subsystem and may need to
> >> implement most of the requirements in the back-end driver. Also, as
> >> discussed above, the UAPI is not suitable for capability-based use cases.
> >> We proposed a new set of ioctl calls for SMC-Invoke driver.
> >>
> >> In this series we posted three patches. We implemented a transport
> >> driver that provides qcom_tee_object. Any object on secure side is
> >> represented with an instance of qcom_tee_object and any struct exposed
> >> to TEE should embed an instance of qcom_tee_object. Any, support for new
> >> services, e.g. memory object, RPMB, userspace clients or supplicants are
> >> implemented independently from the driver.
> >>
> >> We have a simple memory object and a user driver that uses
> >> qcom_tee_object.
> >
> > Could you please point out any user for the uAPI? I'd like to understand
> > how does it from from the userspace point of view.
>
> Sure :), I'll write up a test patch and send it in next series.
>
> Summary.
>
> TEE framework provides some nice facilities, including:
> - uapi and ioctl interface,
> - marshaling parameters and context management,
> - memory mapping and sharing, and
> - TEE bus and TA drivers.
>
> For, MinkIPC, we will not use any of them. The only usable piece, is uapi
> interface which is not suitable for MinkIPC, as discussed above.
I hope that we can change that. :-)
For instance, extending the TEE subsystem with the memory-sharing QTEE
needs could be useful for other TEE drivers.
Cheers,
Jens
Main updates from version V7[1]
Update the series based on Mathieu Poirier's comments.
Details of the updates are listed in the commit messages of the patches.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20240611073904.475019-1-arnaud.pou…
base-commit: 1613e604df0cd359cf2a7fbd9be7a0bcfacfabd0
Description of the feature:
--------------------------
This series proposes the implementation of a remoteproc tee driver to
communicate with a TEE trusted application responsible for authenticating
and loading the remoteproc firmware image in an Arm secure context.
1) Principle:
The remoteproc tee driver provides services to communicate with the OP-TEE
trusted application running on the Trusted Execution Context (TEE).
The trusted application in TEE manages the remote processor lifecycle:
- authenticating and loading firmware images,
- isolating and securing the remote processor memories,
- supporting multi-firmware (e.g., TF-M + Zephyr on a Cortex-M33),
- managing the start and stop of the firmware by the TEE.
2) Format of the signed image:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/src/remoteproc…
3) OP-TEE trusted application API:
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/ta/remoteproc/include/ta_rem…
4) OP-TEE signature script
Refer to:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/blob/master/scripts/sign_rproc_fw.py
Example of usage:
sign_rproc_fw.py --in <fw1.elf> --in <fw2.elf> --out <signed_fw.sign> --key ${OP-TEE_PATH}/keys/default.pem
5) Impact on User space Application
No sysfs impact.the user only needs to provide the signed firmware image
instead of the ELF image.
For more information about the implementation, a presentation is available here
(note that the format of the signed image has evolved between the presentation
and the integration in OP-TEE).
https://resources.linaro.org/en/resource/6c5bGvZwUAjX56fvxthxds
Arnaud Pouliquen (5):
remoteproc: core: Introduce rproc_pa_to_va helper
remoteproc: Add TEE support
dt-bindings: remoteproc: Add compatibility for TEE support
remoteproc: stm32: Create sub-functions to request shutdown and
release
remoteproc: stm32: Add support of an OP-TEE TA to load the firmware
.../bindings/remoteproc/st,stm32-rproc.yaml | 58 ++-
drivers/remoteproc/Kconfig | 10 +
drivers/remoteproc/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 46 ++
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c | 446 ++++++++++++++++++
drivers/remoteproc/stm32_rproc.c | 147 ++++--
include/linux/remoteproc.h | 5 +
include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h | 100 ++++
8 files changed, 769 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_tee.c
create mode 100644 include/linux/remoteproc_tee.h
base-commit: 1613e604df0cd359cf2a7fbd9be7a0bcfacfabd0
--
2.25.1
[BCC all OP-TEE maintainers]
Hi OP-TEE maintainers & contributors,
OP-TEE v4.3.0 is scheduled to be released on 2024-07-12. So, now is
a good time to start testing the master branch on the various platforms
and report/fix any bugs.
The GitHub pull request for collecting Tested-by tags or any other
comments is https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/6906.
As usual, we will create a release candidate tag one week before the
release date for final testing.
In addition to that you can find some additional information related to
releases here: https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/releases.html
Thanks,
Jens
Hello arm-soc maintainers,
Please pull this small patch fixing a few missing-field-initializers warnings
in the optee driver.
Thanks,
Jens
The following changes since commit a38297e3fb012ddfa7ce0321a7e5a8daeb1872b6:
Linux 6.9 (2024-05-12 14:12:29 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git/ tags/optee-fix-for-v6.11
for you to fetch changes up to e0556255a53d6d3d406a28362dffd972018a997c:
tee: optee: ffa: Fix missing-field-initializers warning (2024-06-27 10:27:31 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Fix optee missing-field-initializers warning
----------------------------------------------------------------
Mark-PK Tsai (1):
tee: optee: ffa: Fix missing-field-initializers warning
drivers/tee/optee/ffa_abi.c | 12 +++++++++---
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Hello arm-soc maintainers,
Please pull this small patch to the OP-TEE driver that adds a timemout
parameter when OP-TEE is waiting for a notification via RPC.
Thanks,
Jens
The following changes since commit a38297e3fb012ddfa7ce0321a7e5a8daeb1872b6:
Linux 6.9 (2024-05-12 14:12:29 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git/ tags/optee-notif-wait-timeout-for-v6.11
for you to fetch changes up to 14ca6401d8703725c7297dcc4bf8de73323411ac:
optee: add timeout value to optee_notif_wait() to support timeout (2024-05-30 10:19:28 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
optee: add timeout parameter for notification wait
----------------------------------------------------------------
Gavin Liu (1):
optee: add timeout value to optee_notif_wait() to support timeout
drivers/tee/optee/notif.c | 9 +++++++--
drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 5 ++++-
drivers/tee/optee/optee_rpc_cmd.h | 1 +
drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 10 ++++++++--
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)