The current code waits for data to be available before attempting a
second read. However the second read would not be executed as the
while loop will exit.
This fix does not wait if all data has been read (skips the call to
msleep(0)) and reads a second time if partial data was retrieved on
the first read.
Worth noticing that since msleep(0) schedules a one jiffy timeout is
better to skip such a call.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge(a)foundries.io>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org>
---
drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
index 5bc4700c4dae..a99d82949981 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
@@ -122,14 +122,14 @@ static int optee_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wait)
if (max > MAX_ENTROPY_REQ_SZ)
max = MAX_ENTROPY_REQ_SZ;
- while (read == 0) {
+ while (read < max) {
rng_size = get_optee_rng_data(pvt_data, data, (max - read));
data += rng_size;
read += rng_size;
if (wait && pvt_data->data_rate) {
- if (timeout-- == 0)
+ if ((timeout-- == 0) || (read == max))
return read;
msleep((1000 * (max - read)) / pvt_data->data_rate);
} else {
--
2.17.1
Data rates of MAX_UINT32 will schedule an unnecessary one jiffy
timeout on the call to msleep. Avoid this scenario by using 0 as the
unlimited data rate.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge(a)foundries.io>
---
drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
index 49b2e02537dd..5bc4700c4dae 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int optee_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wait)
data += rng_size;
read += rng_size;
- if (wait) {
+ if (wait && pvt_data->data_rate) {
if (timeout-- == 0)
return read;
msleep((1000 * (max - read)) / pvt_data->data_rate);
--
2.17.1
Hi,
In parallel with - and based on - the work by Jens to enable PSA FF-A as a transport for the SMC ABI (recently merged to the upstream as PR #3908) there's an effort to provide a fully-functional SPMC component in OP-TEE to manage S-EL0 Secure Partitions, with the goal of providing a similar set of PSA Root of Trust services over OP-TEE as presently supported for M-profile processors, while also providing a standard execution framework and ABI for potential integration of 3rd party partitions, such as StMM.
Please note that this work is currently at the prototyping stage and is managed as a fork on trustedfirmware.org, but is planned to be merged with the official OP-TEE stream as it matures.
There's an initial set of patches on review to provide
* A library for S-EL0 SPs to access FF-A ABI at the SVC call interface:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/OP-TEE/optee_os/+/4751
* A change to introduce an SP build system to OP-TEE:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/OP-TEE/optee_os/+/4752
* OP-TEE kernel changes to support initialization and context management of SPs and the forwarding of FF-A messages to their designated endpoints:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/OP-TEE/optee_os/+/4987
All related open reviews at the moment can be found here:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/q/project:OP-TEE%252Foptee_os+status:open
For the S-EL1 SPMC configuration functionality and requirements see the PSA FF-A specification (https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0077/latest)
Work is in progress to showcase the capabilities of the framework using a subset of PSA Crypto API and also to propose a standardized protocol layer for partitions, but as mentioned work is still at the early stages so expect gradual increments in functionality and flexibility.
Any questions and feedback are very welcome
Cheers,
Miklos
IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you.
Hi Jerome,
On Fri, Jul 24, 2020 at 02:57:34PM +0000, Jérôme Forissier via OP-TEE wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Anyone know if the planned dates of OP-TEE releases are publicly available
> somewhere?
>
Still a bit legacy regarding that, i.e., still tracked in the Linaro
Jira instance. Even though the "Linaro OP-TEE Contributions" is publicly
available, the release schedule seems to be locked down.
> Readthedocs [1] documents that we do quarterly releases, but it would help
> to have a more precise indication, at least for the next (upcoming) release.
>
Agree, I can replicate what we have in the Jira instance and put that on
the release page you're referring to.
> Can we count on 3.10.0 being made available by the end of August?
>
Yes, so it's about time to initiate the release work for that tag. As
maintainers, let's sync up on that separately.
Here are the dates for future releases.
Version Start date Release date
OP-TEE 3.10.0 23/May/20 21/Aug/20
OP-TEE 3.11.0 22/Aug/20 16/Oct/20
OP-TEE 3.12.0 17/Oct/20 15/Jan/21
OP-TEE 3.13.0 16/Jan/21 16/Apr/21
> [1] https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/releases.html
>
> Thanks,
> --
> Jerome
> --
> OP-TEE mailing list
> OP-TEE(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/op-tee
--
Regards,
Joakim
Hi,
Anyone know if the planned dates of OP-TEE releases are publicly available
somewhere?
Readthedocs [1] documents that we do quarterly releases, but it would help
to have a more precise indication, at least for the next (upcoming) release.
Can we count on 3.10.0 being made available by the end of August?
[1] https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/releases.html
Thanks,
--
Jerome
On Sat, 18 Jul 2020 13:50:58 -0300
"Daniel W. S. Almeida" <dwlsalmeida(a)gmail.com> wrote:
> TEE bus infrastructure registers following APIs:
> -- match(): iterates over the client driver UUID table to find a corresponding
> - match for device UUID. If a match is found, then this particular device is
> - probed via corresponding probe API registered by the client driver. This
> - process happens whenever a device or a client driver is registered with TEE
> - bus.
> -- uevent(): notifies user-space (udev) whenever a new device is registered on
> - TEE bus for auto-loading of modularized client drivers.
> +
> +match():
> + iterates over the client driver UUID table to find a corresponding
> + match for device UUID. If a match is found, then this particular device is
> + probed via corresponding probe API registered by the client driver. This
> + process happens whenever a device or a client driver is registered with TEE
> + bus.
> +
> +uevent():
> + notifies user-space (udev) whenever a new device is registered on
> + TEE bus for auto-loading of modularized client drivers.
Just FWIW, this could have been fixed by adding a blank line between the
two bulleted entries. This fix is fine too, though, applied, thanks.
jon
Data rates of MAX_UINT32 will schedule an unnecessary one jiffy
timeout on the call to msleep. Avoid this scenario by using 0 as the
unlimited data rate.
Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge(a)foundries.io>
---
drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
index 49b2e02537dd..5bc4700c4dae 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/optee-rng.c
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int optee_rng_read(struct hwrng *rng, void *buf, size_t max, bool wait)
data += rng_size;
read += rng_size;
- if (wait) {
+ if (wait && pvt_data->data_rate) {
if (timeout-- == 0)
return read;
msleep((1000 * (max - read)) / pvt_data->data_rate);
--
2.17.1
Hello arm-soc maintainers,
Please pull these patches enabling multi-stage OP-TEE bus enumeration
and also adds a TPM driver for a OP-TEE based fTPM Trusted Application.
The TPM driver depends on and takes advantage of the multi-stage OP-TEE bus
enumeration by indicating that it should be probed after tee-supplicant has
been started.
Jarkko, one of the TPM maintainers, has been involved in reviewing these
patches and agrees that I can include the TPM patch in the pull request.
Thanks,
Jens
The following changes since commit 3d77e6a8804abcc0504c904bd6e5cdf3a5cf8162:
Linux 5.7 (2020-05-31 16:49:15 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/optee-bus-for-v5.9
for you to fetch changes up to 9f1944c23c8cb1c033b73de80cf6c612a2a80a2b:
tpm_ftpm_tee: register driver on TEE bus (2020-07-10 09:41:58 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Enable multi-stage OP-TEE bus enumeration
Probes drivers on the OP-TEE bus in two steps. First for drivers which
do not depend on tee-supplicant. After tee-supplicant has been started
probe the devices which do depend on tee-supplicant.
Also introduces driver which uses an OP-TEE based fTPM Trusted
Application depends on tee-supplicant NV RAM implementation based on
RPMB secure storage.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Maxim Uvarov (3):
optee: use uuid for sysfs driver entry
optee: enable support for multi-stage bus enumeration
tpm_ftpm_tee: register driver on TEE bus
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-optee-devices | 8 +++
MAINTAINERS | 1 +
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++----
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 27 ++++++++-
drivers/tee/optee/device.c | 38 ++++++------
drivers/tee/optee/optee_private.h | 10 +++-
6 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-bus-optee-devices
Hi Saad,
On Thu, Jun 18, 2020 at 9:43 AM Muhammad Saad via OP-TEE
<op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>
> Hello All,
>
> First, I hope you are safe and doing fine in the unfortunate COVID-19 situation. I am a Ph.D. student at the University of Central Florida. Currently, I am working on a TEE-based prototype application for a proof-of-concept. Since I am totally new in this domain, so it is taking some effort. I have a few questions and I hope you guys can help me in that.
>
> At present, I am able to set up OP-TEE on Qemu and run the examples on the normal world and the secure world. Additionally, I tweaked a few parameters (ie., the integer value in the main.c) for the CA and the addition and subtraction sequence in the TA. Upon building it again (cd/build/make all run), it seems to work. However, if I need to pass a normal string to the TA and the TA computes Sha256 of the string and returns the value, what steps do I need to take? In other words, how can I pass a tuple from the TA to the CA and obtain the Hash of the tuple. Additionally, if I am able to do that by tailoring the HelloWorld examples, how can I develop new CA and TA with unique UUID and perform the same procedure. Finally, instead of doing the entire (cd/build/make all run), is there a method by which I can simply build the application and alone and run it on Qemu?
You can find an example of doing some hashing at
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_test/blob/391168ec03980e1cc8fb6d3e3c4b42481…
You'll need to look around a little to get the whole picture, but it
shouldn't be too hard.
If you only change a TA or some client application it's enough to rebuild with:
make buildroot
and then run it with:
make run-only
A new UUID can be obtained with the Linux command uuidgen.
Cheers,
Jens
>
> I understand that these must be trivial questions, however, I will deeply appreciate if you can help me in figuring them out.
>
>
> Best,
>
> Saad
> --
> OP-TEE mailing list
> OP-TEE(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/op-tee
There are two patches that previously was mailed separatedly. Both
patches fix issues found during testing the OP-TEE 3.9 release.
Julien and Stefano suggested to include this patches in Xen 4.14
release, because optee support still in the preview state and those
patches provide no new functionality, bugfixes only.
Volodymyr Babchuk (2):
optee: immediately free buffers that are released by OP-TEE
optee: allow plain TMEM buffers with NULL address
xen/arch/arm/tee/optee.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--
2.26.2
Hi all
The new TrustedFirmware.org security incident process is now live. This process is described here:
https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/security_center/repor…
Initially the process will be used for the following projects: TF-A, TF-M, OP-TEE and Mbed TLS. The security documentation for each project will be updated soon to reflect this change.
If you are part of an organization that believes it should receive security vulnerability information before it is made public then please ask your relevant colleagues to register as Trusted Stakeholders as described here:
https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/collaboration/security_center/trust…
Note we prefer individuals in each organization to coordinate their registration requests with each other and to provide us with an email alias managed by your organization instead of us managing a long list of individual addresses.
Best regards
Dan.
(on behalf of the TrustedFirmware.org security team)
Update documentation with TEE bus infrastructure which provides an
interface for kernel client drivers to communicate with corresponding
Trusted Application.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org>
---
Changes in v2:
- Add TEE client driver example snippet.
Documentation/tee.txt | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 68 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/tee.txt b/Documentation/tee.txt
index c8fad81..350dd40 100644
--- a/Documentation/tee.txt
+++ b/Documentation/tee.txt
@@ -53,6 +53,66 @@ clients, forward them to the TEE and send back the results. In the case of
supplicants the communication goes in the other direction, the TEE sends
requests to the supplicant which then sends back the result.
+The TEE kernel interface
+========================
+
+Kernel provides a TEE bus infrastructure where a Trusted Application is
+represented as a device identified via Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) and
+client drivers register a table of supported device UUIDs.
+
+TEE bus infrastructure registers following APIs:
+- match(): iterates over the client driver UUID table to find a corresponding
+ match for device UUID. If a match is found, then this particular device is
+ probed via corresponding probe API registered by the client driver. This
+ process happens whenever a device or a client driver is registered with TEE
+ bus.
+- uevent(): notifies user-space (udev) whenever a new device is registered on
+ TEE bus for auto-loading of modularized client drivers.
+
+TEE bus device enumeration is specific to underlying TEE implementation, so it
+is left open for TEE drivers to provide corresponding implementation.
+
+Then TEE client driver can talk to a matched Trusted Application using APIs
+listed in include/linux/tee_drv.h.
+
+TEE client driver example
+-------------------------
+
+Suppose a TEE client driver needs to communicate with a Trusted Application
+having UUID: ``ac6a4085-0e82-4c33-bf98-8eb8e118b6c2``, so driver registration
+snippet would look like::
+
+ static const struct tee_client_device_id client_id_table[] = {
+ {UUID_INIT(0xac6a4085, 0x0e82, 0x4c33,
+ 0xbf, 0x98, 0x8e, 0xb8, 0xe1, 0x18, 0xb6, 0xc2)},
+ {}
+ };
+
+ MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(tee, client_id_table);
+
+ static struct tee_client_driver client_driver = {
+ .id_table = client_id_table,
+ .driver = {
+ .name = DRIVER_NAME,
+ .bus = &tee_bus_type,
+ .probe = client_probe,
+ .remove = client_remove,
+ },
+ };
+
+ static int __init client_init(void)
+ {
+ return driver_register(&client_driver.driver);
+ }
+
+ static void __exit client_exit(void)
+ {
+ driver_unregister(&client_driver.driver);
+ }
+
+ module_init(client_init);
+ module_exit(client_exit);
+
OP-TEE driver
=============
@@ -112,6 +172,14 @@ kernel are handled by the kernel driver. Other RPC messages will be forwarded to
tee-supplicant without further involvement of the driver, except switching
shared memory buffer representation.
+OP-TEE device enumeration
+-------------------------
+
+OP-TEE provides a pseudo Trusted Application: drivers/tee/optee/device.c in
+order to support device enumeration. In other words, OP-TEE driver invokes this
+application to retrieve a list of Trusted Applications which can be registered
+as devices on the TEE bus.
+
AMD-TEE driver
==============
--
2.7.4
Hello All,
First, I hope you are safe and doing fine in the unfortunate COVID-19 situation. I am a Ph.D. student at the University of Central Florida. Currently, I am working on a TEE-based prototype application for a proof-of-concept. Since I am totally new in this domain, so it is taking some effort. I have a few questions and I hope you guys can help me in that.
At present, I am able to set up OP-TEE on Qemu and run the examples on the normal world and the secure world. Additionally, I tweaked a few parameters (ie., the integer value in the main.c) for the CA and the addition and subtraction sequence in the TA. Upon building it again (cd/build/make all run), it seems to work. However, if I need to pass a normal string to the TA and the TA computes Sha256 of the string and returns the value, what steps do I need to take? In other words, how can I pass a tuple from the TA to the CA and obtain the Hash of the tuple. Additionally, if I am able to do that by tailoring the HelloWorld examples, how can I develop new CA and TA with unique UUID and perform the same procedure. Finally, instead of doing the entire (cd/build/make all run), is there a method by which I can simply build the application and alone and run it on Qemu?
I understand that these must be trivial questions, however, I will deeply appreciate if you can help me in figuring them out.
Best,
Saad
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is
an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based early TA which is already
merged in upstream [1].
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/f86ab8e7e0de869dfa25ca05a37ee070d…
Changes in v5:
1. Drop dynamic detection of trust source and use compile time flags
instead.
2. Rename trusted_common.c -> trusted_core.c.
3. Rename callback: cleanup() -> exit().
4. Drop "tk" acronym.
5. Other misc. comments.
6. Added review tags for patch #3 and #4.
Changes in v4:
1. Pushed independent TEE features separately:
- Part of recent TEE PR: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/4/1062
2. Updated trusted-encrypted doc with TEE as a new trust source.
3. Rebased onto latest tpmdd/master.
Changes in v3:
1. Update patch #2 to support registration of multiple kernel pages.
2. Incoporate dependency patch #4 in this patch-set:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11091435/
Changes in v2:
1. Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2.
2. Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3.
3. Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
Sumit Garg (4):
KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 203 ++++++++++---
MAINTAINERS | 8 +
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 48 ++++
include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 +++++
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 15 -
security/keys/Kconfig | 31 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 6 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 321 +++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 280 ++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 335 ++++------------------
10 files changed, 981 insertions(+), 332 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
--
2.7.4
Hi,
I think that Clang erroneously discards a function annotated with
__attribute__((constructor)) when flags -Os -fno-common are given. Test
case below.
What do you think?
Thanks.
----8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------
$ cat ctor.c
int val;
static void __attribute__((constructor)) init_fn(void)
{
val = 1;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
return val;
}
----8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------
Here is what I observed:
- Clang (10.0.0-4ubuntu1) with -Os -fno-common: function init_fn() is
NOT emitted,
- Clang (10.0.0-4ubuntu1) with no flag, or only -Os or -fno-common:
init_fn() is present as expected,
- GCC (Ubuntu 9.3.0-10ubuntu1) with the same flags: init_fn() is present
too,
- Since https://reviews.llvm.org/D75056, -fno-common is the default and
therefore -Os is enough to cause the issue.
----8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------
$ clang --target=arm-linux-gnueabihf -Os -fno-common -S ctor.c \
-o /dev/stdout | grep init_fn
$ clang --target=arm-linux-gnueabihf -Os -S ctor.c \
-o /dev/stdout | grep init_fn
.p2align 2 @ -- Begin function init_fn
.type init_fn,%function
.code 32 @ @init_fn
init_fn:
.size init_fn, .Lfunc_end0-init_fn
.long init_fn(target1)
.addrsig_sym init_fn
$ clang --target=arm-linux-gnueabihf -fno-common -S ctor.c \
-o /dev/stdout | grep init_fn
.p2align 2 @ -- Begin function init_fn
.type init_fn,%function
.code 32 @ @init_fn
init_fn:
.size init_fn, .Lfunc_end0-init_fn
.long init_fn(target1)
.addrsig_sym init_fn
$ arm-linux-gnueabihf-gcc -Os -fno-common -S ctor.c \
-o /dev/stdout | grep init_fn
.type init_fn, %function
init_fn:
.size init_fn, .-init_fn
.word init_fn(target1)
----8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------8<--------
--
Jerome
Update documentation with TEE bus infrastructure which provides an
interface for kernel client drivers to communicate with corresponding
Trusted Application.
Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org>
---
Documentation/tee.txt | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 30 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/tee.txt b/Documentation/tee.txt
index c8fad81..428d3b5 100644
--- a/Documentation/tee.txt
+++ b/Documentation/tee.txt
@@ -53,6 +53,28 @@ clients, forward them to the TEE and send back the results. In the case of
supplicants the communication goes in the other direction, the TEE sends
requests to the supplicant which then sends back the result.
+The TEE kernel interface
+========================
+
+Kernel provides a TEE bus infrastructure where a Trusted Application is
+represented as a device identified via Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) and
+client drivers register a table of supported device UUIDs.
+
+TEE bus infrastructure registers following APIs:
+- match(): iterates over the client driver UUID table to find a corresponding
+ match for device UUID. If a match is found, then this particular device is
+ probed via corresponding probe API registered by the client driver. This
+ process happens whenever a device or a client driver is registered with TEE
+ bus.
+- uevent(): notifies user-space (udev) whenever a new device is registered on
+ TEE bus for auto-loading of modularized client drivers.
+
+TEE bus device enumeration is specific to underlying TEE implementation, so it
+is left open for TEE drivers to provide corresponding implementation.
+
+Then TEE client driver can talk to a matched Trusted Application using APIs
+listed in include/linux/tee_drv.h.
+
OP-TEE driver
=============
@@ -112,6 +134,14 @@ kernel are handled by the kernel driver. Other RPC messages will be forwarded to
tee-supplicant without further involvement of the driver, except switching
shared memory buffer representation.
+OP-TEE device enumeration
+-------------------------
+
+OP-TEE provides a pseudo Trusted Application: drivers/tee/optee/device.c in
+order to support device enumeration. In other words, OP-TEE driver invokes this
+application to retrieve a list of Trusted Applications which can be registered
+as devices on the TEE bus.
+
AMD-TEE driver
==============
--
2.7.4
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is
an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based early TA which can be
found here [1].
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3838
Changes in v4:
1. Pushed independent TEE features separately:
- Part of recent TEE PR: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/4/1062
2. Updated trusted-encrypted doc with TEE as a new trust source.
3. Rebased onto latest tpmdd/master.
Changes in v3:
1. Update patch #2 to support registration of multiple kernel pages.
2. Incoporate dependency patch #4 in this patch-set:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11091435/
Changes in v2:
1. Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2.
2. Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3.
3. Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
Sumit Garg (4):
KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source
MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 203 ++++++++++---
MAINTAINERS | 8 +
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 48 ++++
include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 66 +++++
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 15 -
security/keys/Kconfig | 3 +
security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_common.c | 336 ++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 282 ++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 335 ++++-----------------
10 files changed, 974 insertions(+), 324 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_common.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
--
2.7.4
Hi,
I experienced a crash in code compiled with Clang 10.0.0 due to a
misaligned 64-bit data access. The (ARMv8) CPU is configured with SCTL.A
== 1 (alignment check enable). With SCTLR.A == 0 the code runs as expected.
After some investigation I came up with the following reproducer:
---8<-------8<-------8<-------8<-------8<-------8<-------8<-------
$ cat test.c
extern char *g;
int memcmp(const void *s1, const void *s2, unsigned long n);
int f(void *c)
{
return memcmp(g, c, 16);
}
$ clang --target=aarch64-linux-gnu -Os -mstrict-align -S test.c
$ cat test.s
.text
.file "test.c"
.globl f // -- Begin function f
.p2align 2
.type f,@function
f: // @f
// %bb.0:
adrp x8, g
ldr x10, [x8, :lo12:g]
ldr x9, [x0]
ldr x8, [x10]
rev x9, x9
rev x8, x8
cmp x8, x9
b.ne .LBB0_3
// %bb.1:
ldr x8, [x10, #8]
ldr x9, [x0, #8]
rev x8, x8
rev x9, x9
cmp x8, x9
b.ne .LBB0_3
// %bb.2:
mov w0, wzr
ret
.LBB0_3:
cmp x8, x9
mov w8, #-1
cneg w0, w8, hs
ret
.Lfunc_end0:
.size f, .Lfunc_end0-f
// -- End function
.ident "clang version 10.0.0-4ubuntu1 "
.section ".note.GNU-stack","",@progbits
.addrsig
---8<-------8<-------8<-------8<-------8<-------8<-------8<-------
Note the 'ldr x9, [x0]'. At this point there is no guarantee that x0 is
a multiple of 8, so why is Clang generating this code?
Thanks,
--
Jerome
FYI, the "80 column" rule has just evolved a bit:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?…
So it is now s "<= 80 columns preferred, but up to 100 is OK". Since we are
mostly following the Linux coding style, I think this should apply to
OP-TEE as well.
Personally, I think it's a good thing as it will help avoid some silly line
breaks in long debug messages for instance.
--
Jerome
[BCC all OP-TEE maintainers]
Hi OP-TEE maintainers & contributors,
We're about to make another OP-TEE release, namely: 3.9.0. Target is
Friday, May 22th which leaves us almost 3 weeks to finalize the
release.
Please start testing your favorite platform(s) and report any issue in
this pull request [1]. I will create a release candidate tag one week
before the release date, at which point we will do some more testing and
I will collect Tested-by tags in the same pull request.
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3833
Thanks!
Regards,
Jens
TEE Client API defines that from user space only information needed for
specified login operations is group identifier for group based logins.
REE kernel is expected to formulate trustworthy client UUID and pass that
to TEE environment. REE kernel is required to verify that provided group
identifier for group based logins matches calling processes group
memberships.
TEE specification only defines that the information passed from REE
environment to TEE environment is encoded into on UUID.
In order to guarantee trustworthiness of client UUID user space is not
allowed to freely pass client UUID.
Vesa Jääskeläinen (3):
tee: add support for session's client UUID generation
tee: optee: Add support for session login client UUID generation
[RFC] tee: add support for app id for client UUID generation
drivers/tee/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 6 +-
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 211 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 16 +++
4 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.17.1
Changes v1->v2:
* Changed goto labels to be more logical
* Capture error if formatted string for UUIDv5 does not fit into buffer
Notes:
This patcheset has been designed so that it can be iteratively intergrated
meaning that the application ID (RFC patch) part can be left for later when
there is agreed solution for that.
TEE specification leaves Linux behavior undefined. It does not define any
UUID value for name space. UUID in here is randomly generated with uuidgen
tool.
I have also include amdtee people as this method probably should also be
applied in there.
Using op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org instead of tee-dev(a)lists.linaro.org as
latter is deprecated old list.
Original issue in OP-TEE OS tracker:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/3642
Related reviews and demonstration for the concept:
https://github.com/linaro-swg/linux/pull/74https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_client/pull/195https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_test/pull/406
TEE Client API defines that from user space only information needed for
specified login operations is group identifier for group based logins.
REE kernel is expected to formulate trustworthy client UUID and pass that
to TEE environment. REE kernel is required to verify that provided group
identifier for group based logins matches calling processes group
memberships.
TEE specification only defines that the information passed from REE
environment to TEE environment is encoded into on UUID.
In order to guarantee trustworthiness of client UUID user space is not
allowed to freely pass client UUID.
Vesa Jääskeläinen (3):
tee: add support for session's client UUID generation
tee: optee: Add support for session login client UUID generation
[RFC] tee: add support for app id for client UUID generation
drivers/tee/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 6 +-
drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 188 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/tee_drv.h | 16 ++++
4 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.17.1
Notes:
This patcheset has been designed so that it can be iteratively intergrated
meaning that the application ID (RFC patch) part can be left for later when
there is agreed solution for that.
TEE specification leaves Linux behavior undefined. It does not define any
UUID value for name space. UUID in here is randomly generated with uuidgen
tool.
I have also include amdtee people as this method probably should also be
applied in there.
Using op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org instead of tee-dev(a)lists.linaro.org as
latter is deprecated old list.
Original issue in OP-TEE OS tracker:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/3642
Related reviews and demonstration for the concept:
https://github.com/linaro-swg/linux/pull/74https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_client/pull/195https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_test/pull/406
This patchset creates the DT property /chosen/kaslr-seed which is used
by the OS for Address Space Layout Randomization. If the machine is
secure, a similar property is created under /secure-chosen.
Changes since v1:
- Move creation of /secure-chosen to create_fdt()
- Use qemu_guest_getrandom() instead of qcrypto_random_bytes()
- Create kaslr-seed for the non-secure OS too
Jerome Forissier (2):
hw/arm/virt: dt: move creation of /secure-chosen to create_fdt()
hw/arm/virt: dt: add kaslr-seed property
hw/arm/virt.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--
2.20.1