Hello arm-soc maintainers,
Please pull this patch adding tracepoints around calls to OP-TEE in
secure world.
Thanks,
Jens
The following changes since commit a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15:
Linux 5.12-rc2 (2021-03-05 17:33:41 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/optee-tracepoints-for-v5.13
for you to fetch changes up to 0101947dbcc3204f08fb5b69a21dbd4b1535cad6:
tee: optee: add invoke_fn tracepoints (2021-03-15 12:04:01 +0100)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Add tracepoints around calls to secure world
----------------------------------------------------------------
Jisheng Zhang (1):
tee: optee: add invoke_fn tracepoints
drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 4 +++
drivers/tee/optee/optee_trace.h | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 71 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 drivers/tee/optee/optee_trace.h
Hi,
LOC monthly meeting is planned to take place Thursday March 25th(a)16.00
(UTC+1).
Current topics on the agenda are:
- RNG in OP-TEE: This was proposed by Jorge for Foundries.io who created a
couple of patches in a pull request. However he's unable to continue
working with that, but no matter it's a good discussion, so I've left it on
the agenda.
- OCALL: Then there has been a patch set / PR: OCALL pull request, Jerome
wanted to discuss what the next steps are.
There is most likely room for additional topics, so feel free to suggest.
Meeting details:
---------------
Date/time: Thursday March 25th(a)16.00 (UTC+1)
https://everytimezone.com/s/3596d6d3
Connection details: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/
Meeting notes: http://bit.ly/loc-notes
Project page: https://www.linaro.org/projects/#LOC
Regards,
Joakim on behalf of the Linaro OP-TEE team
Hi Peng,
1-Asynchronous preemption of SP:
The long route is to make changes in the dispatcher and the
corresponding SPD implementation to have synchronous preemption.
ie: OP-TEE dispatcher will implement a G1NS (fiq) handler and invoke
an entry of OP-TEE synchronously. OP-TEE will save the thread context
and return.
I did some POC but the complexity and effort to generalise was not
justified by our requirement at that point especially envisioning the
movement to SPMD in future.
2-Synchronous preemption of SP:
ref:
https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/6345
I used this approach instead to unblock OP-TEE work alongside EHF.
This serves the purpose without changing the routing model with a
limitation that non yielding/fast SMC can
not be preempted. And ofcourse OP-TEE can mask G0 interrupt in
anycase. But I think this is sufficient for your purpose.
Please feedback if the above patch works for you.
Thanks
Sandeep
On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 2:43 PM Peng Fan via TF-A
<tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>
> Hi Achin,
>
>
>
> We are using SDEI for Jailhouse hypervisor to minimize interrupt latency, however we also wanna use OP-TEE when SDEI enabled.
>
>
>
> So I wanna how to make both work together.
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Peng.
>
>
>
> From: Achin Gupta [mailto:Achin.Gupta@arm.com]
> Sent: 2021年3月17日 17:59
> To: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com>; Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org>
> Cc: op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
>
>
>
> Hi Peng,
>
>
>
> +TF-A folk.
>
>
>
> My 0.02$.
>
>
>
> What is the problem you are trying to solve? Why do you need to run OP-TEE and EHF together? EHF was originally written to support a S-EL0 SP that is managed directly by TF-A in EL3 (TF-A folk can chime in).
>
>
>
> The SP could perform RAS error handling for which it needs the EHF. The EHF triages asynchronous exceptions and hands RAS errors to the SP for further handling.
>
>
>
> This is just one use case but there is no Trusted OS in these configurations.
>
>
>
> So, it would help to understand the requirement.
>
>
>
> cheers,
>
> Achin
>
>
>
> ________________________________
>
> From: OP-TEE <op-tee-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Jens Wiklander via OP-TEE <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> Sent: 17 March 2021 09:23
> To: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com>
> Cc: op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
>
>
>
> On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 9:43 AM Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> wrote:
> >
> > > Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
> > >
> > > On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 9:02 AM Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > > Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
> > > > >
> > > > > On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 8:41 AM Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 11:08 AM Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com>
> > > wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > Hi,
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > In bl31/ehf.c, there are following two lines, per my
> > > > > > > > understanding, when cpu is in secure world, the non-secure
> > > > > > > > interrupt as FIQ(GICv3) will be directly catched by EL3, not S-EL1
> > > > > > > > /* Route EL3 interrupts when in Secure and Non-secure.
> > > */
> > > > > > > > set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
> > > > > > > > set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > So this will conflict with OP-TEE, because OP-TEE needs catch
> > > > > > > > NS-interrupt as FIQ in S-EL1 world.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > In the case of GICv3, OP-TEE is configured to receive the
> > > > > > > non-secure interrupts as FIQ and secure interrupts as IRQ. See
> > > CFG_ARM_GICV3.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > But EHF needs NS-interrupt FIQ be catched by EL3 if I understand
> > > > > > correct, per " set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);"
> > > > > >
> > > > > > So currently EHF could not work together with OP-TEE, right?
> > > > >
> > > > > To be honest, I'm not completely sure what EHF does. From OP-TEE
> > > > > point of view we expect to receive the non-secure interrupts as a
> > > > > way of doing a controlled exit. This allows OP-TEE to resume
> > > > > execution with a different core on re-entry. If EL3 takes the
> > > > > non-secure interrupts directly it will have to make sure to only re-enter
> > > OP-TEE on this core as a return from exception.
> > > >
> > > > Is this easy to be achieved?
> > >
> > > I don't know, it depends on what you intend to do with this non-secure
> > > interrupt. If it's handled at EL3 and then there's a return from exception back
> > > to S-EL1 there's likely no harm done. But if there's a world switch involved
> > > there might be trouble, OP-TEE might not be in a suitable state for a world
> > > switch.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > Or by using opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler, could we have similar
> > > > behavior to allow the other core resume execution?
> > >
> > > Only OP-TEE itself can make a controlled exit as there's an internal state to
> > > maintain. Currently that's signalled with a non-secure interrupt.
> >
> >
> > Per EHF, https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/components/exception-han…
> > On GICv3 systems, when executing in S-EL1, pending Non-secure interrupts of
> > sufficient priority are signalled as FIQs, and therefore will be routed to EL3.
> > As a result, S-EL1 software cannot expect to handle Non-secure interrupts at S-EL1.
> > Essentially, this deprecates the routing mode described as CSS=0, TEL3=0.
> >
> > In order for S-EL1 software to handle Non-secure interrupts while having EHF enabled,
> > the dispatcher must adopt a model where Non-secure interrupts are received at EL3,
> > but are then synchronously handled over to S-EL1.
> >
> > The issue to me here how to synchronously handled over to S-EL1 and not break optee.
>
> I understand. OP-TEE is masking interrupts in some critical sections,
> while in such a state OP-TEE cannot handle any asynchronous interrupt.
> Temporarily masking interrupts is normally a quick operation so we do
> it in quite a few places.
> So the crux of the problem is to make sure that OP-TEE is in a state
> where it can make a controlled exit. I don't have any good ideas for
> this right now.
>
> Cheers,
> Jens
>
> --
> TF-A mailing list
> TF-A(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/tf-a
When Secure World returns, it may have changed the size attribute of the
memory references passed as [in/out] parameters. The GlobalPlatform TEE
Internal Core API specification does not restrict the values that this
size can take. In particular, Secure World may increase the value to be
larger than the size of the input buffer to indicate that it needs more.
Therefore, the size check in optee_from_msg_param() is incorrect and
needs to be removed. This fixes a number of failed test cases in the
GlobalPlatform TEE Initial Configuratiom Test Suite v2_0_0_0-2017_06_09
when OP-TEE is compiled without dynamic shared memory support
(CFG_CORE_DYN_SHM=n).
Suggested-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome(a)forissier.org>
---
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 10 ----------
1 file changed, 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
index 319a1e701163..ddb8f9ecf307 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
@@ -79,16 +79,6 @@ int optee_from_msg_param(struct tee_param *params, size_t num_params,
return rc;
p->u.memref.shm_offs = mp->u.tmem.buf_ptr - pa;
p->u.memref.shm = shm;
-
- /* Check that the memref is covered by the shm object */
- if (p->u.memref.size) {
- size_t o = p->u.memref.shm_offs +
- p->u.memref.size - 1;
-
- rc = tee_shm_get_pa(shm, o, NULL);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- }
break;
case OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_RMEM_INPUT:
case OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_TYPE_RMEM_OUTPUT:
--
2.25.1
Hi Peng,
+TF-A folk.
My 0.02$.
What is the problem you are trying to solve? Why do you need to run OP-TEE and EHF together? EHF was originally written to support a S-EL0 SP that is managed directly by TF-A in EL3 (TF-A folk can chime in).
The SP could perform RAS error handling for which it needs the EHF. The EHF triages asynchronous exceptions and hands RAS errors to the SP for further handling.
This is just one use case but there is no Trusted OS in these configurations.
So, it would help to understand the requirement.
cheers,
Achin
________________________________
From: OP-TEE <op-tee-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Jens Wiklander via OP-TEE <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 17 March 2021 09:23
To: Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com>
Cc: op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 9:43 AM Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> wrote:
>
> > Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
> >
> > On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 9:02 AM Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > > Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
> > > >
> > > > On Wed, Mar 17, 2021 at 8:41 AM Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com> wrote:
> > > > >
> > > > > > Subject: Re: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 11:08 AM Peng Fan <peng.fan(a)nxp.com>
> > wrote:
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Hi,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > In bl31/ehf.c, there are following two lines, per my
> > > > > > > understanding, when cpu is in secure world, the non-secure
> > > > > > > interrupt as FIQ(GICv3) will be directly catched by EL3, not S-EL1
> > > > > > > /* Route EL3 interrupts when in Secure and Non-secure.
> > */
> > > > > > > set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
> > > > > > > set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > So this will conflict with OP-TEE, because OP-TEE needs catch
> > > > > > > NS-interrupt as FIQ in S-EL1 world.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > In the case of GICv3, OP-TEE is configured to receive the
> > > > > > non-secure interrupts as FIQ and secure interrupts as IRQ. See
> > CFG_ARM_GICV3.
> > > > >
> > > > > But EHF needs NS-interrupt FIQ be catched by EL3 if I understand
> > > > > correct, per " set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);"
> > > > >
> > > > > So currently EHF could not work together with OP-TEE, right?
> > > >
> > > > To be honest, I'm not completely sure what EHF does. From OP-TEE
> > > > point of view we expect to receive the non-secure interrupts as a
> > > > way of doing a controlled exit. This allows OP-TEE to resume
> > > > execution with a different core on re-entry. If EL3 takes the
> > > > non-secure interrupts directly it will have to make sure to only re-enter
> > OP-TEE on this core as a return from exception.
> > >
> > > Is this easy to be achieved?
> >
> > I don't know, it depends on what you intend to do with this non-secure
> > interrupt. If it's handled at EL3 and then there's a return from exception back
> > to S-EL1 there's likely no harm done. But if there's a world switch involved
> > there might be trouble, OP-TEE might not be in a suitable state for a world
> > switch.
> >
> > >
> > > Or by using opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler, could we have similar
> > > behavior to allow the other core resume execution?
> >
> > Only OP-TEE itself can make a controlled exit as there's an internal state to
> > maintain. Currently that's signalled with a non-secure interrupt.
>
>
> Per EHF, https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/components/exception-han…
> On GICv3 systems, when executing in S-EL1, pending Non-secure interrupts of
> sufficient priority are signalled as FIQs, and therefore will be routed to EL3.
> As a result, S-EL1 software cannot expect to handle Non-secure interrupts at S-EL1.
> Essentially, this deprecates the routing mode described as CSS=0, TEL3=0.
>
> In order for S-EL1 software to handle Non-secure interrupts while having EHF enabled,
> the dispatcher must adopt a model where Non-secure interrupts are received at EL3,
> but are then synchronously handled over to S-EL1.
>
> The issue to me here how to synchronously handled over to S-EL1 and not break optee.
I understand. OP-TEE is masking interrupts in some critical sections,
while in such a state OP-TEE cannot handle any asynchronous interrupt.
Temporarily masking interrupts is normally a quick operation so we do
it in quite a few places.
So the crux of the problem is to make sure that OP-TEE is in a state
where it can make a controlled exit. I don't have any good ideas for
this right now.
Cheers,
Jens
Hi,
In bl31/ehf.c, there are following two lines, per my understanding,
when cpu is in secure world, the non-secure interrupt as FIQ(GICv3)
will be directly catched by EL3, not S-EL1
/* Route EL3 interrupts when in Secure and Non-secure. */
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
So this will conflict with OP-TEE, because OP-TEE needs catch
NS-interrupt as FIQ in S-EL1 world.
Am I understand correct?
Any ideas how we could address this to make EHF + OPTEE run
together?
Thanks
Peng.
Hi,
If I am not mistaking, the fiq handler should be opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler which will forward the interrupt to S-EL1.
R,
Jelle
________________________________________
From: OP-TEE <op-tee-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Peng Fan via OP-TEE <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2021 11:08
To: op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org; Jens Wiklander; Joakim Bech
Subject: EHF + OPTEE on ARM64
Hi,
In bl31/ehf.c, there are following two lines, per my understanding,
when cpu is in secure world, the non-secure interrupt as FIQ(GICv3)
will be directly catched by EL3, not S-EL1
/* Route EL3 interrupts when in Secure and Non-secure. */
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, SECURE);
So this will conflict with OP-TEE, because OP-TEE needs catch
NS-interrupt as FIQ in S-EL1 world.
Am I understand correct?
Any ideas how we could address this to make EHF + OPTEE run
together?
Thanks
Peng.
the word "the" is repeated in the file core.c
so it has been removed. Likewise the word "of"
is repeated in optee_smc.h and have removed it.
Signed-off-by: Anupama K Patil <anupamakpatil123(a)gmail.com>
---
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 2 +-
drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
index cf4718c6d35d..2ccb091cd643 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/core.c
@@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ static bool optee_msg_exchange_capabilities(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn,
/*
* TODO This isn't enough to tell if it's UP system (from kernel
- * point of view) or not, is_smp() returns the the information
+ * point of view) or not, is_smp() returns the information
* needed, but can't be called directly from here.
*/
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) || nr_cpu_ids == 1)
diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
index 80eb763a8a80..49e8e027dc5b 100644
--- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
+++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result {
* Have config return register usage:
* a0 OPTEE_SMC_RETURN_OK
* a1 Physical address of start of SHM
- * a2 Size of of SHM
+ * a2 Size of SHM
* a3 Cache settings of memory, as defined by the
* OPTEE_SMC_SHM_* values above
* a4-7 Preserved
--
2.25.1
Hi Raghu,
On Wed, Mar 3, 2021 at 8:38 AM Yejerla, VeeraraghavuluX via OP-TEE
<op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>
> Dear Sir,
>
> I would like to know that, if I want submit any patch for optee opensource features, could please guide me what are the guide line I have to follow it. Below are some information require .
>
>
> 1. What is the maximum patch size shall I submit?
That depends, it might be good to start with something small as a
first contribution.
> 2. What are the code guide line I have to follow it?
https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/coding_standards.html
> 3. What are mail chain I have to include for patch review purpose?
> 4. Is there any open source link for post quarry ?
See https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/general/contribute.html
Cheers,
Jens
Hi,
On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 9:50 AM Jérôme Forissier via OP-TEE
<op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 9:41 AM Joakim Bech via OP-TEE <
> op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>
> > Hi Jorge,
> >
> > On Wed, 24 Feb 2021 at 18:14, Jorge Ramirez <jorge(a)foundries.io> wrote:
> >
> > > Sorry Joakim.
> > > I guess it is too late now but It would have been good to talk about the
> > > TEE strategy/direction with RNG.
> > > 1) how often do we seed the PRNG.
> > > 2) should we always use PRNG and only use HWRNG to seed if with a certain
> > > cadence.
> > > 3) how do we measure the quality of an RNG in OPTEE (how do we guarantee
> > > no regressions)
> > > this would be really an open discussion more than anything else (unless
> > > there is a matematician amongst us)
> > >
> > Yes, good suggestions. I'll add it to the next meeting (March 25:th).
> >
>
> And now that I think of it... there is this big OCALL contribution that has
> been mostly stalled for months...
> https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3673
> We should discuss what to do with it.
Yes, the kernel part is the hard part here.
Cheers,
Jens
Dear Sir,
I would like to know that, if I want submit any patch for optee opensource features, could please guide me what are the guide line I have to follow it. Below are some information require .
1. What is the maximum patch size shall I submit?
2. What are the code guide line I have to follow it?
3. What are mail chain I have to include for patch review purpose?
4. Is there any open source link for post quarry ?
Regards,
Raghu
Hi,
On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 9:41 AM Joakim Bech via OP-TEE <
op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> Hi Jorge,
>
> On Wed, 24 Feb 2021 at 18:14, Jorge Ramirez <jorge(a)foundries.io> wrote:
>
> > Sorry Joakim.
> > I guess it is too late now but It would have been good to talk about the
> > TEE strategy/direction with RNG.
> > 1) how often do we seed the PRNG.
> > 2) should we always use PRNG and only use HWRNG to seed if with a certain
> > cadence.
> > 3) how do we measure the quality of an RNG in OPTEE (how do we guarantee
> > no regressions)
> > this would be really an open discussion more than anything else (unless
> > there is a matematician amongst us)
> >
> Yes, good suggestions. I'll add it to the next meeting (March 25:th).
>
And now that I think of it... there is this big OCALL contribution that has
been mostly stalled for months...
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pull/3673
We should discuss what to do with it.
Regards,
--
Jerome
Sorry Joakim.
I guess it is too late now but It would have been good to talk about the
TEE strategy/direction with RNG.
1) how often do we seed the PRNG.
2) should we always use PRNG and only use HWRNG to seed if with a certain
cadence.
3) how do we measure the quality of an RNG in OPTEE (how do we guarantee no
regressions)
this would be really an open discussion more than anything else (unless
there is a matematician amongst us)
On Wed, Feb 24, 2021 at 9:18 AM Joakim Bech via OP-TEE <
op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
> Hi,
>
> Haven't received any suggestions for topics to discuss, so no agenda. No
> agenda means no meeting and therefore I'm cancelling the LOC meeting that
> was scheduled for tomorrow.
>
> Regards,
> Joakim
>
>
> On Wed, 17 Feb 2021 at 15:47, Joakim Bech <joakim.bech(a)linaro.org> wrote:
>
> > Hi,
> >
> > LOC monthly meeting is planned to take place on Thursday February 25th @
> > 16.00 (UTC+1).
> >
> > We're looking for topics to discuss in general. Eventually we'll have a
> > presentation from Achin Gupta from Arm talking about the FF-A spec.
> >
> > Meeting details:
> > ---------------
> > Date/time: Thursday Feb 25th(a)16.00 (UTC+1)
> > https://everytimezone.com/s/c4e5d6a3
> > Connection details: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/
> > Meeting notes: http://bit.ly/loc-notes
> > Project page: https://www.linaro.org/projects/#LOC
> >
> > Regards,
> > Joakim on behalf of the Linaro OP-TEE team
> >
>
On 1/21/21 1:02 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen via OP-TEE wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 12:53:28PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
>> On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 at 07:01, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jan 19, 2021 at 12:30:42PM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
>>>> On Fri, Jan 15, 2021 at 11:32:31AM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, 14 Jan 2021 at 07:35, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Jan 13, 2021 at 04:47:00PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
>>>>>>> Hi Jarkko,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Mon, 11 Jan 2021 at 22:05, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko(a)kernel.org> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Nov 03, 2020 at 09:31:44PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
>>>>>>>>> to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Refer to Documentation/tee.txt for detailed information about TEE.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg(a)linaro.org>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I haven't yet got QEMU environment working with aarch64, this produces
>>>>>>>> just a blank screen:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> ./output/host/usr/bin/qemu-system-aarch64 -M virt -cpu cortex-a53 -smp 1 -kernel output/images/Image -initrd output/images/rootfs.cpio -serial stdio
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My BuildRoot fork for TPM and keyring testing is located over here:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/buildroot-tpmdd.git/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The "ARM version" is at this point in aarch64 branch. Over time I will
>>>>>>>> define tpmdd-x86_64 and tpmdd-aarch64 boards and everything will be then
>>>>>>>> in the master branch.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> To create identical images you just need to
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> $ make tpmdd_defconfig && make
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Can you check if you see anything obviously wrong? I'm eager to test this
>>>>>>>> patch set, and in bigger picture I really need to have ready to run
>>>>>>>> aarch64 environment available.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would rather suggest you to follow steps listed here [1] as to test
>>>>>>> this feature on Qemu aarch64 we need to build firmwares such as TF-A,
>>>>>>> OP-TEE, UEFI etc. which are all integrated into OP-TEE Qemu build
>>>>>>> system [2]. And then it would be easier to migrate them to your
>>>>>>> buildroot environment as well.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [1] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/op-tee/2020-May/000027.html
>>>>>>> [2] https://optee.readthedocs.io/en/latest/building/devices/qemu.html#qemu-v8
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -Sumit
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Can you provide 'keyctl_change'? Otherwise, the steps are easy to follow.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> $ cat keyctl_change
>>>>> diff --git a/common.mk b/common.mk
>>>>> index aeb7b41..663e528 100644
>>>>> --- a/common.mk
>>>>> +++ b/common.mk
>>>>> @@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ BR2_PACKAGE_OPTEE_TEST_SDK ?= $(OPTEE_OS_TA_DEV_KIT_DIR)
>>>>> BR2_PACKAGE_OPTEE_TEST_SITE ?= $(OPTEE_TEST_PATH)
>>>>> BR2_PACKAGE_STRACE ?= y
>>>>> BR2_TARGET_GENERIC_GETTY_PORT ?= $(if
>>>>> $(CFG_NW_CONSOLE_UART),ttyAMA$(CFG_NW_CONSOLE_UART),ttyAMA0)
>>>>> +BR2_PACKAGE_KEYUTILS := y
>>>>>
>>>>> # All BR2_* variables from the makefile or the environment are appended to
>>>>> # ../out-br/extra.conf. All values are quoted "..." except y and n.
>>>>> diff --git a/kconfigs/qemu.conf b/kconfigs/qemu.conf
>>>>> index 368c18a..832ab74 100644
>>>>> --- a/kconfigs/qemu.conf
>>>>> +++ b/kconfigs/qemu.conf
>>>>> @@ -20,3 +20,5 @@ CONFIG_9P_FS=y
>>>>> CONFIG_9P_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
>>>>> CONFIG_HW_RANDOM=y
>>>>> CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_VIRTIO=y
>>>>> +CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=y
>>>>> +CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y
>>>>>
>>>>>> After I've successfully tested 2/4, I'd suggest that you roll out one more
>>>>>> version and CC the documentation patch to Elaine and Mini, and clearly
>>>>>> remark in the commit message that TEE is a standard, with a link to the
>>>>>> specification.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sure, I will roll out the next version after your testing.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks, I'll try this at instant, and give my feedback.
>>>
>>> I bump into this:
>>>
>>> $ make run-only
>>> ln -sf /home/jarkko/devel/tpm/optee/build/../out-br/images/rootfs.cpio.gz /home/jarkko/devel/tpm/optee/build/../out/bin/
>>> ln: failed to create symbolic link '/home/jarkko/devel/tpm/optee/build/../out/bin/': No such file or directory
>>> make: *** [Makefile:194: run-only] Error 1
>>>
>>
>> Could you check if the following directory tree is built after
>> executing the below command?
>>
>> $ make -j`nproc`
>> CFG_IN_TREE_EARLY_TAS=trusted_keys/f04a0fe7-1f5d-4b9b-abf7-619b85b4ce8c
>>
>> $ tree out/bin/
>> out/bin/
>> ├── bl1.bin -> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../trusted-firmware-a/build/qemu/release/bl1.bin
>> ├── bl2.bin -> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../trusted-firmware-a/build/qemu/release/bl2.bin
>> ├── bl31.bin ->
>> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../trusted-firmware-a/build/qemu/release/bl31.bin
>> ├── bl32.bin ->
>> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../optee_os/out/arm/core/tee-header_v2.bin
>> ├── bl32_extra1.bin ->
>> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../optee_os/out/arm/core/tee-pager_v2.bin
>> ├── bl32_extra2.bin ->
>> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../optee_os/out/arm/core/tee-pageable_v2.bin
>> ├── bl33.bin ->
>> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../edk2/Build/ArmVirtQemuKernel-AARCH64/RELEASE_GCC49/FV/QEMU_EFI.fd
>> ├── Image -> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../linux/arch/arm64/boot/Image
>> └── rootfs.cpio.gz ->
>> /home/sumit/build/optee/build/../out-br/images/rootfs.cpio.gz
>>
>> 0 directories, 9 files
>>
>> -Sumit
>
> I actually spotted a build error that was unnoticed last time:
>
> make[2]: Entering directory '/home/jarkko/devel/tpm/optee/edk2/BaseTools/Tests'
> /bin/sh: 1: python: not found
>
> I'd prefer not to install Python2. It has been EOL over a year.
AFAIK, everything should build fine with Python3. On my Ubuntu 20.04
machine, this is accomplished by installing package "python-is-python3"
(after uninstalling "python-is-python2" if need be).
$ ls -l /usr/bin/python
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 7 Apr 15 2020 /usr/bin/python -> python3
--
Jerome
From: Allen Pais <apais(a)linux.microsoft.com>
The following out of memory errors are seen on kexec reboot
from the optee core.
[ 0.368428] tee_bnxt_fw optee-clnt0: tee_shm_alloc failed
[ 0.368461] tee_bnxt_fw: probe of optee-clnt0 failed with error -22
tee_shm_release() is not invoked on dma shm buffer.
Implement .shutdown() in optee core as well as bnxt firmware driver
to handle the release of the buffers correctly.
More info:
https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/3637
Allen Pais (2):
optee: fix tee out of memory failure seen during kexec reboot
firmware: tee_bnxt: implement shutdown method to handle kexec reboots
drivers/firmware/broadcom/tee_bnxt_fw.c | 9 ++++
drivers/tee/optee/core.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++-------
2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
--
2.25.1
Hi,
LOC monthly meeting is planned to take place on Thursday February 25th @
16.00 (UTC+1).
We're looking for topics to discuss in general. Eventually we'll have a
presentation from Achin Gupta from Arm talking about the FF-A spec.
Meeting details:
---------------
Date/time: Thursday Feb 25th(a)16.00 (UTC+1)
https://everytimezone.com/s/c4e5d6a3
Connection details: https://www.trustedfirmware.org/meetings/
Meeting notes: http://bit.ly/loc-notes
Project page: https://www.linaro.org/projects/#LOC
Regards,
Joakim on behalf of the Linaro OP-TEE team
Hi Robert,
On 2/22/21 11:01 AM, Robert Delien via OP-TEE wrote:
> Hi,
>
> In imx_csu.c, the Central Security Unit's CSU_CSL*n* registers are set,
> configuring access privileges for different peripherals. These registers
> range from CSU_CSL0 (@ 0x021c0000) to CSU_CSL39 (@ 0x021c009c).
>
> The different i.MX6 platform variants each have their individual tables,
> filled with sets of CSL index and register value, terminated by a sentinel
> set with the index set to -1. (the reason for the parentheses around -1
> espaces me)
>
> in .../core/arch/arm/plat-imx/drivers/imx_csu.c:csu_init()@115, a while
> loop runs through this aforementioned table, setting the CSL registers
> according to the table. However, this loop loops on CSL index values > 0:
> while (csu_setting->csu_index *>* 0) {
> io_write32(csu_base + (csu_setting->csu_index * 4),
> csu_setting->value);
>
> csu_setting++;
> }
> I think it should loop on CSL index values >= 0, because index 0 is a valid
> index, utilized for the PWM peripherals. (I also think csl_index is a more
> descriptive name, but that's besides the point).
>
> I have attached a patch for his.
It does look like a genuine bug to me, but I will let the i.MX expert
comment further. Unfortunately, the OP-TEE ML strips attachments. Would
you mind creating a GitHub pull request [1] (preferred method), or send
the patch inline?
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/pulls
Thanks,
--
Jerome
Hi,
In imx_csu.c, the Central Security Unit's CSU_CSL*n* registers are set,
configuring access privileges for different peripherals. These registers
range from CSU_CSL0 (@ 0x021c0000) to CSU_CSL39 (@ 0x021c009c).
The different i.MX6 platform variants each have their individual tables,
filled with sets of CSL index and register value, terminated by a sentinel
set with the index set to -1. (the reason for the parentheses around -1
espaces me)
in .../core/arch/arm/plat-imx/drivers/imx_csu.c:csu_init()@115, a while
loop runs through this aforementioned table, setting the CSL registers
according to the table. However, this loop loops on CSL index values > 0:
while (csu_setting->csu_index *>* 0) {
io_write32(csu_base + (csu_setting->csu_index * 4),
csu_setting->value);
csu_setting++;
}
I think it should loop on CSL index values >= 0, because index 0 is a valid
index, utilized for the PWM peripherals. (I also think csl_index is a more
descriptive name, but that's besides the point).
I have attached a patch for his.
With kind regards,
Robert.
--
DISCLAIMER
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vertrouwelijk en uitsluitend voor de geadresseerde(n) bestemd. Het gebruik
van de informatie in dit bericht, de openbaarmaking, vermenigvuldiging,
verspreiding en|of verstrekking daarvan aan derden is niet toegestaan.
Gebruik van deze informatie door anderen dan geadresseerde(n) is strikt
verboden. Aan deze informatie kunnen geen rechten worden ontleend. U wordt
verzocht bij onjuiste adressering de afzender direct te informeren door het
bericht te retourneren en het bericht uit uw computersysteem te verwijderen.
Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality
to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is
an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device.
This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based early TA which is already
merged in upstream [1].
[1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/f86ab8e7e0de869dfa25ca05a37ee070d…
Changes in v8:
1. Added static calls support instead of indirect calls.
2. Documented trusted keys source module parameter.
3. Refined patch #1 commit message discription.
4. Addressed misc. comments on patch #2.
5. Added myself as Trusted Keys co-maintainer instead.
6. Rebased to latest tpmdd master.
Changes in v7:
1. Added a trusted.source module parameter in order to enforce user's
choice in case a particular platform posses both TPM and TEE.
2. Refine commit description for patch #1.
Changes in v6:
1. Revert back to dynamic detection of trust source.
2. Drop author mention from trusted_core.c and trusted_tpm1.c files.
3. Rebased to latest tpmdd/master.
Changes in v5:
1. Drop dynamic detection of trust source and use compile time flags
instead.
2. Rename trusted_common.c -> trusted_core.c.
3. Rename callback: cleanup() -> exit().
4. Drop "tk" acronym.
5. Other misc. comments.
6. Added review tags for patch #3 and #4.
Changes in v4:
1. Pushed independent TEE features separately:
- Part of recent TEE PR: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/4/1062
2. Updated trusted-encrypted doc with TEE as a new trust source.
3. Rebased onto latest tpmdd/master.
Changes in v3:
1. Update patch #2 to support registration of multiple kernel pages.
2. Incoporate dependency patch #4 in this patch-set:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11091435/
Changes in v2:
1. Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2.
2. Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3.
3. Switch to use generic trusted keys framework.
Sumit Garg (4):
KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework
KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys
doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source
MAINTAINERS: Add myself as Trusted Keys co-maintainer
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 12 +
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 203 +++++++++++--
MAINTAINERS | 2 +
include/keys/trusted-type.h | 47 +++
include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 55 ++++
include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 17 +-
security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 +
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 354 ++++++++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 278 +++++++++++++++++
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 336 ++++----------------
10 files changed, 979 insertions(+), 327 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c
create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c
--
2.7.4
Hi Kris,
[CC op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org the newer ML for OP-TEE which is
now under the TrustedFirmware.org umbrella]
On 2/9/21 11:04 PM, Kris Kwiatkowski wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I've recently been involved in producing PoC, which utilizes OP-TEE
> to produce proof of a secret key possession. That is used during tunnel
> establishment by OpenVPN.
>
> In case someone finds it interesting, for example as kind of "real-world"
> use case of OP-TEE, then details are described here:
> https://www.amongbytes.com/post/20210112-optee-openssl-engine/
Thanks for sharing! It is a well-written article, quite interesting to
read IMO. I always like to see how OP-TEE is used in various scenarios.
As upstream project maintainers we hear about bug reports and we review
new contributions of course, but there is clearly a lot of activity
going on downstream that we don't know much about. Yet, a bit of context
certainly helps take the good decisions for the project going forward!
> and code is here:
> https://github.com/henrydcase/optee_eng
>
> The actual PoC used post-quantum schemes integrated into TEE OS and TF-A
> (secure boot). Those two points are not described really described for brevity
> (and probably there is low interest anyway).
>
> Kind regards,
> Kris
> _______________________________________________
> Tee-dev mailing list
> Tee-dev(a)lists.linaro.org
> https://lists.linaro.org/mailman/listinfo/tee-dev
Thanks,
--
Jerome
Hello arm-soc maintainers,
Please pull this fix eliminating a stack frame size warning and also
simplifying I2C access in the OP-TEE driver.
Thanks,
Jens
The following changes since commit e71ba9452f0b5b2e8dc8aa5445198cd9214a6a62:
Linux 5.11-rc2 (2021-01-03 15:55:30 -0800)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/optee-simplify-i2c-access_for-v5.12
for you to fetch changes up to 67bc809752796acb2641ca343cad5b45eef31d7c:
optee: simplify i2c access (2021-02-08 13:42:31 +0100)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Simplify i2c acess in OP-TEE driver
----------------------------------------------------------------
Arnd Bergmann (1):
optee: simplify i2c access
drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)