- OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: Linaro OP-TEE Contributions meeting Sept 2020

by Jorge Ramirez

Hi Joakim Shall we discuss how we want to extend the criptodriver API were different algorithms can be taken from different ciphers? And maybe also how to communicate other than using the github frontend? I think this is useful in the case of relatively complex PR. thanks Jorge On Mon, Sep 28, 2020 at 1:08 PM Joakim Bech via OP-TEE < op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > Hi, > > Just a reminder, I have seen no suggestions for topics and if I hear > nothing until noon tomorrow 29/9 (UTC), then I'll cancel the September > meeting. > > Regards, > Joakim > > > On Thu, 17 Sep 2020 at 11:19, Joakim Bech <joakim.bech(a)linaro.org> wrote: > > > Hi, > > > > LOC monthly meeting is planned to take place Sept 30 @ 16.00 (UTC+2). > > Connection details can be found in the meeting notes document (link > below). > > > > This email is a request to gather topics to discuss. If there are no > > suggestions, then there will be no meeting (announced in this email > thread, > > if that's the case). To suggest a topic, either reply to this email > thread > > or add your topic directly into the meeting notes (or do both). > > > > Meeting details: > > --------------- > > Date/time: Wednesday Sept 30th(a)16.00 (UTC+2) > > https://everytimezone.com/s/92bd296e > > Invitation/connection details: In the meeting notes > > Meeting notes: http://bit.ly/loc-notes > > Project page: https://www.linaro.org/projects/#LOC > > > > Regards, > > Joakim on behalf of the Linaro OP-TEE team > > >

5 years, 9 months

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Linaro OP-TEE Contributions meeting Sept 2020

by Joakim Bech

Hi, LOC monthly meeting is planned to take place Sept 30 @ 16.00 (UTC+2). Connection details can be found in the meeting notes document (link below). This email is a request to gather topics to discuss. If there are no suggestions, then there will be no meeting (announced in this email thread, if that's the case). To suggest a topic, either reply to this email thread or add your topic directly into the meeting notes (or do both). Meeting details: --------------- Date/time: Wednesday Sept 30th(a)16.00 (UTC+2) https://everytimezone.com/s/92bd296e Invitation/connection details: In the meeting notes Meeting notes: http://bit.ly/loc-notes Project page: https://www.linaro.org/projects/#LOC Regards, Joakim on behalf of the Linaro OP-TEE team

5 years, 9 months

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Re: [RFC PATCH] tee: add support for application-based session login methods

by Elvira Khabirova

Hello, On Thu, 17 Sep 2020 15:46:07 +0000 Elvira Khabirova via OP-TEE <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: > GP TEE Client API in addition to login methods already supported > in the kernel also defines several application-based methods: > TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION, TEEC_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION, and > TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION. > > It specifies credentials generated for TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION as only > depending on the identity of the program, being persistent within one > implementation, across multiple invocations of the application > and across power cycles, enabling them to be used to disambiguate > persistent storage. The exact nature is REE-specific. > > As the exact method of generating application identifier strings may > vary between vendors, setups and installations, add two suggested > methods and an exact framework for vendors to extend upon. If there are no comments on this, I will resend this and drop [RFC] from the subject. > Signed-off-by: Elvira Khabirova <e.khabirova(a)omprussia.ru> > --- > drivers/tee/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++ > drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 136 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- > 2 files changed, 164 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/tee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/Kconfig > index e99d840c2511..4cd6e0d2aad5 100644 > --- a/drivers/tee/Kconfig > +++ b/drivers/tee/Kconfig > @@ -11,6 +11,35 @@ config TEE > This implements a generic interface towards a Trusted Execution > Environment (TEE). > > +choice > + prompt "Application ID for client UUID" > + depends on TEE > + default TEE_APPID_PATH > + help > + This option allows to choose which method will be used to generate > + application identifiers for client UUID generation when login methods > + TEE_LOGIN_APPLICATION, TEE_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION > + and TEE_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION are used. > + Please be mindful of the security of each method in your particular > + installation. > + > + config TEE_APPID_PATH > + bool "Path-based application ID" > + help > + Use the executable's path as an application ID. > + > + config TEE_APPID_SECURITY > + bool "Security extended attribute based application ID" > + help > + Use the executable's security extended attribute as an application ID. > +endchoice > + > +config TEE_APPID_SECURITY_XATTR > + string "Security extended attribute to use for application ID" > + depends on TEE_APPID_SECURITY > + help > + Attribute to be used as an application ID (with the security prefix removed). > + > if TEE > > menu "TEE drivers" > diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c > index 64637e09a095..19c965dd212b 100644 > --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c > +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c > @@ -7,8 +7,10 @@ > > #include <linux/cdev.h> > #include <linux/cred.h> > +#include <linux/file.h> > #include <linux/fs.h> > #include <linux/idr.h> > +#include <linux/mm.h> > #include <linux/module.h> > #include <linux/slab.h> > #include <linux/tee_drv.h> > @@ -17,11 +19,15 @@ > #include <crypto/sha.h> > #include "tee_private.h" > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY > +#include <linux/security.h> > +#endif > + > #define TEE_NUM_DEVICES 32 > > #define TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_SIZE(x) (sizeof(struct tee_param) * (x)) > > -#define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE 128 > +#define TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE PATH_MAX > > /* > * TEE Client UUID name space identifier (UUIDv4) > @@ -125,6 +131,67 @@ static int tee_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) > return 0; > } > > +#ifdef CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY > +static const char *tee_session_get_application_id(void **data) > +{ > + struct file *exe_file; > + const char *name = CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY_XATTR; > + int len; > + > + exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm); > + if (!exe_file) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); > + > + if (!exe_file->f_inode) { > + fput(exe_file); > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); > + } > + > + len = security_inode_getsecurity(exe_file->f_inode, name, data, true); > + if (len < 0) > + return ERR_PTR(len); > + > + fput(exe_file); > + > + return *data; > +} > +#endif /* CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY */ > + > +#ifdef CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH > +static const char *tee_session_get_application_id(void **data) > +{ > + struct file *exe_file; > + char *path; > + > + *data = kzalloc(TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > + if (!*data) > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); > + > + exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(current->mm); > + if (!exe_file) { > + kfree(*data); > + return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT); > + } > + > + path = file_path(exe_file, *data, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE); > + if (IS_ERR(path)) { > + kfree(*data); > + return path; > + } > + > + fput(exe_file); > + > + return path; > +} > +#endif /* CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH */ > + > +#if defined(CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH) || defined(CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY) > +static void tee_session_free_application_id(void *data) > +{ > + kfree(data); > +} > +#endif /* CONFIG_TEE_APPID_PATH || CONFIG_TEE_APPID_SECURITY */ > + > /** > * uuid_v5() - Calculate UUIDv5 > * @uuid: Resulting UUID > @@ -197,6 +264,8 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, > gid_t ns_grp = (gid_t)-1; > kgid_t grp = INVALID_GID; > char *name = NULL; > + void *application_id_data = NULL; > + const char *application_id = NULL; > int name_len; > int rc; > > @@ -217,6 +286,14 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, > * For TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP: > * gid=<gid> > * > + * For TEEC_LOGIN_APPLICATION: > + * app=<application id> > + * > + * For TEEC_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION: > + * uid=<uid>:app=<application id> > + * > + * For TEEC_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION: > + * gid=<gid>:app=<application id> > */ > > name = kzalloc(TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); > @@ -249,6 +326,63 @@ int tee_session_calc_client_uuid(uuid_t *uuid, u32 connection_method, > } > break; > > + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_APPLICATION: > + application_id = tee_session_get_application_id(&application_id_data); > + if (IS_ERR(application_id)) { > + rc = PTR_ERR(application_id); > + goto out_free_name; > + } > + > + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "app=%s", > + application_id); > + tee_session_free_application_id(application_id_data); > + > + if (name_len >= TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) { > + rc = -E2BIG; > + goto out_free_name; > + } > + break; > + > + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_USER_APPLICATION: > + application_id = tee_session_get_application_id(&application_id_data); > + if (IS_ERR(application_id)) { > + rc = PTR_ERR(application_id); > + goto out_free_name; > + } > + > + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "uid=%x:app=%s", > + current_euid().val, application_id); > + tee_session_free_application_id(application_id_data); > + > + if (name_len >= TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) { > + rc = -E2BIG; > + goto out_free_name; > + } > + break; > + > + case TEE_IOCTL_LOGIN_GROUP_APPLICATION: > + memcpy(&ns_grp, connection_data, sizeof(gid_t)); > + grp = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), ns_grp); > + if (!gid_valid(grp) || !in_egroup_p(grp)) { > + rc = -EPERM; > + goto out_free_name; > + } > + > + application_id = tee_session_get_application_id(&application_id_data); > + if (IS_ERR(application_id)) { > + rc = PTR_ERR(application_id); > + goto out_free_name; > + } > + name_len = snprintf(name, TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE, "gid=%x:app=%s", > + grp.val, application_id); > + tee_session_free_application_id(application_id_data); > + > + if (name_len >= TEE_UUID_NS_NAME_SIZE) { > + rc = -E2BIG; > + goto out_free_name; > + } > + break; > + > default: > rc = -EINVAL; > goto out_free_name;

5 years, 9 months

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[PATCH -next] tee: optee: fix type warning of sizeof in pool_op_alloc()

by Liu Shixin

sizeof() when applied to a pointer typed expression should gives the size of the pointed data, even if the data is a pointer. Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2(a)huawei.com> --- drivers/tee/optee/shm_pool.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/shm_pool.c b/drivers/tee/optee/shm_pool.c index d767eebf30bd..9fdc667b5df0 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/shm_pool.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/shm_pool.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static int pool_op_alloc(struct tee_shm_pool_mgr *poolm, unsigned int nr_pages = 1 << order, i; struct page **pages; - pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(pages), GFP_KERNEL); + pages = kcalloc(nr_pages, sizeof(*pages), GFP_KERNEL); if (!pages) return -ENOMEM; -- 2.25.1

5 years, 9 months

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Re: [PATCH] drivers: optee: i2c: add bus retry configuration

by Jens Wiklander

On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 05:27:32PM +0200, Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz wrote: > Allow OP-TEE to specify the number of retries in the adaptor. > > Signed-off-by: Jorge Ramirez-Ortiz <jorge(a)foundries.io> > --- > drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c | 7 +++++++ > 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c b/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c > index 1e3614e4798f..2d46a9ecb1de 100644 > --- a/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c > +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/rpc.c > @@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ static void handle_rpc_func_cmd_i2c_transfer(struct tee_context *ctx, > struct tee_param *params; > size_t i; > int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP; > + int retries = 0; > u8 attr[] = { > TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT, > TEE_IOCTL_PARAM_ATTR_TYPE_VALUE_INPUT, > @@ -102,12 +103,17 @@ static void handle_rpc_func_cmd_i2c_transfer(struct tee_context *ctx, > client.addr = params[0].u.value.c; > snprintf(client.name, I2C_NAME_SIZE, "i2c%d", client.adapter->nr); > > + /* cache the current value */ > + retries = client.adapter->retries; > + > switch (params[0].u.value.a) { > case OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_I2C_TRANSFER_RD: > + client.adapter->retries = params[1].u.value.b; Do we need to take any locks befor this? Cheers, Jens > ret = i2c_master_recv(&client, params[2].u.memref.shm->kaddr, > params[2].u.memref.size); > break; > case OPTEE_MSG_RPC_CMD_I2C_TRANSFER_WR: > + client.adapter->retries = params[1].u.value.b; > ret = i2c_master_send(&client, params[2].u.memref.shm->kaddr, > params[2].u.memref.size); > break; > @@ -126,6 +132,7 @@ static void handle_rpc_func_cmd_i2c_transfer(struct tee_context *ctx, > arg->ret = TEEC_SUCCESS; > } > > + client.adapter->retries = retries; > i2c_put_adapter(client.adapter); > kfree(params); > return; > -- > 2.17.1 >

5 years, 9 months

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Re: OP-TEE development

by Joakim Bech

Hi Nikita, On Wed, Sep 23, 2020 at 11:24:23AM +0000, Nikita Snetkov via OP-TEE wrote: > Hello! > > Currently, I became interested in TEE research and development. After small > investigation, I found out your product: OP-TEE. After reading about it, > there is a thing that still bothers me: is it possible to create an > application which uses OP-TEE and distribute in via Google Play? > For OP-TEE you typically create a pair of binaries, one binary running on non-secure side (plain Linux environment) and one binary (Trusted Application) running on the secure side. Google Play hosts applications running in non-secure world, so I'd believe that distributing the non-secure side of your feature using Google Play is something you can do. But for the secure side, it's not that easy, since it's usually the OEM that decide what to install and is allowed to run on the secure side on their devices. > -- > Yours faithfully, > Nikita Snetkov -- Regards, Joakim

5 years, 9 months

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OP-TEE development

by Nikita Snetkov

Hello! Currently, I became interested in TEE research and development. After small investigation, I found out your product: OP-TEE. After reading about it, there is a thing that still bothers me: is it possible to create an application which uses OP-TEE and distribute in via Google Play? -- Yours faithfully, Nikita Snetkov

5 years, 9 months

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[GIT PULL] tee dev cleanup for v5.10

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this small cleanup in tee driver registration. There are no changes in behaviour, just a reduction in number of lines due to improved usage of the device driver framework. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit 9123e3a74ec7b934a4a099e98af6a61c2f80bbf5: Linux 5.9-rc1 (2020-08-16 13:04:57 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: git://git.linaro.org:/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git tags/tee-dev-cleanup-for-v5.10 for you to fetch changes up to 8c05f50fe8452f9d3220efad77bef42c7b498193: tee: avoid explicit sysfs_create/delete_group by initialising dev->groups (2020-09-18 10:44:45 +0200) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Simplify tee_device_register() and friends Uses cdev_device_add() instead of the cdev_add() device_add() combination. Initializes dev->groups instead of direct calls to sysfs_create_group() and friends. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Sudeep Holla (2): tee: replace cdev_add + device_add with cdev_device_add tee: avoid explicit sysfs_create/delete_group by initialising dev->groups drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 40 +++++++--------------------------------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

5 years, 9 months

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[PATCH 1/2] tee: replace cdev_add + device_add with cdev_device_add

by Sudeep Holla

Commit 233ed09d7fda ("chardev: add helper function to register char devs with a struct device") added a helper function 'cdev_device_add'. Make use of cdev_device_add in tee_device_register to replace cdev_add and device_add. Since cdev_device_add takes care of setting the kobj->parent, drop explicit initialisation in tee_device_alloc. Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla(a)arm.com> --- drivers/tee/tee_core.c | 21 ++++----------------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c index 64637e09a095..b4a8b362d78f 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/tee_core.c +++ b/drivers/tee/tee_core.c @@ -917,7 +917,6 @@ struct tee_device *tee_device_alloc(const struct tee_desc *teedesc, cdev_init(&teedev->cdev, &tee_fops); teedev->cdev.owner = teedesc->owner; - teedev->cdev.kobj.parent = &teedev->dev.kobj; dev_set_drvdata(&teedev->dev, driver_data); device_initialize(&teedev->dev); @@ -985,24 +984,15 @@ int tee_device_register(struct tee_device *teedev) return -EINVAL; } - rc = cdev_add(&teedev->cdev, teedev->dev.devt, 1); + rc = cdev_device_add(&teedev->cdev, &teedev->dev); if (rc) { dev_err(&teedev->dev, - "unable to cdev_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n", + "unable to cdev_device_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n", teedev->name, MAJOR(teedev->dev.devt), MINOR(teedev->dev.devt), rc); return rc; } - rc = device_add(&teedev->dev); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&teedev->dev, - "unable to device_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n", - teedev->name, MAJOR(teedev->dev.devt), - MINOR(teedev->dev.devt), rc); - goto err_device_add; - } - rc = sysfs_create_group(&teedev->dev.kobj, &tee_dev_group); if (rc) { dev_err(&teedev->dev, @@ -1014,9 +1004,7 @@ int tee_device_register(struct tee_device *teedev) return 0; err_sysfs_create_group: - device_del(&teedev->dev); -err_device_add: - cdev_del(&teedev->cdev); + cdev_device_del(&teedev->cdev, &teedev->dev); return rc; } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tee_device_register); @@ -1062,8 +1050,7 @@ void tee_device_unregister(struct tee_device *teedev) if (teedev->flags & TEE_DEVICE_FLAG_REGISTERED) { sysfs_remove_group(&teedev->dev.kobj, &tee_dev_group); - cdev_del(&teedev->cdev); - device_del(&teedev->dev); + cdev_device_del(&teedev->cdev, &teedev->dev); } tee_device_put(teedev); -- 2.17.1

5 years, 9 months

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[PATCH v6 0/4] Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys support

by Sumit Garg

Add support for TEE based trusted keys where TEE provides the functionality to seal and unseal trusted keys using hardware unique key. Also, this is an alternative in case platform doesn't possess a TPM device. This patch-set has been tested with OP-TEE based early TA which is already merged in upstream [1]. [1] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/commit/f86ab8e7e0de869dfa25ca05a37ee070d… Changes in v6: 1. Revert back to dynamic detection of trust source. 2. Drop author mention from trusted_core.c and trusted_tpm1.c files. 3. Rebased to latest tpmdd/master. Changes in v5: 1. Drop dynamic detection of trust source and use compile time flags instead. 2. Rename trusted_common.c -> trusted_core.c. 3. Rename callback: cleanup() -> exit(). 4. Drop "tk" acronym. 5. Other misc. comments. 6. Added review tags for patch #3 and #4. Changes in v4: 1. Pushed independent TEE features separately: - Part of recent TEE PR: https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/5/4/1062 2. Updated trusted-encrypted doc with TEE as a new trust source. 3. Rebased onto latest tpmdd/master. Changes in v3: 1. Update patch #2 to support registration of multiple kernel pages. 2. Incoporate dependency patch #4 in this patch-set: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11091435/ Changes in v2: 1. Add reviewed-by tags for patch #1 and #2. 2. Incorporate comments from Jens for patch #3. 3. Switch to use generic trusted keys framework. Sumit Garg (4): KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework KEYS: trusted: Introduce TEE based Trusted Keys doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source MAINTAINERS: Add entry for TEE based Trusted Keys Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 203 ++++++++++--- MAINTAINERS | 8 + include/keys/trusted-type.h | 42 +++ include/keys/trusted_tee.h | 55 ++++ include/keys/trusted_tpm.h | 17 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile | 2 + security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 325 +++++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c | 278 ++++++++++++++++++ security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 336 ++++------------------ 9 files changed, 939 insertions(+), 327 deletions(-) create mode 100644 include/keys/trusted_tee.h create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c create mode 100644 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tee.c -- 2.7.4

5 years, 9 months

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