March 2023 - OP-TEE - lists.trustedfirmware.org

[PATCH v9] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image

by Jeffrey Kardatzke

Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARMv8 and above architectures that supports this. The main purpose of this change is to facilitate updating the OP-TEE component on devices via a rootfs change rather than having to do a firmware update. Further details are linked to in the Kconfig file. Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com> --- Changes in v9: - Add CPU hotplug callback to init on all cores at startup Changes in v8: - Renamed params and fixed alignment issue Changes in v7: - Added documentation to Documentation/staging/tee.rst Changes in v6: - Expanded Kconfig documentation Changes in v5: - Renamed config option - Added runtime warning when config is used Changes in v4: - Update commit message - Added more documentation - Renamed config option, added ARM64 dependency Changes in v3: - Removed state tracking for driver reload - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load Changes in v2: - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled - Addressed minor comments - Added state tracking for driver reload Documentation/staging/tee.rst | 41 +++++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 17 +++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 ++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 228 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst index 498343c7ab08..315aa8e35e6b 100644 --- a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst +++ b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst @@ -214,6 +214,47 @@ call is done from the thread assisting the interrupt handler. This is a building block for OP-TEE OS in secure world to implement the top half and bottom half style of device drivers. +OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option +---------------------------------------- + +The OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option enables the ability to load the +BL32 OP-TEE image from the kernel after the kernel boots, rather than loading +it from the firmware before the kernel boots. This also requires enabling the +corresponding option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there +explains the security threat associated with enabling this as well as +mitigations at the firmware and platform level. +https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html + +There are additional attack vectors/mitigations for the kernel that should be +addressed when using this option. + +1. Boot chain security. + Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of + the system. + Migitation: There must be boot chain security that verifies the kernel and + rootfs, otherwise an attacker can modify the loaded OP-TEE + binary by modifying it in the rootfs. +3. Alternate boot modes. + Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the OP-TEE + driver isn't loaded, leaving the SMC hole open. + Mitigation: If there are alternate methods of booting the device, such as a + recovery mode, it should be ensured that the same mitigations are + applied in that mode. +3. Attacks prior to SMC invocation. + Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load + OP-TEE can be exploited to then load an alternate OS image. + Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack + vectors are opened up. This should include mounting of any + modifiable filesystems, opening of network ports or communicating + with external devices (e.g. USB). +4. Blocking SMC call to load OP-TEE. + Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to load + OP-TEE isn't executed when desired, leaving it open to being + executed later and loading a modified OS. + Mitigation: It is recommended to build the OP-TEE driver as an included + driver rather than a module to prevent exploits that may cause + the module to not be loaded. + AMD-TEE driver ============== diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig index f121c224e682..70898bbd5809 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig @@ -7,3 +7,20 @@ config OPTEE help This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver. + +config OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware" + default n + depends on OPTEE && ARM64 + help + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is + probed. This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from + the filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until + it is in SYSTEM_RUNNING. This also requires enabling the corresponding + option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there explains + the security threat associated with enabling this as well as + mitigations at the firmware and platform level. + https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_mode… + + Additional documentation on kernel security risks are at + Documentation/staging/tee.rst. diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h index 70e9cc2ee96b..e8840a82b983 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg { * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b. * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1, * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3. + * + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is: + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4. + * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3. */ #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4 #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01 /* diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result { unsigned long reserved1; }; +/* + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware. + * + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the + * Trusted OS. + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS. + * + * Call register usage: + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format. + * + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise. + */ +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2 +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \ + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE) + /* * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument * diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index a1c1fa1a9c28..fcbcd0c0c3aa 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -7,10 +7,13 @@ #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> +#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h> #include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/irqdomain.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/of.h> @@ -1149,6 +1152,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) return false; } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res); + + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 && + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 && + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 && + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3) + return true; + return false; +} +#endif + static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) { union { @@ -1354,6 +1373,117 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) optee_disable_shm_cache(optee); } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin" + +static optee_invoke_fn *cpuhp_invoke_fn; + +static int optee_cpuhp_probe(unsigned int cpu) +{ + /* + * Invoking a call on a CPU will cause OP-TEE to perform the required + * setup for that CPU. Just invoke the call to get the UID since that + * has no side effects. + */ + if (optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(cpuhp_invoke_fn)) + return 0; + else + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + const struct firmware *fw = NULL; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + phys_addr_t data_pa; + u8 *data_buf = NULL; + u64 data_size; + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low; + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low; + int rc; + int hp_state; + + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn)) + return 0; + + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev); + if (rc) { + /* + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until + * that point. + */ + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING) + return -EPROBE_DEFER; + goto fw_err; + } + + data_size = fw->size; + /* + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary. + */ + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); + if (!data_buf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto fw_err; + } + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size); + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size); + goto fw_load; + +fw_err: + pr_warn("image loading failed\n"); + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0; + +fw_load: + /* + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking + * this SMC. + */ + pr_warn("OP-TEE image loaded from kernel, this can be insecure"); + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low, + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res); + if (!rc) + rc = res.a0; + if (fw) + release_firmware(fw); + kfree(data_buf); + + if (!rc) { + /* + * We need to initialize OP-TEE on all other running cores as + * well. Any cores that aren't running yet will get initialized + * when they are brought up by the power management functions in + * TF-A which are registered by the OP-TEE SPD. Due to that we + * can un-register the callback right after registering it. + */ + cpuhp_invoke_fn = invoke_fn; + hp_state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "optee:probe", + optee_cpuhp_probe, NULL); + if (hp_state < 0) { + pr_warn("Failed with CPU hotplug setup for OP-TEE"); + return -EINVAL; + } + cpuhp_remove_state(hp_state); + cpuhp_invoke_fn = NULL; + } + + return rc; +} +#else +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn; @@ -1372,6 +1502,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn)) return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn); + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) { pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n"); return -EINVAL; -- 2.40.0.rc1.284.g88254d51c5-goog

2 years

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[PATCH v6] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image

by Jeffrey Kardatzke

Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARMv8 and above architectures that supports this. The main purpose of this change is to facilitate updating the OP-TEE component on devices via a rootfs change rather than having to do a firmware update. Further details are linked to in the Kconfig file. Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com> --- Changes in v6: - Expanded Kconfig documentation Changes in v5: - Renamed config option - Added runtime warning when config is used Changes in v4: - Update commit message - Added more documentation - Renamed config option, added ARM64 dependency Changes in v3: - Removed state tracking for driver reload - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load Changes in v2: - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled - Addressed minor comments - Added state tracking for driver reload drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 29 +++++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 +++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 162 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig index f121c224e682..8d4836c58486 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig @@ -7,3 +7,32 @@ config OPTEE help This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver. + +config OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware" + default n + depends on OPTEE && ARM64 + help + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is + probed. This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from + the filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until + it is in SYSTEM_RUNNING. This also requires enabling the corresponding + option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there explains + the security threat associated with enabling this as well as + mitigations at the firmware and platform level. + https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_mode… + + When utilizing this option, the following mitigations should be + implemented to prevent attacks at the kernel level. + 1. There must be boot chain security that verifies the kernel and + rootfs, otherwise an attacker can modify the loaded OP-TEE binary. + 2. It is recommended to build it as an included driver rather than + a module to prevent exploits that may cause the module to not be + loaded. + 3. If there are alternate methods of booting the device, such as a + recovery mode, it should be ensured that the same mitigations are + applied in that mode. + 4. The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack + vectors are opened up. This should include mounting of any + modifiable filesystems, opening of network ports or communicating + with external devices (such a USB). diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h index 70e9cc2ee96b..e8840a82b983 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg { * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b. * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1, * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3. + * + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is: + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4. + * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3. */ #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4 #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01 /* diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result { unsigned long reserved1; }; +/* + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware. + * + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the + * Trusted OS. + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS. + * + * Call register usage: + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format. + * + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise. + */ +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2 +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \ + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE) + /* * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument * diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index a1c1fa1a9c28..00b6b69b6f79 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/irqdomain.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/of.h> @@ -1149,6 +1151,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) return false; } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res); + + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 && + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 && + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 && + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3) + return true; + return false; +} +#endif + static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) { union { @@ -1354,6 +1372,81 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) optee_disable_shm_cache(optee); } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin" + +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + const struct firmware *fw = NULL; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + phys_addr_t data_pa; + u8 *data_buf = NULL; + u64 data_size; + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low; + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low; + int rc; + + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn)) + return 0; + + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev); + if (rc) { + /* + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until + * that point. + */ + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING) + return -EPROBE_DEFER; + goto fw_err; + } + + data_size = fw->size; + /* + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary. + */ + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); + if (!data_buf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto fw_err; + } + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size); + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size); + goto fw_load; + +fw_err: + pr_warn("image loading failed\n"); + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0; + +fw_load: + /* + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking + * this SMC. + */ + pr_warn("OP-TEE image loaded from kernel, this can be insecure"); + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low, + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res); + if (!rc) + rc = res.a0; + if (fw) + release_firmware(fw); + kfree(data_buf); + + return rc; +} +#else +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *__unused1, + optee_invoke_fn *__unused2) { + return 0; +} +#endif + static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn; @@ -1372,6 +1465,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn)) return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn); + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) { pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n"); return -EINVAL; -- 2.40.0.rc1.284.g88254d51c5-goog

2 years

2
5
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[PATCH] tee: optee: Fix typo Unuspported -> Unsupported

by Jules Maselbas

Fix typo Unuspported -> Unsupported Signed-off-by: Jules Maselbas <jmaselbas(a)kalray.eu> --- drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c index 290b1bb0e9cd..df5fb5410b72 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/call.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/call.c @@ -488,7 +488,7 @@ static bool is_normal_memory(pgprot_t p) #elif defined(CONFIG_ARM64) return (pgprot_val(p) & PTE_ATTRINDX_MASK) == PTE_ATTRINDX(MT_NORMAL); #else -#error "Unuspported architecture" +#error "Unsupported architecture" #endif } -- 2.17.1

2 years

3
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[GIT PULL] Fix spell error in OP-TEE driver for v6.3

by Jens Wiklander

Hello arm-soc maintainers, Please pull this small patch fixing a spell error in an error message in the OP-TEE driver. Thanks, Jens The following changes since commit eeac8ede17557680855031c6f305ece2378af326: Linux 6.3-rc2 (2023-03-12 16:36:44 -0700) are available in the Git repository at: https://git.linaro.org/people/jens.wiklander/linux-tee.git/ tags/optee-fix-for-v6.3 for you to fetch changes up to 172fa6366c0c84eda31f1bc34e6c3e4698786215: tee: optee: Fix typo Unuspported -> Unsupported (2023-03-14 11:57:03 +0100) ---------------------------------------------------------------- Fixes a spell error in an error message in the OP-TEE driver ---------------------------------------------------------------- Jules Maselbas (1): tee: optee: Fix typo Unuspported -> Unsupported drivers/tee/optee/call.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

2 years

1
0
0 0

[PATCH v7] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image

by Jeffrey Kardatzke

Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARMv8 and above architectures that supports this. The main purpose of this change is to facilitate updating the OP-TEE component on devices via a rootfs change rather than having to do a firmware update. Further details are linked to in the Kconfig file. Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com> --- Changes in v7: - Added documentation to Documentation/staging/tee.rst Changes in v6: - Expanded Kconfig documentation Changes in v5: - Renamed config option - Added runtime warning when config is used Changes in v4: - Update commit message - Added more documentation - Renamed config option, added ARM64 dependency Changes in v3: - Removed state tracking for driver reload - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load Changes in v2: - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled - Addressed minor comments - Added state tracking for driver reload Documentation/staging/tee.rst | 41 +++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 17 ++++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 +++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 97 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 191 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst index 498343c7ab08..315aa8e35e6b 100644 --- a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst +++ b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst @@ -214,6 +214,47 @@ call is done from the thread assisting the interrupt handler. This is a building block for OP-TEE OS in secure world to implement the top half and bottom half style of device drivers. +OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option +---------------------------------------- + +The OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option enables the ability to load the +BL32 OP-TEE image from the kernel after the kernel boots, rather than loading +it from the firmware before the kernel boots. This also requires enabling the +corresponding option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there +explains the security threat associated with enabling this as well as +mitigations at the firmware and platform level. +https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html + +There are additional attack vectors/mitigations for the kernel that should be +addressed when using this option. + +1. Boot chain security. + Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of + the system. + Migitation: There must be boot chain security that verifies the kernel and + rootfs, otherwise an attacker can modify the loaded OP-TEE + binary by modifying it in the rootfs. +3. Alternate boot modes. + Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the OP-TEE + driver isn't loaded, leaving the SMC hole open. + Mitigation: If there are alternate methods of booting the device, such as a + recovery mode, it should be ensured that the same mitigations are + applied in that mode. +3. Attacks prior to SMC invocation. + Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load + OP-TEE can be exploited to then load an alternate OS image. + Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack + vectors are opened up. This should include mounting of any + modifiable filesystems, opening of network ports or communicating + with external devices (e.g. USB). +4. Blocking SMC call to load OP-TEE. + Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to load + OP-TEE isn't executed when desired, leaving it open to being + executed later and loading a modified OS. + Mitigation: It is recommended to build the OP-TEE driver as an included + driver rather than a module to prevent exploits that may cause + the module to not be loaded. + AMD-TEE driver ============== diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig index f121c224e682..70898bbd5809 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig @@ -7,3 +7,20 @@ config OPTEE help This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver. + +config OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware" + default n + depends on OPTEE && ARM64 + help + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is + probed. This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from + the filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until + it is in SYSTEM_RUNNING. This also requires enabling the corresponding + option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there explains + the security threat associated with enabling this as well as + mitigations at the firmware and platform level. + https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_mode… + + Additional documentation on kernel security risks are at + Documentation/staging/tee.rst. diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h index 70e9cc2ee96b..e8840a82b983 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg { * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b. * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1, * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3. + * + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is: + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4. + * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3. */ #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4 #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01 /* diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result { unsigned long reserved1; }; +/* + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware. + * + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the + * Trusted OS. + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS. + * + * Call register usage: + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format. + * + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise. + */ +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2 +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \ + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE) + /* * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument * diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index a1c1fa1a9c28..00b6b69b6f79 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/irqdomain.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/of.h> @@ -1149,6 +1151,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) return false; } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res); + + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 && + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 && + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 && + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3) + return true; + return false; +} +#endif + static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) { union { @@ -1354,6 +1372,81 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) optee_disable_shm_cache(optee); } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin" + +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + const struct firmware *fw = NULL; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + phys_addr_t data_pa; + u8 *data_buf = NULL; + u64 data_size; + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low; + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low; + int rc; + + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn)) + return 0; + + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev); + if (rc) { + /* + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until + * that point. + */ + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING) + return -EPROBE_DEFER; + goto fw_err; + } + + data_size = fw->size; + /* + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary. + */ + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); + if (!data_buf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto fw_err; + } + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size); + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size); + goto fw_load; + +fw_err: + pr_warn("image loading failed\n"); + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0; + +fw_load: + /* + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking + * this SMC. + */ + pr_warn("OP-TEE image loaded from kernel, this can be insecure"); + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low, + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res); + if (!rc) + rc = res.a0; + if (fw) + release_firmware(fw); + kfree(data_buf); + + return rc; +} +#else +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *__unused1, + optee_invoke_fn *__unused2) { + return 0; +} +#endif + static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn; @@ -1372,6 +1465,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn)) return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn); + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) { pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n"); return -EINVAL; -- 2.40.0.rc1.284.g88254d51c5-goog

2 years

2
2
0 0

[PATCH v8] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image

by Jeffrey Kardatzke

Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARMv8 and above architectures that supports this. The main purpose of this change is to facilitate updating the OP-TEE component on devices via a rootfs change rather than having to do a firmware update. Further details are linked to in the Kconfig file. Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com> --- Changes in v8: - Renamed params and fixed alignment issue Changes in v7: - Added documentation to Documentation/staging/tee.rst Changes in v6: - Expanded Kconfig documentation Changes in v5: - Renamed config option - Added runtime warning when config is used Changes in v4: - Update commit message - Added more documentation - Renamed config option, added ARM64 dependency Changes in v3: - Removed state tracking for driver reload - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load Changes in v2: - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled - Addressed minor comments - Added state tracking for driver reload Documentation/staging/tee.rst | 41 +++++++++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 17 ++++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 +++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 98 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 192 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst index 498343c7ab08..315aa8e35e6b 100644 --- a/Documentation/staging/tee.rst +++ b/Documentation/staging/tee.rst @@ -214,6 +214,47 @@ call is done from the thread assisting the interrupt handler. This is a building block for OP-TEE OS in secure world to implement the top half and bottom half style of device drivers. +OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option +---------------------------------------- + +The OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE Kconfig option enables the ability to load the +BL32 OP-TEE image from the kernel after the kernel boots, rather than loading +it from the firmware before the kernel boots. This also requires enabling the +corresponding option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there +explains the security threat associated with enabling this as well as +mitigations at the firmware and platform level. +https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_model.html + +There are additional attack vectors/mitigations for the kernel that should be +addressed when using this option. + +1. Boot chain security. + Attack vector: Replace the OP-TEE OS image in the rootfs to gain control of + the system. + Migitation: There must be boot chain security that verifies the kernel and + rootfs, otherwise an attacker can modify the loaded OP-TEE + binary by modifying it in the rootfs. +3. Alternate boot modes. + Attack vector: Using an alternate boot mode (i.e. recovery mode), the OP-TEE + driver isn't loaded, leaving the SMC hole open. + Mitigation: If there are alternate methods of booting the device, such as a + recovery mode, it should be ensured that the same mitigations are + applied in that mode. +3. Attacks prior to SMC invocation. + Attack vector: Code that is executed prior to issuing the SMC call to load + OP-TEE can be exploited to then load an alternate OS image. + Mitigation: The OP-TEE driver must be loaded before any potential attack + vectors are opened up. This should include mounting of any + modifiable filesystems, opening of network ports or communicating + with external devices (e.g. USB). +4. Blocking SMC call to load OP-TEE. + Attack vector: Prevent the driver from being probed, so the SMC call to load + OP-TEE isn't executed when desired, leaving it open to being + executed later and loading a modified OS. + Mitigation: It is recommended to build the OP-TEE driver as an included + driver rather than a module to prevent exploits that may cause + the module to not be loaded. + AMD-TEE driver ============== diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig index f121c224e682..70898bbd5809 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig @@ -7,3 +7,20 @@ config OPTEE help This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver. + +config OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware" + default n + depends on OPTEE && ARM64 + help + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is + probed. This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from + the filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until + it is in SYSTEM_RUNNING. This also requires enabling the corresponding + option in Trusted Firmware for Arm. The documentation there explains + the security threat associated with enabling this as well as + mitigations at the firmware and platform level. + https://trustedfirmware-a.readthedocs.io/en/latest/threat_model/threat_mode… + + Additional documentation on kernel security risks are at + Documentation/staging/tee.rst. diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h index 70e9cc2ee96b..e8840a82b983 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg { * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b. * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1, * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3. + * + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is: + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4. + * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3. */ #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4 #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01 /* diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result { unsigned long reserved1; }; +/* + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware. + * + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the + * Trusted OS. + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS. + * + * Call register usage: + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format. + * + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise. + */ +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2 +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \ + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE) + /* * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument * diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index a1c1fa1a9c28..c52930d0062c 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/irqdomain.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/of.h> @@ -1149,6 +1151,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) return false; } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res); + + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 && + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 && + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 && + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3) + return true; + return false; +} +#endif + static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) { union { @@ -1354,6 +1372,82 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) optee_disable_shm_cache(optee); } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_INSECURE_LOAD_IMAGE + +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin" + +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + const struct firmware *fw = NULL; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + phys_addr_t data_pa; + u8 *data_buf = NULL; + u64 data_size; + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low; + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low; + int rc; + + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn)) + return 0; + + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev); + if (rc) { + /* + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until + * that point. + */ + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING) + return -EPROBE_DEFER; + goto fw_err; + } + + data_size = fw->size; + /* + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary. + */ + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); + if (!data_buf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto fw_err; + } + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size); + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size); + goto fw_load; + +fw_err: + pr_warn("image loading failed\n"); + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0; + +fw_load: + /* + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking + * this SMC. + */ + pr_warn("OP-TEE image loaded from kernel, this can be insecure"); + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low, + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res); + if (!rc) + rc = res.a0; + if (fw) + release_firmware(fw); + kfree(data_buf); + + return rc; +} +#else +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif + static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn; @@ -1372,6 +1466,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn)) return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn); + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) { pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n"); return -EINVAL; -- 2.40.0.rc1.284.g88254d51c5-goog

2 years

1
0
0 0

Re: Post-boot loading of OP-TEE

by 梅建强(禹夜)

Hi, experts, I have another two other questions about this issue. (1) What should I do if the current optee to load already exists or I want to update optee? The most straightforward way I could think of is to reclaim the memory currently used by optee, then reload the optee image and initialize it. (2) optee may use multiple cores. When and how to process the initialization of multiple cores? Do you have any solutions or ideas? Regards, Yuye. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 发件人：梅建强(禹夜) <meijianqiang.mjq(a)alibaba-inc.com> 发送时间：2023年3月11日(星期六) 21:44 收件人：Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org>; tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; OP-TEE TrustedFirmware <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 抄　送：Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com>; Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com>; jwerner <jwerner(a)chromium.org>; raghu.ncstate <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>; Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org> 主　题：Re: Post-boot loading of OP-TEE Hi, experts, If I want to apply the code to the S-EL2 framework (Hafnium as SPMC), What special processing should be added to spmd_handle_smc_load function or other function, such as context restore and save? I'm not clear about the details of the process, can you give me some help? Regards, Yuye. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 发件人：Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> 发送时间：2023年1月9日(星期一) 15:39 收件人：tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; OP-TEE TrustedFirmware <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 抄　送：Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com>; Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com>; jwerner <jwerner(a)chromium.org>; raghu.ncstate <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>; Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org> 主　题：Post-boot loading of OP-TEE Hi, The recent patch [1] for the OP-TEE Dispatcher in TF-A proposes a way of post-boot loading OP-TEE by the Linux kernel with signature verification in the normal world only. This has previously been discussed in this mail thread [2] about half a year ago. Ultimately, it was concluded that this should in principle be accepted upstream as a platform choice to allow this or not. There are concerns that what we have in upstream TF-A should serve as good examples, and trusting the normal world to verify secure world software might not meet that criterion. There are also concerns about adding signature verification to BL31 Leaving the secure world wide open until the Linux kernel has been able to successfully load and verify an OP-TEE binary seems very risky. Even if it's claimed that the normal world can be trusted at this point, we're still giving up a critical level of defense without a good reason. I've started to review [1], but it should not be accepted for merging without support and approval from other maintainers. I would like to explore other options in this mail thread. In [2] it was suggested that a remnant of bl2 could be kept to verify OP-TEE before starting to execute it. This could be taken one step further and load a limited OP-TEE at boot which later is updated live, almost like what's discussed in [3]. This should minimize the impact on TF-A and also leave OP-TEE in charge of accepting an update instead of a divided responsibility between the normal world and TF-A. [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 > [2] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… > [3] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 <https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 > Thanks, Jens

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Re: Post-boot loading of OP-TEE

by 梅建强(禹夜)

Hi, experts, If I want to apply the code to the S-EL2 framework (Hafnium as SPMC), What special processing should be added to spmd_handle_smc_load function or other function, such as context restore and save? I'm not clear about the details of the process, can you give me some help? Regards, Yuye. ------------------------------------------------------------------ 发件人：Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander(a)linaro.org> 发送时间：2023年1月9日(星期一) 15:39 收件人：tf-a <tf-a(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>; OP-TEE TrustedFirmware <op-tee(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> 抄　送：Dan Handley <Dan.Handley(a)arm.com>; Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com>; jwerner <jwerner(a)chromium.org>; raghu.ncstate <raghu.ncstate(a)icloud.com>; Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas(a)linaro.org> 主　题：Post-boot loading of OP-TEE Hi, The recent patch [1] for the OP-TEE Dispatcher in TF-A proposes a way of post-boot loading OP-TEE by the Linux kernel with signature verification in the normal world only. This has previously been discussed in this mail thread [2] about half a year ago. Ultimately, it was concluded that this should in principle be accepted upstream as a platform choice to allow this or not. There are concerns that what we have in upstream TF-A should serve as good examples, and trusting the normal world to verify secure world software might not meet that criterion. There are also concerns about adding signature verification to BL31 Leaving the secure world wide open until the Linux kernel has been able to successfully load and verify an OP-TEE binary seems very risky. Even if it's claimed that the normal world can be trusted at this point, we're still giving up a critical level of defense without a good reason. I've started to review [1], but it should not be accepted for merging without support and approval from other maintainers. I would like to explore other options in this mail thread. In [2] it was suggested that a remnant of bl2 could be kept to verify OP-TEE before starting to execute it. This could be taken one step further and load a limited OP-TEE at boot which later is updated live, almost like what's discussed in [3]. This should minimize the impact on TF-A and also leave OP-TEE in charge of accepting an update instead of a divided responsibility between the normal world and TF-A. [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 <https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 > [2] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… <https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… > [3] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 <https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 > Thanks, Jens

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Post-boot loading of OP-TEE

by Jens Wiklander

Hi, The recent patch [1] for the OP-TEE Dispatcher in TF-A proposes a way of post-boot loading OP-TEE by the Linux kernel with signature verification in the normal world only. This has previously been discussed in this mail thread [2] about half a year ago. Ultimately, it was concluded that this should in principle be accepted upstream as a platform choice to allow this or not. There are concerns that what we have in upstream TF-A should serve as good examples, and trusting the normal world to verify secure world software might not meet that criterion. There are also concerns about adding signature verification to BL31 Leaving the secure world wide open until the Linux kernel has been able to successfully load and verify an OP-TEE binary seems very risky. Even if it's claimed that the normal world can be trusted at this point, we're still giving up a critical level of defense without a good reason. I've started to review [1], but it should not be accepted for merging without support and approval from other maintainers. I would like to explore other options in this mail thread. In [2] it was suggested that a remnant of bl2 could be kept to verify OP-TEE before starting to execute it. This could be taken one step further and load a limited OP-TEE at boot which later is updated live, almost like what's discussed in [3]. This should minimize the impact on TF-A and also leave OP-TEE in charge of accepting an update instead of a divided responsibility between the normal world and TF-A. [1] https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/18635 [2] https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/archives/list/tf-a@lists.trustedfirmware.… [3] https://github.com/OP-TEE/optee_os/issues/5699 Thanks, Jens

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[PATCH v3] tee: optee: Add SMC for loading OP-TEE image

by Jeffrey Kardatzke

Adds an SMC call that will pass an OP-TEE binary image to EL3 and instruct it to load it as the BL32 payload. This works in conjunction with a feature added to Trusted Firmware for ARM that supports this. Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jeffrey Kardatzke <jkardatzke(a)google.com> --- Changes in v3: - Removed state tracking for driver reload - Check UID of service to verify it needs image load Changes in v2: - Fixed compile issue when feature is disabled - Addressed minor comments - Added state tracking for driver reload drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig | 10 ++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h | 12 +++++ drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h | 24 +++++++++ drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 142 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig index f121c224e682..f0f12b146add 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/Kconfig @@ -7,3 +7,13 @@ config OPTEE help This implements the OP-TEE Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) driver. + +config OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE + bool "Load OP-TEE image as firmware" + default n + depends on OPTEE + help + This loads the BL32 image for OP-TEE as firmware when the driver is probed. + This returns -EPROBE_DEFER until the firmware is loadable from the + filesystem which is determined by checking the system_state until it is in + SYSTEM_RUNNING. diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h index 70e9cc2ee96b..237d6fa9a6e8 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_msg.h @@ -241,11 +241,23 @@ struct optee_msg_arg { * 384fb3e0-e7f8-11e3-af63-0002a5d5c51b. * Represented in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_UID_0, OPTEE_MSG_UID_1, * OPTEE_MSG_UID_2, OPTEE_MSG_UID_3. + * + * In the case where the OP-TEE image is loaded by the kernel, this will + * initially return an alternate UID to reflect that we are communicating with + * the TF-A image loading service at that time instead of OP-TEE. That UID is: + * a3fbeab1-1246-315d-c7c4-06b9c03cbea4. + * Represetned in 4 32-bit words in OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1, OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2, + * OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3. */ #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_0 0x384fb3e0 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_1 0xe7f811e3 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_2 0xaf630002 #define OPTEE_MSG_UID_3 0xa5d5c51b +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 0xa3fbeab1 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 0x1246315d +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 0xc7c406b9 +#define OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3 0xc03cbea4 #define OPTEE_MSG_FUNCID_CALLS_UID 0xFF01 /* diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h index 73b5e7760d10..7d9fa426505b 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/optee_smc.h @@ -104,6 +104,30 @@ struct optee_smc_call_get_os_revision_result { unsigned long reserved1; }; +/* + * Load Trusted OS from optee/tee.bin in the Linux firmware. + * + * WARNING: Use this cautiously as it could lead to insecure loading of the + * Trusted OS. + * This SMC instructs EL3 to load a binary and execute it as the Trusted OS. + * + * Call register usage: + * a0 SMC Function ID, OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE + * a1 Upper 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a2 Lower 32bit of a 64bit size for the payload + * a3 Upper 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * a4 Lower 32bit of the physical address for the payload + * + * The payload is in the OP-TEE image format. + * + * Returns result in a0, 0 on success and an error code otherwise. + */ +#define OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE 2 +#define OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE \ + ARM_SMCCC_CALL_VAL(ARM_SMCCC_FAST_CALL, ARM_SMCCC_SMC_32, \ + ARM_SMCCC_OWNER_TRUSTED_OS_END, \ + OPTEE_SMC_FUNCID_LOAD_IMAGE) + /* * Call with struct optee_msg_arg as argument * diff --git a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c index a1c1fa1a9c28..14612edef8f2 100644 --- a/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c +++ b/drivers/tee/optee/smc_abi.c @@ -8,9 +8,11 @@ #include <linux/arm-smccc.h> #include <linux/errno.h> +#include <linux/firmware.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <linux/irqdomain.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/of.h> @@ -1149,6 +1151,22 @@ static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) return false; } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE +static bool optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + struct arm_smccc_res res; + + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALLS_UID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res); + + if (res.a0 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_0 && + res.a1 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_1 && + res.a2 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_2 && + res.a3 == OPTEE_MSG_IMAGE_LOAD_UID_3) + return true; + return false; +} +#endif + static void optee_msg_get_os_revision(optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) { union { @@ -1354,6 +1372,80 @@ static void optee_shutdown(struct platform_device *pdev) optee_disable_shm_cache(optee); } +#ifdef CONFIG_OPTEE_LOAD_IMAGE + +#define OPTEE_FW_IMAGE "optee/tee.bin" + +static int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *pdev, + optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn) +{ + const struct firmware *fw = NULL; + struct arm_smccc_res res; + phys_addr_t data_pa; + u8 *data_buf = NULL; + u64 data_size; + u32 data_pa_high, data_pa_low; + u32 data_size_high, data_size_low; + int rc; + + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_image_load(invoke_fn)) + return 0; + + rc = request_firmware(&fw, OPTEE_FW_IMAGE, &pdev->dev); + if (rc) { + /* + * The firmware in the rootfs will not be accessible until we + * are in the SYSTEM_RUNNING state, so return EPROBE_DEFER until + * that point. + */ + if (system_state < SYSTEM_RUNNING) + return -EPROBE_DEFER; + goto fw_err; + } + + data_size = fw->size; + /* + * This uses the GFP_DMA flag to ensure we are allocated memory in the + * 32-bit space since TF-A cannot map memory beyond the 32-bit boundary. + */ + data_buf = kmalloc(fw->size, GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA); + if (!data_buf) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto fw_err; + } + memcpy(data_buf, fw->data, fw->size); + data_pa = virt_to_phys(data_buf); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_pa_high, &data_pa_low, data_pa); + reg_pair_from_64(&data_size_high, &data_size_low, data_size); + goto fw_load; + +fw_err: + pr_warn("image loading failed\n"); + data_pa_high = data_pa_low = data_size_high = data_size_low = 0; + +fw_load: + /* + * Always invoke the SMC, even if loading the image fails, to indicate + * to EL3 that we have passed the point where it should allow invoking + * this SMC. + */ + invoke_fn(OPTEE_SMC_CALL_LOAD_IMAGE, data_size_high, data_size_low, + data_pa_high, data_pa_low, 0, 0, 0, &res); + if (!rc) + rc = res.a0; + if (fw) + release_firmware(fw); + kfree(data_buf); + + return rc; +} +#else +static inline int optee_load_fw(struct platform_device *__unused1, + optee_invoke_fn *__unused2) { + return 0; +} +#endif + static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) { optee_invoke_fn *invoke_fn; @@ -1372,6 +1464,10 @@ static int optee_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) if (IS_ERR(invoke_fn)) return PTR_ERR(invoke_fn); + rc = optee_load_fw(pdev, invoke_fn); + if (rc) + return rc; + if (!optee_msg_api_uid_is_optee_api(invoke_fn)) { pr_warn("api uid mismatch\n"); return -EINVAL; -- 2.40.0.rc0.216.gc4246ad0f0-goog

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OP-TEE March 2023