- mbed-tls - lists.trustedfirmware.org

Re: [mbed-tls] support mbedTLS no entropy source

by Hanno Becker

Hi Palomo, Please take a look at the recent thread https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/pipermail/mbed-tls/2020-April/000069.html which should give you a better understanding of how Mbed TLS manages and uses entropy from the underlying system. Regards, Hanno ________________________________ From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Jesus Gualberto Palomo Garcia via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Sent: Tuesday, May 19, 2020 2:56 PM To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> Subject: [mbed-tls] support mbedTLS no entropy source Hi all! I'm Palomo and I've been working with your library a few weeks ago, I'm using Linux kernel 2.60 but my embedded system has a limit entropy source, i now that this is a critical point, but How can I use your library if I want to use a other entropy source? Thanks and waiting for you! -- ¡Saludos! Best wishes! Jesus Palomo México, D.F.

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support mbedTLS no entropy source

by Jesus Gualberto Palomo Garcia

Hi all! I'm Palomo and I've been working with your library a few weeks ago, I'm using Linux kernel 2.60 but my embedded system has a limit entropy source, i now that this is a critical point, but How can I use your library if I want to use a other entropy source? Thanks and waiting for you! -- *¡Saludos! Best wishes!* *Jesus PalomoMéxico, D.F.*

5 years

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Re: [mbed-tls] Psk tls with trustzone

by Gilles Peskine

Hello, If you enable the use PSA for cryptography in TLS (MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) and configure the PSK with mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(), the key derivation is done through the PSA API. You can then keep your key in the secure world. You'll need to have a PSA crypto implementation where the PSA crypto core is in the secure world and the frontend is in the application that performs the TLS handshake. PSA crypto is designed for this, but you or your TEE vendor will need to port the Mbed TLS code to your platform. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer On 13/05/2020 11:10, mayuri janawad via mbed-tls wrote: > Hello, > > I am currently trying to establish pre shared key based tls handshake > using mbedtls. However, I want to store the pre shared key in the > trustzone and derive the session key inside the trustzone. Is it > possible using mbedtls? Can I provide alternate implementation for psk > based tls in mbedtls library? > > It would be really helpful if this could be answered as soon as > possible. Thank you in advance for your assistance. > > Regards, > Mayuri Janawad >

5 years

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Psk tls with trustzone

by mayuri janawad

Hello, I am currently trying to establish pre shared key based tls handshake using mbedtls. However, I want to store the pre shared key in the trustzone and derive the session key inside the trustzone. Is it possible using mbedtls? Can I provide alternate implementation for psk based tls in mbedtls library? It would be really helpful if this could be answered as soon as possible. Thank you in advance for your assistance. Regards, Mayuri Janawad

5 years

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Re: [mbed-tls] ECDH Computation on STM32 platform

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi Abhilash, > I am trying to do the ECDH shared secret computation using the mbedTLS > library. I am referring to multiple examples such as ecdh_curve25519.c > and ecdh_main.c. > Ok. You should probably know a few things about those examples: 1. They both perform what's known as "ephemeral ECDH" (or sometimes ECDHE). 2. They're both using the low-level part of our ECDH API. For ecdh_curve25519, that is because that curve is not supported by the higher-level API yet - for the other example, I don't know what the reason is. 3. Curve25519 is quite different from other curves regarding how public keys are represented. > In my case, in my application firmware, I already have a device _priv > key and I receive a server_public key; both generated using a curve > ECP_DP_SECP256R1 in the bootloader itself. So in the application > firmware, I would like to do generate a shared secret from here on and > preserve it for future use. > Ok, so you want to do what's known as "static ECDH". So the example ecdh_curve25519 is not a great example, due to points 1 and 3 above. Also, since the curve you're using supports it, you may want to use the higher-level part of our ECDH API (the functions that accept a context as an argument). > The following is the steps that I do: > > 1. Create a new client context, entropy context, ctr_drbg context variables. > 2. use mbedtls_"respective"_init() to initalize all the three variables > 3. Seed a random number using mbedtls_ctr_drbg_seed() function. > 4. load the P256 elliptic curve in client context using mbedtls_ecp_group_load() All this looks absolutely correct. > 5. Then use mbedtls_mpi_lset() to set Qp.Z =1 > 6. Then read the server pub key using mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx_cli.Qp.X, server_pub, 65); >From the 65 I assume that the server public key as encoded as an uncompressed point. Then you can read it with: mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary(&ctx_cli.grp, &ctx_cli.Qp, server_pub, 65); (For Curve25519 mbedtls_ecp_point_read_binary() isn't implemented yet which is why the example does a direct call to an MPI function and accesses individual point coordinates, but Curve25519 and P-256 don't use the same coordinate systems.) > 7. Now the question is: Should I initialize the ctx_cli with my already generated device_priv key using > mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ctx_cli.d, device_priv_key, 50) ? That looks almost correct, except 50 does not look like a valid size for a private key for the curve you're using. > 8. Then I use mbedtls_ecdh_compute_shared(&ctx_cli.grp, &ctx_cli.z, &ctx_cli.Qp, &ctx_cli.d, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg); to compute the shared secret in z. > That's correct, but you could also call mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ctx_cli, &olen, buf, blen, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg ); which also serializes the secret to a buffer. > Questions: > 1. Do I need to generate a keypair for client context using > mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public(&ctx_cli.grp, &ctx_cli.d, &ctx_cli.Q, > mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctrDrbg)? And then set pvtkey as device priv > key and pub key as service pub key? > I'm not sure I understand the context of the question, so I'll distinguish two cases: - When provisioning the device, you need to generate a key pair for it, which can indeed be done as show. - Once the device is working, it doesn't need to generate new key pairs, just load the one that was provisioned as described below. > 2. I see that ctx_cli.Q has two components, Q.x and Q.y. How do I > extract these two values from a public key? Do I need to separately > initialize them? > I don't recommend you manipulate those directly, but use the `mbedtls_ecp_point_{read,write}_binary()` functions instead. > Please let me know if the flow is correct. In all the examples, they > generate a key pair and just update the public key part (Qp.X) of the > key. They do not touch the private key part (d) of the key. Please > confirm if I can upload my private key directly in my case. > Your flow looks correct, and the difference from the examples is that they're demonstrating ephemeral ECDH while it looks like you want to do static ECDH. > Also if my platform is a little endian, is there a recommended step > before using mbedtls_mpi_read_binary_le functions? Then endianness of your plaftorm should not matter, and you shouldn't need to use that function. Regards, Manuel.

5 years

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Re: [mbed-tls] Edwards curve support (#3245): fixing mbedtls_ecp_get_type

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi Aurélien, > I have submitted PR#3245 in order to add Edwards curves support to Mbed > TLS, with the eventual goal to add support for the EdDSA algorithm. > There are still a few things to fix that require discussion. > Thank you very much for your contribution, and for opening this discussion! > Let's start the discussion with the first one. Adding a new curve type > requires to add a new entry to the mbedtls_ecp_curve_type enum. The > curve type used by a group is returned by the mbedtls_ecp_get_type > function. It currently uses the coordinates type of the base point to > determine the curve type. Montgomery curves are lacking the y > coordinate, and the Short Weierstrass curves use the three x, y and z > coordinates. > > The Edwards arithmetic implementation in this PR uses the projective > coordinates. As such it also uses the x, y and z coordinates and this > gives no way to differentiate a Short Weierstrass from an Edwards curve. > Indeed, the current implementation of `ecp_curve_type()` is a bit of a hack and needs changing now that you're adding Edwards curves. > I have currently implemented that by checking if the curves are the > Ed25519 or Ed448 ones using the group id [1]. I am not sure it's very > clean and it won't scale if more curves are added later. Another > alternative would be to add another entry to mbedtls_ecp_group to hold > the curve type. > > What do you think is the best option? Any other idea? Honestly I think both options are fine. In the medium term (in 3.0 or 3.x) I'd like to entirely rework the `ecp_group` structure, which currently potentially wastes memory by having multiple instances for the same curve around (for example, when verifying a chain of N certificates all signed with the same curve, we'll have N instances of the `ecp_group` structure for that curve in RAM, which is quite wasteful). So I think in the meantime we don't need to sweat it too much. I have a slight preference for the option you currently implemented (checking the group ID), for two reasons: 1. Lack of scaling is not an issue, as it's unlikely a large number of Edwards curves are going to be added soon (in particular, not before the rework of ecp_group), since these last few years the tendency seems to be to focus on a small number of trusted curves [1]. 2. Adding a new member to `mbedtls_ecp_group` would be an ABI break, and while we don't have a strict policy of ABI stability, it tends to cause pain to packagers if we change the ABI too often, so it's probably better to avoid it if we can. Thanks, Manuel. [1] For example, compare https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.1.1 to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8422#section-5.1.1

5 years

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Re: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base

by Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard

Hi Simon, > I appreciate I'm coming very late to this discussion, but I want to make a > point and suggestion. > Well, I don't think we had reached a clear consensus yet, so it's not too late to explore more options! > These are very similar points to those Manuel was making to remove the feature > in the first place - however - short of investing the time in rewriting the > asymmetric functions, what we could do as a quick fix is to replace the > existing memory code with a block allocation scheme - which should be much > faster, speed up the asymmetric functions (in theory), avoid fragmentation, be > more deterministic, and a better fit for embedded applications. That could > then become the basis of the library for other projects too. > I think compared to our existing allocator, that would indeed be an improvement, and as you say possibly a "quick fix" for some of the performance issues of our asymmetric crypto (esp. ECC)... for people who use our allocator. I'm still under the impression they're a minority of users, even in the embedded world. I think it comes back to a point we touched on earlier in the thread: what other allocators are available, and how do they compare to the design you have in mind? If existing allocators in popular embedded libc implementations already handle small allocations efficiently, then people are probably better off using them. > I wouldn't mind contributing such a feature, as I had to write something very > similar last week anyway. > > If I do it - will you accept it? Thanks for the offer! Unfortunately I think it's hard to give you a clear yes or no answer at this point. Speaking only for myself (others in the team may disagree and are welcome to say so in reply), I'm a bit concerned that for a "quick fix" it would represent a significant review effort: there are obvious security implications, it would be a complete re-design of a whole module, and I'm not sure how many of the potential reviewers are very familiar with allocators (I know I'm not). Considering we already have a number of significant contributions that we just can't review as soon as we'd like, I'd be concerned adding another one. Adding to that concern is the fact that at this point it's still not clear to me if in the long-term we want to keep maintaining this, or use some existing allocator, or move it to a separate project possibly maintained by another team. Would your offer still stand in a couple of months, when the future of the module is perhaps a bit clearer, and when we've hopefully cleared a few of the long-standing large PR awaiting review? Thanks, Manuel.

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Re: [mbed-tls] Fwd: MBEDTLS never exits ecp_double_jac function call

by Gilles Peskine

Hi Sirjee, Does this fail systematically or randomly? Can you reproduce this with a very small program that only opens a TLS connection and nothing else, like programs/ssl/ssl_client1? At a guess, but this is only a guess, maybe this is the part of your program which uses the largest amount of stack, and there's a stack overflow that causes some variable to be overwritten. Please try increasing the stack size. -- Gilles Peskine Mbed TLS developer P.S. The config.h attachment didn't come through, but a graphical signature did. Please check your email settings when posting to the list. On 04/05/2020 10:50, Sirjee Rooplall via mbed-tls wrote: > > > Hi Support, > > I am using MBEDTLS and most of it works, except I have hit a snag > where I am trying to communicate to an https server, and it fails in > the ssl->handshake-step (ssl_write_client_key_exchange). > > My stack trace shows that it gets to the function ecp_double_jac and > never exits. It is looping at > MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &P->X, &S ) ); > MOD_ADD( T );. > Stack trace: > test.elf! mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs (mbedtls_mpi * X, const mbedtls_mpi * A, > const mbedtls_mpi * B) Line: 1287 > test.elf! ecp_double_jac (const mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, > mbedtls_ecp_point * R, const mbedtls_ecp_point * P) Line: 1310 > test.elf! ecp_precompute_comb (const mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, > mbedtls_ecp_point * T, const mbedtls_ecp_point * P, unsigned char w, > size_t d, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx * rs_ctx) Line: 1702 > test.elf! ecp_mul_comb (mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, mbedtls_ecp_point * > R, const mbedtls_mpi * m, const mbedtls_ecp_point * P, int (*)(void *, > unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx > * rs_ctx) Line: 2095 > test.elf! mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable (mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, > mbedtls_ecp_point * R, const mbedtls_mpi * m, const mbedtls_ecp_point > * P, int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng, > mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx * rs_ctx) Line: 2396 > test.elf! ecdh_gen_public_restartable (mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, > mbedtls_mpi * d, mbedtls_ecp_point * Q, int (*)(void *, unsigned char > *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx * rs_ctx) > Line: 84 > test.elf! mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public (mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, > mbedtls_mpi * d, mbedtls_ecp_point * Q, int (*)(void *, unsigned char > *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng) Line: 102 > test.elf! ecdh_make_public_internal (mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed * > ctx, size_t * olen, int point_format, unsigned char * buf, size_t > blen, int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng, > int restart_enabled) Line: 514 > test.elf! mbedtls_ecdh_make_public (mbedtls_ecdh_context * ctx, > size_t * olen, unsigned char * buf, size_t blen, int (*)(void *, > unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng) Line: 542 > test.elf! ssl_write_client_key_exchange (mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl) > Line: 3362 > test.elf! mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step (mbedtls_ssl_context * > ssl) Line: 4015 > test.elf! mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step (mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl) > Line: 9564 > test.elf! mbedtls_ssl_handshake (mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl) Line: 9588 > test.elf! https_do_tls_handshake (struct httpsConfigStr * client) > Line: 419 > test.elf! HttpsStateMachine Line: 366 > test.elf! HttpsTask (void * param) Line: 110 > test.elf! ?? Line: 110 > > MBEDTLS VERSION: mbed TLS 2.18.0 > PLATFORM: embedded microchip SAME70 micro controller. > > I have attached my config.h file. > > What am I doing wrong? > >

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Fwd: MBEDTLS never exits ecp_double_jac function call

by Sirjee Rooplall

Hi Support, I am using MBEDTLS and most of it works, except I have hit a snag where I am trying to communicate to an https server, and it fails in the ssl->handshake-step (ssl_write_client_key_exchange). My stack trace shows that it gets to the function ecp_double_jac and never exits. It is looping at MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &P->X, &S ) ); MOD_ADD( T );. Stack trace: test.elf! mbedtls_mpi_sub_abs (mbedtls_mpi * X, const mbedtls_mpi * A, const mbedtls_mpi * B) Line: 1287 test.elf! ecp_double_jac (const mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, mbedtls_ecp_point * R, const mbedtls_ecp_point * P) Line: 1310 test.elf! ecp_precompute_comb (const mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, mbedtls_ecp_point * T, const mbedtls_ecp_point * P, unsigned char w, size_t d, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx * rs_ctx) Line: 1702 test.elf! ecp_mul_comb (mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, mbedtls_ecp_point * R, const mbedtls_mpi * m, const mbedtls_ecp_point * P, int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx * rs_ctx) Line: 2095 test.elf! mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable (mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, mbedtls_ecp_point * R, const mbedtls_mpi * m, const mbedtls_ecp_point * P, int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx * rs_ctx) Line: 2396 test.elf! ecdh_gen_public_restartable (mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, mbedtls_mpi * d, mbedtls_ecp_point * Q, int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng, mbedtls_ecp_restart_ctx * rs_ctx) Line: 84 test.elf! mbedtls_ecdh_gen_public (mbedtls_ecp_group * grp, mbedtls_mpi * d, mbedtls_ecp_point * Q, int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng) Line: 102 test.elf! ecdh_make_public_internal (mbedtls_ecdh_context_mbed * ctx, size_t * olen, int point_format, unsigned char * buf, size_t blen, int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng, int restart_enabled) Line: 514 test.elf! mbedtls_ecdh_make_public (mbedtls_ecdh_context * ctx, size_t * olen, unsigned char * buf, size_t blen, int (*)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t) f_rng, void * p_rng) Line: 542 test.elf! ssl_write_client_key_exchange (mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl) Line: 3362 test.elf! mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step (mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl) Line: 4015 test.elf! mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step (mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl) Line: 9564 test.elf! mbedtls_ssl_handshake (mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl) Line: 9588 test.elf! https_do_tls_handshake (struct httpsConfigStr * client) Line: 419 test.elf! HttpsStateMachine Line: 366 test.elf! HttpsTask (void * param) Line: 110 test.elf! ?? Line: 110 MBEDTLS VERSION: mbed TLS 2.18.0 PLATFORM: embedded microchip SAME70 micro controller. I have attached my config.h file. What am I doing wrong?

5 years, 1 month

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Re: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base

by Simon Butcher

Hi All, I appreciate I'm coming very late to this discussion, but I want to make a point and suggestion. The performance of the asymmetric functions is less than ideal, and whilst I think we can all agree that the ECC code should be rewritten at some point to be more competitive, one of the issues with the performance is that the MPI code uses malloc() a lot. There are competing crypto libraries out there that are faster and use a smaller RAM footprint and don't use dynamic memory allocation at all. Our memory allocation code is also kind of slow, and has a primitive and simplistic design of a linked list. These are very similar points to those Manuel was making to remove the feature in the first place - however - short of investing the time in rewriting the asymmetric functions, what we could do as a quick fix is to replace the existing memory code with a block allocation scheme - which should be much faster, speed up the asymmetric functions (in theory), avoid fragmentation, be more deterministic, and a better fit for embedded applications. That could then become the basis of the library for other projects too. I wouldn't mind contributing such a feature, as I had to write something very similar last week anyway. If I do it - will you accept it? Kind regards Simon On 09/04/2020, 12:07, "mbed-tls on behalf of Dan Handley via mbed-tls" <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org on behalf of mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote: Hi There has already been some discussion about a shared C standard library implementation, at least for TF-A and TF-M. So far there's been general agreement that this is a good idea but no actual commitment from anyone to make this happen, since each project is reasonably happy with what they've got. Regarding MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C, TF-A at least enables this so removing this from the codebase would be an issue there. Memory allocators are probably not the core expertise of other Trusted Firmware projects either but it needs to be if they're going to use them! I propose that we move this allocator into a new shared TrustedFirmware.org standard C library project and work with the other projects to ensure it has the correct initial maintainers. This will probably have to be driven by the maintainers of whichever project is most motivated to make this happen. It sounds like that could be Mbed TLS and this will need to be done before any separation of the PSA Crypto implementation. In the short term, as we move C stdlib functionality out of the other projects and into this new project, we will need to support multiple implementations of some functions. Eventually we should move towards a common implementation, and I agree we should look at what security-oriented implementations are already available. I also agree it would make sense for Mbed TLS to not use the toolchain-provided stdlib implementation by default, but only once it uses a default implementation it trusts. Regards Dan. > -----Original Message----- > From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > Ronald Cron via mbed-tls > Sent: 09 April 2020 08:47 > To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Subject: Re: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code > base > > Hi, I think this is related to the more general need for an implementation of > the C standard library for trusted firmware projects. As far as I know TF-A > and TF-M don't use the standard library provided by compilation toolchains. > The rationale is to have complete control over the trusted firmware code. > Currently they both have their own partial implementation of the parts of the > C standard library they need. > > This memory_buffer_alloc.c module in question here is another partial > implementation of the C standard library. Currently TF-A and TF-M don't > use/provide dynamic memory allocations but PSA-FF explicitly mentions that an > SPM implementation may support dynamic memory allocation. Thus it is possible > that TF-M at some point consider providing dynamic memory allocation support. > > All of this to say that a possible way forward may be to remove > memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base when there is a C standard library > implementation common to trustedfirmware.org projects (is there already a > security oriented open source implementation out there ?). > > In Mbed TLS, it would also make sense to me to, by default, not use C > standard libraries provided by compilation toolchains > (MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_NO_STD_FUNCTIONS defined by default). > > Thanks, Ronald. > > > -----Original Message----- > From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> On Behalf Of > Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard via mbed-tls > Sent: 08 April 2020 12:42 > To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > Cc: nd <nd(a)arm.com> > Subject: [mbed-tls] 3.0 plans: remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code > base > > Hi all, > > In this new installment of "let's discuss ideas for Mbed TLS 3.0" [1]: > should we remove memory_buffer_alloc.c from the code base? > > [1]: https://developer.trustedfirmware.org/w/mbed-tls/tech-plans-3.0/ > > Currently the crypto library includes a module called memory_buffer_alloc.c, > disabled in the default build (config.h option MBEDTLS_MEMORY_BUFFER_ALLOC_C), > which provides implementations of calloc() and free() based on a user- > provided buffer (which could be static or on the stack), suitable for use in > the rest of the crypto, X.509 and TLS libraries as replacements to the > standard functions. > > In addition to providing replacement calloc() and free(), the module also > offers some facilities for measurement and debugging. > > We're considering dropping this module and removing it from the code base > entirely for the following reasons: > > - Memory allocators are not our core area of expertise. > > - This allocator is pretty basic and has a large allocation overhead. For > example for ECC computations, the overhead can be as large as the actual > memory used. > > - Using this allocator also tends to slow things down, so we don't run many > tests with it enabled. > > - In the future when we split between PSA Crypto on one side and Mbed TLS and > X.509 on the other, it's unclear on which side this allocator should fall. > Which can be taken as a sign that it doesn't really belong here. > > On the other hand, we're hesitating for the following reasons: > > - We know from bug reports and questions that some people are using it. > > - Unlike other modules we'd like to drop, there isn't a strong security > incentive to dropping this allocator, it's merely a matter of how we spend > our maintenance resources. > > What do you think? Should we keep maintaining this allocator as part of Mbed > TLS? Should we drop it and focus on our core instead? If you're using this > allocator, why did you pick it over other alternatives? > > Regards, > Manuel. > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls > IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are > confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended > recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the > contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the > information in any medium. Thank you. > -- > mbed-tls mailing list > mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org > https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls IMPORTANT NOTICE: The contents of this email and any attachments are confidential and may also be privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately and do not disclose the contents to any other person, use it for any purpose, or store or copy the information in any medium. Thank you. -- mbed-tls mailing list mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls

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