I am using v16 of the mbedTLS library to setup DTLS server. However, I
observe that the handshake does not work well and there are several issues
starting with the cookie exchange. Do I necessarily have to update to the
latest version of mbedTLS? Are there known issues with DTLS server setup
using previous versions (as far as I could tell from the ChangeLog).
Thanks
Mehdi
Hi Gilles,
as you said: Git is public. As long as it is kept public there's no reason
to "duplicate details".
My 2 cents.
sincerely,
Frank
On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 09:41:26PM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote:
> Hello,
>
> The Mbed TLS team is soliciting feedback on a proposed change of our
> contributor acknowledgement policy.
>
> Background: our current policy is to acknowledge all contributors who
> are not Arm employees in the ChangeLog files. This is a tradition that
> dates back from when the version control history of Mbed TLS (then
> PolarSSL) was not public.
>
> Proposed change: the ChangeLog file will no longer mention who
> contributed a patch (“Contributed by …”). A patch will require a
> ChangeLog entry only if it makes a user-visible changes, regardless of
> who contributed it. We will still credit reporters in the ChangeLog
> file, at least for security issues.
>
> Rationale: the ChangeLog file had a dual purpose: informing users, and
> acknowledging contributors. It will now have the single purpose of
> informing users. There are better ways of acknowledging contributors
> nowadays: the Git history is public, and your contributions are visible
> from your GitHub profile. (Note that we don't squash commits, and
> attempt to preserve authorship as much as possible when we have to
> rebase a patch.) Furthermore, writing a good ChangeLog entry often turns
> out to require some back-and-forth, so lessening this requirement will
> make it easier to accept contributions and to merge them faster (this is
> in fact our primary motivation for the change).
>
> We are also thinking of creating an acknowledgement page out-of-tree. It
> isn't clear yet what its scope would be, but it would include
> acknowledging contributions in the form of reviews, which we wish to
> encourage. (Please stay tuned for future announcements and discussions
> regarding the Mbed TLS review process.)
>
> Question to potential contributors, or people who have participated in
> other open-source projects: do you think that there is any value in
> keeping acknowledgements in a file that is distributed with Mbed TLS? Is
> there any value in maintaining an exhaustive list of contributors in a
> form other than the Git history?
>
> Best regards,
>
> --
> Gilles Peskine
> Mbed TLS developer
>
> --
> mbed-tls mailing list
> mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls
--
Frank Bergmann, Pödinghauser Str. 5, D-32051 Herford, Tel. +49-5221-9249753
SAP Hybris & Linux LPIC-3, E-Mail tx2014(a)tuxad.de, USt-IdNr DE237314606
http://tdyn.de/freel -- Redirect to profile at freelancermap
http://www.gulp.de/freiberufler/2HNKY2YHW.html -- Profile at GULP
Hi Gilles,
when I ask in our team to review a PR I usually provide an estimation about
it. Of course a time base estimation and not an agile one in values of
complexity. ;-)
One could also provide an estimation about priority.
Maybe these tiny rules may help somewhat. At least it can provide a better
overview if you have tons of PRs.
sincerely,
Frank
On Sun, Sep 20, 2020 at 10:27:44PM +0000, Gilles Peskine via mbed-tls wrote:
> Hello,
>
> Historically, Mbed TLS has been maintained by Arm as an open-source
> project, accepting external contributions, but with with priorities and
> plans mostly driven only by Arm. Since earlier this year, Mbed TLS is an
> open governance project under the umbrella of TrustedFirmware, with the
> objective of making it a community led project, allowing community to
> contribute and collaborate on the design and development of the project.
> In practice, however, the project effectively still has some barriers of
> entry. We would like to lift these barriers.
>
> The Mbed TLS team at Arm have already identified some concrete actions,
> filed on the Mbed TLS epic board
> https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-10667107
> under “Facilitating community contributions”. A few more should be up
> soon as the result of some internal brainstorming.
>
> We've also identified some problem areas which we're tracking as
> separate topics.
>
> * Probably the biggest topic: review was and is a bottleneck. We are
> working to streamline the review process where possible, without
> lowering the quality bar, and to prioritize reviews better over new
> work. (Having personally often been on both sides of the coin, I can
> confirm that having a pull request sit around for years without getting
> reviews is frustrating, and so is seeing all these pull request and not
> having the time to review them all.) We would also like to enable,
> encourage and value reviews from people who are not project maintainers.
>
> * We will migrate the CI to a publicly available platform hosted by
> TrustedFirmware. However this platform will not be available until 2021.
>
> * We are working on a new documentation platform, where we'll transfer
> both the information available on the current website and information
> that is currently recorded in an Arm internal wiki.
>
> To all of you who have contributed to Mbed TLS, who have tried, or who
> are considering it, what difficulties have you encountered? What else
> can we do to make contributing easier?
>
> Best regards,
>
> --
> Gilles Peskine
> Mbed TLS developer
>
>
> --
> mbed-tls mailing list
> mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls
--
Frank Bergmann, Pödinghauser Str. 5, D-32051 Herford, Tel. +49-5221-9249753
SAP Hybris & Linux LPIC-3, E-Mail tx2014(a)tuxad.de, USt-IdNr DE237314606
http://tdyn.de/freel -- Redirect to profile at freelancermap
http://www.gulp.de/freiberufler/2HNKY2YHW.html -- Profile at GULP
Hello,
Historically, Mbed TLS has been maintained by Arm as an open-source
project, accepting external contributions, but with with priorities and
plans mostly driven only by Arm. Since earlier this year, Mbed TLS is an
open governance project under the umbrella of TrustedFirmware, with the
objective of making it a community led project, allowing community to
contribute and collaborate on the design and development of the project.
In practice, however, the project effectively still has some barriers of
entry. We would like to lift these barriers.
The Mbed TLS team at Arm have already identified some concrete actions,
filed on the Mbed TLS epic board
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-10667107
under “Facilitating community contributions”. A few more should be up
soon as the result of some internal brainstorming.
We've also identified some problem areas which we're tracking as
separate topics.
* Probably the biggest topic: review was and is a bottleneck. We are
working to streamline the review process where possible, without
lowering the quality bar, and to prioritize reviews better over new
work. (Having personally often been on both sides of the coin, I can
confirm that having a pull request sit around for years without getting
reviews is frustrating, and so is seeing all these pull request and not
having the time to review them all.) We would also like to enable,
encourage and value reviews from people who are not project maintainers.
* We will migrate the CI to a publicly available platform hosted by
TrustedFirmware. However this platform will not be available until 2021.
* We are working on a new documentation platform, where we'll transfer
both the information available on the current website and information
that is currently recorded in an Arm internal wiki.
To all of you who have contributed to Mbed TLS, who have tried, or who
are considering it, what difficulties have you encountered? What else
can we do to make contributing easier?
Best regards,
--
Gilles Peskine
Mbed TLS developer
Hello,
The Mbed TLS team is soliciting feedback on a proposed change of our
contributor acknowledgement policy.
Background: our current policy is to acknowledge all contributors who
are not Arm employees in the ChangeLog files. This is a tradition that
dates back from when the version control history of Mbed TLS (then
PolarSSL) was not public.
Proposed change: the ChangeLog file will no longer mention who
contributed a patch (“Contributed by …”). A patch will require a
ChangeLog entry only if it makes a user-visible changes, regardless of
who contributed it. We will still credit reporters in the ChangeLog
file, at least for security issues.
Rationale: the ChangeLog file had a dual purpose: informing users, and
acknowledging contributors. It will now have the single purpose of
informing users. There are better ways of acknowledging contributors
nowadays: the Git history is public, and your contributions are visible
from your GitHub profile. (Note that we don't squash commits, and
attempt to preserve authorship as much as possible when we have to
rebase a patch.) Furthermore, writing a good ChangeLog entry often turns
out to require some back-and-forth, so lessening this requirement will
make it easier to accept contributions and to merge them faster (this is
in fact our primary motivation for the change).
We are also thinking of creating an acknowledgement page out-of-tree. It
isn't clear yet what its scope would be, but it would include
acknowledging contributions in the form of reviews, which we wish to
encourage. (Please stay tuned for future announcements and discussions
regarding the Mbed TLS review process.)
Question to potential contributors, or people who have participated in
other open-source projects: do you think that there is any value in
keeping acknowledgements in a file that is distributed with Mbed TLS? Is
there any value in maintaining an exhaustive list of contributors in a
form other than the Git history?
Best regards,
--
Gilles Peskine
Mbed TLS developer
Good morning to all,
I am currently trying to perform RSA encryption, so I am using a file containing a public key (generated by OpenSSL) to do this.
So at the beginning I use the "mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile" function to read it, as you can see on the image below. Unfortunately, I find the following error : ERROR 3E00 : Read/write of file failed.
Do someone have an idea of why I have this error ? Or should I change my way to read this file ?
Thanks a lot, have a nice Weekend
[cid:image002.png@01D68839.7B058100]
Hi,
Unrelated comment from my side, adding on to Manuel's comment:
It appears that ST supplies a binary blob which does make use of their
hardware crypto accelerator.
https://www.st.com/en/embedded-software/x-cube-cryptolib.html
Cheers,
Manu
On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 1:21 PM Manuel Pegourie-Gonnard via mbed-tls
<mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> On those CPUs, the AES implementation in Mbed TLS is pure C, it doesn't use any hand-written assembly. The only platforms where it does so so far are x86-64 (to take advantage of the AES-NI extension if available), and some Via CPUs (x86) that have AES acceleration as well.
>
> Regards,
> Manuel.
> ________________________________
> From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Areeb Asad via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> Sent: 09 September 2020 08:32
> To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
> Subject: [mbed-tls] Query related to ARM - MbedTLS
>
> Hi,
>
> I hope you are doing well. I am using the mbedTLS AES library in my projects, part of my master thesis at Uppsala University.
>
> I would like to know whether the mbedTLS AES library uses any assemble specific code for operations? I am using this library on Cortex-M23 and Cortex M0+.
>
> Looking forward to hearing from you.
>
>
> Best regards,
> Hafiz Areeb Asad
> --
> mbed-tls mailing list
> mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org
> https://lists.trustedfirmware.org/mailman/listinfo/mbed-tls
Hi,
On those CPUs, the AES implementation in Mbed TLS is pure C, it doesn't use any hand-written assembly. The only platforms where it does so so far are x86-64 (to take advantage of the AES-NI extension if available), and some Via CPUs (x86) that have AES acceleration as well.
Regards,
Manuel.
________________________________
From: mbed-tls <mbed-tls-bounces(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org> on behalf of Areeb Asad via mbed-tls <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Sent: 09 September 2020 08:32
To: mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org <mbed-tls(a)lists.trustedfirmware.org>
Subject: [mbed-tls] Query related to ARM - MbedTLS
Hi,
I hope you are doing well. I am using the mbedTLS AES library in my projects, part of my master thesis at Uppsala University.
I would like to know whether the mbedTLS AES library uses any assemble specific code for operations? I am using this library on Cortex-M23 and Cortex M0+.
Looking forward to hearing from you.
Best regards,
Hafiz Areeb Asad
Hi,
I hope you are doing well. I am using the mbedTLS AES library in my
projects, part of my master thesis at Uppsala University.
I would like to know whether the mbedTLS AES library uses any assemble
specific code for operations? I am using this library on Cortex-M23 and
Cortex M0+.
Looking forward to hearing from you.
Best regards,
Hafiz Areeb Asad
Hello,
As you may be aware, there is work in progress to implement support for
hardware drivers in Mbed TLS when using the PSA API. These are direct
calls from the PSA frontend layer to driver code, without going through
mbedtls_xxx APIs and the ALT implementations. The specifications are the
psa-driver-*.md files in
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/tree/development/docs/proposed and
you can watch the work in progress in the “Unified driver interface: API
design and prototype” epic
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-8543266 .
When an algorithm is implemented in hardware, in most cases, it is
unnecessary to include a software implementation, and it should be
possible to exclude the software implementation from the build to keep
the code size down. Unfortunately the current Mbed TLS configuration
mechanism does not support this, because it does not distinguish “I want
AES” from “I want mbedtls_aes_xxx”. So we need new compile-time options
to convey “I want PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES in my application but I don't care
whether it's done in hardware or mbedtls_aes_xxx”.
We are going to implement a configuration mechanism to select which
cryptographic algorithms are included in the PSA interface in a build of
Mbed TLS. It will rely on #define statements, like the existing
config.h, but with different naming conventions for PSA. You can see the
specification proposal at https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/pull/3628 .
Feedback is welcome. We're likely to merge this pull request soon, but
even after it's merged I'll keep watching comments, or you can post
feedback on the mailing list, or raise an issue on GitHub if you have a
specific feature request.
A major difference between the current MBEDTLS_xxx_C configuration and
the new PSA_WANT_xxx configuration is that PSA_WANT_xxx is additive: if
PSA_WANT_xxx depends on some other feature, enabling PSA_WANT_xxx will
automatically enable that feature in most cases (the exception being
when there's more than one way to enable the dependent feature, e.g.
when a hash algorithm is needed but it doesn't matter which hash). This
is in contrast with the current strict mechanism where enabling
MBEDTLS_xxx_C is an error if it depends on some other feature that isn't
enabled. We haven't decided yet, but we're thinking of changing to an
additive mechanism for the whole Mbed TLS configuration in Mbed TLS 3.0.
If you want to watch the implementation work in progress, it will be
under the “Driver Interface: Removing unused code” epic
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/projects/2#column-9449707 .
Note that the #define-based mechanism is somewhat experimental and we
won't commit yet about its long-term stability in Mbed TLS. It is likely
to be complemented by a JSON-based mechanism in the future. This JSON
mechanism would be similar to the proposed mechanism for drivers and
would allow finer granularity (for example, RSA verification without RSA
signature). Arm is considering standardizing the (as yet non-existent)
JSON mechanism as a PSA specification.
Best regards,
--
Gilles Peskine
Mbed TLS developer (and PSA crypto architect)